WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21st CENTURY: International Stability and Balance of the New Type

7/21/2019 WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21st CENTURY: International Stability and Balance of the New Type

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WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21stCENTURYINTERNATIONAL STABILITYAND BALANCE OF THE NEW TYPE

VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT


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Authors

The report was prepared

by the research team of the Foundationfor Development and Supportof the Valdai Discussion Club

Oleg Barabanov

Timofey Bordachev

Fyodor Lukyanov

Andrey Sushentsov

Dmitry Suslov

Ivan Timofeev

Executive Editor

Fyodor LukyanovAcademic Director of the FoundationforDevelopment and SupportoftheValdai Discussion Club

The initial draft was discussed at the 12thAnnual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Clubin Sochi on October 2015 and finalised uponthe results of the discussion.

Chairman of the Board of the FoundationforDevelopment and Support

of

the

Valdai

Discussion Club

Andrey Bystritskiy

ISBN 978-5-906757-18-0


3/15VALDAI DISC US SION CL UB REPORT 1

WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21stCENTURY. INTERN ATIONAL STABILI TY AND BALAN CE OF THE NEW TYPE

Foreword

Two hundred years ago Europe

then

the undisputed centre of the world

stood onthe threshold of a new historical era. A seriesof political, social, and ideological storms hadshaken the Old World since the last quarter ofthe 18thcentury, triggering wars, which engulfedall of the leading European nations. TheCongress of Vienna remained in session for manymonths

its activity suspended for a

time bya

new outburst of military action

seeking a

neworder for the continents development. Heads ofstate and diplomats sought to create a system

of international relations, which could managethe conflicts that arise inevitably betweenmajor states, while avoiding head-on collisionsand minimising damage. The changes that hadto be made in the structure of states spawnednumerous threats to stability from new playersoperating outside the system.

The significance of the time went farbeyond diplomacy. The world stood on thethreshold of profound changes in the nature ofsociety, technology, and the economy. Ideas werealready taking shape that would play a

criticalrole in mankinds history through the 19thand 20thcenturies. Perhaps most important: centre stage

would now be taken by nations and peoples,increasingly aware of their own interests andtheir ability to make history, and no longer

willing to submit unquestioningly to rulersand their political states.

None of the emperors, chancellors andministers who gathered in Vienna could have

foreseen what was in store for the world five, ten,thirty, and a

hundred years into the future. Butthey understood their responsibility and felt theburden of time, which made stricter demandsthan ever before on those who presumed todetermine events.

More than fifty years later the greatRussian writer Leo Tolstoy, whose deep interestin the philosophy of history is well known,would address the period that culminated in theCongress of Vienna in his great novel War and

Peace. Tolstoy refused to accept that history ismade by individuals, but he also rejected anyfatalistic belief in divine determinism, instead

seeing the roots of historical movement in the

totality of the strivings of millions of people.For history, there are lines of movement ofhuman will, one end of which are shrouded inthe unknown, while at the other end peoplesconsciousness of their freedom in the presentmoves in space, in time and in dependence oncauses, Tolstoy wrote. The dialectic of freedomand determinism, of what we can change andwhat is objectively inevitable lies at the heart ofTolstoys novel and his perception of history.

This perception looks surprisingly modern

today. Perhaps because, 200 years after the endof the Napoleonic wars, humankind finds itselfin a

place that is similar. There is a

generalunderstanding that fundamental changes areunderway, but no one is yet able to grasp theirnature or to sketch the outline of a

future. Everyonewants peace, but each has his own idea of whatpeace means. And players operating outside thesystem are ready to seize opportunities, whichthis historical break presents. DAISH, a

structurethat aspires to a

complete overthrow of borders,political systems, social relationships, and values,has bared its teeth to the world.

Tolstoy believed that the historicalprocess is objective, non-linear and irreversible.It cannot be stopped at a

particular point forsomeones benefit. In other words, there is noend of history. The historical process consistsof the hopes and passions of millions of people,its driver is a force equal to the momentum ofnations (what we might today call increasingly

diverse polycentrism or democratisation of theinternational environment).

Times of change are always associatedwith uncertainties, risks and opportunities. Atsuch moments the price to pay for amistakeincreases dramatically. Many processes andevents, of prime importance at other times, becomesecondary, and age-old issues of policy and diplomacy,of war and peace, take centre stage. It is criticallyimportant to understand the logic of history; thechallenge for the leaders of countries, working within

this logic, is to ensure the survival of humanity, themaintenance of peace and strengthening of thefoundations for progress worldwide.


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Policy objective

Moving away from the illusions of the

20th century, the policy objective today is theprevention of hell on earth, rather than thecreation of paradise. Recent military, political andeconomic crises show that maintaining stability isno easy task, even in traditionally calm regions,such as Europe and North America. The destructivenature of global experiments the military-political missions of Communism, Liberalism, theCaliphate, or any other dogmatic ideologies

hasbecome evident.

Competition between the major powers,

provocative action by medium-sized and minorcountries, and cross-border challenges remainthe main sources of global threats. They requirethought-out and agreed positions. However, theworld powers exist and develop in extremelydifferent conditions. Although we live in the eraof global communications, the powers fail to hearand understand each other. This entails a riskthat countries interests will be inadequatelyunderstood and that threats to mutual security willarise. Attempts to build relations on ideological,rather than pragmatic foundations invariably leadto adead-end of violent escalation. Foreign policyloses its way and wars are the result.

What we now have is a

Hobbesianmoment: not only (one might even say not somuch) agrowing number of increasingly variedconflicts and wars, but, specifically, the inabilityof the leading players to agree on rules forinteraction. An ongoing game without rules.The opinions of the leading centres of world power

as to what is allowed and what is prohibited

about the basic rules of international life

differ,and sometimes diametrically. The fight againstextra-systemic threats, weakening of traditionalrivals, ideological fervour and the promotionof geopolitical interests form a

tangled skein ofcontradiction and double standards, where theattempt to achieve certain goals undermines thepossibility of attaining others.

At the same time, we all have thesame primary interests: keeping the peace,

resisting instability (particularly that causedby increasingly virulent terrorist structures)and creating the conditions for sustainable

development. These tasks are only possible if

the global powers can find consensus on theirbehaviour towards each other and the use of force.There is no other alternative in the modern world.Or rather, the alternative is to see global politicsplunge into a

vortex of uncontrolled escalation inall directions.

The world stands at aparting of the ways:will the growth of internal problems in the leadingcountries and the rise of non-western centres ofpower bring us to a

revolutionary explosion or willchange be slow and systematic? For the moment

the West is still in the lead. But there are twotrends undermining this status quo: the relativedecline of Americas allies, from the EC to Japan,and narrowing of the gap between them and BRICScountries in terms of influence on global processes.

The Western community is increasinglyimpatient at the actions of large non-westernstates, aspiring to go their own way on globalissues. This impatience is manifested even whenthe non-western countries try simply to asserttheir interests in the immediate proximity oftheir own borders, something that was previouslyregarded as the evident right of any serious power.So, as regards security, the main source of frictionis the periphery of emerging states. The West isconcerned by the situation in the post-Soviet spaceand in the South China Sea and issues informalguarantees to the small neighbours of Russiaand China. Moscow and Beijing understand theseactions as an attempt to stifle their aspirations.

A revolutionary demolition of the

western-centric global order is not inevitable.There is still scope for orderly reform. Thisrefers not only to mutual nuclear deterrencebetween Russia and the West, which renderswar unlikely. The BRICS countries have alreadylearnt to make the existing global system work totheir own advantage. But more extensive use ofsanctions as a

political tool has led many to wonderwhether interdependence is turning into asourceof pressure and vulnerability. This undermines thefoundations of the global economic system. It also

hinders initiatives to create trade and economicmega-blocks, which can create new, non-universalinternational rules.


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ChinaIndiaSouth Africa Australia

CanadaUSA

Brazil

321,368,864

17.35 trln

54,400

3.5% 1%

35,099,836

1.596 trln

45,000

22,751,014

1.1 trln

46,600

1.8%

1,367,485,388

18.09 trln

13,200

2.06%

1,251,695,584

7.411 trln

5,800

2.4%

53,675,563

707.1 bln

13,100

1.2%

204,259,812

3.276 trln

16,200

1.4%

EU, NATO, TPPmember f Population (July,20 5)

GDP (PPP, $, 2014)

GDP per capita($, 2014)

Military expenditures(%, 2014)

BRICS, CSTO, EEU, SCOState-member f

WORLD FORCE CENTERS: TOWARDS A NEW BALANCE

Sources: http://www.eurasiancommission.org/, http://www.sipri.org/, https://www.cia.gov/

EU countries

513,949,445

18.12 trln

39,400

1.65% **

* 1.01.2015

2012

Japan

126,919,659

4.767 trln

37,500

1%

182,536,5004.3796 trln

24,104

RussiaEEU

142,423,7733.577 trln

24,400

4.5%

*




The use of force and its limits

Discord between the core of the global

system and emerging states is assuming anepistemological character. The parties find itincreasingly difficult to agree on the definitionof such concepts as stability, security,progress or democracy. The West relies ona holistic conception of global developmentand the values that are to be promoted, but theoutcome of its efforts is often the contrary of whatis intended. Non-western countries know whatthey oppose, but they have not yet found a

single,integrated vision of how the whole system should

be structured. Although they are striving toconstruct such a

vision. In the global arena thereis increasing divergence between the conceptsof freedom and justice: the first is held aloft bythe western community, while the second is theslogan of the rising non-western states.

During the Ukrainian crisis of 20142015the issue of military security in Europe returned tothe agenda for the first time in 25 years. Russia andthe West flexed their muscles and the prospect ofan armed confrontation no longer belonged to therealm of fantasy: the risk of a

major war in Europe,which seemed to have been left behind once andfor all in the 20thcentury, was back in focus. The

situation has been further complicated by the

latest phase of the Syrian conflict. For the firsttime, Russia and the United States and its alliesare carrying out large-scale military operationsin the same region. And although the Americanand Russian militaries have apparently agreed onthe minimisation of risks, the dangers inherent tothis situation were demonstrated by the acrimonybetween Russia and Turkey, which erupted afterTurkey shot down a

Russian military aircraft.Finding themselves on the edge of

aprecipice, Russia and the West asked themselves:

what are to be the rules of this great game andwill there be any rules? For the moment thedifferent sides are giving different answers.

The crisis can be overcome if its causemutual distrust between Russia and theWest

will be dealt with. The experience gainedin the period since the Cold War shows that trustcannot be based on an ideological unconditionalsurrender, the acceptance by one side of theopinions and perceptions of the other. The defectsof such an approach are obvious even within theEuropean Union, where a

mental unification isstill lacking, so its attainment in relations withRussia is not to be dreamt of.

International relations in recent years haverepeatedly cast doubt on the efficacy of militaryforce and the ability to achieve political objectivesby armed methods. The decision to use force hasfrequently been based on an incorrect calculationor on ideological arguments (in Afghanistan, Iraq,Libya and Syria), which had nothing to do with thereal national interests of those involved.

War that does not aim to achieve territorialoccupation is a new phenomenon in internationalrelations. We have seen wars unleashed under the

banner of human rights, justified by the need forhumanitarian intervention and aresponsibility toafford protection. Revolutionary military technology

has changed the nature of war. The use of precisionweapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, hybrid tacticsand strikes against information infrastructure andsatellites are now the most probable scenarios foramilitary conflict between the great powers. Thedevelopment of rules of the game in these spheresis a

matter of common interest and urgency.Mutual nuclear deterrence remains an

effective tool. Discussion of the use of nucleararsenals in military operations has re-emerged forthe first time in many decades in the context of

the Ukrainian and Middle East crises. But the chiefnovelty of the 21st century is non-military methodsof suppressing an opponent through political,




economic and technological isolation. The questions

arise: what is the potential and implications of suchadeterrence policy for the global development? Dosanctions resolve existing problems or do they onlydefer their solution, and even lead to an escalationof conflicts? The interdependence, which wassupposed to favour compromise, produces a quitedifferent effect: it becomes an opportunity to causethe largest possible damage to the other side bysmashing the newly created bonds, often withoutregard to the costs for the first side.

International policy today is universal

and total. Decisions to use force are increasinglytaken in the interests of specific groups. Publicpressure on government, domestic politicalneeds and militarisation of civil society impactthe external and military policy of countries.Non-state actors-terrorist and rebel movementsor individual fanatics have emerged as keyparticipants of conflicts. They are no match forthe concerted force of states, but the scale of thedamage, which they can inflict, is disproportionate.

The world of ideas

The session of the Valdai Discussion Clubin October 2014 posed an evident question in thecontemporary context: New rules or no rules?A year later we seem to have movement in thedirection of new rules, or at least their frameworkin the form of a

bipolar structure of the world.Although the term bipolar, with its Cold Warechoes, is perhaps undesirable and it would bemore accurate to speak of two groups of powersfollowing different vectors of development.

The West has manifested strong hostility tothe long-term paradigm of a

harnessing of Russianand Chinese interests in continental Eurasia. Therewas a

symbolical expression of this when Westernleaders refused unanimously to attend military

parades celebrating the 70th anniversary of theend of the Second World War, not only in Moscow(explainable in terms of the Ukrainian conflict), butalso in Beijing (which has no part in that conflict).

The trend towards anew division into campsis not purely a

consequence of the Ukrainian crisisand the conflict between Russia and the West,though these factors have acted as an accelerator.Dissatisfaction with the western mainstream andthe world order that it dictates intensified from thebeginning of the century, and reached a

new level

after the crisis of 20082009. The formalisationand gradual consolidation of the BRICS, on theone hand, and the dramatic electoral rise of radical

protest parties or individual politicians withextreme platforms in Europe and the USA, on theother hand, underlined the growing instability ofthe mainstream. The next stage is global politicallegalisation of alternative development models,both inside and outside the West. Estrangementbetween ordinary people and the political eliteis increasingly manifest, even to a point wherethe radical, inhumane ideas of DAISH achievepopularity among certain groups not only in theMiddle East, but also in Europe and Eurasia.

The growing importance of alternativeprojects entails a revival of the role of ideologiesand ideological struggle. For a quarter of a centuryafter the Cold War ideological messages were a

monopoly of the West, while others either acceptedthem or locked themselves away in a combinationof fortress mentality and Realpolitik. Now,though, attempts to formulate an ideologicalresponse to the West are apparent. All the more sobecause the new type of confrontation has less todo with military factors and more to do with worldview and communication. The coming decade maywell see an ideological renaissance.

The urge of the West to replace ideologiesin their traditional understanding by standardised

common values is driving demand for alternatives.There is a

disillusion with an imposed model thatpresents itself as universal. Particularly since its


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THE COST OF WAR

GLOBAL MILITARY SPENDING

DEFENSE BUDGETS OF 2014 BY COUNTRY

$4

billion$387The First World War costto humanity

trillionThe Second World War cost

trillion$30The Cold War cost (approx.)

billion$14The price of all global cin 2014 alone exceeded

$ billion

1960

0

2

4

300

500

600

00

800

1970 1980 1990 2001 2005 2014

322

454

549

676

722

1 118

over $3 trillion

REGIONAL WARS IN THE 20 -21STTH CENTURY

$ billion

War in Korea(1950-1953)

Military assistanceto North Vietnamin the war againstthe US (1961-1974)

War in Afghanistan(1979-1989)

Military assistanceto Syria (2000-2012)

Operation in SouthOssetia (2008)War in Vietnam

(1961-1974)

Gulf War(1990-1991)

Iraq War(2003-2011) War in Afghanistan

(2001 present)

Anti-ISISoperation in Syria(2015)

1950

100

200

4

300

500

7

800

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

t

r

US

China

Russia

UK

Japan

Fran

India

Saudi Arabia

Germany

South Korea

Defense budgetin 2014;($ billion)

US Expenditures

Change comparedto 2013; (%)

33 3

-2

-3

-1

-1

-4

-4

3

13

6

44

44

45

53

55

57

78

148

575

456

518

1.616

88

2.2

0.5

3.7

685.6

814.6

USSR / Russia Expenditures

Source: HIS Jane's Aerospace, De, fense & Security




efficacy is open to doubt. The inability of economies,

even in developed countries, to afford the level ofsocial guarantees and resource reallocation that wastaken for granted just a

few years ago is promotingdissatisfaction and reviving the issue of socialjustice, which had seemed forgotten in Europe. Theissue tends to assume a xenophobic aspect in thecontext of the migrants inflow.

Simultaneously, gradual crystallisation ofthe BRICS is working to change the situation. Thepolitical course taking shape within the BRICSframework is perceived not only as acontinuation

of the ideology of developmentalism, but as theassertion of a

comprehensive global project.That is not to suggest, however, that

ideological consolidation between non-westerncountries will ever achieve the western level. TheAtlantic community is a

unique example of valueunification. By contrast, non-western states aretogether in stressing the importance of diversity,insisting that no uniform emblems of amodernstate and society are either desirable or possible.This is an approach more in tune with theconditions of a

multipolar world.

While the ideological opposition still

remains vague, pressing cultural and (increasinglyoften) religious contradictions are already inevidence. The situation worsened significantly in20142015 with the appearance of a

principallynew factor in global policy: DAISH. The so calledIslamic State challenges existing civilisationas such, defying moral and political standards.Though the global nature of the threat posedby DAISH is generally recognised, the proposedstrategies for combatting it vary greatly.

Barack Obama has openly equated the

threat posed by Russia and by DAISH. Such anapproach, though occasionally played down outof tactical considerations, suggests that the threatposed by Islamic radicalism and terrorism willnot only fail to re-establish the previous rules ofthe game, based on a

quasi-consensus, but willescalate the division into centres of power and thecrystallisation of bipolarity. And such tragic eventsas the November terrorist acts in Paris (bound,unfortunately, to be repeated in various parts of theworld) will only promote cooperation for a

shorttime or for the solution of specific tasks.

Another globalisation

A single universal international orderwith shared values and development models

is unattainable in the increasingly fragmentedand pluralist international system. However, inthe context of global interdependence andinterfusion, awar without rules and war ofall against all will lead to catastrophe.Thefirstsymptoms are already evident: a

series of upsetsin the global economy (including the energy andfinancial sectors), the migration crisis in the EU,the spread of DAISH and low efficiency of effortsof global society to oppose it, climate change, etc.

The world order like the modern state

suffers from an imbalance between two majorprinciples justice and efficiency. The harmoniouscombination of these two principles based on

international institutions, which was sought bymany people, has proved ineffective due to failure

of the institutions to correspond to a

changingreality. A strict hierarchy has also failed to ensureefficiency. And asimple balance of power, as usedto exist, is impossible due to the complex andnon-linear nature of global processes and thelarge number of players involved in them.

The gradual transfer of economic cooperationand integration to the regional level does not call timeon globalisation. The key to success of most regionalcommunities is their integration into the globaleconomy. Global and regional institutions and trade

regimes must strengthen and not weaken each other.In order to create abalance, rules are needed thatwill allow groups of countries to efficiently manage




global interdependence, to coordinate measures for

counteracting transnational challenges and threats.Globalisation goes hand in hand with

better and closer relations, including a

processof integration, at the regional, bilateral andmini-lateral (i.e. with a

relative small numberof participants) levels. More competition,redistribution of power in the world and generalvulnerability in the changing internationalcontext makes key players transfer their efforts tothe bilateral and regional level in order to createa favourable environment in their immediate

vicinity (since it cannot be attained at the globallevel). Regional communities are coming intoexistence to promote the development and

security of the countries that are included in them

and particularly of the leading members of theseregional communities.

Regional economic groups are beingtransformed into larger transcontinental ortransoceanic groups, since narrow regional unitsfind themselves unable to maintain competitivenessin the context of more intense global competition.The new large communities are notintegrational in nature, but offer moreintense trade regimes and general rules ofcooperation in trade and the economy. The

smaller integration associations are not dissolvedin such communities, but rather woven intothem through matching of models and interests.

Towards a new balance

The escalation of chaos anduncontrollability in international relationscannot last forever. As described above, we areprobably witnessing the start of the formation ofa

new world order based on a

factual, though notinstitutionalised, balance of two major groupsof states. These two groups are not doomedto confrontation. They will maintain closerelations at the economic and human level, seeka

common response to development problemsand challenges, and sometimes join hands to

resist threats, mainly those of an anti-systemicnature. All of this is perfectly compatible withthe existence of permanent competition betweenthe two groups.

Such competition is natural in view ofinsurmountable cultural and value differences,as well as objective contradictions betweendevelopment objectives. The current stage ofrelations between Russia and the West may provea step on the way to a normalisation, whichadequately reflects the competitive nature of

their interests, and to the rejection of a

pretendedstrategic partnership (perhaps sincere and notconsciously grasped) that has not worked.

Geographically these two groups willinclude the USA, the European Union and theirallies, on the one part, and China, Russia anda number of other countries supporting them,on the other. Their economic base will be twoocean partnerships

Atlantic and Pacific anda harnessing of integration and trade andinvestment projects in Greater Eurasia. Thecommunities are already on their way to suchrelative consolidation.

However, while the internal structure of the

Western group of countries is already formedand is unlikely to change significantly, the East-Eurasian association of Russia and China is stillin the process of intensive formation, primarilythrough systematisation of the activities of theShanghai Cooperation Organisation.

It would be mistaken to expectlegitimisation of the future model of the worldorder by the decisions of acongress or internationalinstitution. Everything was much simpler 200years ago: war had served as a

universal measure

of the international hierarchy, and diplomacywas the means of its formalisation. Congressesare possible when there is aclear distribution of




power and roles between the participants, when

there are clear winners (whether wise, as in 1815,or short-sighted as in 1919 or 1991) and losers.Today a

new order is not being built directly onthe ruins of war, but is gradually taking shapeout of the dialectical chaos of competition andinterdependence.

This future order cannot be based onwinners and losers. The winners of the Cold Warwill not negotiate on equal terms with those whoare dissatisfied with its outcome. The West willnever recognise the equality moral, ideological

or political

of other players. It will resistinstitutionalisation of the new internationalstructure. The sensations experienced at the endof the 20th century were too sweet: undisputedpower, combined with absolute moral and politicalcorrectness. But a

return to the glorious 1990sis also impossible for the West. Internationalrelations in the grey area that comprises most ofthe countries of Latin America, Africa, Southernand South-Eastern Asia, and perhaps EasternEurope, will remain a

challenge to internationalsecurity.

The new global balance of power will beunlike the Cold War system. That system wasunique and unrepeatable in human history, beingcharacterised not so much by an ideologicalopposition between two camps, as by acompletelack of interconnection and interdependencebetween two parts of the world

their physicalsplit. World civilisation had never experiencedanything comparable and will not experience it

again in the future.The new framework will most probably

keep the free flow of people, goods and capital.If efforts to create new international financialinstitutions and integration associations provesuccessful, that will be greatly to the benefit ofglobal controllability. Governments and privatecompanies will have a

choice, which will stimulatecompetition between institutions and increasetheir vitality. In some sense the future systemwill be an antipode of that, which existed during

the Cold War, and also of that, which failed tocome about at the end of the Cold War. It willbe characterised by maximum flexibility and

variability, necessitated by the impossibility of

establishing hard and fast rules.Both groups will pursue aperiodic hybrid,

more or less intensive struggle with each other.The global great game will be played out both inthe geographical spaces of the grey area, and inthe globalised spheres of information, technologyand others. But the hacker attacks that the majorpowers already use against one another, as well asinformation campaigns and diplomatic intrigueswill not terminate economic and human links.The possible transfer of territories, which may

become inevitable in the context of numerousterritorial disputes and dilution of the solidinternational legal base, will also be less thancatastrophic. In some cases de-facto transfer orwithdrawal of territories will be compensated bythe preservation of economic openness.

Sanctions and countersanctions, bothexplicit and implicit, will be usual practice.As universal rules of global trade becomemoribund (the WTO is an increasinglyceremonial body), mutual restrictions will

be standard in relations between majoreconomic and investment blocks. Globalnuclear deterrence will also limit the scale ofdisagreements, preventing their escalation intomilitary conflicts. Diplomatic work to control theescalation of inevitable conflicts will be avitaltask of international consultative structures,such as the United Nations Security Council.Informal platforms, such as the G20 can beviewed as an analogue of the UN Security Council

for the economy. And, since the legitimacy ofthe UN Security Council is likely to be calledinto question due to its limited representation,the remit of the G20 may actually extend topolitical issues. Particularly since it is becomingimpossible to separate economics from politicsand, when political and economic expediencycollide, the first are increasingly given priority.

Relationships within each group willprobably be far less hierarchical than might

be expected from the experience of the

Cold War. Decisions and policies can only beformulated through consensus and not throughdiktat. Despite its economic and military power,


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SANCTIONSTypes of sanctions:

Dynamics of economic sanctions in the 19thcentury

Sanctions in the 20thcentury

12 11 3 2 1

Great Britain France

1911-1915 1916-1920 1921-1925 1926-1930 1931-1935 1936-1940

1966-1970 1961-1965 1956-1960 1951-1955 1946-1950 1941-1945

1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000

Italy Germany Russia Austria Chile

Finance sanctions

Trade sanctionsFreeze of property of certain persons

Ban on entry into the country for certain persons

Ar ce re w mat

market, rates of int ce markets,

rates of exchange on money market

Freeze of property of a country

(is used in case of a war or a serious

international c

19thcentury naval embargo. From 1827 own naval embargo w xed 21 cases of embargoes

against Turey, Portugal, Netherlands, Colombia, Panama, Mexico, Argentina and El Salvador

Initiatorsof embargo

Number of casesof embargo

Numberof sanctions

3 2

1

1854 10

15

13 25 15 20 34 13

2 2 3 3

Years


13/15

Russia

Turkey

DemocraticRepublicof Congo

Iraq

Afghanistan

Iran

Current International Sanctions

Countries under sanction

Initiators of sanctions

Sources: kremlin.ru, government.ru, gazeta.ru, ria.ru, tass.ru

EU

ra ct o

s ct ns e

f t no og

s ct ns

sphere of energ

sanct

ountr es mpose or

e ct

Countries underuss a s sanct

ntry

t e c untry o a n

persons

m a n expor

of raw ate ial

anct ns agan st

defense industr

Payment systems

sa, aster ar

layoff

m a rgo on mp

y m

m argo on ra oact ve

materials supply

m argo on weapons supp

an nt t e coun

for certain persons

Freezing the proper

o ce ta n

m a n ra oact vematerials supply

ntry nt t e c un

or ce ta n pe

ance sanct

Initiators o sanctions

UN


Russia


USA

m argo on export

of products

uspens on o

non-visa regime

Suspension of

t e pro ect out s tream

usa n p

of citizens of Turke

Ban the activit

o ur s compan es

t to uss

Embargo on weapons supply

Other countries which imposed sanctions against Russia: Albania, Australia,

Canada, Island, Japan, Liechtenstein, Moldavia, Montenegro, New Zealand,

Norway and Switzerland

Current UN sanctions against:Democratic People's Republic of Korea, te D'Iv ire, Liberia, omalia, udan, Sierra eone and Repu ic of uth f ic




it is not in the interests of the USA to impose its

will by force. As can be seen from a

comparisonof the events of 2003 and 20142015, it is easierand more efficient to implement a

compromisesolution than a

solution by force. The model ofmutually beneficial compromise is even morenatural on the Moscow-Beijing axis, where theeconomic power of the Peoples Republic of Chinais an excellent match for Russias military power.

It is also important that the countrieswithin each group are free of objective, deepand antagonistic contradictions in respect of

one another. The development needs of theindividual states are not such as to give rise tosuch contradictions.

Russias national development objectivesin Central Asia need not conflict with those ofChina, and vice versa. Both of the major powersare seeking resources and opportunities in theircommon neighbourhood: Russia is particularlyinterested in recruiting workers and China is insearch of investment expansion. Both Russia andChina are deeply committed to regional securityand the stability of political regimes. The moreChina invests in the Silk Route area, the morepressing it will become to ensure the security ofthat zone, and the only guarantor of that security(for example, in Central Asia) is Russia.

Europe is not acompetitor for the USA, butrather its closest ally in terms of shared valuesand economic importance. Both the USA and EUare interested in the deterrence of other powercentres and retaining monopoly opportunities in

Africa, Latin America and, to some extent, Asia.It may be a

simplification to equate theWest

non-West dichotomy with the balance ofpower worldwide, since the cultural and ideologicalseparation and the entire international systemis likely to be dynamic. Rather, the point is thatthe aspiration of the rich West to preserve andstrengthen its leading position in the internationalsystem is bound to stimulate others to aspire toa

similar position.We should stress that we are still at the

very beginning of the formation of such a

system.Its creation will be a long process. Breakdownsand backward steps are bound to happen, as well

as periods of temporary rapprochement to oppose

common threats, such as that posed by DAISH.But international and political escalations

will gradually become amatter of course andwill no longer be perceived as harbingers ofArmageddon, as happened in wars throughouthistory until 1945. In a

more distant perspectivethe new balance will create the conditions fortougher global unity, based on recognition byboth groups that neither can dominate. Suchrapprochement will be assisted by the escalationof anti-systemic threats from forces that aim to

destroy any standards and rules (DAISH is againthe prototype).

That is why the new bipolar world order thatwe have described seems the most likely, naturaland, consequently, the most desirable. It will bea

path of peace, not without imperfections, butstable and without extremes.

* * *

Leo Tolstoy believed that global history isthe history of all the people who participate in itsevents. This is truer today than ever. Transparencyof borders, availability of technologies, theuniversal expansion of democracy as a

form ofsocial organisation, and the total domination ofcommunications means that everyone has an impacton the historical process. This makes the processless predictable, but that is no excuse for relying onabenign fate the stakes are simply too high.

Tolstoy wrote: For history there isno irresolvable mystery in the union of twoopposites

freedom and necessity,

the mysterythat is found in religion, ethics and philosophy.History assumes a concept of human life, inwhich these two opposites have already beenunited. This Tolstoyan view is highly relevanttoday, when the hopelessness of efforts to forceevents into adogmatic framework is abundantlyclear. The role of leaders, states and communitiesis to understand the limits of the possible and

boundaries of the permissible, and to createasystem of relations with minimum risks withinthis framework.


15/15

MGIMO

UNIVERSITY

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WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21st CENTURY: International Stability and Balance of the New Type

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