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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

ANNUAL REPORT

on Activities of Military Intelligence in 2010

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DIRECTOR’S INTRODUCTORY WORD

Madam/Sir,

The sixth Annual Report of Military Intelligence assessing the year 2010 includes also the period when the Government of the Czech Republic was forced to take measures concerning cuts in the state budget expenditures. These measures naturally affected also the Ministry of Defence, including Military Intelligence. In spite of that, Military Intelligence successfully met tasks set by the provision of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., On Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic, and resulting from requirements of the addressees specified by the Act.

In 2010, Military Intelligence improved its response to newly occurring security risks and therefore provides early and relevant information to the authorized addressees.

The members of Military Intelligence also participated in a series of expert groups formed to prepare the White Book on Defence within which they attended many meetings on future functional providing of security of the Czech Republic and development of the Armed Forces.

Integral part of Military Intelligence is the 601st Special Forces Group, which ended its third combat mission of the Special Task Force in the territory of Afghanistan at the turn of 2009/2010 and participated in meeting of other tasks in this region in 2010. Employment and excellent performance of the 601st Special Forces Group were highly appreciated not only by the top representatives of the Czech Republic but also by the Commander of the US Special Forces. In this sphere, we face another significant task decided by the Government of the Czech Republic, i.e. to handover the 601st Special Forces Group to the subordination of the General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic.

Let me thank, in this way, all the members of Military Intelligence for their high-quality work.

Lieutenant General Ondrej PÁLENÍK, MBA

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CONTENTS 1 PUBLIC RELATIONS

2 BASIC INFORMATION

2.1 General Structure 2.2 Budget Means

3 TASKING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TASKS

4 RESULTS OF ACTIVITIES

4.1 Crisis Regions 4.2 Terrorism and Extremism 4.3 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Conventional Weapons and Dual Use Materiel 4.4 Activities of Foreign Intelligence Services in the Field of Defence in the Territory of the

Czech Republic 4.5 Intentions and Activities Directed against Security of the Czech Republic 4.6 Intentions and Activities Posing Threat to Classified Information in the Field of Defence of

the Czech Republic

5 COOPERATION WITHIN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

6.1 Multilateral Cooperation 6.2 Bilateral Cooperation 6.3 Military Diplomacy

7 PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

7.1 Personal Security 7.2 Security of Communication and Information Systems 7.3 Physical Security 7.4 Administrative Security 7.5 Basic Tasks Met in the Area of Release of Operative Documents of Former Military

Counterintelligence (VKR) and Former Intelligence Service of the General Staff (ZS GŠ) of the Czechoslovak People’s Army

8 INSPECTIONS ACTIVITY

8.1 External Inspection and Its Results 8.2 Internal Inspection and Its Results

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1 PUBLIC RELATIONS

Activities of Military Intelligence are presented mainly to the bodies of the Government of the Czech Republic and the committees of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.

Military Intelligence still uses the possibility to release information on some of its activities on the Internet websites www.vzcr.cz. These websites contribute to general awareness of the structure and activity of Military Intelligence within the framework set by the Act No. 412/2005 Coll., On Protection of Classified Information and Security Competence.

In 2010, the public was presented the exhibition of photographs called “Afghanistan – Pride and Bravery” held in Prostějov and several other places in the Czech Republic. This exhibition, which showed several dozens of photographs taken by Herbert Slavík, Warrant Officer Daniel Hlaváč, and members of the 601st Special Forces Group, was created to celebrate the 65th anniversary of the end of the WWII. The words “pride and bravery” are intentionally in the title of the exhibition, because the meaning of these words is a part of service of the Czech soldiers. These words are in the title of the book which was published with a significant contribution of the 601st Special Forces Group. It is called “Pride and Bravery – Faces of the Czech Army” and it is by Herbert Slavík, Barbora Potůčková, and Eduard Stehlík. The book was dedicated to all who risk their lives for our security. History and presence of our elite unit – the 601st Special Forces Group – is described in the book called “DUM SPIRO SPERO” (While I breathe, I hope). Its author is military historian Eduard Stehlík.

Within the celebrations of the 65th anniversary of liberation of Czechoslovakia, a series of unique historic documents of Military Intelligence was handed over to the Military History Archives and the Military History Institute. These were mainly documents and correspondence of Colonel František Moravec, correspondence of the Czechoslovak Military Attachés to London, Warsaw and Stockholm and also documents related to preparation and operation of Czechoslovak paratrooper units dropped in the territory of Czechoslovakia in the period of the WWII from the west and east fronts, intelligence documents picturing the situation in Czechoslovakia and Germany before 1939, historical cipher keys used in the WWII and seized documents of the German troops from the sphere of the cipher service from the era of the WWII. The public could see them in the exhibition in the Military History Institute in the period of the May liberation celebrations.

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2 BASIC INFORMATION ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Military Intelligence is a unified armed intelligence service of the Czech Republic integrating intelligence and counterintelligence activities, which gathers, collects, analyses and disseminates intelligence of military, military-political, and military-technical nature to the authorized addressees.

The primary task of Military Intelligence is to provide information support to decision-making process at the supreme military-political level of the country. In practice, it means provision of relevant intelligence information to the authorized addressees, mainly to the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, and other representatives responsible for security of the Czech Republic.

Military Intelligence participates in analyses and assessments of security risks and potential military and non-military threats posed to the Czech Republic, and the EU and NATO countries and other partners, units of the Army of the Czech Republic operating in missions abroad, or units of the coalition partners. Further, it analyses operation of foreign military intelligence services, which can cause serious security damage to the Czech Republic, observation of regulations concerning handling of classified information in the Department of Defence and all other activities, which could significantly damage the Department of Defence. Last but not least, it participates in analyses of development of the so called supranational phenomena focusing on extremism, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Activity of Military Intelligence is set by § 5, Article 3 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll.

In accord with § 5, Article 4 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., Military Intelligence meets other tasks if set by a special act (e.g. Act No. 412/2005 Coll.) or an international agreement, by which the Czech Republic is bound.

According to provisions of the § 7 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., the Government of the Czech Republic is responsible for and, at the same time, coordinates activity of Military Intelligence. The Government of the Czech Republic tasks Military Intelligence within its authorities. With cognizance of the Government, Military Intelligence can be tasked also by the President.

Use of specific means to gain information and keep database of individuals necessary for work of Military Intelligence, authorities and obligations of its members are set by the Act No. 289/2005 Coll. On Military Intelligence, as subsequently amended.

Internal organization and activity of Military Intelligence is set by the Statute of Military Intelligence, which was approved by the Government of the Czech Republic.

In 2010, there was initiated the work on elaboration of the new Strategy of Activity and Development of Military Intelligence in 2012-2017, which will emphasize the new Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and the White Book on Defence.

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2.1 General Structure

Military Intelligence is a component of the Ministry of Defence. The Minister of Defence is the direct superior of the Director of Military Intelligence.

Members of Military Intelligence are in duty according to the Act No. 221/1999 Coll. On Career Soldiers, as subsequently amended, or according to the Act No. 262/2006 Coll., Labour Code, as subsequently amended.

In 2010, the organizational structure of Military Intelligence was as follows1:

1 This is a general structure, the release of which observes the provisions of the Act No. 412/2005 Coll.

Analysis

Chief of Staff Zástupce ředitele

Inspection & Internal Security

Human Resources & Education

601st Special Forces Group SIGINT

Special Operation Forces Directorate

Protection of Classified Information

Logistic Support & Communication and Information Systems

Sources

Director of Military Intelligence

Plans & Policy

Management Support

Economic Support

Planning

Deputy Directors

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2.2 Budget Means

The budget of Military Intelligence is a part of the budget chapter of the Ministry of Defence and it was set at 2,135,230 thousand Czech Crowns.

Compared to 2009, the volume of means allocated for Military Intelligence for 2010 was by 8.6 % lower.

The allocated financial means were spent in accordance with the Act No. 218/2000 Coll. On Budgetary Rules and on Change in Some Related Acts, as subsequently amended, and the Act No. 320/2001 Coll. On Financial Control in the Public Administration and on Change in Some Acts, as subsequently amended, and in accord with budgetary composition of the Ministry of Defence. All incomes and expenditures of Military Intelligence form a part of accountant procedures conducted in accord with the Act No. 563/1991 Coll. On Accountancy, as subsequently amended, with respect to § 20 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll.

Taking possessions and purchase of construction works, and other services in favour of Military Intelligence were implemented in accord with the Act No. 137/2006 Coll. On Public Orders.

Unauthorized drawing from the budgetary assets was not found out within the carried out inspections.

The percentage division of expenditures of Military Intelligence in 2010 is shown in the

following graph:

Struktura výdaj ů Vojenského zpravodajství v roce 2010

41% 33%

26%

Mandatorní výdaje Ostatní běžné výdaje Kapitálové výdaje

Structure of MI expenditures in 2010

Mandatory expenditures Other common expenditures Capital expenditures

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3 TASKING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TASKS

Activities of Military Intelligence in the field of providing information to authorized subjects were carried out pursuant to § 8 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll.

In 2010, Military Intelligence was meeting tasks arising from its authorities and mainly from tasks assigned by the Government of the Czech Republic set in the priorities of activities of intelligence services of the Czech Republic.

These priorities were further worked out into individual requirements for information and distributed to the sources. Requests for information of the intelligence bodies of NATO, the European Union, and bilateral partners were handled in the same way. To meet the assigned tasks, Military Intelligence gained information through its own means - Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Open Sources Intelligence (OSINT), as well as within bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In 2010, Military Intelligence handed over 996 main information products mainly to the President, the Prime Minister, top representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Army of the Czech Republic, the EU and NATO intelligence bodies and partners at bilateral level.

601st Special Forces Group

The main task of the 601st Special Forces Group was preparation for the mission abroad in 2011 - 2012, which was approved by the October 2010 resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic.

Along with meeting of this task, preparation of the selected Special Task Force (hereinafter only Task Force) to protect the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Kabul was carried out. The first Task Force was deployed in Kabul in January 2010 and it took over the task of protection of the Embassy from the Rapid Response Unit (URNa) of the Police of the Czech Republic on February 1, 2010.

Three Task Force units rotated while meeting the task of protection of the Embassy in 2010. Each Task Force served a four-months deployment. This mission was specific for the members of the Task Force units or all members of the 601st Special Forces Group mainly due to the fact that it was purely a national task under the direct operational command of the Director of Military Intelligence. Its members met tasks of protection of high positioned civilians whom they guarded 24 hours a day. These men operated in non-standard conditions and with non-standard equipment off a military base. These facts required extraordinary organizational capability, independence in any situation and behaviour completely different from the basic skills and training of a member of the Special Forces Group. In view of the fact that all tasks were met and members of all Task Force units returned to the Czech Republic, the operational task is assessed as completed in extenso.

The resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic prolonged the mandate of the Task Force units to 2011 and 2012, therefore the task continues.

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4 RESULTS OF ACTIVITIES

4.1 Crisis Regions

Region of the Balkans

Considering the geographical location, the Balkans represents a significant area of interest for the Czech Republic not only in security but also in economic and investments point of view.

In 2010, that time political and security situation in Kosovo was assessed mainly in connection with the need to define potential risks for the members of the Task Force of the Army of the Czech Republic deployed within the multinational peacekeeping operation of NATO in the territory of Kosovo – Kosovo Force (KFOR) and for the nationals of the Czech Republic operating in the diplomatic missions, the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). The attention was paid mainly to analysis of the political and security development in the ethnically various regions of Kosovo. Due to significant influence on the security situation in the country, a number of events was monitored – response to the credential of the International Court of Justice in The Hague concerning declaration of Kosovo independence, impact of the released report of the Council of Europe accusing the Kosovo Prime Minister of war crimes and the course of the governmental crisis and early parliamentary elections. Other issues of attention were development, training and activity of the Kosovo Security Forces and Kosovo Intelligence Service. In the area of the administrative border between Kosovo and Serbia were analyzed activities of the Armed Forces of Serbia.

The key issues, which Kosovo faces and will face at the international level, include low support provided by the countries, which decided not to recognize independence of Kosovo or to have a neutral position to it, in spite of the credential of the International Court of Justice in The Hague. This situation will worsen by enforcing of Kosovo legitimacy at the international level, which will complicate its approach towards its slow full-value international integration. Unclear and slow access negotiations into the international organizations along with high level of corruption and criminality will discourage potential investors with the necessary capital. In this point of view, any improvement of social-economic situation of the population cannot be expected. That will reflect in civil disorders and economic emigration.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Military Intelligence focused on assessment of political and security situation in connection with the nationalist-motivated statements of some political representatives on coexistence of individual nationalities and in connection with separatist efforts of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which could result in violation of the overall political and territorial integrity of the country. Military Intelligence also assessed the level of

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practical implementation of reforms set by the representatives of the European Union as the condition of continuation in the integration processes, monitored fight against organized crime, corruption and extremism, and analyzed results of the parliamentary elections and their impact on future development of the country. The attention was paid mainly to the difficult post-election negotiations, which were complicated by the attitude of the Bosnian-Croat minority requiring equalization with Serbs and Bosniaks and also strong protests against handover of the individuals accused of war crimes to the criminal prosecution. There were also assessed problems connected with economic stability of the country which is dependent on foreign grants and directly influences the security situation. Last but not least, there was monitored the process of division of the property of the former Yugoslavia, which the representatives of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to avoid making unilateral decisions without any agreement on the state level to gain higher profit. The object of interest of Military Intelligence was reorganization of the Military, mainly build-up of united armed forces and formation of mechanisms of their independent control. In connection with lasting problems with establishment and activities of multiethnic state institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, continuing complications can be expected even in the upcoming period, which will reflect in their insufficient functioning.

In Serbia, mainly attitude of the Serbian representatives in the issue of Kosovo and national minorities in Serbia were monitored. Serbian support provided to the Serbian parallel structures in Kosovo territory and the effort to prevent Kosovo from participation in the international organization were assessed. Turning point of the development of relations between Serbia and Kosovo became resolution of Serbia towards Kosovo, which after changes worked out in cooperation with the European Union, calls for moderate approach and for start of the dialogue with the Kosovo representatives on the organizational matters which should decrease tensions mainly in the northern part of Kosovo. Military Intelligence paid its attention also to political and security situation in the area of Sandjak settled by the Bosniak minority, and in the south-east part of Serbia (area of Preshevo), where ethnic Albanians have strong representation. Continuing development in Serbia shows that this country will even in the oncoming period face increase in the nationalist demonstrations, mainly for deteriorating social-economic situation in the country.

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), political and security situation was monitored from the point of view of nationalist and territorial demands of the Albanian ethnic minorities. In connection with continuing tensions between ethnic minorities and political crisis in the country, there cannot be expected any improvement in the overall situation in the oncoming period mainly due to unwillingness of the political representatives to cooperate and solve the situation.

Working out analysis information products and other information, Military Intelligence participated in preparation of documents for activities and decision making of representatives of the country and main officials of the Ministry of Defence with the emphasis put on further engagement of the Army of the Czech Republic in Kosovo. Military Intelligence contributed with its information to the decision of the Czech Republic to gradually decrease military presence of the Army of the Czech Republic in the Balkans. In spite of that and right for that necessary intelligence attention will be paid to this region.

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Information on the Region of the Balkans

Addressee Number of passed information

President of the Czech Republic, political

and military representatives of the Czech Republic

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Missions of the Army of the Czech Republic abroad

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Region of the Middle East

Development in the region of the Middle East influences also the Czech Republic more than development in most other regions of the world. It is for many reasons, some of these are geographical location, export of strategically important mineral resources, state of development of the Middle East companies, nature of its regimes and, last but not least, difficult security and political situation. Therefore, Military Intelligence regularly informed the top representatives of the Czech Republic on security threats and risks connected with developments in the region in 2010.

In the long term, the Middle East security environment and military-political situation have been formed by a number of lasting and mutually influencing negative phenomena, which have directly affected the stability of the region. Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iranian nuclear programme, instable political development in Iraq and Lebanon and security situation in Yemen can be considered the main problems of the region in 2010. All these problems are deeply enrooted and are still in the centre of attention of Military Intelligence due to small probability of their soon and firm solution.

The long-term blocked Middle East peace process represents a significant risk of destabilization of the security situation in the Middle East. Last time, this occurred in connection with the Israeli intervention in the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009. In this context, Military Intelligence assessed mainly critical factors and indicators, which could contribute to local war conflict with serious regional impact due to failed peace talks and practical solution connected with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Iran continues in the effort to gain dominant position in the region. That is connected also with its nuclear programme and support to the regional militant movements. Therefore, there were monitored activities of Iran aimed at forming of such military-political conditions, which would allow it destabilize the region in its favour and so meet its power ambitions. Besides that, Military Intelligence analyzed position and stability of the ruling regime and its ability to face the international pressure. Not only in connection with Iran were monitored internal development and foreign policy in Syria, which tries to keep a significant influence on the solution to key regional issues. The main tools of the Syrian policy are cooperation with the radical movements of Hezbollah and Hamas and strengthening of relations with the pro-Syrian groups of interest operating in Lebanon. Information of Military Intelligence helped the top representatives of the Czech Republic gain objective view of the highly discussed share of Iran and Syria in the regional instability.

Military Intelligence further focused on monitoring and assessment of development in Iraq. In 2010, the most important processes in the country were withdrawal of the US troops and establishment of the new Government. Military Intelligence assessed mainly ability of the Iraqi politicians and its security forces to keep the set trend, which still heads to build-up a united and sovereign country also under the conditions of the planned termination of operation of the US troops in the country. The provided information warned of the possibility of future

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destabilization of the country, because security threat posed by insurgent and terrorist organizations remains high and the problems in the Iraqi society are lasting.

Tense situation between individual society groups and their political representation still lingers in Lebanon. Military Intelligence focused mainly on assessment and outlook concerning the state of the security environment in connection with activities of the Shiite movement of Hezbollah, which takes a stand of the main leader of the resistance movement against Israel. While monitoring the overall situation, the emphasis was put on activity of the Special Tribunal of Justice investigating assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, development in individual communities and problems with the weak state institutions. Military Intelligence warned the top representatives of the Czech Republic of a great risk of outbreak of an armed conflict in Lebanon, which could develop into a regional conflict.

In 2010, problems in Yemen, country located strategically in the southwest of the Arab Peninsula, deteriorated. Military Intelligence assessed and predicted development in the country on the basis of monitoring of all-society social-economic problems, tension inside the ruling and opposition elite of the country and security challenges for integrity of the country on the side of the Houthi Tribe in the north, separatists in the south, and AQ in tribal areas. Regarding the above mentioned problems, information of Military Intelli gence focused on potential impact of collapse of the central Yemeni Government. Intelligence information on security situation in Yemen was used also for evaluation of risks connected with visits of the top officials of the Czech Republic to the country.

Besides focus on actual, the thorniest problems of the region, Military Intelligence monitored development of allied and hostile relations among regional countries and important non-state actors. The emphasis was put on rivalry of Iran and the Persian Gulf countries and, at more general level, with most other west-oriented Arab countries, on internal Arab competition for the role of the leading Arab country and on the attitude of other countries of the region towards Israel.

Security situation in the region of the Middle East was assessed from the point of view of the strategic interests of the Czech Republic and their allies. In spite of the complicated relations and tendencies in the region, the top representatives of the country were informed in advance on the risks of continuing destabilization in the region and on possible impact of the most probable variants of development.

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Information on the Region of the Middle East




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Region of Afghanistan - Pakistan

In 2010, military-political situation in Afghanistan was characterized by insufficient progress in the security, economic and social spheres, which was caused mainly by lasting insurgency of the Opposing Militant Forces (OMF) and instability in the internal political environment. In 2010, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops and civilian experts were reinforced. That increased the pace of operations in the selected key regions. In the previous years, Military Intelligence predicted that OMF cannot be defeated by military force only and therefore it was necessary to fill the strategy also by negotiations of the Afghan Government and insurgent representatives. In 2010, the representatives of the international community, Afghan Government and some insurgent groups reached a consensus on initiation of institutional peace talks. For that reason, the High Peace Council was established. Tasked by the Afghan Government, it is responsible for the reconciliation process with OMF. It is headed by the former Afghan President. Local peace councils providing reintegration of insurgents were established at local level. A preparatory phase of handover of responsibility for security in the country to the Afghan Government and the local security forces was started in 2010. In spite of the mentioned reinforcement, Afghan OMF still adapted their modus operandi to greater engagement of the International and Afghan Armed Forces in 2010 and that contributed to increase in the number of incidents compared to 2009.

In the sphere of the military-political situation, Military Intelligence continuously assessed the overall development mainly in the period of the parliamentary elections with the aim to detect the risk factors influencing the security situation in time. Tense relations in the Afghan Government and their further deterioration in the post-election period in fall 2010 were analyzed. Military Intelligence continuously assessed the state of corruption at governmental and provincial level and effectivity of anti-corruption measures. There was monitored the level of operation of the governmental administration, cooperation and relations with regional and western great powers, provisions and obligations originating in the international conferences and agreements. Military Intelligence analysed connections of the governmental officials with members of OMF, their engagement in illegal trade and other crimes. Cooperation of representatives of the Afghan Security Forces and public administration with ISAF was continuously assessed.

A great emphasis was put on assessment of development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in 2010. It is the primary factor of successful fulfilling of transfer of responsibility. In 2010, development lay mainly in successful recruitment, due to which the planned number was reached. Training of ANSF to reach its full operational capability will require longer time period and also engagement of a greater number of international embedded training teams. The Afghan Government started the build-up of units of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) comprising the local communities, which are formed to temporarily stabilize the security situation in the regions with lower presence of the Afghan Security Forces.

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In 2010, Military Intelligence focused on assessment of OMF activities in the area of operation of the Army of the Czech Republic units with the emphasis put on changes in structure, ability of mutual coordination and warfare tactics. It continuously assessed risk behaviour and ties of OMF with representatives of the Afghan administration and security forces, which represented possible threat posed to the Army of the Czech Republic and members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team. Intelligence from these areas was provided to the constitutional officials and representatives of the Ministry of Defence to support their decision-making on the intents of further engagement of the Army of the Czech Republic in the given region. Military Intelligence provided intelligence on the security threats also to the coalition partners and through information it participated in support of the operations led in connection with abduction of coalition soldiers. A specific factor contributing to provision of the above mentioned information was also the National Intelligence Cell, which includes members of Military Intelligence and operates in the area of conflict. In several cases, Military Intelligence revealed and prevented negative impact of force use against the units of the Army of the Czech Republic in the territory of Afghanistan in time.

Military Intelligence assessed influence of countries of the South East Asia on the security situation and termination of the conflict in Afghanistan. Within bilateral relations of the Afghan Government and other regional governments, the development of relations and diplomatic efforts with Pakistan was primarily assessed. The Pakistani Government confirmed that it was ready to participate in political solution to the Afghan conflict in 2010. In spite of that, it assesses its security interests towards Afghanistan mainly with regard to the Indian activities. Saudi Arabia offered mediation of the peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban and, during the conference of the Economic Cooperation Organization held in Istanbul in 2010, Turkey pledged to support the reconciliation process.

A significant regional partner, China, in its relation to Afghanistan focused on the use of Afghan mineral resources. In Lowgar Province, it owns rights for mining in the Aynak copper mine, a part of which is also obligation to build the infrastructure in the area of output. Activity of the Russian Federation (RF) was primarily directed against spread of terrorism and trade in narcotics. The Russian support lies mainly in deliveries of military equipment, aid in training of Afghan security components and economic aid to stabilize and restore Afghanistan.

In accord with previous analyses of Military Intelligence, in 2010, continuing domestic political and economic instability of Pakistan did not allow to efficiently solve the long-term deteriorated security situation in the country. The Pakistani Government faced increase in radical Islam, deteriorating economic problems of the country and growing anti-western demonstrations of a significant part of the population. Operations of extremist and terrorist groups negatively influenced situation not only in the border area with Afghanistan, but also in the Pakistani interior. The opposition forces used the instable political situation, humanitarian crisis and focus of the army on rescue operations after the vast floods to further destabilize the situation. Within the bilateral relations, Pakistan tried to intensify cooperation with China and Central Asia countries.

Development of the long-term tense bilateral relations between Pakistan and India did not reach any significant change in 2010. Indications of potential abuse of Pakistani nuclear means by illegitimate subjects have not been found out.

The region of South Asia still belongs to the crisis regions, which influence security interests of the Czech Republic and its allies. In the long term, Military Intelligence warns of risk factors and tendencies, which can influence security situation in Europe. Information of Military Intelligence forms an important part of su pport provided to decisions of the constitutional officials and diplomats on further engagement of the Czech Republic in this

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region. Priority of intelligence activities of Military Intelligence was and will be protection of lives of the Czech Republic citizens operating in military and diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. Information on the Region of Afghanistan- Pakistan




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Region of the Commonwealth of Independent States

The Commonwealth of Independent States currently includes nine of fifteen former republics of the Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan severed its membership in 2005 and it is the associated member of the Commonwealth now. The founding member was also Ukraine, which has the status of observer only, because it has not signed the statutes of the Commonwealth of Independent States. On the contrary, Georgia left the organization immediately after the Russia-Georgia conflict of August 2008.

The greatest attention of Military Intelligence was paid to the Russian Federation. A characteristic sign of the Russian politics is continuing effort to restore its position of the global great power. Within that aim, the Russian Federation takes legislative steps, tries to increase the potential of the security organizations led by it, reforms and modernizes its armed forces. The Russian leadership demonstrated its great-power ambitions also in long-distance flights of the Strategic Air Forces and long-distance navigation of the brand-new vessels of the Navy.

Military Intelligence monitored the process of preparation and approval of the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation, which is a follow-up of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation approved in 2009. According to the RF military doctrine, the main threat is posed by enlargement and approaching of NATO towards the Russian borders, and build-up and deployment of the missile defence system. Besides that, Military Intelligence focused on continuing reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, mainly establishment of the new command structures and military districts. In the sphere of operational and combat preparation, training activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were monitored. These were carried out independently or with other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The spheres of interest were, among others, monitoring of build-up of military bases of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation abroad, mainly in the territory of separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The common denominator connecting all Russian military facilities and bases deployed off the territory of the Russian Federation is provision of the Russian power interests and military security on strategic approaches to its territory.

In North Caucasus, Military Intelligence analysed military-political and security situation mainly in connection with demonstrations of terrorism. In South Caucasus, the matter of interest was development of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, situation in solution to the “frozen” conflict related to Nagorno Karabakh and activities of the Russian Federation in the territory of Georgia.

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Increased attention was paid to development of military political situation before the presidential elections and following political development of Ukraine and Belarus. Conclusions of Military Intelligence on significant change in foreign policy direction of Ukraine in case of victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential elections were confirmed.

Military-political and security situation was monitored in the countries of Central Asia. The emphasis was put on further development of Kyrgyzstan after the fall of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and of Tajikistan in connection with growing instability of the security situation. The attention was paid also to radical Islamic movements, which operate, in the long term, in the densely populated Fergan Basin situated in the territory of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where they endeavours to establish the Islamic caliphate. Still, there lasts also the interest of the Russian Federation to influence the situation in Central Asia, mainly in economic and military sphere, where the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet countries of the given region focuses mainly on weakening of the US and China’s influence. Information on the Region of the CIS



and military representatives of the Czech Republic 51


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Region of Africa

Military Intelligence monitored development of security situation in Africa mainly in regard to obligations of the Czech Republic connected with its membership of NATO and the European Union. In the relation with the European Union, it is mainly a long-term information support for the reason of preparation of the Army of the Czech Republic for participation in the EU Battle Group (EU BG) planned for the year 2012. In this context, the attention was paid mainly to monitoring of security situation development in the countries and regions, which could be possible future areas of employment in accord with regulations on deployment of the EU BG. In this context, the interest focused on Sudan, Somalia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. At the same time, Military Intelligence

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informed on security situation development in the countries, where members of the Army of the Czech Republic operated.

In connection with the ongoing EU operations (ATALANTA counter-piracy operation in Somalia and the European Union Training Mission - EUTM), Military Intelligence provided information support to the selected members of the Army of the Czech Republic designated to participate in the ATALANTA operation or the EU and NATO command structures.

The matter of interest of Military Intelligence was security situation development in Somalia where is a long-term conflict between the current Government and the opposition, and where the Islamic radicalism, which can be the fertile ground for spread of the international terrorism, is strengthening. A special emphasis was put on the sea piracy, which is a significant destabilizing factor in the region and currently already poses a serious threat to global security.

In Sudan, Military Intelligence concentrated on analysis of development of the domestic political and security situation, which was influenced by continued fighting in the area of Darfur, preparation for presidential elections, and planned referendum on possible independence of South Sudan.

In connection with security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, there were assessed key factors and indicators, which were tainted by lasting domestic political instability originating from insufficient function of the state bodies, high level of corruption and existence of militant groups terrorizing civilians. In the mentioned regions, vast activities of the organized crime and demonstrations of ethnic or religious extremism were monitored.

Long term analyses of Military Intelligence confirming growing potential of culmination of risk factors, which can influence security situation in Europe, are met in the African continent. Africa becomes the future theatre of economic and political interests of great powers with the potential of terrorism expansion, which can eventually influence interests of the Czech Republic. Military Intelligence warned in advance of deepening of social, demographic and security disproportion, which can develop into a new political situation in the region of North Africa and the Horn of Africa. Military Intelligence will keep monitoring development of the continent with emphasis put on growing ambitions of religious terrorism to expand to the territory of Europe. Information on the Region of Africa




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4.2 Terrorism and Extremism

Terrorism

The Czech Republic faced the terrorist threat also in 2010. As the member country of NATO, within which the units of the Army of the Czech Republic operate in Afghanistan, it was aware of the fact that the threat of religious terrorist attack against the target in the territory of Europe is relevant. The risk connected with that is assessed by Military Intelligence as of mid or high probability; the risk of the act of the terrorist threat to be conducted in the Czech Republic is still assessed as low. Significance of the terrorist threat was exponentiated by some

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aspects of solution to the issue of the EU immigrant policy within the Schengen Zone. The mentioned level of risk was, to a certain point, also reflection of a number of threats, which the terrorist groups or their media directed against NATO and the European Union.

The main terrorist entity of this kind continued to be Al-Qa’ida (AQ). In spite of the fact that its core underwent a series of personnel, material and financial losses, and it practically stopped to refer to its franchises and ideologically allied groups in other but propaganda ways, bounded a significant potential of the Coalition and Pakistani Forces operating in the Afghan-Pakistani border area. AQ franchises, in Iraq, Yemen, Maghreb/Sahel or in East Africa, focused their efforts on attacks against targets and interests of the local governments and the West within their areas of regional operations, where supra-regional operations were rather the exception. Regional dimension was not crossed even by religious terrorist groups operating in Pakistan, India and other countries in Asia. In their areas of influence, all these groups posed a threat also to the interests of the Czech Republic and its citizens who travelled to the given countries within military missions, to meet service tasks or on their own decision.

The greatest threat to the targets in Europe kept being posed by terrorist cells operating in the territory of Europe. In 2010, the terrorist groups failed to cause any casualties or property damages in Europe. This success was the result of effectivity of the taken security measures improved by close international cooperation of the relevant intelligence, executive and judicial bodies. The evidence of their intensive efforts was almost 180 people arrested for suspicion of terrorist acts justified by twisted interpretation of Islam. Out of these, almost one half was arrested for suspicion of preparation of terrorist acts. In 2010, the terrorists successfully initiated three attacks, one in Sweden and two in Denmark. However, all three failed.

In 2010, Military Intelligence monitored certain changes in the organizational structure of terrorist groups. They became more nationality-mixed and were influenced by instructions from the off-Europe areas only rarely. There rose the number of culprits who prepared or wanted to carry out a terrorist attack alone (so called lone wolves). These culprits were mostly members of some European country; some of them were already raised in Europe. A permanent threat within the European Union was also posed by individuals who returned to Europe from the conflict areas with experience in fights against coalition and local security forces. Growth in diaspora of people from the North Caucasus region logically reflected in the efforts to financially support the religious or nationalist terrorist groups in North Caucasus.

Some European countries, mainly Spain, France, Great Britain and Turkey faced attacks of terrorist groups pursuing separatist and ethnic-nationalist aims. In 2010, these groups carried out about 200 attacks – thwarted or failed. Fight against these organizations as well as fight against political, environmental or other terrorism still belonged to the national responsibility.

Besides identification and monitoring of development of terrorist threats, Military Intelligence also focused on possible occurrence of indications of build-up of logistic and financial support of the terrorist groups. In 2009, Military Intelligence concluded, on the basis of its information that activities of terrorist groups, their franchises and cells are and evidently will be funded from resources of individuals, grants from diaspora members, cover non-governmental organizations, but more and more often also from illegal activities.

Military Intelligence monitored also development in the sphere of abuse of the cyber space, mainly use of the Internet as the main tool of communication, ideological manipulation, training and recruitment of terrorists. In all its counter-terrorism activities, Military Intelligence cooperated with other intelligence services of the Czech Republic.

Military Intelligence was continuously sending to the authorized addressees analyses worked out on the basis of information gained within solving of cases connected with real threats of

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terrorist attacks against interests and targets in the Czech Republic. Military Intelligence passed the given information also to the national intelligence community during regular meetings of the Joint Intelligence Group and relevant partners within NATO, the European Union, and within other forms of the international cooperation. In 2010, Military Intelligence gained from its own sources information on movement and presence of significant terrorists, which were assessed by analysts as relevant. The information was handed over to partner intelligence services and could finally contribute also to catching of the most wanted terrorist in the world. According to pieces of knowledge of Military Intelligence, in all probability, the terrorism originating in fundamental Islam will remain a significant security threat posed to the Czech Republic and its allies in the future.

Extremism

As in previous years, also in 2010, Military Intelligence focused on revealing of links of members of the Army of the Czech Republic to the extremist environment in the Czech Republic. The main task in this sphere was to gain sufficient amount of relevant information on the basis of which the appropriate bodies of the Army of the Czech Republic could take effective measures to eliminate activity of extremists in military structures.

There continued the trend of decreasing number of career soldiers identified as sympathizers with extremist groups and movements.

Military Intelligence in cooperation with other security bodies of the Czech Republic continuously verified activities of identified adherents of extremism and informed the top leadership of the Ministry of Defence and other public and police bodies on the disclosed facts. However, Military Intelligence assesses that the amendment to the Act No. 221/1999 Coll., in relation to fighting extremism did not met the expectations in facilitation of termination of the service of career soldiers.

In 2010, recruitment of new people interested in service in the Army of the Czech Republic was stopped as well as their admission to career soldier positions. Extremists have a temporarily closed possibility to penetrate the structures of the Army of the Czech Republic. At the moment of reopen recruitment of new soldiers, Military Intelligence will pay its increased attention to this sphere again. Information on the Issue of Terrorism and Extremism


President of the Czech Republic 1

Prime Minister 21

Minister of Defence 29

Other bodies of the Ministry of Defence and the Army of the Czech Republic

35

The Office of the Government of the Czech Republic

13

Minister of Interior and the Police of the Czech Republic

7

Security Information Service 11

Office for Foreign Relations and Information 19

20

Other bodies off the Department of Defence (within the Czech Republic)

5

Other bodies off the Department of Defence (within international cooperation)

31

TOTAL 172

4.3 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Conventional Weapons and Dual Use Materiel

Besides illegal trade in military materiel, Military Intelligence paid its attention to proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (weapons of mass destruction – WMD) and means of their delivery perceiving this to be one of the most important security threats. Proliferation of technologies, materiel and know-how needed for development and manufacture of these weapons is still in progress, despite the effort of the international community to eliminate it. Undesired transfer to the countries posing a security threat is implemented through illegal business activities and form of cooperation with the countries, which are not bound by the international control regimes and agreements, or which violate them. Therefore, experts of Military Intelligence took intensive part in activities of bodies of the international control regimes and in elaboration of documents of their expert groups.

A significant problem worsening the proliferation control lies in liberalization of trade in military materiel and commodities belonging to the so called dual use materiel. The rapid increase in the number of business subjects or trade mediators aggravates their monitoring and finding of end users, or control over further handling of the sold materiel.

The attention of Military Intelligence was paid to the current state of existing WMD programmes of countries as the Korean People’s Democratic Republic (KPDR), Iran, Syria, China, and Pakistan, with the emphasis put on their military nuclear programmes and programmes of missile launcher development. The effort was also focused on cooperation among these countries, where a significant role was played by sharing of technologies and “know-how” between Iran and the KPDR, and on activity of China within development of missile programmes of these countries, particularly development of ballistic missiles of medium up to long range2. Within the same intentions, there was carried out information gathering related to implementation of the Treaty on Ban on Chemical Weapons by the countries of the Treaty. There were monitored activities of the Russian Federation and China in sale of militarily important materiel to the cri sis regions.

Military Intelligence monitored development of military expenditures in the countries of the Middle East, North Africa, South-Eastern Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The attention was paid particularly to financially important acquisition and modernization projects of the Armed Forces and purchase of sophisticated weapon systems. For this reason, there were checked particularly export activities of companies of the military-industrial complexes of China and the Russian Federation, which export military equipment also to risky countries of the Middle

2 Ballistic missiles of short range - maximum 1,000 km medium range - 1,000 km to 3,000 km long range - 3,000 km to 5,500 km intercontinental - more than 5,500 km

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East and Africa. Intentionally, there was gained also information on transfers of weapons to OMF in Afghanistan or on handover of more important weapon systems to the non-state actors in the Middle East.

One of the important tasks of Military Intelligence is its share in control activities connected with trade in military materiel pursuant to the laws of the Czech Republic (particularly the Act No. 38/1994 Coll. On Foreign Trade in Military Materiel) and to the adopted international obligations. For this reason, in licence procedures, Military Intelligence gave its opinion on requirements of individual companies as for the extent of their commodities as well as for their territorial spheres of activity regarding the topical security situation in the destination countries and valid international restrictions.

In 2010, Military Intelligence gave its opinion on requirements of individual business subjects for issuing of licences, permits or broadenings of existing licences for export/import of military materiel, explosives, and for handling of highly hazardous materiel:

- pursuant to the Act No. 38/1994 Coll.:

• 106 expertises to issuing of licence for export of military materiel; out of these, 2 with reservations connected with embargo or military-political situation in the given country;

• 62 expertises to issuing of permit for trade in military materiel; out of these, 36 with reservations connected with embargo or military political situation in the given region;

• 19 expertises to broadening of the permit; without restrictions;

- pursuant to the Act No. 61/1988 Coll. On Mining Activity, Explosives, and the National Mining Office, 25 permits for repeated export of explosives; without restrictions;

- pursuant to the Act No. 19/1997 Coll. On Some Measures Connected with the Ban on Chemical Weapons, 1 expertise to the request for licence for handling of highly hazardous materiel; without restrictions.

Information on continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, technologies and materiel of potential strategic effect represents a significant part of the intelligence effort of Military Intelligence. In several cases, partner intelligence services highly appreciated information on clarification and monitoring of this phenomenon provided by Military Intelligence.

4.4 Activities of Foreign Intelligence Services in the Field of Defence in the Territory of the Czech Republic

The counterintelligence activity in the field of defence belongs to the basic tasks of Military Intelligence flowing from the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. In cooperation with other intelligence services, this activity focused on revealing of activities of foreign intelligence services and on taking measures to eliminate these.

In 2010, Military Intelligence paid its attention particularly to operation of intelligence services of the Russian Federation in the field of defence, which belonged to the most active foreign intelligence services operating in the territory of the Czech Republic.

Regarding the Defence Department, activities of the Russian, both military and civil, intelligence services aimed at revealing of security, economic, and foreign political interests of the Czech Republic were often overlapping. The traditional covers of the Russian intelligence officers still included diplomatic positions at embassies and consulates. However, the recently revealed cases of espionage abroad show the rising importance of illegal cover (with the help of people

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operating under another identity), which enjoys a great potential in the Schengen Zone and, at the same time, represents a threat posed to the countries in question.

Military Intelligence also paid a great attention to activities of the Chinese intelligence services, predominantly Chinese Military Intelligence. The subjects of its interest included, in particular, advanced technologies, the mastering of which helps quickly develop Chinese economy, including the armaments industry.

Within its legal authority, Military Intelligence also paid its attention to activities of intelligence services of other countries, which can pose a threat to security of the Czech Republic, NATO, or the European Union.

Counterintelligence protection of security interests of the Czech Republic belongs to the priorities of Military Intelligence. This task is especially important in the context of integration processes of the European Union, when almost uncontrolled movement of people is possible throughout the territory of the European Union, which creates space for free movement of intelligence officers. Information on Activities of Foreign Intelligence Services in the Field of Defence in the Territory of the Czech Republic


Prime Minister 1


Other bodies of the Defence Department 6

Minister of Foreign Affairs 4


Other bodies off the Defence Department 24

TOTAL 90

4.5 Intentions and Activities Directed against Security of the Czech Republic

Regardless of the fact that this issue was not one of the priorities of the Government of the Czech Republic concerning intelligence activities of Military Intelligence in 2010, Military Intelligence dealt with and provided information on this field pursuant to the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. Military Intelligence provided permanent cooperation with the bodies primarily responsible for this field within the Ministry of Defence (i.e. Military Police, Inspection of the Minister of Defence), handover of information on intentions and activities, which could cause damage to the Ministry of Defence, particularly for possible non-economical spending of financial means or conditions violating the transparency of competition environment of orders for acquisition of goods or services.

Within its legal authority, Military Intelligence verified information connected with non-economical management of supply system, purchase of technologies and services, providing of materiel and maintenance of equipment used particularly in missions abroad, and potential modernization of some military branches or individual armament and equipment.

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Information on Intentions and Activities Directed against Defence of the Czech Republic



Other bodies of the Defence Department 7


Other bodies off the Defence Department 1

TOTAL 18

4.6 Intentions and Activities Posing a Threat to Classified Information in the Field of Defence of the Czech Republic

Within the tasks met pursuant to the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. and the Act No. 412/2005 Coll., Military Intelligence paid its attention particularly to threats posed to information systems used within the Ministry of Defence and to information passed by NATO, the European Union, and the partner countries, which the Czech Republic obliged to protect.

In the field of administrative security, as in the field of security of information systems, there were not found out any relevant pieces of knowledge indicating security risks. Findings on sporadic imperfections in personal security were passed to authorized addresses to take their own measures.

Information on Intentions and Activities Posing a Threat to Classified Information in the Field of Defence of the Czech Republic


Bodies of the Defence Department 2

Bodies off the Defence Department 1

TOTAL 3

5 COOPERATION WITHIN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

To meet the set tasks, Military Intelligence is authorized to cooperate with other intelligence services of the Czech Republic. This cooperation is approved, pursuant to § 9 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., by the Government of the Czech Republic. Cooperation with other authorities of the public administration is implemented on the basis of agreements concluded between the individual subjects.

In 2010, Military Intelligence continued in intensive cooperation with the Security Information Service, the Office for Foreign Relations and Information, the General Customs Directorate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Security Authority, the Interior Ministry, and the Police of the Czech Republic. Within the Police of the Czech Republic, this regarded, in particular, the Office for the Detection of Organised Crime, where Military Intelligence was engaged in activities of the National Contact Point for Terrorism.

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Assigned members of Military Intelligence took active part in work of the Joint Working Group, which is a platform for coordination of security measures of the intelligence services of the Czech Republic, the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police of the Czech Republic, and other subjects. The main task of the Group was to exchange and analyze all pieces of knowledge connected with potential terrorist threat posed to the Czech Republic.

On the basis of requirements of the National Security Authority, Military Intelligence implemented database and activity investigations within the processes connected with issuing of certificates of individuals pursuant to the Act No. 412/2005 Coll.

Activity investigation

Individuals Legal entities

Confidential Secret Top secret

9 31 165 0

Database investigation

Operations

Individuals Legal entities

25,064 1,386

Pursuant to § 140, Article 3 of the Act No. 412/2005 Coll., which sets the intelligence services the obligation to immediately report circumstances indicating that a holder of a certificate of individuals or a holder of certificate of entrepreneurs do not meet the requirements for their issuing any more, Military Intelligence submitted 18 announcements to the National Security Authority.

Cooperation of Military Intelligence with Intellige nce Services and Other Public Administration Authorities of the Czech Republic (except for requirements of the National Security Authority)



Office for Foreign Relations and Information 90

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 95

Police of The Czech Republic 2

General Customs Directorate, Office for the Detection of Organised Crime

4

TOTAL 264

6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The cooperation with foreign intelligence services and the bodies of NATO and the European Union contributes to increase in capabilities of Military Intelligence to meet the tasks set by laws and the Government’s priorities regarding the intelligence activities.

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The cooperation of Military Intelligence with foreign intelligence services is organized in accord with §10 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. only if approved by the Government of the Czech Republic.

The cooperation of Military Intelligence with NATO and the European Union flows from meeting of obligations of the membership of the Czech Republic in these international organizations.

6.1 Multilateral Cooperation

In 2010, Military Intelligence kept meeting its obligations towards the main intelligence bodies of NATO and the European Union. Besides sending information reports, Military Intelligence took active part in analysis and intelligence conferences of NATO and the European Union. These were, for instance, conferences of analysts on assessment of crisis regions, issues regarding intelligence support provided to the ongoing operations led by NATO, issues of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, terrorism, or abuse of new technologies. Military Intelligence also took part in conferences on the level of directors of military intelligence services of the NATO countries and conferences on the level of deputy directors aimed at development and more efficient use of intelligence capabilities and structures within NATO and their reform. Within the European Union, Military Intelligence took part in the conference on the level of directors of military intelligence services of the EU member countries aimed at improvement of intelligence support provided to the newly established European Service for Outer Actions.

Members of Military Intelligence took part in development of NATO joint intelligence documents. They contributed to intelligence production of NATO with their pieces of knowledge on situation in the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, Southern and South-Eastern Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Valuable conclusions of Military Intelligence reflected in the main documents of NATO, which helped support the decision making processes of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Military Committee as well as the NATO International Military Staff.

In the previous year, there was developed cooperation with the European Union Military Staff (European UnionMS). It was based on replies to intelligence requirements regarding the situation in crisis and security-difficult regions of the world.

In the Czech Republic, Military Intelligence is also authorized to control, administer and develop the military communication and information system of NATO, which is the basic system enabling international cooperation and sharing of intelligence. Military Intelligence also granted the two civil intelligence services of the Czech Republic access to this system. In the Czech Republic, Military Intelligence is the guarantor responsible for the intelligence area of crisis management on NATO and EU levels. Important multilateral activities of Military Intelligence include annual meeting of directors of military intelligence services of the Visegrad Group countries. In 2010, the meeting was held in Poland. There was discussed topical situation in the areas of interest, which the member countries or their military intelligence services share, and further advance in meeting of joint goals.

6.2 Bilateral Cooperation

Bilateral cooperation of Military Intelligence with foreign intelligence services is represented by participation of Military Intelligence in intelligence activities implemented with chosen intelligence services of foreign countries, with which the Czech Republic shares similar values and Military Intelligence joint intelligence interest. The point of gravity of bilateral

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cooperation lies in exchange of intelligence information, expert meetings of analysts on the areas of interest, and operative forms of cooperation.

In 2010, the cooperation of Military Intelligence with its foreign partner intelligence services reflected in a number of top officials’ meetings and expert negotiations.

In 2010, endeavouring to broaden its skills and capabilities, Military Intelligence initiated a negotiation on establishment of new cooperation with several other foreign intelligence services.

Cooperation with the Foreign Intelligence Services and Bodies of NATO and the European Union


NATO 174

The European Union 186

Intelligence Services 291

6.3 Military Diplomacy

Military diplomacy is an integral part of Military Intelligence, which is significantly involved in development of bilateral and multilateral relations between the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic and the ministries of defence of the countries of interest and their military as well as intelligence structures.

It meets the set tasks via the Offices of Defence Attachés. Currently, Military Intelligence has Defence Attachés accredited in 28 countries with other 37 co-accredited countries.

In 2010, there was opened a new Office of Defence Attaché to Jordan seated in Amman and, at the same time, there were reassessed the existing co-accreditations of the Offices of the Defence Attachés to suit more the interests and required capabilities of Military Intelligence.

7 PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

7.1 Personal Security

In 2010, in the sphere of personal security, Military Intelligence, consistent with provisions of § 140 of the Act No. 412/2005 Coll. accepted 395 requests for and issued 399 certificates for individuals. In 5 cases, it decided not to issue the certificates and, in 1 case, it decided to invalidate the certificate.

In this field, a great attention was also paid to educational, methodical, and control activities.

7.2 Security of Communication and Information Systems

In the sphere of security of communication and information systems, Military Intelligence was meeting tasks connected with providing of security administration of certified information and communication systems designated for processing of classified information and its appropriate cryptographic protection. In cooperation with the National Security Authority, there was carried out re-certification of several key information systems and certification of a new information system.

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Within performance of security administration of the existing systems, the activity focused particularly on implementation of accreditation procedures, inspections, and evaluation of security aspects connected with satisfying of requirements of the users. There were organized schoolings of security administrators, service administrators, and new members of Military Intelligence.

In 2010, the most important tasks included broadening of tools aimed at automated security controls and real time evaluation of security records.

Military Intelligence concluded an agreement with the National Security Authority on zone gauging to be carried out by its own resources.

7.3 Physical Security

In the sphere of physical security, Military Intelligence controlled or directly implemented installations, service, and repairs of security systems and checked, whether there are not used unauthorized devices designated for information gathering in the monitored areas.

To increase professional protection of facilities, there was signed an agreement with Military Police, the Cooperation Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Help in Police Protection of Chosen Facilities of Military Intelligence.

Meeting the tasks, Military Intelligence cooperated with contract partners, particularly expert bodies of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Security Authority, the Police of the Czech Republic, and the Security Information Service.

7.4 Administrative Security

In spring 2010, in accord with the Act No. 499/2004 Coll. On Archive Service and Record Management and on Some Law Amendments, as subsequently amended, there was accredited the Security Archives of Military Intelligence.

In this context, there were elaborated new internal guidelines, which set activity of Military Intelligence in the sphere of record management, archive service, and administrative security.

Within the special military training, there were organized schoolings in the field of record management and administrative security for all members of Military Intelligence and special schoolings for members prepared to be assigned to workplaces abroad or deployed in missions abroad.

7.5 Basic Tasks Met in the Area of Release of Operative Documents of Former Military Counterintelligence (VKR) and Former Intelligence Service of the General Staff (ZS GŠ) of the Czechoslovak People’s Army

Within implementation of the Agreement between the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic on Use of Documents Produced before the Break-Up of the Czechoslovak Federative Republic (hereafter only Agreement), in 2010 there was held a working meeting of the joint committee and a working meeting between the committee of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic and the sub-committees of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic.

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Digitalization of documents produced to implement the Agreement:

Task Number of

people Number of

images

Handover of digitalized documents of VKR and ZS GŠ to the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic – 2010

727 61,155

Handover of digitalized documents of VKR and ZS GŠ to the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic – total (2007 - 2010)

2,947 179,079

On the basis of requests of authorized subjects, within implementation of the Agreement, there was implemented following investigation:

In 2010, Military Intelligence implemented lustration requirements in the database of former VKR and ZS GŠ. Based on 1,090 requirements of authorized subjects, there were carried out investigations on 36,922 people. Based on requirements of the authorized subjects, there were released documents of VKR and ZS GŠ stored in the Security Archives of Military Intelligence on 114 lustrated individuals.

8 INSPECTIONS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

Inspection of Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic is set by § 12 and 13 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll. Based on these provisions, there follows that the Government and the Parliament of the Czech Republic have the right to inspect performance of intelligence services.

Pursuant to § 13 of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., provisions of this Act do not touch the authority of public bodies in the field of inspections regarding meeting tasks in the sphere of management of the state property and the state budget according to special legal directives. These are especially the Act No. 219/2000 Coll. On Property of the Czech Republic and Its Performance in Legal Relations, and the Act No. 166/1993 Coll. On the Supreme Control Office.

Pursuant to § 21 – 24 of the Act No. 289/2005 Coll., a special inspection body consisting of Members of the Parliament of the Czech Republic carries out inspections of Military Intelligence. The inspections are also carried out by NATO and public administration bodies.

8.1 External Inspection and Its Results

Neither the Government, nor the Parliament of the Czech Republic, nor NATO implemented any inspection in 2010.

As for the level of the public administration bodies, the General Health Insurance Company of the Czech Republic carried out inspection of health insurance payments and observing of other obligations of the health insurance payer, and the Prague Social Security Authority carried out

Subject Number of requests

Number of people

Positive VKR Positive ZS GŠ

Military Intelligence of the MoD of the Slovak Republic

16 196 33 1

Military Counterintelligence of the MoD of the Slovak Republic

24 28 28 0

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inspection of insurance premium and meeting of tasks within the field of sickness and pension insurance.

8.2 Internal Inspection and Its Results

In 2010, most planned internal inspections focused on economic management regarding financial means of the state budget and state property with the emphasis put on observing of principles of economy, usefulness, and efficiency flowing, in particular, from the Act No. 320/2001 Coll. On financial inspections, the Act No. 219/2000 Coll. On Property of the Czech Republic and its Performance in Legal Relations, and the internal guidelines Všeob-P-35, Internal Inspection and Handling of Petitions and Complaints within the Responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. Pursuant to § 76 of the Act No. 187/2006 Coll. On Health Insurance, there were carried out inspections of regime of temporarily sick insurance beneficiaries. A number of inspections was carried out in the sphere of protection of classified information in connection with the Act No. 412/2005 Coll. and appropriate internal guidelines.

The inspection of operational activity focused on keeping of appropriate records in accord with the provisions of the Act No. 153/1994 Coll., the Act No. 289/2005 Coll., the Act No. 412/2005 Coll., and relevant internal guidelines.

Based on the amendment of the Act No. 141/1961 Coll., a crucial change in the sphere of internal security was the establishment of an investigative, prosecuting and adjudicating police body of Military Intelligence. Its main task is to check, reveal, and record crimes of Military Intelligence members and find out the culprits in accord with the Criminal Procedure Code.

The found out imperfections were rectified and solved by the control body with the authorized official directly on the spot and there were taken measures to prevent their reoccurrence and preventive measures. Imperfections and problems of more serious nature, which could not have been rectified immediately, were solved on appropriate levels and monitored from the point of view of implementation of the taken measures.

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