Hemisphere

Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 1

2005

Volume 15, Summer 2005

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Volume 15, Summer 2005

This issue is available in Hemisphere: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/lacc_hemisphere/vol15/iss1/1

Lul a'sBrazil

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Florida International University2005 Summer Study Abroad Programs in Brazil

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LANGUAGE AND CULTUREIN RIO DE JANEIRO

June 25-August 6, 2005

Administered jointly with the

University of Florida

Study Portuguese at Rio's top private language school, the Instituto Brasil-Estados Unidos(IBEU), in Copacabana. The program features lectures and cultural activities, as well as excur-

sions to historical and cultural sites in the city and state of Rio de Janeiro.

For more information, visit the program website, www.clas.ufl.edu/users/cap/IBEU2005or contact Dr. Timothy Power at (305) 348-3295, powertj@fiu.edu

PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE ANDBRAZILIAN CULTURE IN

BELO HORIZONTE

June 1-30, 2005

Held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), one of the most

important and traditional universities in Brazil. Courses are taught by FIU and PUC Minas

faculty and include weekend excursions to historic towns such as Ouro Preto, Mariana and

Sabara to view the region's famous baroque art.

For more information, see the program website, www.fiu.edu/-modlang/pages/sap_brazil.htm

or contact Augusta Vono, Program Director, at (305) 349-2049, vonoa@fiu.edu

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*SM E 2005

* TP/LC.I.DII I

FROM THE EDITOR

FROM THE GUEST EDITOR

REPORTS

Fragile Threads

Bananas, Beats, Bossas

FEATURES

Brazilian Democracy at Twenty

A New Era for Brazil's Economy?

Rethinking Foreign Investment

Facing the Past

Learning with Brazil and Lula

PHOTO ESSAY

Drought and Hope in the Sertdo

REVIEW FORUM

US-Brazilian Relations

PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

Lula and the Workers' Party

Eduardo A. Gamarra

Timothy J. Power

Rosana Resende

Charles A. Perrone

Timothy J. Power

Edmund Amann

Roy C. Nelson

James N. Green

Tanya Dawkins

Ricardo Funari

Donna J. Hrinak

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7

10

14

18

23

26

30

38

Marian Goslinga

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HemisphereVOUE1 * SUME 0 HTP/LC. IU.D

EDITORIAL STAFF

Founding EditorEditor

Associate Editors

Managing EditorArt Editor

Book Review EditorBibliographer

Anthony P. MaingotEduardo A. GamarraMark B. RosenbergRichard TardanicoPatricia PriceAlisa NewmanPedro D. BottaIvelaw GriffithMarian Goslinga

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Uva de Arag6nDavid Bray

Janet M. ChernelaMichael W. Collier

Carol DamianDamian J. Fernindez

Sarah MahlerWalt PeacockLisandro PdrezAna RocaAndrea Mantell SeidelVictor Uribe

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Don BohningEttore Botta

Wolf GrabendorffAlistair Hennessy

Harry HoetnikFranklin W. Knight

Vaughan LewisLarissa A. Lomnitz

Abraham E LowenthalTerry L. McCoy

Andres OppenheimerRobert A. Pastor

Anthony J. Payne

Guido PennanoAlejandro PortesSally PriceDavid RonfeldtSelwyn RyanSteven E. SandersonSaskia SassenAndrds SerbinCarol A. SmithLourdes SolaYolande Van EeuwenArturo VillarJuan Yanes

Hemisphere (ISSN 08983038) is published twice a year by the LatinAmerican and Caribbean Center at Florida International University.Copyright © 2005 by the Latin American and Caribbean Center,Florida International University. All rights reserved. Printed in theUnited States of America.

Hemisphere is dedicated to provoking debate on the problems, initia-tives and achievements of the Americas. Responsibility for the viewsexpressed lies solely with the authors.

Editorial, Circulation and Advertising Offices: Latin American andCaribbean Center, Florida International University, University Park,DM 353, Miami, Florida, 33199, Tel.: (305) 348-2894, Fax: (305)348-3593, E-mail: gamarrae@fiu.edu.

S even years ago, Alisa Newman became

managing editor of Hemisphere and of

all publications at the Latin American

and Caribbean Center. Alisa came to

us from LatinFinance and promptly set out to

significantly improve the quality and style of the

magazine. I was especially impressed with the

breadth of knowledge she possessed of Latin

American and Caribbean affairs. As a result, she

became more than a copy editor, she proposed

topics, recruited articles, and edited each and

every one of them to meet the quality standards

that she established for the magazine.

This is the last issue of Hemisphere that bears

Alisa Newman's magical touch. She worked very

closely with Timothy Power, the guest editor of

this issue to produce this outstanding collection

of articles on Brazil. Alisa announced shortly

before this issue was completed that she was leav-

ing LACC and Hemisphere to concentrate on her

family. She and her husband Juan Carlos will be

parents to a second child this coming fall.

We were privileged to have worked with Alisa

and will miss her greatly. LACC wishes her well

and thanks her for the many years of dedicated

effort she gave to Hemisphere. Her duties will be

assumed by Pedro Botta, who will also continue

to produce the magazine. I am delighted to wel-

come him as managing editor.

EDUARDO A. GAMARRA

2 Hemisphere Volume 15

bservers of Latin America are well aware that one country is responsible for nearly half of theregion's population and economy. With its continental dimensions, Brazil is large enough to war-rant a Hemisphere of its own-and that, in fact, is what you have in your hands. In this specialissue, Hemisphere looks at developments in Brazil under its new, history-making president, LuizInicio "Lula" da Silva.

Since his inauguration in January 2003, President Lula has seemed to be everywhere at once. Domestically, Lulahas continued the economic reforms of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and has attempted to deliverthe magic formula that has proven elusive in Brazil's recent past-sustainable growth without inflation. Regionally,Lula has become the linchpin in a new cooperative axis among the four Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil,Chile and Uruguay), all of which now have socialist or progressive presidents for the first time in history. Globally,Lula has worked tirelessly to maximize Brazil's visibility and influence in international affairs. Whether pressing theflesh in a Rio favela, pushing paper in his third-floor office in Brasilia, or skirting the globe in his gleaming newAirbus A-319, Lula is setting a new standard for activist leadership in Latin America.

This issue of Hemisphere explores Brazilian politics, economics, culture and society. My essay looks at the state ofBrazilian democracy on its twentieth anniversary in 2005. While the regime seems secure in terms of its basic sur-vival, massive inequality and continual institutional stalemates erode the quality of the democracy that is being deliv-ered to citizens. Ed Amann's essay on economic performance reviews the many obstacles that inhibit sustainabledevelopment. Many economic challenges are related to the questdo social in Brazil, particularly the country's notedinability to catch up with Asian competitors in terms of human capital. Roy Nelson explains why, despite its protec-tionist history, the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT) has adopted a more favorable attitude toward for-eign direct investment since coming to power in 2003.

Tanya Dawkins and Jim Green examine the PT's relationship to organized social movements. Dawkins shows thatLula's decision to maintain the tight-money, low-inflation policies of his predecessor has led to disappointment with-in the progressive coalition that backed the PT during its two decades in opposition. The most vocal opposition toLulas policies has, in fact, come from the left, leading to important defections from the PT. Green's essay revisitsBrazil's authoritarian legacy and shows that even under the Lula government-which contains many important fig-ures exiled and tortured by the military regime of 1964-1985-human rights activists are still waiting for a fullaccounting of the past.

Two articles examine society and culture. In discussing the diffusion of Brazilian musical forms, Charles Perroneshows why Brazil is "hot" in terms of its large-and growing-cultural influence. In fact, Lula's minister of culture,Gilberto Gil, has been a dominant figure in world music over the past four decades. Rosana Resende's essay beginsby illustrating how these cultural influences are washing over South Florida, brought by many thousands of Brazilianimmigrants, and goes on to show the many difficult challenges faced by these new arrivals. The lives of these immi-grants are dramatized in the Globo network's new telenovela, entitled simply America, which began running in March2005 and features numerous scenes shot in Miami. Lula is a political figure here as well. On the day of his historicelection in October 2002, the lines snaking out of the polling station set up by the Brazilian Consulate at CoralGables High School showed that, politically speaking, Miami has become a Brazilian municipio like any other.

This issue showcases a photo essay by Ricardo Funari documenting life in the arid, impoverished sertdo of theBrazilian Northeast, whence the future President Lula migrated to Sdo Paulo as a small boy. We also feature a bookreview contributed by Hon. Donna Hrinak, the distinguished US Ambassador to Brazil from 2002 to 2004 and afrequent visitor to FIU. Marian Goslinga closes the issue with a bibliography of new sources on Lula, the PT andcontemporary Brazilian affairs.

I am grateful to Dr. Eduardo Gamarra for the kind invitation to serve as guest editor of this special issue; to thecontributors for their fine essays; and to Pedro Botta and Alisa Newman for their advice and support along the way.This will be Alisa's final edition of Hemisphere, and my regret at her departure is tempered only by the pleasure ofhaving worked with her on this special issue on Brazil.

TIMOTHYJ. POWER

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Fragile Threadsby Rosana Resende

It's a balmy summer night andhundreds of Brazilians gatherin front of an oversize moviescreen on a beach. Yet anotherfilm festival is opening with a

free screening of the previous year'sAudience Award recipient. Later inthe festival, reporters from theBrazilian network Rede Globo inter-view filmgoers as they wait. Andwait they must, in long, messy lines,as promoters for events and productssuch as alai ice cream and cachafaroam the crowd plying their trade.Surrounding establishments vie forcustomers as the screening ends.Perhaps some will go listen to liveBossa Nova at a local jazz bar andcafe, or savor pizza and caipirinhas atthe palm tree-lined outdoor mallnearby. This particular film festivaldraws thousands of people, includ-ing distribution executives from allover the Americas, to see the best ofnew Brazilian cinema. It is a power-ful vehicle for disseminatingBrazilian art and culture.

Some miles away, perhaps lesstrendy but no less exciting to itspatrons, a restaurant begins its week-end evening routine, turning downthe lights and opening the dancefloor for forrd night. The live band,complete with accordion and trian-gle, essential forrd instruments, beltsout songs as the dancers glide by inthe familiar two-step of the Braziliannortheast. There are men in cowboyboots, women in tight, low-ridingjeans, and lots of beer. Some mencomplain that the women prefer theforeign men to the Brazilians, and asthere are many more men thanwomen here, the women can affordto be choosy. Before midnight the

numbers peak, crowding out fromthe dance floor those eager to showoff fancy footwork and leaving onlysweaty bodies bumping up againsteach other while trying to avoidstepping on any feet. A typicalSaturday night in Brazil, you mightthink, and in fact none of thiswould be remarkable were it takingplace in Rio, Salvador or Recife.But I am describing a night in SouthFlorida.

Fragile ThreadsThese examples are only a few

manifestations of the expandingBrazilian presence in South Florida,but they encapsulate some strikingaspects of the Brazilian populationliving in the area; namely, its diversi-ty and geographical spread. Muchas in Brazil itself, Brazilians in SouthFlorida have little more in commonthan language and nationality, andin fact often seem to function in dis-tinct and disjointed worlds dividedby social class, region of origin, faithand, here in the United States, docu-ments. To speak of a Brazilian"community" in South Florida issomewhat of a misnomer. The eth-nic press echoes the sentiments ofmany local Brazilians when it callsfor more community and complainsof a lack of solidarity. Large out-pourings of national pride, evidentafter World Cup soccer victories,dissipate into fragmented preferencesand possibilities for just about every-thing else, from the trite (whichbeach to hang out on) to the telling(how often to visit Brazil). National-ity and language, as it turns out, arerather fragile threads by which toknit a community.

But just who, and where, are theseBrazilians of South Florida? Thethree southeastern counties ofMiami-Dade, Broward and PalmBeach are home to a sizable Brazilianpopulation, with estimates runningfrom 20,000 on the conservative endto upwards of 200,000. The realnumber, likely in the middle of thisrange, is difficult to divine, as is thecase with any immigrant populationthat includes an undetermined num-ber of undocumented persons.What is certain, however, is thatvarying concentrations of Braziliansfrom all regions of Brazil live in thisarea, from southern Miami-Dade(Kendall) to northern Palm Beach(Delray Beach). Pompano Beachand Deerfield Beach in Browardhave whole strip malls of Brazilian-owned and targeted businesses. Thetri-county area now boasts a publicschool that offers a fully bilingualcurriculum with 40% of instructionin Portuguese, two Brazilian culturalcenters, more than 30 churches andtemples, and countless restaurants,stores, nightclubs and markets. Thisimmigrant stream includes the exec-utives who organize events like theBrazilian Film Festival, those whoattend it, and those who park thecars of the moviegoers and clean upthe theater after hours. Three yearsof researching this population inMiami-Dade and Broward countieshave led me to conclude thatBrazilian immigration shows no signof stopping and only promises toincrease in size and diversity.

Tropical BrazucasRenewed waves of disappointment

in Brazil as the purported "land of

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Brazilians in South Florida

Since the 1980s, Miami has attracted a diverse lot of Brazilian immigrants.

the future" have ensured a steadystream of people leaving the countryin search of opportunity and stabili-ty. Beginning in the early 1980s, onthe heels of democratization, intensi-fying with the disillusionment of thepost-Collor 1990s and beyond-asboth Cardoso and now Lula failed todeliver a sustainable economic mira-cle-emigration has steadily becomea viable option for Brazilians, whoseimage of their own country is that ofa land of immigrants.

According to Itamaraty, Brazil'sMinistry of Foreign Relations,approximately two million Brazilianslive outside of Brazil. Brazilians arescattered across the globe, with largepopulations in Japan and Europe,including many who gained entry byheritage claim. But most Braziliansliving abroad headed north toCanada and the United States, somuch so that Globo's new primetimesoap opera, entitled simply America,specifically deals with the plight ofBrazilian immigrants. In the US,

several metropolitan areas boast sig-nificant populations of these trans-

plants, most notably New York,Boston and Miami, with lesser con-centrations in other cities.

Metropolitan Miami has receivedlarge numbers of immigrants only inthe last 40 years or so, when a largeinflux of Cubans fleeing Castro's rev-olution established the first signifi-cant enclave. Since the 1980s, how-ever, the area has grown tremendous-ly and attracted diverse populationsof Latin American and Caribbeannationals, including Brazilians. Likemany immigrant groups in the area,some of the first South Floridabrazucas, as Brazilians in the US aresometimes called, were at the upperend of the socioeconomic spectrum,relocated by their companies ordrawn here by the large concentra-tion of corporate Latin Americanheadquarters in Miami.

Even in its origins, the Brazilianpopulation in South Florida showsdiversity. This trend goes beyond theeventual diversity of established com-munities, whereby ever-expandingnetworks of employees and relativesserve to verticalize the social struc-

ture and broaden the geographicalreach. My research thus far indicatesthree distinct points of origin, inher-ently diverse in their makeup. Inaddition to the corporate settlers,other "pioneers" include tourismindustry workers and "snowbirds,"Brazilians who previously settled inpoints north and migrated south-ward in search of warmer weather.These three trunks, if you will, inturn led to different patterns of set-tlement and expansion, and differentchains of subsequent migrants. Thesnowbirds, for example, pulledBrazilians from other parts of the USto follow them to sunny Florida.And where they settled in SouthFlorida involved questions of space,affordability and work opportunity.

One former hospitality worker Imet arrived in the 1970s and used tospend six months a year workinglegally in the resorts of Boca Raton(catering to "traditional" snowbirds)and the other six months in Brazil.Eventually, he found stable, year-round work in downtown Miami,but without proper work authoriza-tion, at a Brazilian restaurant thatcatered to Brazilian tourists on vaca-tion. He was able to bring his familyand settled in Broward Countybecause rent there was less expensive.Over the years, he normalized hisfamily's legal status and eventuallycame to provide food for Braziliansin a different way, as the owner of aBrazilian ethnic market for immi-grants in Pompano Beach.

Misfits and BackstabbersThe diversity in points of origin

only partly explains the lack of socialcohesion among South Florida

Hemisphere Volume 15 5

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Brazilians. Another, more seriouschallenge to community exists:internal mistrust and disparagement.Time after time, informants com-plain of a lack of community feelingamong Brazilians here, that theywould do well to emulate the"Latins" and unite for the commongood. These same informants insistthat they specifically avoid doingbusiness with Brazilians, or thatBrazilians can't be trusted. As evi-dence, I have been told horror sto-ries of backstabbing, exploitationand threats-of roommates whosteal each other's jobs, family mem-bers charging $50 for a car ride,exorbitant rents, and employers whorefuse to pay their workers andthreaten to report them to immigra-tion authorities should they com-plain. The climate of mistrust isfurthered as these cautionary talesare told to newcomers. As extremeas these experiences may be, howev-er, a more pervasive threat is theresistance on the part of manyBrazilians here to be part of a largercommunity.

Consider the story of Vera, once asuccessful physician in Brazil. Aftera messy divorce, she came to the USto visit a sister and decided to stay.She intended (and still hopes) toobtain a license to practice medicinehere, but as a single mother sheneeded a job compatible with herson's school schedule, leaving her lit-tle time to learn English or study forher boards. Today Vera works as ababysitter. She spent most of ourinterview complaining about life inthe United States and comparing itto the good old days of living inBrazil. Like many other immigrantswho had careers in Brazil they can-not practice here, Vera insisted thatshe had nothing in common withthe Brazilians who live here, describ-ing them as mainly uneducated peo-ple whose only ambition is to makemoney.

Other "misfits" like Vera, individ-uals clearly uneasy with their situa-tion in the United States, believe ina Brazilian social hierarchy thatplaces them in a different categorythan the people they find themselveslumped with here. They distinguishthemselves by prioritizing self-improvement at an intellectual andcultural level, versus purely materialgain, and employ a discourse of dif-ferentiation that further fragmentsthe community:

"I stopped going to church because allpeople talked about was how to get agreen card and how many houses theycleaned a week. "

"You shouldn't interview me. I havenothing in common with otherBrazilians here. "

"We moved further north becausethere were too many Brazilians in thearea."

"Our people are just no good. "

These are people whose currenteconomic capital is less than theircultural capital, blocking their accessto wealthier Brazilian immigrants,but they will not befriend othercountrymen in their situation. Theyalso find something lacking in theirsocial relations with Americans,whom they consider somewhat dis-tant. They complain of lonelinessand long for more friends, evenwhile avoiding friendships withBrazilians. The social codes theylearned in Brazil are no longer appli-cable here, but they insist on main-taining them, focusing less on eco-nomic achievement or occupationand more on their former status inBrazil.

Order and ProgressThe distinct points of origin, geo-

graphical spread, and internal dis-

paragement and mistrust that char-acterize Brazilians in South Floridaare compounded by differencesbrought from Brazil, faith andregional traits, as well as gender, gen-eration and family structure. Thesefactors generate a multitude of com-peting agendas and disjointed proj-ects, complicating the genesis ofcommunity by encouraging multiplefactions that operate in isolationfrom one another.

Despite these differences, Brazilianimmigrants display a remarkablesimilarity and simplicity when thetopic turns to the pros and cons ofliving in the United States. Whetherthe respondents are happy to be hereor not, they invariably cite stabilityand opportunity, safety and account-ability as positive aspects of life inthe US. Here, they say, the laws arerespected and applied equally, andeveryone is treated with fairness andrespect. In the US they find theordem eprogresso ("order andprogress") emblazoned on theBrazilian flag. All that order, howev-er, comes at the cost of flexibilityand familiarity. Brazilians in the UScomplain of robot-like efficiencyand of feeling like a number. Thetruth is that despite all the negativitytoward other Brazilians, saudadelooms large: At heart everyone longsfor family and home, and the gener-al warmth and friendship Braziliansare famous for. Perhaps when theybegin to recognize that basic need intheir fellow brazucas, the Braziliansof South Florida can begin to form acommunity that bridges the gapbetween forrd and bossa nova.

Rosana Resende is a PhD candidate incultural anthropology at the Universityof Florida. She has presented andpublished on the topic of Brazilianimmigration to South Florida and co-organized the seminar "Brazilians out-side Brazil" at the University ofMiami in 2002.

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Bananas, Beats, Bossasby Charles A. Perrone

n the opening scene of PrimalFear (1996, dir. GregoryHoblit), a haunting songplays. The voice is that ofPortuguese diva Dulce Pontes.

She had the good fortune to catchthe ear of lead actor Richard Gere inEurope and he lobbied the directorsto use one of her recordings in thefilm. The selection was "Cando doMar" (Song of the Sea), an appropri-ate title for a composition destinedto cross the ocean. This cinematicchance opened the way for thevocalist to enter specialty musicmarkets in North America moreattuned to the sonorous exports ofthe Portuguese-speaking titan ofSouth America, Brazil. The movieproduction aided Ponte's exposure inthe land of samba and Ipanema aswell. For his part, renowned singer-songwriter Gilberto Gil gave a briefsolo musical performance at theUniversity of California Berkeley inFebruary 2005. His mini-show wasso short because he had come not asa recognized icon of the popular-music industry but to deliver anaddress on contemporary Brazilianculture in his capacity as minister ofculture in the Lula administration.That appointment in itself speaksvolumes about the ascension ofexpressive arts in the current govern-

ment. These two episodes nicelyillustrate diversification and transat-lantic motion in the realm of con-temporary popular culture. Wheremusic, Brazilian varieties and for-tunes abroad are concerned, suchactivity has at least a century of his-tory behind it.

Ever since the birth of the indus-try, Brazil has been a major overseas

Brazilian popular music charmsthe globe, still

client for sound recordings ofsong/dance tunes produced inEurope and the United States. Thetropical nation's celebrated music-makers have always absorbed stylisticinfluences and adapted non-nativeelements to local forms. Responsesto the impact of foreign fashions,notably Anglo-American, have beenevident in Brazilian songwritingsince the 1920s; related commentaryhas often been sarcastic or humor-ous. Since the 1930s, vocalists andmusicians have traveled from Rio deJaneiro and other cities in Brazil toleave their marks abroad-NewYork, Los Angeles, Paris, Japan,Latin American capitals-as enter-tainers, composers, studio hands,sometimes as actors, producers; insum, as players in different senses ofthe word. The flamboyant CarmenMiranda, actually Portuguese bybirth, was the ambassadress ofsamba in the 1940s and 1950s onstage and screen. The Lady in theTutti-Frutti Hat was associated withUncle Sam's Good Neighbor Policyduring World War II, as were, moredirectly, the Latin American animat-ed features of Walt Disney, SaludosAmigos and The Three Caballeros,which showcased Brazilian sounds.The grand cinematic success BlackOrpheus (1959), a French film, wastremendously influential in spread-ing images of Rio de Janeiro, carni-val samba and incipient Bossa Nova.The sophisticated samba-jazz of

Ant6nio Carlos Jobim and his new-knack colleagues created a statesidesensation in the early 1960s. Sincethe mid 1980s, in turn, the USmedia have speculated every coupleof years about the coming of a new"Brazilian wave" or portrayed theworld's fascination with Brazilianmusic as old favorites are remem-bered or new developments catchthe eyes and ears of consumers ondifferent continents.

In the first years of the twenty-first century, the New York Timesweighed in frequently on issues ofBrazilian popular music and its per-formance in cosmopolitan venues,the music business and publishingcircles. Of particular notice werethree translations of books onBrazilian music. One was the nicelyillustrated Bossa Nova, the US ren-dering of the bestselling Chega deSaudade by journalist extraordinaireRuy Castro, an admirable account ofthe epoch-making movement inBrazil. (The Portuguese title is thatof the landmark 1958 song by JoaoGilberto that was cast as "No MoreBlues" in the US jazz repertory.)

The second book to merit attentionwas Os Mutantes: The True Story of aPsychedelic Brazilian Rock Band,which examines a 1960s trio thatbecame an object of keen interest inthe post-rock world in NorthAmerica. The third and mostprominent book, Tropical Truth, wasthe Alfred Knopf-commissioned title

Hemisphere Volume 15 7

Reports

Music icon Gilberto Gil was appointed Brazil's minister of culture by PresidentLuiz Indcio Lula da Silva in 2003. (Photo: Cristina Granato)

of Verdade Tropical, a memoir byCaetano Veloso, the most renownedof all active Brazilian singer-song-writers. Along with Gilberto Gil,Veloso led the eclectic sixties move-ment known as Tropicalism thatbecame the subject of numerousspecials in the North Americanpress, multilingual websites and aca-demic treatises, such as ChristopherDunn's Brutality Garden: Tropiciliaand the Emergence of a BrazilianCounter Culture (2001). Ponderingthe international importance of hisfield, Veloso writes: "Brazilian music... is the most efficient means ofthe worldwide affirmation of thePortuguese language, so many arethe admirers who were conqueredby the sonorous magic of the wordsung in the Brazilian way." In addi-tion to such proud statements,Veloso writes of relations with thebig powers. Like so many artistsand intellectuals before him, he isintrigued by parallels between hisland and the United States: "Brazilis the other giant of America, theother melting pot of races and cul-tures, the other promised paradisefor European and Asian immi-grants, the Other." Gil's diplomaticmissions around the Americas andhis current service in the Lula cabi-net naturally draw attention,national and international, to hisorigins as a public figure in theentertainment sphere, as well as tothe mature relationship betweenofficial government channels andpopular musicians, many of whomstrongly supported Lula during hisdecades of ascent as political leader.

Veloso's latest recording projectsare more about hemispheric rapportand internationalization. In the late1990s he assembled a repertory ofsalient Spanish American songs andtoured in support of the album FinaEstampa. One must remember thatthe bolero was prominent enoughon the mid-century musical menu

8 Hemisphere Volume 15

Reports

of Brazil that a new hybrid genrewas spawned, the sambolero, a vari-ant of the lyrical samba. Thebreadth and Latin American spiritof Fina Estampa are consistent withVeloso's concerns for creative repriseand global perspective. The venturemay have begun as a way by therecording company to reach Pan-American markets but it turned outto be a most elegant exploit indeed,both in the studio and on stage(and live CD). A lesson to belearned from this singer-songwriter'smany colorful roles is that showbusiness and art really can be mutu-ally inclusive. Veloso further turnedthe language issue on its head withhis 2004 release, A Foreign Sound,an album consisting entirely ofcompositions in English by suchsongsmiths as Cole Porter, NeilSedaka, Kurt Cobain, Bob Dylanand David Byrne.

No North American artist hasdone more to promote currentBrazilian popular music than theformer leader of Talking Heads. In1989, Byrne's solo label, Luaka Bop,issued the landmark CD BelezaTropical, a compilation of artists ofthe post-Bossa Nova sixties genera-tion. This Brazil Classics series con-tinued with a couple of genreanthologies, O Samba and Forrd Etc.(traditional accordion-based north-eastern dance music), followed by aretrospective and new releases bythe eccentric pop composer andexperimental poet of sound, TomZd, who won special recognition inseveral music publications. Byrneput together a Latin band andtoured with diva MargarethMenezes, a proponent of neo-Afro-Bahian axe music (a curious market-conscious use of the English nounmodified by a Yoruba word for "lifeforce"). The sponsorship of tradi-tional and vanguard-inspired musi-cal offerings from Brazil insured anotherwise unthinkable exposure,

prompted distribution of the for-eign-theme collections, and thrustBrazilian tracks even further intothe whirlwind of so-called "worldmusic."

Since the mid 1990s, numerousother US and UK artists-perhapsmost notably the sui generis Beck-have demonstrated particular inter-est in aspects of Brazilian popularmusic. One extremely interestingcase of new sounds in the 1990swas an ethno-pop movement in thenortheast called Mangue Beat(mangue is the shantytown man-grove wetland in the city of Recife).If most Brazilian rock of the 1980sdid not stray too far from metropol-itan models, this local version privi-leged regional difference, overlayingfunk, hip hop, and metal onto folkforms, principally the percussionheavy African-derived carnival prac-tice known as maracatu. The cen-terpiece of this postmodern flourishwas Chico Science & NaioZumbi, a group plenty aware of tra-dition but that identified with glob-al youth culture and cyberspace. Asevidence of its "globalized" enter-prise, the group sent its first albumto music festivals and promotersabroad, winning a contract fromSony Music, which successfullymarketed this fresh "world music."Chico Science & Nagao Zumbiappeared at the Montreux JazzFestival, CBGBs (a key site of theNew York underground rock scene),and the Central Park Summer Stagein New York, which led to a lengthyfeature on National Public Radio.

NPR's Afropop Worldwide pro-gram, it is worth noting, has awhole sub-catalogue of Brazilianshows, including more recent oneson soul and Jorge Ben Jor (of "Maisque Nada" fame). Conventionalmedia like radio are now greatlycomplemented by virtual vehicles(for example, the websiteafropop.org and endless Brazilian

sites linked to broadcasters). ChicoScience was one of the firstBrazilian acts to use digital commu-nication to great advantage. TheInternet, of course, has had atremendous and ever-increasingimpact on transnational flows ofmusic and music information. Theever-diplomatic Gilberto Gil evenpenned a clever tune, "PelaInternet," that harkens back to theofficial origins of samba as an urbanpopular form. Brazil has kept up anoutstanding presence in Internet-based aspects of cultural interaction,particularly those related to popularmusic. The surge of dot-com dataand e-commerce since the 1990s, aswell as the burgeoning aficionadodomains, have truly enhanced accessto, and the growth of, all kinds ofBrazilian popular music around theglobe-acoustic instrumental reper-tories (carioca choro), samba schools(Japan to Sweden), Lusophonebrands of rap (and reggae!), loungeand neo-Bossa Nova (BebelGilberto), original house tracks(hear London!)-even, when thestars are aligned appropriately, inthe theaters of Miami Beach. As forthe Internet, Gil's recent happen-ing-engaging address, provocativediscussion, and charming musicalmoments-is archived (http://webcast.berkeley.edu/events) for allto relive and contemplate. U

Charles A. Perrone is a professor ofPortuguese and Luso-Brazilian litera-ture and culture in the Department ofRomance Languages and Literaturesat the University of Florida, where heis also affiliated with the Center forLatin American Studies. He is co-editor with Christopher Dunn ofBrazilian Popular Music andGlobalization (University Press ofFlorida, 2001)

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Brazilian Democracy at Twentyby Timothy J. Power

O n March 15, 1985,Brazil's last militarydictator, General JoioFigueiredo, quietlyslipped out the back

door of the presidential palace.Figueiredo had refused to hand thepresidential sash to Jose Sarney, whowas sworn in moments later as thefirst civilian president in more than20 years. It is difficult to believe that20 years have passed since that fate-ful day. On March 15, 2005,Brazilians quietly celebrated thebeginning of a third decade of demo-cratic rule. On the anniversary ofthe political transition, in the samethird-floor office once occupied bythe generals who jailed him, satPresident Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva,the symbol of a new Brazil. Thedemocratic regime founded in 1985is now Lula's laboratory. This essayreviews some of the enduring chal-lenges to Brazilian democracy butalso highlights some good news notnecessarily in the headlines.

Challenges to DemocracyMany of the key problems of

Brazilian democracy are institutionalin nature. Brazil has one of the mostfragmented party systems in theworld, making it a virtual certaintythat a president will not control amajority of the seats in Congress.Currently, the Workers' Party (PT),founded by President Lula, controlsonly 18% of the seats in the lowerhouse. Given the mathematics ofCongressional support, Brazilianpresidents must behave likeEuropean prime ministers and fash-ion multiparty cabinets and multi-party voting blocs on the floor of the

legislature (in 2005, 10 different par-ties support Lula). Brazilian politicalscientist Sdrgio Abranches has giventhis system a name: presidencialismode coalizao, or coalitional presiden-tialism. Although presidencialismo decoalizdo bears a superficial resem-blance to parliamentarism, there is akey difference: The survival of thegovernment in office does notdepend on the loyalty of the nominalsupporters of the president. Partiescan and do abandon the presidenton key votes. A telling exampleoccurred in February 2005, whendespite having built a massive pro-government coalition in theChamber of Deputies, the Lula gov-ernment could not secure the elec-tion of its preferred candidate forspeaker. Presidencialismo de coalizdois unwieldy and legislative supportcomes at a high price. Make no mis-take: This is still presidentialism, buta very different type than the com-paratively user-friendly, two-partyformat practiced in the UnitedStates.

One of the reasons for the unpre-dictability of presidencialismo de coal-izdo is the weakness of Brazil's partysystem. Except for a handful of par-ties on the left-Lula's PT is by farthe most important-the parties arelargely devoid of ideology and disci-pline. Most catch-all parties haveweak organizations, generic plat-forms and low levels of continuity.In a typical four-year Congress, morethan one in three federal legislatorswill switch parties, some more thanonce. Elections are largely an indi-vidual affair and politicians oftenbelieve that their mandate belongs tothemselves rather than to their par-

ties. The personalization of electionsextends to campaign finance, makingBrazilian elections staggeringlyexpensive. Current electoral lawsfavor high fragmentation, low insti-tutionalization of parties and mini-mal party fidelity.

Two other institutional challengesto Brazilian democracy are executive-legislative relations and robust feder-alism. Presidents control much ofthe agenda-setting power in Brazil.More than 75% of all legislationadopted since 1985 has originated inthe executive branch, often via presi-dential decrees. Presidents also havea high level of discretion over publicspending; Congress can only author-ize the budget, while it is up to theexecutive to actually disburse it. Thereactive status of Congress makes leg-islative life unappealing to manyambitious politicians. Their prefer-ence for executive office is under-standable in the context of Brazilianfederalism; the 1988 constitutionreturned more than half of centralrevenues to states and municipalities,making subnational offices (the 5500mayoralties and especially the 27governorships) extremely attractive.Subnational executives control budg-ets and have the power to hire andfire, the essence of Brazilian politicalcareers. State governors are vastlyimportant; since they often dominatetheir state delegations to Congress,presidents must negotiate with themcontinually, especially with regard toexpenditures and debt. Lula's prede-cessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,drafted a Fiscal Responsibility Lawand forced the privatization of sever-al profligate state banks, but prob-lems of federalism continue to lend

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A look at Lula's laboratory

Members of the Brazilian honor guard salute President Jose Sarney as he leaves Jaburu Palace in May 1985. Sarney was Brazil'sfirst civilian president in more than two decades.

an air of unpredictability to nationalpolitics.

Given these imbalances of power,the institutional design of Braziliandemocracy favors a strongly clien-telistic style of politics. All politicalsystems have patron-client relations,but in Brazil the concentration ofpower in the executive branch createsa small number of patrons and a verylarge number of potential clients. Atthe national level, the dynamics ofpresidencialismo de coalizdo requirepresidents to offer cabinet portfoliosto different parties in exchange for

legislative support, while at the sub-national level politicians line up invertical chains of command extend-ing from municipal mayors throughstate governors to the powerful presi-dency. These horizontal and verticalrelationships are lubricated by favors,jobs and pork. The rules of thegame are known to all political actorsand compliance with them isunavoidable. After 20 years of exco-riating "traditional politics," sincetaking office in 2003 the PT has hadno choice but to follow the time-honored practices of exchanging jobs

and resources for support from gov-ernors and legislators. This realityhas dismayed many of Lula's long-time supporters.

Not all of the obstacles to demo-cratic consolidation in Brazil derivefrom political institutions, of course.Towering challenges to democracyare posed by massive poverty,inequality and social exclusion.More than a quarter of the popula-tion is under the official poverty line.Brazil has one of the worst incomedistributions in the world: Thewealthiest 10% control 48% of

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national wealth, while the poorest10% control less than 1%. Per capi-ta income has stagnated in recentyears and unemployment has provenlargely intractable to both theCardoso and Lula governments.Economic growth, astounding in the1950-1980 period, slowed dramati-cally in the 1980s and was low anderratic throughout the 1990s. Theprospects for a sustained recovery inthe second half of the currentdecade, Edmund Amann argues inthis issue of Hemisphere, are still verymuch in question. These dismaleconomic results are difficult toaccept for the many Brazilians whoremember the glory days of the post-war expansion. As the journalist ElioGaspari recently pointed out, if theaverage 7% growth rate between1950 and 1980 had been maintainedup to the present day, Brazil wouldnow have a per capita income on parwith that of Spain.

The simultaneous pressures ofpoverty, inequality and social exclu-sion mean that Brazilian democracyis under constant stress. Importantpockets of urban Brazil, especiallyfavelas where drug trafficking is ram-pant, effectively escape state control.Meanwhile, in the countryside,agrarian pressures have led to vio-lence and standoffs betweenlandowners and the LandlessWorkers' Movement (MST).Poverty and social exclusion causeBrazil to continue to underproducein the area of human capital, theundisputed key to today's globaleconomy. Due to unequal access tohigher education, Brazil's enrollmentrate lags behind that of its regionalneighbors and especially that ofAsian competitors. Some 90% ofBrazilian households have a televi-sion set, but newspaper circulationper capita in Brazil is one-third thelevel of Argentina or Chile. Theproduction of education and market-oriented skills is arguably the biggest

single challenge to Brazilian socialpolicy today. As a cover story in thenewsweekly Veja put it in early 2005,"If South Korea can do it, so canBrazil."

Given lackluster economic per-formance and the persistence ofsocial inequalities, it is perhaps notsurprising that public support fordemocracy in Brazil is low in com-parative perspective. Each year, theLatinobardmetro polling organiza-tion asks citizens throughout LatinAmerica whether they think democ-racy is the best form of government,whether an authoritarian regimecould sometimes be preferable, orwhether it doesn't matter to them.In 2003, support for democracy inBrazil stood at 35%, the second low-est level in Latin America afterGuatemala, with 33%. (The averagefor 17 countries was 53% support).Some 55% of Brazilians were eitherindifferent to the regime type oropenly authoritarian; only Paraguayat 60% ranked higher on the per-centage of nondemocrats. Whilethese numbers do not necessarilyimply trouble in the short term-inthe same poll, Brazilians showedstrong support for the Lula govern-ment-in the long run, any politicalregime must develop a supportivecultural system or risk breakdownwhen confronted by crisis. Clearly,Brazilian democracy has not yetdeveloped deep roots at the level ofmass opinion.

Achievements of the DemocraticRegime Since 1985

The challenges to democracy areimmediate and real. However,democratization since 1985 has alsoachieved some undeniable successesand continues to benefit from certainfavorable conditions. The economicbackdrop to democracy, while unap-pealing in terms of poverty andincome distribution, has clearlyimproved on one important score:

price stability. In 1994, Cardoso'sintroduction of the Plano Real gaveBrazil a stable currency for the firsttime in memory. The annual infla-tion rate fell to single digits after1995, compared to an 80% monthlyrate in 1990. Although dented bythe 1999 devaluation, the Real hasheld up reasonably well and celebrat-ed its tenth anniversary in July 2004.One should not underestimate thedegree to which stabilization hasremoved inflationary populism fromnational politics and benefited ordi-nary Brazilians.

Another point in the regime's favoris that while public support fordemocracy is weak, active oppositionto democracy is even weaker. It isdifficult to conceive of any antide-mocratic or anti-system actor withany real presence in national politics.Take the military, for example. Inthe 1946-1964 period, the armedforces intervened in politics on sever-al occasions; after the 1964 coupthey governed directly for 21 years;and during the first postauthoritariangovernment of Jose Sarney (1985-1990) they often acted as veto play-ers. Today, after 15 years of erodingbudgets and civilian encroachmentupon its prerogatives, the military ispolitically impotent. In 1999,Cardoso created the nation's firstcivilian Ministry of Defense, a posi-tion that has been maintained byLula. Comparing the 2002 presi-dential race to the first direct electionheld under democracy in 1989, inwhich Lula was a finalist, is instruc-tive. In 1989, the military, the peakbusiness association (FIESP), and thepowerful Globo television networkall actively opposed Lula, leadingmany to wonder if he could havetaken office if he had won. In the2002 presidential campaign, thesethree conservative actors were largelyinvisible. On the left as well there islittle active opposition to democracy.In terms of elite commitment to

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democratic procedures, the regimehas improved remarkably since thelate 1980s.

Brazilians are justifiably proud oftheir consolidation of the electoralside of democracy. Since the 1980s,the country has undergone one ofthe fastest expansions of the franchisein the world. In 1955, the electorateas a share of the population was25%; in 1975, close to 41%; and in2005 it is about 64%. In absoluteterms, the electorate is approachingan astounding 120 million people.Because of compulsory voting,Brazil's raw turnout in presidentialelections will soon exceed that of theUnited States. This expansion hasbeen led by the electoral manage-ment board (TSE), which is recog-nized for its professionalism andimpartiality. Beginning in 1996,Brazil adopted an electronic votingsystem capable of tallying 100 mil-lion presidential votes before mid-night on election day.

The expansion of political partici-pation has coincided with a remark-able growth in the organizationaldensity of civil society, which in turnis transforming the nation's politics,economy and culture. As TanyaDawkins's article in this issue makesclear, social movements, NGOs,unions, churches, neighborhoodassociations, and racial and genderadvocacy groups are remarkablyvibrant. These transformations"from below" constitute arguably themost striking difference between thecurrent regime and the previousdemocratic experiment in 1946-1964: Today, a vibrant and diversenetwork of fully autonomous sec-ondary associations provides a coun-tervailing force against state power.Together with the dynamic andaggressive news media, the new civilsociety has helped promote increas-ing openness and transparency inBrazilian politics, as was evident inthe impeachment of President

Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992.This is not to say that corruptionhas been eradicated-far from it-but the cost of engaging in suchbehavior is higher than ever before.Impressionistic evidence suggests thatsocietal tolerance of corrupt politi-cians-once captured in the reveal-ing phrase rouba masfaz (he steals,but he gets things done)-hasdeclined dramatically over the pastdecade.

Although the party system contin-ues to earn criticism, there are somesigns that it is consolidating. Thelast three presidential elections havebeen fought between the same twoparties, the Party of Brazilian SocialDemocracy (PSDB) and the PT.The 2002 candidates, Josh Serra(PSDB) and Lula (PT), were bothcommitted "party men" who hadspent 14 years and 22 years, respec-tively, in parties that they themselvescreated. This is remarkable. Both ofthese political parties are legitimate,experienced power contenders withclear visions for Brazilian develop-ment and both have deep reservoirsof talent. The fact that they havenow alternated in power is a majorachievement for Brazilian democracy.Lula's victory in 2002 essentially"rebooted" the democratic regime,creating a refreshing new contextwherein all of the major parties havenow been both in government andin opposition. The conservativeLiberal Front (PFL), which roboti-cally supported virtually every gov-ernment since 1964, is now learningwhat it is like to live without thelifeblood of state patronage. Con-versely, the leftist PT, always partialto a loud, aggressive, confrontationalstyle during its two decades in thewilderness, is learning that it is easyto oppose but much harder to gov-ern. Since all of the major partieshave now had their turn at governinga complex society, elite political cul-ture is likely to become increasingly

consensual and pragmatic. Politicallearning matters.

Finally, one of the major advan-tages of Brazilian democracy over thepast decade has been strong leader-ship. In the transition from Cardosoto Lula, Brazil moved from one his-tory-making president to another. Itis difficult to think of another LatinAmerican country that has had twoconsecutive presidents of a similarstature. The fact that they workedtogether against military dictatorshipin the 1970s, opposed one anotherin the democratic 1980s and 1990s,and pulled off the most professionalpresidential transition in LatinAmerican history in 2002-2003 isnothing but good news for the sus-tainability of democracy. AlthoughCardoso and Lula have many policydifferences, they have three essentialsimilarities: They are modernizers,they are institution-builders, andthey are antipopulists. Together theyhave significantly revised the old rep-utation of the Brazilian presidency asa magnet for personalists, populistsand demagogues. Both employed a"team" style of government withdeep benches of talent and wereunafraid to delegate important tasksto professionals, and both reachedacross the aisle to ally with partiesthat were formerly anathema tothem. Although presidencialismo decoalizdo remains an unwieldy systemof governance, there is no doubt thatfirst Cardoso and now Lula havefound some ways to make it marchforward in the face of daunting chal-lenges. These two statesmen mustcontinue to work together, for it istheir combined legacy that will shapedemocracy's third decade andbeyond. U

Timothy J Power is associate professorofpolitical science at Florida Inter-national University and president ofthe Brazilian Studies Association(BRASA).

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A New Era for Brazil's Economy?by Edmund Amann

T he election of

President Luiz InicioLula da Silva inOctober 2002 repre-sented a milestone in

terms of the consolidation ofdemocracy in Brazil. Here, appar-ently, was incontrovertible evidencethat Brazilian political culture hadmatured to the point that the elec-torate at large-and not just a radi-calized fringe-could embrace anostensibly left-leaning candidaterather than opt for the centristcontinuity offered by the socialdemocratic alternative. If nothingelse, Lula's triumph demonstratedthat the unspoken fears of instabili-ty and, in extremis, possible mili-tary intervention that had stymiedprevious attempts by the left togain the presidency had, by 2002,abated.

Once the dust had settled afterthe election, attention began torefocus on the new administration'spolicy agenda. The most acutearea of concern, especially amonginternational investors, related toLula's proposed economic reformpackage. In the run-up to the elec-tion, Lula's campaign had sparedno effort in pointing to the defi-ciencies of the Cardoso administra-tion (1995-2002), especially asregarded its record in fostering sus-tained, socially equitable growth.To address what it sees as thisunsatisfactory record, the Lulaadministration has committed itselfto a multi-track approach thatcombines fiscal and monetaryorthodoxy with a raft of measuresdesigned to tackle poverty head on.At the same time, the government

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Brazil's economics minister Antanio Palocci.

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The Lula administration tackles thechallenge of structural change

has embarked on a program ofstructural reforms designed tobring about a step change in sup-ply-side performance. The Lulaadministration is attempting totackle ingrained economic prob-lems while, through the pursuit ofmacroeconomic orthodoxy, simul-taneously seeking to avoid alienat-ing powerful investor groups. Themajor question is whether such astrategy can be effective given thecontradictions that may existbetween adhering to macroeco-nomic orthodoxy, on the one hand,and promoting socially equitablestructural economic reform, on theother.

Lula's Economic InheritanceIn order to grapple with this

question, a brief review of the char-acteristics of the Brazilian economyis essential. Throughout the post-war period, the economic develop-ment of Brazil has been marked byprofound instability. After general-ly impressive growth in the 1950sunder an energetic program ofimport substitution industrializa-tion, by the beginning of the fol-lowing decade, output had begunto fall off and inflation to rise.Without question, the growingeconomic instability of this periodwas one of the triggers for the mili-tary coup of 1964. Over the nexttwo decades, the military fared lit-tle better than its civilian predeces-sors in steering the economy ontoa path of long-term sustainablegrowth. Brazil enjoyed rapidgrowth between 1967 and 1973 asthe result of a substantial industri-alization and export drive, but this

momentum could not be sustainedinto the mid 1970s, when oil pricehikes led to an international reces-sion. During the boom years,moreover, social inequality hadincreased sharply. By the mid1980s and the return to civilianrule, the economy was once againin profound difficulties as the debtcrisis and hyperinflation took theirtoll. Since 1994, a combination ofincreased economic openness and anew monetary policy frameworkhas done much to dampen infla-tion; however, growth in the pastfive years has proven highly unsta-ble and the gap between rich andpoor remains wide.

The Fundamental EconomicChallenge

Reviewing this experience, twoessential (and related) featuresstand out. First, unlike its newlyindustrialized counterparts else-where (the "Asian Tiger" economies,for example), Brazil has provenincapable of delivering steady,rapid growth. Instead, periods ofboom (frequently lasting no morethan one or two years) are swiftlyfollowed by periods of bust.Second, and stemming in partfrom the lack of sustained growth,widespread poverty and inequalityhave continued to characterize theBrazilian economy.

These perennial features ofBrazilian economic life have consti-tuted a key challenge for policymakers over the years. More oftenthan not, however, the need togenerate sustained, equitablegrowth has been subordinated tomore immediate objectives, such as

controlling inflation or the externalvaluation of the currency.Macroeconomic fire-fighting,rather than systemic measuresaimed at promoting equitablegrowth, has been the order of theday. Fortunately, realization hasgrown that this approach to eco-nomic management, akin to tack-ling symptoms rather than causes,cannot offer a lasting solution toBrazil's economic problems. Tothis end, policy makers have begunto focus on the structural con-straints that impede steady, equi-table growth.

Of these constraints, the mostobvious are constituted by externaland fiscal deficits. In both cases,Brazil has historically found it dif-ficult to realize sustained economicexpansion without the currentaccount moving sharply into deficitor the burgeoning governmentdeficit-through its call on savingsto service existing debt-chokingoff resources for further productiveinvestment. As a result, economicgrowth has rarely been able to pro-ceed steadily and consistently.Instead, faced with a wideningexternal deficit and the threat ofcurrency depreciation and import-ed inflation, the authorities have,more often than not, opted to slamon the brakes by raising interestrates and reducing public expendi-ture on all activities not directlyrelated to debt service.

One of the constraints that mostseriously affects Brazil's growth per-formance is its poor record oninvestment. Particularly over thepast 20 years, Brazil's investment asa proportion of GDP has tended to

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lag behind that of its main com-petitors. Not surprisingly, there-fore, Brazil has had difficultymatching the growth performanceof, say, South Korea or China. Atthe same time, the legacy of under-investment has imposed capacitylimitations that are soon met oncegrowth accelerates. This, of course,contributes to the stop-go patternof growth. The reasons underpin-ning Brazil's subdued investmentperformance are complex; however,two factors stand out: the absorp-tion of scarce domestic savings intonon-productive public sectorspending, and structural deficien-cies in domestic capital markets.

Another fundamental structuralconstraint is poor productivitygrowth in the Brazilian economy.One of the secrets of the success ofthe East Asian Tiger economies wastheir efficient use of capital andlabor resources during their rise toprominence. This enabled them todeliver far higher growth-andultimately higher living stan-dards-than would otherwise havebeen possible. Central to thisachievement was a determinationto invest in education, a commit-ment that not only facilitated thedevelopment and adoption of effi-cient management techniques butalso made the workforce more pro-ductive. Unfortunately, Brazil'sefforts to improve productivity-orto invest in human capital througheducation-have not matchedthose of its competitors in Asia andelsewhere, despite the fact thatBrazilian industry has been forcedto improve its competitiveness inresponse to the trade liberalizationinitiated in the late 1980s.

The final constraint-and oneexplicitly connected to the issue ofsocial equity-concerns the degreeto which the economic growth thathas been achieved has had differen-tial impacts upon the rich and

poor. Throughout the postwarperiod, one of the central featuresof the Brazilian economy has beenthe unequal division of the fruits ofgrowth and development. Manyfactors help account for this imbal-ance, including the skewed natureof public spending (disproportion-ately favoring the salaried middleclasses) and the highly uneven pre-existing distribution of assets, espe-cially land. As a result, significantsectors of the population have beenlargely bypassed by the improvedincome and living standards thathave benefited other groups. Whileclearly undesirable from any pro-gressive normative standpoint, theexistence of such widespread pover-ty, through its malign impacts onproductivity and participation inthe formal economy, acts in itselfas a limit on growth potential.Thus, it can be argued, alleviatingpoverty and inequality is justifiednot only in altruistic terms but alsoin terms of its potential to raiseeconomic performance.

The Policy ResponseThe Lula administration has

been quick to grasp the importanceof tackling these structural con-straints. Indeed, their removalnow forms a fundamental plank ofthe government's economic strate-gy. The government has attempt-ed, as did the preceding Cardosoadministration, to improve the per-formance of public sector accountsby reducing the social securitydeficit through structural and indi-rect tax reform. The goal is to cre-ate more space for spending onmuch needed investment projectsand poverty alleviation. So far,however, the reforms have had onlylimited effects, while high interestrates have increased debt servicingexpenditures.

Concerned about the historicaltendency of the current account

balance to move into the red oncethe economy picks up speed, theLula administration has launched aseries of initiatives aimed at boost-ing export performance. The mostimportant of these provideincreased export financing. Theadministration also has made stren-uous efforts to improve marketaccess for Brazilian exporters, notleast by pursuing trade deals withChina and other East Asianeconomies. On the face of it, thegovernment's export promotiondrive appears to be working, atleast if trade balance figures areused as a measure of success.Between 2003 and 2004, Brazil'sfull-year trade surplus increasedfrom US$24.8 billion to US$33.7billion. Of course, it should bestressed that Brazil, with its hugenatural comparative advantages innatural resource-based goods, isfaring very well from the currentboom in global industrial com-modity prices, in particular thosefor iron ore, steel and other metal-lic products. The question iswhether the government's initia-tives will be sufficient to supportother areas of export activity oncethe commodities boom subsides, asit is expected to do in the course of2005. On this score, the outlookis uncertain. While Brazil hasdeveloped substantial competitiveadvantages in certain higher value-added exports (automotive prod-ucts and jet aircraft, in particular)the picture in other sectors is lessfavorable.

Any widespread improvement inexport performance will of coursepartly depend on addressing theproductivity constraint identifiedearlier. Here again, the prospectsfor success are uncertain. By con-tinuing the relatively open tradingregime of its predecessor, the cur-rent government will ensure thatadequate competitive pressure is

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placed on enterprises to maintainthe incentive for productivity per-formance. However, with rates ofproductivity growth in competitorcountries tending to outpace thoseof Brazil (and from a higher base),government policy must promotemore substantial improvements inperformance. So far, the indicatorsare relatively encouraging. TheLula administration is committedto promoting more intensiveresearch and development withinenterprises while offering financinginitiatives to support fixed capitalinvestment. The latter develop-ment should in time lead to theintroduction of upgraded capitalequipment with favorable conse-quences for productivity. Turningto the issue of investment morebroadly, the government has takena bold step toward improving avail-ability of capital through a newbankruptcy law (approved inDecember 2004). Its streamlinedinsolvency procedures may lowerinterest rates for borrowers, buthigh domestic interest rates and thecontinued heavy absorption ofdomestic savings into public sectordebt servicing are likely to placeconstraints on the ability of invest-ment to expand.

Undoubtedly the most politicallysensitive constraint concerns pover-ty and inequality. In the 2002election campaign, Lula and hisWorkers' Party did much to ensurepopular support by committingthemselves to a program of socialreform and poverty alleviation.The central elements of this plat-form were improved investment inprimary education and a series ofdirect poverty reduction initiativeswhich have come to be known asFome Zero (Zero Hunger) andBolsa Famlia (Family Grant).These initiatives, which were intro-duced in 2003, involve a range ofmeasures, including the provision

of food cards for needy familiesand investment in social infrastruc-ture in deprived communities.While broadly welcomed at homeand abroad, the initiatives soon raninto practical problems thatstemmed not only from flaws intheir design but also from fundingshortfalls. The fiscal constraintsthat have restricted the extent ofthe anti-poverty programs have alsolimited the government's efforts toraise investment in primary educa-tion, a major target of the reform-ers. As a result, frustration hasgrown among Lula's core support-ers that the rhetoric of crusadingsocial reform and poverty allevia-tion is running ahead of the reality.

The Way AheadThe funding problems accompa-

nying official efforts to tacklepoverty (and to invest elsewhere toremove other constraints ongrowth) illustrate a certain tensionat the heart of the current govern-ment's agenda. On the one hand,the government is anxious not tounsettle investors. For this reason,it has adopted strict IMF-agreedfiscal targets while retaining a tight,counter-inflationary monetary poli-cy. Without question, these poli-cies have been successful to theextent that inflation has remainedin check and growth (which is esti-mated at 5% for 2004) hasrebounded from a dismal perform-ance in 2003. On the other hand,the government's macroeconomicstance is limiting its ability to tack-le the structural constraints thatultimately need to be overcome ifgrowth is to be sustained well intothe future. This limitation takeson a number of concrete forms.The pursuit of tight fiscal policy initself reduces the scope for invest-ing in such areas as education,poverty alleviation and export pro-motion. When combined with

high interest rates (which increasedyet again in the final quarter of2004) the fiscal limitation is all thegreater, since high debt-servicingcosts can tend to squeeze out otherpublic expenditures. At the sametime, the high interest rates dis-courage private investment proj-ects. Tackling the investment con-straint, therefore, becomes increas-ingly difficult.

Of course, it should not be sug-gested that orthodox macroeco-nomic policies are keeping the Lulagovernment from making progresson its structural constraint agenda.Real signs of change are evident;however, the gravity of the struc-tural problems facing the economy(especially as regards poverty)means that more rapid and con-certed action is needed. If thisopportunity is lost, then the cur-rent improvement in Brazil's eco-nomic fortunes is likely to be, as sooften in the past, only a blip. U

Edmund Amann is senior lecturer indevelopment economics at theUniversity of Manchester, England,and affiliate research associate profes-sor at the University of Illinois/Federal Reserve Bank of ChicagoRegional Economics ApplicationsLaboratory (REAL). This articlestems from work the author is carry-ing out for a book on Brazil's recenteconomic performance. The authoracknowledges the financial support ofthe Leverhulme Foundation.

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Rethinking Foreign Investmentby Roy C. Nelson

T raditionally, Brazil'sWorkers' Party (PT)and its leader, currentpresident Luiz Inicio("Lula") da Silva, were

characterized by a somewhat antago-nistic stance toward foreign invest-ment and capitalism in general. Yetduring the presidential campaign of2002, and after taking office in2003, Lula moderated his position.Lula now actively promotes foreigninvestment and strives constantly toreassure the foreign business com-munity of Brazil's suitability as aplace to invest its capital. Why didthis happen? This article examinesthe ways political experience at thesub-national level has shaped thePT's national policies since 2003.

BackgroundIn the 1970s, as a leader of the

Metalworkers' Union of SaoBernardo do Campo, a suburb ofSao Paulo where automobile firmssuch as Volkswagen, Mercedes andFord had large plants, Lula ledstrikes against foreign firms anddenounced their actions with fiery,radical rhetoric. As one of thefounders of the socialist PT in 1980and as the PT candidate for presi-dent in 1989, 1994 and 1998, Lulaspoke out against privatization,promising to put a stop to the saleof Brazil's state-owned firms to for-eign investors.

In his successful campaign forpresident in 2002, however, Lula'sposition on this issue changed. Headopted a much more moderatestance. During the campaign, Lulawent out of his way to reassure for-eign investors. He even traveled to

New York to speak with institutionalmoney managers and Wall Streetinvestment bankers about his views,assuring them that, if elected, hewould implement investor-friendlypolicies.

Since taking office in January2003, Lula has kept these promises.Signaling his rapprochement withthe business community, heappointed prominent executives tokey posts in his government.Henrique Meirelles, president ofBankBoston, took over as head ofthe Central Bank, and Luiz Furlan,owner and chairman of the board ofSadia Corporation, a giant Brazilianfrozen foods company, became min-ister of development, industry andtrade. Lula also enacted a reform ofBrazil's pension plan that put thecountry on a much sounder footingfinancially. He promised to main-tain the agreement that his predeces-sor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,had signed with the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), and hisadministration has adhered faithfullyto its guidelines. More specificallywith regard to foreign direct invest-ment (FDI), Lula continued plansbegun during the previous adminis-tration for Brazil to create a nation-al-level investment promotionagency, Investe Brasil.

All of these actions confirmed tothe business community in general,and to foreign investors in particu-lar, that Lula had thoroughlychanged his views on foreign invest-ment. Brazil was rewarded with animprovement in its investment gradefrom rating agencies such asStandard and Poor's and Moody's, akey indicator for prospective

investors of a country's financial sta-bility and overall investment climate.

What caused Lulas views on for-eign investment to change so rapid-ly? The practical realities of being ingovernment, rather than outside ofit, and Lulas determination to provethat the PT could be effective atrunning the country were importantfactors. But the experiences ofOlivio Dutra, who as governor ofthe southern state of Rio Grande doSul from 1999-2003 was one of theparty's highest elected officials untilLula took office, also provided les-sons for the PT about the benefits-both political and economic-offoreign direct investment fromtransnational corporations. Thestory of Dutra and the PT in RioGrande do Sul speaks volumes abouthow parties and politicians can learnfrom their perceived mistakes.

Setting the Stage: Britto's Effortsto Attract FDI

Dutra's predecessor as governor ofRio Grande do Sul, the centristAnt6nio Britto (1995-1999), had avision of turning Brazil's southern-most state into an attractive locationfor manufacturing. It is commonpractice for many of Brazil's 26states to use reductions in their statesales tax and other incentives tocompete for FDI. Seeking to lureFDI away from the more prosper-ous, industrialized and densely pop-ulated state of Sao Paulo, Brittooffered generous incentives to per-suade large transnational corpora-tions to establish manufacturingplants in his state. By the timeBritto ran for re-election in 1998,General Motors and other firms had

18 Hemisphere Volume 15

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Lessons from the PT governmentin Rio Grande do Sul

a4

Olivio Dutra, governor of Rio Grande do Sul (1999-2003).

already established major plants inRio Grande do Sul. Ford MotorCorporation and Dell Computerhad signed contracts with the Brittogovernment guaranteeing specificincentives and were preparing tobegin construction on plants of theirown.

To the chagrin of these executives,Britto lost the election. The winnerwas Dutra, the PT candidate andone of the parry's founders. Dutrahad campaigned in part on a plat-form to discontinue the incentivesoffered to large transnational corpo-rations, including Ford and Dell.The executives' concerns were justi-fied: Upon taking office, Dutra pro-ceeded to follow through on hisrhetoric, announcing that he wouldrescind Britto's agreements with thecompanies.

The Ford FiascoExecutives at Ford attempted to

renegotiate with Dutra, but to noavail. Standing by his positionregarding the incentives, Dutrarefused even to meet with them.After several thwarted attempts tonegotiate, the Ford executives gaveup. Since they had not yet begunconstruction on the manufacturingplant planned for the town ofGuaiba, near the state capital ofPorto Alegre, they began to consideralternative locations within Brazil.

The state of Bahia emerged as aviable alternative. Officials there,determined to win Ford's investmentfor their state in the impoverishednortheastern region of Brazil, offeredincentives identical to those theBritto administration had promised.Another plus was a federal govern-

ment program that gave specialincentives to automobile manufac-turers locating their plants in Brazil'snortheast.

Another strong point in Bahia'sfavor was the fact that AntonioCarlos Magalhaes, then president ofBrazil's Senate and one of the coun-try's most influential politicians atthe time, was from the state. Hisparty, the Partido da Frente Liberal(PFL), was a key partner in PresidentCardoso's governing coalition. Withhis enormous clout, Magalhaes wasable to persuade Congress to modifythe legislation on incentives for man-ufacturing automobiles in the north-east so that Ford could take advan-tage of it, even though the deadlinefor companies to participate hadpassed.

The federal government approvedadditional incentives to make up forthe extra costs Ford would face bybuilding its plant in Bahia instead ofthe more conveniently located RioGrande do Sul. Brazil's nationaldevelopment bank, Banco Nacionalde Desenvolvimento Econ6mico eSocial (BNDES), offered Ford a low-interest loan of more than US$300million after the companyannounced it was moving to Bahia.This was far more than it hadplanned to give for Ford's investmentin Rio Grande do Sul.

Too late, Dutra realized that Fordwas about to pull out of Rio Grandedo Sul and go to Bahia instead.Aware of the negative political conse-quences that could ensue, heattempted to negotiate with the Fordexecutives. But Ford had alreadydecided to withdraw from RioGrande do Sul, and the company

Hemisphere Volume 15 19

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soon signed a contract with theBahian state government.

Ford's departure was a political dis-aster for Dutra. Residents ofGuafba, the town where the plantwas to have been located, protestedagainst the governor. Editorials andarticles in the press attacked Dutrafor his actions. Naturally, Dutra'spolitical opponents emphasized thenegative impact the lost jobs wouldhave on Rio Grande do Sul.

Dutra Changes His StanceNot wanting to lose another major

investment, Dutra took a differentapproach when Dell executivesapproached him to renegotiate theirincentives package. Britto hadpromised Dell generous incentives toattract its proposed US$108 millionplant: a 75% reduction in the stateincome tax for 12 years and a US$17million loan, to be paid back over 10years with a five-year grace period.Facing the loss of these incentives,Dell considered following Ford'sexample and locating its plant else-where. Other states were ready andwilling to receive Dell's investmenton highly favorable terms. Despitethese offers, however, and Ford'sfailed attempts to renegotiate withDutra, local Brazilian executivesworking for Dell decided toapproach the governor again.

Dell's director of corporate affairsin Brazil, Fernando Loureiro, deviseda face-saving strategy for the gover-nor to allow Dell to keep its incen-tives. When Loureiro and his teammet with the governor, they madethe case that Dell was not a typicaltransnational corporation. Personalcomputers, the products Dell pro-duced, were beneficial to society,they argued. Computers allowed useof the Internet, which provided peo-ple of all social strata with access toinformation. Thus, Dell's productswould actually help to create a moreegalitarian social structure. Dell's

goals and those of the PT governorwere actually closely aligned,Loureiro insisted. While it mightmake sense not to offer incentives tocompanies such as Ford, he contin-ued, Dell was different.

Dutra had already experienced theire of the gaucho population first-hand after Ford decided to locate itsplant in Bahia, so political calcula-tions may have influenced his actionsat this point. But whether persuadedby Loureiro's reasoning, motivatedpurely by political factors, or somemixture of both, Dutra decided to letDell keep all of the original incen-tives the previous governor hadoffered with only minor conditions.Dell stayed. And in many of hispublic speeches thereafter, Dutraused Dell as an example of the sortof company his government wouldlike to attract to Rio Grande do Sul.

Despite this new approach, theDutra government still had difficultyluring investment to the state in theyears that followed Ford's departure.Few transnational corporations werewilling to invest in a state whose gov-ernor seemed at the very least to havean ambivalent attitude toward FDI,and where the rules regarding foreigninvestment could change so quickly.

The Lessons from Rio Grandedo Sul

The PT could not help but absorbthe painful and well-publicized les-sons of Dutra's experience in RioGrande do Sul. As governor of amajor state, Dutra held one of thefew major offices the PT had cap-tured up until that time, but hisrigid, ideologically driven stancetoward Ford, and Ford's subsequentwithdrawal of its proposed manufac-turing plant from Rio Grande doSul, contributed to make him hugelyunpopular. It helped explain whyDutra lost the internal party primaryto run for re-election in 2002 andwhy the candidate finally selected to

represent the PT in that race, TarsoGenro, eventually lost to a relativelyunknown politician from the moremoderate Party of the BrazilianDemocratic Movement (PMDB).The PT's decline in Rio Grande doSul continued in October 2004when the party lost control of thecapital city, Porto Alegre (home tothe World Social Forum), for thefirst time since 1988.

The lessons of Dutra's rapiddecline were discussed widely in themedia, in business and political cir-cles, and especially within the PTitself. To a certain extent, the stategovernment of Rio Grande do Sulhad been the PT's showcase at thesub-national level, a dress rehearsalfor how the party might behave ifand when it finally achieved nationalpower. A longstanding fear of thedomestic and international businesscommunities was that a PT nationalgovernment would be hostile to for-eign investment. This fear was con-firmed in Rio Grande do Sul byDutra's aggressive and ultimatelycounterproductive confrontationwith Ford. Within the PT, the con-sensus among Lula's advisors was thatif the party were to have a seriousshot at winning the presidential elec-tion in 2002, it would have to adopta more pragmatic and moderatestance toward FDI.

Many factors explain Lula's shift toa more pragmatic approach regardingforeign investment. But the PT'sexperiences in sub-national govern-ment are certainly a large part of thestory. Without a doubt, the harshlessons that Dutra, and the PT itself,learned firsthand in Rio Grande doSul were among the most importantreasons for this change. U

Roy C. Nelson is associate professor ofinternational studies at Thunderbird,the Garvin School ofInternationalManagement.

20 Hemisphere Volume 15

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MODULE TWO"The African Diaspora: Contesting the Heteronormative"

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African Diaspora: Fragmented Geographies and Positionalities"Nalini Persram, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland

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"African Diaspora: Hybridities Against Race?"Shalini Puri, University of Pittsburgh

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Features

Facing the Pastby James N. Green

Brazil's return to demo-cratic rule has been arough roller coaster ride.Spiraling inflation in the

late 1980s and early 1990s dove-tailed with the impeachment ofFernando Collor, the country's firstdirectly elected president since 1960.Two-term President FernandoHenrique Cardoso (1995-2002) helddown price increases and stepped upthe integration of the Brazilian econ-omy into the global market, but hispopular support waned during hisfinal years in office. In late 2002,Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva came to thepresidency with widespread backingfrom the popular classes and theenthusiastic expectations of his left-wing political base. His administra-tion, however, has become embroiledin controversy about the lingeringlegacy of the military regime. Anational debate has emerged aboutwhether the excesses of the militarydictatorship merit further investiga-tion or should be laid to rest. Theoutcome may be a test of the extentto which democracy is firmly rootedin Brazil.

Solidarity in the StatesFew people realize that the con-

certed campaigns in the UnitedStates to defend human rights inLatin America over the last threedecades grew in large part out of amodest effort initiated in the late1960s by Brazilians seeking interna-tional allies to inform the world ofthe deteriorating situation in theircountry after the military coup ofApril 1, 1964. Instrumental in thiseffort was a meeting between a small

Archives, torturers and the legaciesof dictatorship

group of Brazilian exiles and WilliamWipfler, then assistant director of theLatin American Department of theNational Council of Churches.

In December 1969, Jether PereiraRamalho, a lay leader in theBrazilian Congregationalist Church,and his wife, Lucilia, traveled to NewYork. Upon arrival, they wentdirectly to meet Wipfler at an officebuilding on Riverside Drive, next tothe imposing neo-Gothic churchthat dominates the neighborhood.There they were greeted by JovelinoRamos, a Presbyterian minister fromRio de Janeiro who left Brazil in1968 after being indicted for allegedsubversive activities. He was accom-panied by an old friend, RubenCdsar Fernandes, who had gone intoexile in the mid 1960s and recentlyenrolled at Columbia University tocomplete his doctorate in history.Domicio Pereira, a Congregationalistminister from Rio de Janeiro, wasalso present. The warm embracesand jovial atmosphere so commonwhen old friends reunite, however,was undercut by the serious tone ofthe occasion. A simple but signifi-cant plan was in the making.

Discretely, Ramalho and Pereirahad brought with them to theUnited States a collection of docu-ments detailing the fates of hundredsof Brazilian political prisoners. Itemby item, they turned over the materi-al to Wipfler for his examination.Many years later, the Episcopal cleric

recalled looking at the denunciationsfor the first time: "Several werescrawled on scraps of filthy paper,paper bags or wrinkled envelopes,and were difficult to decipher.Another was transcribed in minutelettering on a single square of toiletpaper; reading it required a magnify-ing glass...I knew things were bad inBrazil, but I hadn't seen anything inwriting, any texts. [Ramalho andPereira] brought with them individ-ual and group testimonies."

Among the material the two hadsmuggled out of Brazil was a state-ment drafted earlier that month by16 female political prisoners at adetention center on an island in Riode Janeiro harbor. The documentboldly declared: "We have writtenthis letter from where we are impris-oned on the Ilha das Flores in Rio deJaneiro. Only now is informationstarting to trickie out about theatrocities that have been committedagainst political prisoners in ourcountry; thus, the Brazilian publicmay still doubt that these criminalacts are really taking place. We canassure everyone that TORTUREDOES EXIST IN BRAZIL." Thedocument then named the 16 femaleprisoners and detailed their treat-ment, describing beatings, electricshock and other forms of torture.

Shaken by what he had read anddetermined to help, Wipfler immedi-ately invited the Brazilians to set upoperations in a vacant office at the

Hemisphere Volume 15 23

Features

WE CANNOT REMAIN SILENTWe cannot remain silent in the face of the overwhelming evidence of the flagrant denial of human

rights and dignity coeing to us from Brazil. This dossier is but a fraction of that evidence. Signi-ficantly, several documents were written by Brazllians and smuggled out of grazil at great risk to thoseinvolved. They accepted the possible penalties in order to inform the people of the world of the factthat terror and torture are used in their country as instruments of government.

We cannot remain silent. To do so would make us accomplices of those who are the authors andperpetrators of this repression. We call upon the readers of this dossier to raise their voices is pro-test with us.

RALPH DAVID ABERNATHYPres identSouthern Christian Leadership Conference

DORY ASTitONAuthor

lJlHN BENNETTPresidentUnion Theological Seminary

STERLING W. BROWNIPresidentNational Conference on Christians and Jews

LOUIS M. COLONNESEDirector. Division for Latin AmaricaUnited Statee Catholic Conference

THOMAS CORNELLational Seeretary

Catholic Paece FellowshipALLEN E'ARCANGELO

ArtistDOROTHY gAY

The Catholic WorkerRALPH litLA CAVA

Assistant Professor of HistoryQueens College. City Univ. N.Y.

JOSEPH P. FITZPATRICKProfessor of SacitoiogyP ordloam University

*A S. ,'EENDirector. Latin America DepartmentNational Council of Churches

iAWS NAACKEArtist

HERSCHEL HALBERTExecutive Director. internationalLeague for the Rights of Man

RICHARD HOWARDPoet and Critic

IRENE JONESAssistant General SecretaryAmerican Baptist Foreign Mission Society

TRACEY K. JONES, JR.General SecretaryBoard of MissionsUnited Methodist Church

STANLEY KUNITZPulitzer Prize Winning Post

JOHN A. MCKAYPresident E'eritosPrinceton Seinary

RICHARO MORSEProfessor of Historyyale University

JAMES H. ROBINSONDilrectorCrossroads Africa

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTlNALU.S. Congressman, New York CityInteramerican Affairs Sub-comittee ofthe House Foreign Affairs Cosaittes

ANDRE SCHIFFRINManaging DirectorPantheon Books

MARGARET SANINExecuti*e Director, Church W"nen UnitedNaetional Council of Cihurches

RICHARD SHAULLProfessor of Ecumenics, Princeton SeminaryPresident, World Student Christian Federation

THOMHAS E. SKI OREProfessor of Latin Aericen HistoryUniversity of Wdisconsin

JOhN COVENT"Y SMITHteneral SecretaryCawsision on Ecumenical Mission s RelationsUnited Preshyterian Churcb

STANLEY J. STtINProfessor of Latin American HistoryPrinceton University

I. F. STONEEditori. F, Stone Weekly

DAVID M. STOWEExecutive Vice President-ElectUnited Church Board for World Ministries

BRADY TYSONAssociate Professor, Latin American StudiesAericen University, Wfashington, D.C.

CHARLES WAGLEYBoaz Professor of AnthropologyColumbia University

LLOYD C. WICKEBishopUnited Methodist Church

ANDREW YOUNGExecutive Vice-PresidentSouthern Christian Leadership Conference

ADJA YORKERSArtist

(INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION IS INDICATED SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFICATION)

director of the US CatholicConference's Latin American Bureau,and his successor, Thomas Quigley,soon joined these efforts, playing aleading role in keeping the issue alivein Washington.

Over the next several years a loose-ly knit but broad-based network ofclerics, academics, political exiles andactivists carried out a series of cam-paigns to educate the American pub-lic about the serious violation ofhuman rights in Brazil and the USgovernment's tacit support for themilitary regime. They sought sup-port from leading clergy, academicsand other prominent figures for a

National Council of Churches. Forthe next two months they organizedthe material that Ramalho andPereira had brought from Brazil,indexing the denunciations andpreparing a complete dossier thatcould be published in English anddistributed in the United States.Wipfler also put the group in contactwith Ralph Della Cava, a professorof Brazilian and Latin American his-tory at Queens College who, alongwith American University ProfessorBrady Tyson, had been workingbehind the scenes in the UnitedStates against the Brazilian dictator-ship. Louis M. Colonnese, then

public statement, "We CannotRemain Silent," that condemned theBrazilian government's treatment ofpolitical prisoners. In April 1970,Latin American specialists at theSecond National Conference of theLatin American Studies Association(LASA) in Washington, D.C., passeda stinging resolution condemningtorture in Brazil. Representatives ofthe National Council of Churchesand the US Catholic Conferencepresented a thick dossier to theInter-American Human RightsCommission of the Organization ofAmerican States in June of that yearrequesting that the internationalagency conduct an on-site investiga-tion into human rights abuses. InDecember 1971, when General andPresident Emilio G. Mddici visitedPresident Richard Nixon inWashington, activists organized aprotest in front of the White House.Reports from Brazil and consistentcampaigning in the United Statesinfluenced strong editorial positionsin the New York Times and theWashington Post against the Braziliangenerals in power. Brazil was nolonger simply the land of parrots,Amazonian rain forest and Carnival;it had also become the land of tor-ture.

The campaign in the United Statesto denounce the repressive measuresof the Brazilian military governmentproved to be a valuable experiencefor those who took up the cause ofhuman rights in Chile after thearmed forces of that country, led byAugusto Pinochet, overthrew thedemocratically elected government ofDr. Salvador Allende in 1973.Whereas hundreds of concernedindividuals in the United States hadmobilized against human rights vio-lations in Brazil, thousands becameinvolved in a multitude of campaignsthroughout the country to denouncethe arrest, execution and disappear-ance of progressive political activists

24 Hemisphere Volume 15

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in Chile. The Watergate scandalsand the widespread questioning ofUS foreign policy initiatives in thewake of the Vietnam War laid thegroundwork for the introduction ofnew legislation limiting foreign aidto countries that violated their citi-zens' human rights. In 1976, JimmyCarter's presidential campaign wasbased in part on his call for a newforeign policy that privileged humanrights over other geopolitical consid-erations.

Opening the ArchivesParallel to the expansion of the

international human rights move-ment, efforts toward democratizationgained momentum in Brazil.Although the promise of civilian ruletook another 10 years to be fulfilled,government-initiated gestures favor-ing a loosening of military controlaccelerated in 1974 after the opposi-tion party trounced its pro-militaryrival in Congressional elections. Aspart of the many accords reached toguarantee a safe exit strategy for thearmed forces and avoid a revanchistreckoning with Brazil's torturers, theBrazilian Congress passed anAmnesty Act in 1979. This bill ben-efited approximately 4,500 politicalprisoners and exiles, but excludedmany leftist activists found guilty ofmurder, kidnapping or other violentacts. It also exempted from criminalprosecution those involved in thetorture or disappearance of membersof the opposition.

In 1985, only months after areturn to civilian rule, the BrazilianCatholic Church published anexhaustive dossier entitled Brasil:Nunca Mais (Brazil Never Again)that documented the forms of tor-ture and repression carried out dur-ing the 21 years that the generalswere in power. Five years later, ajournalist reported the discovery ofan unmarked mass grave of govern-ment opponents. These revelations

sparked public outrage and renewedpressure to hold the militaryaccountable for the crimes of therecent past. Brazilian human rightsgroups, including the Commissionof Relatives of the Dead and theDisappeared, pressed the governmentto conduct further investigations intothe final fate of many activists whohad died or disappeared over the pre-vious two decades. During theCardoso administration, the 1995Law of the Disappeared authorized aspecial commission to investigatethese deaths. The Commission'sreport documented the torture andmurder of hundreds of activists, butthe 1979 Amnesty Law precludedprosecution for human rights abuses.At the same time, state governmentsbegan to declassify and open to thepublic millions of political policefiles that contained extensive infor-mation about the national securitymethods employed during the mili-tary regime. Researchers who haveconsulted these political policerecords remain acutely aware thatmany other archives of the differentgovernment agencies involved inrepressive measures have remainedsealed.

In late 2004, 30 years afterBrazilian journalist Vladimir Herzogdied in military custody, a militaryintelligence agent leaked a pair ofpreviously unknown photographsalleged to have been taken onlyhours before Herzog supposedlyhanged himself. The journalist'sdeath in 1975 had sparked unprece-dented protests and contributed tostrengthening the movement againstthe military regime. The agent whosupplied the photographs claimedthat the armed forces continuedsecretly to spy on left-wing activists,unions and other social movementsfor many years after the militaryrelinquished power in 1985.Representatives of the armed forcesinsisted that files from the years of

political repression had been dulydestroyed in the 1980s, yet inJanuary 2005 more documents, sup-posedly burned years ago, reap-peared.

Nongovernmental organizationssuch as Tortura, Nunca Mais(Torture Never Again) are demand-ing that all of the archives of the dif-ferent intelligence agencies of thearmed forces be turned over to theNational Archive or another publicentity so that friends and relativescan finally learn the truth about thewhereabouts of the disappeared.Scholars working on the period ofthe military dictatorship stress thatwithout full access to the armedforces' archives an exhaustive analysisof the country's recent history will beimpossible. The Brazilian HistoricalAssociation has gone on recordprotesting an executive order issuedin late 2002 extending the classifica-tion of many official documents foran additional 30 to 50 years. TheLula administration, which containsmany individuals who were victimsof repression between 1964 and1985, has pledged its commitmentto uncovering the hidden secrets ofthe military regime. Whether it willhave the political will to confront thearmed forces in this matter remainsto be seen.

James N. Green is associate professorof Brazilian history and culture atBrown University and chair of theCommittee on the Future of BrazilianStudies in the United States. He iscurrently completing a book entitled"'We Cannot Remain Silent:'Opposition to the Brazilian MilitaryDictatorship in the United States,1964-85."

Hemisphere Volume 15 25

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Learning with Brazil and Lulaby Tanya Dawkins

N ot since the electionof South Africa'sNelson Mandela andPoland's Lech Walesahas a new leader

generated such interest, hope andexpectation as Brazilian PresidentLuiz Inicio "Lula" da Silva. In2003, the newly elected Lula elec-trified the overflow crowd in PortoAlegre at his first World SocialForum address. His victory seemedto be a concrete affirmation of theforum's mantra, "Another World isPossible." That was then. At the2005 World Social Forum, newparties, including the Party ofSocialism and Liberty (P-SOL),founded by dissidents from Lula'sWorkers' Party (PT) in 2004, spon-sored loud protests just outsidePorto Alegre's Gigantinho Stadium.Hecklers inside couldn't drown outthe largely supportive crowd, butthe joy, tears, hope and adorationthat washed over the 2003 audiencewas replaced by the bated breath ofsupporters who seemed to havecome to hear Lula say something,anything that would make it allmake sense.

The Politics: Is Compromise the"Gift" that Keeps on Giving?

Candidates are prone to speak insuperlatives, and Lula was noexception. To the markets hepromised macroeconomic stabilityand spectacular growth; to Brazil'sworking class and unemployed hepromised 10 million jobs and dou-ble the minimum wage in fouryears; and to the landless he prom-ised "more land than they couldoccupy." He courageously

acknowledged Brazil's need forracial justice.

The PT's campaign decision togain power by moving toward thepolitical center has led to an ava-lanche of compromises that havetested the party's unity and capacityto move its agenda forward. Lula'searly decision to maintain the eco-nomic team and many of the eco-nomic policies of his predecessor,Fernando Henrique Cardoso, wasan immediate source of contradic-tion and controversy. Brazil's inter-est rates are among the highest inthe world and the country's pri-mary surplus exceeds InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) require-ments. The tight monetary policiesof Economics Minister Ant6nioPalocci and Central Bank PresidentHenrique Meirelles may have wonthe hearts and minds of investors,but advocates for domestic socialand economic investments are call-ing for their replacement.

The PT's enviably progressiverecord of governance at the subna-tional level has not translated easilyto the federal level. In a cruelirony, the PT lost two strategic andsymbolic elections in 2004: inPorto Alegre, known around theworld for pioneering participatorybudgeting and hosting the WorldSocial Forum, and in Sao Paulo,the industrial capital and SouthAmerica's largest city.

Since 2003, Lula's personalapproval ratings have remainedconsistently high. Yet the PT doesnot have a majority in either cham-ber of Congress. Each legislativeinitiative requires major negotiationand alliance building. The opposi-

tion Social Democratic Party(PSDB), for example, is a likely allyfor social security reform but notnecessarily for progressive landreform. Growing fissures betweenLula's supporters and groups frus-trated with the pace of changerecently cost the PT the leadershipof the Chamber of Deputies. InFebruary 2005, this pivotal seat,which determines which bills reachthe floor for debate and when, wentto a conservative former supporterof the 1964-1985 military regime,Severino Cavalcanti. For the firsttime, emerging schisms within thePT led to a major political defeat.

The Geopolitics: Brazil's StarShines on the World Stage

Lula, along with his tireless for-eign minister, Celso Amorim, hasrevitalized Brazil's presence in theinternational arena. RubensBarbosa, Brazil's former ambassadorto the US, points to the breadthand sophistication of Brazil's globalagenda-reinvigorating MERCO-SUR; shepherding the SouthAmerican Community of Nations;forging economic ties with India,China, Russia, South Africa and theMiddle East; and, in general,increasing the Brazilian presence inthe world. In two years, Brazil'strade deficit has become a US$32billion surplus, including an 80%(US$4.5 billion) increase withChina. Cecilia Alemany from theAssociation of Latin AmericanDevelopment Organizations(ALOP) credits Lula with redefin-ing the very concept of LatinAmerica by focusing on buildingSouth America's strength and

26 Hemisphere Volume 15

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The politics and geopolitics of socialand economic justice

Another world is possible. Every region, coun-

try and community struggles with Brazil's

questions within its own unique political and

historical context. It is oddly fitting that

Brazil should be on the leading edge of what it

means to get from here to there.

capacity as a region. The G20, aBrazilian-led South-South alliancethat includes India, China,Argentina and South Africa,brought the September 2003 WorldTrade Organization (WTO) talks toa standstill over the issue of agricul-tural subsidies. Nine months later,at the United Nations Conferenceon Trade and Development (UNC-TAD) meeting, Brazil hosted thenegotiating session that broke theimpasse.

"Sometimes, I don't thinkBrazilians fully appreciate howBrazil's leadership is changing theworld," says Hazel Henderson,author of Building a Win-WinWorld: Life Beyond Global EconomicWarfare. Henderson cites numer-ous examples, including the factthat 600 of the 2000 corporate sig-natories to the United NationsGlobal Compact are Brazilian.Judy Morrison, director of theWashington-based Inter-AmericanConsultation on Race, points toBrazil's sponsorship of the Inter-American Commission on HumanRights' Special Rapporteurship onPeople of African Descent in theAmericas as a pioneering govern-

ment initiative at the internationallevel.

Complexity and ContradictionsYet for all the diplomatic and

economic dividends, the domesticsocial agenda is languishing.Unemployment remains high.Flagship programs such as ZeroHunger (Fome Zero) and the FamilyGrant (Bolsa Familia) have beenplagued by slow startups, inade-quate funding and poor manage-ment.

Sociologist and Lula critic JamesPetras recently wrote a scathingessay entitled, "Brazil: Deepeningand Extending NeoLiberalism -Year Two." Petras contends thatexponential increases in soybeanand meat exports fuel rain forestdeforestation while resources forenvironmental protection aredeclining. "This strategy locksBrazil into a new cycle of depend-ence on raw material production,further distorting development pat-terns," he writes. In a rebuttal,Lula ally and AFL-CIO AmericasProgram Director Stan Gacek con-tends that such critiques are unfair,premature, and miss what he calls

the "left-wing of the possible."Gacek points to Lula's success inadvancing public interest industrialpolicy, foreign policy and trade in"distinct opposition to the undis-puted hegemony of the North andits multinational interests." He alsopraises unprecedented levels of pub-lic participation in Brazilian politi-cal life.

"Yes, there is more participation,but...," says Iara Pietricovsky,director of the Center forSocioeconomic Studies (INESC) inBrasilia, who notes that the realwork is linking increased participa-tion with accountability andrealigning economic policy andspending. Commissions and con-sultative processes abound, butfinancial resources for education,health, housing and land reform arein much shorter supply. Groupslike INESC and Inter-Redes, acoalition of 42 Brazilian networksrepresenting indigenous and land-less groups, Brazilians of Africandescent, environmental and humanrights associations, see democratiz-ing the budget-making process as akey political and organizing strategyfor shifting priorities and are press-ing for a number of reforms,including making the budgetprocess electronically accessible tothe public.

Race and Land: Heavy LiftingBrazil's stunningly unequal land

distribution is an enduring symbolof its historical inability to grapplewith inequality. One percent ofBrazil's population controls 50% ofits land. Stung by the slow pace ofland settlements and growing vio-

Hemisphere Volume 15 27

Features

lence against land rights activists,groups like the Landless RuralWorkers Movement (MST) thatsupported Lula's election are turn-ing up the heat. Rather than breakwith the government, they havecarved out a policy called apoiocritico (critical support). Criticalsupport keeps the channels of com-munication open but sets the stagefor stepped-up land occupations,direct action and other measures ofexternal pressure.

Like land reform, Brazil's racialinequality remains a major chal-lenge. Lula's government has raisedthe profile of issues of race andsocial inclusion by creating theSpecial Secretariat for thePromotion of Racial Equality (SEP-PIR) to coordinate race-consciouspolicies across government; launch-ing Diversidade, a national publicawareness campaign; and beginningefforts to diversify Brazil's elitediplomatic corps. But Dr. SilvioCunha, economist and co-founderof the Instituto Cultural Steve Bikoin Salvador, points out that,"Legislative initiatives such as Law10639-which promotes affirma-tive action in higher education andthe teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history in schools-areundoubtedly important, "but thepassage of stalled measures like theStatute of Racial Equality is neededto consolidate policies that advancethe interests of Brazil's majorityAfro-descendant population anddeal with racism at a structurallevel."

Learning with LulaLula's cautious overtures to capi-

tal markets and his progressivebase's learning curve about its newrole as friend of the president hascost precious momentum andsowed the seeds of cynicism anddisappointment. "I cannot acceptthe permanence of everything I

condemned throughout my entirelife," explains PT militant and his-torian Sergio Lamario. "People saythat Lula's mandate is the thirdterm of Fernando HenriqueCardoso. Unfortunately, I have toagree with them." Others think itis too early to give up on Lula."What will happen has yet to bedecided," cautions EduardoSiqueira, a Brazilian scholar andactivist at the University ofMassachusetts-Lowell who advo-cates a posture of "support withstruggle."

Lesson #1: Models and MultipliersMatter. Whether Lula's early eco-nomic decisions were necessaryevils or just evils remains the sub-ject of debate. By privilegingexport growth and foreign invest-ment over domestic social and eco-nomic reforms, however, he hasdeepened the very model he cam-paigned against. "Good economicpolicy must generate somethingmore than money for corpora-tions," notes Dr. Luiza Bairros,director of the Race andDemocracy Project at the FederalUniversity of Bahia and formerleader of Brazil's United BlackMovement.

Lula's current economic modelrests on the risky assumption thatgrowth will create the domesticpolitical will to distribute gainsmore equitably. This will not hap-pen if traditional power relationsremain unchanged. For example, iffeeding the hungry is not accompa-nied by a strategy that targets thestructural roots of hunger-i.e.access to land, capital, productivecapacity-the poor will remain atthe mercy of a model incapable ofprioritizing their interests.

Lesson #2: Inequality Matters.These disconnects act as powerfulmultipliers in the reproduction ofpoverty and inequality. Brazil's newgrowth in exports and GDP has

yet to show signs of bridging thecountry's deep structural inequali-ties. New incentives and indicatorsthat assess all areas of economicactivity in terms of their contribu-tion to addressing inequality areneeded to make participafdo mean-ingful.

Lesson #3: Movements Matter.Twenty years after the militarywithdrew from power, Braziliansrealize that political democracy isnot economic democracy. Noteven a leader with Lula's credentialscan create and sustain the condi-tions needed to advance an aggres-sive agenda for change. Organizedcommunities, movements and adynamic civil society ultimatelyprovide the accountability andpolitical space needed to advancechange at multiple levels. Thetremendous resources expendedduring national elections oftencome at the expense of local organ-izing and base-building work. Thismodel leaves far too much to thewinner's popularity or personalcharisma. The MST, BlackMovement and others are raisingthe stakes in the hope thatincreased organization, mobiliza-tion and pressure will give Lula theimpetus for an aggressive push inthe remaining two years of hisadministration and put Brazil's nextpresident (whether Lula or not) onnotice. In May 2005, the MSTstepped up its campaign with a 17-day, 150-mile march on Brasilia.Twelve thousand small farmers, land-less rural workers, and their alliesretraced the steps of a previous marchto demand the implementation ofthe National Plan for Land Reform(PNRA). Leaders of Brazil's BlackMovement have reportedly been dis-cussing a similar mobilization.

Lesson #4: Tough Love Matters.The struggle over the social andeconomic justice agenda in Brazil isoften a fight between "friends."

28 Hemisphere Volume 15

Features

Lula's allies are realizing the needfor a new set of skills to win recog-nition from the government. TheMST's "Critical Support" policy isjust one of many emerging terms ofengagement. The US civil rightsmovement and South Africa's anti-apartheid movement lost criticalmomentum during similarmoments. The art and science ofmovement-state relations when aleader with progressive credentials isin office is still unfolding.

Lesson #5: Ideas Matter. Fiveyears ago, Brazil gave birth to thefirst World Social Forum. In thatshort time, the annual event hasgrown from 5000 to 175,000 par-ticipants. The World Social Forumis the intellectual touchstone of anew generation of analysts,activists, NGOs, and progressivebusiness and movement leaderswho are reclaiming the market,redefining democracy and rejecting

labels like "protectionist." Proposalsrange from new strategies for guar-anteeing access to health care andcapital to maintaining citizen con-trol over natural resources and har-nessing international currency spec-ulation to fund health and econom-ic development. "New ideas need10 to 15 years to take hold. Thisnew tide of citizen mobilizationround the world is less than 10years old," notes CandidoGrzybowski, director of theBrazilian Institute for Social andEconomic Analysis (IBASE) and amember of the World Social ForumOrganizing Committee.

Another world is possible. Everyregion, country and communitystruggles with Brazil's questionswithin its own unique political andhistorical context. It is oddly fit-ting that Brazil should be on theleading edge of what it means toget from here to there. For all its

contradictions and complexities,the political space that has openedbecause of Brazil's leadership andmovements is enviable and impres-sive. One of Brazil's many gifts tothe world may very well be lessonsthat inform and transform the poli-tics and geopolitics of social andeconomic justice. U

Tanya Dawkins (dawkinst@mindspring.com) is the founder/director of the Inter-American Forumand senior vice president of theCollins Center for Public Policy.

The Forum is a leadership and policyproject working to develop, highlightand promote new visions of trade andeconomic policy that place social equi-ty, public interest and community atthe center of the public and policyagenda.

Hemisphere Volume 15 29

COMING SOON

FIU Report on "Terrorism Preparedness in Florida"Dr. Michael W. Collier, Lead Investigator

This two-year field research project by Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Centerand Institute for the Study of Transnational Crime and Terrorism investigates the readiness of Florida's firstresponders to handle a terrorist attack. Included are an assessment of the security posture of Florida's criticalinfrastructure and a statewide telephone poll of Florida citizens about terrorism preparedness issues.

While Florida is often seen as a national leader in emergency readiness programs and is better prepared thanbefore the 9/11 disasters, the state is far from ready to respond to future attacks. The citizens surveyed for thisproject strongly supported terrorism preparedness programs, indicating they would give up more civil libertiesand pay higher taxes to ensure the safety of their families.

To order an advance copy, call the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University,(305) 348-2894, or email Michael Collier at: collierm@fiu.edu.

Drought and Hope in the SertaoPhotos and text by Ricardo Funari

T he northeastern regionof Brazil known as thesertdo is synonymouswith drought andpoverty for most

Brazilians. In fact, however, its aver-age annual rainfall is twice that ofproductive areas in Arizona and NewMexico. An underground sea offresh water waits to be tapped-some 4,300 cubic meters of waterper inhabitant. (The United Nationsestimates the region's minimum needas 2,000 cubic meters per inhabi-tant.) Huge amounts of water arealso stored in reservoirs.

The technical know-how for chan-neling and distributing all this waterhas been around for decades, and thefinancial means to tackle the prob-lem have always existed. What islacking is political will to solve theproblem, an impasse has kept the so-called drought industry thriving.Against a background of artificialscarcity, a few powerful individualsprofit from the poverty of the major-ity, with paternalism a dominant cul-tural trait. Illiteracy levels are high inthe sertdo, short-term job prospectsare nil for the overwhelming majori-ty of the rural population and mal-nutrition is beginning to spread.

The sertdo is the most populoussemi-arid region in the world. Some10 million people live in a rural areathat includes 1,209 municipalities innine states. To date, no governmenthas ever taken effective measuresagainst this historic tragedy, eventhough severe droughts strike theregion every 12 to 15 years-the lastone was in 1998-1999-and moder-ate drought conditions are nearlyalways a problem. Scientists recently

correlated these cycles with El Nino,which typically causes floods in thesouth of the country and fires in thenorth.

A project that would substantiallyalleviate the effects of drought in thenortheast has been gathering dust inthe drawers of Brazil's federal govern-ment for more than a decade: divert-ing the So Francisco River, an ideathat traces back to the beginning oflast century and that has re-emergedwith every drought in the area. Thediversion would create a man-madechannel to bring water to 2,100 kilo-meters of dried-up riverbeds. Atleast six million inhabitants wouldbenefit from the water supply, andthe project would create 1.2 milliondirect and indirect jobs on 333,000newly irrigated hectares of land.With adequate water supplies, agro-industry could change the profile ofthe whole region. The media recentlybegan publicizing the project and theLula administration is consultingecologists in an attempt to revive it.

Drought is not a problem con-fined to the northeastern part of thecountry. Its human effects spill overto the rest of Brazilian society. Since1991, I have been researching what Icall "modern forms of slavery" inBrazil. I haven't found people inshackles or public floggings; themethods used to enslave humanbeings today are more sophisticated,and therefore more difficult to detectand fight. Modern-day slaves workas day laborers, sugar cane cutters,rubber gatherers, charcoal burnersand farm hands conned into corruptlabor relations that imply slaverythrough debt. The overwhelmingmajority of the workers are migrants

and refugees from northeasternregions historically scourged bydrought. People from these areasalso account for a large percentage ofresidents in the favelas (shantytowns)of Rio de Janeiro and So Paulo.

Formal employment simply doesnot exist in the rural areas of thesertdo. People try to make a livingon small plots of cleared land.Without water, there can be no crop,no income, or anything to eat. Thisis the ground where the age-oldplague of slavery flourishes andspreads in its modern forms, creatingan army of cheap, unskilled laborersto serve the economic system.People who have no other optionswill work in exchange for food orridiculously low wages if their onlyalternative is to go hungry. U

Ricardo Funari is a photojournalist inBrazil. He directs SocialPhotos,a cooperative ofphotographers thatcreates and distributes images docu-menting and addressing issues of socialjustice. More examples of his work canbe viewed at www.photobrazil comand www.socialphotos.com.

Opposite, top: Soledade, Paraiba.A girl plays in a dry dam usednowadays as a soccer field.

Opposite, bottom: Barra de SantaRosa, Paraiba. In drought condi-tions, residents must walk up toseveral miles for clean water, car-rying heavy buckets back home.

30 Hemisphere Volume 15

Hemisphere Volume 15 31

ti

Photo Essay

Barra de Santa Rosa, Paraiba. Refugees from drought and poverty in the sertdo pass a grave beside the road.

Soledade, Paraiba. A municipalclerk supervises people waiting inline for water from a desalinator.Each family is allotted two buck-ets of clean water every other day.

32 Hemisphere Volume 15

Photo Essay

Soledade, Paraiba. Food is in short supply for many rural families.

Brejinho, Pernambuco.A volunteer agent of the NGOPastoral da Crianfa monitors

children's weight with a scale tocheck for infant malnutrition.

Hemisphere Volume 15 33

Photo Essay

Santa Cruz da Baixa Verde, Pernambuco. The Catholic Church distributes basic goods to rural residentsaffected by drought.

Juazeiro do Norte, Ceard.

Ca holi Mass

The faithful crowd an outdoor

<, a

Opposite: Afogados da Ingazeira,Pernambuco. Rural residents ofthe sertdo receive only sporadicmedical care, relying on theirCatholic faith instead. On thewall are pictures of Padre Ciceroand Frei Damido, revered clergy-men who ministered to the rural

i northeast.

34 Hemisphere Volume 15

4 -

1 1.

&W

Fes

f

6 4

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Hemisphere Volume 15 35

Photo Essay

Bananeiras, Paraiba. A 72-year-old man embraces his six-year-old son.

Pernambuco. Like many othersbefore them, a family of ruralmigrants from the sertdo tries tohitch a ride to Sdo Paulo, SouthAmerica's largest city. PresidentLula made a similar trip with hismother and six siblings in 1952,when he was seven years old. Thefamily traveled on the back of atruck from Garanhuns,Pernambuco, to Sdo Paulo. Thetrip took 13 days.

36 Hemisphere Volume 15

SocialPho osdocumentary photography advocating change

J.R. Ripper/SocialPhotos

SocialPhotos is a cooperative of photographersthat works to create and distribute images docu-menting and addressing issues of social justice. Weactively strive to build collaborative relationships withprogressive organizations engaged in work on theissues we cover, in order to encourage the mosteffective, constructive use of our photos.

Online photo catalog at:http://www.socialphotos.com/

There you will find: human rights, exploitation & mod-ern slavery, Third World-related subjects, poverty &hunger, housing & health, children in risky situations,women's issues, social work, religion, environmentaldegradation, minorities...

And also those same people laughing, playing,loving, dancing, sharing, giving a hand, dreaming...

SocialPholos.com by Ricardo funari Tel. +55-21-22650974 -[mail socialphotos@socialphoos.com -Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

R E VIE W FP0 R UM

US-Brazilian Relationsby Donna J. Hrinak

The United States and Brazih ALong Road of Unmet ExpectationsBy Monica Hirst; conclusion byAndrew Hurrell. London, NewYork: Routledge, 2004, 160 pages.$75 hardcover; $18.95 paperback.

The US-Brazil relationship is socomplex and so different from USrelations with the countries ofHispanic America that, evenamong hemispheric policy makers,few in the United States under-stand it. When other countries ofthe region looked to the UnitedStates for leadership, Brazil soughtpartnership. When others lookednorthward for direction, Brazillooked inward. US insensitivity tothe differences Brazil cherishes,combined with Brazil's insistencethat it owes the US no explana-tions, have for too many years lefteach side believing the other hasacted unreasonably, capriciously orsimply from a desire to provoke.As this book notes, the result hasbeen "unmet expectations" in bothcountries.

By discussing the contemporarybilateral relationship in historicalcontext and examining some of thefactors shaping it today, MonicaHirst does an admirable job ofdescribing what makes US relationswith Brazil different from thosewith other countries in the region,explaining the complexities ofalliance between two of whatGeorge Kennan has termed theworld's five "monster" countries.But Hirst's task, complicated fromthe start, is made more difficult bythe format of the series of which itforms a part.

According to the producers ofRoutledge's series on ContemporaryInter-American Relations, the booksare deliberately short, in part toencourage further study. Thatapproach worked well in the oneother book in the set with which Iam familiar, The United States andVenezuela, by Carlos Romero andthe late Janet Kelly. But in the caseof Brazil, brevity confines theauthor to raising topics rather thanexamining them in depth. ChapterThree's discussion of Brazilian andUS voting patterns in the UnitedNations, for example, would havebenefited from an explanation thatdifferences often stem from long-held Brazilian foreign policy tenets,such as an unwillingness to approvesingle-country human rights resolu-tions. I kept feeling that Hirstwanted to say more but was run-ning out of space. More informa-tion on certain points in the firstpart of the book also would havegiven Andrew Hurrell's conclusion astronger foundation.

Still, when issues are relativelyunexplored, as are many of thosewhich Hirst presents, even a men-tion can be worthwhile and positive.This is particularly true of two top-ics she raises at the end of ChapterThree: 1) Brazilian immigration tothe United States, and 2) publicperceptions of the other in eachcountry.

Many immigrant populationshave influenced relations betweentheir native country and the UnitedStates. Mexico comes to mind first,of course, as well as the DominicanRepublic and, recently, Venezuela.Few Americans are aware of the

growing Brazilian population in theUS, but its development is wellworth watching, perhaps even forthe day when the US CongressionalHispanic Caucus has to change itsname to accommodate a newBrazilian-American member.

Hirst only briefly mentions theflip side of the new Brazilian pres-ence in the United States: growingUS investment in Brazil. Thisinvestment comes not from SiliconValley or the Fortune 500, but fromhundreds and thousands of Midwestfarmers who are forming coopera-tives to buy land in Brazil. Theirpotential to influence decisions onagricultural issues in particular issimilarly worth following. Caseslike the recent anti-dumping chargesbrought in the US against Brazilianshrimp, for instance, could be han-dled quite differently in the futureas the number of US citizens withshrimp farms in Brazil increases.

As for public opinion, Hirst cor-rectly notes that much workremains to be done on both sides ifBrazilians and Americans are todevelop a more complete and bal-anced understanding of each others'culture and world view. Expandingthe current modest level of exchangeprograms and targeting more publicaffairs resources to work with youngpeople should be a priority for bothcountries. Under AmbassadorRubens Barbosa, the BrazilianEmbassy in Washington began amajor school outreach program, butother options, such as creating aBrazilian version of the USInternational Visitors program foryoung professionals, remain unex-plored.

38 Hemisphere Volume 15

Review Forum

Another important and controver-sial issue Hirst takes on at severalpoints in the book is the dominantrole of Itamaraty, the Brazilian

Foreign Ministry, in foreign policy

making. Itamaraty "remains themain state agency" on trade issues,she notes, while the State

Department doesn't even figure

among the three US government

agencies responsible for economicrelations with Latin America.

US diplomats can only envyItamaraty's role. Members of theBrazilian Foreign Service act asinternational affairs advisors to othercabinet members and can themselvesaspire to cabinet posts outside theForeign Ministry. This was the pathfollowed by former Industry and

Development Minister SergioAmaral, former Defense MinisterJose Viegas, and former Science andTechnology Minister RonaldoSardenberg. Brazil's relatively under-developed civil service system gener-ally means that Itamaraty careerfunctionaries are the most preparedto assume positions throughout thegovernment, and their presence inall key agencies has allowed them tospread the Foreign Ministry's worldview in all administrations.

Nevertheless, Hirst reports chal-lenges to Itamaraty's dominancefrom other ministries that sharegrowing responsibility for foreignaffairs, particularly foreign economicissues. Another area worthy ofbroader discussion, therefore, is thepotential influence on US-Brazilrelations of the increasingly loudervoices of these new actors.

In addition to its limited space fordiscussion, another of this book'sflaws is the inclusion of certainminor but significant factual errors.According to Hirst, for example, theUS "praised the Brazilian govern-ment for its... military air intercep-tion program" to fight narcotics traf-ficking. In fact, the Brazilian shoot-down law (Lei do Abate) is a primeexample of the various misunder-standings at play in the bilateral rela-tionship. Brazil expected the US tobe pleased with this signal of its clear

intent to fight traffickers, but thenew regulations ran afoul of a USlaw-passed after the tragic down-ing in Peru of a plane with US mis-

sionaries on board-prohibitingassistance to countries whose lawsplace civilian aircraft at risk.

Because of US concerns, Brazil wait-

ed until 2004 to implement the law,five years after its passage and aftermany domestic complaints aboutUS infringement of the nation's sov-ereignty.

Hirst also cites a BrazilianEmbassy report claiming that US

Hemisphere Volume 15 39

Review Forum

tariffs on Brazil's top exports aver-aged 45.6%, in contrast to Brazil's14.3% average tariff on leadingexports from the US. While tech-nically correct, this calculation ismisleading. It includes the 350%tariff imposed on tobacco importedfrom Brazil above the quota set forthis commodity, but in fact thattariff has never been imposedbecause Brazil has never come evenclose to filling its quota. It is thistype of simplistic informationabout complex subjects that irri-tates the US and embitters theatmosphere of already difficultbilateral trade talks.

The transition from the fourchapters written by Hirst to theconcluding essay by AndrewHurrell is less than smooth, butHurrell makes an important contri-bution by considering US-Brazilrelations in a global context.Perhaps most useful is his examina-tion of Brazil's uncertainty about itsplace in the world; in particular, itsunwillingness to accept the respon-sibilities of leadership while clamor-ing for respect. Also thoughtful ishis point that while Brazil and the

US may share important values-support for democracy, for exam-ple-they differ seriously over howto promote those values and whichelements to prioritize. The discus-sion helps readers understand thestatic in a relationship between twocountries whose core values coin-cide.

Hurrell also reinforces one ofHirst's essential points, about thelink between Brazil's foreign anddevelopment policies. Business andcommercial interests are essentialcomponents of Brazil's modern for-eign policy, but economic develop-ment has never been an importantfactor in US global affairs. The USlargely fails to recognize the impor-tance Brazil places on the linkbetween its development and eventsin the rest of the world. By empha-sizing and explaining this link,Hirst and Hurrell make an impor-tant contribution to US under-standing of Brazilian identity.

A more complete view of US-Brazilian relations requires substan-tially more discussion than thisbook offers, but to the extent Hirstand Hurell raise questions and a

desire for further knowledge theywill have succeeded in advancingthe "mature partnership" the twocountries deserve. The directors ofthe project on Contemporary Inter-American Relations deserve praisefor including this essential topic inthis series.

Finally, it's worth repeating thequote Hirst includes by formerBrazilian Foreign Minister JuracyMagalhaes, who in 1966 famouslydeclared, "What's good for theUnited States is also good forBrazil." That may not always betrue; however, what's good for theUS can also be good for Brazil, andvice versa. By recognizing the com-plexities in our relationship, we canmore successfully identify whereour common interests lie and workmore collaboratively to promotethem.

Donna J. Hrinak is the former USambassador to Brazil. She is current-ly co-chair of the International Trade,Competition and GovernmentPractice at Steel, Hector & DavisLLP in Miami.

40 Hemisphere Volume 15

6TH CONFERENCE ON CUBAN AND CUBAN-AMERICAN STUDIESpresented by the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University

October 27-29, 2005

The Cuban Research Institute continues the tradition of convening scholarsengaged in the study of Cuba and Cuban-Americans by presenting its 6th Conference.

The theme of this year's conference is "Politics and Culture.'

For further information about the conference and other CRI activities,please see our website at http://lacc.fiu.edu/cri/ or contact us at:

Cuban Research InstituteFlorida International University

DM 363, University Park, Miami, FL 33199 * (305) 348-1991/crinst@fiu.edu

Now Available from Routledge

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haib an m~ Political Corruption in theCaribbean BasinConstructing a Theory to Combat Corruption

by Michael W. CollierLatin American and Caribbean CenterFlorida International University

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin retards state economic growth and development, undermines

government legitimacy, and threatens state security. In spite of recent anti-corruption efforts of inter-

governmental and nongovernmental organizations, Caribbean political corruption problems appear to be

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ical corruption. Case studies of political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica are included.

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Lula and the Workers' Partyby Marian GoslingaOn October 27, 2002,

the Brazilian peopleelected Luiz InicioLula da Silva, theleader of the

Workers' Party (PT) and a formermetalworker, to the presidency with61% of the popular vote. Thisunusual result was partly a reflec-tion of a gradual shift within theBrazilian labor movement fromradical socialism as a politicalobjective to more pragmatic politi-cal and economic strategies.

This bibliography, drawing upondiverse sources, sheds light on con-ditions in today's Brazil, with anemphasis on selections about Lulaand the Workers' Party. The mainfocus of most of the entries is eco-nomic, reflecting both the mainchallenge Lula faces and the toppreoccupation of analysts con-cerned about Brazil's economicfuture under his left-leaning admin-istration.

In addition to the more recenttitles listed below, two older butinformative books on the formationand early experiences of the PT areRachel Meneguello, A formacdo deum partido, 1979-1982 (Rio deJaneiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1989)and Margaret Keck, The Workers'Party and Democratization in Brazil(New Haven: Yale University Press,1992).

Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. "Lapolitica externa del nuevo gobier-no del Presidente Luiz Inicio Lulada Silva: retrospectiva historica yevaluacion pragmitica." RevistaEspacio Academico, v. 2, no. 19(December 2002): 19-37.

Almeida, Thomas. The BrazilianEconomy and President Lula [videorecording]. 2003. 1 videocassette

Alves, Brito. A histdria de Lula: ooperdrio presidente. Rio de Janeiro:Espago e Tempo, 2003. 191 pp.(Published in 2004 in Spanish as Lahistoria de Lula: de obrero a presidenteby Editorial Oveja Negra, Bogota,Colombia.)

Aragdo, Murillo de. "Lula at theHalfway Point." LatinFinance

(September 2004): 38-41.

Bacha, Edmar Lisboa. "Elementospara uma economia politica dasreformas no governo Lula." Revistade Economia Politica (Brazil), v. 24,no. 1 (January-March 2004): 17-28.

Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, ed. Radicalsin Power: The Workers'Party (P)and Experiments in UrbanDemocracy in Brazil New York,NY: Zed Books (distributed byPalgrave), 2003. 254 pp.

Betto, Frei. "Dilemas da politicaeconomica." Caros Amigos, v. 8, no.

95 (February 2005): 6-12.

. "Lula: detalhes biografi-cos," Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 67(October 2002): 26-27.

. "O significado da vitoriade Lula para a esquerda: a estrelasobe." Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 69(December 2002): 18-20.

Branford, Sue, Bernardo Kucinski,and Hilary Wainwright. Lula andthe Workers' Party in Brazil. NewYork, NY: New Press, 2003. 144 pp.(Originally published under the titlePolitics Transformed.)

Carvalhal, Eugenio do. "Os nego-ciadores de Lula." ConjunturaEconomica, v. 57, no. 2 (February2003): 40-43.

Carvalho, Fernando J. Cardim de,and Fernando Ferrari Filho. "Elpresidente Lula da Silva en elprimer tercio de su mandato."Investigacidn Econdmica, v. 63, no.249 (July/September 2004): 55-74.(Analyzes Lula's economic policiesafter the first third of his term, focus-ing on policy strategies.)

Cavalcanti, Luiz Otivio. O que d ogoverno Lula. Sao Paulo: LandyEditora, 2003. 77 pp.

Coggiola, Osvaldo. Governo Lula:da esperanfa a realidade. SioPaulo: Xamd, 2004. 181 pp.

Coligagio Lula Presidente. Programade governo 2002: um Brasil paratodos. Sdo Paulo: Comitd LulaPresidente, 2002. 88 pp.

Corazza, Gentil, and FernandoFerrari Filho. "A politica economicado governo Lula no primeiro anode mandato: perplexidades, dile-mas, resultados e alternativas."Indicadores Economicos FEE, v. 32,no. 1 (May 2004): 243-251.

42 Hemisphere Volume 15

Publications Update

Dathein, Ricardo. "Governo Lula:uma alternativa de politicaeconomica para evitar seu fracassoe atingir o desenvolvimento conestabilidade de preeos." IndicadoresEconamicos FEE, v. 31, no. 4(February 2004): 229-258.

Diaz, Leonardo. Lula. Barcelona,Spain: Ediciones de la Tempestad,2004. 124 pp.

. "O que o Brasil podeesperar do governo Lula."Conjuntura Economica, v. 57, no. 2(February 2003): 24-26.

Fausto Neto, Antonio, Eliseo Ver6n,and Antonio Albino Rubim. Lulapresidente: televisdo e politica nacampanha eleitoral Sao Paulo:Hacker, 2003. 174 pp.

Figueira Leal, Paulo Roberto. O PTe o dilema da representafdo politi-ca. Rio de Janeiro: Editora daFundagio Getulio Vargas, 2005.128 pp.

Furuguem, Alberto. "Para ondevamos com Lula? Dois cenarios."Conjuntura Econamica, v. 57, no. 4(April 2003): 12-15.

Giambiagi, Fabio, Josd GuilhermeReis, and Andre Urani. Reformasno Brasil. balanfo e agenda. SaoPaulo: Nova Fronteira, 2004.543 pp.

Gacek, Stanley. "Lula and Chavez:Differing Responses to theWashington Consensus."New Labor Forum, v. 13, no. 1(Spring 2004): 40-49.

Genosko, Gary. The Party withoutBosses: Lessons on Anti-Capitalismfrom Filix Guattari and LuizIndcio 'Lula' da Silva. Winnipeg,Canada: Arbeiter Ring Pub., 2003.87 pp. (Based on interviews.)

Godio, Julio, ed. Un PT enArgentina? Reformular las formasde pensar la politica para entenderla experiencia brasilenia. BuenosAires: Corregidor, 2003.

Gratius, Susanne. "La politica exte-rior de Lula: ma's cambio que con-tinuidad." Iberoamericana(Germany), v. 4, Nueva epoca, no.13(March 2004): 175-181.

Hakim, Peter. "The ReluctantPartner." Foreign Affairs, v. 83, no.1 (January/February 2004): 114-123. (Suggestions for improvingUS-Brazil relations.)

Hunter, Wendy. "Brazil's NewDirection." Journal of Democracy 14,no. 2 (2003):151-162.

Indursky. Freda. "Discurso, linguae memoria: Lula-estrutura e acon-tecimento." Organon, v. 17, no. 35(2003): 101-122.

Lula (Luiz Inacio da Silva). Tengoun sueso: cinco propuestas paracambiar la historia. Barcelona,Spain: Ediciones Peninsula, 2003.91 pp. (Features speeches by Lulafrom 2002-2003.)

Manzo, Paolo. Lula, elpresidentedei poveri: un ex operaio allaguida del Brasile. Milan, Italy:Baldini & Castoldi, 2003. 149 pp.

Medeiros, Jarbas. "Simpatia para ogoverno Lula." Caros Amigos, v. 6,no. 70 (January 2003): 39-40.

Mendes, Candido. Lula. opfdomais que o voto. 5th ed., rev. Riode Janeiro: Garamond, 2003.347 pp. (Attempts to explain Lula'ssuccess at the polls.)

Minakata, Kazumi, Maria AliceVieira, and Alexandre Fortes.Partido dos Trabalhadores:trajetorias. 2d ed. Sao Paulo:Editora Funda~ao Perseu Abramo,2003. 143 pp. (Intellectual founda-tions of Lula's government.)

Morrison, John. Luiz Indcio Lulada Silva. Philadelphia, PA: ChelseaHouse, 2004. 96 pp.

Nascimento, Joio. Lula: do agresteao planalto, 1945-2003. Lisboa:Editorial Noticias, 2003. 138 pp.

Oz6rio de Almeida, Anna."Continuity and Change in the PTGovernment." Centro Studi diPolitica Internazionale, WorkingPapers (November 2004).

Parana, Denise. Lula, elhijo deBrasil Marcelo Canossa, trans.Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo,2003. 464 pp. (Translation of Lula,oflho de Brasil)

Paula, Antonio de. A economiapolitica da mudanfa: os desafios eos equivocos do inicio do governoLula. Belo Horizonte: Autentica,2003. 2 54 pp.

Pochmann, Marcio, ed. Atlas daexclusdo social no Brasi: os ricosno Brasil Sao Paulo: CortezEditora, 2004. 204 pp. (Features aregional breakdown of wealth distri-bution.)

Riethof, Marieke. "ChangingStrategies of the Brazilian LaborMovement: From Opposition toParticipation." Latin AmericanPerspectives, v. 31, no. 6 (November2004): 31-47.

Rodrigues, Iram Jacome. "O papeldos sindicatos no governo Lula."Conjuntura Economica, v. 57, no. 9(September 2003): 36-41.

Hemisphere Volume 15

Publications Update

Sallum, Basilio, and EduardoKugelmas. "Gobierno de Lula:icontinuidad, avance o retroceso?"In La Argentina de Kirchner y el Brasilde Lula, edited by Carlos ChachoAlvarez (Buenos Aires: PrometeoLibros): 19-36.

Samuels, David J. "From Socialismto Social Democracy: PartyOrganization and the Transforma-tion of the Workers' Party inBrazil." Comparative Political Studies37, no. 9 (2004): 999-1024.

Schmidt, Benicio. "A politicabrasileira a partir de Lula."Humanidades, no. 49 (January2003): 54-65.

Soares, Laura Tavares, et al.Governo Lula: decifrando oenigma. SIo Paulo Viramundo,2004. 190 pp. (Texts published in"Outro Brasil" between September2003 and March 2004.)

Summariva, Marco. Lula: storia,idee, speranze. Rome:Malatempora, 2003. 122 pp.

Trotter, Richard. "The NewEconomic and Social Model: AThird Stage of Economic andSocial Development in Brazil inthe Millennium." Journal of theAmerican Academy of Business, v. 4,no. 1/2 (May 2004): 178-183.

Vasconcellos, Gilberto Felisberto."Medo do imperialismofinanceiro: o vacilo do GovernoLula." Caros Amigos, v. 7, no. 75(June 2003): 19-20.

"A mundanea da matrizenergitica da sociedade brasileira ea perspectiva de Luiz Inacio Lulafazer o seu sucessor en 2006."Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 68(November 2002): 17-18.

Velasco, Sebastiao C. and Ana MariaCruz. "Cambiando el rumbo: lapolitica exterior del gobierno deLula." In La Argentina de Kirchner yel Brasil de Lula, edited by CarlosChacho Alvarez (Buenos Aires:Prometeo Libros): 117-132.

Vernengo, Matias. "ExternalLiberalization, Stabilization, andthe Labor Market in Brazil."Latin American Perspectives, v. 31, no.4 (July 2004): 62-75.

Wheatley, Jonathan. "WideningExpectations." LatinFinance(September 2004): 33-36. (DiscussesBrazil's economic upturn in August2004.)

Winckler, Carlos Roberto, andSalvatore Santagada. "Entre mun-dan~a e estagnaqio: os indicadoressociais na vigencia do Plano Real."Indicadores Econdmicos FEE, v. 32,no. 2 (August 2004 ): 155-174.

Zobel, Gibby, Jessie Sklair, andDylan Howitt. O Presidenteengraxate/ The Shoeshine President[video recording] Rio de Janeiro:Filmes; distributed by LatinAmerican Videoarchives, 2003. 1videocassette. (In Portuguese withEnglish subtitles) U

Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri-can and Caribbean bibliographer atFlorida International University.

44 Hemisphere Volume 15

Now Available from Indiana University Press

Camargo Guarnieri, Brazilian Composer:A Study of His Creative Life and Worksby Marion Verhaalen

Published in April 2005, this book provides the first com-prehensive overview of Guarnieri's life and works inEnglish, along with a CD compilation of representativeworks.

Marion Verhaalen is a teacher, composer andauthor who teaches at the Wisconsin Conservatory ofMusic in Milwaukee. She has spent time in Brazil as bothresearcher and teacher, including a semester on aFulbright Professorship at the Federal University in P6rtoAleg re.

302 pp., 36 b&w illus., append., notes, bibl., index, 6x9Cloth, ISBN 0-253-34475-1, $60Available at bookstores or by calling (800) 842-6796

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BRABRASA is an international, interdisciplinary group of

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For more information, see our newwebsite at www.brasa.org.

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