Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers || Synopsis

SynopsisSource: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1980, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1980), pp. xi-xviiiPublished by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192582 .

Accessed: 09/05/2014 12:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Press and Philosophy of Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR todigitize, preserve and extend access to PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of ScienceAssociation.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.252 on Fri, 9 May 2014 12:42:25 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=psa

http://www.jstor.org/stable/192582?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


SY NOPSIS

The following brief summaries provide an introduction to each of the papers in this volume.

1. The Hunt for Scientific Reason. Mary Hesse. The thesis of underdetermination of theory by evidence has led to an opposition between realism and relationism in philosophy of science. Various forms of the thesis are examined, and it is concluded that it is true in at least a weak form that brings realism into doubt. Realists therefore need, among other things, a theory of degrees of confirmation to sup- port rational theory choice. Recent such theories due to Glymour and Friedman are examined, and it is argued that their criterion of "unifi- cation" for good theories is better formulated in Bayesian terms. Bayesian confirmation does, however, have consequences that tell against realism. It is concluded that the prospects are dim for scientific realism as usually understood.

2. Probabilistic Causality and Multiple Causation. Paul Humphreys. It is argued in this paper that although much attention has been paid to causal chains and common causes within the literature on probabilistic causality, a primary virtue of that approach is its ability to deal with cases of multiple causation. In doing so some ways are indicated in which contemporary sine qua non analyses of causation are too narrow (and ways in which probabilistic causality is not) and an argument by Reichenbach designed to provide a basis for the asym- metry of causation is refined. The importance of referring causal claims to an abstract model is also emphasized.

3. The Reality of Causes in a World of Instrumental Laws. Nancy Cartwright. Philosophers of science nowadays are inclined to believe in physical laws, but generally, like Hume and Russell, to reject causes. This paper urges the reverse. Explanatory practice in physics argues that we must take literally the causal stories that our theories provide, but the fundamental laws and equations that are essential to modern science are merely instrumental.

4. Causality: Production and Propagation. Wesley C. Salmon. A theory of causality based upon physical processes is developed. Causal processes are distinguished from pseudo-processes by means of a criterion of mark transmission. Causal interactions are characterized as those intersections of processes in which the intersecting processes are mutually modified in ways which persist beyond the point of inter- section. Causal forks of three kinds (conjunctive, interactive, and perfect) are introduced to explicate the principle of the common cause.



Causal forks account for the production of order and modifications of order; causal processes account for the propagation of causal influence.

5. The Herd as a Means. David L. Hull. Many of the objections to the sociobiological research program arise from putative peculiar- ities of human beings and human societies when many of them actually arise from the nature of hierarchically organized systems. The levels of selection problem is no easier to handle at the gene-organism interface than at the organism-society interface. The unity of the genotype is just as problematic as the cohesiveness of the gene pool. One distinction which helps to reduce confusion is between replicators and interactors. Implications of various versions of evolutionary theory for human beings are set out.

6. Holism, Individualism, and the Units of Selection. Elliott Sober. Developing a definition of group selection, and applying that definition to the dispute in the social sciences between methodological holists and methodological individualists, are the two goals of this paper. The definition proposed distinguishes between changes in groups that are due to group selection and changes in groups that are artefacts of selection processes occurring at lower levels of organization. It also explains why the existence of group selection is not implied by the mere fact that fitness values of organisms are sensitive to the composition of groups. And, lastly, the definition explains why group selection need not involve selection for altruism. Group selection is thereby seen as an evolutionary force which is objectively distinct from other evolutionary forces. Applying the distinction between group and individual selection to the holism/individualism dispute has the desirable result that the dispute is not decidable a priori. This way of looking at the dispute yields a conception of individualism which is untainted by atomism and a conception of holism which is unspoiled by hypostatis.

7. The Units of Selection and the Structure of the Multi-level Genome. William C. Wimsatt. The reductionistic vision of evolutionary theory, "the gene's eye view of evolution" is the dominant view among evolutionary biologists today. On this view, the gene is the only unit with sufficient stability to act as a unit of selection, with individuals and groups being more ephemeral units of function, but not of selection. This view is argued to be incorrect, on several grounds. The empirical and theoretical bases for the existence of higher-level units of selection are explored, and alternative analyses discussed critically. The success of a multi-level selection theory demands the recognition and development of a multi-level genetics. The way to accomplish this is suggested. The genotype/phenotype distinction also requires further analysis to see how it applies at higher levels of organization. This analysis provides a way of defining genotype and phenotype for cultural evolution, and a treatment of the innate-acquired distinction which are both generalizeable to analyze problems of the nature and focus of scientific change.

xii



8. What Was Born's Statistical Interpretation? Linda Wessels. The statistical interpretation introduced by Born in mid-1926 is not the interpretation now associated with his name. Born's own under- standing of that interpretation is revealed by looking at some of its roots in Born's earlier work with Franck on collisions (fall, 1924), his collaboration with Jordan on that topic (early 1925), his contri- butions to matrix mechanics (last half of 1925), his attempt in collaboration with Wiener at an operator formulation of quantum mechanics (early 1926), and at the exposition of the interpretation in Born's first papers on a wave mechanical treatment of collisions (mid-1926).

9. The Projection Postulate and Bohr's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Paul Teller. This article explains why Bohr does not need to discuss the projection postulate or the "problem of measurement". Beginning with a thumbnail sketch of Bohr's general views (which should serve as an efficient introduction to Bohr for newcomers), it is argued that Bohr interprets the state function as giving a statistical summary of experimental outcomes. Against the objection that Bohr was too much a microrealist to endorse such an instrumentalist statistical interpretation it is suggested that he rejected the issue of microrealism as not well formed. It is shown that on his statistical interpretation Bohr does not need the projection postulate or face the usual problem of measurement.

10. Niels Bohr on the Unity of Science. Edward MacKinnon. Niels Bohr began his career with an attempt to give a correct descriptive account of the motion of electrons. When forced to abandon this interpretation, he adopted, but soon rejected, a hypothetical-deductive account. In his development of an interpretation for the new quantum theory Bohr began to concentrate on the way language functions to make descriptions possible. His later work on this problem and on the role of concepts in the foundations of science led him to anticipate some of the basic ideas developed in Wittgenstein's Investigations. Bohr eventually saw his own analysis of the conditions of the possibility of unambiguous communication as the basis for making explicit the unity implicit in science.

11. An Information-Processing Theory of Mental Imagery: A Case Study in the New Mentalistic Psychology. George E. Smith and Stephen M. Kosslyn. A particular research program on mental imagery is defended against certain sweeping methodological criticisms that have been advanced against it. The central claim is that the approach taken in the program is an appropriate response to the problem of doing empirical research in a theoretical vacuum, and that when it is viewed in this perspective, the criticisms are not merely unfounded, they are inappropriate. The argument for this claim is developed by first describing the program and then analyzing the methodological rationale behind it.

12. Confusions of Symbolization in Mental Representation. Paul A. Kolers. Standard views usually propose that there is something in the mind that is the representation, typically a picture of some sort

xiii



or a proposition. An alternate view supported here is that the ability to carry out procedures skillfully provides a better account of perfor- mance than presence of a fixed mental object does. Evidence from some experiments in the cognitive domain supports the claim.

13. Imagery -- There's More to It Than Meets the Eye. Robert Schwartz. This paper looks at the role of imagery in cognition from the standpoint of treating images as forms of symbolization. It begins by making some basic distinctions about different kinds of symbolic functioning. It then proceeds to examine issues concerning: the va- riety of types of symbol systems used in cognition, the analog-digital distinction, image picture-percept relations, and propositionality.

14. The Norms of Social Inquiry and Masculine Experience. Sandra Harding. Disproportionate reliance on distinctively masculine social experience contributes a false plausibility to the shared assumptions of "naturalist" and "intentionalist" approaches to the philosophy of social science. This social bias leads these approaches to recommend purposes, contents, forms, methods and ethics of social inquiry which produce both insoluble problems for both approaches and also distorted accounts of social reality. The paper explores some of the reasons why men's experience has been granted this unjustifiable epistemological privilege.

15. Social Life and Social Science: The Significance of the Naturalist/Intentionalist Dispute. Nancy C.M. Hartsock. Historicist understandings of social scientific theories encounter problems of relativism. They also fail to take account of the process by which theories emerge and the social conditions which make some ideas plau- sible and others implausible. The utility of adopting a more radically histoicist approach, one which both situates theories in social life and lays the basis for moving beyond relativism, is demonstrated by reexamining the debate about whether the social sciences and natural sciences share a unity of method or are deeply incommensurable. By means of the critique of political economy, the fundamental inadequa- cies of both "naturalist" and "intentionalist" approaches to the philosophy of social science are shown to share common roots in social life. The paper then explores some alternative social bases on which to ground a more adequate philosophy of social science.

16. Methodology, Ideology and Feminist Critiques of Science. Noretta Koertge. This paper deals with two questions. First, if all scientists were perfect Popperians, how much influence could their background values and experiences have? It is argued that background can play a role in problem choice and in the constructing and testing of hypotheses. Second, do the ideals of feminism suggest the need for a new methodology and epistemology for science? In answering this question, Harding's paper in this volume is discussed.

17. Is General Relativity Generally Relativistic? Roger Jones. Among the principles that are generally taken to underlie the general theory of relativity is a general principle of relativity. Such a

xiv



principle is supposed to extend the special principle of relativity, which holds observers in uniform motion to be indistinguishable by appeal to the laws of physics, to a requirement on observers in arbi- trary states of motion. Starting with physical intuitions described graphically by Galileo, proceeding through a series of formal require- ments on reference frames defined on models of space-time theories, and considering other "observations" commonly associated with relativity principles, this paper argues that the general principle of relativity is neither justified by "fact", nor exemplified by the general theory of relativity.

18. Similarities and Differences between Evolutionary Theory and the Theories of Physics. Mary B. Williams. Many philosophers have claimed that the structure of evolutionary theory is intrinsically different from the structure of physical theories. These claims were based on the appearance of the immature structure of the theory. Refutations of these claims have been based on newly available glimpses of the mature structure of the theory. These claims and their refutations show that the relationship between the immature and mature structures of evolutionary theory is dramatically different from this relationship for Newtonian physics. Analysis of the cause of this difference provides insight into significant features of the process of maturation of scientific theories.

19. What's Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory? John Beatty. Much if not most recent literature in philosophy of bi- ology concerns the extent to which biological theories conform to what is known as the "received" philosophical view of scientific theories, a descendant of the logical-empiricist view of theories. But the received view currently faces a competitor--a very different view of theories known as the "semantic" view. It is argued here that the semantic view is more sensitive to the nature and limitations of evolutionary theory than is the received view. In particular, the semantic view better accomodates the fact that evolutionary theory is bound to change as a result of the evolutionary process itself. This unusual feature of evolutionary theory provides a good reason for reconsidering the received view and paying close attention to the semantic view.

20. A Structural Description of Evolutionary Theory. Robert N. Brandon. The principle of natural selection is stated. It connects fitness values (actual reproductive success) with expected fitness values. The term'adaptedness' is used for expected fitness values. The principle of natural selection explains differential fitness in terms of relative adaptedness. It is argued that this principle is absolutely central to Darwinian evolutionary theory. The empirical content of the principle of natural selection is examined. It is argued that the principle itself has no empirical biological content, but that the presuppositions of its applicability are empirical. They form the empirical biological core of evolutionary theory.

xv



21. The origin and Implications of Engineers' Obligations to the Public Welfare. Jerry W. Gravander. The Codes of Ethics of the engineering profession require engineers to "blow the whistle" on their clients or employers whenever they believe such action is required to protect the public interest, and the Codes also require engineers to be loyal and faithful and maintain confidentiality toward their clients or employers. This paper formulates an approach to both justifying the "whistleblowing" provision of the Codes and resolving the conflict between it and the loyal employee provision. The foundation of this approach is an analogy between engineering and social experimentation.

22. Means/Ends and the Nature of Engineering. Michael Hodges. Aristotle's distinction between the practical life and the contempla- tive life has been of central importance in fixing the sort of justification that is required for engineering activity. As practical it must be justified by its products, while intellect's activity claims intrinsic worth. Most philosophers of technology accept this model of justification. However, engineering is not essentially practical in the relevant sense. To claim that it is overlooks a distinction between "structuring ends" and "products" which when made allows engineering to lay claim to the same sort of value as intellectual activity. The final conclusion is that both have intrinsic worth but that does not free either from the obligation to look to their consequences.

23. The End-Use Problem in Engineering Ethics. C. Thomas Rogers. End-uses of technology, and thus of engineering, have to do with the purposes or ends for which we are doing engineering. Engineers are means to their client's objectives, and this raises engineer's end-use problems. The paper is a critique of two ways of dealing with end-use problems which can be found in engineering professionalism. The central part of the paper is a critique of Samuel Florman's claims as a spokes- man for the "received wisdom" of engineering. The end-use problem is inadequately treated in current engineering professionalism, but a proposal to treat the end-use problem by Stephen Unger is supported.

24. Technology and Value Theory. Carol Ann Smith. A rough cat- egorization of issues in the field of Technology and Society Studies is provided and the kinds of values and value issues under discussion are examined. It is argued that value theory is not sufficiently well- developed to address some of the value issues that arise. Three approaches to values with which the author disagrees are discussed: the atomistic view of values; the ordinary language approach; and, an approach the author calls the "rationality approach". Under the latter, an analysis of value offered by Kurt Baier in "Fact and Value" is criticized.

25. Quantum Logic and Meaning. Geoffrey Hellman. Quantum logic as genuine non-classical logic provides no solution to the "paradoxes" of quantum mechanics. From the minimal condition that synonyms be substitutable salva veritate, it follows that synonymous sentential connectives be alike in point of truth-functionality. It is a fact of pure mathematics that any assignment b of (0, 1) to the subspaces of

xvi



Hilbert space (dim. > 3) which guarantees truth-preservation of the ordering and truth-functionality of QL negation, violates truth- functionality of QL V and A. Thus, from within both the classical framework and that of any QL that preserves elementary set theory, two distinct (nonsynonymous) sets of connectives are discernible. Classical derivations of QM paradoxes are all available unless the language of QM is not classically closed. Maintaining this requires a strong and selfdefeating verification theory of meaning, the philosophical cornerstone of the Copenhagen interpretation to which QL was to provide an alternative.

26. Quantum Mathematics. J. Michael Dunn. This paper explores the development of mathematics on a quantum logical base when mathematical postulates are taken as necessary truths. First it is shown that first-order Peano arithmetic formulated with quantum logic has the same theorems as classical first-order Peano arithmetic. Distribution for first-order arithmetical formulas is a theorem not of quantum logic but rather of arithmetic. Second, it is shown that distribution fails for second-order Peano arithmetic without extensionality. Third, it is shown that distribution holds for second-order Peano arithmetic (second- order quantum logic) with extensionality. Some remarks about extensions to quantum set theory are made,

27. Correlations and Physical Locality. Arthur Fine. Two principles of locality used in discussions about quantum mechanics are distinguished. The intuitive no-action-at-a distance requirement is called physical locality. There is also a mathematical requirement of a kind of factorizability which is referred to as "locality". It is argued in this paper that factorizability is not necessary for physical locality. Ways of producing models that are physically local although not factorizable which are concerned with correlations between the behavior of pairs of particles are suggested. These models can account for all the quantum mechanical single and joint probabilities.

28. Causal Analysis of Hidden Variables. Patrick Suppes. The retreat from the paradise of deterministic causation and the general principles involved in this retreat, which has been forced upon us by quantum mechanics, is described in more or less successive stages.

29. Critique of the Papers of Fine and Suppes. Abner Shimony. A combination of methodological considerations and propositions about the causal structure of spacetime provides a reply to Fine's criticisms of the "factorizability requirement" used in several versions of Bell's theorem. His proposal of "action in harmony" is criticized. Experi- mental tests are proposed for both the "synchronization models" and the "prism models", which Fine has invented as loopholes to Bell's theorem. A theorem of Suppes and Zanotti which purports to show the impossibility of hidden variables is criticized. One of their crucial premisses seems to be justifiable only if one accepts a Parmenidean metaphysics.

xvii



30. Introspection, Observation, and Experiment: An Example Where Experiment Pays Off. Guy Carden and Thomas G. Dieterich. The standard methodology for testing theories about syntax and semantics, which has been attacked both by philosophers and by sociolinguists, depends heavily on the personal introspection of the professionals. An im- proved data-collection methodology is proposed and an extended example of its application to a long-standing data dispute on a question of theoretical interest is given.

31. "Internal" and "External" Evidence in Linguistics. Arnold M. Zwicky. A Distinction between "internal" and "external" evidence in linguistics is illustrated, and two occasions on which the distinction arises are identified: in the division of labor between linguistics and other fields, and in the choice among alternative descriptions. Assumptions which would bias generative linguists both away from and towards external evidence are explored. Examples from phonological and syntactic analyses are contrasted, and speculations are made as to why evidence should be differently used in phonology and syntax. A prescription favoring external evidence is tempered by the need for credible assumptions linking linguistics to other fields.

32. Some Thoughts on Data and Theory in Linguistics. Richard E. Grandy. Arguments for the preference of introspective judgments as evidence for syntactic theory are reviewed. A brief historical account of the origins of the presuppositions of the orthodox theory of data collection is given.

33. Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology. Richard N. Boyd. A realistic and dialectical conception of the epistemology of science is advanced according to which the acquisition of instrumental knowledge is parasitic upon the acquisition, by successive approximation, of theoretical knowledge. This conception is extended to provide an epistemological characterization of reference and of natural kinds, and it is integrated into recent naturalistic treatments of knowledge. Im- plications for several current issues in the philosophy of science are explored.

34. Theory Construction and Experiment: An Empiricist View. Bas C. van Fraassen. This paper focuses on the empiricism/realism debate. The initial portion of the paper is a short sketch of the nature of the enterprise of philosophy of science. What are taken as empiricist views on theory construction and experiment are described. The paper concludes with a simple recasting of the main points at issue in the empiricism/realism debate.

xviii



Date post:	08-Jan-2017
Category:	Documents
Upload:	vannhan
View:	212 times
Download:	0 times

Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers || Synopsis

Documents