PRESIDENT’S LETTER ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES AND INFORMATION LEGAL NOTES By: Todd Jermstad PARTICIPANTS’ VIEWS OF A VETERANS’ COURT PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM By: Kelli D. Stevens-Martin, Cynthia Hipolito, Jason Clark-Miller, Darian Eldred and Jialiang Liu TRAS TIME-SAVING TIPS By: Jennifer Gifford NEW GROUP OF HIDALGO CSCD PROBATION OFFICERS COMPLETE SOARING 2 TRAINING By Claudia V. Lemus NEWS FROM THE FIELD JOURNAL OF THE TEXAS PROBATION ASSOCIATION Volume XXX Number 3 Fall 2015
Transcript
PRESIDENT’S LETTER
ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES AND INFORMATION
LEGAL NOTESBy: Todd Jermstad
PARTICIPANTS’ VIEWS OF A VETERANS’ COURTPRE-TRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM
By: Kelli D. Stevens-Martin, Cynthia Hipolito, Jason Clark-Miller, Darian Eldred and Jialiang Liu
TRAS TIME-SAVING TIPSBy: Jennifer Gifford
NEW GROUP OF HIDALGO CSCD PROBATION OFFICERS COMPLETE SOARING 2 TRAINING
Texas Probation is published quarterly (Winter, Spring, Summer and Fall) by Sam Houston Press and Copy Center in Huntsville, Texas, for the Texas Probation Association. The contents of articles or other materials contained in Texas Probation do not reflect the endorsements, official attitudes, or positions of the Texas Probation Association or the George J. Beto Criminal Justice Center at Sam Houston State University unless so stated. Articles may be reproduced without charge as long as permission is obtained from the editor and credit is given to both the author and Texas Probation.
CONTENTS
PRESIDENT’S LETTER .................................................................................................. 1
ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES .......................................................................................... 2
PROFESSIONAL PROFILE ............................................................................................. 2
Participants’ Views of Veterans’ Court Pre-Trial Diversion Program By: Kelli D. Stevens-Martin, Cynthia Hipolito, Jason Clark-Miller, Darian Eldred and Jialiang Liu ....................................................................................................................12
TRAS Time-Saving TipsBy: Jennifer Gifford .......................................................................................................17
New Group of Hidalgo CSCD Probation Officers Complete SOARING 2 TrainingBy Claudia V. Lemus ......................................................................................................19
NEWS FROM THE FIELD ............................................................................................. 20
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 1
to date on court decisions that affect our departments’ procedures.
Our next conference will be the 2016 Annual Conference in San Marcos (Hays County) in April. The conference planning committee has been meeting regularly and I anticipate a well-rounded educational agenda with many opportunities for networking and just having a good time in the hill country.
Last, I want to thank Publications Committee Co-Editor, Karla Kutch (Brazoria County CSCD) and welcome newly appointed Co-Editor, Kelli Martin (Tarrant County CSCD). Their commitment, dedication and enthusiasm make this journal possible. I encourage all members to submit articles, pictures and news from the field to the Publications Committee.
Have a wonderful holiday season and from the TPA Board – See you in San Marcos!
Caroline RickawayTPA President
PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE
Welcome to the 2015 fall issue of Texas Probation. My thoughts go out to those who have been affected by the recent floods and fires across the state. Hopefully, those communities and individuals who suffered losses are being restored.
I’ll begin with a recap of the 2015 Legislative Conference in Houston. Special thanks go out to Tom Brooks, Director of Harris County JPD, and Dr. Teresa May, Director of Harris CSCD, for their support of the conference. I also want to thank Conference Planning Committee Co-Chairs, Susan Orendac (Harris County JPD), Henry Gonzales (Harris County JPD), Dr. Brian Lovins (Harris County CSCD) and all the members of the planning committee for their time, hard work, and outstanding collaboration with the hotel, the Exhibitors Committee, and local resources. I heard many comments from conference attendees about the informative workshops, the wonderful break refreshments, as well as the fun social activities. A sincere thanks to the exhibitors who participated in the conference and especially to those whose significant contributions made the conference a success.
During the conference luncheon, two resolutions were presented to long time TPA members. A resolution was presented to Lonnie Laqua, Supervisor at Brazoria County CSCD, who retired in February 2015 after four decades of service in community corrections fields. The other resolution was presented to John Wilmoth, Director of the Concho Valley CSCD, who retired in May 2015. John has been in various criminal justice related positions since 1971 and has been a CSCD Director in several Texas jurisdictions since 1983. I’ve heard the expression “you get what you give.” I believe that John, Lonnie and many other leaders in our field, who are retiring with decades of service, are rich with the rewards of making a difference in the lives of many.
Speaking of making a difference, please check out the articles in this journal including feedback from a Tarrant County Veterans’ Court Pre-Trial Diversion Program, tips for conducting the Texas Risk Assessment System effectively and efficiently, and a description of the positive changes in Hidalgo County CSCD as a result of implementing the SOARING 2 program. We always appreciate Todd Jermstadt’s “Legal Notes” column which keeps us up
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Thank you to all who were able to attend the TPA Legislative Conference in Houston last August. There was great fun had by all! Please visit the TPA website www.txprobation.com to see pictures from Houston.
ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES AND INFORMATION
UPCOMING CONFERENCESAnnual ConferenceApril 17-20, 2016 Embassy Suites - San Marcos
Kelli D. Stevens-Martin has a B.A. in Psychology, with a minor in English and a M.A. in Criminology and Criminal Justice from the University of Texas at Arlington. She has completed much of her coursework toward a PhD in Criminology at the University of Texas at Dallas, with a current 4.0 GPA. Mrs. Martin has twenty years’ experience in the field of criminal justice, mainly as an adult probation officer with positions such as line officer, court officer, Presentence Investigation Officer, specialized substance abuse officer, probation academy training officer, specialized sex offender officer, and search & seizure team leader. Nine years in management in community corrections includes supervisor for a regular field unit, sex crimes unit, Training Academy for new probation officers, and she is currently the Research Unit Supervisor at Tarrant County Community Supervision and Corrections Department. Additionally, Mrs. Martin has 11 years’ experience in academia with nine years at Texas Christian University. Mrs. Martin is a published author with works including a criminology college e-textbook, a book chapter in Icons of Crime Fighting, a report for the U.S. Dept. of Justice on Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking in Tarrant County, and numerous journal articles and technical reports. Mrs. Martin is welcomed as the co-chair and Editor of the Texas Probation Journal and is already proving to be an asset to the Publications Committee.
KELLI D. STEVENS-MARTIN
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 3
Legal NotesBy: Todd Jermstad
This column of “Legal Notes” examines several decisions that have been discussed before but have implications that still need to be “fleshed out,” such as the effect of an appeal on the trial court’s authority to modify the conditions of community supervision and the neces-sity of filing a motion and issuing a capias in the timely manner in a revocation proceeding. In addition, this column examines other recurring issues such as the propriety of ordering restitution, the level of proof necessary to support a finding of failure to pay and the stack-ing of a probated sentence on top of a hard time sentence. Interspersed among these famil-iar issues are some novel issues such as the ability to appeal a decision denying “ judicial clemency” upon the successful completion of a term of “regular” community supervision and whether the admonishment as to the range of punishment must include an admonish-ment regarding the likelihood of being placed on community supervision. These cases and more are found in this column of “Legal Notes.”
ARTICLES
Motion to Adjudicate Guilt – Both the Motion must be Filed and the Capias Issued Prior to the Expiration of
the Term of Community Supervision
In an interesting recent court decision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined whether a trial court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant when the motion to adjudicate was filed prior to the expiration of the term of community supervision but the capias was issued after the expiration of the term. In Ex parte Moss, 446 S. W. 3d 786 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2014), the defendant had entered a plea of guilty to the offense of aggravated assault and had been placed of deferred adjudication community supervision for a term of five years. The term was set to expire on October 3, 2005.
On the day the term of community supervision was to expire a motion to adjudicate was filed in the Court with an order to issue a capias for the defendant’s arrest. However, the Clerk of the Court did not issue the capias until three days after the expiration of the term of community supervision. Nevertheless, a hearing was conducted on the motion and the trial court subsequently adjudicated the defendant’s guilt and sentenced her to twelve years in prison.
The defendant appealed the decision to adjudicate her guilt. However, apparently not feeling too confident about her chances of prevailing on appeal or not wanting to wait out the appeal in prison, the defendant absconded. The appellate
court then dismissed her appeal, and three years later the defendant was apprehended. Not being able to appeal her conviction, the defendant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing the trial court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate her guilt because the capias was issued after the expiration of the term of her community supervision.
The State initially contended before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals the defendant was procedurally barred from raising this issue in a writ of habeas corpus because she could have raised this on direct appeal if she had not absconded. Nevertheless, although the Court recognized that a defendant could forfeit one’s constitutional rights on habeas corpus due to lack of action [on direct appeal], see Ex parte Townsend, 137 S. W. 3d 79 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2004), the Court stated this holding did not apply to a claim of lack of jurisdiction. Instead, the Court re-affirmed a lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction deprived a court of any authority to render a judgment. See Garcia v. Dial, 596 S. W. 2d (Tex. Cr. App. – 1980).
In examining the merits of the defendant’s claim, the Court noted it had held that for a trial court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant who was on community supervision, “both the motion to revoke and capias for arrest must be issued prior to the termination of the probationary period.” See Guillot v. State, 543 S. W. 2d 650, (Tex. Cr. App. – 1976); see also, Prior v. State, 795 S. W. 2d 179 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1990). Moreover, the Court
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noted that in 2003 the Legislature codified this holding by adding a subsection (h) to Article 42.12, Section (5), Code of Criminal Procedure.
Thus, the Court stated based on its voluminous and uninterrupted caselaw on this topic and the Legislature’s codification of its judicially-fashioned rule without modification, the Court would continue to interpret Article 42.12, Section 5 (h), supra, as it had applied it before the statutory provision was adopted by the Legislature. Hence, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held because the capias in this case was issued after the expiration of the defendant’s period of supervision, the trial court did not retain jurisdiction to proceed to adjudicate the defendant guilty and sentence her. Moreover, the Court held that because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to adjudication, the defendant discharged her term of community supervision and therefore the judgment in this case was vacated.
If You are Going to Get into More Trouble after Being Placed on Probation, You had Better Do it Quickly
In a recent court decision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was asked to consider a case in which a motion to revoke was filed during the pendency of a motion for new trial for the offense for which the defendant was granted community supervision. In Lundgren v. State, 434 S. W. 3d 594 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2014) the defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea bargain agreement for the offense of driving while intoxicated and was placed on community supervision. Within a week after he was granted community supervision the defendant was once again arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated. After his second arrest he filed a motion for new trial and a notice of appeal. The State still filed a motion to revoke which the trial court granted.1
In response to the State’s motion to revoke, the defendant filed a motion to quash the State’s motion, claiming he did not violate his community supervision. The defendant argued since he had timely filed a motion for new trial and notice of appeal in his first case, the community supervision became enforceable only after the appellate court’s mandate was issued and his motion for new trial was overruled. The trial court nevertheless determined it could revoke the defendant’s community supervision, reasoning the defendant’s supervision was effective on January 7, 2011 – the date the original judgment was signed and therefore the defendant’s second arrest was a violation of the conditions of his community supervision. As such, the trial court revoked his community supervision and sentenced him to serve 300 days in the county jail.
The defendant appealed his conviction to the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and the defendant proceeded to file an application for petition for discretionary review before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court granted the application. The defendant argued he was not on community supervision when he was alleged to have violated the condition of his supervision because his filing of a notice of appeal and a motion for new trial retroactively stayed the commencement of his community supervision.
The State argued the defendant, as part of the plea bargain, had executed two waivers of appeal and therefore the filing of a notice of appeal did not stay the commencement of the term of community supervision. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted as a general rule if a defendant files a timely and effective notice of appeal, that filing stays the commencement of the community supervision term imposed until the appellate mandate has issued affirming the judgment of conviction. See Delorme v. State, 488 S. W. 2d 808, (Tex. Cr. App. – 1973). Nevertheless, the Court further observed if an appellate court dismissed an appeal because the notice of appeal, though timely, was ineffective in initiating the appellate process, then the judgment was “deemed to be final on the date of sentencing.” See Ex parte Tabor, 565 S. W. 2d 352 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1977); see also, Jones v. State, 77 S. W. 3d 819 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2002). While these statements of the Court might indicate a favorable ruling for the State, the Court further stated the waiver of appeal did not extend to the filing of the motion for new trial and the Court still had to examine how the filing of a motion for new trial might affect the disposition of this case.
The Court noted a valid, express waiver of the right to appeal does not waive a defendant’s ability to file a motion for new trial. The Court reasoned even though motions for new trial and notices of appeal are both filed at the trial-court level, only a trial court can grant or overrule a motion for new trial and only an appellate court can render judgment on appeal. As such, the Court next turned to the question of whether the defendant’s filing of a motion for new trial retroactively stayed the commencement of his community supervision such that the trial judge erred in overruling his motion to quash.
The Court recognized that the defendant had filed a timely and effective motion for new trial. Moreover, the Court had held when a timely and effective motion for new trial is filed, and no notice of appeal is given, [or in this case an ineffective notice of appeal is filed and disposed of,] the terms of community supervision commence on the day the motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law. See McConathy v. State, 544 S. W. 2d 666 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1976).
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 5
The Court held unlike his ineffective notice of appeal, the mere filing of a timely and effective motion for new trial did retroactively render the judgment placing him on community supervision non-final. As such the Court stated that as a result, the commencement of his community supervision term was also stayed until the motion for new trial was overruled. Hence, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the court of appeal erred when it affirmed the ruling of the trial court denying the defendant’s motion to quash.
Another recent court decision has examined a trial court’s order modifying the conditions of community supervision pending an appeal. In Simon v. State, (Tex. App. – San Antonio, 2014) the defendant was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender and sentenced to two years in prison with the sentence probated for a period of ten years. The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision placing him on community supervision to the San Antonio Court of Appeals. The trial court’s decision was eventually affirmed on appeal. However two days before the appellate court issued its mandate, the trial court amended the conditions of the defendant’s community supervision by adding a condition that the defendant attend sex offender counseling.
The defendant failed to attend counseling and was dropped from the program. The State filed a motion to revoke based solely on the allegation that he failed to attend sex offender counseling. The defendant pled “true” to the violation, the trial court revoked his community supervision and sentenced him to two years confinement. The defendant appealed the decision revoking his community supervision, and argued on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the conditions of his community supervision after his appeal was filed but before the mandate was received by the trial court.
The appellate court noted that ordinarily the probation period begins on the date the terms of community supervision are imposed. See Whitson v. State, 429 S. W. 3d 632 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2014). However, the Court further stated this general rule does not apply when a defendant files a timely and effective notice of appeal. Instead, the Court observed that when an appeal is taken from a criminal conviction assessing a probated sentence, the terms of community supervision do not commence until the appellate court’s mandate, effecting final disposition of the appeal, is issued. See Delorme v. State, 488 S. W. 2d 808 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1973). Consequently, the San Antonio Court of Appeals stated the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the defendant’s conditions prior to the issuance of the mandate. As such, the Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s term of
community supervision based on the modified condition of community supervision.
Judgments – There had Better be a Thumbprint
In a point of appeal I have never seen before, a defendant complained her judgment did not include her right thumbprint. In Norton v. State, 434 S. W. 3d 767 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.], 2014), the defendant was placed on deferred adjudication for five years for the state jail felony offense of theft of property. Two and one-half years into the term of her community supervision, the State filed a motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. The trial court granted the State’s motion and sentenced her to two years in a state jail felony facility.
One of the issues the defendant raised on appeal was the judgment did not contain her right thumbprint. The defendant asked that the judgment be corrected to include her thumbprint. The State opposed this request and asserted the failure of the judgment to include the defendant’s thumbprint was a harmless error. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals noted that Article 42.01, Code of Criminal Procedure, requires the judgment contain, among other things, “the defendant’s thumbprint taken in accordance with Article 38.33, Code of Criminal Procedure.” Following a holding by the Tenth Court of Appeals regarding a juvenile’s appeal from an adjudication order, In re K.M.C., 2008 WL 3114404 (Tex. App. – Waco, 2008 no pet.), the Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded the absence of the defendant’s thumbprint from the judgment was a clerical error and was not subject to a harm analysis. As such, the Court ordered the trial court to modify the judgment to include the defendant’s thumbprint taken in accordance with Article 38.33, supra.
Revocation Proceeding Alleging Failure to PayYou may have noticed in past columns of “Legal
Notes” that the litigation of the issue of failure to pay in a revocation proceeding has lately become the subject of appellate review. For example, in Gipson v. State, 347 S. W. 3d 893 (Tex. App. – Beaumont, 2011) the State filed a motion to revoke the defendant’s community supervision, alleging three violations: (1) the defendant committed the offense of theft from a person; (2) the defendant failed to pay court-assessed fees and was in arrears; and (3) the defendant failed to avoid contact with the victim. At the revocation hearing the defendant entered a plea of “not true” to violations (1) and (3) and “true” to violation (2). However, the State presented no evidence at the revocation hearing concerning the two alleged violations to which the defendant pleaded “not true” and no evidence regarding the violation to which the defendant did plead “true.” At the
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conclusion of the hearing the trial court revoked the term of his community supervision and sentenced him to eight years in prison.
On appeal, the Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the trial court, holding that although a plea of true is generally sufficient to support a judgment revoking community supervision, when the sole basis for revocation is failure to pay court-ordered fines and fees, there must be evidence of willful refusal to pay or failure to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. See “Legal Notes,” Texas Probation, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, July 2012. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently ruled that in making an inquiry into the ability of a defendant to pay fees before revoking the individual’s community supervision as specified by the United States Supreme Court in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660 (1983), the Bearden holding prescribes a mandatory judicial directive and not a prosecutorial evidentiary burden. See Gipson v. State, 383 S. W. 3d 152 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2012).2
In a recent appellate decision, the Texarkana Court of Appeals was asked to apply the holding of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Gipson to another case examining the question of failure to pay in a revocation proceeding. In Rusk v. State, 440 S. W. 3d 694 (Tex. App. – Texarkana, 2013) the defendant was placed on community supervision pursuant to a plea bargain agreement after having been charged with leaving the scene of an accident in which someone had received a serious bodily injury. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke alleging two new criminal offenses and also alleging the failure to pay his community supervision fees and attorney’s fees. As in Gipson, the State dropped the alleged violations involving new criminal offenses and the defendant entered a plea of “true” to the alleged violation of failure to pay.
The defendant contended at the revocation proceeding that he lacked the ability to pay the fees and claimed that an order revoking his community supervision based solely on poverty to be unconstitutional under both the United States and Texas Constitutions. In this proceeding neither side presented any evidence concerning the defendant’s ability to pay the fees he was ordered to pay as a condition of community supervision and the record contained no discussion of alternatives to imprisonment. The defendant appealed the decision to revoke his community supervision to the Texarkana Court of Appeals.
The appellate court noted that in 2007 the Legislature shifted the burden of proof of inability to pay from an affirmative defense to a showing that the defendant was able to pay and did not pay as ordered by the judge that the
State had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence. The State argued that as a result of the plea of “true,” the defendant did not put the issue of his inability to pay before the court. In support of this argument the State cited a line of cases holding that a plea of “true” is sufficient, standing alone, to support the revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S. W. 2d 127, (Tex. Cr. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); see also, Mitchell v. State 482 S. W. 2d 221 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1972).
The appellate court observed that even if these holdings were applicable to a plea of “true” to an alleged violation of failure to pay, in this case while the State alleged a failure to pay, it did not allege that the defendant’s failure to pay was willful. Thus, the Court found that while the defendant’s plea of “true” was an admission that he violated the terms of his community supervision by failing to pay the fees he was ordered to pay, it was not an admission of the additional fact of willfulness. As such, the appellate court concluded the record failed to contain any evidence of a willful failure to pay; therefore, the Court held the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s community supervision.
Although the Court could have ended its opinion with this holding, it continued to examine whether a Bearden v. Georgia, supra, issue had been preserved for review and if so whether the trial court had failed to apply the holding of Bearden. The Court, in examining the record, concluded that defendant made a sufficient objection at the revocation hearing to avoid any forfeiture of any claims under Bearden. Moreover, the Court concluded a plea of “true” to the allegation of failure to pay did not waive a Bearden claim.3 Thus, in reviewing the merits of the defendant’s Bearden claim, the appellate court found the trial court had made no effort to comply with the mandatory judicial directive of Bearden, i.e., making inquiry into whether the defendant had made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. The Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that without such an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay, the willful failure to pay exception in Bearden had not been established.
Restitution – the Recurring Subject in “Legal Notes”
I cannot say how many court decisions I have analyzed over the years regarding restitution. What I can say is that this subject does not go away. Two more recent Court of Criminal Appeals’ cases have examined this issue once again. In Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. State, 444 S. W. 3d 21 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2014) the defendant had been charged with stealing two items in two burglary of vehicle cases. The defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on community supervision. As a condition of community
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supervision the trial judge imposed restitution for some of the missing items that the defendant had not been charged with stealing. At trial the defendant raised no objection to the imposition of this condition.
Even though no objection had been made to this condition at trial, the defendant nevertheless appealed this order to the Amarillo Court of Appeals. The appellate court agreed with the defendant’s assertion that the restitution requirement lacked any factual basis in the record. As such, the Court deleted the restitution requirement from the conditions of community supervision and affirmed the judgment as modified. The State then filed an application for petition for discretionary review before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals granted the application.
The State argued the defendant had forfeited her claim by failing to object at trial. The Court noted that ordinarily to preserve an issue for appellate review, the defendant must have first raised the issue in the trial court. See Burt v. State, infra; see also, Tex. Rule App. P. 33.1 (a). Nevertheless, the Court further recognized the exception to this rule is that a claim regarding sufficiency of the evidence need not be preserved for review at the trial level. See Moore v. State, 371 S. W. 3d 221 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2012). However, the Court further acknowledged that the imposition of a sentence is profoundly different from the granting of community supervision and concepts of error-preservation that apply in non-probation cases do not necessarily carry over to probation cases because probation involves a kind of contractual relationship that does not exist in non-probation cases.
The Court noted that in Speth v. State, 6 S. W. 3d 530 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1999),4 it held that when probation is granted, the trial court extends clemency to the defendant and creates a sort of contractual relationship. Moreover, the Court stated that conditions of probation that are not objected to are affirmatively accepted as terms of the contract unless the condition is one that the criminal justice system finds to be intolerable and is therefore not a contractual option available to the parties. See Gutierrez v. State, 380 S. W. 3d 167 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2012). The Court then stated that requiring restitution for stolen items that were not included in the charging instrument, but that belonged to the complaining witnesses and were stolen during the same transaction as the charged items, was not the sort of condition that the criminal justice system finds intolerable or unconscionable. As such, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that by failing to object to the restitution, the defendant “affirmatively accepted the terms of the contract” and therefore forfeited her claim regarding the restitution requirement.
In examining a court decision mentioned above in the discussion of Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. State, supra, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals posed the question: When the record is clear that the trial judge orally made restitution a part of the sentence, but either the amount or the person(s) to whom it is owed is unclear, incorrect, or insufficient, should the restitution order be deleted or should the case be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on restitution? In Burt v. State, 445 S. W. 3d 752 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2014), the defendant was convicted of misapplication of fiduciary property in excess of $200,000. The defendant was sentenced to 14 years in prison. At the time of sentencing the trial judge orally pronounced the defendant would owe restitution but did not specify the amount. Then the next day the judge entered an order to pay restitution in the amount of $591,000 in the written judgment.
At the initial appeal the Court of Appeals vacated the restitution order and remanded the case to the trial court for a restitution hearing. The defendant appealed this ruling of the appellate court to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court first noted that for a number of reasons, it had interpreted restitution statutes liberally to effectuate fairness to the victims of crime. However, the Court also acknowledged that fairness to the defendant required his sentence be “pronounced orally in his presence.” See Taylor v. State, 131 S. W. 3d 497 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2002). Moreover, the Court re-affirmed the long-standing rule that when there was a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controlled. See Taylor v. State, supra. Thus, the Court stated a trial judge has neither the statutory authority nor the discretion to orally pronounce one sentence in front of the defendant, but then enter a different written judgment outside the defendant’s presence. See Ex parte Madding, 70 S. W. 3d 131 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2002).
The Court noted it had approved the deletion of a written restitution order in at least two scenarios. The first was when the trial judge did not have statutory authority to impose the specific restitution order. The second was when the trial judge was authorized to assess restitution, but the evidence did not show proximate cause between the defendant’s criminal conduct and the victim’s injury. Thus, the Court stated due process placed three limitations on the restitution a trial judge could order: 1) the restitution ordered must be for only the offense for which the defendant was criminally responsible; 2) the restitution must be for only the victim or victims of the offense for which the defendant was charged; and 3) the amount must be just and supported by a factual basis within the record.
In this case the Court recognized restitution was part
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of the trial judge’s oral pronouncement of sentence.5 The Court stated the problem in this case was that the defendant was never told of the specific amount of restitution in open court and given an opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or the specific amount of restitution due each victim. The Court stated because the trial judge made restitution a part of his oral pronouncement of sentence, the restitution order should not be deleted. Instead, the Court stated the case should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing in which the defendant would have the opportunity to object to the amount, introduce evidence to support his position, and exercise all of his due process rights. As such, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the decision.
Denial of Judicial Clemency – Is There a Statutory Right to Appeal?
In a recent column of “Legal Notes” I discussed a couple of court decisions explaining the statutory provision allowing for judicial clemency in community supervision cases and whether there was a time limit for the defendant requesting such clemency. Article 42.12, Section 20 (a), Code of Criminal Procedure and its various predecessors in the Code of Criminal Procedure has long provided that after discharging the probationer, a judge may also set aside the verdict or permit the probationer to withdraw his plea, and… dismiss the accusation, complaint, information or indictment against the defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which the defendant has been convicted or to which the defendant has pleaded guilty [with certain exceptions]. The Court of Criminal Appeals has characterized this type of discharge as not a right, but rather as a matter of judicial clemency within the trial court’s sole discretion. If a judge chooses to exercise this judicial clemency provision, the conviction is wiped away, the indictment dismissed, and the person is free to walk away from the courtroom released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction. See Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
In State v. Shelton, 396 S. W. 3d 614 (Tex. App. – Amarillo, 2012 no pet.), the defendant had been discharged from community supervision in 1996. In 2011, the defendant filed a “motion to set aside conviction and dismiss charges” for the probated offense, supported by an affidavit in which he described his educational achievements during and after his community supervision, and his stable work, family and church life since his discharge. The Amarillo Court of Appeals determined the trial court lacked “continuing jurisdiction” in this matter and held that [absent the filing of a motion within thirty days of the court’s issuance of a discharge] the trial court lost jurisdiction to consider this matter.
Moreover, in State v. Fielder, 376 S. W. 3d 784 (Tex. App. – Waco, 2011, no pet.), the Waco Court of Appeals also examined this issue. The defendant had completed a term of community supervision on October 3, 2007 and had received a discharge from the trial court on November 9, 2007. However, this discharge did not include an order setting aside the verdict or permitting the defendant to withdraw the defendant’s plea, and then dismissing “the accusation, complaint, information, or indictment against the defendant.” Instead, this occurred on April 14, 2011 when the defendant petitioned the trial court and the trial court set aside the verdict and dismissed the indictment against the defendant. The Waco Court of Appeals stated that in the instant case, any plenary power the trial court could have retained following its 2007 judgment terminating and discharging the defendant’s community supervision expired long before entry of its 2011 judgment. See “Legal Notes,” Texas Probation, Vol. XXX, No. 1, Winter 2015.
Now a recent court decision has examined whether a defendant even has the right to appeal a decision denying judicial clemency. In Raley v. State, 441 S. W. 3d 647 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) the defendant in 1981 was placed on community supervision for a term of three years for the offense of burglary of a building. The defendant successfully completed the term of his community supervision and was discharged by the court. In 2013, the defendant requested that the trial court exercise its “judicial clemency” pursuant to Article 42.12, Section 20 (a), supra, permit him to withdraw his guilty plea, and dismiss the indictment against him. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.
The defendant appealed the ruling of the trial court to the First Court of Appeals in Houston, contending the trial court erroneously concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. The Court noted that neither the United States nor the Texas Constitution required the state to establish appellate courts or provide defendants with the right to appellate review of criminal convictions. See Phynes v. State, 828 S. W. 2d 1 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1992). The Court further observed that only the Texas Legislature could grant a court the authority to hear an appeal. See Wolfe v. State, 120 s. W. 3d 368 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2003). Finally, the Court stated that the standard for determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases was not whether the appeal was precluded by law but whether the appeal was authorized by law. See Abbott v. State, 271 S. W. 3d 694 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2008).
The Court noted that while Article 44.02, Code of Criminal Procedure provides a right of appeal for a “defendant in any criminal action,” the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized “the long established rule that a
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 9
defendant’s general right to appeal under Article 44.02 ‘has always been limited to appeal’ from a ‘final judgment.’ See Abbott v. State, supra. The Court stated a “final judgment” was a “final judgment of conviction,” which is defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure as “the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge and entered of record showing the conviction or acquittal of the defendant.” See Dewalt v. State, 417 S. W. 3d 678 (Tex. App. – Austin, 2013). The appellate court concluded the court denial that the defendant was appealing was not a final judgment of conviction. As such, the First Court of Appeals held there was no statutory right to appeal an order granting or denying judicial clemency pursuant to Article 42.12, Section 20 (a), supra.
Stacking a Probated Sentence on Top of a Hard Time Sentence
Years ago when I was a young prosecutor in the Brazos County District Attorney’s Office I handled an appeal before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to uphold an order of the trial judge who sentenced a defendant to prison in one case, probated the sentence in another case and then ordered the probated sentence be served after the defendant was released from prison for the first conviction. The reasoning of the judge was the victim of the offense had incurred a huge amount of medical expenses and the judge thought this would be the best way to enforce a restitution order. Nevertheless, I lost this case on appeal with the Court holding there was no statutory authority to stack a probated sentence on top of hard time sentence. See Green v. State, 706 S. W. 2d 653 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1986).
Much to my surprise nearly thirty years after my defeat, the Green decision was once again mentioned in a court decision examining a cumulation order involving a sentence to confinement and a probated sentence. In Mireles v. State, 444 S. W. 3d 679 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2014) the defendant entered a plea of guilty in a consolidated trial to one count of intoxication manslaughter and one count of intoxication assault. The jury recommended four years in prison in the first count and seven years community supervision in the second count. The judge entered the judgment accordingly, but ordered the probated sentence not begin until the defendant had completed his term of imprisonment,
The defendant appealed the decision stacking the two counts to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston, arguing that the two convictions should be served concurrently. The appellate court observed that a trial court’s authority to stack was provided by statute. Moreover, the Court stated there were two statutes that governed a trial court’s authority to stack. My loss in Green was not a complete defeat. During
the legislative session following the Green decision, the Legislature amended Article 42.08, Code of Criminal Procedure to provide that in the discretion of the [trial] court, the judgment in the second and subsequent convictions may either be that the sentence imposed or suspended shall begin when the judgment and the sentence imposed or suspended in the preceding conviction has ceased to operate, or that the sentence imposed or suspended shall run concurrently with the other case or cases.6
The Court further noted that Section 3.03 of the Penal Court also has special rules for the stacking of sentences. Section 3.03 (a) provides that ordinarily when the accused is found guilty of more than one offense arising out of the same criminal episode prosecuted in a single criminal action, a sentence for each offense . . . shall run concurrently. However, Section 3.03 (b) also has certain exceptions to this rule, one being that if the accused is found guilty of more than one offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the sentences may run concurrently or consecutively if each sentence is for a conviction of intoxication assault or intoxication manslaughter.
The defendant on appeal contended that Section 3.03 (a) controlled over the language in Section 3.03 (b) and Article 42.08 and therefore the trial court erred in not ordering the two convictions to be served consecutively. The defendant argued that Section 3.03 (a) applied to the exclusion of Article 42.08 because his two convictions were obtained in a consolidated trial and that Section 3.03 (b) did not apply because the language in 3.03 (b) only mentioned the stacking of sentences and not probated sentences. In support of his position the defendant cited the Green decision. Nevertheless, the Court found the term “sentence” in Section 3.03 did not include community supervision and therefore Article 42.08 would apply by default. As such, based on the language found in Article 42.08, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s stacking order could not be said to be an abuse of discretion.
Admonishing a Defendant regarding the Possibility of Community Supervision does not Mean that the
Trial Judge Must Admonish the Defendant as to the Likelihood of Receiving Community Supervision
In a creative if ultimately futile argument on appeal, a defendant claimed that his plea of guilt was involuntary because the court failed to admonish him as to the likelihood that he would receive community supervision if found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. In Hampton v. State, 435 S. W. 3d 343 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) the defendant was charged with the felony offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. The defendant
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 10
waived a jury trial and entered a plea of guilty without an agreed punishment. After examining the presentence investigation report, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to 25 years in prison.
Before pleading guilty the defendant signed the trial court’s written admonishments that included a statement that “the only type of community supervision that the court can give you is deferred adjudication. Shock probation and regular community supervision are not available.” At the sentencing hearing the trial court heard evidence of two prior felony offenses and police testimony about two incidents that had occurred during the two-month period between the defendant’s guilty plea and the sentencing hearing. Not surprisingly to this author, the defendant did not get deferred adjudication. Disappointment in the results of his criminal proceedings the defendant appealed the trial court’s sentence to the First Court of Appeals in Houston.
The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by admonishing him on deferred adjudication without “inquiring with the defendant further about his understanding of the availability of probation,” i. e., his likelihood of receiving deferred adjudication community supervision. The appellate court recognized that trial courts were required to admonish defendants as to the applicable punishment for every offense charged before accepting a guilty plea. See Article 26.13 (a) (1), Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, the Court further observed that admonishing on the “range of punishment” did not include a requirement that the trial court discuss the possibility of probation. See Harrison v. State, 688 S. W. 2d 497 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1985). Finally, the Court acknowledged that if the trial court volunteered an admonishment on probation, the court had a duty to admonish the defendant accurately. See Ex parte Williams, 704 S. W. 2d 773 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1986).
The defendant conceded that the trial judge did not provide inaccurate information. The range of punishment for aggravated robbery is five years to life and a defendant convicted of that offense is eligible for deferred adjudication. Nevertheless, the defendant contended the trial court’s deferred adjudication admonishment created an additional duty on the court to provide more complete information on the possibility of receiving deferred adjudication. He argued that the trial judge should have told him that deferred adjudication for a charge of aggravated robbery, particularly with a history of two prior felony convictions, was unlikely.
The First Court of Appeals did not buy the argument. The Court noted the trial court provided the defendant with accurate information regarding the applicable range of punishment when it stated that his punishment could be
anywhere between “deferred adjudication and life in prison.” Moreover, the Court observed the written admonishments clearly and correctly limited the type of probation available to deferred adjudication and specifically excluded regular community supervision from the range of punishment. Finally, the Court stated the defendant’s guilty plea was not rendered involuntary because the actual sentence imposed exceeded his expectation of receiving deferred adjudication. As such, the appellate court held the trial court substantially complied with the statutory admonishments required when accepting a guilty plea and that therefore the defendant’s plea was voluntary.
You Cannot Correct a Judicial Error through a Nunc Pro Tunc
In a recent court decision the San Antonio Court of Appeals examined whether a trial court could eliminate a deadly weapon finding by entering a judgment nunc pro tunc in order to grant “shock probation” to a defendant. In State v. Garza, 442 S. W. 3d 585 (Tex. App. – San Antonio, 2014) the defendant pled guilty to the charges of burglary of a habitation and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial judge assessed five years confinement for each offense to run concurrently. The final judgment recited a finding of a deadly weapon.
Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for “shock probation.” At the hearing on the motion the State objected to the defendant’s request, arguing that the defendant was not eligible due to the deadly weapon finding. The trial court then signed an “Amended/Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment” which was identical to the original judgment except for deleting the affirmative finding of a deadly weapon. Afterward, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for shock probation and placed him on community supervision for a term of ten years. The State appealed the decision of the trial court to the San Antonio Court of Appeals.
The appellate court initially noted that a trial judge may not grant shock probation unless the defendant is eligible for judge-ordered community supervision. See State v. Posey, 330 S. W. 3d 311(Tex. Cr. App. – 2011). Moreover, the Court noted that Article 42.12, Section 3g, Code of Criminal Procedure, prohibits the imposition of judge-ordered community supervision if an affirmative finding is made reflecting that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.
The Court then explained the purpose of a nunc pro tunc order was to correctly reflect, from the court’s records, a judgment actually made, but which for some reason was not properly entered. See Ex parte Poe, 751 S. W. 2d 873 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1988). Moreover, the Court stated a judgment nunc
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 11
pro tunc was the appropriate avenue to make a correction when the court’s records did not mirror the judgment that was actually rendered. See Alvarez v. State, 605 S. W. 2d 615 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1980). Finally, the Court stated that a nunc pro tunc could not be used to correct judicial errors, only to correct clerical errors so that the judgment conformed with what was already determined and not what should have been determined. See Wilson v. State, 677 S. W. 2d 518 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1984).
The Court stated that in this particular case there was no evidence in the original record that the trial court intended to enter a finding of no deadly weapon. Moreover, the Court noted the record indicated that there was ample evidence that the defendant did use a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. Thus, based on the record the appellate court concluded that the trial court acted to correct a judicial error when entering the nunc pro tunc judgment. Hence, the Court stated that the trial court was not authorized to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc correcting a judicial error outside of its plenary power. See Loud v. State, 329 S. W. 3d 230 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.], 2010). Moreover, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that since the defendant was bound by the original deadly weapon finding, the defendant was not eligible for judge-ordered community supervision and therefore was also ineligible for shock probation.
Conclusion
This column marks the twenty-fifth time that “Legal Notes” has appeared in Texas Probation. I started this column in 1999 based on the suggestion of my friend, Dan Beto. When I was at the Community Justice Assistance Division, I had regularly sent court analyses to the field discussing court decisions that I thought were pertinent to the practice of community corrections in the State. Dan suggested that instead of sending out analyses piecemeal that I just send them out all at once as a column. I did not get the opportunity to do so until I left CJAD and went to work for the Bell/Lampasas Counties CSCD. I was not certain how long I would be writing this column and whether there would be enough material to regularly write a column. However, over the last sixteen years I have found plenty of cases to discuss and have no doubt there will be plenty of cases to discuss in future columns of “Legal Notes.”
1 The trial court did not conduct the revocation hearing until after the Fort Worth Court of Appeal had ruled on the matter.
2 In a subsequent review of the Gipson decision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Article 42.12, Section 21 (c), Code of Criminal Procedure, which places the burden of the State to prove an allegation of failure to pay does not apply to an allegation of failure to pay a fine. The failure to pay statute only applies to “compensation paid to appointed counsel, community supervision fees, or court costs.” See Gipson v. State, 428 S. W. 3d 107 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2014).
3 The Texarkana Court of Appeals noted that in a previous case before it, the Court had held that a plea of “true” did not waive a violation of Bearden when the State did not allege in its motion to revoke that the failure to pay was willful. See Lively v. State, 338 S. W. 3d 140 (Tex. App. – Texarkana, 2011).
4 See my analysis of Speth v. State in “Legal Notes,” Texas Probation, Vol. XV, No. 2, April 2000
5 The Court noted that if the order of restitution had not been orally pronounced, then the remedy would have been to delete the written order of restitution. See Alexander v. State, 301 S. W. 3d 361 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, 2009).
6 Nevertheless the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that the trial judge can only stack a “regular” probated sentence and does not have the authority to stack the defendant’s deferred adjudication community supervision term onto his prison sentence. See Beedy v. State, 250 S. W. 3d 107 (Tex. Cr. App. – 2008)
12 TEXAS PROBATION Volume XXX, No.3
Participants’ Views of a Veterans’ Court Pre-Trial Diversion Program
By Kelli D. Stevens-Martin, M.A., Cynthia Hipolito, M.A., Jason Clark-Miller, Ph.D., Darian Eldred and Jialiang Liu
IntroductionPhysical and emotional injuries suffered while on active
duty can make the return to civilian life challenging for many veterans. Because of the rising veteran population there is an increased need to understand the effect of military service on individuals. Veterans are at high risk for mental health and substance abuse issues, family and marital strain, homelessness, difficulties related to finances and housing, and employment security (Baldwin, 2013). The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in 2000 that 81 percent of veterans involved in the criminal justice system had a substance abuse problem prior to incarceration, 35 percent specifically had an alcohol problem, 23 percent were homeless at some point in the prior year, and 25 percent were identified as mentally ill (BJA, 2007).
In a more recent study, Stahre et al. found that over 43 percent of active duty military reported binge drinking (2009). Of the 43 percent who reported binge drinking, a significant number also reported alcohol-related legal violations. Data from the 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Corrections Facilities demonstrated a decline in incarcerated veteran populations; however, more recent data that reflects the effects of the prolonged war in Iraq and Afghanistan on veterans and active-duty service members is still being collected and evaluated. Nonetheless, from the data that is currently available, researchers found nearly 46 percent of adjudicated veterans were incarcerated for drug-related violations, more than a quarter were intoxicated at the time of their arrest, over half met the diagnostic criteria for substance dependence or abuse, and more than one-third would not qualify for Veterans’ Affairs (VA) benefits due to their discharge status. Moreover, veterans who do qualify for VA benefits and who have been diagnosed with substance abuse disorders still face barriers to getting clean and healthy. One of the most pressing obstacles is their inability to receive the most effective treatments for opioid dependence: methadone and buprenorphine.1 Unfortunately,
1 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the Institute of Medicine of the National Institutes of Health, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the World Health Organization, and over 4 decades of government-funded, peer-reviewed medical research have repeatedly proven.
the Department of Defense’s (DoD) insurance system (TRICARE) explicitly prohibits coverage of methadone and buprenorphine treatment for active duty personnel or veterans in the process of transitioning out of the DoD care. In other words, active-duty and recently active military in DoD care are denied effective treatment for opioid dependence.
The principal reason for the existence of Veterans’ Courts is to rehabilitate non-violent offenders whose cases present numerous challenges (such as the co-occurrence of multiple disorders) for traditional probation given the unique experiences of veterans. For example, many veterans suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a traumatic brain injury (TBI), or other mental health conditions in addition to a substance abuse disorder which may increase their risk for involvement in the criminal justice system (Berenson, 2010). Veterans’ Courts generally accept non-violent cases and incorporate a treatment regimen for offenders as opposed to harsh punishments for their crimes. Some courts incorporate a peer mentor component where participants in a program are assigned a mentor. Mentors undergo training and must be familiar with VA services and community resources. In most cases the mentor is another veteran who serves as a positive support, advocate and role model, and sometimes has served in combat (Moore, 2012). Mentors play an important role in many Veterans’ Courts as they help individuals in the program resolve personal issues, motivate participants using a strengths-based approach to positive behavioral changes, helping the individual develop a network of resources
The first Veterans’ Court was established in Buffalo, New York in 2008 and since that time over 100 other courts have emerged across the nation. Scientifically rigorous impact evaluations are necessary to determine whether these programs actually produce their intended effects. Obviously, there is little merit in the continuation of programs that fail to ameliorate the social problems they target. Empirical research evaluating the outcomes of veterans’ courts is almost non-existent. What little reports that do exist typically only document the development of these initiatives (Holbrook & Anderson 2011), and only a few studies were found that evaluated the efficacy of these courts (Baldwin, 2013).
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Tarrant County, TX Veterans Court Pre-Trial Diversion Program
The 2011 Census estimates indicate there were over 11,000 veterans living in the jurisdiction of study, with almost 3,000 suffering from some form of disability. With a rising population of recently discharged veterans, many who suffer with undiagnosed mental illness or cognitive disability, there is an increased need to understand the effect of military service on individuals’ life-course outcomes. While veterans of every war have battled PTSD, addiction, and other forms of mental illness, as more veterans return from longer and repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of individuals with PTSD, TBI, and other illnesses that contribute to serious substance abuse and addiction is likely to rise, as is their involvement in the criminal justice system. Currently, it is estimated that as few as 20 percent of those thought to be suffering from a mental illness receive any form of treatment. Those who are treated for PTSD symptoms, including insomnia, are prescribed several medications, oftentimes with lax supervision, resulting in some service members self-medicating and misusing narcotics. In a 2008 survey conducted by the U.S. military, researchers found that “military personnel are reporting higher rates of prescription drug abuse than the general population” (NCADD, 2014).
The Veterans’ Court in Tarrant County, TX was launched in April, 2010. The mission of the program is to “successfully habilitate the justice-involved veteran by diverting them from the traditional criminal justice system and providing them with the tools they need to lead a productive and law-abiding lifestyle while improving mental health recover and successful re-entry into the community.”
In 2013 a research study was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the pre-trial diversion Veterans’ Court Tarrant County, TX at reducing recidivism rates for program participants. Recidivism was defined as a re-arrest either while currently under supervision in the program, or at any point upon completion of supervision. Recidivism for the sample (n=49) of program participants who successfully graduated from the program was just over 8 percent. Additionally, of the first 97 veterans to enter the program, the program “population” as captured in the Veterans’ Court Cohort data, 47 percent successfully completed the program, 41 percent were still active in the program, and only 11 percent were terminated unsuccessfully. Consistent with prior research on recidivism, marriage appears to enhance the likelihood a veteran will complete his or her pre-trial term successfully. Ninety (90) percent of those veterans who failed to complete the program were unmarried. Similarly, completers were more likely than non-completers to be employed full-time. Subsequent analysis with larger samples
and a clearly defined comparison group will allow for a more comprehensive and decisive evaluation.
Current Study
The preliminary evaluation of the program led this researcher to curiosity about participants’ views of the program. Little, if any, research exists on Veterans’ Court participants’ views of such programming. The current project involved designing and administering a survey to measure participants’ views of several constructs: overall satisfaction with the program, views of peer mentors, perceptions of the helpfulness of court ordered counseling (including substance abuse counseling and specific mental health counseling), and views of the deterrent effect of the program.
The majority of participants that completed the survey were single, males under the age of the 30 with some college education and in the program due to a misdemeanor offense. Sixty-six (66) percent of survey respondents were in the program due to a Driving While Intoxicated arrest. Eighty-two (82) percent reported having a mental health diagnosis, mainly PTSD. It should be noted however, that about one-third of respondents indicated having more than one diagnosis. Around 52 percent of respondents were employed, about 32 classified as student, retired or disabled, and only 11 percent unemployed. Just over 50 percent of respondents reported serving in the U.S. Army, and 46 percent served in Operation Iraqui Freedom.
Methods and Results Surveys.
A survey was developed and administered to Veterans’ Court participants to gather information on their perceptions of several aspects of the program. At the time the surveys were administered (October 1, 2014) there were 40 Veterans’ Court participants. A total of 27 surveys were completed, which is close to 70 percent of the Veterans’ Court population.
The survey administered to Veterans’ Court participants was divided into several sections. The first section measured offenders’ views of their Veterans’ Court Peer Mentor, overall satisfaction with the program, helpfulness of court ordered counseling, deterrent effect of the program and changes in cognitions due to the program. The next section gathered information about offenders’ program status including how long they had been in the program, what phase of the program he/she was in, if they had served any jail time for program violations, their progress in the program and importance of mental health services and expungement of criminal records. Section three of the survey covered
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demographic and military service information. Lastly, offenders were given the opportunity to provide written comments about changes they have made in their lives, if any, since being placed in the program, likes and dislikes about the program, and any suggestions for improvement.
Analysis.
Simple frequency distributions were created for demographic variables. The Cronbach’s Alpha (α) statistical test was used to determine internal consistency or reliability of constructs being measured by survey questions. Lastly, a thematic content analysis was conducted on the portion of the survey where participants gave written feedback about the program.
Demographic Descriptives.
Table 1. Demographic Composition of Veterans’ Court Survey Respondents
Frequency distributions were tabulated for each of the demographic variables derived from the survey participants (n=27). Some respondents did not answer all of the questions on the survey. Thus, indications for missing data are noted. Table 2 depicts military service related information.
Military Service Descriptives.
Table 2. Veterans’ Court Survey Respondents’ Military Service
Most of the survey respondents were no longer enlisted at the time the survey was administered, but all of them had received an Honorable Discharge. Over 50 percent had been in the Army and had served in Operation Iraqui Freedom. Around 20 percent of respondents indicated having served in more than one initiative (e.g. both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqui Freedom.)
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Descriptives.
There were eight questions on the survey directly related to substance abuse and mental health issues, and respondents self-report about these issues appeared to be quite candid. Table 3 reveals a high percentage of respondents did have substance abuse issues, and interestingly, 97 percent indicated they did not have a substance abuse issue before entering the military. Research conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates 81 percent of all justice involved veterans have a substance abuse problem prior to incarceration [or arrest] (BJA 2007).
Table 1. Demographic Composition of Veterans’ Court Survey Respondents
Less than $20,000 8 30% $20,000 but less than $40,000 8 30%
More than $40,000 10 37% Missing* 1 3%
Total 27 100% Marital Status
Married 3 11% Divorced 12 44%
Single 11 41% Missing* 1 4%
Total 27 100%
Table 2. Veterans’ Court Survey Respondents’ Military Service
Variable Veterans Court Survey
Veterans Court Survey
Respondents Raw Count
Respondents (%)
Currently enlisted No 19 70% Yes 6 22%
Missing* 2 8% Total 27 100%
Branch Army 15 56% Navy 1 4%
Air Force 1 4% Marines 6 22%
Reserves 1 3% Missing* 3 11%
Total 27 100% Operation
Vietnam 2 8% Desert Storm 1 3%
Operation Enduring Freedom 2 8% Operation Iraqui Freedom 13 48% Served in more than one 6 22%
Missing* 3 11% Total 27 100%
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Table 3. Veterans’ Court Survey Respondents’ Substance Use and Mental Health Issues
Survey results revealed that 23 of the 27 respondents reported having PTSD, and 13 respondents had more than one mental health diagnosis. For example, many respondents reported having both PTSD and an Anxiety Disorder. One respondent indicated having PTSD, a Traumatic Brain Injury, an Anxiety Disorder, and an Adjustment Disorder.
Program Satisfaction.
Section one of the survey asked respondents to rate their perceptions about various aspects of the program including peer mentors, the counseling they were receiving for substance abuse and/or mental health issues, their perceptions of the judge, and other effects the program has had on participants from their views, if any. Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient statistical test was conducted for the various constructs being measured by the questions. This test is generally used as a measure of internal consistency or reliability of a psychometric instrument for a sample of respondents. In this case it was used to determine the reliability of questions for each construct in Section 1 of the survey. Results of the test can range from 0 to 1. Acceptable alpha coefficients are .60 and higher, with .70 and higher in the excellent range. Alpha coefficients for the various constructs being measured ranged from α= .678 to α= .902.
Around 85 percent of survey respondents reported being satisfied with the program and over 80 percent feel their peer mentor is helpful. A majority of respondents feel the group counseling they are receiving is helping them, but about 50 percent would rather have individual counseling instead
of group counseling. Close to 65 percent of participants agreed the random drug testing has helped them to stop using alcohol and drugs.
Regarding program status, the average length of time a defendant had been in the program was eight months, and an equal number of participants were in each phase of the program (phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3). Around 42 percent of survey respondents had received jail time for violating conditions of the program, ranging from two days up to one individual receiving a total of 31 days for multiple violations while in the program.
Lastly, offenders were given the opportunity to give written feedback or comments. A thematic content analysis of comments was conducted designed to identify patterns in responses. When asked about how the program has improved their lives or what changes a person had made due to the Veterans’ Court program, many respondents indicated the program has helped them stop using drugs and/or alcohol. Below are several comments from offenders regarding improvements they’ve made in their lives because of the program.
“I no longer want/need alcohol.”“Less anxiety, more confident, and gotten rid of bad
influences in my life.”“It helped me to stop drinking. I quit spending time
with people that drink.”
Next, offenders stated they liked how fair the judge is, getting their records expunged, the treatment and help they are receiving and meeting fellow veterans. Things participants disliked about the program were missing work due to court meetings, random drug testing interfering with work and costs associated with the program. The main thing participants suggested to change is not forcing everyone to the random drug/alcohol testing, only requiring this of participants with those kinds of problems. However, the majority of respondents had no suggestions for changes.
Conclusion
Overall, results of the survey are favorable for the Tarrant County Veterans’ Court Pre-Trial Diversion program. Participants feel the program is helping them, they are generally satisfied with the program, and around 30 percent stated what they liked most about the program is that it has helped them with their substance abuse issues. Specialty courts are an integral part of the criminal justice system that can have a positive impact on reducing recidivism and help to rehabilitate offenders. More research is needed on Veterans’ Courts to clearly delineate the effect the various
Variable Raw Count (%) Has substance abuse/use
been a problem in your life? No 7 26% Yes 20 74%
Total 27 100% led to emotional/psychological problems?
No 5 19% Yes 22 81%
Total 27 100% led to problems with family, friends, work, police?
No 3 11% Yes 24 89%
Total 27 100% led to health or medical problems?
No 14 52% Yes 13 48%
Total 27 100% Did you have a substance abuse problem BEFORE
entering the military?
No 26 97% Yes 1 3%
Total 27 100% Is there a family history of abusing substances?
No 3 11% Yes 24 89%
Total 27 100% Mental Health
No 2 8% Yes 23 85%
Missing* 2 7% Total 27 100%
Table 3. Veterans’ Court Survey Respondents’ Substance Use and Mental Health Issues
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components of such courts have on recidivism rates, as well as program satisfaction among participants in relation to recidivism rates.
ReferencesBaldwin, J.M. (2013). Executive summary: National survey
of veterans’ treatment courts. Little Rock, AR. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2274138 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274138.
Berenson, S. (2010). The movement toward veterans’ courts. Journal of Poverty, Law and Policy, 44(37).
Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2007). Veterans in state and federal prison, 2004. Washington DC. NCJ 21799.
Holbrook, J.G. & Anderson, S. (2011). Veterans’ courts: Early outcomes and key indicators for success. Widener Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-25. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912655.Moore, E.C. (2012). A mentor in combat veterans’ court: Obser-
vations and challenges. National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, VA.
National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence. (2014). Veterans and Drugs. Retrieved from http://ncadd.org/index.php/learn-about-drugs/seniors-vets-and-women/213-veter-ans-and-drugs on December 4, 2014.
Stahre, M.A., Brewer, R.D, Fonseca, V.P., & Naimi, T.S. (2009). Binge drinking among U.S. active-duty military personnel. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 36 (3), 208-
217.
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 17
TRAS Time-Saving TipsBy Jennifer Gifford
With the implementation of the Texas Risk Assessment System (TRAS), Probation Departments across the State of Texas have experienced their own unique challenges and rewards concerning the implementation of this instrument. One of the most significant challenges faced by probation officers is finding enough time to conduct the assessments. Here are some tips that I hope will help you to maximize your time.
Familiarize yourself with the scoring guide
The scoring guide is essential in ensuring the TRAS has been accurately scored. While the guide is crucial, it can also be tedious to search for how to score each particular answer that is not clear-cut. As probation officers continue to utilize the scoring guide, the rules and guidelines presented in the guide will become more familiar and we will find ourselves being more efficient in correctly scoring the assessment.
It is important for assessments to be scored correctly as errors in scoring have an impact on offenders when scored incorrectly. In order for assessments to be sound, they must be without any bias or falsehoods. The TRAS utilizes Inter-Rater Reliability, which “is a measure of reliability used to assess the degree to which different judges or raters agree in their assessment decisions. Inter-rater reliability is useful because human observers will not necessarily interpret answers the same way; raters may disagree as to how well certain responses or material demonstrate knowledge of the construct or skill being assessed.”
Accurately scoring the TRAS is essential. Each score sets the level at which an individual will be supervised, as well as determining how the offender will be supervised, which needs of the offender should be addressed to reduce risk, and how to get the offender back on track.
Be Prepared for the interview
When possible, review new files at the first available opportunity. Review clients’ criminal history, offense report, and any other collateral information that you may have such as chronos from previous probation terms, Ignition Interlock reports, alcohol and drug assessments, etc. While this does involve more work on the front-end, doing this can be a major time-saver in the end. It also allows us to have information about clients that may not have been reviewed during the TRAS interview.
Avoid Bunny Trails
We’ve all been there. We ask clients about their school experience and clients are more than willing to tell us all about their 10th grade science teacher, what their favorite cafeteria food was, and how they can remember their locker combination. While it is important to remember Motivational Interviewing (MI) principles when clients go on tangents, it is our job as the assessor to keep the interview on track. Maintain control during the interview.
One technique that can be utilized is “Topical Shift,” which can be helpful for probation officers completing the TRAS. The probation officer can purposely change the subject of discussion perhaps because the topic under discussion is unproductive to completing the assessment.
Officers can utilize phrases such as, “That’s important, but first, could we get back to …” or “Before we move on to that, it might be helpful to think about …” and also, “Perhaps we have covered that enough for now, how about you mentioned…”
Another technique that can be helpful in moving the interviewing process along is utilizing summarizations. Summaries remind the offender about major discussion points that are pertinent to the interview, as well as acting as a bridge to assist the offender to continue on with the assessment. Summaries can be utilized in a manner in which we show the offender that we are listening to what he or she has to say, as well as identifying themes in what the offender has been saying. Summaries can be used as a transition between sections of the interview.
Talk to Your Coach
If there is a section that seems to be taking you an excessive amount of time to get through or if there is a question you haven’t quite figured out how to word in a clear, cohesive manner talk to your coach. Thinking about challenges and formulating solutions based on some of the
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past TRAS interviews you have conducted is exactly what your coach is for. Take advantage of the extra support and guidance that you have available to you if you find yourself struggling.
Pay Close Attention to Answers
This may seem like an obvious point; however, it is easy to find yourself distracted at times during the interview. Try to minimize distractions such as your phone ringing, email, instant messages, etc., so that you can stay focused on the interview. Being mindful of your client’s answers can sometimes enable you to more accurately score other parts of the interview. It also enables you to build rapport with the client and show him/her you are listening to what he/she has to say.
Minimizing distractions and interruptions after the assessment is complete can also have a substantial impact on errors made while scoring the assessment. According to a 300-person study published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology, the subjects made twice as many typing errors when they were asked to type two letters after a brief interruption of only 2.8 seconds. Additionally, on average it can take more than 25 minutes to resume a task after being interrupted (Altmann, Trafton, Hambrick, 2014).
Score the Assessment ASAP
When possible, score the assessment immediately following the interview. When you are able to do this, it is much easier to recall the information that was presented, as everything is fresh on your mind and you aren’t finding yourself digging through all of the notes taken throughout the interview.
It’s important to remember that with time, the staff will become more familiar and comfortable with the TRAS, and many of the time-intensive aspects of conducting and scoring the assessment will become less so, allowing us to complete the TRAS quicker and more effectively.
References
Altmann, E.M., Trafton, J.G., and Hambrick, D.Z. (2014). Mo-mentary interruptions can derail the train of thought. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 143(1), 215-226.
Mondal, P. (2014). Top 10 interviewing techniques used in social work practice. Sociology, Retrieved October 5, 2015 from http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/sociology/top-10-inter-viewing-techniques-used-in-social-work-practice/36561/
Phelan, C. and Wren, J. (2015). Exploring reliability in academic assessment. University of Northern Iowa, College of Humani-ties and Fine Arts Student Outcomes Assessment Website. http://www.uni.edu/chfasoa/reliabilityandvalidity.htm
Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (2015). The Texas Risk Assessment System: A new direction in supervision plan-ning.” Criminal Justice Connections, 22(3), 1-2. Austin, TX. Retrieved from https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/connections/JanFeb2015/agency_vol22no3.html#tras.
Walters, S.T., Clark, M.D., Gingerich, R., and Meltzer, M.L. (2007). Motivating offenders to change: A guide for pro-bation and parole.” Washington, DC: National Institute of Corrections.
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 19
New Group of Hidalgo CSCD Officers Complete SOARING 2 TrainingBy Claudia V. Lemus
To this day more than 150 Community Supervision Officers in the Hidalgo County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) have successfully completed the Skills for Offender Assessment and Responsivity in New Goals (SOARING 2) Training online program, including a group of 15 most recent graduates. The 15 graduates started the training on May 6th, 2015, and completed a module every Wednesday for four weeks.
According to a case study conducted by George Mason University’s Center for Advancing Correctional Excellence (ACE), the SOARING 2 Training program is an eLearning system designed to educate officers in core correctional practices. Based on ACE’s case study, the following are the different modules required to complete the eLearning training:
1. RNR Module: Focuses on taking note of the common psychological factors among criminal justice clients.
2. Case Planning Module: Presents officers with a strategic method for targeting criminogenic needs and working with the probationer to select goals that need to be accomplished during supervision.
3. Problem Solving Module: Gives officers the tools to help probationers recognize their own patterns that contribute to negative behavior and identify alternative pro-social strategies to prevent reoffending.
4. Engagement Module: Emphasizes attention to the strategies to develop intrinsic motivation among probationers. During this module communication and deportment skills focusing on the interaction with the probationer are emphasized.
5. Desistance Module: Presents recent research on how to best facilitate an exit from a life of crime. It is based on strength building efforts to stabilize the person in the community through social supports, reducing criminal lifestyles and criminal identities, and improve their ability to be self-sustaining.
Due to the team’s weekly dedication, they completed the eLearning curriculum, which normally takes approximately 20 hours over a period of 6-8 weeks, in only 5 weeks. The Community Supervision Officers officially graduated from the program June 3, 2015. According to Sydney Peña, one of the Hidalgo CSCD SOARING graduates, the training has helped her become a better Community Supervision Officer.
“Since going through the program and taking the exams, I find it really useful when having to deal with different types of personalities,” said Peña. “It gives us an advantage to be able to help the defendant more and come down to their level of understanding.”
Since 2012, ACE and the Hidalgo County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) have collaborated to implement evidence-based practices (EBPs) for probation supervision via the use of online translational tools. Such tools include the SOARING 2 Training and the Risk Need Responsivity (RNR) Simulation Tool, which was designed to assist jurisdictions in putting the RNR framework into practice.
Based on the definition by the National Institute of Corrections, EBPs are the research and knowledge on processes and need assessment tools that can improve correctional outcomes like reducing recidivism by focusing on decision-making and implementation.
According to Executive Director Arnold Patrick, he first learned of the SOARING 2 pilot program during the Community Supervision Summit held February 2012. “After listening to the information given in the summit we realized that we didn’t know as much as we thought,” shared Patrick. “We needed to educate everyone in the department about evidence-based practices so that everyone could speak the same language.”
Realizing the importance of EBPs, the executive director and a team of supervisors, Rodolfo Perez, Faustino Lopez, and Jaime Torres, decided to apply for the program. “The first thing it did was educate me,” said Patrick regarding his experience with the program. “Once I understood it, I had a better idea and it was easier to envision implementing it.”
Determined to improve his probation department, the executive director and his team of supervisors in the Hidalgo CSCD became the first in Texas to implement the SOARING 2 training program in 2012. According to Patrick, the SOARING 2 eLearning modules are now mandatory for all newly hired Community Supervision Officers as part of their core training and it is a critical part of their individual evaluations.
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 20
Juanlino Garza, a Community Supervision Officer since 2007 and one of the first to complete the training, shared how SOARING 2 turned out to be unlike any other program he had seen. “When I started as a probation officer there were treatment programs in place but not like the years after the SOARING training,” Garza said. He feels he has been able to do more for defendants since his participation in the program. “After the training, I learned how to not only hold my defendants accountable but to have them hold themselves accountable. I also learned to apply the appropriate level of treatment to the wide variety of defendant types,” shared Garza. “I know I have had a greater impact on my defendants’ lives.”
But even though the SOARING 2 program has resulted in positive changes for Hidalgo County CSCD, Arnold Patrick admits executing it was no easy task. “Implementing a program like SOARING 2 is not something you can do overnight,” shared Patrick. “It is a long process and takes a lot of work.” Nonetheless, Mr. Patrick said that the impact seen throughout Hidalgo County CSCD has been worth it. “We now have a very low recidivism rate,” said Patrick. “Overall, we have less people going to prison.”
As a result, SOARING 2 Training graduates like Sydney Peña and Juanlino Garza take pride in their work for the department and they make a difference in defendants’ lives. “It is a rewarding experience. Yes, there will be some offenders that will never change,” shared Peña of defendants she’s impacted, “but it’s the ones that do change and come back and tell you, that make the job worth doing.”
Volume XXX, No. 3 TEXAS PROBATION 21
Lubbock – Crosby County CSCDAssistant Director Farrell Martin announced his retire-
ment effective October 31, 2015 after serving more than two decades with the Lubbock County CSCD, CRTC, and the Liberty – Chambers County CSCD. We wish Farrell noth-ing but the best in his retirement.
David Rowan has been selected as the new Assistant Director in Lubbock County. He has many years of experi-ence as an officer, quality control administrator, and super-visor. In addition he has been a Resource Training Officer, a mentor for Motivational Interviewing, as well as a founding member of the Texas Motivational Interviewing Coopera-tive. Davis was also a subject matter expert for the Texas Risk Assessment System (TRAS).
Swift and Certain Sanctions Down UnderBy Steven Powell, Felony Courts Supervisor, Tarrant County CSCD
October in Tarrant County saw Australia come to Texas. On October 12, 2015 a three person team from the North-ern Territory Community Corrections in the city Darwin
located in Northern Territory, Australia arrived in Tarrant County for 2 ½ days of meetings, procedural discussions, and court observation for Tarrant County’s Supervision with Immediate Enforcement (SWIFT) Court. Led by the Honorable Mollee Westfall, SWIFT is a swift and certain sanctions model which was implemented in Tarrant County in 2011 targeting high risk defendants. SWIFT guarantees a structured approach to probation with immediate, con-sistent, measured jail sanctions which are issued during a face-to-face conversation between the judge and defendant for every violation, every time. Under the leadership of Tra-cy Luke, Executive Director of Community Corrections, the Northern Territory is working to implement a similar sanctions court in Darwin.
The partnership with the Australian team saw fruitful exchanges of ideas and experiences, collaboration about strategic approaches to implementation, and meaningful group discussion between all SWIFT stakeholders from line officers to the judiciary. Tarrant County CSCD is honored to be a part of an international coalition helping to imple-ment the swift and certain sanctions model to the Northern Territory and beyond.
Brazos County CSCD would like to welcome Jennifer Goerig as new Di-rector. Jennifer was sworn in on June 5, 2015 by Judge Steve Smith of the 361st District Court. Many of you may already know Jennifer through her 22 years of experience as a supervi-sion officer, her RTO duties, TRAS lead trainer, or numerous other duties relating to the probation field.
Brazos County CSCD would like to welcome our newest officers Kim New-ton and Morris Carrillo. They were sworn in on June 5, 2015 by Director Jennifer Goerig. Kim comes to us from Child Protective Services and recently joined TPA. Morris previously worked at the Brazos County Sherriff’s Office. Welcome aboard!
Dan Beto was presented with a Pro Bono Advisor award on June 5, 2015 for his contributions to Brazos County CSCD. His insight and wisdom are greatly appreciated!
NEWS FROM THE FIELD
22 TEXAS PROBATION Volume XXX, No.3
Join the Texas Probation Association, the only professional organization created to exclusively serve the needs of probation and community corrections practitioners.
The Texas Probation Association has four membership classifications – Professional, Associate, Alumni, and Student. Professional Membership is for full-time certified probation officers. Associate Membership is for all other categories of professionals who do not qualify for full membership, including, but not limited to, criminal justice practitioners, counselors, volunteers, treatment center personnel, and professors. Alumni Membership is for professionals
who retire from the field and choose to remain active in the association. Student Membership is for persons enrolled in an institution of higher learning.
Dues paid to the Texas Probation Association are not tax deductible.
All members, whether Professional, Associate, Alumni, or Student receive a subscription to Texas Probation journal, lapel pin, decal, membership card, and registration discounts for Association conferences. All members may serve on committees. Professional and Alumni members may vote, hold office, and chair committees, while Associate members are ineligible for these three activities.
MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION(Please Photocopy)
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TEXAS PROBATION ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP
23 TEXAS PROBATION Volume XXX, No.3
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTORS
Texas Probation, the quarterly journal of the Texas Probation Association, publishes articles, reports, book reviews, poems and prose, editorials, commentaries, obituaries, and news items of interest to community corrections professionals.
Texas Probation is published quarterly, in January, April, July, and October. Unless previously discussed with the editor, submissions should be received no later than the 15th day of the month preceding the publication month. Submissions for publication consideration should be typed on 8½ by 11 inch paper, double spaced, with at least one inch margins. Manuscripts exceeding one page in length must be submitted on a computer diskette, or by e-mail, in either MS Word or WordPerfect format. Persons submitting articles, commentaries, or book reviews should enclose a brief biographical sketch or resume and a photograph for possible inclusion. Specific questions concerning this procedure should be directed to Kelli D. Martin at 817-884-1222 or Karla Penate Kutch at 713-844-1724.
All submissions and/or other correspondence regarding Texas Probation should be sent to the following:
Kelli D. Martin, Co-EditorM.A. Research Unit Supervisor, TCCSCD 200 W. Belknap St.Fort Worth, TX 76196Office: 817-884-1222Fax: [email protected]
Karla Kutch, Co-EditorTexas ProbationBCCSCD North County Unit713-844-1724 or [email protected]
The Criminal Justice Center at Sam Houston State University serves as the Secretariat for the Texas Probation Association. Texas Probation is published by Sam Houston Press and Copy Center.
Editor/Co-ChairsKelli MartinKarla Kutch
Associate EditorsDr. Melvin Brown, Jr.
Jim Stott
MembersRodolfo Perez
Stephanie Christopher Priscilla SolisTodd JermstadErnest Perry
Darin Deutsch
COMMITTEE CHAIRS
PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE
Adult LegislativeJaved Syed Dallas CSCDChris Thomas Jasper CSCD
Advanced EducationAngela Dugay Jefferson CSCDTracy Robinson Jefferson CSCD
Awards and ResolutionsLaTricia Coleman Jefferson JPDWill Hurley Wharton/Matagorda CSCD
Exhibitors Rick Morales Nueces County CSCDLaRonda Turner Jefferson County JPDKarma Chambless Matagorda CSCDKelly Tootle Jasper County CSCD
Site Selection Aris Johnson Gregg JPDEd Cockrell Jefferson JPDChris Thomas Jasper CSCD
Organized 1974
Secretariat Since 1994
Sam Houston Press & Copy CenterPublisher Since 1995
Texas Probation AssociationCorrectional Management Institute of TexasGeorge J. Beto Criminal Justice CenterSam Houston State UniversityHuntsville TX 77341-2296
