DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE (Joint Ministerial Committee

of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund

On the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries)

INTERNATIONAL BANK

FOR

WORLD BANK

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CO

NSTRUCTION AND DEVELO

PME

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DC2007-0024

October 11, 2007

VOICE AND PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES IN DECISION MAKING AT THE WORLD BANK

OPTIONS PAPER

Attached for the October 21, 2007, Development Committee Meeting is a background report entitled “Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries in Decision Making at the World Bank Options Paper,” prepared by the staff of the World Bank.

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Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries In Decision Making at the World Bank

Options Paper Draft Report for the Fall 2007 DC Meeting

Introduction 1. The 2002 Monterrey Consensus “encouraged the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the Fund) to find pragmatic ways to continue to enhance participation of all developing countries and countries with economies in transition (DTC) in their decision making (Voice), and thereby to strengthen the international dialogue and the work of these institutions as they address the development needs and concerns of these countries”1.

2. Since 2003, the Executive Directors (EDs) and the Development Committee (DC) have discussed how to respond to this call in the belief that Voice is necessary to:

• Enhance mutual accountability. The notion of mutual accountability, which is now widely accepted in the development community, requires that there is genuine and better representation and participation of DTC in all aspects of decision-making in the institution.

• Enhance Bank legitimacy and credibility. Giving greater voice to DTC to

provide input into the strategic agenda of the Bank and to articulate views on the Bank’s activities would enhance the continued legitimacy and credibility of the Bank. The financial health and strength of the Bank should be borne in mind in this context.

• Enhance Bank effectiveness. Addressing this issue would intensify the

dialogue and improve understanding between the Bank and the borrowing countries and allow the Bank to take these countries’ perspectives more into account in its decisions. Overall, this would enhance the effectiveness of Bank programs: experience shows that reforms work best when they are wanted by the countries themselves.

3. Voice is a complex issue that involves many dimensions at different levels including at the country level, at the level of Bank staffing and that of the Executive Directors’ offices, and at the level of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) related to capital structure and voting rights. It is equally recognized that actions on one dimension cannot address all Voice concerns. These concerns include areas such as (a) enhanced attention to DTC ownership of the formulation of their development strategies, programs and projects; (b) reinforced capacity of DTC’s EDs so that they are better placed and fully equipped to use opportunities to present DTC views and also effectively advocate

1 See the Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, March 18-22, paragraph 63.

their interests at the Bank; and (c) changes in voting power to reflect the changed relative position of countries in the world economy and other factors (i.e “over-“ or “under-“ representation of countries in the Bank compared to their share of the world economy). The objective of Voice is to respond to the Monterrey call by addressing all these concerns.

4. Voice has been on the DC Agenda five times (Spring and Fall of 2003, Fall of 2004, Spring of 2005 and Spring of 2007). In that context, the Bank EDs have provided regular reports to the DC dealing with (i) structural issues relating to the voting rights and capital structure at the Bank , and (ii) capacity building measures at the country and EDs’ levels. In the Spring of 2003, the EDs took the decision to enhance capacity in EDs’ offices and recommended that further actions be considered. The DC noted these efforts at the 2003 Spring meeting and urged that additional steps be considered. Subsequent steps were adopted by the EDs and the DC has noted the significant progress made in capacity building at the country and EDs’ levels, including the original strengthening of EDs’ capacity. For instance, means of communications with their capitals have been improved, an analytical trust fund to provide Sub-Saharan EDs with independent technical research support has been established, and a multi-year secondment program for DTC officials at the Bank has completed its third year of implementation. It has been requested to conduct a systematic evaluation of all these capacity building measures as has been done for the secondment program by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG).2 However, there has been little or no progress on the structural issues due to a lack of political consensus concerning change in (i) IBRD voting structure; (ii) IBRD capital stock; (iii) IDA’s voting and capital structure; and (iv) composition of the Board of Executive Directors.

5. Upon review of the Options Paper on Voice and Representation at its April 2007 meeting, the DC noted in its Communiqué: “We welcomed the “Options Paper on Voice and Representation” setting out a comprehensive range of options for enhancing the voice of developing and transition countries in the Bank’s decision making framework, which we note is key to strengthening the credibility and legitimacy of the institution. We recognized that further consultations are necessary to reach a political consensus and expect the Bank to continue carrying out technical work to assist such consultations. We look forward to a report from the Bank by our next meeting”.

6. This paper responds to this request and provides a further evaluation of the options prepared for the Spring 2007, DC meeting. Each option is defined from the perspective of the members supporting it. The different factors that need to be taken into account in considering each option and its eventual adoption and implementation are then assessed as well as its potential for support from the Bank members based on the most recent discussions or consultations. Finally, the likely impact of each option is examined.

2 QAG noted the exceptional commitmemt of the Secondment Secretariat but recommended design and governance changes that it considers necessary for the program to meet its objectives and outcomes. Some of its recommendations were endorsed by the Board for implementation.

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The report then concludes by proposing a phased program and further steps or measures to be considered.

7. The key options included in the April 2007 DC Options Paper were as follows:

Non-Structural options:

• Higher representation of Staff from developing countries in the Bank’s senior management levels

• A communications component in Bank-financed projects • Board effectiveness • The selection of the President of the Bank • The Establishment of a Donors’ Trust Fund • Some aspects of the Board composition, including the length of EDs’

terms • IDA-related options (some of these options are structural but are put here

for convenience) Structural Options:

• Increase in Basic Votes • Selective Capital Increases, including for the allocation of 50% of the

Bank’s capital to DTC • Increase in Membership Shares • Special Majorities • Some aspects of the Board Composition • Some aspects of the length of EDs’ Terms

8. A brief summary of past deliberations on Voice is provided in Annex I.

Review of Options

I. Non-Structural Options

Higher Representation of DTC Nationals in Senior Management Positions

9. This is considered necessary to improve diversity in the Bank staff and to be responsive to the requests being made by DTC. In general, the Bank’s staffing policies are implemented within the framework of the Articles of Agreement’s (“the Articles”) requirements that “in appointing the officers and staff the President shall, subject to the paramount importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency and of technical competence, pay due regard to the importance of recruiting personnel on as wide a geographical basis as possible” [Article V, Section 5(d)].

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10. The issue of an appropriate diversity framework for the Bank has been discussed at the level of the Board Committees, with the last discussion taking place on January 10, 2007 by the Personnel Committee to review the report and recommendations of the “Inclusion and Diversity Task Force” established by management in 2005. Issues discussed include nationalities, monitoring and periodic reporting to the Board on diversity and inclusion, diversity in academic and educational backgrounds of staff, the scaling up of the Young Professional Program and inclusion of country offices in the diversity programs. It was agreed that additional efforts were needed in the form of action plans and that management would prepare a progress report to the Board on the issues raised.

11. Management has also paid due attention to diversity in appointments at the senior management levels in the last three fiscal years, with a significant number of DTC nationals being appointed to available positions at Director level and above including Vice-Presidents and Managing Directors. The new President has clearly stated his intention to engage in senior management appointments and get involved with appointments at different management levels to the extent feasible, and to learn more about the people, posts, and their Vice Presidential Units. In this context, he has said that he wants to ensure appropriate attention to diversity in appointments.

Communications Component

12. Many Bank members believe that the mandatory inclusion of a communications component in all Bank-financed projects would increase the outreach, the involvement, and thus the Voice of local communities, stakeholders and beneficiaries for these projects. They hold the view that such participation in the design and implementation evaluation of all Bank-funded projects through consultations and communications would enhance local ownership, help develop better appreciation of local realities and improve prospects for successful implementation. It would also improve the government’s accountability to its citizens on the management of economic development activities.

13. Many Bank-funded projects currently include a communications component handled by External Relations (EXT) at the request of the Country Director concerned. At a minimum, such a component includes an explanation of the project activities and, at a maximum, a fully designed component with clearly defined activities that are subsequently implemented. EXT staff work routinely with the Task Team Leader (TTL) to conduct a communications and a risk assessment and to design mitigation measures. Operations Policy & Country Services (OPCS) provides guidance on process and policy. The cost of a given component varies between $20,000 and $50,000.

14. Other Bank-funded projects include communications activities depending on the determination of their likely impact on the environment. For these projects and programs proposed for Bank financing, there is an Environmental Assessment (EA) process under the Bank’s Operational Policy 4.01 that requires extensive consultations with groups

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expected to be affected and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to take their views into account. More generally, whether a project has a communications component or falls under the provisions of Operational Policy 4.01, a project launch workshop or meeting is organized for every new project to introduce it to the agencies responsible for its implementation and to explain Bank rules and procedures. Project beneficiaries are encouraged to participate in the project launch.

15. It is proposed that, working with the regions and OPCS, EXT staff prepare a full review of experience with all the communications components included in Bank-funded projects over the last few years and make proposals for possible inclusion of such components in future projects on the basis of clearly defined criteria that could include (i) the size of the project, (ii) its expected impact on project beneficiaries, (iii) its impact on the environment, and (iv) the likely budgetary implications for the Bank and the project itself. The review of experience-to-date and specific proposals for the inclusion of a communications component in Bank-financed projects would be prepared as part of any papers on Voice for the Spring, 2008 DC meetings. It also has been suggested that the concept of “communications,” as conceived in the paper might be broadened to include additional considerations beyond Bank projects and programs, for instance, constituency relations with the Bank and access to the Bank’s flagship publications and policy reports by all countries including non-English speaking countries and small and fragile states.

Board Effectiveness

16. Many DTC representatives have indicated that an effective Board is a key element and one of the best ways to enhance DTC’s voice at the highest levels of decision making at the World Bank. They also agree that efforts to enhance Board effectiveness should aim to improve the strategic focus of the Board. On November 8, 2005, the Board approved recommendations on measures to improve Board effectiveness. This was the result of long and extensive consultations among EDs and with senior management on specific proposals to make Board decision-making processes more efficient. The improvements recommended are being implemented while further measures are under consideration. A first evaluation of the implementation of the Board effectiveness concluded that much progress has been made in improving Board efficiency. On the other hand, the results of a Board self-evaluation survey conducted in October 2006 suggested that more work is needed in strategic priority setting, the delineation of roles between senior management and the Board in strategy and policy making, the Board’s oversight function, and the follow-up on and evaluation of the implementation of the decision made by the Board.

17. Many of these questions will be addressed by the Board Committee on Governance and Executive Directors’ Administrative Matters (COGAM) and the working group on governance established by COGAM. The first report by this working group, focused on issues related to the recent events, will be discussed by COGAM and the Board before the 2007 Annual Meetings. A priority list of other governance issues to be addressed, including on Board effectiveness, is being prepared with a timetable for

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their consideration by the Board. In the meantime, the Board has approved a system designed to allow technical questions to be addressed outside of Board meetings, so that discussions during the meetings can focus on policy and strategy. The system is to be implemented over three months on a pilot basis starting in September 2007. More specifically, the system is designed to (i) focus Board discussions on policy and strategy, (ii) minimize the time and effort operations staff devote to bilateral briefings, and (iii) help reduce the number of duplicate questions from the EDs’ offices. The pilot results will be evaluated and a decision taken on further action.

Selection of the Heads of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI)

18. Many DTC representatives have indicated that DTC voice is constrained by the unwritten agreement that to date all the heads of the Bank and the Fund should originate from particular regions. This has led to the suggestion that the selection process for the heads of the BWI be changed so that DTC nationals can also be considered. In 2000, working groups were established at the Bank and the Fund to review the process for the selection of the President of the Bank and the Managing Director of the Fund, respectively. These two groups produced a joint Draft Report which sets out principles for the selection process, including transparency and accountability that are critical, subject to the need to protect the privacy of candidates. The EDs agreed that their endorsement of the draft report on April 21, 2001, did not constitute a formal approval of the draft and, indeed, the specific process recommended in the joint draft report has not been followed for the selection of the Managing Director or the President since then. The EDs need to consider the next steps they would like to take on this option.

Board Composition including the length of EDs’ terms

19. The Board has 24 chairs and thirteen of these currently are held by nationals of Part I countries. Of these, eight represent mixed constituencies. For two of these mixed constituency chairs, there is a rotation mechanism whereby a Part II country holds the chair at regular intervals. Finally, Part II chairs include two who represent more than 20 countries each and, for them, it has long been recognized that Chairs representing more that 20 countries have great difficulties in discharging their functions as EDs. While the circumstances of these chairs have somewhat improved with the appointment of several more Advisors and Senior Advisors as compared to other chairs, the issue of the Board composition has been taken up in the Voice deliberations. Possibilities that have been discussed include:

• establishment of additional chairs,

• possible agreement in principle on the maximum number of countries that a single office can represent (16 has been suggested),

• decision by countries from the two largest constituencies to join other constituencies,

• agreement by some members to give up their chair for the benefit of other countries or constituencies,

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• increase in the number of Alternate EDs as discussed at the Fund, and • extension of the terms of the EDs.

20. There has been no wide-spread support for an increase in the number of chairs so that the constituencies representing more than 20 countries each can elect additional chairs. One argument against additional chairs has been that they would negatively affect Board effectiveness and efficiency. There has been no support either for the reconfiguration of countries between constituencies. No serious suggestions have been made to have members from the two largest constituencies join mixed constituencies, as it is clear that such a suggestion would be met with strong resistance. However, the chairs and other members of existing mixed constituencies, without implying that their model should be adopted by other constituencies, have underlined the benefits they draw from such arrangements, including:

• Cross-fertilization: This allows for better mutual understanding of the workings

and problems of countries of each group. • Better framework for bilateral assistance: Close collaboration between the two

groups of countries usually leads to the provision of better informed, more focused and more effective bilateral assistance.

• Policy impact: The close association has a positive influence on the development assistance policies of the developed countries.

• Improved Voice: DTC Voice in the constituency is enhanced by the support provided by their developed constituency member or members.

• Improved representation: Spreading of the DTC voices more evenly and helping prevent “polarization” in discussions between borrower and creditor countries improves representation.

21. Members of multi-country constituencies have pointed out that some of the benefits of mixed-constituencies also accrue to them in general and that multi-country constituencies could help solve the problem of Board composition. No country or group of countries have yet expressed a willingness to give up a chair for the benefit of other countries. Remaining possibilities that could be explored for support to offices representing more than 20 countries include the allocation of additional Senior Advisors or Advisors and an increase in the number of Alternate EDs for such chairs, as contemplated by the Fund. An increase in the number of Alternate Executive Directors would require an amendment to the Articles. Further consultations need to be conducted with and among shareholders, and with the Fund on these possibilities. If this is a feasible option and garners the required support, it is proposed that a report on these consultations be prepared for the 2008 Spring meetings.

22. Regarding the length of EDs’ terms, concern has been expressed by some that the Voice and impact of EDs, especially those from developing countries, are impaired by the brevity of their appointment. It has therefore been suggested that mechanisms should be sought which have the effect of lengthening the typical term of EDs. The Articles provide for elections of EDs every two years, without limitation on the number of terms. Different constituencies have different arrangements for the length of such

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terms. A two-year term may be too short considering the number and complexity of the issues before the Board with which new EDs must quickly become familiar. While formal change in the length of terms would require an amendment of the Articles, members of any constituency can reach an informal agreement, as some already have, that EDs would serve multiple terms or extend the term from two to three years. It is proposed that the constituencies which face the problem of high ED turnover and experience its consequences should hold intra-constituency consultations with a view to developing appropriate proposals.

23. Depending on the results of the consultations on additional support to chairs representing more than 20 countries as outlined in paragraph 21 above, detailed proposals would be prepared on how to implement the measures considered most likely to be adopted, including an evaluation of their budgetary impact since many chairs have repeatedly underlined that factors that need to be taken into account in the consideration of any measure should include its likely impact on the budget. More specifically, several chairs have indicated that to the maximum extent possible, any changes should be budget-neutral.

IDA-Related Options

Full Payment by DTC of their subscriptions to IDA to increase their voting power

24. DTC could take up and pay for available IDA subscriptions in order to underscore their commitment to a greater participation in decision making in IDA. The Bank and IDA have separate voting and capital structures. Voting power in IDA has two components: membership votes, which are allocated equally to all members, and subscription votes, which vary with the amount each member has subscribed.3 Through successive IDA replenishments, the Board of Governors has allocated votes on account of subscriptions, on the basis of three fundamental principles: (i) the subscription votes of each Part I country should correspond to its share of total cumulative Part I resources contributed to IDA; (ii) the relative voting power of the Part II countries as a group should be maintained by conferring subscription votes on Part II members at a nominal cost; and (iii) membership votes should be increased to preserve the voting share of the smaller countries.

25. In principle, this system was designed to protect the voting power of the developing countries in IDA, and to avoid the problem the Bank faces in maintaining the proportion of basic votes to total votes. At present, however, there is a significant discrepancy between votes allocated and actual voting rights, because not all Part II 3 IDA Article VI, Section 3(a). Membership votes and subscription votes are allocated to members to take up the subscriptions authorized by the Board of Governors in IDA replenishments. Membership votes were originally 500 votes per member, and have since increased through successive replenishments to a total possible 30,600 membership votes (for each member who has subscribed to all allocations made).

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members have subscribed to the full amount allocated to them.4 The Part I block holds about 59 percent of the votes, the Part II bloc about 41 percent. However, if allocated subscriptions were taken up, the Part I block would hold about 52 percent of the votes and the Part II block about 48 percent. Table 5 provides a statement of IDA voting power, subscriptions and contributions as of June 30, 2007. Table 5a provides details on unsubscribed and unpaid subscriptions as of June 30, 2007.

26. Since the allocated voting powers of Part I and Part II members are relatively balanced, there may be no need for adjustments to the current formula for the allocation of IDA shares. A mass mailing effort by the Bank starting in 2005 to encourage Part II members to subscribe fully resulted in a limited response. In this connection, 19 of the 45 African countries contacted have subscribed to IDA Replenishments. All, except five of these 19, have paid for their shares and the corresponding votes have been allocated as of June 30, 2007. Of the 79 non-African and non-IDA donor developing countries that were encouraged to take up their full subscription, twenty-eight have fully paid and their votes have been allocated as of June 30, 2007. It is proposed that this effort be continued.

27. It has been suggested that a donor-financed trust fund be established to help the poorest countries pay for their IDA subscriptions. The trust fund proposal and other IDA matters have raised a number of issues that include: (i) the level of commitment to ownership, (ii) whether available funds could be better used for financing programs and projects instead of subscriptions, and (iii) the nature, relevance, and decision making process of the IDA Board. Payment of the Part II allocated subscriptions by Part I countries would call into question the commitment to IDA of the former. The second point on the best use of funds has been raised by some of the potential donors to the proposed Trust Fund.

IDA Board

28. Regarding the IDA Board, it should be noted that, under IDA’s Articles5, IDA’s Board is composed of Bank appointed and elected EDs serving ex-officio. Moreover, elected EDs cast as a unit the IDA votes of all members who elected them. This in effect means that, as long as the block-voting provision is unchanged, the Voice of Part II countries in terms of decision making through voting at the Board would not improve even if the countries take up all their subscribed shares.

4 Currently, for Part II members subscription votes are allocated at the rate of one vote for each $25 subscribed; membership votes are acquired without additional charge when subscriptions are made. 5 IDA Article VI, Section 4(b) and Section 4 (c).: The Executive Directors of the Association shall be composed ex officio of each Executive Director of the Bank who shall have been (i) appointed by a member of the Bank which is also a member of the Association, or (ii) elected in an election in which the votes of at least one member of the Bank which is also a member of the Association shall have counted toward his election (Article 6 Section 4(b)). Each Director who is an appointed Executive Director of the Bank shall be entitled to cast the number of votes which the member by which he was appointed is entitled to cast in the Association. Each Director who is an elected Executive Director of the Bank shall be entitled to cast the number of votes which the member or members of the Association whose votes counted toward his election in the Bank are entitled to cast in the Association. All the votes which a Director is entitled to cast shall be cast as a unit. (Article 6, Section 4(c))

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29. The main question is how to make voting by the IDA Board reflect the members’ actual voting rights given the requirement for block-voting. The following possibilities have been considered as a way to address this issue:

• Establishment of a separately composed IDA Board • Amendment to IDA’s Articles to remove block voting • Elimination of mixed constituencies

30. Consideration of a separately composed IDA Board has not received support because many believe this could lead to a substantial increase in costs and further complicate the internal coordination of the World Bank Group institutions. Removal of block voting through an amendment to the Articles has not received broad support either. Nevertheless, it is proposed that a technical review of the modalities and implications of an amendment to remove block voting be conducted and submitted to the Board before the Spring 2008 Meetings.

Respective Roles of the IDA Board and the IDA Deputies

31. A different question that has arisen concerns the IDA replenishment process. There is a perception that, in discharging their responsibilities during the replenishment process, the IDA Deputies have become involved in IDA policy making, which is the responsibility of the EDs. Consequently, calls have been made to review the role of IDA Deputies vis-à-vis the role of the Board.

32. A description of IDA’s replenishment procedures is provided in Annex II. IDA’s Articles provide for periodic reviews of the adequacy of IDA’s resources and, if desirable, the authorization of general increases in member subscriptions. Final approval of IDA replenishments is within the powers reserved to the Board of Governors, and requires approval by a two-thirds majority of IDA’s total voting power.6 The substance of the replenishment discussions and recommendations is recorded in a Deputies’ report. Management submits this report to the EDs for review, discussion and approval, including those recommendations that may have an impact on IDA’s policies and general operations. Upon approval of the Deputies’ report by the EDs, it is transmitted to IDA’s Board of Governors, with a recommendation for adoption of the replenishment Resolution usually by a vote without a meeting.

33. Papers and materials that the Bank’s management prepares to facilitate replenishment discussions among IDA Deputies and Borrower Representatives for each replenishment are sent to the IDA Deputies and Borrower Representatives as well to EDs

6 Article III, Section 1(d) of the Articles of Agreement. In addition, the power to authorize additional

subscriptions and to determine the related terms and conditions may only be exercised by the Board of Governors and is non-delegable (Article VI, Section 2(c) of IDA’s Articles of Agreement).

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ahead of the scheduled meetings. After each replenishment meeting, Bank management reports back to the Executive Directors of IDA on the discussions held.

34. Borrowers’ representatives have joined the replenishment process since IDA13 when six regional borrower representatives selected by the relevant EDs associated with the borrowing country constituencies first attended the discussions. This representation has been expanded to nine representatives complemented by three alternate representatives with their participation funded by the Bank. Borrower representation in IDA replenishment meetings is also enhanced through a formal consultation process with regional opinion leaders that provides an opportunity for dialogue between donors and recipients and the incorporation of the recipients’ views in the replenishment discussions. In recent replenishments, such consultation meetings have taken place in Vietnam (July 2004 for IDA14) and Mozambique (June 2007 for IDA15).

35. Overall, the IDA replenishment is a complex but balanced process which has evolved over many replenishments. It has also become more inclusive with the participation of borrower representatives and the consultation process with regional opinion leaders. One issue that has emerged is that although the Board reviews and approves the conclusions and recommendations of the IDA Deputies and Borrower Representatives as set out in the Deputies’ report, it would be difficult in practice for the Board not to approve the Deputies’ report, hence the perception of an expanded role for IDA Deputies. However, only IDA EDs are empowered to take decisions regarding IDA’s lending policies. They determine these policies in a number of ways, in addition to their approval of the IDA Deputies’ report: (i) they decide on the financial terms and conditions of IDA credits, (ii) they control IDA lending through their decisions on Bank/IDA sectoral policies, and (iii) they approve the allocation of Bank/IDA administrative resources through the budget process review and they consider individual projects proposed for IDA financing. However, experience also shows that there have been no changes made to the Deputies’ report by the Board before it is sent to the Board of Governors for approval.

36. For IDA15 where replenishment discussions are at an advanced stage, it appears advisable to preserve the stability of the current replenishment arrangements which are tried, tested and agreed among all of the many parties to this complex negotiation process. Opening issues on the relationship between the IDA Board and the IDA Deputies at this particular time may have unintended consequences. Once the IDA15 replenishment is agreed and discussions are completed by the fourth quarter of FY08, there may be a window to start consultations on the matter.

37. Another issue that may emerge for IDA16 is the increasing number of representatives attending the replenishment meetings, and in particular the number of speakers at the replenishment table itself where there are now more than 40 donors plus nine borrower representatives. It is becoming increasingly challenging to get all parties to voice their opinion on the relevant topics over the two to three day period of a replenishment meeting.

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II. Structural Options

Increase in Basic Votes

38. Basic Votes were introduced at the founding of the Bank and the Fund to provide increased weight for smaller countries. While not counted as part of the Bank’s capital base, each country’s 250 votes are added to its shares to produce its total voting power in the institution. Votes now represent 2.8% of total votes, down from 10.78% at the founding of the Bank. This dilution has led to a decrease of the total votes of the developing countries to 40% of total votes.

39. The degree of the impact of an increase in basic votes on developing countries’ Voice in decision making would depend on the magnitude of the increase considered. Many members have stressed that consideration for an increase in basic votes should be linked to the reform underway at the Fund, with some recommending that no action be taken until the results of the Fund reform are known. In the context of the Fund reform, Fund management was requested to submit to its Board by the 2007 Annual Meetings and no later than the 2008 Annual Meetings proposals for amendments to the Articles of Agreement for at least a doubling of the Basic Votes of each member and, at the minimum, protection of the low income countries as a group. They were also requested to submit a mechanism to safeguard the proportion of basic votes in total voting power going forward. Proposals for the amendment of the Articles for at least a doubling of the basic votes have been submitted to the Fund Board. A summary of the Fund’s reform program is provided in Annex III.

40. It should be underlined that the process at the Fund is still underway and that, although there is no legal requirement for the Bank to respond to the Fund reform, the outcome of that reform is likely to influence the course of action at the Bank for the following reasons: (i) Fund quotas have been used as a proxy for world economic position in Bank shareholding; (ii) the Fund reform reflects some degree of political consensus among key shareholders that could break the logjam on these issues at the Bank; and (iii) the reform at the Fund will lead to renewed expectations by developing countries for the Bank to take action on these issues. In addition, the Bank needs to take into account considerations that include some that are different from those in play at the Fund. For instance, the Bank needs to give special consideration to the representation of the poorest countries and the role of IDA.

41. For the Bank, as shown in Table 4, Scenario 1, doubling the basic votes would increase the votes of developing countries to 41.18%. The impact of the this doubling on each constituency is shown in Table 4a. A tripling of the basic votes would increase DTC votes to 42.25% (Table 4a Scenario 2). It is estimated that increasing the level of basic votes to their original level of about 11% of total votes would require 128,800 additional basic votes from the current level 46,250, a nearly three-fold increase.

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42. Some EDs have expressed the view that a key objective of Voice should be to allocate 50% of the Bank’s voting power to DTC. If that objective were to be achieved solely through a selective increase in basic votes only to DTC, this would require 322, 717 additional basic votes (see Tables 3 and 3a). Although it can be argued that a selective allocation of the basic votes only to DTC would achieve the purpose of increasing their voting powers, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the basic votes to allocate them to certain members only. Not only would an amendment to the Articles be needed to make it possible to use the basic votes selectively, such an amendment would need to provide criteria for or specify, among other things, which members would be allocated additional basic votes.7 It is not clear that political consensus can be gathered around such a proposal.

43. Action for any increase in basic votes requires an amendment to the Articles of Agreement. A number of key donors have indicated that an increase in basic votes should be linked to a parallel action at Fund. This suggests that, at a minimum, a doubling of the Basic Votes would have a favorable reaction from the Bank’s shareholders. It is considered unlikely that support could be obtained for an increase higher than the one being proposed at the Fund. It is therefore recommended that the legal and analytical work be carried out by the 2008 Spring Meetings to support proposals and facilitate consultations for an amendment of the Articles to provide for at least a doubling of the basic votes.

Selective Capital Increases

44. Justification. A Selective Capital Increase (SCI) is another approach that could be considered to maintain or increase the Voice of DTC. While General Capital Increases (GCI) have been used to augment the Bank’s callable capital, which is considered necessary to enhance the Bank’s borrowing capacity and to ensure lending for growing operations, the SCI have been used for the most part to accommodate selective increases parallel with the Fund’s selective quota increases resulting from general quota reviews. The SCI has also been used to effect ad hoc adjustments in consideration of members’ support to the Bank, their contributions to development assistance as well as to address serious disparities between members’ relative positions in the Bank and in the world economy. For a GCI, a prerequisite is whether there is a need to augment the Bank’s capital to enhance its borrowing and thus lending capacity. This is not an issue at the present time. In previous cases, this has been determined by showing that the current and projected level of Bank’s activities justifies an increase in capital resources. In the past, the approach has been to calculate the Sustainable Level of Lending (SLL), the hypothetical level of annual commitments that could be sustained indefinitely without the need for additional capital.

7 Article V Section 3(a) of the Articles- Voting: Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each share of stock held.

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45. Issues. A proposal for an SCI raises the question of whether increasing the Bank’s capital is the most efficient way to realign specific countries’ positions in the capital of the Bank. From this perspective, unless the Bank is expected to need additional capital, some may see the SCI as an inefficient instrument for adjusting relative shares among members, especially when the Bank has sufficient capital to meet the foreseeable borrowing needs of its clients.

46. Another important concern for an SCI would be to determine how to allocate shares among members. The principle that a Bank member’s share in the capital stock of the Bank should reflect its position in the world economy was the basis for the discussions on a suitable formula for the allocation of the shares of the Bank’s capital among the participants at the Bretton Woods conference and has been reaffirmed many times since. This principle has been implemented through the use of IMF quotas, which have formed the basis for calculation of the allocation of shares to new members and for the allocation of shares to current members8. However, not all allocations of shares have been made on the basis of parallelism with the Fund because there have been (i) special IBRD share allocations not linked to the Fund quotas, (ii) certain members have exercised their right to maintain their share of the Bank’s capital when there have been increases in the authorized capital of the Bank (their “pre-emptive rights”), (iii) releases of shares by some members, and (iv) the allocation of 250 membership shares in the Bank in 1979 to protect the voting power of small members.

47. Process. One approach would be to use the SCI to mirror the first round of ad hoc Fund quota increases as well as the proposed second round of ad hoc quota increases, following a revision of the quota formula. In this connection, the current shareholdings of the four countries which have benefited from the Fund’s first ad hoc quota increases are summarized below:

Status of the four countries with Ad Hoc Quota Increases*

Current Bank Ratio Additional

Shares Projected New Bank

Shareholdings IBRD/CQ(1) In IBRD Shareholdings % %

China 2.85 0.55 36932 4.96 Mexico 1.2 0.62 11517 1.84 Korea 1.01 0.40 23625 2.39 Turkey 0.53 0.71 3325 0.71

Total 5.59 75399 9.9

Source: World Bank (1) Calculated Quotas (CQ) are based on the IMF paper “Quotas-Updated Calculations”, August 4, 2006 8 At the Bretton Woods Conference, efforts were made to devise a Bank-specific formula, based on national income and trade data, but the effort was abandoned in view of the prolonged arguments over Fund quotas, and Bank subscriptions became modified Fund quotas.

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48. In the past, unsubscribed shares have been used for allocation to members. There are currently 1,581,724 authorized IBRD capital shares, of which 1,572,661 have been subscribed, leaving a balance of 9,063 shares. An allocation of shares consistent with the increases that could be proposed for these four countries would require 66,336 shares. Consideration would need to be given as to how the additional shares required would be obtained and whether an SCI would be a viable option for this purpose.

49. For countries other than those shown above, the determination of the adjustments that might be needed would be based, as in the past, on the ratio of their Bank shareholdings over their Fund Calculated Quotas. A country is considered significantly under-represented when this ratio, as applied to it, is less that 85%. A ratio of more than 115% means that a country is significantly over-represented. As Tables 1 and 1a show, using this yardstick, only about 20 developing countries would be eligible to receive additional chares. Details by constituency show the position of individual countries and constituencies using this yardstick.

50. Consideration for additional SCIs relates not only to the four countries referred to above but to other countries as well. A clearer picture will emerge with the outcome of the on-going quota formula revision at the Fund where the situation is still evolving. Tables 1 and 1a, 2 and 2a provide estimates using four of the many assumptions that have been made at the Fund, namely a GDP/PPP blend, a GDP/Population Blend, a Financial Openness Blend and a linear formula. It should be underlined that the Fund figures used here are for illustrative purposes only and in no way imply that they are officially sanctioned by the Fund. The results show that the industrialized countries would be allocated 197,376 additional shares compared to 87,662 to DTC (Table 1) using the existing Quota formula as the basis for adjustment of IBRD shares. This would amount to about 285,000 additional shares that would need to be authorized, pointing again to the need for a mechanism to obtain additional shares to be allocated. Tables 2 and 2a provide basically the same information as in Tables 1 and 1a but with an estimate of the value of additional shares.

51. An SCI could therefore result only in an increase of the shares of a select group of countries that excludes the poorest or smallest ones which would see their relative positions proportionately reduced. In addition, unlike basic votes, obtaining the SCI shares creates a financial cost to participants (and a contribution, albeit small, to the capital base of the Bank), although if the previous SCI model is followed the paid-in portion would be just six percent of the price of the share ($120,635), of which ten percent would be in US dollars and the remainder in national currency. A contingent liability is however created by the callable portion of subscriptions. In this connection, it should be noted that some Part II countries may be unable to bear the resulting financial burden.

52. An important aspect of the SCI is that it does require that each Bank member agree to this approach, as no country can be forced to reduce its shareholding percentage, which would obviously be required if some shareholders need to increase their holdings.

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The members not targeted by a proposed adjustment need to agree not to exercise their preemptive rights. Another consideration that has been mentioned is that any capital increase should not result in an increase in the shares of one DTC group at the expense of another DTC group.

53. As mentioned in paragraph 44. above, other considerations that have been used in discussions for the allocation of shares are members’ support to the Bank including their financial support and access to their financial markets, and in particular their contribution to IDA, contribution to Official Development Assistance (ODA), and the general issue of the proportion of shares, and hence of voting rights, held by developed and developing countries. In the case of contributions to IDA and ODA, important decisions or actions taken from 1979 onwards are summarized below.

54. Brief Review of Past SCIs. In 1979, in the context of the General Capital Increase (GCI), Japan, France and Yugoslavia all received “Special Increases in Certain Subscriptions to the Capital Stock of the Bank”. The GCI took two and a half years from the first management memorandum to the adoption of the resolution to be submitted to the Governors. For Japan, its government requested the increase in order to have its share of the Bank’s capital, then representing 5.9% of the total shares of all IDA contributors, become more comparable to its share of contributions to IDA5, 10.3% of total IDA contributions. Its share in the Bank’s capital was raised to 7.5%. The Government of France requested and obtained an increase of 1,900 shares to reflect its role as a major source of ODA among OECD countries. In the case of Yugoslavia, its request, and its approval, were based on the fact that as an original member of the Fund and Bank, (i) its original subscription was below its IMF quota share, at its own request, and this was reflected in its subscription to the Bank’s capital; (ii) it had subscribed to the full amount of increases since its initial subscription; (iii) it had released the full 9% of its subscriptions for use by the Bank; and (iv) its economy had considerably improved.

55. As a result of these increases, the Board asked management to prepare a review of criteria applicable to share allocations. Papers were submitted to the Board in 19809 but no consensus could be reached and no formal Board meeting was held on these issues. Another review of share allocation criteria also failed to result in agreement on such criteria10.

56. In 1987, in the context of IDA8 negotiations, Executive Directors recommended to the Board of Governors that it act on the requests of certain members, namely the governments of Japan, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands and Korea, to increase their subscription to IBRD capital in a manner that would take account of their position in the

9 Criteria for Selective Capital Increases, R80-191 dated July 16, 1980 and R80-326 dated November 18, 1980.

10 Ad Hoc Committee on Criteria for Allocation of Shares of Bank Capital – Progress Report, R90-207 dated October 23, 1990, the Shiratori Committee.

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world economy, and their strong and growing support for the Bank Group in various forms, including co-financing and access to their capital markets, and their contribution to development assistance, in this case their willingness to support IDA8. As a result of these adjustments, Japan became the second largest shareholder in the Bank.

57. In the context of IDA11 negotiations, the Board considered proposed increases in the subscription of Japan and Korea based fundamentally on the significant changes in their economic position, while the timing of the proposed increases was related to IDA negotiations.

58. In 1998, an SCI was approved after two years of deliberations. It resulted in five countries being able to increase their IBRD shareholdings to reflect more accurately their improved economic circumstances. On that occasion, all member countries that were 15 percent or more below their appropriate level of shareholding (based on the ratio of their share of IBRD shareholding to either their share of Fund Calculated Quotas or GNP) were eligible to participate, if they were also prepared to demonstrate their commitment to the Bank Group by increasing their contributions to IDA. In this connection, proposals have been made for inclusion of criteria around the contribution to overall ODA, including the provision of trust funds. Out of 25 eligible countries, five ultimately participated (Brazil, Denmark, Korea, Spain and Turkey), requiring an increase of about 23,000 shares or 1.49 percent of total shares at that time.

59. Future Considerations. While recognizing the need to adequately reflect the evolving position of members in the world economy and their contribution not only to IDA but also to overall ODA in arriving at a formula for the allocation of IBRD shares, it has also been suggested to consider factors related to the demand for Bank resources or the potential need for its assistance. From this perspective, it has been proposed that consideration of the criteria for the allocation of IBRD shares include poverty numbers, e.g. the proportion of the population living on less than one or two dollars per day, and the quality of infrastructure in member countries because it can help gauge the potential need for assistance from the Bank.

60. Linking the allocations of shares to IDA or overall ODA contributions would have the effect of further eroding overall DTC shareholdings at the Bank because most of them do not contribute to IDA and those which do are not key players. They are recipients, not contributors, of IDA funds. The objective of increasing overall DTC shares would therefore not be achieved. For this reason, it has been suggested that IDA and ODA contributions be linked to Part I countries’ shares because this would benefit DTC by giving incentives for higher financial contributions to development.

61. Considerations of the criteria for the allocation of IBRD shares will require extensive consultations among shareholders in order to agree on a mutually acceptable framework. This was the case in past SCI decisions as explained above. In the case of factors related to IDA and overall ODA contributions, one approach used in the past was

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the comparison of Part I or OECD countries’ IBRD shareholdings to their shares of IDA or overall ODA contributions. In that context, Table 6 provides a comparison between IBRD total votes and IDA total votes for all members, while Table 6a provides the same data only for Part I members. Finally, Table 7 gives historical ODA contribution data over the period 1950-2006, Table 7a provides ODA contributions over the past five full years, while Table 7b gives a comparison between relative IBRD votes and ODA contributions for OECD countries using preliminary 2006 ODA figures.

62. In conclusion, an SCI has many features that may not facilitate the objectives of the Voice deliberations, namely to increase the Voice of DTC in decision making. In addition, as long as there is no agreement on a quota formula at the Fund, it is difficult to determine the basis or assumptions for determining the allocation of shares. Finally, there may be no need to increase the Bank’s already healthy capital base. However, when the time comes to take a decision on SCI, it will be important to consider it within the framework of the objective agreed and the measures that are needed to increase DTC shares including the basic votes regardless of the order in which decisions on SCI and basic votes are taken.

Membership Shares

63. Another mechanism that can be considered to improve the position of DTC in decision making is the allocation of “membership” shares. They were used for the first and only time for the 1979 GCI to help reduce the erosion of the aggregate voting power of member developing countries as a result of almost a doubling of the Bank’s capital. Membership shares have the same impact on voting as basic votes if all members subscribe to them. Instead of issuing basic votes, which would have required an amendment to the Articles, it was decided to make a special allocation of 250 “membership shares” to each member or 33,500 in total, in addition to the pro-rata allocation. These membership shares were structured as a kind of synthetic increase in basic votes, so that the shares had no paid-in portion and were entirely callable, and would not count towards the Bank’s lending limits. This may be another option to be considered if shareholders wish to address the erosion of the developing countries’ share of basic votes in total votes noted above. The 1979 membership share allocation could be repeated or increased.

64. The impact of an increase in membership shares would be similar to the case of the basic votes described in paragraphs 42 and 43 above. However, the main differences with the basic votes scenario would be as follows:

• Subscription of an additional 250 shares by each member would entail an

additional contingent financial liability of roughly $30 million or a proportionate amount depending on the number of shares to be issued. This is because these shares would be only callable capital with no paid in portion. This would still be an additional financial burden for developing countries with no immediate visible

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pay off. In 1979, the Membership Shares were entirely callable. If however there is a paid in provision, membership shares would also constitute an additional immediate financial burden for the DTC.

• As has happened in the past, some developing countries might not take advantage

of the additional shares.

• As it would be available to all members, it would not address the issue of reflecting the relative weight of members in the world economy taking into account their improved economic performance.

• It would need to be considered whether the gain of roughly one to three percent in

additional shareholding percentage for borrowers – particularly for the poorest members – would be worth the potential financial burden.

• No amendment would be required to the Articles of Agreement but, an approval

by Governors with a 75% majority of total voting power would be necessary. 65. If membership shares alone were to be used to achieve the objective of allocating 50% of the Bank’s capital stock to DTC as advocated by a number of countries, the discussion on the basic votes in paragraphs 42 and 43 apply here as well. The option of the use of membership shares should be discussed when basic votes are being considered.

Special Majorities

66. Many Bank members have requested that consideration be given to the introduction of special majorities. Generally, as explained in paragraph 68 below, the double majority provisions for the Bank require affirmative votes from a specified number of members as well as a specified percentage of voting power without reference to a class of members. The objective of the recent request would be to increase the number of countries whose agreements are needed for major decisions and to ensure substantial support from DTC for specific decisions. This can only be accomplished through an amendment to the Articles.

67. Such an amendment could introduce special majority votes for additional decisions or introduce additional double majority requirements that specifically include separate majorities for developing country members for proposals to be approved. A paper commissioned by the German Ministry of Cooperation proposes a two-year pilot for a double majority system during which specific decisions on “operational matters”, defined as projects and programs, would be subject to a special double majority and would require approval by a majority of votes on the one hand and a majority of DTC votes on the other hand. The paper proposes that, after an evaluation of the pilot phase and assuming that it is found satisfactory in achieving the desired objectives, the

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approach might be finalized with an amendment to the Articles.11 However, the pilot phase itself cannot be undertaken without an amendment to the Articles.

68. Under the Articles, decisions are made by a simple majority unless otherwise specified. The Articles currently specify two types of special majorities: super majorities required for decisions by the Governors and the EDs for such decisions as capital increases (75% majority of total voting power) and an increase in the number of elected EDs (80% majority of total voting power); and double majority decisions such as amendments to the Articles of Agreement (approval by three-fifths of the members having 85% of the total voting power). The Board’s Rules of Procedure provide that voting may be utilized as a basis or decisions of the Board in accordance with the Articles’ provisions on majorities. The introduction of special majorities as proposed at least in the report cited raises a number of issues or questions noted below. It is proposed to develop proposals on how they can be addressed by the 2008 Spring Meetings, assuming fundamentally that the Articles can be amended to allow for the adoption and implementation of the pilot proposed:

• Double or special majorities by member (Part I and Part II) and voting power would require a legal definition of Part I and Part II, as there is none in the Articles. Adding double-majority decisions to increase the number of members’ agreement for specific decisions without restrictions to Part I/Part II would not require such a definition.

• Mixed constituency EDs can only cast one vote as a unit, as per the Articles.12 It would therefore not be possible to account for the votes of one group of countries represented in a mixed constituency office because a split vote is not possible.

• It would be necessary to define the kinds of decisions that would be classified as subject to a special double majority.

69. Some aspects of the options of Board Composition and the length of EDs’ terms which are of a structural nature have been dealt with in paragraphs 21 and 23 above.

Conclusions

70. This review of options confirms again the complexity of the issues and the need for careful preparation and consultations among shareholders before an agreement can be reached on specific measures or package of measures, most specifically on the structural

11 “Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in the World Bank”, German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, July 2004, pp.16-18. 12 Article V Section 4(g) provides: “Each appointed director shall be entitled to cast the number of votes allotted under Section 3 of this Article to the member appointing him. Each elected director shall be entitled to cast the number of votes which counted toward his election. All the votes which a director is entitled to cast shall be cast as a unit.”

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options concerning changes in voting power. Suggestions have been made to consider more structured consultations among shareholders and/or other stakeholders to ensure that there is an adequate understanding of the issues.

71. The following program is proposed in two phases which reflect the need to take into account on-going developments at the Fund, the Bank’s own specific features and needs, most notably IDA and the focus on poverty reduction, the need for consensus and staff workload considerations. The first phase would therefore include measures or technical work on the basic votes to prepare the ground so as not lag too much behind developments at the Fund, higher representation of DTC nationals in senior management positions, the communications component, Board effectiveness, Board composition, IDA questions except the question of IDA Board and deputies because of the need to wait for the completion of IDA 15 negotiations and special majorities.

72. The second phase would include Selective Capital Increase which depends on the outcome of the quota formula revision at the Fund, the review of the role of the IDA Board and the IDA Deputies and the selection of the President which has less urgency now. The two phases are summarized below with corresponding references to paragraphs in the paper. A summary matrix is provided at the end.

73. While work is being done on this program, Executive Directors need to discuss the consultations proposals that have been made. Specific points that they need to consider include:

• The objectives of such consultations. • The main issues to be covered during the consultations. • The expected outcome of the consultations. • The costs and financing of the consultations. • The audience to be targeted by the consultations. • The respective roles of the staff and Board members in the consultations. • The timetable of the consultations.

First Phase * Increase in Basic Votes

Undertake legal and analytical work to support proposals and facilitate consultations, including on an amendment to the Articles, for a doubling of the Basic Votes (paragraph 43). Membership shares need to be considered when such proposals are prepared and discussed (paragraph 65). Timeline: By the 2008 Spring Meetings. Responsibility: Corporate Secretariat, Legal Department

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* Higher Representation of DTC Nationals in Senior Management Positions

This question is being addressed in the context of the implementation of the recommendations of the “Inclusion and Diversity Task Force” as amended to reflect the suggestions made by the Personnel Committee in January 2007. Periodic are planned every six months from January 2007 (paragraph 10).

* Communications Component Preparation of a full review of experience with all the communications

components included in Bank-funded projects over the last few years and proposals for possible inclusion of such a component in most future projects on the basis of clearly defined criteria that could include (i) the size of the project; (ii) the component’s expected impact on project beneficiaries; (iii) the component’s impact on the environment; and (iv) the likely budgetary implications for the Bank and the project itself. (paragraph 15)

Timeline for the preparation of the review and proposals: By Spring 2008 Responsibility: Management (EXT) * Board Effectiveness

Evaluation of measures taken and preparation of periodic reports on the implementation of adopted and to be adopted Board effectiveness measures to COGAM. (paragraph 16) Timeline: Quarterly reporting Responsibility: Coordination by the Corporate Secretariat * Board Composition

Explore possibility for the addition of Senior Advisors or Advisors to large-

constituency offices through consultations among shareholders and with the Fund. (paragraph 21)

Timeline: Prepare report with proposals by Spring 2008 Responsibility: Management (Corporate Secretariat)

Prepare proposals including on amendment of the Articles, to the Board for an

increase in the number of Alternate EDs, as contemplated by the Fund. Review feasibility of addition of Senior Advisors and Advisors. (paragraph 21)

Timeline: By Spring 2008 Responsibility: Corporate Secretariat and Legal Department

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The constituencies which face the problem of high ED turnover and experience its consequences to hold intra-constituency consultations and report the results obtained (paragraph 23) Timeline: Spring 2008 Responsibility: Concerned Constituencies * Full Payment by DTC of their subscriptions to IDA to increase their voting

power

Continue to encourage DTC to subscribe fully to their IDA allocations (paragraph 26) Timeline: As frequently as feasible Responsibility: Management (Financial Resource Mobilization, Legal Department and Corporate Secretariat)

* IDA Board Prepare technical review of modality and implications of an amendment to the

Articles to remove block-voting. (Paragraph 30) Timeline: 2008 Spring Meetings Responsibility: (Corporate Secretariat, Legal Department) * Special Majorities

Prepare technical review of proposals for the introduction of special majorities

(paragraph 68). Timeline: By Spring 2008. Responsibility: Management (Legal, Secretariat) Evaluation of impact of capacity building measures Conduct a review of the impact of the capacity building measures adopted and implemented so far (paragraph 4) Timeline: By Spring 2008. Responsibility: To be determined

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Second Phase * Selective Capital Increases

Study mechanism to obtain additional shares to be allocated (paragraphs 48, 50).

Timeline: By Spring 2008 Responsibility: Management (FINCF: Corporate Finance, Corporate Secretariat, Legal) * IDA Board and IDA Deputies

Review relationships between IDA Board and IDA Deputies (paragraph 36). Timeline: By First Quarter FY 2009 Responsibility: Management (FRM) * Selection of the President of the Bank

EDs need to consider what further steps are needed to adopt a different process for the selection of the President.

Timeline: Undetermined

Responsibility: Executive Directors

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Summary Matrix - Voice: Proposed Work Program

Option Next Step Timeline ResponsibilityFirst Phase Increase in Basic Votes

Undertake legal and analytical work needed to support proposals and facilitate consultations, including on an amendment to the Articles for a doubling of the Basic Votes. The option of membership shares would be considered at the same time.

By the 2008 Spring Meetings

Legal and Secretariat

Higher Representation of DTC Nationals in Senior Management Positions

This question is being addressed in the context of the implementation of the recommendations of the “Inclusion and Diversity Task Force” as amended to reflect the suggestions made by the Personnel Committee in January 2007.

Periodic reports are planned every six months from January 2007

Management (HR)

Communications Component

Preparation of a full review of experience with all the communications components included in Bank-funded projects over the last few years and proposals for possible inclusion of such a component in most future projects on the basis of clearly defined criteria that could include (i) the size of the project, (ii) the component’s expected impact on project beneficiaries, (iii) the component’s impact on the environment, and (iv) the likely budgetary implications for the Bank and the project itself.

By Spring 2008

Management (EXT)

Board Effectiveness

Evaluation of measures taken and preparation of periodic reports on the implementation of adopted and to be adopted Board effectiveness measures to COGAM.

Quarterly reporting

Coordination by the Corporate Secretariat

Board Composition

Explore possibility for the addition of Senior Advisors or Advisors to large-constituency offices through consultations among shareholders and with the Fund.

Prepare report with proposals by Spring 2008

Management (Corporate Secretariat)

Board Composition (cont’d)

Prepare proposals including on amendment of the Articles, to the Board for an increase in the number of Alternate EDs, as contemplated by the Fund. Review feasibility of addition of Senior Advisors and Advisors.

By Spring 2008

Corporate Secretariat and Legal Department

Board Composition (cont’d)

The constituencies which face the problem of high ED turnover and experience its consequences to hold intra-constituency consultations and report the results obtained.

Spring 2008 Concerned Constituencies

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Full Payment by DTCs of their subscriptions to IDA to increase their voting power

Continue to encourage DTCs to subscribe fully to their IDA allocations. Prepare technical review of modality and implications of an amendment to the Articles to remove block-voting.

As frequently as feasible

Management (Financial Resource Mobilization, Legal Department and Corporate Secretariat)

Special Majorities

Prepare technical review of proposals for the introduction of special majorities.

By Spring 2008

Management (Corporate Secretariat, Legal)

Capacity building measures

Conduct an evaluation of capacity building measures taken and implemented so far

By Spring 2008

To be determined

Second Phase Selective Capital Increases

Study mechanism to obtain additional shares to be allocated.

By Spring 2008

Management (Corporate Finance, Corporate Secretariat, Legal)

IDA Board and IDA Deputies

Review relationships between IDA Board and IDA Deputies

By First Quarter FY 2009

Management (FRM)

Selection of the President of the Bank

Consideration of further steps to change the process.

Undetermined EDs

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Annex I Past Deliberations on Voice

Voice Deliberations by the Executive Directors and the Development Committee

1. Voice has been on the DC agenda five times (Spring and Fall of 2003, Fall of 2004, Spring of 2005 and Spring 2007). In that context, the Bank and Fund EDs have provided regular reports to the DC dealing with (i) structural issues relating to the voting rights and capital structure at the Bank and Fund, and (ii) capacity building measures at the country and at EDs’ levels. In the Spring of 2003, the EDs took the decision to enhance capacity in EDs’ offices and recommended that further actions be considered. The DC noted these efforts at the 2003 Spring meeting and urged that additional steps be considered. Subsequent steps were adopted by the EDs and the DC has noted the significant progress made in capacity building at the country and EDs’ levels, including the original strengthening of EDs’ capacity. For instance, means of communications with their capitals have been improved, an analytical trust fund to provide sub-Saharan EDs with independent technical research support has been established, and a multi-year secondment program for DTC officials at the Bank is in its second year of implementation.

2. EDs with the largest constituencies have, by and large, concluded that actions taken so far are useful and ought to be pursued. They note for instance that communications with their capitals have improved. A mid-term evaluation of the Secondment Program by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) concluded that the program has been effectively implemented but needed to be restructured if it is to meet its objectives. Many of its conclusions were not shared by COGAM members and non-members or by the program Secretariat which coordinates the implementation of the program.

3. Despite the recurring appearance of Voice on the DC agenda, substantial debate on structural issues took place only in the fall of 2003 in Dubai. The limited debate on Voice and the overall lack of progress, except on capacity building, are due to the lack of political consensus on structural issues covering four major areas: (a) IBRD’s voting structure; (b) change in IBRD capital stock; (c) IDA’s voting and capital structure; and (d) the composition of the Board of Executive Directors.

4. The DC discussions have generally expressed the need for a political consensus on the structural issues. They have also recommended that an agreement be reached on a road map on procedures and next steps and suggested that priority be given to those options that showed potential for broad support. The suggestions most frequently mentioned both by DC members and by EDs include:

• An increase in Basic Votes in order to avoid further dilution in the shareholdings of the African countries.

• The need to consider an increase in the number of chairs for constituencies of more than 20 countries as is the case for the two African Chairs.

• The need for more diversity at the senior Staff level. • The need for more representation of aid-receiving countries in IDA negotiations

and to encourage developing countries to take up their IDA subscriptions. • The need to have a comprehensive approach taking into account the IDA context. • Whether or not to wait for quota reform at the Fund before undertaking anything

at the Bank. 5. Following the April, 2007 DC meeting, the DC Communiqué stated that: “We welcomed the “Options Paper on Voice and Representation”, setting out a comprehensive range of options for enhancing the voice of developing and transition countries in the Bank’s decision making framework, which we note is key to strengthening the credibility and legitimacy of the institution. We recognized that further consultations are necessary to reach a political consensus and expect the Bank to continue carrying out technical work to assist such consultations. We look forward to a report from the Bank by our next meeting”

6. The “Options Paper” given in Appendix was prepared for the 2007 Spring Meetings. It provides a comprehensive review of the options that the Bank has considered, taking into account the views expressed at consecutive DC meetings, Board discussions and during various consultations held with the EDs to obtain their views and those of their capitals over the last three years. In order to facilitate discussions towards an appropriate package to be formulated by the EDs for the consideration of the DC, these options were grouped in relative terms of the legal and procedural constraints associated with them. This grouping however does not necessarily reflect the degree of difficulty associated with the suggested changes, since that will depend on the difficulty of achieving consensus more than on the legal procedures for approving the change. The four categories of options that were considered are summarized below.

7. (i) Options that are within the competence of Bank Management and the Executive Directors:

• Higher representation of Staff from developing countries in the Bank’s senior management levels.

• A communications component in Bank-financed projects. • Board effectiveness. • The selection of the President of the Bank.

8. (ii) Options that are within the competence of Governors on behalf of their countries:

• The Establishment of a Donors’ Trust Fund.

• IDA Votes. • Some aspects of Board composition. • The length of EDs’ terms.

9. (iii) Options that require the approval of the Board of Governors but no amendment to the Articles:

• Selective Capital Increases. • Increase in Membership Shares. • Some aspects of the Board Composition. • The allocation of 50% of the Bank’s capital to DTC.

10. (iv) Options that require an amendment to the Articles of Agreement:

• Increase in Basic Votes • Special Majorities. • Some aspects of the length of EDs’ Terms.

11. The discussions that led to and resulted in the April, 2007 Communiqué concluded that it would be helpful to prepare a phased program that could include the following:

• A first phase that would include the adoption of an initial package of options which can generate a consensus and help build momentum. More specifically, the first phase would include:

i. Management appointment of DTC nationals in senior management

positions. ii. Inclusion of a communications component in Bank-financed projects

iii. A clear and transparent process for the selection of the President which provides an opportunity for the selection of the best possible candidate.

iv. Further steps to continue to improve Board effectiveness. v. Increase the staffing resources for large constituencies (after review by

COGAM). vi. Full payment by DTC of their their subscriptions to IDA to increase

their voting power. It should be noted that if all DTC subscriptions are paid, DTC would have 48% of the voting shares as per existing policy.

• A second phase that would address the more challenging structural options in

order to help achieve a political consensus as soon as possible. Taking into account the consensus already taking shape at the Fund, elements of the second phase could include:

i. An increase in the Basic Votes

ii. A Selective Capital Increase (SCI) iii. Measures to support the constituencies with a large number of

countries. iv. Board composition including (a) the size of the Board, (b) the length

of EDs’ terms and (c) additional staffing resources for offices with large constituencies.

v. The introduction of special majorities. 12. The proposals arrived at also recommended that for options that would entail negotiations and decisions parallel to those at the Fund, most specifically those requiring an amendment of the Articles of Agreement, the Bank work in tandem with the Fund so that necessary governmental and parliamentary approvals for both Bank and Fund amendments could be sought at the same time.

13. Finally, it was suggested that on options like Board composition, discussions could start on new constituency arrangements, the size of the Board and the length of EDs’ terms. In addition, the issue of further strengthening the capacity of some EDs’ offices with additional Alternate Executive Directors can be considered as is being done in the Fund. The rest of this report provides a review of the feasibility of the options in the two phases, including an indication of the timetable for the finalization and implementation of each phase. A brief review of the situation at the Fund and its relationship to the Bank is also provided

Annex II Voice Fall 2007

IDA Replenishment Procedures

1. IDA’s resources are normally replenished by donors every three years. The most recent regular replenishment, IDA14, covers the period from July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2008. Subsequent to the conclusion of the IDA14 discussions, IDA’s donors discussed the proposal by G8 countries to provide additional debt relief through total cancellation of eligible debt stocks of HIPC countries. The initiative, now referred to as the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), was approved by IDA’s Executive Directors on March 28, 2006; financing arrangements to increase IDA’s resources to cover MDRI-related costs were adopted by IDA’s Board of Governors on April 21, 2006. The replenishment discussions for IDA15 started in March 2007 in Paris with 41 donor countries participating. Current IDA donor countries include nearly all Part I members as well as many Part II members, including a number of middle-income countries.

2. IDA replenishment negotiations are carried out in the run-up to a new replenishment of IDA’s resources. IDA’s Articles of Agreement provide for periodic reviews of the adequacy of its resources and, if desirable, the authorization of general increases in member subscriptions. Final approval of IDA replenishments is within the powers reserved to the Board of Governors, and requires approval by a two-thirds majority of IDA’s total voting power.1

3. Discussions for a new IDA replenishment typically begin some 15 months prior to the end of the current replenishment period. The process entails both informal bilateral contacts between Bank management and donors, as well as formal meetings of IDA donor country representatives (called IDA Deputies) and representatives of IDA recipient countries (called Borrower Representatives). There are typically four to five formal replenishment meetings before the discussions conclude with an agreement to replenish IDA’s resources.

4. To facilitate deliberations among IDA Deputies and Borrower Representatives, Bank management prepares discussion papers and other relevant background materials for each replenishment meeting. The IDA Deputies and Borrower Representatives receive these discussion papers ahead of the scheduled meetings. The discussion papers are also provided to IDA’s Executive Directors. After each replenishment meeting, Bank management reports back to the Executive Directors of IDA on the discussions held.

5. A report is prepared (the Deputies’ Report) which sets out the replenishment arrangements. The Report sets out the size of the replenishment and the relative burden

1 Article III, Section 1(d) of the Articles of Agreement. In addition, the power to authorize additional

subscriptions and to determine the related terms and conditions may only be exercised by the Board of Governors and is non-delegable (Article VI, Section 2(c) of IDA’s Articles of Agreement).

2

sharing among the contributing donors, and it discusses the effectiveness date of the replenishment, the advance commitment mechanisms as well as payment procedures for donors. The Report may also elaborate on other matters which are not directly related to the financial terms and conditions of the replenishment. In IDA14, for example, the Report discussed IDA’s strategy for promoting economic growth; IDA’s role in promoting private sector development; issues of debt sustainability and eligibility criteria for IDA grants; IDA’s results measurement system; as well as IDA’s approach towards working together with recipients and donors at the country level. The replenishment discussions conclude with an agreed, final text of the Deputies’ Report.

6. While the IDA Deputies are not a formal organ within IDA’s governance structure, their role has evolved over time. From the inception of IDA, replenishment discussions were an exercise primarily conducted between Bank Management and donor countries. Donor representatives were referred to as “Part I Representatives”, “delegates” and then as “Deputies.”2

7. Policy making and IDA’s general operations fall within the responsibility of IDA’s Executive Directors under its Articles of Agreement and under the broad delegation of authority given to them by IDA’s Board of Governors. The substance of the replenishment discussions is recorded in the Deputies’ Report. Management submits this Report to the Executive Directors for their review, discussion and approval. Thus, recommendations of the IDA Deputies are subject to approval by the Executive Directors, including recommendations that may have an impact on IDA’s policies and general operations. Upon approval of the Report by the Executive Directors, the Report is transmitted to IDA’s Board of Governors with a recommendation for adoption of the replenishment Resolution. The decision of the Board of Governors on the replenishment is usually made by a mail vote.3

8. Borrower Representatives have joined the replenishment discussions since IDA13. At that time, Deputies decided to open up the replenishment process to IDA recipient countries by inviting six senior borrower representatives (“primary representatives”) from different regions to take part in the meetings (one each from LAC, ECA, South Asia, and East Asia, and two representatives from AFR). Borrower Representatives are selected by the relevant Executive Directors associated with the borrowing country constituencies.

2 Refer to “The IDA Deputies – An Historical Perspective”, November 2001, prepared for the IDA13

replenishment discussions. The origin of this term was likely in IDA2 where it was proposed that a meeting be convened of high level representatives of Part I countries, preferably Cabinet Ministers or their Deputies.

3 The Board of Governors is asked to accept the Report as approved by the Executive Directors, adopt its

conclusions and recommendations, and approve a general increase in member subscriptions in accordance with the terms set out in the replenishment Resolution.

3

9. Based on the experience of IDA13 and following a discussion with Executive Directors representing IDA recipient countries, a decision was made in February 2003 to broaden and strengthen borrower representation in the replenishment process further, by adding one more primary Borrower Representative (from MNA) and by introducing a system of “alternate Borrower Representatives” to facilitate consistent participation in meetings in case a primary representative is unavailable. There are currently three alternate Borrower Representatives. It was also agreed that Executive Directors' offices of borrower constituencies should assume leadership for providing back-up support for representatives, including the provision of background information and associated briefings. 10. In IDA14, the system of borrower representation was expanded to better reflect the level of IDA's engagement in various geographic regions as well as its focus on poverty reduction. Two (primary) Borrower Representatives were added (from South Asia and East Asia), bringing the total number of primary representatives to nine, complemented by three alternate representatives. 11. Following IDA Deputies' recommendation at the IDA13 Mid-Term Review, Bank Management made budget funds available to Borrower Representatives to facilitate their consultations with regional constituencies and with their respective Executive Directors’ offices in Washington. Management has also made available budget funds to cover travel-related costs of Borrower Representatives attending IDA replenishment meetings. 12. Borrower representation in IDA replenishment meetings is also ensured through a formal consultation process with regional opinion leaders. For the first time in IDA13, one of the replenishment meetings was held in an IDA recipient country (Ethiopia). This meeting included a one-day dialogue between IDA Deputies and representatives from African governments, civil society and academia, organized and chaired by the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The objective is to make the replenishment meetings more representative by providing an opportunity for dialogue between donors and recipients and incorporating the views of the recipients into the replenishment discussions. This practice has been continued in subsequent replenishments with regional opinion leader consultations held in Vietnam in July 2004 (for IDA14) and in Mozambique in June 2007 (for IDA15). FRM July 12, 2007

Annex III Draft Voice Fall 2007

Summary of the Fund Reform Program

The Fund’s Board of Governors approved a two-phase reform program just before the start of the 2006 Annual Meetings in Singapore.

• The first stage, completed in Singapore, allowed for an overall ad hoc increase in IMF quotas of 1.8%, to the four most clearly under-represented members—China, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey. These increases are being implemented as follows:

Status of Ad Hoc Quota Increases

Quota Shares

Quota Shares

Shares at

Before

Increase After

Increase The

Bank % % %

China 2.98 3.719 2.85 Mexico 1.21 1.449 1.2 Korea 0.764 1.346 1.01 Turkey 0.451 0.548 0.53

Total 5.405 7.062 5.59

Sub-

Sahara Africa 4.41 3.99 3.16

Source: IMF and World Bank

• Governors also agreed upon a second stage of IMF governance reform to be carried out over two years, and requested the IMF Board:

(i) to reach agreement on a new quota formula that would better capture countries’ weights in the global economy. The resolution indicates that consideration should be given to placing significantly higher weight on GDP, while ensuring that other variables, in particular openness of economies also play a role.

(ii) to propose an amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to provide for at least a doubling of the basic votes that each member possesses, so as to protect the voting power of low-income countries as a group. The resolution of the Board of Governors envisaged that the amendment should also safeguard the proportion of basic votes in total voting power.

(iii) to recommend to Governors a second round of quota increases, based on the new quota formula. Governors agreed that these increases will become effective only when the basic vote increase has entered into force.

• In each instance, Governors set early and latest dates for completion. The early completion date set by Governors for all three elements of the proposals is the Annual Meetings 2007 The latest time for completion comprises the Spring Meetings in 2008 for the new quota formula; and the 2008 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF, both for the proposal to amend the Articles of Agreement to provide for an increase in basic votes and for the recommendation to Governors in regard to further quota increases.

• The Resolution also calls on the Executive Board to act expeditiously to increase the staffing resources available to those Executive Directors elected by a large number of members whose workload is particularly heavy. The Board is also asked to consider the merits of an amendment of the Articles that would enable each Executive Director elected by a large number of members to appoint more than one Alternate Executive Director.

• Substantial progress has been made since Singapore, with two formal discussions by the Fund's Executive Board on the new formula and the modalities for second round increases since the Spring Meetings in April 2007. The Fund's Executive Board will provide a formal report on this progress to the Fund's Board of Governors on progress at the 2007 Annual Meetings.

Introduction to the Tables Tables 1 and 1a The figures illustrate the ratio of the percentage of existing shareholdings of the Bank over the percentage of existing of calculated quota shares of the IMF by members, under the five formulae and other economic indicators. Where a figure is greater than one (> 1), a country holds a higher percentage of shares at the Bank than quota shares at the Fund. Conversely, where a figure is less than one (< 1), the reverse is true. Traditionally, the threshold for determining over-representation has been 1.15, while the threshold for determining under-representation has been 0.85. The dots ( , ) in the table serve as indicators: a black dot ( ) signifies where a country’s ratio is greater than 1.15 (i.e., over-represented); a white dot ( ) signifies where a country’s ratio is less than 0.85 (i.e., under-represented). Where there is no dot, the country’s ratio is within the band of 0.85-1.15 and, according to the formula (e), appropriately represented. Background information on the five formulae/economic indicators used in these tables (i.e., “Existing Five Formulas,” “GDP Blend,” “Population Blend,” “Openness Blend,” and “Linear Formula”) can be found in the footnotes of the tables. Table 2a This table illustrates the estimate of shares needed to align IBRD shares with the IMF’s calculated quota (i.e., to raise the country’s ratio to a level within the 0.85-1.15 band noted above), based on the ratios in Table 1a. Table 3a This table demonstrates estimates for selectively allocating additional Basic Votes to DTCs only, in order for them to reach 50% of the Bank’s capital. Table 4a – Scenarios 1 and 2 These tables calculate the impact of doubling (Scenario 1) and tripling (Scenario 2) Basic Votes on member countries. The member countries are arranged by Executive Director’s office.

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Table 3: Estimate for Selectively Allocatlng Addltlonal Baric Votes to DTC Only for them to reach 50% of the Bank Capltal on Members

Current Votlng Power # Of n of Baric Total 36 of

Shares Share8 Votes Votes Total Votei

DeVelODed IHlah Income1 AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BAHAMAS, THE BAHRAIN BELGIUM BRUNEI DARUSSALAM CANADA CYPRUS DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE ICELAND IRELAND ISRAEL ITALY JAPAN KOREA, REPUBLIC OF KUWAIT LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NORWAY PORTUGAL QATAR SAN MARINO SINGAPORE SLOVENIA SPAIN SWEDEN SWITZERLAND

Adjusted Voting Power Add'l Total %of

Voter to make LDC countries

Reach 50% Voter Total Votes

24,464 11,063 1,071 1,103

28,983 2,373

44,795 1,461

13,451 8.560

69,397 72,399

1.684 1.258 5,271 4,750

44,795 127,000 15,817 13,280 1,652

35,503 7,236 9,982 5,460 1,096

595 320

1,261 27,997 14,974 26.606

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 2,365

1.55% 250 0.70% 250 0.07% 250 0.07% 250 1.84% 250 0.15% 250 2.85% 250 0.09% 250 0.85% 250 0.54% 250 4.41% 250 4.60% 250 0.11% 250 0.08% 250 0.34% 250 0.30% 250 2.85% 250 8.07% 250 1.01% 250 0.84% 250 0.10% 250 2.26% 250 0.46% 250 0.63% 250 0.35% 250 0.07% 250 0.04% 250 0.02% 250 0.08% 250 1.76% 250 0.95% 250 1.69% 250 0.15% 250

24,714 11,313 1,321 1,353

29,233 2,623

45,045 1,711

13,701 8,810

69,647 72,649

1,934 1,508 5,521 5,000

45,045 127,250 16,067 13,530 1,902

35,753 7,466

10,232 5,710 1,346

845 570

1,511 28,247 15,224 26.856

1.53% 0.70% 0.08% 0.08% 1 .BO% 0.16% 2.78% 0.11% 0.85% 0.54% 4.30% 4.49% 0.12% 0.09% 0.34% 0.31% 2.78% 7.86% 0.99% 0.84% 0.12% 2.21% 0.46% 0.63% 0.35% 0.08% 0.05% 0.04% 0.09% 1.74% 0.94% 1.66%

24,714 11,313 1,321 1,353

29,233 2,623

45,045 1.71 1

13,701 8,810

69,647 72,649

1,934 1,508 5,521 5,000

45,045 127,250 16,067 13,530 1,902

35,753 7,486

10,232 5,710 1,346

845 570

1,511 28,247 15,224 26.856

2,635 0.1 6% I I 2,635

1.27% 0.58% 0.07% 0.07% 1.51% 0.14% 2.32% 0.09% 0.71% 0.45% 3.59% 3.74% 0.10% 0.08% 0.26% 0.26% 2.32% 6.55% 0.83% 0.70% 0.10% 1.84% 0.39% 0.53% 0.29% 0 07% 0.04% 0.03% 0.08% 1.45% 0.78% 1.38% 0.14% 3.59% 250 69,647 69,647

250 265,219 1":;/1 265,219 13 65% UNITED KINGDOM 69,397 441% UNITED STATES 264 969 16 84% Countnes 962.408 61 17% 8.750 971,158 5996% 971,158 50 00%

DeVelODlna [Low and Middle Income)

ALBANIA ALGERIA ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ARGENTINA ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN BARBADOS BELARUS BELIZE BOLIVIA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BOTSWANA BRAZIL BULGARIA CAMEROON CHILE CHINA COLOMBIA CONGO. REPUBLIC OF COSTA RlCA COTE DIVOIRE CROATIA CZECH REPUBLIC DOMINICA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ECUADOR EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR ESTONIA FIJI GABON GEORGIA GHANA GRENADA GUATEMALA GUYANA HONDURAS HUNGARY INDIA INDONESIA IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

830 9,252

520 17,911 1,139 1,646

948 3,323

586 1,785

549 615

33,287 5,215 1,527 6,931

44,799 6,352

927 233

2,516 2,293 6.308

504 2,092 2,771 7.108

141 923 987 987

1,584 1,525

531 2,001 1,056

641 8.050

44,795 14,981 23,686 2,608

0.05% 0.59% 0.03% 1.14% 0.07% 0.10% 0.06% 0.21% 0.04% 0.11% 0.03% 0.04% 2.12% 0.33% 0.10% 0.44% 2.65% 0.40% 0.06% 0.01% 0.16% 0 15% 0 40% 0.03% 0.13% 0.18% 0.45% 001% 0.06% 0 06% 0.06% 0.10% 0.10% 0.03% 0.1 3% 0.07% 0.04% 0.51% 2.85% 0.95% 151% 0.18%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

1,080 9,502

770 18,161 1,389 1,896 1.198 3,573

836 2,035

799 865

33,537 5,465 1,777 7,181

45,049 6,602 1,177

483 2,766 2,543 6,558

754 2,342 3,021 7,358

391 1,173 1,237 1,237 1,834 1,775

781 2,251 1,308

891 8.300

45,045 15,231 23,936 3,058

0.07% 0.59% 0.05% 1.12% 0.09% 0.12% 0.07% 0.22% 0.05% 0.13% 0.05% 0.05% 2.07% 0.34% 0.11% 0.44% 2.78% 0.41% 0.07% 0.03% 0.17% 0.16% 0.40% 0.05% 0.14% 0.19% 0.45% 0.02% 0.07% 0.08% 0.08% 0.11% 0.11% 0.05% 0.14% 0.08% 0.06% 0.51% 2.78% 0.94% 1.48% 0.19%

2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151

3,231 11,653 2,921

20,312 3,540 4,047 3,349 5,724 2,987 4,186 2,950 3,016

35,688 7,616 3,928 9,332

47,200 8,753 3,328 2,634 4,917 4,694 8,709 2,905 4,493 5,172 9,509 2,542 3,324 3,388 3,388 3,985 3,926 2,932 4,402 3,459 3,042

10,451 47,196 17,382 26,087 5,209

0.17% 0.60% 0.15% 1.05% 0.18% 0.21% 0.17% 0.29% 0.15% 0.22% 0.15% 0.16% 1.84% 0.39% 0.20% 0.48% 2.43% 0.45% 0.17% 0.14% 0.25% 0.24% 0.45% 0.15% 0.23% 0.27% 0.49% 0.13% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.21% 0.20% 0.15% 0.23% 0.18% 0.16% 0.54% 2.43% 0.89% 1.34% 0.27%

Additional llablllty

f@ t 120,6351 Share

259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769

Table 3 /Page 1 of 3

Table 3: Estimate for Selectively Allocatlng Additional Baric Vote8 to DTC Only for them to reach 60% of the Bank Capital on Memben

# Of n of Bask Total % of

JAMAICA JORDAN KAZAKHSTAN KENYA KYRGYZ REPUBLIC LATVIA LEBANON LIBYA LITHUANIA MACEDONIA, FYR OF MALAYSIA MALTA MARSHALL ISLANDS MAURITIUS MEXICO MICRONESIA, FED. STATES OF MOLDOVA MONGOLIA

Add'l Total %of Votes to make

MONTENEGRO MOROCCO NAMIBIA NICARAGUA NIGERIA OMAN PAKISTAN PAIAU PANAMA PAPUA NEW GUINEA PARAGUAY PERU PHILIPPINES

Shares Shares Votes Votes Total Vote8

2,578 0.16% 250 2.828 0.17% 1,388 0.09% 250 1,638 0.10% 2,985 0.19% 250 3,235 0.20% 2,461 0.16% 250 2,711 0.17% 1,107 0.07% 250 1,357 0.08% 1,384 0.09% 250 1,634 0.10%

340 0 02% 250 590 0.04% 7,840 0.50% 250 8.090 0.50% 1,507 0.10% 250 1,757 0.11%

427 0.03% 250 677 0.04% 8,244 0.52% 250 8,494 0.52% 1,074 0.07% 250 1,324 0.08%

469 0.03% 250 719 0.04% 1,242 0.08% 250 1,492 0.09%

18,804 1.20% 250 19,054 1,18% 479 0.03% 250 729 0.05%

1,368 0.09% 250 1,618 0.10% 466 0.03% 250 716 0.04% 688 0.04% 250 938 0.06%

4,973 0.32% 250 5,223 0.32% 1,523 0.10% 250 1,773 0.11%

608 0.04% 250 858 0.05% 12,655 0.80% 250 12,905 0.80%

0.10% 250 0.11% 0.59% 250 0.59% 0.00% 250 0.02% 0.02% 250 0.04% 0.08% 250 0.10% 0.08% 250 0.09% 0.34% 250 0.34% 0.43% 250 0.44% 0.69% 250 0.69% 0.18% 250 0.18% 0.25% 250 0.26% 2.85% 250 2.78% 2.85% 250 2.78% 0.02% 250 0.03% 0.20% 250 0.21% 0.86% 250 0.85% 0.24% 250 0.25% 0.02% 250 0.03% 0 04% 250 0.05% 0 02% 250 0.03% 0.03% 250 0.04% 0.03% 250 0.04% 0.14% 250 0.15% 0.07% 250 0.08% 0.40% 250 0.41% 0.03% 250 0.05% 0.17% 250 0 18% 0.05% 250 0 06% 0.53% 250 0.53% 0.03% 250 0.05% 0.69% 250 0.69% 0.18% 250 0.1 9% 0.16% 250 0.17% 1.29% 250 1.27%

POLAND REPUBLIC OF SERBIA ROMANIA

LDC countries Reach 60% Votes Total Votes

2151 4,979 0.26% 2151 3,789 0.20% 2151 5,386 0.28% 2151 4,862 0.25% 2151 3,508 0.18% 2151 3,785 0.19% 2151 2,741 0.14% 2151 10,241 0.53% 2151 3,808 0.20% 2151 2,828 0.15% 2151 10,645 0.55% 2151 3,475 0.18% 2151 2,870 0.15% 2151 3,643 0.19% 2151 21,205 1.09% 2151 2,880 0.15% 2151 3,769 0.19% 2151 2,867 0.15% 2151 3,089 0.16% 2151 7,374 0.38% 2151 3,924 0.20% 2151 3,009 0.15% 2151 15,056 0.78% 2151 3,962 0.20% 2151 11,740 0.60% 2151 2,417 0.12% 2151 2,786 0.14% 2151 3,695 0.19% 2151 0.19% 2151 0.40% 2151 0.48% 2151 0.69% 2151 0.27% 2151 0.33% 2151 2.43% 2151 2.43% 2151 0.14% 2151 0.28% 2151 0.82% 2151 0.32% 2151 0.14% 2151 0.15% 2151 0.14% 2151 0.14% 2151 0.15% 2151 0.24% 2151 0.18% 2151 0.45% 2151 0.15% 2151 0.26% 2151 0.16% 2151 0 55% 2151 0.15% 2151 0.69% 2151 0.27% 2151 0 25% 2151 1.17%

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SAUDI ARABIA SEYCHELLES SLOVAK REPUBLIC SOUTH AFRICA SRI LANKA ST. K I T S AND NEVIS ST. LUCIA ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES SURINAME SWAZILAND SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TAJIKISTAN THAILAND TONGA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TUNISIA TURKEY TURKMENISTAN UKRAINE URUGUAY UZBEKISTAN VENEZUELA. REP. BOLIVARIANA DE

1,561 9,339

16 385

1,294 1,229 5,331 6,844

10,908 2,846 4,011

44,795 44,795

263 3,216

13,462 3,817

275 552 278 412 440

2,202 1,060 6,349

494 2,664

719 8,328

526 10,908 2,812 2,493

20,361

1,811 9,589

266 635

1,544 1,479 5,581 7,094

11,158 3,096 4,261

45,045 45,045

513 3,466

13,712 4,067

525 802 528 662 690

2,452 1,310 6,599

744 2,914

969 8,578

776 11,158 3,062 2,743

20.61 1

3,630 7,732 9,245

13,309 5,247 6,412

47,196 47,196

2,664 5,617

15.863 6.218 2,676 2,953 2,679 2,813 2,841 4,603 3,461 8,750 2,895 5,065 3,120

10,729 2,927

13,309 5,213 4,894

22,762 VIETNAM 968 006% 250 1,218 ZIMBABWE 3325 021% 250 3,575 Countnes 560 553 35 63% 25,250 585,803 36 17% 217296 803099 41 35%

Least DeveloDed Countries fClasslficatlon Done bared on UN webslte Datal AFGHANISTAN 300 0.02% ANGOLA 2,676 0.17% BANGLADESH 4,854 0.31% BENIN 868 0.06% BHUTAN 479 0.03% BURKINA FASO 868 0.06% BURUNDI 716 0.05% CAMBODIA 214 0.01% CAPE VERDE 508 0.03% CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 862 0.05% CHAD 862 0.05% COMOROS 282 0.02% CONGO, DEM. REP. OF 2,643 0.17% DJIBOUTI 559 0.04% EQUATORIAL GUINEA 715 0.05% ERITREA 593 0.04% ETHIOPIA 978 0.06% GAMBIA, THE 543 0.03% GUINEA 1,292 0.08% GUINEA-BISSAU 540 0.03% HAITI 1,067 0.07%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

550 2,926 5,104 1.118

729 1.118

966 464 758

1,112 1,112

532 2,893

809 965 843

1,228 793

1,542 790

1,317

0.03% 0.18% 0.32% 0.07% 0.05% 0.07% 0.06% 0.03% 0.05% 0.07% 0.07% 0.03% 0.18% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.08% 0.05% 0.10% 0.05% 0.08%

2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151

2,701 5,077 7,255 3,269 2,880 3,269 3,117 2,615 2,909 3,263 3,263 2,683 5,044 2,960 3,116 2,994 3,379 2,944 3,693 2,941 3,468

0.14% 0.26% 0.37% 0.17% 0.15% 0.17% 0.16% 0.13% 0.15% 0.17% 0.17% 0.14% 0.26% 0.15% 0.16% 0.15% 0.17% 0.15% 0.19% 0.15% 0.18%

Additional Ilablllty

Q $120,6361 Share

259,539,769 259,539,769 258,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 258,539,769 259,538,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,538,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 256,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,538,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769

26,213,516,632

259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769

Table 3 /Page 2 of 3

Table 3: Estimate for Selectively Allocating Addltlonal Basic Votes to DTC Only for them to reach 50% of the Bank Capital on Members

Current Voting Power # of 56 of Basic Total K of

Sharer Shares Votes Votes Total Votes

KIRIBATI LAO PEOPLES DEM. REP. LESOTHO LIBERIA MADAGASCAR MALAWI MALDIVES MALI MAURITANIA MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR NEPAL NIGER RWANDA SAMOA SA0 TOME AND PRlNClPE SENEGAL SIERRALEONE SOLOMON ISLANDS SOMALIA SUDAN TANZANIA TIMOR-LESTE TOGO UGANDA VANUATU YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

Adjusted Voting Power Add'l Total %of

Voter to make LDC countrles

Reach 60% Votes Total Votes

465 178 663 463

1,422 1,094

469 1,162

900 930

2.484 968 852

1,046 531 495

2,072 718 51 3 552 850

1,295 51 7

1,105 61 7 586

2,212 2,810

0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.04% 0.10% 0.08% 0.04% 0.09% 0.07% 0.07% 0.17% 0.08% 0.07% 0.08% 0.05% 0.05% 0.14% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.07% 0.10% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.15% 0.19%

0.03% 0.01% 0.04% 0.03% 0.09% 0.07% 0.03% 0.07% 0.06% 0.06% 0.16% 0.06% 0.05% 0.07% 0.03% 0.03% 0.13% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.08% 0.03% 0.07% 0.04% 0.04% 0.14% 0 18%

2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151

250 715 250 428 250 913 250 713 250 1,672 250 1,344 250 719 250 1,412 250 1,150 250 1,180 250 2,734 250 1,218 250 1,102 250 1,296 250 781 250 745 250 2,322 250 968 250 763 250 802 250 1,100 250 1,545 250 767 250 1,355 250 867 250 836 250 2,462 250 3.060

Countries 50.388 3 20% 12,250 62.638 3.87%

Total 1,673,349 100.00% 46,250 1,619,589 100.00%

105,421 168,059 865%

322,717 1,942,316 100.00%

2,866 2,579 3,064 2,864 3,823 3,495 2,870 3,563 3,301 3,331 4,885 3,369 3,253 3,447 2,932 2,896 4,473 3,119 2,914 2,953 3,251 3,696 2.918 3,506 3,018 2.987 4,613 5.21 1

0.15% 0.13% 0.16% 0.15% 0.20% 0.18% 0.15% 0.18% 0.17% 0.17% 0.25% 0.17% 0.17% 0.18% 0.15% 0.15% 0.23% 0.16% 0.15% 0.15% 0.17% 0.19% 0.15% 0.18% 0.16% 0.15% 0.24% 0 27%

Addltlonal llablllty

Q S 120,6351 Share

259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539.769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769 259,539,769

12,717,448,663

38,S30,966,296

Table 3 / Page 3 of 3

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Table 4: Scenario 1 -Evaluation of Impact of Doubling of Basic Votes on Members

Current Voting Power Adjusted Voting Power

# o f % o f Basic Total % o f Add’l Total % o f country %Gain/

Develooed (Hiah Income) AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BAHAMAS, THE BAHRAIN BELGIUM BRUNEI DARUSSALAM CANADA CYPRUS DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE ICELAND IRELAND ISRAEL ITALY JAPAN KOREA, REPUBLIC OF KUWAIT LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NORWAY PORTUGAL QATAR SAN MARINO SINGAPORE SLOVENIA SPAIN SWEDEN SWITZERLAND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES UNITED KINGDOM

Shares Shares Votes Votes Total Votes Bask Votes Voter Total Votes Loss

24,464 11,063 1,071 1,103

28,983 2,373

44,795 1,461

13,451 8,560

69,397 72,399

1,684 1,258 5,271 4,750

44,795 127,000 15,817 13,280 1,652

35,503 7,236 9,982 5,460 1,096

595 320

1,261 27,997 14,974 26,606 2,385

69.397

1.50% 0.69% 0.09% 0.10% 1.77% 0.17% 2.72% 0.12% 0.64% 0.54% 4.20% 4.38% 0.13% 0.11% 0.35% 0.32% 2.72% 7.65% 0.98% 0.63% 0.13%

0.46% 0.63% 0.36% 0.10% 0.07% 0.05% 0.11% 1.71% 0.93% 1.63% 0.17%

2.16%

4.20%

1.55% 0.70% 0.07% 0.07% 1.84% 0.15% 2.65% 0.09% 0.85% 0.54% 4.41 % 4.60% 0.11% 0.08% 0.34% 0.30% 2.85% 8.07% 1.01% 0.84% 0.10% 2.26% 0.46% 0.63% 0.35% 0.07% 0.04% 0.02% 0.08% 1.78% 0.95% 1.69% 0.15% 4.41%

-0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.04% 0.01%

-0.06% 0.01%

-0.01% 0.00%

-0.10% -0.11% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.06% -0.20% -0.01% -0.07% 0.01%

0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.03% -0.01% -0.03% 0.01%

-0.05%

-0.10%

250 24,714 250 11,313 250 1,321 250 1,353 250 29,233 250 2,623 250 45,045 250 1,711 250 13,701 250 8,810 250 69,647 250 72,649 250 1,934 250 1,508 250 5,521 250 5,000 250 45,045 250 127,250 250 16,067 250 13,530 250 1,902 250 35,753 250 7,486 250 10,232 250 5,710 250 1,346 250 845 250 570 250 1,511 250 28,247 250 15,224 250 26,856 250 2.635 250 69,647 4.30%

Countries 962.408 61.17% 8,750 971,158 59.96%

1.53% 0.70% 0.08% 0.08% 1.80% 0.16% 2.78% 0.11% 0.85% 0.54% 4.30% 4.49% 0.12% 0.09% 0.34% 0.31% 2.78% 7.86% 0.99% 0.84% 0.12% 2.21% 0.46% 0.63% 0.35% 0.08% 0.05% 0.04% 0.09% 1.74% 0.94% 1.66% 0.16%

8,750 979.908 56.82%11 -1.14%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

0.08% 0.59% 0.06% 1.11% 0.10% 0.13% 0.09% 0.23% 0.07% 0.14% 0.06% 0.07% 2.03% 0.34% 0.12% 0.45% 2.72% 0.41% 0.09% 0.04% 0.18% 0.17% 0.41% 0.06% 0.16% 0.20% 0.46% 0.04% 0.09%

24,964 11,563 1,571 1,603

29,483 2,873

45,295 1,961

13,951 9,060

69,897 72,899 2,164 1,758 5,771 5,250

45,295 127,500 16,317 13,780 2,152

36,003 7,736

10,482 5,960 1,596 1,095

820 1,761

28,497 15,474 27,106 2,885

69.897

0.01% 0.00% 0.01%

-0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%

-0.06% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%

Developino (Low and Middle Income)

ALBANIA ALGERIA ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ARGENTINA ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN BARBADOS BELARUS BELIZE BOLIVIA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BOTSWANA BRAZIL BULGARIA CAMEROON CHILE CHINA COLOMBIA CONGO, REPUBLIC OF COSTA RlCA COTE D’IVOIRE CROATIA CZECH REPUBLIC DOMINICA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ECUADOR EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR ESTONIA

830 9,252

520 17,911 1,139 1,646

948 3,323

586 1,785

549 615

33.287 5,215 1,527 6,931

44,799 6,352

927 233

2,516 2,293 6,308

504 2,092 2,771 7,108

141 923

0.05% 0.59% 0.03% 1.14% 0.07% 0.10% 0.06% 0.21 % 0.04% 0.11% 0.03% 0.04% 2.12% 0.33% 0.10% 0.44% 2.85% 0.40% 0.06% 0.01% 0.16% 0.15% 0.40% 0.03% 0.13% 0.18% 0.45% 0.01% 0.06%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

1,080 9,502

770 18,161

1,389 1,896 1,198 3,573

836 2,035

799 865

33,537 5,465 1,777 7,181

45,049 6,602 1,177

483 2,766 2,543 6,558

754 2,342 3,021 7,358

391 1,173

0.07% 0.59% 0.05% 1.12% 0.09% 0.12% 0.07% 0.22% 0.05% 0.13% 0.05% 0.05% 2.07% 0.34% 0.11% 0.44% 2.78% 0.41 % 0.07% 0.03% 0.17% 0.16% 0.40% 0.05% 0.14% 0.19% 0.45% 0.02% 0.07%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

1,330 9,752 1,020

18,411 1,639 2,146 1,448 3,823 1,086 2,285 1,049 1,115

33,787 5,715 2,027 7,431

45,299 6,852 1,427

733 3,016 2,793 6,808 1,004 2,592 3,271 7,608

64 1 1,423

Table 4 Scenario 1 I Page 1 of 3

Table 4: Scenarlo 1 - Evaluation of Impact of Doubling of Basic Votes on Members

Current Voting Power

# o f % o f Basic Total % o f Shares Shares Votes Votes Total Votes

I

Country

Adjusted Voting Power

Add'l Total %of I %Gain/ Basic Votes Votes Total Votes Loss

FIJI GABON GEORGIA GHANA GRENADA GUATEMALA GUYANA HONDURAS HUNGARY INDIA INDONESIA IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAQ JAMAICA JORDAN KAZAKHSTAN KENYA KYRGYZ REPUBLIC LATVIA LEBANON LIBYA LITHUANIA MACEDONIA, FYR OF MALAYSIA MALTA MARSHALL ISLANDS MAURITIUS MEXICO MICRONESIA, FED. ST. OF MOLDOVA MONGOLIA MONTENEGRO MOROCCO NAMIBIA NICARAGUA NIGERIA OMAN PAKISTAN PALAU PANAMA PAPUA NEW GUiNEA PARAGUAY PERU PHILIPPINES POLAND REPUBLIC OF SERBIA ROMANIA RUSSIAN FEDERATION SAUDI ARABIA SEYCHELLES SLOVAK REPUBLIC SOUTH AFRICA SRI LANKA ST. KlTTS AND NEVIS ST. LUCIA ST. VINCENT -3 GRENADINES SURINAME SWAZILAND SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TAJIKISTAN THAILAND TONGA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TUNISIA TURKEY TURKMENISTAN UKRAINE URUGUAY UZBEKISTAN VENEZUELA, REP. BOL. DE

0.09% 0.09% 0.13% 0.12% 0.08% 0.15% 0.09% 0.07% 0.51% 2.72% 0.93% 1.45% 0.20% 0.18% 0.11% 0.21% 0.18% 0.10% 0.11% 0.05% 0.50% 0.12% 0.06% 0.52% 0.09% 0.06% 0.10% 1 .16% 0.06% 0.11% 0.06% 0.07% 0.33% 0.12% 0.07% 0.79% 0.12% 0.59% 0.03% 0.05% 0.11% 0.10% 0.35% 0.44% 0.68% 0.20% 0.27% 2.72% 2.72% 0.05% 0.22% 0.84% 0.26% 0.05% 0.08% 0.05% 0.05% 0.06% 0.18% 0.09% 0.41% 0.06% 0.19% 0.07% 0.53% 0.06% 0.68% 0.20% 0.18% 1.25%

987 987

1,584 1,525

531 2,001 1,058

64 1 8,050

44,795 14,981 23,686

2,808 2,578 1,388 2,985 2,481 1,107 1,384

340 7,840 1,507

427 8,244 1,074

469 1,242

18,804 479

1,368 466 688

4,973 1,523

608 12,655 1,561 9,339

16 385

1,294 1,229 5,331 6,844

10,908 2,846 4,011

44,795 44,795

263 3,216

13,462 3,817

275 552 278 412 440

2,202 1,060 6,349

494 2,664

719 8,328

526 10,908 2,812 2,493

20,361

0.01% 0.01% 0.07% 0.01% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.00%

-0.06% -0.01% -0.03% 0.07% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.07% 0.01% 0.07% 0.00% 0.07% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.02% 0.01% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07%

-0.07% 0.01% 0.00% 0.07% 0.01% 0.07% 0.07% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.06% -0.06% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.07% 0.07% 0.01% 0.07% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.02%

0.06% 0.06% 0.10% 0.10% 0.03% 0.13% 0.07% 0.04% 0.51% 2.85% 0.95% 1.51% 0.18% 0.16% 0.09% 0.19% 0.16% 0.07% 0.09% 0.02% 0.50%

0.03% 0.52% 0.07% 0.03% 0.08% 1.20% 0.03% 0.09% 0.03% 0.04% 0.32% 0.10% 0.04% 0.80% 0.10% 0.59% 0.00% 0.02% 0.08%

0.34% 0.43% 0.69% 0.18% 0.25% 2.85% 2.85% 0.02% 0.20% 0.86% 0.24% 0.02% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.14% 0.07% 0.40% 0.03% 0.17% 0.05% 0.53% 0.03% 0.69% 0.18% 0.16% 1 .29%

0. 10%

0.08%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

1,237 1,237 1,834 1,775

781 2,251 1,308

891 8,300

45,045 15,231 23,936 3,058 2,828 1,638 3,235 2,711 1,357 1,634

590 8,090 1,757

677 6,494 1,324

719 1,492

19,054 729

1,618 716 938

5,223 1,773

858 12,905 1,811 9,589

268 635

1,544 1,479 5,581 7,094

11,158 3,096 4,261

45,045 45,045

513 3,466

13,712 4,067

525 802 528 662 690

2,452 1,310 8,599

744 2,914

969 8,578

776 11,158 3,062 2,743

20,611

0.08% 0.08% 0.11% 0.11% 0.05% 0.14% 0.08% 0.06% 0.51% 2.78% 0.94% 1.48% 0.19% 0.17% 0.10% 0.20% 0.17% 0.08% 0.10% 0.04% 0.50% 0.11% 0.04% 0.52% 0.08% 0.04% 0.09% 1.18% 0.05% 0.10% 0.04% 0.06% 0.32% 0.11% 0.05% 0.80% 0.11% 0.59% 0.02% 0.04% 0.10% 0.09% 0.34% 0.44% 0.69% 0.19% 0.26% 2.78% 2.78% 0.03% 0.21% 0.85% 0.25% 0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.15% 0.08% 0.41% 0.05% 0.18% 0.06% 0.53% 0.05% 0.69% 0.19% 0.17% 1.27%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

1,487 1,487 2,084 2,025 1,031 2,501 1,558 1,141 8,550

45,295 15,481 24,186

3,308 3,078 1,888 3,485 2,961 1,807 1,884

840 8,340 2,007

927 8,744 1,574

989 1,742

19,304 979

1,868 966

1,188 5,473 2,023 1,108

13,155 2,061 9,839

51 6 885

1,794 1,729 5,831 7,344

11,408 3,346 4,511

45,295 45,295

763 3,716

13,962 4,317

775 1,052

778 912 940

2,702 1,560 6,849

994 3,164 1,219 8,828 1,026

11,408 3,312 2,993

20,861

Table 4 Scenario 1 I Page 2 of 3

Current Voting Power

Country # o f % o f Basic Total %of Add7 Total %of

Adjusted Voting Power

Shares Shares Votes Votes Total Votes Basic Votes Votes Total Votes

VIETNAM 968 0.06% 250 1,218 0.08% 250 1,468 0.09% ZIMBABWE 3,325 0.21% 250 3,575 0.22% 250 3,825 0.23% Countries 560,553 35.63% 25,250 585,803 36.17% 25,250 611.053 36.68%

Least Develowd Countries IClassiflcation Done based on UN website Data] AFGHANISTAN 300 0.02% 550

%Gain/ Loss

0.01% 0.01% 0.51%

ANGOLA BANGLADESH BENIN BHUTAN BURKINA FASO BURUNDI CAMBODIA CAPE VERDE CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. CHAD COMOROS CONGO, DEM. REP. OF DJIBOUTI EQUATORIAL GUINEA ERITREA ETHIOPIA GAMBIA, THE GUINEA GUINEA-BISSAU HAITI KIRIBATI LAO PEOPLES DEM. REP. LESOTHO LIBERIA MADAGASCAR MALAWI MALDiVES MALI MAURlTANiA MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR NEPAL NIGER RWANDA SAMOA SA0 TOME AND PRlNCiPE SENEGAL SIERRA LEONE SOLOMON ISLANDS SOMALIA SUDAN TANZANiA TIMOR-LESTE TOGO UGANDA VANUATU YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

0.05% 0.19% 0.32% 0.08% 0.06% 0.08% 0.07% 0.04% 0.06% 0.08% 0.08% 0.05% 0.19% 0.06% 0.07% 0.07% 0.09% 0.06% 0.11% 0.06% 0.09% 0.06% 0.04% 0.07% 0.06% 0.12% 0.10% 0.06% 0.10% 0.08% 0.09% 0.18% 0.09% 0.08% 0.09% 0.06% 0.06% 0.15% 0.07% 0.06% 0.06% 0.08% 0.11% 0.06% 0.10% 0.07% 0.07% 0.16% 0.20%

2,676 4,854

868 479 868 716 214 508 862 862 282

2,643 559 715 593 978 543

1,292 540

1,067 465 178 683 463

1,422 1,094

469 1,162

900 930

2,484 968 852

1,046 531 495

2,072 718 513 552 850

1,295 517

1,105 617 586

2,212 2,810

0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0'01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%

0.17% 0.31% 0.06% 0.03% 0.06% 0.05% 0.01% 0.03% 0.05% 0.05% 0.02% 0.17% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.06% 0.03% 0.08% 0.03% 0.07% 0.03% 0.01% 0.04% 0.03% 0.09% 0.07% 0.03% 0.07% 0.06% 0.08% 0.16% 0.06% 0.05% 0.07% 0.03% 0.03% 0.13% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.08% 0.03% 0.07% 0.04% 0.04% 0.14% 0.18%

Countries 50,368 3.20% 12,250 62,636 3.87%

Total 1,573,349 100.00% 46,250 1,619,599 100.00%

~

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

12,250 74,888 4.50% 0.63%

46,250 1,665,849 100.00%

2,926 5,104 1,118

729 1,118

966 464 758

1,112 1,112

532 2,893

809 965 843

1,228 793

1,542 790

1,317 71 5 428 91 3 71 3

1,672 1,344

719 1,412 1,150 1,180 2,734 1 2 1 6 1,102 1,296

781 745

2,322 968 763 802

1,100 1,545

767 1,355

867 836

2,462 3,060

0.03% 0.18% 0.32% 0.07% 0.05% 0.07% 0.06% 0.03% 0.05% 0.07% 0.07% 0.03% 0.18% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.08% 0.05% 0.10% 0.05% 0.08% 0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.04% 0.10% 0.08% 0.04% 0.09% 0.07% 0.07% 0.17% 0.08% 0.07% 0.08% 0.05% 0.05% 0.14% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.07% 0.10% 0.05% 0.08% 0.05% 0.05% 0.15% 0.19%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

800 3,176 5,354 1,368

979 1,368 1,216

714 1,008 1,362 1,362

762 3,143 1,059 1,215 1,093 1,478 1,043 1,792 1,040 1,567

965 678

1,163 963

1,922 1,594

969 1,662 1,400 1,430 2,984 1,468 1,352 1,546 1,031

995 2,572 1,218 1,013 1,052 1,350 1,795 1,017 1,605 1,117 1,086 2,712 3.310

Table 4 Scenario 1 / Page 3 of 3

Table 4: Scenario 2 - Evaluation of Impact of the Equivalent to Tripling of Basic Votes on Members

Current Voting Power

&g@g

DeveloDed lHiah Incomd AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BAHAMAS, THE BAHRAiN BELGIUM BRUNEI DARUSSALAM CANADA CYPRUS DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE ICELAND IRELAND ISRAEL ITALY JAPAN KOREA, REPUBLIC OF KUWAIT LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NORWAY PORTUGAL QATAR SAN MARiNO SINGAPORE SLOVENIA SPAIN SWEDEN SWiTZERLAND

Adjusted Voting Power

# Of % Of Basic Total %of Shares Shares Votes Votes Total Votes

Add'l Shares Add'l Total % of Gain/ Subscribed Basic Votes Votes Votes Loss

24,464 11,063 1,071 1,103

28,983 2,373

44,795 1,461

13,451 8,560

69,397 72,399

1,684 1,258 5,271 4,750

44,795 127,000 15,817 13,280 1,652

35,503 7,236 9,982 5,460 1,096

595 320

1,261 27,997 14,974 26 606

1.47% 0.69% 0.11% 0.11% 1.74% 0.18% 2.66% 0.13% 0.83% 0.54% 4.10% 4.27% 0.14% 0.12% 0.35% 0.32% 2.66% 7.46% 0.97% 0.82% 0.14% 2.12% 0.47% 0.63% 0.36% 0.11% 0.08% 0.06% 0.12% 1.88% 0.92% 1.60% 0.18% 4.10%

. -~~ - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 2 385

-0 05% -0.01% 0.02% 0.02%

-0.07% 0.02%

-0.12% 0.02%

-0.02% 0.00%

-0.20% -0.21% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.12% -0.40% -0.02% -0.02% 0.02%

-0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02%

-0.07% -0.02% -0.06% 0.02%

-0.20%

1 55% 0 70% 0 07% 0 07% 1 84% 0 15% 2 85% 0 09% 0 85% 0 54% 441% 4 60% 0 11% 0 08% 0 34% 0 30% 2 85% 8 07% 101% 0 84% 0 10% 2 26% 0 46% 0 63% 0 35% 0 07% 0 04% 0 02% 0 08% 178% 0 95% 1 69% 0 15% - - - _.

UNITED KiNGDOM 69,397 4 30%

Countries 962,408 61 17% 8750 971 158 5996%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

8 750 8,750 988 658 57 75%11 -2 22%

250 441% 250

009% 058% 007% 109% 011% 0 14% 010% 024% 008% 015% 008% 008% 1 99% 035% 013% 045% 2 66% 041% 010% 006% 019% 018% 041% 007% 017% 021% 046% 005% 0 10% 0 10% 010% 014% 013% 007%

24,714 11,313 1,321 1,353

29,233 2,623

45,045 1,711

13,701 8,810

69,647 72,649

1,934 1,508 5,521 5,000

45,045 127,250 16,067 13,530

1,902 35,753 7,486

10,232 5,710 1,346

845 570

1,511 28,247

003% 000% 003%

-003% 002% 002% 003% 002% 003% 002% 003% 003%

-008% 001% 002% 001%

-0 12% 001% 003% 003% 002% 002% 001% 003% 002% 002% 0 00% 0 03% 003% 003% 003% 002% 002% 003%

15,224 26,856

2,635 69 847

0.70% i s 3 x I i

0.08% 0.08% 1 .EO% 0.16% 2.78% 0.11% 0.85% 0.54% 4.30% 4.49Qh 0.12% 0.09% 0.34% 0.31% 2.78% 7.86% 0.99% 0.84% 0.12% 2.21% 0.46% 0 63% 0.35% 0.08% 0.05% 0.04% 0.09% 1.74% 0.94% 1.66% 0 16%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

25,214 11,813 1,821 1,853

29,733 3,123

45,545 2,211

14,201 9,310

70,147 73,149 2,434 2,008 8,021 5,500

45,545 127,750 16,567 14,030 2,402

36,253 7,986

10,732 6.210 1,846 1,345 1,070 2,011

28,747 15,724 27,356

3,135 70.147

DevelODina (Low and Middle Income)

ALBANIA ALGERIA ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ARGENTiNA ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN BARBADOS BELARUS BELIZE BOLlViA BOSNiA AND HERZEGOVINA BOTSWANA BRAZIL BULGARIA CAMEROON CHiLE CHiNA COLOMBiA CONGO, REPUBLiC OF COSTA RlCA COTE D'iVOiRE CROATiA CZECH REPUBLIC DOMINICA DOMINICAN REPUBLiC ECUADOR EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR ESTONiA FIJI GABON GEORGIA GHANA GRENADA

830 9,252

520 17,911 1,139 1,646

948 3,323

588 1,785

549 61 5

33,287 5,215 1,527 6,931

44,799 6,352

927 233

2,516 2,293 6,308

504 2,092 2,771 7,108

141 923 987 987

1,584 1,525

531

0 05% 0 59% 0 03% 1 14% 0 07% 0 10% 0 06% 0 21% 0 04% 011% 0 03% 0 04% 2 12% 0 33% 0 10% 0 44% 2 85% 0 40% 0 06% 0 01Qh 0 16% 0 15% 0 40% 0 03% 0 13% 0 18% 0 45% 0 01% 0 06% 0 06% 0 08% 0 10% 0 10% 0 03%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

1,080 9,502

770 18,161 1,389 1,896 1,198 3,573

836 2,035

799 865

33,537 5,465 1,777 7,181

45,049 6,602 1,177

483 2,766 2,543 6,558

754 2,342 3,021 7,358

391 1,173 1,237 1,237 1,834 1,775

781

0.07% 0 59% 0.05% 1.12% 0.09% 0.12% 0.07% 0.22% 0.05% 0.13% 0.05% 0.05% 2.07% 0.34% 0.11% 0.44% 2.78% 0.41 % 0.07% 0.03% 0.17% 0.16% 0.40% 0.05% 0.14% 0.19% 0.45% 0.02% 0.07% 0.08% 0.08% 0.11% 0 11% 0.05%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

1,580 10,002 1,270

18,661 1,889 2,396 1,698 4,073 1,336 2,535 1,299 1,365

34,037 5,965 2,277 7,681

45,549 7,102 1,677

983 3,266 3,043 7,058 1,254 2,842 3,521 7,858

891 1,673 1,737 1,737 2,334 2,275 1,281

Table 4 Scenario 2 I Page 1 of 3

Table 4: Scenario 2 - Evaluation of Impact of the Equivalent to Tripling of Baric Votes on Members

Current Voting Power Adjusted Voting Power

# of % Of Basic Total %of Add'l Shares Add'l Total %of Shares Shares Votes Votes Total Votes Subscribed Basic Votes Votes Votes

GUATEMALA GUYANA HONDURAS HUNGARY INDIA INDONESIA IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAQ JAMAICA JORDAN KAZAKHSTAN KENYA KYRGYZ REPUBLIC LATVIA LEBANON LIBYA LITHUANIA MACEDONIA, FYR OF MALAYSIA MALTA MARSHALL ISLANDS MAURITIUS MEXICO MICRONESIA, FED. STATES OF MOLDOVA MONGOLIA MONTENEGRO MOROCCO NAMIBIA NICARAGUA NIGERIA OMAN PAKISTAN PALAU PANAMA PAPUA NEW GUINEA PARAGUAY PERU PHILIPPINES POLAND REPUBLIC OF SERBIA ROMANiA RUSSIAN FEDERATION SAUDI ARABIA SEYCHELLES SLOVAK REPUBLIC SOUTH AFRICA SRI LANKA ST. KITTS AND NEVIS ST. LUCIA ST VINCENT 8 THE GRENADINES SURINAME SWAZILAND SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TAJIKISTAN THAILAND TONGA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TUNISIA TURKEY TURKMENISTAN UKRAINE URUGUAY UZBEKISTAN

Gainl Loss

0.16% 0.11% 0.08% 0.51% 2.66% 0.92% 1.43% 0.21% 0.19% 0.12% 0.22% 0.19% 0.11% 0.12% 0.06% 0.50% 0.13% 0.07% 0.53% 0.11% 0.07% 0.12% 1.14% 0.07% 0.12% 0.07% 0.08% 0.33% 0.13% 0.08% 0.78% 0.13% 0.59% 0.04% 0.07% 0.12% 0.12% 0.36% 0.44% 0.68% 0.21% 0.28% 2.66% 2.66% 0.06% 0.23% 0.83% 0.27% 0.06% 0.08% 0 06% 0.07% 0.07% 0.17% 0.11% 0.41% 0.07% 0.20% 0.09% 0.53% 0.07% 0.68% 0.21% 0.19% 1.23% VENEZUELA, REP. BOLIVARIANA DE 20,361

VIETNAM 968

0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00%

-0.12% -0.02% -0.05% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02%

0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03%

-0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%

-0.01% 0.02% 0.01%

-0.12% -0.12% 0.03% 0.02%

-0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03%

-0.01% 0.02% 0.02%

-0.04%

2,001 1,058

641 8,050

44,795 14.981 23.686 2,808 2,578 1,388 2,985 2,461 1,107 1,364

340 7,840 1,507

427 8,244 1,074

469 1,242

18,804 479

1,368 466 688

4,973 1,523

608 12,655 1,561 9,339

16 385

1,294 1,229 5,331 6,844

10,908 2,846 4,011

44,795 44,795

263 3,216

13,462 3,817

275 552 278 412 440

2,202 1,060 6,349

494 2,664

719 8,328

526 10,908 2,812 2,493

010%

0 13% 0 07% 0 04% 0 51% 2 85% 0 95% 1 51% 0 18% 0 16% 0 09% 0 19% 0 16% 0 07% 0 09% 0 02% 0 50% 0 10% 0 03% 0 52% 0 07% 0 03% 0 08% 1 20% 0 03% 0 09% 0 03% 0 04% 0 32% 0 10% 0 04% 0 80% 0 10% 0 59% 0 00% 0 02% 0 08% 0 08% 0 34% 0 43% 0 69% 0 18% 0 25% 2 85% 2 85% 0 02% 0 20% 0 86% 0 24% 0 02% 0 04% 0 02% 0 03% 0 03% 0 14% 0 07% 0 40% 0 03% 0 17% 0 05% 0 53% 0 03% 0 69% 0 18% 0 16% 129% 0 06% 003%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

2,251 1,308

891 8,300

45,045 15,231 23,936

3,058 2,828 1,638 3,235 2,711 1,357 1,634

590 8,090 1,757

677 8,494 1,324

719 1,492

19,054 729

1,618 716 938

5,223 1,773

858 12,905 1,811 9,589

266 635

1,544 1,479 5,581 7,094

11,158 3,096 4,261

45,045 45,045

513 3,466

13,712 4,067

525 802 528 662 690

2,452 1,310 6,599

744 2,914

969 8,578

776 11,158 3,062 2,743

20,611 1,218

0 14% 0 08% 0 06% 051% 2 78% 0 94% 148% 0 19% 0 17% 0 10% 0 20% 0 17% 0 08% 0 10% 0 04% 0 50% 011% 0 04% 0 52% 0 08% 0 04% 0 09% 1 18% 0 05% 0 10% 0 04% 0 06% 0 32% 0 11% 0 05% 0 80% 0 11% 0 59% 0 02% 0 04% 0 10% 0 09% 0 34% 0 44% 0 69% 0 19% 0 26% 2 78% 2 78% 0 03% 021% 0 85% 0 25% 0 03% 0 05% 0 03% 0 04% 0 04% 0 15% 0 08% 0 41% 0 05% 0 18% 0 06% 0 53% 0 05% 0 69% 0 19% 0 17% 127% 0 08%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

2,751 1,808 1,391 8,800

45,545 15,731 24,436

3,558 3,328 2.138 3,735 3,211 1,857 2,134 1,090 8,590 2,257 1,177 8,994 1,824 1,219 1,992

19,554 1,229 2,118 1,216 1,438 5,723 2,273 1,358

13,405 2,311

10,089 766

1,135 2,044 1,979 6,081 7,594

11,658 3,596 4,761

45,545 45,545

1,013 3,966

14,212 4,567 1,025 1,302 1,028 1,162 1,190 2,952 1,810 7,099 1,244 3,414 1,469 9,078 1,276

11,658 3,562 3,243

21,111 1,718

Table 4 Scenario 2 I Page 2 of 3

Current Voting Power Adjusted Voting Power

# Of % Of Basic Total %of Add'l Shares Add'l Total %of Shares Shares Votes Votes Total Votes Subscribed Basic Voter Votes Votes

Least DeveloDed Countries lClassification Done based on UN webslte Datal AFGHANISTAN

Gain/ Loss

ANGOLA BANGLADESH BENIN BHUTAN BURKiNA FASO BURUNDI CAMBODIA CAPE VERDE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHAD C 0 M 0 R 0 S CONGO, DEM. REP. OF DJIBOUTI EQUATORIAL GUINEA ERITREA ETHIOPIA GAMBIA, THE GUiNEA GUINEA-BISSAU HAITI KIRIBATI LAO PEOPLES DEM. REP. LESOTHO LIBERIA MADAGASCAR MALAWI MALDIVES MALI MAURITANIA MOZAMBiQUE MYANMAR NEPAL NIGER RWANDA SAMOA SA0 TOME AND PRiNClPE SENEGAL SIERRA LEONE SOLOMON ISLANDS SOMALIA SUDAN TANZANIA TIMOR-LESTE TOGO UGANDA VANUATU YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

0.06% 020% 0.33% 0.09% 0.07% 0.09% 0.09% 0.06% 0.07% 0.09% 0.091 0,06% 0.20% 0.08% 0.09% 0.08% 0.10% 0.08% 0.12% 0.08% 0.11% 0.07% 0.05% 0.08% 0.07% 0 13% 0.11% 0.07% 0.11% 0.10% 0.10% 0.19% 0.10% 0.09% 0.10% 0.07% 0.07% 0.16% 0.09% 0.07% 0.08% 0.09% 0.12% 0.07% 0.1 1% 0.08% 0.08% 0.17% 0.21%

300 0.03% 0,020~ 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02%

0.02% 250

Countries 50,388 3.20% 12,250 62,638 3.87% 12,250 12,250 87,138 5.09%

Total 1,573,349 100.00% 46,250 1,619,599 100.00% 46,250 46,250 1,712,089 100.00%

~~~

2,676 4,854

868 479 868 716 214 508 862 862 282

2,643 559 715 593 978 543

1,292 540

1 , 0 7 465 178 663 463

1,422 1,094

469 1,162

900 930

2,484 968 852

1,046 531 495

2,072 718 51 3 552 850

1,295 517

1,105 617 586

2,212 2,810

1.22%

0.17% 0.31% 0.06% 0.03% 0.06% 0.05% 0.01% 0.03% 0.05% 0.05% 0.02% 0.17% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.06% 0.03% 0.08% 0.03% 0.07% 0.03% 0.01% 0.04% 0.03% 0.09% 0.07% 0.03% 0.07% 0.06% 0.06% 0.16% 0.06% 0.05% 0.07% 0.03% 0.03% 0.13% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.08% 0.03% 0.07% 0.04% 0.04% 0.1 4% 0.1 8%

- ~ . 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

550 2,926 5,104 1,118

729 1,118

966 464 758

1,112 1,112

532 2,893

809 965 843

1,228 793

1,542 790

1,317 715 428 913 713

1,672 1,344

719 1,412 1,150 1,180 2,734 1,218 1,102 1,296

781 745

2,322 968 763 802

1,100 1,545

767 1,355

867 836

2,462 3,060

0 03% 0 18% 0 32% 0 07% 0 05% 0 07% 0 06% 0 03% 0 05% 0 07% 0 07% 0 03% 0 18% 0 05% 0 06% 0 05% 0 08% 0 05% 0 10% 0 05% 0 08% 0 04% 0 03% 0 06% 0 04% 0 10% 0 08% 0 04% 0 09% 0 07% 0 07% 0 17% 0 08% 0 07% 0 08% 0 05% 0 05% 0 14% 0 06% 0 05% 0 05% 0 07% 0 10% 0 05% 0 08% 0 05% 0 05% 0 15% 0 19%

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250

1,050 3,426 5,604 1,618 1,229 1,618 1,466

964 1,258 1,612 151 2 1,032 3,393 1,309 1,465 1,343 1,728 1,293 2,042 1,290 1,817 1,215

928 1,413 1,213 2,172 1,844 1,219 1,912 1,650 1,680 3,234 1,718 1,602 1,796 1,281 1,245 2.822 1,468 1,263 1,302 1,600 2,045 1,267 1,855 1,367 1,336 2,962 3,560

Table 4 Scenario 2 /Page 3 of 3

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Table 5: Statement of IDA Voting Power, and Subscriptions and Contributions as of JUNE 30,2007 Expressed in millions US Dollars except vote data

Subscriptions Number Percentage

Member Committed votes total votes Part I Members

& Contributions of o f

Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Kuwait Luxembourg Netherlands, Kingdom o f the New Zealand Norway Portugal Russian Federation Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Sub-total Part I Members

Part II Members Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Armenia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Barbados Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon

2,604.47 1,452.7 1 2,455.99 6,345.67 2,726.08 1,007.64

12,6 12.15 19,734.68

141.29 44.17

374.09 6,776.91

28,858.06 813.20 163.89

6,334.90 239.81

2,764.13 232.17 297.84

21.57 149.71

2,293.1 1 5,374.55 2,421.70

5.58 18,275.67

211,357 120,425 192,729 462,791 169,299 102,458 687,398

1,076,549 45,962 42,791 60,966

432,7 16 1,676,530

90,524 47,099

346,481 51,753

172,928 48,714 51,361 40,878 50,798

122,2 19 328,687 188,489

1,367 858,061

38,981.03 2,158,302 163,502.77 9,839,632

1.29 0.33 5.10 8.24

69.84 0.58 0.91 7.61 1.05 0.26 0.69 0.08 1.48 2.43 1.62

583.67 0.74 1.02 1.39 1.48

16,857 36,599 27,720 57,909

134,439 15,132 7,860

100,314 39,219 13,784 23,105 34,663 51,788 38,077 32,495

282,228 4 1,732 36,060 22,642 34,991

1.27 0.72 1.16 2.77 1.02 0.61 4.12 6.45 0.28 0.26 0.37 2.59

10.05 0.54 0.28 2.08 0.3 1 1.04 0.29 0.3 1 0.25 0.30 0.73 1.97 1.13 0.01 5.14

12.94 59.00 *

0.10 0.22 0.17 0.35 0.81 0.09 0.05 0.60 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.3 1 0.23 0.19 1.69 0.25 0.22 0.14 0.21

Table 5 / Page 1 o f 4

Table 5: Statement of IDA Voting Power, and Subscriptions and Contributions as o f JUNE 30,2007 Expressed in millions US Dollars except vote data

Subscriptions Number Percentage

Member Committed votes total votes & Contributions of o f

Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic o f Congo, Republic o f Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia

Czech Republic Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Republic o f El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Fiji Gabon Gambia, The Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic o f Iraq Israel Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea, Republic of Kyrgyz Republic Lao People's Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya

Cyprus

0.10 0.69 0.68 4.47

43.96 24.69 0.1 1 4.34 0.73 0.25 1.48 5.78 1.20

75.80 0.20 0.12 0.58 0.92 7.12 0.40 0.41 0.13 0.73 0.77 0.63 0.34 0.94 3.18 0.13 0.55 1.34 0.17 1.04 0.99 0.42

73 -79 60.63 14.92 5.69 1.02

42.21 0.41 1.89 2.41 0.08

1,065.47 0.5 1 0.66 0.93 0.56 0.23 0.95 1.35

8,320 23,029 16,890 31,782

332,400 77,70 1 13,141 56,767 38,923 12,480 46,863 59,878 48,466 79,859

6,44 1 26,014 27,780 47,252 79,574 6,244 6,167

31,162 39,529 19,462 2,093

19,444 41,519 66,391 20,627 37,397 33,987 6,790

23,460 24,871 43,282

124,659 488,525 130,075

15,455 15,669 60,421 24,865

4,106 58,781 11,777

107,096 8,75 1

22,867 40,225

8,562 38,272 22,467 17,478

0.05 0.14 0.10 0.19 1.99 0.47 0.08 0.34 0.23 0.07 0.28 0.36 0.29 0.48 0.04 0.16 0.17 0.28 0.48 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.24 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.25 0.40 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.75 2.93 0.78 0.09 0.09 0.36 0.15 0.02 0.35 0.07 0.64 0.05 0.14 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.13 0.10

Table 5 / Page 2 o f 4

Table 5: Statement of IDA Voting Power, and Subscriptions and Contributions as o f JUNE 30,2007 Expressed in miIIions US Dollars except vote data

Subscriptions Number Percentage & Contributions o f o f

Member Committed votes total votes Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic o f 1.07 Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mal i Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Micronesia, Federated States o f Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Palau Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Solomon Islands Somalia Sr i Lanka St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Sudan Swaziland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor-Leste Togo

1.34 1.00 3.78 0.05 1.25 0.01 0.67 1.26

138.32 0.03 0.68 0.29 0.72 5.40 1.73 3 -04 0.71 0.43 0.67 4.62 1.37

14.44 0.03 0.03 1.20 0.40 2.29 6.43

81.95 1.00 0.12 0.09

2,258.21 2.47 6.86 0.98

36.41 17.61 0.11 0.95 4.20 0.17 0.23 0.11 1.32 0.42 1.20 0.46 2.25 4.56 0.35 1.02

34,011 44,794 44,374 68,189 40,284 35,336 4,902

35,623 49,657

102,666 18,424

612 24,389 44,271 79,602 19,523 55,655 4 1,409 43,282 19,302 74,183 37,068

156,805 3,804

10,185 45,445 20,258 29,494 16,583

36 1,284 23,612 21,741

9,714 556,643 50,925 52,017 38,112 1 1,000 53,523

518 10,506 72,188 13,778 3033 1 34,787 25,784 19,022 10,351 20,568 53,758 75,798

558 23,243

0.20 0.27 0.27 0.41 0.24 0.21 0.03 0.21 0.30 0.62 0.1 1 0.00 0.15 0.27 0.48 0.12 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.44 0.22 0.94 0.02 0.06 0.27 0.12 0.18 0.10 2.17 0.14 0.13 0.06 3.34 0.3 1 0.3 1 0.23 0.07 0.32 0.00 0.06 0.43 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.32 0.45 0.00 0.14

Table 5 / Page 3 o f 4

Table 5: Statement of IDA Voting Power, and Subscriptions and Contributions as o f JUNE 30,2007 Expressed in millions US Dollars except vote data

Subscriptions Number Percentage

Member Committed votes total votes & Contributions of o f

Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vietnam Yemen, Republic o f Zambia Zimbabwe Subtotal Part I1 Members

0.10 1.75 1.89

142.37 2.50 7.61 1.48 0.25 1.96 2.1 1 3.55

26,061 14,309 2,793

107,538 48,099

1,762 746

13,821 19,203 49,574 60,030

4.97 20,957 4,935.78 6,838,634

Total - June 30,2007 168,438.55 16,678,266

From: IDA'S Financial Statements, June 30,2007 *NOTE: Totals may not add up due to rounding.

0.16 0.09 0.02 0.64 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.30 0.36 0.13

41.00 * 100.001 *

Table 5 / Page 4 o f 4

Table 5a: IDA Total Unsubscribed Subscriptions

as of June 30, 2007

Unsubscri bedlUnpaid

(in USD) a/ Countries Subscriptions

Africa Countries Angola Benin Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia, The Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Somalia Sudan Swaziland Togo Uganda Zimbabwe

Non African Countries Afghan istan Algeria Armenia Azerbaijan Belize Cambodia Chile China Costa Rica Dominica Dominican Republic Egypt, Arab Republic of El Savador Fiji Grenada Guyana Haiti

732,548 106,298 75,150

192,126 27,070 87,576

128,027 16,150

21 8,164 b/ 48,789 77,235 4,875

18,600 b/ 11 7,001 55,249 97,059 37,647

1 18,630 93,625 88,701 b/

308,395 63,026

105,005 24,341

124,412 b/ 130,155 176,801 58,250

11 1,730 223,987 b/ 991,206

Subtotal 4,657,828

154,996 633,876 108,746 187,091 53,753

214,250 412,787

1,342,025 33,017 18,739 18,375

207,525 84,700

101,282 15,199 98,939 93,530

Table 5a I Page 1 o f 2

Table 5a: IDA Total Unsubscribed Subscriptions

as of June 30, 2007

Unsubscribedlunpaid

(in USD) a/ Countries Subscriptions

Indonesia 247,150 Iran 850,649 Jordan 26,625

420,230 Kazakhstan Kiribati 19,874 Kyrgyz Republic 103,223 Lao People's Democratic Republic 66,476 Lebanon 83,139

192,126 Libya Marshall Islands 8,164 Micronesia, Federated States of 7,225

157,625 Moldova Mongolia 18,825 Nepal 8,075 Palau 8,873 Panama 4,280 Paraguay 42,812

286,661 Peru Philippines 946,485 St. Kitts and Nevis 33,920 St. Lucia 5,500 Samoa 14,850 Solomon Islands 28,570

181,591 Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan 38,375 Thailand 20,625 Timor-Leste 76,733 Tonga 11,853 Trinidad and Tobago 344,509 Tunisia 343,404 Ukraine 1,657,547 Uzbekistan 339,237 Vanuatu 44,324 Vietnam 204,404

Subtotal 10,622,789 Grand Total 15,280,617

a/ At exchange rates at time of replenishment agreement. b/ These countries have either subscribed or partially paid some replenishments

in response to our mailing.

Table 5a I Page 2 o f 2

Table 6: Comparison Between IBRD Total Votes and IDA Total Votes

Expressed in millions US Dollars excel

Member

Part I Members Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Kuwait Luxembourg Netherlands, Kingdom of the New Zealand Norway Portugal Russian Federation Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Sub-total Part I Members

Part I1 Members Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Armenia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Barbados Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil

vote data

IBRD Total % of

Total Votes * # Votes * #

24,714 11,313 29,233 45,045 13,701 8,810

69,647 72,649

1,934 1,508 5,521

45,045 127,250 13,530 1,902

35,753 7,486

10,232 5,710

45,045 1,511

13,712 28,247 15,224 26,856 2,635

69,647

1.56% 0.71 % 1.85% 2.85% 0.87% 0.56% 4.40% 4.59% 0.12% 0.10% 0.35% 2.85% 8.04% 0.85% 0.12% 2.26% 0.47% 0.65% 0.36% 2.85% 0.10% 0.87% 1.78% 0.96% 1.70% 0.17% 4.40%

265,219 16.75% 9 9 9,O 7 9 63.11%

550 1,080 9,502 2,926

18,161 1,389 1,896 5,104 1,198

836 1,118

729 2,035

799 865

33,537

0.03% 0.07% 0.60% 0.18% 1.15% 0.09% 0.12% 0.32% 0.08% 0.05% 0.07% 0.05% 0.13% 0.05% 0.05% 2.12%

IDA Number of % of

Votes * Total Votes *

21 1,357 120,425 192,729 462,791 169,299 102,458 687,398

1,076,549 45,962 42,791 60,966

432,716 1,676,530

90,524 47,099

346,481 51,753

172,928 48,714 51,361 40,878 50,798

122,219 328,687 188,489

1,367 858,061

1.27% 0.72% 1.16% 2.77% 1.02% 0.61 % 4.12% 6.45% 0.28% 0.26% 0.37% 2.59%

10.05% 0.54% 0.28% 2.08% 0.31 % 1.04% 0.29% 0.31 % 0.25% 0.30% 0.73% 1.97% 1.13% 0.01 % 5.14%

2,158,302 12.94% 9,839,632 59.00%

16,857 36,599 27,720 57,909

134,439 15,132 7,860

100,314 39,219 13,784 23,105 34,663 51,788 38,077 32,495

282,228

0.10% 0.22% 0.17% 0.35% 0.81 % 0.09% 0.05% 0.60% 0.24% 0.08% 0.14% 0.21 % 0.31 % 0.23% 0.19% 1.69%

Difference BRD % of Votes - IDA % of Votes)

0.29% -0.07% 0.69% 0.07%

-0.15% -0.06% 0.28%

-1.87% -0.15% -0.16% -0.02% 0.25%

-2.01% 0.31%

-0.'16% 0.18% 0.16%

0.07% 2.54%

0.56% 1.05%

-1.07% 0.57% 0.16%

-0.74% 3.81%

-0.39%

-0.15%

-0.07% -0.15% 0.43%

-0.16% 0.34% 0.00% 0.07%

-0.28% -0.16% -0.03% -0.07% -0.16% -0.18% -0.78% -0.14% 0.43%

Table 6 / Page 1 o f 4

Table 6: Comparison Between IBRD Total Votes and IDA Total Votes

Exmessed in millions US Dollars excel

Member

Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Costa Rica Cote d'lvoire Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt, Arab Republic of El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Fiji Gabon Gambia, The Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Israel Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya

1,118 966 464

1,777 758

1,112 1,112 7,181

45,049 6,602

532 2,893 1,177

483 2,766 2,543 1,711 6,558

809 754

2,342 3,021 7,358

39 1 965 843

1,228 1,237 1,237

793 1,834 1,775

78 1 2,251 1,542

790 1,308 1,317

891 8,300

45,045 15,231 23,936

3,058 5,000 1,638 3,235 2,711

Jote data

Total % of

0.07% 0.06% 0.03% 0.11% 0.05% 0.07% 0.07% 0.45% 2.85% 0.42% 0.03% 0.18% 0.07% 0.03% 0.17% 0.16% 0.11% 0.41 % 0.05% 0.05% 0.15% 0.19% 0.46% 0.02% 0.06% 0.05% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 0.05% 0.12% 0.11% 0.05% 0.14% 0.10% 0.05% 0.08% 0.08% 0.06% 0.52% 2.85% 0.96% 1.51% 0.19% 0.32% 0.10% 0.20% 0.17%

41,732 36,060 22,642 34,991 8,320

23,029 16,890 31,782

332,400 77,701 13,141 56,767 38,923 12,480 46,863 59,878 48,466 79,859 6,441

26,014 27,780 47,252 79,574 6,244 6,167

31,162 39,529 19,462 2,093

19,444 41 3 1 9 66,391 20,627 37,397 33,987 6,790

23,460 24,871 43,282

124,659 488,525 130,075 15,455 15,669 60,421 24,865 4,106

58,781

0.25% 0.22% 0.14% 0.21 % 0.05% 0.14% 0.10% 0.19% 1.99% 0.47% 0.08% 0.34% 0.23% 0.07% 0.28% 0.36% 0.29% 0.48% 0.04% 0.16% 0.17% 0.28% 0.48% 0.04% 0.04% 0.19% 0.24% 0.12% 0.01 % 0.12% 0.25% 0.40% 0.12% 0.22% 0.20% 0.04% 0.14% 0.15% 0.26% 0.75% 2.93% 0.78% 0.09% 0.09% 0.36% 0.15% 0.02% 0.35%

Difference lBRD % of Votes - IDA % of Votes)

-0.18% -0.16% -0.11% -0.10% 0.00%

-0.07% -0.03% 0.26% 0.85%

-0.05% -0.05% -0.16% -0.16% -0.04% -0.17% -0.20% -0.18% -0.06% 0.07%

-0.11% -0.02% -0.09% -0.01% -0.07% 0.02%

-0.13% -0.16% -0.04% 0.07%

-0.07% -0.73% -0.29% -0.07% -0.08% -0.17% 0.01 %

-0.06% -0.07% -0.20% -0.22% -0.08% 0.18% 1.42% 0.70%

-0.05% -0.05% 0.18%

-0.18%

Table 6 I Page 2 o f 4

Table 6: Comparison Between IBRD Total Votes and IDA Total Votes

Expressed in millions US Dollars excel:

Member

(iribati <orea, Republic of <yrgyz Republic -ao People's Democratic Republic -atvia -ebanon -esotho -iberia -ibya Macedonia, former Yugoslav Rep. of Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Micronesia, Federated States of Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Palau Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic

/ote data

IBRD Total Yo of

Total Votes * ## Votes * ##

71 5 16,067 1,357

428 1,634

590 91 3 71 3

8,090 677

1,672 1,344 8,494

71 9 1,412

71 9 1,150 1,492

19,054 729

1,618 716 938

5,223 1,180 2,734 1,218

858 1,102

12,905 1,811 9,589

266 635

1,544 1,479 5,581 7,094

11,158 1,296

78 1 745

45,045 2,322 3,096

968 570

3,466

0.05% 1.01% 0.09% 0.03% 0.10% 0.04% 0.06% 0.05% 0.51% 0.04% 0.11% 0.08% 0.54% 0.05% 0.09% 0.05% 0.07% 0.09% 1.20% 0.05% 0.10% 0.05% 0.06% 0.33% 0.07% 0.17% 0.08% 0.05% 0.07% 0.82% 0.11% 0.61 % 0.02% 0.04% 0.10% 0.09% 0.35% 0.45% 0.70% 0.08% 0.05% 0.05% 2.85% 0.15% 0.20% 0.06% 0.04% 0.22%

IDA Number of % of

Votes Total Votes *

11,777 107,096

8,751 22,867 40,225

8,562 38,272 22,467 17,478 34,011 44,794 44,374 68,189 40,284 35,336 4,902

35,623 49,657

102,666 18,424

61 2 24,389 44,271 79,602 19,523 55,655 41,409 43,282 19,302 74,183 37,068

156,805 3,804

10,185 45,445 20,258 29,494 16,583

361,284 23,612 21,741 9,714

556,643 50,925 52,017 38,112 11,000 53,523

0.07% 0.64% 0.05% 0.14% 0.24% 0.05% 0.23% 0.13% 0.10% 0.20% 0.27% 0.27% 0.41 % 0.24% 0.21 % 0.03% 0.21% 0.30% 0.62% 0.11% 0.00% 0.15% 0.27% 0.48% 0.12% 0.33% 0.25% 0.26% 0.12% 0.44% 0.22% 0.94% 0.02% 0.06% 0.27% 0.12% 0.18% 0.10% 2.17% 0.14% 0.13% 0.06% 3.34% 0.31% 0.31% 0.23% 0.07% 0.32%

~~ ~

Difference 'BRD % of Votes - IDA % of Votes)

-0.03% 0.37% 0.03%

-0.11% -0.14% -0.07% -0.17% -0.09% 0.41%

-0.16% -0.16% -0.18% 0.13%

-0.20% -0.12% 0.02%

-0.14% -0.20% 0.59%

-0.06% 0.70%

-0.70% -0.21% -0.15% -0.04% -0.16% -0.17% -0.21% -0.05% 0.37%

-0.71% -0.33% -0.07% -0.02% -0.17% -0.03% 0.18% 0.35%

-1.46% -0.06% -0.08% -0.01% -0.49% -0.16% -0.12% -0.17% -0.03% -0.70%

Table 6 I Page 3 o f 4

Table 6: Comparison Between IBRD Total Votes and IDA Total Votes

IBRD Total %of

Total Votes * # Votes * #

Expressed in millions US Dollars excel

Member

IDA Difference Numberof % of (IBRD % of Votes -

Votes * Total Votes * IDA % of Votes)

Solomon Islands Somalia Sri Lanka St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Sudan Swaziland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor-Leste Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vietnam Yemen, Republic of Zambia Zim babwe Subtotal Part II Members

51 8 0.00% 10,506 0.06% 72,188 0.43% 13,778 0.08% 30,531 0.18% 34,787 0.21 % 25,784 0.15% 19,022 0.11% 10,351 0.06% 20,568 0.12% 53,758 0.32% 75,798 0.45%

558 0.00% 23,243 0.14% 26,061 0.16% 14,309 0.09% 2,793 0.02%

07,538 0.64% 48,099 0.29%

1,762 0.01 % 746 0.00%

13,821 0.08% 19,203 0.12% 49,574 0.30% 60,030 0.36%

Total #

0.05% -0.01% -0.18% -0.05% -0.13% -0.18% -0.09% -0.07% 0.09%

-0.04% -0.22% -0.04% 0.05%

-0.05% -0.17% 0.10% 0.04%

-0.70% -0.23% 0.69% 0.17%

-0.03% 1.19%

-0.14% -0.17%

vote data I

3,575 0.23% 20,957 0.13% 583,877 36.89% 6,838,634 41 .OO%

763 802

4,067 525 802 528

1,100 690

2,452 1,310 1,545 6,599

767 1,355

744 2,914

969 8,578

867 11,158 2,743

836 20,611

2,462 3,060

0.10%

0.05% 0.05% 0.26% 0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 0.07% 0.04% 0.15% 0.08% 0.10% 0.42% 0.05% 0.09% 0.05% 0.18% 0.06% 0.54% 0.05% 0.70% 0.17% 0.05% 1.30% 0.16% 0.19%

I I

1,582,956 100.00% I 16,678,266 100.00%~

IDA information from IDA'S Financial Statements, June 30, 2007 * NOTE: Totals may not add up due to rounding. # NOTE: IBRD Total votes in Table 6a will not equal actual IBRD Total Votes, since non-IDA members are not listed.

Table 6 I Page 4 o f 4

Table 6a: Comparison Between IBRD Total Votes and IDA Total Votes - Part I Members Only

Expressed in millions US Doll6

Member

Part I Members Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Kuwait Luxembourg Netherlands, Kingdom of the New Zealand Norway Portugal Russian Federation Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Total Part I Members

except vote data

IBRD Total % of Votes Part I Votes

24,714 11,313 29,233 45,045 13,701 8,810

69,647 72,649

1,934 1,508 5,521

45,045 127,250 13,530

1,902 35,753 7,486

10,232 5,710

45,045 1,511

13,712 28,247 15,224 26,856 2,635

69,647

2.47% 1.13% 2.93% 4.51 % 1.37% 0.88% 6.97% 7.27% 0.19% 0.15% 0.55% 4.51%

12.74% 1.35% 0.19% 3.58% 0.75% 1.02% 0.57% 4.51 % 0.15% 1.37% 2.83% 1.52% 2.69% 0.26% 6.97%

265,219 26.55% 999,079 100.00%

Difference Number of % of (IBRD % of Votes -

21 1,357 120,425 192,729 462,791 169,299 102,458 687,398

1,076,549 45,962 42,791 60,966

432,716 1,676,530

90,524 47,099

346,481 51,753

172,928 48,714 51,361 40,878 50,798

122,219 328,687 188,489

1,367 858,061

2.15% 1.22% 1.96% 4.70% 1.72% 1.04% 6.99%

10.94% 0.47% 0.43% 0.62% 4.40%

17.04% 0.92% 0.48% 3.52% 0.53% 1.76% 0.50% 0.52% 0.42% 0.52% 1.24% 3.34% 1.92% 0.01 % 8.72%

2,158,302 21.93% 9,839,632 100.00%

0.33% -0.09% 0.97%

-0.19% -0.35% -0.16% -0.01% -3.67% -0.27% -0.28% -0.07% 0.11%

-4.30% 0.43%

-0.29% 0.06% 0.22%

-0.73% 0.08% 3.99%

-0.26% 0.86% 1.59%

-1.82% 0.77% 0.25%

-1.75% 4.61%

Table 6a / Page 1 o f 1

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Table 7a: Comparison Between IBRD % of Shares (for OECD Countries only) and % of Net ODA (1996-2005)USD million

IBRD ODA DifferenceTotal % of Net ODA * % of (IBRD % of Shares -

Shares Shares (USD million) Net ODA % of Net ODA)

Australia 24,464 2.67% 11,284.91 1.79% 0.88%Austria 11,063 1.21% 6,321.58 1.00% 0.20%Belgium 28,983 3.17% 11,358.09 1.81% 1.36%Canada 44,795 4.89% 20,919.59 3.33% 1.57%Denmark 13,451 1.47% 17,682.64 2.81% -1.34%Finland 8,560 0.93% 4,962.22 0.79% 0.15%France 69,397 7.58% 64,679.57 10.28% -2.70%Germany 72,399 7.91% 64,298.16 10.22% -2.31%Greece 1,684 0.18% 2,500.60 0.40% -0.21%Ireland 5,271 0.58% 3,557.89 0.57% 0.01%Italy 44,795 4.89% 23,085.73 3.67% 1.22%Japan 127,000 13.87% 105,186.43 16.72% -2.85%Luxembourg 1,652 0.18% 1,501.74 0.24% -0.06%Netherlands 35,503 3.88% 35,304.63 5.61% -1.73%New Zealand 7,236 0.79% 1,537.17 0.24% 0.55%Norway 9,982 1.09% 16,641.06 2.65% -1.55%Portugal 5,460 0.60% 3,592.35 0.57% 0.03%Spain 27,997 3.06% 17,285.41 2.75% 0.31%Sweden 14,974 1.64% 20,892.10 3.32% -1.69%Switzerland 26,606 2.91% 11,167.25 1.78% 1.13%United Kingdom 69,397 7.58% 52,858.19 8.40% -0.82%United States 264,969 28.94% 132,507.46 21.06% 7.88%

TOTAL 915,638 100.00% 629,124.77 100.00%

* Net ODA 1996-2005 (updated April 2007) (ref. Table 7, page 3 of 3)

Table 7a / Page 1 of 1