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Walkable development is not a drug
Talk at the Design for Health ConferenceMinneapolis, April 30, 2007
Jonathan LevineProfessor and ChairUrban and Regional Planning ProgramThe University of Michigan
Evaluative Framework for Walkable Development #1
Proveneffective
Marketinterventions
Market uninterested or incapable of providing
Market for walkable development
Essence of transportation/ land-use policy reform
What would justify transportation/land-use policyreform?
Evaluative Framework for Walkable Development #2
Choiceexpansion
Removal of obstacles
Municipal regulationconstrains market
Market for walkable development
Essence of transportation/ land-use policy reform
What would justify transportation/land-use policyreform?
Do Developers Want Greater Density than Regulations Allow?
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Central City Inner Suburb Outer Suburb Rural
All Respondents
Northeast
Mid-Atlantic
Southeast/Carribean
Midwest
South Central
Great Plains, RockyMountains
Pacific andNorthwest
Multi-RegionDevelopers
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40P
erce
nt
of
Sam
ple
Very StrongPedestrian-
NeighborhoodPreference
Mid-Range Very StrongAuto-
NeighborhoodPreference
Atlanta
Boston
Residential Neighborhood Preferences, Atlanta and Boston
The Gap Between Preferences and Choices in a Sprawling Environment
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile in Neighborhood Preference Scale
%
Liv
ing
in
Wal
kab
le/T
ran
sit-
Fri
end
ly Z
on
es
Atlanta
Boston
Strong Transit/Pedestrian Preferences
Strong Auto Preferences
Can walkable development be required (where the market isn’t interested)?
• Smart-growth codes
• Transfer of development rights
• Incentive zoning
• Inclusionary zoning
• Urban growth boundaries
The Development Request for Proposals
• Signal
• Market Facilitation vs. Market Forcing
You’ve selected a developer: What do you do now?
• Zoning code
• Other land-use regulations
• Variance – (and how to gauge success)
• Pragmatic Compromises
The Three Levels of Policy Reform
• Educate while leaving municipal prerogative in place
• Change incentive structure• Share land-use planning authority
between municipality and higher-level governments
Oregon Transportation Planning Rule
“…local governments shall adopt land use and subdivision regulations to reduce reliance on the automobile which … allow transit-oriented developments (TODs) on lands along transit routes…
Thank you!
Extras
Framework #1: Sprawl as Potential Market Failure (the drug model)• “[D]oes the invisible hand, which guides the
conversion of land to urban use, push too hard in the direction of bigger cities? Economists use the term market failure to describe a situation in which the invisible hand fails to allocate resources in a socially desirable manner so as to maximize aggregate economic well-being. Is a…market failure involved in the spatial expansion of cities? If so, the criticism of urban sprawl is justified, and measures are needed to restrict urban expansion.” (Brueckner 2000)
High-Density Requirements are Unenforcable because Capital is Mobile
Higher-density development offers…
Municipal land-use policy toward higher-density development
Development outcome
Greater profits than lower-density on-site and elsewhere
Prohibit Lower density
Allow Higher density
Require Higher density
Lesser profits than lower-density development on-site and elsewhere
Prohibit Lower density
Allow Lower density
Require Vacant
Framework #2: Sprawl as Potential Government Failure (the organic produce model)• “[T]he belief that sprawl is caused primarily by market
failures is based on the false assumption that there is a freely operating land use market in U.S. metropolitan areas. No metropolitan area has anything remotely approaching a free land use market because of local regulations adopted for parochial political, social and fiscal purposes. Most suburban land use markets are dominated by local zoning and other regulations that are aimed at excluding low-income households and that distort what would occur in a truly free market.” (Downs 1999)
Empirical Research on Land-use Regulation• White 1988• Moss 1977• Pasha 1996• Fischel 1999• Shay and Rossi 1981• McMillen and McDonald 1991• Thorson 1994• Thorson 1997• Peiser 1989
Zoning May Lower Densities and Accelerate Sprawl, but…Local Regulation is “the Free Market” (Political Version)
• “Smart growth is inconsistent with the American dream of a big home on a five-acre lot," said David Bliden, executive director of the Maryland Association of Counties, which opposed [former Maryland Governor] Glendening's effort as an unreasonable intrusion into counties' power to regulate building. "The concept of a higher authority, of a Big Brother, is inconsistent with the democratic principles that have to be intertwined with land use management." (Washington Post, August 10, 2004).
Tiebout Modeland Exclusionary Zoning
• “Each community is authorized to enact a ‘zoning’ ordinance which states, ‘No household may reside in this community unless it consumes at least some minimum amount of housing.” (Hamilton 1975)
• Otherwise, risk a game of “musical suburbs,
with the poor following the rich in a never-ending quest for a tax base.”
The Costs of Exclusionand How to Assume them Away
• “Restrictions due to employment opportunities are not considered. It may be assumed that all persons are living on dividend income.” (Tiebout 1956)
Constructing the Myth of the Market
Provenbenefits
Marketinterventions
Market uninterested or incapable of providing
Framework #1
Choiceexpansion
Removal of obstacles
Municipal regulationconstrains market
Framework #2
Scientific
Evaluation of
Smart Growth
Assume proof of benefit of smart
growth is ambiguous
In Framework #1 In Framework #2
Refrain from intervention
into markets
Remove regulatoryobstaclesregardless
Conclusions
• Market failure vs. government failure
• Travel-behavior science and the “neutral default”
• Choice-based rationale
Metropolitan Accessibility and Transportation Sustainability:Comparative Indicators for Policy ReformFunding:
EPA-STAR, 2007-2010 Graham Environmental Sustainability Institute,
2007-2009
Mobility
Transportation Capacity Expansion
Land-Use
Planning
Travel Demand
Management
Accessibility
Mobility Proximity Connectivity
MEANS
ENDS
Job Accessibility by Car, Boston and Atlanta 1995
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Population Percentile
Acc
essi
bil
ity
Sco
re (
mil
lio
ns)
Atlanta
Boston
Hamilton’s Three-Way Classification of Municipalities
Westminster, Colorado
Can Increased Property Rights Lead to Increased Production of Multifamily Housing? (From Mitchell 2004)
New Jersey 1970
60.2%15.9%
22.8%
1.1%
New Jersey, New Units 1970-1990
53.0%
18.3%
26.7%
2.1%
Pennsylvania 1970
58.6%18.3%
21.9%
1.2%
Pennsylvania, New Units 1970-1990
47.2%
24.1%
25.6%
3.2%
Single FamilyTownhouseApartmentMobile Home
The Fiction of “Unzoned” Houston
• Subdivision regulations, transportation standards, parking requirements still in place
• Deed restrictions are municipally enforced
An R-1 Zone is (nearly) Forever
• State of Massachusetts, 1970-1999– Existing single-family areas
changing to other uses: between 0.003% and 0.3% of 1970 single-family acreage
How a Libertarian Could View Land-Use Policy Reform• In fact, the market’s delivery of private goods is not related at
all to the scientific validity of people’s preferences. Markets can and do supply organic lettuce regardless of whether it really is “better” for your health. The market’s ability to deliver Miller Lite is not at all contingent on the resolution of the “Great-Taste, Less-Filling” debate. European consumers do not want genetically modified food regardless of scientists’ arguments that consumer concerns about such food are without merit. And people pay good money for light trucks because they feel “safer” in the vehicles even though scientific evidence challenges that sentiment. (Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, 2003)
By contrast…
• “The New Urbanist fall-back position that ‘...people should be given a choice’ is not plausible; there is no acknowledgement of the fact that markets regularly generate the more feasible choices while discarding the infeasible ones, based on opportunity costs compared to consumers’ willingness to pay.” (Gordon and Richardson 2001)
Even though…
• “An interesting question, especially with regard to infill projects, is whether these alternatives are acceptable to the community at large, as opposed to the prospective purchasers. There are many examples of broader community objections to high-density projects, usually on traffic-generation grounds.” (Gordon and Richardson 2001)
Proactive roles for planning
• Foster high quality of life at a range of densities through:– Design– Connectivity– Proximity/agglomeration– Open space– Persuasion
Local Regulation is “the Free Market”(Academic Version)
A“household’s ability to select a place of residence from among a host of fully autonomous jurisdictions offering different amounts of public spending” is tantamount to “freedom of choice in the public sector.” (Brueckner 2000)