PROXY MONTHLY
June 2014Volume 1, Issue 2
www.proxyinsight.com
ALL THE LATEST VOTING NEWS
POISON PILLS: DO INVESTORS REALLY HATE THEM?
BANKING REMUNERATION: THE STATS AND PIRC’S VIEW
Thank you for the very positive
feedback we received for
our first edition of Proxy
Monthly, I hope this edition will
be at least as well received.
Following the fascinating headline
interview with Jonas Kron, from
Trill ium in May, I am delighted that we
have Tim Bush from PIRC (Pensions
& Investment Research Consultants)
in the hot seat this month. PIRC has
a reputation of being hardline in its
policies and vote recommendations.
Tim tackles this head on
citing failures in compensation
policies and auditor selection.
Keeping with the compensation
theme, it will not have escaped your
notice that Say on Pay votes are very
much in the spotlight again this year
with significant levels of opposition.
Looking at the Top US and EU Banks,
the level of opposition is back to
“Shareholder Spring” levels. Our
review of shareholder voting activity
provides some surprising results.
While the Pfizer AstraZeneca deal
did not quite get off the ground,
the likely upturn in M&A activity
got us thinking about poison pills.
Analysing the Proxy Insight database
showed a major disconnect
between Japan and the rest of the
world regarding the support of such
pills. While not liked or encouraged,
73% of votes for non Japanese
poison pill resolutions were
supported, largely due to restricted
timescales and independent board
structures. However this number
crashes to just 4% when looking
solely at Japanese companies.
Conference season is well and truly
upon us and no doubt we will all be
attending one or two to do some
all-important networking and keep
up to date with the latest trends.
The Growth of Activist Investing
in Europe 2014—provided a real
insight to how mainstream Activist
Investing has become in the US
and a real taste of what is coming
for the UK and perhaps a little later
Continental Europe. The depth of
research carried out by Activists
can be staggering as they think
the unthinkable and look for areas
to achieve greater shareholder
value. The catalyst for this is
often discontent from long only
shareholders either at the ballot or
in extreme circumstances direct
albeit unofficial contact made with
friendly activists who will campaign
for change. More evidence, as if it
were needed, to understand your
shareholder base and understand
how they vote and why—might just
save a massive headache later on!
With predictions of rising activism
in 2014 there is increasing pressure
worldwide to better regulate proxy
advisory firms. The rise in activism
means an increase in the number
of contentious votes appearing
at AGMs and in turn a perceived
increase in the importance of
these firms in deciding the vote.
Companies in Australia are
calling for greater regulation and
the CSA (Canadian Securities
Administrators) has recently
released guidelines for proxy
advisors, with similar guidelines
soon expected from the SEC.
Now that the Proxy Season is coming
to an end, why not take a trial of our
online Proxy Insight database. With
nearly 20 million votes covering
over 22,000 global issuers and
over 400 corporate governance
profiles, it is the definitive source
of proxy voting intelligence.
Proxy statementNick Dawson, Co-Founder & Managing Director, Proxy Insight Limited
2
73% of votes for non-Japanese poison pill
resolutions were supported”“
Investor Resolutions voted on
Votes For Investor Resolutions voted on
Votes Against
Aviva Investors 12 100% Deutsche Investment Management Americas 18 90%
TIAA-CREF 42 100% Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company 17 77%
AQR Capital 10 100% State of New Jersey Division of Investment 11 69%
SWIB 10 100% APG 13 65%
SunAmerica 13 100% F&C Asset Management 11 48%
I n recent years, there has been
something of a backlash against
shareholder rights plans, otherwise
known as poison pills, leading to a much
lower take-up by issuers. Institutional
investors often oppose them because
they limit the amount of stock they can
acquire, but also increasingly because
they render management insensitive
to shareholder pressure—especially
with the development of a new range
of pills designed to combat shareholder
activists.
However, according to new figures
from Proxy Insight, the poison pill isn’t
as unpopular as the world has been
led to believe. Since 2012, nearly 2,000
votes have been cast by investors on
poison pill resolutions at non-Japanese
companies worldwide. Of those votes,
73% have been in favor of implementing
or retaining a pill, and thirty-three
investors approved pills on every occasion.
Below, Proxy Insight highlights the
investors most likely to vote for or
against management proposals on
rights plans (having done so on 10 or
more occasions). Aviva, TIAA-CREF
and AQR Capital Management are
among those that have the most positive
approach to pills, while Deutsche
Investment Management Americas and
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company
prove even more hostile than the likes of
CalPERS or CalSTRS.
Last October, Sotheby’s adopted a
poison pill with a trigger of 10% for
investors filing a Schedule 13D. During
activist investor Third Point Partners’
subsequent litigation of the pill, e-mails
were read out in court from the auction
house’s financial advisers suggesting
the pill be dropped if key shareholders
Blackrock and Vanguard were opposed.
According to Proxy Insight, however,
those two investors backed poison pills
in 59% and 96% of the management
proposals they voted on respectively.
The activist lost the court case, but the
Delaware judge said he was “generally
sympathetic” to arguments that pills
deterring activism at US companies
were “inherently troubling.” Had Third
Point not been heading for a likely
victory in its proxy contest anyway, the
court might have seen fit to oppose
the company’s decision (Sotheby’s
subsequently offered Third Point three
seats on the board in return for a
standstill agreement).
At Japanese companies, the picture
is radically different. Of the 4,229
proposals covered by the database,
investors voted for poison pills just 4% of
the time, suggesting that they have not
proved popular since their introduction
in 2005. With Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
promising better corporate governance
to reboot growth in the country, pills
seem unlikely to take off again.
Do investors really hate poison pills?A look at the latest research from Proxy Insight
Votes on poison pill resolutions:
3
1
3
2Voting policies and contacts of each investor
Who voted and how at any shareholder meeting
How an institution typically votes on a particular issue
As simple as:
Call or visit our website to arrange a trial:
+44 (0) 20 7788 7772 • www.proxyinsight.com
Data from Proxy
Insight indicates that
the average level
of shareholder opposition
to remuneration at the world’s
largest banks has reached
highs last seen in 2012.
The results of mostly non-binding
“say on pay” votes at the annual
meetings of the top 20 banks saw
an average 13.1% of shareholders
vote against management in
2014—the same as in 2012, and a
significant increase on the
average 8.4% who voted
against management last year.
A number of high profile revolts
during this year’s proxy season
embarrassed the likes of Barclays,
JP Morgan Chase and Standard
Chartered, which all received votes
against exceeding 20% of their
shareholder base. What has been
less noted is that opposition to
bankers’ pay is more dif fuse today
than in 2012, with votes against
management exceeding 10% at ten
banks. In 2012, the remuneration
policies of f ive of these 20
banks received votes against
of 10% or more. Fig 1.
below provides further detail.
Who votes against?
Proxy Insight has analysed the
remuneration votes of major
institutional investors at each bank
during 2013 to illustrate the level of
opposition from long-term investors.
Domini, Trill ium and Green Century
opposed management on every
remuneration vote, where they
voted, as did Proxy Voting Advisor
PIRC, which has a large influence
over local authority pension funds.
Public pension funds such as
PGGM, British Columbia and APG
also voted against management on
a frequent basis. However, perhaps
more significant is that a number
of traditional asset managers
such as Aviva, Threadneedle
and Fidelity Worldwide opposed
at least half the remuneration
resolutions where they voted. The
full data are shown in Fig 2. below.
Fig 2. Shareholders/advisors who
voted against/abstained from bank
remuneration proposals:
Rank Shareholder/Advisor Against/
Abstain
1 Domini Social
Investments
100%
2 Trillium Asset
Management
100%
3 PIRC 100%
4 Green Century Capital
Management
100%
5 PGGM Investments 72.2%
6 British Columbia
Investment Management
Corporation
61.5%
7 Aviva Investors 53.3%
8 APG 50%
9 Threadneedle
Investments
50%
10 Fidelity Worldwide
Investment
50%
Revolt on bankers’ compensation spreadingA look at the latest research from Proxy Insight
Bank 2012 2013 2014 Bank 2012 2013 2014 Bank 2012 2013 2014
Citigroup 54.6 8.3 14.9 HSBC 10.2 11.0 16.1 BNP Paribas n/a n/a 6.8
UBS 36.8 15.8 11.2 JP Morgan 7.2 5.5 21.2 Bank of America 6.9 6.1 6.4
Credit Suisse 31.6 10.3 16.6 Goldman Sachs 5.1 12.3 16.5 Lloyds 2.3 4.1 12.7
Barclays 26.9 5.3 24.0 Morgan Stanley 5.2 13.2 7.3 Banco Santander 8.1 6.4 4.0
Standard Chartered 7.4 7.2 40.8 Deutsche Bank 5.8 11.3 n/a Wells Fargo 3.4 2.2 2.1
Fig 1. Top global banks—% votes against for remuneration plans:
What’s different in the banking
remuneration votes this year?
There’s a lot going on this year. The
new EU bonus cap is affecting the
way remuneration is structured and
approved. Previously, shareholders
have only voted on the directors’
remuneration report, but with the EU
bonus cap, there is also the vote on
employee pay for the first time.
Then there are the new pay regulations
from the UK government, which have
introduced binding voting on pay
policies, and an advisory vote on
disclosure. There seems to have been a
lot of lobbying by companies behind the
scenes to avoid the embarrassment of
losing the binding vote, with companies
calling up shareholders and asking
them to change their votes already cast.
And disappointingly some will have
changed their votes, no doubt about it.
What sort of concerns has PIRC been
raising about compensation in the
banking sector?
PIRC looks at three things; the
appropriateness of the pay policy
as a reward system, whether the
contract is too weighted in favour of the
employee (including Golden Hello’s),
and how remuneration is disclosed.
A company arguably could have a
good remuneration policy, but if it isn’t
transparent, by definition shareholders
can’t tell whether it’s a good policy.
PIRC has a reputation as a hardliner
on corporate governance and
compensation. Are you comfortable
with that reputation?
You say it is hardline, but PIRC’s
positions have increasingly been proved
to be right over time. Back in 1993,
PIRC was the first in the UK to focus on
pay, calling for a shareholder vote even
then. Even as late in 2008, I was on a
public platform with people in banking
regulation who were totally dismissive of
the idea that pay could pose a systemic
risk in the way banks were run. The
PIRC position is now the mainstream
asset owner view.
Then there are non-audit fees, where
we have seen a very relaxed approach
from the UK regulator barely dealing
with the disclosure of non-audit fees.
However, pending the EU directive,
some types of non-audit work are now
prohibited from being carried out by a
company’s auditor. There is also a cap
on fees for non-audit work to not exceed
70% of the value of audit fees. PIRC has
recommended removing auditors on
these grounds, but the legislation will
go one step further and actually make
it unlawful.
Do you think more auditors will be
removed by shareholders in future?
Hopefully they will be at least on quality
grounds. The Financial Reporting
Council has finally decided after the Co-
Op Bank scandal [where a large capital
hole was discovered by the PRA last
year] that there is a systemic problem
with banking audits. PIRC is increasingly
looking at the past record of auditors,
and to some extent, directors of failed
banks in this regard. For instance,
PIRC recommended voting against the
appointment of KPMG as auditors at
HSBC because the lead audit partner,
Guy Bainbridge, was also the auditor at
HBOS. You may call it hard line, but it’s
based on risk and analysis.
Tim Bush is the Head of
Governance and Financial Analysis
at Pension & Investment Research
Consultants Limited, Europe’s
largest independent corporate
governance and shareholder
advisory consultancy.
Hardline? How about insightful?An interview with Tim Bush, PIRC
You may call it hard line, but it’s based on risk and
analysis”“
6
THE INVESTOR RELATIONS SOCIETY28 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
TODAY’S IR:
VALUE
// TUESDAY 17TH JUNE 2014
VISIT WWW.IRS.ORG.UKFOR MORE INFORMATION ANDTO BOOK YOUR PLACE
CREATINGTOMORROW’S
// KINGS PLACE, 90 YORK WAY, LONDON N1 9AG
A WORLD-CLASS PANEL OF SPEAKERS WILL EXPLORE INVESTORRELATIONS BEST PRACTICE INTERNATIONALLY AND DISCUSS WHAT ISREQUIRED TO GROW COMPANIES’ VALUE NOW AND IN THE FUTURE
PLATINUM GOLD SILVER SILVER EVENTS MEDIA PARTNER SUPPORTER
TH
CII seeks more regulation from the SEC
on golden leashes
With activism on the rise compensation
arrangements between activists and
their board nominees, known as
golden leashes, have come under
greater scrutiny. The Council of
Institutional Investors (CII) recently
wrote a letter to the SEC expressing its
concerns regarding the transparency
of compensation paid in golden
leash arrangements. Golden leash
arrangements occur when a shareholder
activist privately offers to compensate its
nominee directors in connection with
the nominees’ service as a director
of a target company. CII said in its
letter that “disclosure rules that apply
to contested proxy solicitations fail to
sufficiently address compensation. CII’s
suggestions include “the existence of any
compensatory arrangements between
a board nominee and a nominating
shareholder relating to the nominee’s
candidacy or board service; the specific
components of any compensatory
arrangements; and disclosure regarding
any conflicts of interest presented by
such compensation arrangements.”
CII’s request for greater transparency
regarding third party compensation is
most likely an effort to align it with the
disclosure required for other forms of
director compensation.
Shareholders vote against compensation
at Chipotle
Chipotle saw the greatest level
of opposition to its executive
compensation, for any company so
far this year, with 77% of shareholders
voting against. Chipotle increased stock
awards by 15% this year, despite co-
CEOs, Steve Ells and Monty Moran,
receiving $25.1 million and $24.4
million, respectively in 2013. ISS and
Glass Lewis both recommended a vote
against compensation at the company.
Shareholders also rejected a further
increase of 2.6 million shares to its
existing stock-incentive plan. Calls for
refreshment of the board were reflected
by support for a shareholder resolution
reducing the requirement for the removal
of directors from a supermajority to a
majority.
Two strike rule increasing influence of
proxy advisors
With the strict two strike rule now in
full force in Australia, companies are
calling for greater regulation of proxy
firms. The two strike rule means that if
25% of shareholders vote against the
remuneration report for two consecutive
years then the shareholders will vote at
the same AGM to determine whether
all the directors will need to stand
for re-election at a spill meeting. If a
majority of shareholders support this
resolution then the board has to be
subject to an election within 90 days. A
consequence of this rule is that proxy
advisors recommendations can have
very significant effects. Companies are
requesting that if advisors recommend a
vote against proposals at a company’s
AGM then the advisor should have to
alert the company ahead of the meeting
so they can address any concerns.
Trend of activism set to continue in 2014
Investors predict a trend of activism
this year to rival that of the shareholder
spring of 2012 with many shareholders
opposing proposals at big companies
like Barclays, AstraZeneca, National
Express and Standard Chartered.
Glass Lewis rated compensation
as “poor” at a number of big banks
including Morgan Stanley, Goldman
Sachs, UBS and Credit Suisse. The
EU is looking at legislation that would
enforce say on pay in all of its countries.
Compensation is not the only issue that
shareholders are angry about. Glencore
Xstrata came under fire after remaining
the only member of the FTSE 100 not to
appoint a female director.
Wal-Mart to suffer through uncomfortable
AGM
Wal-Mart has been criticized on a range
of issues from bribery and corruption to
executive compensation by shareholders
and advisors alike. In response to
investigations into violations of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Mexico,
Brazil, China and India; ISS and Glass
Lewis have expressed their support for a
News summaryA round-up of the latest developments in proxy voting
ISS & Glass Lewis both recommended a vote against
compensation at Chipotle”“
8
shareholder proposal seeking an annual
report on recoupment of executive pay
“as a result of a determination that the
senior executive breached a company
policy or engaged in conduct inimical
to the interests of or detrimental to
Walmart.” So far the company has
spent $450 million on the investigation.
ISS and CtW are also recommending
a vote against the company’s advisory
vote on executive compensation. Wal-
Mart’s founding family controls more
than half its outstanding shares, so the
recommendation likely won’t have any
effect. Instead investors have begun to
express displeasure with Wal-Mart via
the company’s stock. Wal-Mart’s shares
have fallen 2% over the last year.
41% of shareholder oppose Standard
Chartered compensation
ISS and Glass Lewis recommended
a vote against compensation at the
bank after changes to its pay structure
this year meant a significantly larger
proportion of variable pay is now based
on single-year targets. This goes against
government efforts to encourage banks
to focus compensation on longer
term targets in an attempt to avoid the
excessive risk taking that contributed
to the financial crisis. 75% of CEO
Peter Sands’ total variable pay for 2014
will be based on performance in that
year alone. A significant increase over
the 42% in 2013, when the majority of
his variable pay was based on targets
spread over three years. Longer-term
performance targets make up about
two-thirds of variable pay at other UK
banks, according to Glass Lewis.
Nabors governance failures raise ire of
advisors
ISS and Glass Lewis are recommending
a vote against executive pay at
Nabors. CEO Anthony Petrello’s 2013
compensation is valued at $68.2 million.
ISS is recommending a vote against
six out of seven of Nabors directors,
whilst Glass Lewis is recommending a
vote against the three members of the
compensation committee. Large pay
packages are only one of the governance
concerns at Nabors. The company
tried to defend itself by pointing out
improvements it has made recently such
as limited proxy access. ISS and Glass
Lewis criticized Nabors for not going far
enough with proxy access. A shareholder
proposal to permit a shareholder with at
least a 3% stake held for three years or
more to nominate competing candidates
for up to 25% of the board’s seats was
approved by shareholders in 2012 and
2013. The company has failed its say-
on-pay vote for the past three years.
In addition, Nabors didn’t accept the
resignation of directors John Yearwood
and John Lombardi after they received
less-than-majority support last year.
At this year’s AGM shareholders voted
against the entire compensation
committee. John Lombardi and John
Yearwood failed to be re-elected
again, each only receiving 46.4% votes
in favour; additionally, Michael Linn
received only 49.5% votes in favour. As
in 2013, Nabors decided not to accept
the resignation of any of the directors.
Shareholders also voted against the
company’s say-on-pay for the 4th year
in a row with 62.4% of voting against.
58.32% supported a proposal to elect
directors by a majority vote.
ISS against Target board after data
breach
ISS is recommending a vote against 7
out of 10 directors at Target in wake
of huge data breach that resulted in the
theft of 40 million credit card numbers.
ISS justified its recommendation by
saying that the company’s audit and
corporate responsibility committees,
which are responsible for risk oversight,
were not prepared for the risks of online
shopping. Target has already fired its
CEO in connection with the breach and
has said that it is reviewing its entire
risk oversight and reporting structure.
ISS is also recommending a vote for
a shareholder proposal to appoint an
independent chairman.
PIRC opposes WPP remuneration
PIRC is advising against WPP’s pay
package for its CEO, Martin Sorrell.
He will receive £29.84 million, a 40%
increase from £17.6 million in 2012,
making him the highest paid chief
executive in the FTSE 100. This is in
spite of 20% of shareholders voting
against WPP’s remuneration last year.
Shareholders reject say on pay at Staples
Shareholders at Staples voted against
the company’s say on pay after
the company created a new “2013
Reinvention Cash Award” of $500,000
to award to 4 of its top executives.
The bonus was created because poor
performance at the company meant
the executives wouldn’t qualify for their
usual bonuses. ISS and Glass Lewis
both criticized the decision with ISS
recommending a vote against say on
pay. Staples tried to justify the award
by arguing that it was designed to retain
talent after not paying a bonus in two
years and to reward the executives extra
efforts in turning the company around.
Shareholders also supported a proposal
to separate the chairman and CEO.
Shareholders vent frustrations at
Morrisons AGM
Investors expressed their displeasure
at Morrisons as more than 15.4% of
shareholders voted against re-electing
Dalton Philips as CEO, with most
directors receiving over 10% of votes
against. 26.5% of shareholders also
voted against approving the company’s
remuneration policy.
PIRC is advising against WPP’s
pay package for its CEO, Martin Sorrell”“
9
www.activistinsight.com
The definitive resource on activist investing
Market-leading commentary, analysis and profiling of all activist situations worldwide
Detailed profiles of over 250 activist investors
worldwide, including investment strategy, activist
holdings and performance.
Live and exclusive news service and alerts system,
keeping you informed of all activist situations
worldwide.
Market analysis, intermediary profiling, bespoke
data requests and much more...