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7 Days 15 March 1972 PAKISTAN W ill the Army take over again? Disarming the Mukti Bahini has been one of the major political problems in Bangladesh since independence. Since Sheik Mujib gave the call to lay down arms only some 30% have been turned in. Most of the irregulars have retained their weapons and split into multiple factions from formally pro-Peking groups to the powerful “Mujib Bahini”, a group of students personally dedicated to Mujib and “Mujibism”. To add to the confusion some 3,000 convicts were released, armed and career through the streets as “freedom fighters”. Although all give formal allegience to Mujib deeper ideological divisions could quickly dissolve this ephemeral unity. Statements from the Mujibist students indicate their function to “contain the left”. Already an element of anarchy is evident in the reported looting, factional skirmishes, summary execution of collaborators. Dick Nations T HE REMOVAL of Gul Hussein, the late Com- mander-in-Chief of West Pakistan’s armed forces, takes with it the “moderate” sector of the Pakistani brass and brings forward the hardliners led by Tikka Khan — the architect of military repression in East Pakistan. The full implications have yet to unfold. Nonetheless the re-emergence of the Army hawks represents a crucial junc- ture in Pakistan’s political course which can best be understood against the background of Bhutto’s deepening political crisis. Tikka’s appearance brings Pakistani politics toward the close of a perfect circle. Just two and a half months ago Bhutto ushered in an “era of socialism, democracy and reform” with the whole- sale sacking of the hardline generals and an apparent assertion of civilian control. Since then Bhutto has produced nothing but more martial law and a sham of reforms to avoid any real political base and brought the frustrated masses into open opposition and hence to the potentially revolutionary situation with which Pakistan is all too familiar. Thus Tikka takes command of his favourite post. Bhutto has been facing real problems since assuming office in late December. These are: The economy: although not seriously damaged by the war the Pakistani economy is in a shambles. The loss of East Bengal cut away both the major source of foreign exchange as well as the market for their manufactured goods. The wheat harvest threatens to be disappointing for a second consecutive year. Lacking foreign exchange and markets the economy is operating well under capactiy with the inevitable results of inflation and unemployment. Prisoners of war: The remains of the defeated military forces in Bengladesh — they number about 93,000 men, including police — have yet to be repatriated, at a price still to be deter- mined. The military traditionally recruit from many of the stronghold areas of Bhutto’s People’s Party. Hence strong pressure builds up to get back sons and brothers. Settlement: Coexistence with India and Bangladesh will have to be reached through negotiations. Rescheduling of debts, repatriation of prisoners and exchange of territory will all have to be settled within the concrete realisation of former East Pakistan as now sovereign and of India as the dominant power in the subcontinent. Succession: The rump of Pakistan faces another potentially secessionist movement this time on its Western Flank. The tribal Pathans and Baluchis of the North West Frontier Provinces have suffered from economic and political exploitation similar in many ways to that of the former East Pakistan. The result has been a long standing, if latent movement for an autonomous independent ' Paktunistan' , under the leadership of Wali Khan who next to Bhutto, is the most powerful politician in the country. The move- ment has very serious international implications. The homeland of ethnic Pathans lies across the Afghan Pakistani border and confident in its newly Russian-trained and re-equipped army the Afghan government is giving increas- ing support to the Paktunistan move- ment; the realization of which would give their land-locked country a port on the Arabian Sea. Bhutto got off to a good start with this catalogue of problems by releasing Sheik Mujib in early January. He thus preserved some international good will and made later negotiations possible. Thereafter he began to slip from the reality of his situation His first move was to continue martial law with an even heavier concentration of power than under the military. This he argued was necessary to impliment his program of socialist reforms, which is logical enough if Bhutto had in mind the genuine structural changes essential to clear away Pakistan’s feudal and class ridden society. Yet Bhutto’s role has been precisely to preserve that structure, as each of his successive reforms was made increasingly obvious. Typical was his ‘radical socialist’ pro- gram of “nationalizing” the economy. “Nationalization” amounted to no more than the appointment of state admini- strators to 20 industries, the majority of which were either owned by a public body, the West Pakistan Development Corporation, or else in the incipient stages of development and in need of state subsidies anyway. On the other hand the major indus- trial strong-hold of the business class, (eg, cotton textiles) were not touched: Bhutto furthermore went out of his way to reassure foreign investors that his radicalism needn’t be a bother to them. His subsequent attack on the ‘22 families’ was equally vapid. Within a month threats of imprisonment, impounded passports and ‘seizures’ gave way to private capital. Thus his policy of coercing the politically weak bourgoisie clearly failed. It gained him no popularity with the public and it alienated one of the traditional bases of power in the country. On the political front Bhutto appears once again to have miscalculated his own strength and underestimated his support. With the secessionist potential of the Frontier areas always a threat, some sort of coalition with Wali Khan would have seemed prudent. Instead Bhutto again used the promise of future democracy to justify placing two of his own People’s Party men as governors in the Frontier areas. Now Wali Khan calls Bhutto a “fascist, a dictator, and a bully” , and has aligned with the Baludh: party the Jamiat Ulema e Islam in a united front against him. Internationally Bhutto has also failed to gain any success. His approaches to India and Bangladesh were too late with too little, and hence his. offer to come to Decca was simply ignored by Sheik Mujib. To date he has failed - to initiate the substantative negotiations necessary to bring home the prisoners and untangle the web of problems that ties Pakistan’s economy to that of Bangladesh. Continuation of aid on a permanent basis depends directly on these negotiations. Bhutto’s most recent ‘reform’ measure is typical again of the same dilemma. This time it is a flamboyant land reform program which despite lowering ceilings of land holdings by impressive proportions, has allowed many of the loopholes customary to this genre of ‘reform’ e.g., that the previous owner has the first claim to lease excess land seized by the state. If such measures promise no real change in the tenurial structure they reportedly have infuriated the Sindhi landlords, again the class who from the bedrock of Bhutto’s People’s Party and one of the major powers in Pakistan. Thus Bhutto and more martial law have failed to produce results, and it is not surprising that every base of political support is rapidly sliding from under him. The working class tradition- ally militant and politically sensitive were the first to move. Labour troubles swept Karachi and Lahore in mid- February as factory after factory was ‘gheraoted’ (a mass siege on manage- ment premises), and culminated in a two-day general strike which brought the economy to a standstill. All opposition parties of both left and right со operated to press for the end to Bhutto’s maritial law, and repatriation of soldiers as well as protest against the killing of Biharis in Bangladesh. None other than the police force in Hyderabad struck for higher pay, while those in Lallpur seized the town armoury, cut official telephone lines and beat up local People’s Party politicians. Splits in Bhutto’s party moved towards an open confrontation as party workers surrounded the central headquarters in Karachi protesting the concentration of power in their leader’s own hands. But the most threating opposition has come from the Frontier where Wali Khan has mobilized his armed Pathans. Wali has more than guns: with 30% of the Pakistani army being Pathans and the interest of Afghanistan and potentially the Russians in his move- ment repression in the West threatens even more sucidal consequences for Pakistan than it had in the East. Thus with the popular forces moving into the streets, the traditional powers, bureaucracy, landlords and bourgeoisie sliding away, and the Frontier provinces threaten in g armed and open revolt Bhutto finds himself in a position not unlike that of Ayub in late ’68. The parallel has not been lost, and Bhutto is scrambling hard to retrieve himself. His first step was to offer another reform; this time the promise that on August 15 “the hated curse of martial law will be lifted from this country forever”. This appears to have at least temporarily released the pressures from the Frontier areas, as Bhutto’s announcement followed a meeting between himself and Wali Khan. But of more significance is the re-appearance of Tikka Khan and Zafar Choudhury in command of the Army. Tikka, notorious as the “Bomber of Baluchistan” and the “Butcher of Bengal” for organizing the vicious repressions of these two areas, has his own ideas about how the country should be run. And although it is difficult to say whether Bhutto is still in control or whether Tikka’s appointment simply preludes an open army take-over in the near future, one thing is clear: having sent the Opposition into the street the real power in Pakistan has moved back to the army. And although an army crackdown would appear totally irrational, the Pakistani brass and particularly, Tikka Khan have shown how utterly irrational they can be 6
Transcript

7 Days 15 March 1972

PAKISTANW ill the Army take over again?

Disarming the Mukti Bahini has been one of the major political problems in Bangladesh since independence. Since Sheik Mujib gave the call to lay down arms only some 30% have been turned in. Most of the irregulars have retained their weapons and split into multiple factions from formally pro-Peking groups to the powerful “Mujib Bahini”, a group of students personally dedicated to Mujib and “Mujibism”. To add to the confusion some 3,000 convicts were released, armed and career through the streets as “freedom fighters”. Although all give formal allegience to Mujib deeper ideological divisions could quickly dissolve this ephemeral unity. Statements from the Mujibist students indicate their function to “contain the left”. Already an element of anarchy is evident in the reported looting, factional skirmishes, summary execution of collaborators.

Dick Nations

THE REMOVAL of GulHussein, the late Com- mander-in-Chief of West

Pakistan’s armed forces, takes with it the “moderate” sector of the Pakistani brass and brings forward the hardliners led by Tikka Khan — the architect of military repression in East Pakistan. The full implications have yet to unfold. Nonetheless the re-emergence o f the Army hawks represents a crucial junc­ture in Pakistan’s political course which can best be understood against the background of Bhutto’s deepening political crisis.

Tikka’s appearance brings Pakistani politics toward the close of a perfect circle. Just two and a half months ago Bhutto ushered in an “era of socialism, democracy and reform” with the whole­sale sacking of the hardline generals and an apparent assertion of civilian control. Since then Bhutto has produced nothing but more martial law and a sham of reforms to avoid any real political base and brought the frustrated masses into open opposition and hence to the potentially revolutionary situation with which Pakistan is all too familiar. Thus Tikka takes command of his favourite post.

Bhutto has been facing real problems since assuming office in late December. These are:

The economy: although not seriously damaged by the war the Pakistani economy is in a shambles. The loss of East Bengal cut away both the major source of foreign exchange as well as the market for their manufactured goods. The wheat harvest threatens to be disappointing for a second consecutive year. Lacking foreign exchange and markets the economy is operating well under capactiy with the inevitable results of inflation and unemployment.

Prisoners of war: The remains of the defeated military forces in Bengladesh — they number about 93,000 men, including police — have yet to be repatriated, at a price still to be deter­mined. The military traditionally recruit from many of the stronghold areas of Bhutto’s People’s Party. Hence strong pressure builds up to get back sons and brothers.

Settlement: Coexistence with India and Bangladesh will have to be reached through negotiations. Rescheduling of debts, repatriation of prisoners and exchange of territory will all have to be settled within the concrete realisation of former East Pakistan as now sovereign and of India as the dominant power in the subcontinent.

Succession: The rump of Pakistan faces another potentially secessionist movement this time on its Western Flank. The tribal Pathans and Baluchis of the North West Frontier Provinces have suffered from economic and political exploitation similar in many ways to that of the former East Pakistan. The result has been a long standing, if latent movement for an autonomous independent 'Paktunistan' , under the leadership of Wali Khan who next to Bhutto, is the most powerful politician in the country. The move­ment has very serious international implications. The homeland of ethnic

Pathans lies across the Afghan Pakistani border and confident in its newly Russian-trained and re-equipped army the Afghan government is giving increas­ing support to the Paktunistan move­ment; the realization of which would give their land-locked country a port on the Arabian Sea.

Bhutto got off to a good start with this catalogue of problems by releasing Sheik Mujib in early January. He thus preserved some international good will and made later negotiations possible. Thereafter he began to slip from the reality of his situation His first move was to continue martial law with an even heavier concentration of power than under the military. This he argued was necessary to impliment his program of socialist reforms, which is logical enough if Bhutto had in mind the genuine structural changes essential to clear away Pakistan’s feudal and class ridden society. Yet Bhutto’s role has been precisely to preserve that structure, as each of his successive reforms was made increasingly obvious. Typical was his ‘radical socialist’ pro­gram of “nationalizing” the economy. “Nationalization” amounted to no more than the appointment of state admini­strators to 20 industries, the majority of which were either owned by a public body, the West Pakistan Development Corporation, or else in the incipient stages of development and in need of state subsidies anyway.

On the other hand the major indus­trial strong-hold of the business class, (eg, cotton textiles) were not touched: Bhutto furthermore went out of his way to reassure foreign investors that his radicalism needn’t be a bother to them. His subsequent attack on the ‘22 families’ was equally vapid. Within a month threats of imprisonment, impounded passports and ‘seizures’ gave way to private capital. Thus his policy of coercing the politically weak bourgoisie clearly failed. It gained him no popularity with the public and it alienated one of the traditional bases of power in the country.

On the political front Bhutto appears once again to have miscalculated his own strength and underestimated his support. With the secessionist potential of the Frontier areas always a threat, some sort of coalition with Wali Khan would have seemed prudent. Instead Bhutto again used the promise of future democracy to justify placing two of his own People’s Party men as governors in the Frontier areas. Now Wali Khan calls Bhutto a “ fascist, a dictator, and a bully” , and has aligned with the Baludh: party the Jamiat Ulema e Islam in a united front against him.

Internationally Bhutto has also failed to gain any success. His approaches to India and Bangladesh were too late with too little, and hence his. offer to come to Decca was simply ignored by Sheik Mujib. To date he has failed - to initiate the substantative negotiations necessary to bring home the prisoners and untangle the web of problems that ties Pakistan’s economy to that of Bangladesh. Continuation of aid on a permanent basis depends directly on these negotiations.

Bhutto’s most recent ‘reform’ measure is typical again of the same dilemma. This time it is a flamboyant land reform program which despite

lowering ceilings of land holdings by impressive proportions, has allowed many of the loopholes customary to this genre of ‘reform’ e.g., that the previous owner has the first claim to lease excess land seized by the state. If such measures promise no real change in the tenurial structure they reportedly have infuriated the Sindhi landlords, again the class who from the bedrock of Bhutto’s People’s Party and one of the major powers in Pakistan.

Thus Bhutto and more martial law have failed to produce results, and it is not surprising that every base of political support is rapidly sliding from under him. The working class tradition­ally militant and politically sensitive were the first to move. Labour troubles

swept Karachi and Lahore in mid- February as factory after factory was ‘gheraoted’ (a mass siege on manage­ment premises), and culminated in a two-day general strike which brought the economy to a standstill. All opposition parties of both left and right со operated to press for the end to Bhutto’s maritial law, and repatriation of soldiers as well as protest against the killing of Biharis in Bangladesh. None

other than the police force in Hyderabad struck for higher pay, while those in Lallpur seized the town armoury, cut official telephone lines and beat up local People’s Party politicians. Splits in Bhutto’s party moved towards an open confrontation as party workers surrounded the central headquarters in Karachi protesting the concentration of power in their leader’s own hands.

But the most threating opposition has come from the Frontier where Wali Khan has mobilized his armed Pathans. Wali has more than guns: with 30% of the Pakistani army being Pathans and the interest of Afghanistan and potentially the Russians in his move­ment repression in the West threatens even more sucidal consequences for Pakistan than it had in the East.

Thus with the popular forces moving into the streets, the traditional powers, bureaucracy, landlords and bourgeoisie sliding away, and the Frontier provinces threatening armed and open revolt Bhutto finds himself in a position not unlike that of Ayub in late ’68. The parallel has not been lost, and Bhutto is scrambling hard to retrieve himself. His

first step was to offer another reform; this time the promise that on August 15 “the hated curse of martial law will be lifted from this country forever” . This appears to have at least temporarily released the pressures from the Frontier areas, as Bhutto’s announcement followed a meeting between himself and Wali Khan.

But of more significance is the re-appearance of Tikka Khan and Zafar Choudhury in command of the Army. Tikka, notorious as the “Bomber of Baluchistan” and the “Butcher of Bengal” for organizing the vicious repressions of these two areas, has his own ideas about how the country should be run. And although it is difficult to say whether Bhutto is still in control or whether Tikka’s appointment simply preludes an open army take-over in the near future, one thing is clear: having sent the Opposition into the street the real power in Pakistan has moved back to the army. And although an army crackdown would appear totally irrational, the Pakistani brass and particularly, Tikka Khan have shown how utterly irrational they can be

6

7 Days 15 March 1972

THE GREAT RACE

Four men with but a single fear - Wallace. Meet first Muskie: even his craggy “integrity has finally to conceal bovine stupidity. Here, he and his aide gaze nervously down a political path that is not rosy. He has been called “the tree stump”: gnarled and well hewn, but with something missing on top.

Who has not a soft spot for Hubert Humphrey? Unfortunately for Hubert the answer is an ever decreasing proportion of the electorate. Here he is in Tampa, Florida, wheedling as they deal. Humphrey is noted for the amazing ease with which he cries. Aides carry kleenex by the sackful. Currently his cheeks are wet with the news that he has severe financial problems.

us: FOUR RATS IN

This is McGovern, diminutive darling of the liberals, and possible kite-flier for Teddy Kennedy, the amnesiac boozer. McGovern did well in New Hampshire, delighting all with his put-down of Muskie. Unfortunately for the fans his liberalism is looking a little pock-marked after his equivocation, in the face of Wallace pressure, on the bussing issue.

Finally the man who loves to take his jacket off an meet the people. As the man said he must wear his brains in his armpit. In fact, Mayor Lindsay of New York, ever popular overlord of the dirtiest town in the east, hopes to inherit the boyish, idealistic mantle of Bobby Kennedy. Note the calm, pensive pose in this picture; the relaxed, yet firm grasp on the beer can. Nobody down in Florida knows who he is

7

7 Days 15 March 1972

THE BUILDING photo­graphed here is not a night­mare out of an expressionist

film, but a nightmare out of real life, built for 60,000 people. The Markische Viertel stands in West Berlin. Once a little village nestled here in the sand dunes, only six feet above water level: in the nineteenth-century retired Berlin­ers or large proletarian families had their little acres, and grew flowers and vegetables. Now the same area carries the weight of one of the largest single housing schemes in Europe.

Like any such architectural mon­strosity, tales abound about the origin of the Markische Viertel estate. There is a story that some of the blocks were designed by a French architect, a pupil of Le Corbusier, who, being used to the bright Mediterranean sun, put in win­dows which were half the size needed for the grey light of northern Europe.

There are some amazing stories about

the teenagers on the estate; about the Hells Angels motor cycle gang that wrecked the only youth club, belonging to the Evangelical Church, when they were refused admission because they were drunk. The police were called; when they arrived, a gang member held them at gunpoint, face to the wall, while the other kids escaped.

Prices in the supermarkets, some called “Co-Op” but owned by private enterprise, are about 10% higher than in the centre of West Berlin, where they are in turn higher than the rest of West Germany.

Rents for the small rooms are so high that round the edge of the Markische Viertel, the shanty towns and slums have been preserved — so that those who fall behind with their rents can be evicted back to them.

Some facts: A non-profit making body run by the S.P.D. (West Ger­many’s governing party) put the build­ings up. There were three main architects (Muller, Heinrich and Dutt- mann), aided by 40 younger architects. It was built by the. Gesellschaft fur

Sozialien Wohnungspau — the Society for Public Housing.

The scheme has taken 10 years to build and will be finished next year. There will finally be 17,000 flats for 60,000 people, It cost 1,500 million marks., about £150 million.

There was a state subsidy only for the area of the flats: not even for the staircases outside the flats. Because of such specifications of the subsidy, all the public areas were cut down and the actual areas of the flats, though not the rooms, increased.

Every family has a certain area — eighty square yards, to be exact. (The Parker-Morris standard now used for all subsidised housing in this country allows 77.5 square yards.) But because the flat areas have been enlarged, every family has automatically to pay extra. The price of the flats varies between £15 and £50 per month. Average earn­ings in the Märkische Viertel are £90 per month.

Last year 35,000 people had taken up residence, 10,000 of them were under 15 years old; this is double the normal

percentage in West Berlin. When the. people were pushed into this concrete desert they became ill. The children excreted on the floors of the apartments and in the telephone kiosks, because there is no lavatory on ground level and no child likes to climb 20 storeys to have a piss. There is one public lavatory for the whole estate. The whole place stinks of urine and shit.

There are enormous problems of rent arrears — a half million mark debt last year.

There are problems too if the inhabi­tants fall ill. There are 12 doctors for the whole estate, and just two children’s doctors for 10,000 children. Last year there were 6 state creches., and some privately organized ones. There are more than 1,000 children waiting to get into them. The schools work on a shift system.

All the open space is concrete. The imagination of the architects only stretched to selecting three kinds of vegetation: plane trees planted in straight lines, and two kinds of nonde­script shrubs.

The architects also forgot to include a hospital or a cemetary.

The builders had no right to include commercial structures: all these were farmed up out to a Hamburg contractor called Werner Limberg; He got monopoly rights to develop the one shopping centre which has 42 shops, one restaurant and one small hotel with 8 rooms.

Perhaps Kubrick should set his next film there. The age imbalance was so acute that residents say children

stopped to stare when they saw some one over 50

These are the beehives that writers have dreamed of in their desolate visions of the future; where the children have nowhere to play, no schools worth speaking of; where the adults have only the space to sleep before working Where the sick have no place to be cured, and the dead no place to be buried.

Kurt Schenk

8

7 Days 15 March 1972

Protestant voices, Protestant fearsFred Halliday

ALTHOUGH I’m a Unionist, in favour of Union, I'm certainly not a Tory. I like

to think of myself as socialist-minded”. Fred Proctor, a worker in Harland and Wolff’s shipyard, is Democratic Unionist Party local councillor for the Woodvale constituency, a staunch Unionist working class area off the Shankill road.

For Proctor the “number one enemy at the moment is Harold Wilson” . “I support most of the things he does in economic and social policy” , he says, “but I can’t take him at all on Ireland” . Wilson, and indeed all British politicians, are suspect to the Shankill: they have been “taken in” by the propaganda of the SDLP and Catholic civil rights spokesmen, and they are liable “to sell the north out” .

The DUP, originally the Protestant Unionist Party, was started by Paisley to counter O’Neill’s reform policies. Since that time, Proctor says, the party has changed its name, substituting “Democratic” for “Protestant” and emphasising social issues. “To be honest it hasn’t gone down too well in some quarters” , he said, pointing to the DUP’s poor showing at a recent election in Dungannon.

One member of the pro-Craig Loyalist Workers Association to whom I spoke said that Paisley had lost a lot of support for some of his recent actions. “He jumps around too much” , I was told. His criticism of internment and his allegedly equivocal remarks about eventual unity with the south did him no good on the Shankill or anywhere

else. Moreover, he only made his original hit because of O’Neill. “Anyone could have beaten O’Neill at that time” .

Paisley’s original appeal lay in his attack on O’Neill’s reforms. But when O’Neill went, and especially when Chichester-Clark was replaced by Faulkner disgust with the Unionist Party among Protestants decreased. Faulkner spoke tough, and appeared to be able to “stand up” to Westminster. Although at times small groups broke away over the past fifty years, all Protestants have tended to rally to the. party in moments of crisis. Its leaders have known how to mobilise support in the face of a real or imagined enemy.

In the Shankill area moods change rapidly and unexpectedly, in response to what leading Unionists say and do. At the moment Craig’s support is growing, but he, like local Westminster MP Boal and Faulkner himself, is clearly middle-class. They live in suburban or rural areas, not in the central working class Protestant areas themselves.

Proctor and members of the Northern Ireland Labour Party whom I spoke to emphasised that local people felt their case had been misrepresented to the world. The Frost programme had projected an unfair image, by putting on the most crude and virulent Protestants and by contrasting them with reasonable and calm Catholics. But this view was closely tied into the belief, constantly affirmed, that there was not much basically wrong with the north. “There is no Catholic that doesn’t have exactly the same opportunity as a Protestant has in this country” , said Proctor. “It’s just unfortunate that there’s even polarisation within the different industries and works here. For instance, the Low Docks are 100% Catholic and the cross-channel boats are all 100% Protestant. But that’s the way

it is here. You just have to accept it” .Protestant workers on the Shankill

had, it is claimed, just as bad conditions as workers on the Falls. The property discriminations in local elections were aimed at working class people, of both kinds Proctor emphasised that the origi­nal civil rights demand of “one man one vote” was fine — but then Catholic businessmen and gunmen took over, and pushed the movement too far.

Proctor was clear that “the official IRA had an outside chance of achieving a united Ireland — but the Provisionals abolished it” . Now no-one took seri­ously the socialist claims of the IRAs. “They’re not socialists, they’re gangsters” , one man said. Proctor gave an instance where he claimed that republicans had raided the Co-op the day before and taken the purses of the shoppers as they left. There seemed little chance of any change in this view. A former NILP Stormont MP Billy Reid explained that 90% of the unionised workers in the north were members of British trade unions, and looked to England. Though the IRB does not apply to northern Ireland there was a big demonstration last year in support of the TUC’s protest actions. But the recent decision by DATA to donate £100 to the anti-internment struggle had provoked considerable hostility.

More generally, the Protestant people felt they were part of Britain not southern Ireland. They were like the Scots and the Welsh: there is certainly considerable hostility to the “English” but the sense of solidarity with Britain as an entity remains. They certainly reject the idea that they form one nation with the southerners.

The talk about Protestant backlashes and arms is hard to pin down. But Proctor was clear: “I wouldn’t under­estimate the so-called Protestant back­

lash” , he said. “It’s a reality, believe me” . And Billy Reid talked about forced unity: “The Protestant people here are tough and determined. At the end of the day, whatever might be the loss in cost, in blood and in property, they would fight on until they had cleared everyone out” . “It’s like Israel” , Proctor added. “We’re the Jews here” .

It was emphasised again and again that the south was an alien country: it was not a question of specific legal or constitutional provisions — changing them would make no diference.

At the moment the running is being made by Craig’s Vanguard, allegedly a pressure group within Unimnism. Flanked by Martin Smyth of the Orange Lodges and Billy Hull of the Loyalist Workers, Craig is calling for a mass rally in Belfast on March 18. DUP supporters regard Hull as unreliable and “another Major Bunting” — he’s only been an Orangeman for just over a year, and before that was a member of the NILP. More charges of “jumping around” were frequent. But Craig’s standing is high. “He’s the man” (rhymes with brawn) an LWA militant told me.

The situation on the Protestant side is grim indeed, the last three years have further divided the working class, and there is no sign that statements from southern politicans or republican left wingers about secularism or guarantees for the Protestants have had any effect whatsoever. Just as it is illusory to think that such statements will, in the short run at least, have any effect, so it is also illusory to imagine that the Protestant population will submit peacefully to any Irish unification that they oppose.

Their spokesmen, culture, and organi­sations are ridden with supremacist ideology and with the blunt refusal to acknowledge or rectify the oppression of the Catholic minority. They now feel

their backs are to the wall, and the field is open for rightist demagogues and semi-fascist ideas. There is no organi­sation of any standing among the Protestant community which simul­taneously asserts their rights to choose their future, and which combats the supremacist ideology.

TURN LEFT AT DOVER

. . . and AGENOR will give you the alternative left wing views on Europe:

Monthly review of the left, owned by a co-operative; seeks to promote communication between groups on the left; present informed criticism of transnational, political and economic forces; contribute to new thinking about the left in Europe.

13 rue Hobbema, Brussels 1040. Belgium.

9

7 Days 15 March 1972

SINGAPORE |Harrassment in Lee’s police stateMa l c o l m c a l d w e l l ,

militant and lecturer at the School of Oriental and

African Studies, has sent us the following account of what happened to him on a recent transit stopover at Singapore air­port: the detention of oneScottish professor for a night is of no importance in itself, compared to the savage and mass attacks made by premier Lee on the Singapore People. But Caldwell’s point is not to bemoan his own discomforts, but to use his own specific experience to draw attent­ion to the general situation pre­vailing in Lee’s neo-colonial fief:

“My plane touched down about nine p.m. on February 20, on my way from London to Sydney. My ongoing flight was due to leave at ten p.m. As I was going through immigration, my name was checked on a list, and I was passed up the line to more senior officials. First I assumed this special treatment was because of my relatively long hair (Singapore having recently greatly intensified its drive to exclude or shear long-hair visitors). However, as I was being hustled through all formalities, the immigration official told me that I was a ‘security risk’, that I had been banned from the island ‘indefinitely’.

As it happened, my plane was de­layed overnight with engine trouble. The other passengers were accordingly put up at the Hyatt Hotel in Singapore. But I was not allowed to leave the airport. Instead, I was taken to the Traffic Control Staff Office, and there given a seat for the night. As I had already had one night in the plane from London, and was to have another in the plane to Sydney, I would have appre­ciated a good sleep that night. The office was hardly ideal for this purpose, as the glaring lights and noisy activity went on all through the night.

The following morning, I was detained in the office until midday, when I was permitted to return to the Transit Lounge (I had been allowed up for breakfast, for which I was very grateful). Eventually, late in the after­noon, my passport was returned to me, and I was allowed to embark for Sydney.

No explanation was given as to the reasons for this treatment. I can only presume that my articles and activities while I was resident in Singapore in 1970—71 were retrospectively deemed prejudicial to the interests of the regime. Singapore’s rulers are notor­iously touchy to any criticism, however

Flashback to the past: British colonialists in Singapore bung their cars in the water rather than let them fall into the hands of the Japanese — in May, 1942. This little unpleasantness now over, the British can’t wait to invest in Singapore. Their interests are well guarded by the monstrous Lee, lord over crowded gaols and paid newspapers.oblique, of their actions. I am by no means the first writer to have had the dust of Singapore forcibly shaken off his feet.

The irony of the situation lay in the juxtaposition of events. As I was being detained, Singapore’s leaders were being entertained to a lavish banquet aboard the Royal yacht Britannia, as a sumptuous finale to the Queen’s visit. During the visit, Lee Kuan Yew ven­tured on to the streets of the city for the first time in years. Security pre­cautions were, of course, of blanket proportions. He usually hazards abroad from his residence only in what amounts to an armoured convoy.

Further irony: the present Home Affairs Minister in Singapore is Dr. Wong Lin Ken, who presented his Ph.D. thesis at the School of Oriental and African Studies, the college at which I teach. Indeed, I helped supervise the thesis, and knew Lin Ken well. Once, on a visit to Singapore, I actually stayed with him and his family.

So we have yet another instalment in the long saga of Singapore’s march

towards an outright police state. It is very important to give prominence to such episodes, trivial though they may seem when seen in isolation. It is important because Lee Kuan Yew’s public relations industry continues, despite everything, to chalk up successes round the world. He is, incredibly, still seen in some Western circles as a dynamic, brilliant, successful social democrat — a model of what a third world leader ought to be. He has his sycophants to thank for that.

Many of the people in the West who are vaguely leftish and who respond to Lee’s rhetoric and image are just ignorant of the facts. Perhaps the abrupt expulsion of Amnesty’s emissary from Singapore last year helped open some eyes: such inquisitiveness cannot be tolerated by Lee. Again, few are aware of the massive popular discontent at rising prices, wages suppressed by ruth­less government decree, absence of any openings for constitutional expression of grievances, arbitrary political arrest, the ostentatious consumption of the

elite, and the steady Americanisation of the island.

On the other hand, Western business’s admiration for Lee is soundly based on

•an accurate appreciation of the facts. Everything that irks the people of Singapore brings joy to the heart of the foreign investor: low wages, the ban on strikes, suppression of leftist political activity, a flourishing local market for luxury and semi-luxury consumer goods, and excellent facilities in the way of snob hotels, night-clubs, and every kind of “cultural” provision demanded by the business man abroad and by the tourist.

It is interesting in view of the close, economic relations between Singapore and Indonesia — Singapore acting as entrepot for the vast archipelogical hinterland - that Indonesia, too, has declared me persona non grata. Premier Lee Kuan Yew and President Suharto, for all their differences, are both men of a stamp congenial to imperialist interests in South East Asia: the stamp of jack-boots.

ITALY Sensations in Valpreda trialTHE VALPREDA trial is off,

at least temporarily. The Rome court has accepted the

argument of a part o f the defence that the case does not fall within its territorial jurisdiction, and has sent it back to Milan where it should have been heard in the first place. There will be a delay of months before the hearings begin again.

In the two weeks of legal argument that preceded this decision, the defence have exposed a series of lies and omissions in the conduct of the case from the moment when Valpreda, a few hours after his arrest on December 15, 1969, was illegally hustled off to the

capital and delivered to the tender mercies of the Rome police and magistrates. But the suspension of the hearings must prove a pyrrhic victory if it means only that the trial will be held elsewhere and not that the handling of the whole case will be properly investigated. Valpreda’s lawyers wanted the trial to continue despite the irregularities, for it is by no means guaranteed even that, after 820 days in jail, Valpreda will be granted provisional liberty.

One certain beneficiary of the decision, however, will be the ruling Christian Democrat Party, which will be spared the embarrassment of sensational revelations in court regarding govern­ment policy (or non-policy) since 1968

during this sensitive pre-election period. It is at the moment engaged in trying to restore its wobbly prestige and to recover votes on the right with an official campaign against the neo- fascists.

Only three days before the Valpreda decision came the arrest of journalist Pino Rauti, founder of “Ordine Nuovo” , national executive member of the neo-fascist party (MSI) allegedly the link man identified as signor P in the Greek papers which contained plans for the attempts of 25th April 1969 for which the anarchists were at once indicted (acquitted two years later). He organised the trip to Greece in April

of infiltrating left wing groups, the policy which brought Mario Merlino in tow with Valpreda and the anarchists. He is now accused, with other fascists, of the bombs planted on a number of trains during the night of 8—9th August 1969, which the Milan police had originally tried to pin on the murdered anarchist Pinelli.

But while Rauti is arrested, the Valpreda case is transferred and in effect suspended. Before that decision, the presiding judge had already refused to consider certain evidence relating to the activities of Ordipo Nuovo at the period of the bombings. Officially, it seems that the truth about the State massacre is once again to be postponed indefinitely.

USA — The Supreme Court ruled last week that women can be legally forced to change their names when marrying and to use their husband’s surnames for official documents. An Alabama couple, Wendy Forbush and Ronald Carver, agreed on marrying to continue using their existing names but the state Department of Motor Vehicles refused to accept her driving licence. Appeals against court decisions have been rejected by the US's highest judicial authority.

DRVN — An editorial in the February issue of the party journal, Hoc Tap, has attacked perfunctory screening of candidate members for the party, which has enabled “profiteers and opportunists” to find their way into the organisation. Up to 20% of new party members in some areas did not come up to the necessary requirements, the editorial said.

DRVN — A March 3 editorial in Nhan Dan has continued the North Vietnamese policy of attacking Nixon and his policies, while abstaining from any direct criticism of either Russia or China.

CUBA — Cuba announced at the end of February that it had recognised Bangladesh.

GREECE — The composer Mikis Theodorakis announced last week in Australia that he had left the Communist Party after thirty years. He gave as his reasons disagreement over tactics within Greece, and his own objection to political conditions in eastern Europe and China. In a statement issued in Paris the Greek Communist Party of the interior — i.e. the group that have broken from tight Russian control — regretted the resignation of Theodorakis, whom it consistently referred to as “comrade” . Acceptance of his views, the statement said, “would lead to rejecting the ideological, political and organisational bases on which the party is built” .

BELGIUM — Financial ministers of the EEC 6 agreed on March 7 to tighter monetary co-operation, limiting the margins of fluctuation between different currencies. What European bankers regard as chaos broke out last year when in May the florin and the mark broke lose, and then in August free floating became universal. Disagreement between French and Germans plus uncertainties about the dollar delayed a return to “normal” : but these doubts were overcome by the February encounter of Brandt and Pompidou, plus last week’s Senate go-ahead to revaluing the dollar (gold to go from $35 to $38 an ounce). Monetary union in the late 1970s is being expected: but the most immediate concern is the next dollar crisis, expected for this summer.

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA - UNGeneral Secretary Waldheim visited South-West Africa last week in the wake of the strike that has rocked the zone. Waldheim was allegedly there following the terms laid down by the UN Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, but he in fact gave support to the Pretoria regime, who claim his visit is a tacit acceptance of their rule. Waldheim also failed to pose any prior conditions about who he was to meet before going to the territory.

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