Arab Securitocracies and

Security Sector Reform

March 2014

The War in Sinai:

A battle against terrorism or cultivating terrorism for the

future?

Ismail Alexandrani1

Introduction

It is not yet clear what narrative will be told by history, but a dominant media narrative, the

official one, has already been found for the on-going turbulence in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. It

appears that social media in the Nile Valley has preceded its counterpart in the Sinai

Peninsula in developing this narrative due to geographical and demographic factors which are

out of the control of the security and military authorities in Egypt. The main bridge

connecting the northern Sinai with the Nile Valley has been closed since 30 June, 2013

(setting transport links back to the time when ferries made their way across the Suez Canal

between great sea ships) and the military and security authorities have, to a great extent,

succeeded in concealing whatever is happening on the ground that contradicts their narrative.

Journalists in northern Sinai live between the ‘hammer’ of the army and the ‘anvil’ of

religious groups, both armed and unarmed, and are embedded in a traditional way of life in

which numerous pressures are exerted upon them; the safest option is often silence. When

Ayman Mohsen, a correspondent for MBC Egypt, insisted on communicating both sides of

the story, his camera was smashed by supporters of the isolated President, Mohamed Morsi, in

Al Arish. The angry protesters changed the letters MBC to CBC, a channel hostile to the

Muslim Brotherhood and to Islamists, and which adopted the official military and security

discourse. When Sinai journalist Ahmad Abu Deraa counter-narrated the official military

story about the raid in his besieged village, al Muqata’a, on 2 September 2013, rejecting the

false narrative provided by a military spokesman in a telephone interview with OnTV, his

penalty was a military trial, and the publication of a photo of him with seven other prisoners

arrested in northern Sinai and labelled 'terrorists'. Abu Deraa, the journalist closest to the

military authorities in Sinai, was detained for 6 months, and then renewed his loyalty to the

army in a recording filmed at the door of the military deputy in Ismailiyah. After this incident,

all the local journalists learned their lesson: that no journalists endear themselves to the army

1 Ismail Alexandrani is a freelance journalist and field researcher at the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social

Rights.

2

if they contradict the army’s narrative, even if they present their story with unequivocal

evidence and eye witness testimonials, and even if they are favoured by the army, with whom

they are in regular contact. As for the journalists under the patronage of political groups that

are the object of the army's anger, their natural refuge is to flee outside Sinai. This was the

situation for Hosam Al Shorbagi, the son of Abd al Rahman Al Shorbagi, a former

parliamentary representative and a local leader of the Brotherhood in Al Arish. Others, such

as citizen journalist Said Abu Haj, who regularly covered protests against the military

authority after the coup of 3 July, 2013, end up in criminal courts with fabricated accusations

against them.

For foreign journalists, freedom of movement is limited. Following 3 July, 2013, it became

almost impossible for them to visit northern Sinai if their aim was to find out the truth of the

widespread military operations, and of the skirmishes between regime forces and armed

groups. When journalists from private Egyptian newspapers decided to investigate and went

through all the official channels in order to secure a trip to northern Sinai, they were blocked

and compelled to go no further if they wanted to be assured of their personal safety and the

continued publication of their work. For instance, when Al-Shorouq Newspaper's Azza

Moghazy and her companion, photographer Sabry Khaled, met by chance with some victims

of human trafficking in the village of Mahdiyya, their punishment was a humiliating arrest

from their hotel and detention in the security headquarters. They were released after a nominal

apology in which it was revealed that the security forces thought that the reporters were

working on behalf of Al Jazeera. The executive editor-in-chief of the newspaper then put

them under pressure to return to Cairo immediately by threatening not to publish anything

they sent after their detention and release. As for the investigations team of "Al Masry al

Youm", which visited the border area in October 2013 while military operations and related

violations against civilians were taking place (which could be categorized as criminal

encroachments), they were only permitted to publish about the out-of-order development

plans in Sinai, and some aspects of general human suffering, without any consideration of the

effects of military operations on innocent unarmed civilians, women and children.

All communications networks in northern Sinai, including the internet, mobile networks and

land lines, have been cut off daily for between 6 and 12 hours since the military operations

began on 7 September 2013. A curfew was also imposed on the highways between cities in

northern Sinai starting from 4pm, unlike the midnight start for the rest of Egypt, following the

break-up of the sit-in at Rabaa on 14 August. As a result, nobody outside the border regions

knew the reality of what was happening in the way of crimes and infractions. They were

isolated from al Arish and its inhabitants most of the time, so nothing emerged to counter the

official narrative except for reports from a handful of activists from the cities of Sheikh

Zuwayd and Rafah and their villages. These activists participated a little through social media

in correcting the story broadcast by the army, then backed down after receiving threats against

their children and families.

The media blackout was imposed under the pretext of protecting national security with the

declared intention of preventing the communications network from being used by armed

groups to trigger explosions. However, the blackout did not prevent the army from targeting a

bus transporting its soldiers, killing ten and wounding more than thirty, at the end of the

3

eleventh week of operations. In the midst of this atmosphere of deadly possibilities,

obstructed freedom and threats to personal safety, I was able to stay in the area of the

operations and in Al Arish from 9 to 16 September 2013, and then from 3 to 10 October, and

finally from 9 to 22 November. My pre-existing personal relationships with locals allowed me

exceptional security in staying and moving among remote villages to which access for

external visitors is normally impossible with the exception of the armed forces.

In this paper I will try to present field observations in a wider analytical framework which

may allow for an understanding of what is happening in Sinai in a manner distanced from the

biased narratives of the two sides of the struggle or conflicting political propaganda. This

paper follows the positions of the two main sides of the conflict, the army and the armed

Islamist groups, and looks at the relationship between the army and the Israelis, as well as the

relationships between the Islamist groups and the Palestinians and the Brotherhood. It is

written following my research in the conflict zone carried out over two and a half years as a

researcher and journalist in Sinai, and is based on individual and group interviews.2

Three levels of the war

The military situation in Sinai exists on three levels: the first is political (international and

regional), the second is strategic, and the last is operational and procedural. At the level of international and regional politics, it appears that it was necessary for a deal to

take place between Cairo and Tel Aviv in order to guarantee the authority of the 3 July

military coup that overthrew President Mohamed Morsi of the Brotherhood. Their

cooperation was required to pressure the United States to avoid announcing officially that it

was a coup, which would have meant an end to American military aid and the collapse of one

of the most important pillars of the Camp David agreement and the peace treaty.3 The military

leadership in Cairo decided on an agreement with their counterparts in Tel Aviv to abrogate

temporarily and partially the security annex of the agreement instead of threatening the treaty

itself.4 The idea of re-examining the treaty in accordance with the wishes of the Egyptian

2 The original paper was written in Arabic in November 2013 and is available here: http://www.arab-

reform.net/ar/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-

%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-

%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1. 3 There is no text in the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel signed on

17th September 1978 at Camp David, nor in the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel signed on March 26th

1979 in Washington, D.C., that commits the United States to providing military aid to the two sides. But the role

of the United States in signing the treaty was exceptional, exceeding that of mediator and taking on more of a

sponsoring role. Some papers have expressed the view that military aid cannot be distinguished from American

sponsorship for the upholding of the treaty. In a document published by Wikileaks (number (10CAIRO181_a)),

dated February 9th 2010, it was revealed that Mubarak considered the annual American military aid to Egypt of

$US1.3 billion as compensation that could not be touched, for the sake of the peace made with Israel. Link:

http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10CAIRO181_a.html 4 According to the security annex of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the Egyptian army is not allowed

to exist in zone (c), the border area, which is supposed to be protected only by civil police forces. This was

amended after the Palestinians had broken the border siege in 2005 and 2007, and an armed force of 750 soldiers

was allowed. Together with the withdrawal of the civil police in January 2011, the army spread its forces in the

border area where they were reinforced by exceptional military reinforcements after the first Rafah Massacre in

2012. July 2013 marked the first time since June 1967 that Egyptian military tanks and helicopters were in this

4

people is still a fantasy which has not entered the minds of anyone who has held power since

the fall of Mubarak.

In the same vein, the Israelis praised their Egyptian ally for their security cooperation in

confronting jihadists and “terrorists” as a common enemy for both Egypt and Israel. This was

expressed both in Israeli newspapers and in conferences in Washington at which American

researchers and delegates met a number of the leaders of the Egyptian army, including

General Abd al Fatah Al Sisi.5 The inhabitants of the border region in northern Sinai, who

speak Hebrew and follow Israeli television, saw a news item broadcast by Channel Ten that

was broadcast once and never repeated, as usually happens. This news item reported the

arrival of a high level military delegation from Tel Aviv to Cairo at the end of the first week

of widespread military operations (13-14 September, 2013) and that this delegation carried

out expeditions for a period of two hours before leaving.

After the killing of more than fifty protestors on 6 October 2013, a debate arose around the

reduction of American military aid to Egypt (valued at more than a billion dollars per year). In

the middle of the debate about the extent of the reduction and whether or not it would be

permanent, it was assured that there would be no reduction in special reinforcements for the

fight against terrorism in Sinai.6 A number of Israeli officials announced their opposition to

aid reduction.7

The subject, which was consistently refused by Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi,

ruler of Egypt from the time of Mubarak’s overthrow until the election of President Morsi, is

no longer a matter of negotiations.8 Under the rule of General Abd al Fatah al Sisi, fighting

terrorism has become a part of Egyptian army practices and the army has withdrawn from its

zone. Since the treaty is still valid, this presence could not have been allowed without coordinating with the

Israeli and American sides or without, at least, notifying the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) mission. 5 For example, the Westminster Institute held a press conference in Washington, D.C. on 1 October 2013 for a

delegation that it had sent to Egypt from 27th-29th September to meet with Abd al Fitah Al Sisi and a number of

military and government leaders. The delegation was formed of three former American military leaders and

counter-terrorism experts. The announcement of the press conference may be accessed here:

http://www.westminster-institute.org/announcements/press-conference-on-findings-policy-recommendations-

from-westminster-institutes-delegation-to-egypt/

The press conference is viewable at the institute channel on Youtube:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EqppsDaYrBQ 6 Mohammed, Arshad. ‘U.S. seen withholding most military aid from Egypt’, Reuters, 9 October 2013, accessed

10 October 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/09/us-usa-egypt-aid-idUSBRE99801520131009;

‘US military aids to Egypt’ (in Arabic), Sky News Arabia, published on 10 October 2013, accessed 12 October

2013, http://goo.gl/mHaxju 7 Mekelberg, Yossi. ‘Israel sweat over U.S. aid cut to Egypt.’ Al Arabia News, 17 October 2013, accessed 18

October 2013. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/world/2013/10/17/Israel-sweats-over-U-S-aid-cut-to-

Egypt.html 8 Despite the transformation of the army under the leadership of Abd al Halim Abu Ghazalah and Muhammad

Hussein Tantawi, one of the Wikileaks documents revealed the red line which the last group of leaders who

participated in the 1973 October War would not cross. The former commander-in-chief, Muhammad Tantawi

absolutely refused to make the war on terror part of army doctrine or to change the army training to focus on

tasks other than fighting armies. Original Wikileaks document:

http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10CAIRO181_a.html

5

combat functions. It now occupies itself with the roles of policing and managing its economic

interests.9

At the level of strategy, Israel has benefited from having the activity of armed groups in the

Sinai confronted by the Egyptian army. Israeli borders have been secured with a buffer zone

maintained by the Egyptian armed forces unconcerned about the property of Egyptian citizens

in the area10

. Even if the military operations do not eradicate the groups, and most are of the

opinion that they will not, the armed groups have depleted a considerable proportion of their

power and arms, to a degree that will be difficult to reverse in the near future. The increase in

the variety and quality of weapons in Sinai since the Libyan revolution, and during the

concurrent period of reduced security in Egypt, makes it hard to imagine that this situation

may be resolved in the near future.

The military operations have also been of strategic benefit to the Egyptian army, despite the

fact that its claims of imposing control and protecting national sovereignty could be easily

countered by pointing to the fact of pre-operational security coordination with Israel. At a

practical level, the security annex of the peace treaty, which prohibited the Egyptian army

from maintaining any military presence in zone (C) and from flying military planes there, has

been abrogated. Even the two operations, 'Eagle' and 'Eagle 2', that were allowed as

exceptions to the treaty were relatively limited.11

Today, Egyptian military planes have been

flying over the region (zone C) for the first time since 1967 and the region has been combed

by land and air more than once. Similarly, it is probable that the movement of Multinational

Force and Observers (MFO) will expand and that more materials will have entered the region,

including those that are forbidden according to both the terms of the peace treaty annex and

the recent security coordination.12

The MFO forces give absolute priority to the safety of their individuals and therefore do not

undertake patrols during the hours of curfew, which in the border region of northern Sinai

begins at 4pm rather than midnight as in most areas of Egypt. During Egyptian military

operations, the MFO forces do not move from their bases, which means that a lot of details

9 For more information: Yazid Sayyegh, 'Above the State: the republic of officers in Egypt'. Carnegie Centre for

the Middle East, 1 August 2012. http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48996 10

The Egyptian military authorities established a buffer zone 500 metres inside the city of Rafah, and one

kilometre south of Rafah along the international border. The buffer zone has not been established by destroying

all the houses, which would mean a war on the inhabitants, but they uprooted trees, razed crops and destroyed all

that they could possibly destroy from the houses, claiming that there were tunnels inside them, actions that had

no legal or constitutional basis. 11

Operation Eagle was launched in August 2011 following the attack on police station II of Al Arish with heavy

artillery and the attempt to destroy the monument to the late President Muhammad Anwar Sadat in Rifa'i square

in the heart of Al Arish. This attack took place on Friday 29 July and was called by the Islamists "Islamic

identity Friday", and by the liberals, "Kandahar Friday". Operation Eagle 2 was launched almost a year later

following the elimination of an entire military unit consisting of 16 soldiers, in what came to be known as the

first Rafah massacre. 12

According to the peace treaty, use of airports in areas (b) and (c) for military purposes is forbidden, as is the

establishment of early warning stations (ground radars) except in area (a) east of the Suez canal and area (d) in

Israel. This is supposed to be under the supervision of multinational forces in areas (b) and (c) in Sinai, but they

are unable to carry out their duty during widespread operations and constant clashes. Al Arish airport is used as a

launching place for Apache armed and reconnaissance airplanes, and it is probable that Egyptian army forces

maneuvered around the multinational forces with ground radars.

6

could be hidden from MFO eyes. The MFO forces disappear for several days or weeks at a

time.

But the Egyptian army is paying a heavy price for loosening the security shackles imposed by

the peace treaty. When the army made it clear that it was making war on the armed groups,

whether through field combat or through the media, it gave them a justification for

considering their operations against the army as a defensive attack, and they did not hesitate

to accuse the army publicly of apostasy and blasphemy. Far from the angry and vengeful

reaction that propelled a 'One man army' phenomena which inflicted heavy losses upon the

government and the society, the groups had already threatened the delegate advisor of the

isolated president Mohammed Morsi after the first Rafah massacre in 2012 that their

retaliation against being targeted by military operations in Sinai would be in the centre of

Cairo and the Nile Valley.13

They fulfilled their promises, with Ansar al-Quds, a Salafi jihadi

group, announcing their targeting of the procession of the interior minister close to his house

in Medinat Nasr (4 September, 2013), the military intelligence office in Isma’illiyah (20

October, 2013), which was well fortified in the military barracks and was of great significance

in the canal and Sinai region, and finally the assassination of homeland security officer

Muhammad Mabrouk in Medinat Nasr east of Cairo.

The departure of Ansar al-Quds and the other Salafi jihadi groups, which used to restrict their

attacks to Israelis and did not get involved in Egyptian or Palestinian politics, from the path

they have followed since the January 2011 revolution is a strategic transformation, indicating

an open war with no apparent possibilities for peace or a ceasefire.14

The conflict between

wings within the ruling authority over how to handle the Sinai were mostly won by “the voice

of reason” until May 2013, when the crisis of the seven kidnapped soldiers ended by

negotiations without any concessions. The “voice of force” became louder and more dominant

following the second massacre of soldiers at Rafah in August, 2013 (after the coup and Rabaa

sit-in massacre).15

Since then, the voices of those in the military intelligence services who are

serving in Sinai were subdued, aware of the danger of being implicated in encroachments

against the local inhabitants, the effects of which would not easily be effaced. This change

caused doubts and led to the questioning of the identity of the perpetrators of the second

13

The truth has not been circulated in the media since the time of Muhammad Morsi of what happened in the

meeting that brought together Yasser Burhami, the deputy leader for the Salafist mission of Alexandria, and the

leaders of the armed Islamist groups in Sinai after the first Rafah massacre. Imad Abdul Ghafur, former assistant

to the President for community dialogue, had previously sent Burhami as a delegate for dialogue with the armed

groups in the border area. At the meeting they gathered in one of the mosques in the Kawthar neighbourhood of

the town of Sheikh Zuwayd near the coast, and one of the heads of the military intelligence services was present.

All those present at the meeting swore that they did not know anything about those who were involved in the

massacre, and when Burhami hinted at the use of force they threatened him, and the Brotherhood behind him,

with a fierce retaliation in the heart of Cairo. Bypassing some details that are difficult to ascertain precisely

through research, some of those present reported that they proved the seriousness of the threat through a piece of

information supplied to the leader of the intelligence services accompanying Burhami about a cell in Cairo that

did not belong to them. This information was supplied as a challenge and a way of displaying their extensive

intelligence penetration outside of Sinai, and close to the main headquarters of the military intelligence services.

A result of this was that the Brotherhood and their allies were compelled to call a truce, and to give up their

hopes for a field victory. The truth, according to this narrative, is that the peace between the Brotherhood and the

armed groups was out of fear, not out of desire for a deal. 14

I will discuss this claim properly and put forward my argument for it in the following pages. 15

The first massacre was in August 2012, two months after Morsi's inauguration.

7

massacre, even through posing the traditional conspiracy question: who had gained the most

from the massacre? It is a serious possibility that the perpetrators of the second massacre were

aware of the conflicting perspectives of the strategic and combat units within the army, and

were keen to cause a violent response.

This theoretical possibility raises questions about the operational capacity of regional players

(for example Israel) to carry out an operation (the second massacre). This massacre had 25

unarmed victims travelling from Arish to their battalion headquarters in the town of Rafah,

unescorted, after spending the night in the transport station in Arish where they waited for the

end of the night curfew. Perhaps Israel’s penetration deep into Egypt with the assassination

operation of the leader of Ansar Beit El-Maqdis (ABM), Ibrahim Awidah, or the kidnapping

of Wael Abu Rida, the leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, from the heart of the

Nile Valley where he was travelling to get medical treatment for his son, might provide an

answer to these questions.16

Despite the fact that no accusations have been officially levelled

at any party over the first assassination of soldiers, for which all the armed groups in Sinai

have been cleared of responsibility, the elimination of an entire military unit of 16 soldiers

(the first massacre) in their base with their military uniform and light and heavy weapons

points to the capability of “unknowns” to carry out operations of this size with political and

strategic goals that may not be clear until years afterwards.

At the level of operations, it is not currently possible to write about this beyond the damaging

human and economic costs and the dreadful encroachments that the Egyptian regime’s forces

have been involved in under the leadership of Ahmed Wasfy, commander of the second field

army, and under the supervision of the chief of staff and the general commander. Precise

information about operations is not available except for the claims of the official narrative

regarding detainees and other issues, along with statements by armed groups, particularly

ABM, which claim partial victories over the forces of the regime in specific battles. It is not

currently possible for an investigator in the combat zone to conduct interviews with either of

the two sides, or to travel around and keep track of the effects of the operations in a detailed

and analytical fashion. This is because operations are still ongoing and security

reinforcements have reached the point where communications networks are cut off for no less

than eight hours every day. It is certainly not possible to look to the propaganda war and to

statements from either side as a source of information, although it has been established that

the content of the statements issued by the armed groups remain more reliable and accurate

than those issued by the military spokesman. But in the end, such statements are a tool of war,

deliberately used to make public certain things and to hide others.17

Some accounts have been published in the media of routine violations committed by army

forces of the rights of thousands of citizens living in the border region of northern Sinai. 18

It

16

Alexandrani, Ismail, ‘Repeated Israeli Security Breaches in Sinai and the Question of Sovereignty and

Efficiency,’ I love Sinai entry of 20th July 2013. (In Arabic) http://wp.me/p1xe8K-4q 17

Media statements of the armed groups ignore the mention of deaths of non-Sinai people who were buried as

“martyrs of field struggle” without being washed or placed in a shroud and without any funeral rites. Not one of

the locals missed them because they had come from the Nile Valley and were camouflaged by living with group

members among the locals. 18

‘Counter Terrorism Operations or Collective Punishment?’ Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar, 14 September

2012. (In Arabic) http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/191238

8

could take many years to prove that these violations constituted ‘war crimes’ but there is no

doubt that they have included forced migration, the destruction of homes and farms, and the

bombing of homes and mosques by planes and tanks without evacuation warning, resulting in

the deaths of more than ten children and five women at the end of September 2013. In

addition, private vehicles have been intentionally burnt by the armed forces without the least

reason. Some of the burnt homes were the only refuge for the impoverished Bedouins of the

border region. There have been successive testimonies of homes being routinely plundered of

money and jewellery, and even of clothes, furniture and food, before being burned in their

entirety, with no suspects ever being accused or arrested during these operations.19

All of these actions have social, economic and political effects, but they do not give

information sufficient for an analysis of the operations that are currently taking place. Some

pictures, videos and local accounts attest to the veracity of claims by armed groups of losses

inflicted on the army in this technically unequal war, which is difficult to classify as urban

conflict, or as a war on rugged ground. The truth is that the land where the operations are

being carried out is open and flat, far from the mountains in the middle of Sinai, around which

empty myths about security are woven (such as that of al-Halal mountain).20

. Members of the

armed groups are tactically withdrawing outside the villages and are mostly not captured in

home raids. They then manoeuvred the regime’s forces and target their vehicles with

explosives on the roads between villages.

Terrorist groups or armed resistance/rebel groups that have been

redirected?

It is not possible for any researcher to judge the intentions of any party. Instead, researchers

must undertake a sound analysis of the practical positions and rhetoric issuing from different

parties in order to deduce probable outcomes. Therefore, to cast doubt on the intentions of any

armed groups without palpable evidence of practice or public statements is not possible. I will

try, however, to answer a secondary question: whether armed groups in Sinai have been

terrorists since their establishment or whether they were rebels against the authority of the

state (and its strategies and international treaties), who were forced to depart from their path

to become terrorists later. 21

19

Al Akhbar investigates in the villages of Sinai and examines the damage and the victims of random

operations: testimonies and cases of deaths are a refutation of the military narrative, Lebanese newspaper Al

Akhbar 18th September 2013. (In Arabic) http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/191500 20

Mount Halal lies northeast of the city of Nekhel in the middle of Sinai, and southeast of the city of Al Arish,

and extends more than 40 kilometres longitudinally between the lands of the Tiyaha tribe and the lands of the

Tarabin tribe. Some of the most wanted criminals from the Tarabin tribe fled there in the era of Habib al Adly,

Mubarak’s Interior Minister, and untrue myths were woven around it, that it was a place of refuge and hiding for

armed ideological groups, making it impossible for the tribes living there to refuse the harbouring of wanted

strangers. 21

The second paragraph of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel signed on March 26th, 1979,

stipulates that: “each party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not

originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any

other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other party. Each party

also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of

9

Any researcher looking into armed groups in Sinai is faced with a great stock of declared

positions and rhetoric which seems coherent and which has not changed significantly other

than in ways explained by brutal and oppressive military actions. In contrast, there are some

incoherent analyses of these groups that have been circulated in the media and in non-

specialist circles that lack precise information and a chronological analysis of their declared

positions and evolving discourse.

In the following paragraphs, I will try to describe the positions of the armed Islamist groups in

Sinai, their operations and the development of their discourse.

Egyptians have been very amused by the “masked” character who has targeted the gas

pipeline that supplies Israel 13 times without being arrested. The description of “the masked

one” in official media statements from security services soon transformed into the Egyptian

jihadi version of “Robin Hood”, who braves great danger for the sake of preserving the

nation’s wealth that belongs to the people, most of whom are poor. The “masked one” has

remained a popular hero in the cyberspace and the hash tag “the masked one” (Al-Molatham)

has spread on Twitter, until the masked ones revealed themselves in 2012 with a thirty minute

film titled “if you come back, we’ll come back”, and for the first time the name of the group,

Ansar Beit El-Maqdis (ABM), was spread.

The film showed detailed aspects of the investigations carried out by group members around

the pipeline, the planning phase, and selections from the execution of the fifth, tenth and

thirteenth operations, with voiceovers from Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri praising

them. It was clear that the film had been made with relatively advanced techniques in filming,

recording and editing. Analysis of the film also revealed a high level of preparation and their

focus on the Egyptian and Israeli press, indicating their religious and patriotic motives for

these operations.

The targeting of the pipeline stopped with the announcement of the Supreme Council of the

Armed Forces (SCAF), when it was in power, that the supply of natural gas to Israel would be

halted. The decision came in accordance with a court decision that the gas deal was null and

void due to corruption in the circle of former President Mubarak, his exiled friend,

businessman Hussein Salem, and Samih Fahmi, the former Petroleum Minister. After that, the

operations of ABM focused on the interior of the occupied Palestinian territory. They targeted

an Israeli car in the Negev desert close to the border with Sinai, and carried out a number of

operations in Eilat (Um al-Rashrash) which they filmed and broadcast on Youtube.

Among the operations that have revealed the extent of Israeli penetration of Egyptian security

in the Sinai was the assassination of the leader of ABM and one of the perpetrators of the

Eilat attack, Ibrahim Oweida Bereikat, on 26 August 26 2012, challenging Egyptian powers.

The elimination of Oweida Bereikat was carried out by an assassination squad composed of

four members of the Israeli army with the cooperation of three Egyptian spies. There had been

cross border meetings and plans exchanged by the two sides. The operation was carried out by

an Israeli drone, 15 kilometres inside the Egyptian borders in the village of Khereiza in the

middle of Sinai. In a recorded video broadcast by ABM on Youtube on 11 September 2012,

belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that

perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.”

10

Meneizel Muhammad Suleiman Salamah confessed that he was the main spy in the operation,

that he had recruited both Salamah Muhammad Salamah al Oweidah and Suleiman Salamah

Hamdan, and that Salamah al Oweidah had planted the chip under the fuel tank of Oweida's

motorcycle which exploded when the circuit closed.

ABM took revenge by cutting off the head of Meneizel Salamah and throwing it in the road

between the border villages al Barth and al Mahdiyyah. Suleiman Hamdan’s family disowned

him and handed him over and he was killed, while Salamah Oweida fled into the occupied

Palestinian territories under the protection of the Israeli intelligence services.22

The Israeli army repeated its penetration of Sinai in June 2013 when it kidnapped Wael Abu

Ridda, the leader of the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza strip, who was on a trip to Cairo

to get medical treatment for his son. He was brought into the occupied Palestinian territories

through Sinai by a Bedouin group that was cooperating with the Israeli services after being

taken from the heart of the Egyptian capital. According to a Palestinian media, Abu Rida’s

family in Gaza received a call from an unknown number a few days after he was kidnapped,

in which the caller said that he was from Mossad, that Abu Rida had been detained by them

and was in Ashkelon prison, and advised them to engage a lawyer in the occupied territories

to defend him. They were told that if they wanted peace of mind about him they should

contact the Red Cross. The Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar published a local informer’s

confirmation of the veracity of the details of the kidnapping of Abu Rida. The account

mentioned his escape from a number of attempts to kidnap him within Gaza, and expressed

his regret that this operation had finally succeeded through the penetration of Egyptian

national security.23

According to the Egyptian newspaper Al-Shorouq, the newspaper Haaretz revealed through

intelligence and strategic affairs analyst, Yossi Melman, that the Israeli General Security

Service (Shabak) had established a specialist unit called the “Sinai unit” to foil operations it

considered to be 'terrorist'.24

But it is not possible to understand this or any other information

about the penetration as being aimed at reducing the power of only the Brotherhood, since 4

Egyptian soldiers were killed by Israelis at the border of Taba in southern Sinai in September

2011 at the time of the SCAF’s rule. The Israeli penetration, however, reached its greatest

extent under the rule of the army after the coup. International news agencies reported the

killing of five jihadists in August 2013 over Eid al Fitr in Sinai by missiles fired by an Israeli

22

It is striking that the operation of identifying those involved and ambushing two of them took only three days,

while the elimination of an entire Egyptian military unit comprising 16 soldiers was carried out at the “Horiyya”

border point in August, and no announcement was made about who was involved nor were any official

accusations leveled at any local or regional group until the writing of this paper, more than a year later.

According to local Bedouins who have been cooperating with the Egyptian security and intelligence services,

one of the reasons for the superiority of the jihadi groups over the regime’s agencies is that they have been

seeking help from local professional trackers whom the Egyptian agencies do not trust and with whom they do

not officially cooperate. 23

Alexandrani, Ismail, ‘Repeated Israeli Security Breaches in Sinai and the Question of sovereignty and

Efficiency’, ibid. 24

‘Israeli Counter-terrorism Special Unit,’ Al-Shorouk, 16 July 2013.

http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=16072013&id=9243aba9-608e-4fdc-a36f-2460d219c922

11

drone close to the border.25

The Egyptian military spokesman was content with a brief

comment on Facebook indicating that two explosions were heard between international points

10 and 11 at 4pm on 9 August, 2013.26

The denial by the military spokesman of Israeli infringement of Egyptian sovereignty did not

hold for long, however, since ABM issued a statement on the morning of Saturday 10 August

announcing the death of four martyrs. ABM gave their names and the two tribes they

belonged to, “Al Tiyahah” and “Al Sowarkah”, and the border villages they lived in, and

explained that the fifth, their leader, was safe, without mentioning his name. The statement

levelled a frank accusation at the Egyptian army of working for Israel, and included eye

witness testimonials of inhabitants who saw an Egyptian military plane flying over the region

and then withdrawing, and an Israeli drone then appearing and dropping two missiles and

killing the four jihadists while they were preparing three rockets aimed in the direction of

Israeli settlements close to the border. This testimony fits with what was reported in the local

Sinai media according to the website “Sinai Now TV” on the internet. The ABM statement

also pointed out the announcement in the Israeli and international media of the security

cooperation between Egypt and Israel in this operation, which ABM considered as proof of

the guilt of the Egyptian army.

The matching of the content of ABM statement with what was published in the international

media and the Israeli press put the Egyptian military authorities in a critical position and

pushed Middle East News Agency (MENA), the main press outlet for the Egyptian

authorities, to publish a claim from an unnamed “high military source” that the bombing of

the four jihadists was carried out by two aircraft, “Apache” and “Gazelle”, belonging to the

Egyptian army. Though the unknown security source relied upon the account of the civilian

sighting of the Egyptian Apache aircraft, he also claimed, untruthfully, that they had seen the

“Gazelle” plane. However, the eyewitnesses quoted in the ABM statement had been certain

that the missiles were fired not from the Apache aircraft but from the Israeli side and that it

was very easy to see the direction from which the missiles fell because it was a sunny clear

day. The official narrative continued to push forward these lies among the truths and claimed

that two of the jihadists had taken possession of a motorcycle, which was true, as well as that

the rockets were aimed in the direction of Egyptian land. This contradicts the picture

published by Sinai Now news page which was taken by the Sinai journalist Ahmed Abu

Deraa of one of the rockets aimed in the direction of the occupied territories, not to mention

the lack of logic in aiming at the Egyptian mainland from the furthest point of the border. The

unidentified Egyptian security source concluded with a statement about high confidentiality,

25

‘Officials to AP: Israeli drone strike kills 5 Egypt’. Ahram Online. 9 August 2013, Accessed 10 October 2013.

http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/78692/Egypt/Politics-/Officials-to-AP-Israeli-drone-strike-kills--

in-Egy.aspx 26

With a dictation mistake, the military spokesman said that the explosions had taken place at a distance of three

kilometres west of the international border line in the region of Al Agraa, which he wrote on his Al Agrah page.

The publication of his statement can be reached at the following link:

https://www.facebook.com/Egy.Army.Spox/posts/353197188144603

12

the impenetrability of the Egyptian airspace to any breaches, and denial of the news published

via satellite agencies and websites.27

Salafiyya Jihadiyya Group (SJG) did not hesitate to reply with a statement on Sunday 11

August to the untrue narrative of the military spokesman and other military leaders over the

state controlled media, and confirmed the accusations levelled by their associates ABM

regarding the Egyptian army of working for and serving the interests of the Israel.28

In their

statement, SJG indicated that Israeli encroachments had gone further than breaching the

Israeli airspace to carrying out operations against targets in Egypt with the permission and

coordination of the Egyptians. Egyptian military planes had not been allowed to fly in the

border region since 1967 until they were given permission to do so by Israel in 2012 for

reasons connected with the hunt for the armed groups as a “common enemy” of the two sides.

Alongside the statement by SJG, another organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council in the

Environs of Jerusalem – Aknaf Beit el-Maqdis (MSC – ABM), issued statement number 39 on

10 August 2013, which also confirmed the story of ABM and announced the death of the four

“martyrs” with their names and tribes. The statement of the MSC-ABM also accused the

Egyptian army of killing and burning the mujahideen in Sinai during Ramadan of the previous

year. They claimed that in August 2012, the operation known as “Eagle 2” killed a group of

mujahideen who were responsible for the repeated explosions of the pipeline supplying

Egyptian gas to Israel. In addition, the latter statement connected the incident with an

accusation against the Egyptian army of killing those praying and demonstrating in the

squares of Cairo and Alexandria, hinting at the events at the Republican Guard club (Cairo)

and the Al-Qaed Ibrahim Mosque (Alexandria) last Ramadan (2013). The statement ended by

exhorting the tribes of Sinai to rally around their sons of Mujahideen.

On the afternoon of 10 August, hundreds of private vehicles set out in a long funeral

procession for the solemn burial of the four jihadists: Hussein Ibrahim Salem al Tihi, Yusri

Muhaareb al Sawaarkah, Ibrahim Khalaf al Munei'I, and Muhammad Hussein al Munei'I. The

members of the armed groups forbade local journalists and citizens from using recording

devices, threatening to shoot anyone who used a camera. In a special video recording by the

armed groups that was filmed from a distance to avoid clearly showing the faces of the

deceased, hundreds of cars full of people are shown joining the processions for the funeral of

the four, before it then turned into a march chanting Islamist slogans against the Zionists, not

against the Egyptian authorities.

The Egyptian armed forces reacted by sending military planes to the village of Thoma south

of the city of Shiekh Zuawid. The village was hit by a number of missiles, resulting in the

death of two citizens, Abdullah Ahmed Salem, aged 32, and Jihad Jabr al Suwirky, aged 30.

The military spokesman announced on the official Facebook page on Saturday night (10

August, 2013) the observation of what he called a “terrorist group”, and claimed that some of

them were involved in the killing of 16 soldiers the previous August, and in the kidnapping of

seven soldiers the previous May. Then, the next day, he made another announcement on the

27

‘Security source: The attack on terrorist group in Rafah done by Egyptian Apaches,’ (in Arabic). Shorouk

News, 10 August 2013, Accessed 10 August 2013. http://goo.gl/BbZzET 28

http://alplatformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?t=27385

13

same page in which he estimated that 25 members of "terrorist ingredients" had been killed

and wounded, and that their weapons store had been destroyed. They claimed that the store

was used by terrorist factions in their actions against the armed forces and the civil police and

to frighten civilians in the governorate of northern Sinai.

SJG issued a new statement on Sunday 11 August entitled “The truth about the military

operation in the village of Thoma 10/08/2013 documented with pictures”, describing what

happened as a random raid to deceive public opinion and make the people believe that there

was an Egyptian military operation in El Ajraa, where the four jihadists were killed, and

which was completed in al Thoma.29

The statement claimed that most of the bombing which

continued from 9pm into the early hours of Sunday morning hit the road and the sides of

buildings, and that the two people killed were wounded by fragments from missiles while they

were in a guest house. The statement vehemently denied any link between the victims of the

Thoma bombing and the killing of the soldiers from the “Hurriya” border military unit in

August 2012, or with the kidnapping of the seven soldiers at the end of spring 2013.

In quasi-legal language, not widespread in the rhetoric of Islamist armed groups, the statement

of SJG accused the Egyptian army of committing a number of crimes, including: use of

excessive force and lethal weapons in a random operation that was for show, the deliberate

killing of innocents, and the fabrication of an accusation to justify their deaths without any

investigation or evidence. The statement also accused the army of spreading fear in a

residential area full of women, children and elderly people and of exposing them to danger

without justification, of deceiving public opinion and making empty accusations against

innocent people with no proof, and of claiming to have carried out imaginary heroic acts

while in fact cooperating with the enemy of the Ummah by opening its airspace so that the

enemy could carry out espionage and killing as it wished. The statement was accompanied by

pictures of the corpses of the two people killed, a picture of the traces of the bombing on the

wall of one of the houses, and three pictures of the other missile attacks, in one of which

appears a child, Amar Abdullay Ahmed Salem, aged 10, who was one of eight children

orphaned by the army’s attack on the village of Al Thoma.

On the morning of Tuesday 13 August, the MSC-ABM issued its 40th

statement, and

announced its responsibility for the firing of a Grad missile at the village of Eilat an hour after

dawn that day.30

The statement derided the Israeli panic which led the inhabitants to hide

underground, and to the announcement by the Israeli authorities that three rockets had fallen

and others had been blocked. The statement announced that the operation came as a swift

reaction to the killing of the four jihadists, and that its perpetrators had returned safely and

were planning more operations31

.

On Wednesday 14 August, a sit-in in Nahdah square in Giza was broken up with tens of

people were killed. The same day, a slaughter began at dawn with an attack on the sit-in in

29

Published on Sinai Now TV page on Facebook on 10 August 2013.

https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.513301388750840.1073741831.125077947573188&type=1 30

http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1201281#.UxNNKGJ_uSo 31

This was the latest hostile operation targeting the occupation forces in the occupied Palestinian territories up to

the time of writing the original paper (November 2013), and it is expected that it will be the last operation for a

long time on account of the widespread military operations that have been ongoing since September 7th 2013.

14

Rabaa square in the east of Cairo. Hundreds of unarmed civilians were killed. This was the

slaughter that added to the discourse of religious solidarity in all the following statements of

the armed Sinai groups. It was noticeable in the discourse of the Salafi jihadist groups in Sinai

that they distanced themselves from making any accusation or declaration of hostility against

the Egyptian authorities and the regime’s army and police forces until after the fall of the four

members of ABM on Eid al Fitr and the escalation of the Egyptian army’s activity against the

groups and their home environment. It appeared that it was the groups' strategic choice, and it

was reaffirmed immediately after the second massacre of soldiers on 19 August, 2013. The

afternoon of the same day, less than five hours after the killing, the ABM broadcast a video

recording of the seven soldiers formerly kidnapped and released in May 2013. 32

The soldiers

appeared in a good state of health and one of them spoke and thanked ABM for mediating

their release and for dealing with them so well. The group made an appeal to President

Mohammad Morsi through the solider, demanding the release of their prisoners.

It appeared that the broadcasting of this video three months after it was recorded was a

message to guarantee exoneration from implication in the killing of the 25 soldiers in the

second massacre, and was a message aimed both at national and local public opinion. The

funeral of the four members who were killed had revealed an outpouring of popular local

sentiment, which risked being lost if ABM were found guilty of killing the soldiers. Two

weeks had barely passed before a controversial statement entitled “Revenge attack for the

Muslims of Egypt”, in which ABM embraced an attempt to assassinate Muhammad Ibrahim,

Egyptian Minister of the Interior on 4 September.33

The statement was issued on Sunday 8

September, four days after the failed attempt, which took place near the minister’s home and

as a result of which a number of civilians were wounded. The statement shocked the Egyptian

media which seemed to listen for the first time to the organisation which had been carrying

out operations since 2011, and it confused observers who understood that ABM was a group

engaged in jihad/resistance against only the Israeli enemy.

But dynamic analysis must see ABM as a living organization that interacts with events. On

Tuesday 2 September an Egyptian Apache launched a raid on the villages of Al Thoma and al

Muqat’aa, south of the town Sheikh Zawayd. This was the issue which led to the military trial

of the Sinai journalist Ahmed Abu Deraa when he contradicted the official story given by the

army. The local inhabitants, among them Abu Deraa himself, who lives in the village of

Muqata’a, confirmed that the bombing had hit four empty homes in the village of Al Thoma,

one of which consisted of a small shack built by one of the jihadists from the Nile Valley after

the removal of Morsi, who had left it after the attacks of last Eid el Fitr. Homes were also

bombed in the village of Al Muqattaa, and the side of the neighboring Abu Munir mosque

was hit.

While the inhabitants of the two villages confirmed that the raid had not resulted in any

deaths, and that only one of the four wounded had been arrested from the Sheikh Zuwayd

hospital before receiving treatment, the state television announced that more than ten had

32

‘Surprise: Salafi Jihadism in Sinai are the mediators to release the kidnapped soldiers’, (in Arabic).

The original link has been removed because of abuse reporting. Here is another link where the video was re-

loaded: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AfInGG71gIM 33

http://alplatformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?t=28951

15

been killed and many more wounded. The official story, in which it was claimed that an arms

store had been blown up, was also rejected by people living in the neighbourhood where the

buildings were bombed.

SJG in Sinai issued a statement on the morning of Wednesday 3 September describing the

Egyptian army as lying and treacherous, and mentioned the losses inflicted by the raid on

houses owned by civilians and the damage that had occurred to the mosque. The statement

also said that the family house of Yusry Muharib al Suwarikah, who was killed by an Israeli

drone in the last days of Eid al Fitr before he participated in firing rockets at the occupied

territories, had been targeted. The statement was accompanied by around ten photographs

showing the effects of the bombing on the mosque and on the houses, and showing the

remains of what was bombed by the rockets and the details of the American made “Hell fire”

rockets.

On the Israeli side, the website Debka said in a special report published after this operation

that it was the first time in 8 years that the Egyptian army had fulfilled the commitments that

were agreed with Hosni Mubarak in 2005, following the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza

strip.34

According to the report, the Egyptian army had relied upon two simultaneous

strategies since Muhammad Morsi had removed the restrictions on what it referred to as

“terrorists”, who constitute a danger to Egypt and to Israel. These were: the establishment of a

buffer zone along 14 kilometres of the border between Egypt and Gaza, and the establishment

of tens of inspection points for checking whether human and logistical reinforcements were

arriving.

In the report, published on Tuesday 10 September 2013 under a title describing the air strike

as being “in support of the siege on Gaza,” Debka referred to detailed information about the

operation, such as that thirteen rockets were fired at the two villages from two Apache

aircraft, according to military sources. The report relied on the official narrative, which stated

that tens of people had been killed and wounded in the operation, and said it was the most

wide ranging military operation undertaken by the army against what it called “terrorism”.

The Zionist investigative report made a connection between the air strike and the Egyptian

army’s demolition of tunnels in Rafah to restrict what it called the free movement of armed

fighters from Hamas and the jihadists between Gaza and the border area in northern Sinai.

The report concluded by saying that the air strike was in anticipation of what Debka claimed

was a large attack being prepared by the armed jihadists.

The point here is that the discourse of the ABM, which could be classified as armed rebellion

against the state, did not have any content that could categorically be classified as terrorist,

other than the statement of 8 September which added some unnamed media personalities to

the list of those targeted for assassination, accusing them of incitement to kill and of the

elimination of protestors. This is a point of difference between the leading figures of the

Brotherhood, who have made explicit and implicit threats of civil war (even if they did not

have the capacity for it or were the weaker side), and the armed Sinai groups who were forced

to depart from their specific operational plan since 2011 to become an internal enemy

34

http://www.debka.com/newsupdate/5683/

16

involved in clashes with the army within Egyptian territory, which is taking on the role of the

police and internal security in fighting terrorism, though this role for the army was rejected by

the military council in the era of Mubarak, and is in the strategic interests of only Israel.

After the start of the military operations on 7 September 2013, and after ABM published more

than one statement of the losses it inflicted on the regime’s forces (army and special police) a

video recording was broadcast showing a number of clips of the targeting of army forces and

their vehicles. One of these operations was the targeting of a security support point in front of

a government building at the entrance of the Kawther neighbourhood in the town of Al Sheikh

Zuwayd. There was no need to clarify the date of that explosion in the recording, as the

people of the town know it very well, since its force was such that it damaged shop doors in a

large area, including glass doors that were temporarily closed just before Iftar last Ramadan.

This shows that the operations against the regime forces did not begin with the slaughter of

the sit-in (which took place after Ramadan), but went back to what the Salafi jihadists call in

Sinai “slaughters of the prostrated and the fasting”.35

It also proves that it is not sufficient to

study the armed groups by analysing their statements which may not reveal some of their

combat operations or other important information.

Between the political divide and the regional rift

At first glance, the scene appears to be an extension of the political and ideological

polarization between the Islamists and their political opponents. This impression is confirmed

by the ease with which the groups may be classified as ideological armed groups allied with

the former regime of the Brotherhood. This contrasts with the army of the regime committed

to the text of the peace treaty and its international political arrangements, and which supports

the liberal forces which resist the power of the Brotherhood. But these impressions do not

hold for long if examined in the light of the differences between the armed groups in Sinai

and the Brotherhood and its political Islamist allies, such as al-Jama’ah al Islamiyyah and the

Nour party (before differences emerged between the Brotherhood and the Nour party.) The

media statements of the Islamists who chose the political path criticized the operations of

blowing up the gas pipeline and other aggressive acts committed by the Sinai groups, quite

apart from the belittling of what were referred to as the “new jihadists” by the classical

jihadist leaders, and the criticism levelled at their thought, which was not considered adequate

for Islamic jurisprudence, in the view of Nabil Naim and Kemal Habib, for example, and their

lack of a political project.36

35

This refers to the two massacres at the Republican Guard house and memorial monument in Cairo, and the

firing on people demonstrating in Al Arish who were praying in front of the governorate building in Ramadan, as

well as the events at al Qa’id Ibrahim mosque in Alexandria when some Morsi supporters were trapped inside

the mosque for a whole night, and some were wounded. 36

‘“Unity and jihad”: the Islamic Emirate in Mount Halal’, Al Watan newspaper, 13 August 2012. (In Arabic)

http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/37413

It has become clear that the journalist investigation published in Al Watan newspaper cannot be relied upon for

what it says about the armed groups in Sinai, as it gives only the position of the classical jihadi leaders who have

named them “neo jihadis”. Otherwise, it is a press article that was written from a distance to satisfy the official

security narrative without any field investigation or interviews in Sinai.

17

The political Islamists allied with the Brotherhood lacked a minimal understanding of the map

of the armed groups in Sinai and the differences between them. After the crisis of the

kidnapping of the seven soldiers in May 2013, Tareq al Ramz, the head of the Construction

and Development party (CDP), the political wing of the Egyptian Islamic group (al-Jama’ah

al-Islamiyyah), contacted me and suggested that I help the Presidency and explain the form of

the groups, by virtue of my research knowledge, since the Brotherhood lacked this kind of

information. There was an assumption in al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah and among its leaders,

who are considered historic leaders of classical jihadism, that it has a connection with, or at

least monitoring of, these groups, but this assumption was not true. During my interviews in

2012, I got an impression of the views of most of the armed Sinai groups regarding most of

the historic figures of the al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah group and the jihad movement. The latter

were notorious for making revisions to their ideas when coming out of prison, and the

revisions they made were considered to represent a submission to the regime. There were

doubts over the integrity of those who came out of prison in the era of Mubarak and they were

accused of making deals to get out, because most of those who completed their prison

sentence years before the revolution did not get out until afterwards.

As for the armed Sinai groups, they did not stop their operations during the rule of

Muhammad Morsi, announcing their solidarity with the Salafi jihadists in Gaza against what

they considered to be restrictions placed upon them by Hamas. It is true that they did not

denounce the Brotherhood and the Salafis in their statements as apostates, but all among the

inhabitants of the border area who have come into contact with them know very well that they

consider the Brotherhood to be irreligious and view the Brotherhood rule as that of a tyrant

which does not rule according to the shari’a, and has not proclaimed jihad against the Zionists

to liberate the holy places in Palestine. In addition, they have a hostile ideological position

against democracy. The Brotherhood disappointed the expectations of the Islamist support

base concerning, for example, the benefits of an IMF loan. Regardless of ideological purity or

of penetration by security or intelligence agents, I tend to consider the armed Sinai groups as

living beings that interact with their environment and are influenced by it. This may explain

their discourse of solidarity with the protestors and victims of the slaughters carried out by the

army, and their withdrawal of the criticism of democracy (which from their point of view is

the preserve of the unbelievers).

Behind this debate, which I claim is not of decisive importance, are other problems which are

not examined by the human rights activists or the media, even by those who are most

emancipated from the official narrative. Ordinary people in northern Sinai, especially the

Bedouins of the border region, are neither concerned with the political divide nor with the

debate around whether the takeover of 3 July was a coup or otherwise. The inhabitants of the

border region live between the ‘hammer’ of the army and the ‘anvil’ of the armed groups.

Even those who would like a ceasefire and to save the lives of citizens do not feel safe with

either of the two sides. If either side knew of contact with the other, it would target them; the

army would arrest them, kill them, or burn their house, while the armed groups would kill

them. The inhabitants of Sinai are angry about the practices of the army, which they compare

18

with the behaviour of all the armies that have previously been in Sinai during its

contemporary history: the Ottomans, the English and the Israelis. Their anger is particularly

directed at the army’s excessive violations and random collective punishments that are

unprecedented in the history of Sinai. But it is also true that they are not happy with the rule

of the Brotherhood, mainly due to local reasons. The Brotherhood in Arish did not hesitate to

join in the conflict over resources in the region whenever the opportunity presented itself, as

occurred with the plans to rebuild Gaza after Qatar made a gift of 500 million dollars.37

It

could therefore be said that the majority of the inhabitants of Sinai, especially those in the

border regions, are outside the polarized political debate. The political competition does not

concern them as much as their personal safety and basic rights.

Under the surface of the political divide lies a regional rift that strikes into the depths of the

souls of the local people, a rift which widens as they become more isolated, and have less

interaction with people outside their local society. During my second visit from 3 to 10

October 2013 during the military operations, some of my friends among the Bedouins

revealed something they have not said during research and press interviews, and would not

say unless speaking personally to a trusted person. They spoke about the negative view that

local people hold of the delegates from the Nile Valley. The administrators who entered the

region after the Israeli withdrawal in 1982 mostly cooperated with the security services when

there was doubt over the loyalty of the Bedouins to the Egyptian state. The delegates oversaw

the administrative posts and all the governmental privileges and created networks from their

extended families to act for their own parasitic interest and advantages, both in society and in

the security network.

After being delayed four times, the school year began in northern Sinai in November. The

pupils were present and the teachers were absent, since most of them were outside the border

villages and had to travel to get there. Whilst they are attending they are barely attempting to

keep pace with the central education system which has little relevance to the local situation.

The girls need to obtain a preparatory certificate so that they can teach their children when

they are married, and the boys need to obtain a certificate so that they can obtain a driver’s

license. As for the educational content and the skills obtained, or a guarantee of fair

opportunities for employment or healthcare, or the right to water or housing, none of these

matters are on the agenda of the military operations. Perhaps the people’s growing

susceptibility to taking part in terrorist activities is a popular way of continuing to question the

legitimacy of the war on terror.

When the crisis in Sinai deepened, many people from the Nile Valley living in Sinai took

refuge back in their towns of birth, from which they had perhaps been moved as a punitive

measure, sending them to a remote region. This led to the multiplication of societal fractures.

The local inhabitants felt disappointed with those who fled back to the Nile Valley. They felt

that those who had taken all the privileges and abused their powers had fled, and that their

sense of superiority – which sometimes reached the level of disdain – for the Bedouins and

the people of Sinai was undiminished. Now, the local inhabitants see the future of the region

37

Alexandrani, Ismail, ‘Mafia of Building Materials: Businessman, Brothers, Army, and Tribes’, Lebanese Al

Akhbar newspaper, 30th May 2013. (In Arabic) http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/184065

19

from the West Bank to the Suez Canal as a vision of national colonization, monopolized by

the police and military professions, while the locals of Sinai are deprived of compulsory

service in the army like the rest of the citizens. They are confronted by a colonizer dressed in

civilian clothes and seeking commercial gain through unjust relationships that rely on

bureaucratic influence and the favouritism of the security services for delegates from the Nile

Valley. When someone from the Nile Valley talks about development and construction in

Sinai, he sees no problem at all in repeating slogans on local settlement such as “bring 3

million from the Delta to Sinai”, as though talking about the colonisation of Sinai rather than

construction, and as if it were a “land without people” for a people whose land is too crowded.

One of the Bedouins who is hostile to the armed groups said “this is our land and we will stay

here. The Turks were here and they left, the English were here and they left, the Jews came

and withdrew, we will endure the harm inflicted by the Egyptians and we will not leave our

land". He said this last Ramadan before the start of the war/extensive operations; in other

words, before the local society in the border area was divided into three sections. The older

people compare the practices of the Egyptian army with the army of the occupation as they

saw and experienced. Those who are middle aged compare its practices with the policies of

the ministry of the interior in the era of Mubarak and his interior minister Habib al Adly,

which caused a storm of vengeance with the igniting of the revolution in January 2011 and the

banning of the police from returning to the border regions until the present. As for the

younger people, they compare what they are living through with the viewpoint brought to

their screens from Syria. At all levels, the rift is only growing. One of the most keen to

strengthen the relationship between the army and local society, who has called the most for

tolerating the army’s mistakes, is Hajj Hassan Khalaf, a veteran and war hero, who did not

submit to the random bullets of the army that took one of his sons and killed him one month

before his marriage. This incident was added in the collective local consciousness to an

unending list of events and testimonies that contribute to the lack of trust and the lack of

expectation of anything good from the central state and everything in its orbit.

I was doubtful of what my friends among the Bedouins told me. They asked that I did not

make evaluations of them but that I tried to understand that they have many neighbours and

relatives who are very cut off and do not have much contact with anyone outside their

restricted environment. But in a number of unofficial interviews with friends in Al-Arish,

some of whom are revolutionaries and important local figures in the community, it became

clear that what the Bedouins are expressing is one aspect of a huge societal rift. Despite the

atrocities that have been committed against the rights of the inhabitants of the border region,

most of the urban people in Al-Arish do not express the least bit of sympathy with their

victims. The local regional fanaticism in Sinai has flared up between the urban society in Al-

Arish and the Bedouins through some of the aggressive acts and attitudes carried out by some

of the Bedouins. Some Bedouins had perhaps never seen a city like al Arish in their lives,

since their movement prior to the revolution was curtailed. They had never been allowed to

see beyond their small world of the desert. For some residents in Al-Arish, their regional bias

overcomes their ideological leanings. Some of the Muslim Brothers of Al Arish speak frankly

to those close to them when far from their political assignments to produce propaganda for the

violations of the army in Sinai. They declare that they are happy about this kind of “purge”,

20

because they, like most of the urban residents in Al-Arish, do not view the border area as

anything other than a source of gangsters, terrorism, and other troubles. This divide in

sentiment between the Muslim Brothers of Al Arish and the inhabitants of the border areas is

strengthened by the absence of any organizational presence of the Brotherhood east of Al

Arish. The towns of Sheikh Zuwayd and Rafah and the adjacent villages have more extremist

inclinations, ranging from Salafi advocacy to both peaceful and armed takfiri groups.38

Who will pay the bill of the future?

It is beyond the sphere of this paper to seek the reasons for the regional conflict and to trace

its origins and motives. But it appears that the deepening of the regional split between the Nile

Valley and Sinai generally, and between Al Arish and the border area in particular, is not the

only disaster that has resulted from the military operations and the associated dreadful

infringements and random collective punishment. If the deracination of terrorism requires

human development that is concerned with the dignity of life, social cohesion, education,

healthcare and a moderate religious orientation, then the reality of the central military and

governmental regime’s policies is going in completely the opposite direction.

The barbaric behaviour, close to that of armed mercenaries, that the inhabitants of the border

areas of Sinai have suffered in recent weeks is completely destroying the possibility of

establishing a respectful relationship between the citizens in Sinai and the state, whose

soldiers have stolen the jewellery of Sinai’s women, the food from its children, have burned

furniture, destroyed walls and uprooted olive trees before departing. When armoured cars and

tanks storm schools and destroy gates so that the forces can take control of them and turn

them into temporary camps, this indicates the status of education among the priorities of the

tyrannical military regime which controls Sinai. The imposition of a curfew from 4pm

without any official public resolution, the cutting of communication networks for long periods

each day, and a succession of testimonials of ambulances being forbidden to transport the

wounded except on occasion through the mediation of the MFO forces, all show the single

mindedness of the current security perspective which looks no further than raising the morale

of soldiers who are confused and threatened.

The security state has experienced the repercussions of building anger in the hearts of the

Bedouins of the border region. The January 2011 revolution was peaceful in all of Egypt,

including Al Arish, while for the towns of Sheikh Zuwayd and Rafah, the death of the first

martyr signalled the end of peacefulness among the Bedouin revolutionaries. After this point,

stones were replaced with bullets, and they fired at the central security camp in Rafah as well

as at a police station in Al-Arish with RBJ.39

The recent decisions by the army, the voice of

38

For more information, Ismail Alexandrani, ‘What is the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Armed

Groups in Northern Sinai?’ Lebanese Al Akhbar newspaper, 26 August 2013. (In Arabic)

http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/189566 39

Ismail Alexandrani, Revenge and Revolution: Why does the north revolt and not the south? Jadaliyya website

10th May 2013. (In Arabic)

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11620/arabic

21

force, do not show that they have learned the lesson from the police, who are paying the

penalty for this even up to now, and will continue to pay the price in the border region for a

long time. The most experienced wing, which has most deeply penetrated the local Sinai

society and acts as the voice of reason, is betting on the long term connections with the people

of Sinai. They believe the people will not support a tendency that is in the interest of their

historical enemy (and current friend of the state), so the generation of those in their 20s and

30s in the border area will not stand idly and do nothing in the face of this dual threat.

Locals from Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayd have described requests they have made of the

dominant intelligence agencies to invite sheikhs from Al Azhar to give a moderate religious

address, and to contain the young religious people who do not hear anything other than

extremist Salafi and Takfiri discourse in the border area. The intelligence agency response

was negative, telling the initiators that the local sheikhs were enough. With a declining level

of education that makes the reading by youth groups of the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Abu Ala

Al Mawdudi and even of Imam Al Sharif and Shukri Mostafa an intellectual luxury, it would

not be strange if in the near future there were to be a spread of the 'One Man Army'

phenomena, in which a man blows himself up without working with any organization or

coordinating with anybody else. For the young people, their options are much broader than

the duality of loyalty to the Egyptian state in return for a commission by forces of occupation,

and these options may not be controlled or dominated from one side.