War-No War Core - Gonzaga 2013

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Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013 Yes/No War Core

Aff

Globalization has made war obsolete – great powers and rising states need internationalinstitutions to surviveIkenbarry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and Deudney,

professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, 2009

(Daniel and G. John, Jan/Feb, ―The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p.8, EB)It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracieswill become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be

competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even moreconflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the ShanghaiCooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian

dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint the picture of an international system marked by

rising levels of conflict and competition, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growingconvergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments andignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe, themost striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic

globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure ofthe international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, thecontemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities — of

pushes and pulls — that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives forcooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also

fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from aroutine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers

possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare amongthese states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in thegreat powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts.Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limitedthe ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria,Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the

nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorialcontrol; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something inreturn. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production

networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, totake one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist

regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the

economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocraticrevivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international

system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which theycould reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefitthemselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simplecomparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capabilitydo not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of

liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or evenof a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China




and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions thatmake up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto

power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, areconfigured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions.The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside andthrough the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these

autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that pointtoward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges ontheir ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on internationaltrade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on aliberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes inorder to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist

states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining anopen, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and

investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basicdependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive

dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies inimporting states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states

are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilersintent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of thecapitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international

borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people — particularly upwardlymobile and educated elites — have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growingnumbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational

educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values andorientations of these networks, stark: "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and

sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of theinternational diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its

neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a

satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there arestrong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global

problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interestsacross states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are

democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in pricestability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International EnergyAgency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of globalwarming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and

cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is notonly a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-

induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means

that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovativesolutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose globalthreats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration andcooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based

on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The declining utility of war, thethickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmentalinterdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point tothe renewed value of international integration and cooperation.




Nuclear weapons deter all war – empirics proveTepperman, LL.M. in International Law from NYU, former Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs,

2009

(Jonathan, 8-28-9, The Daily Beast, ―Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,‖http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html,

accessed 7-14-13, EB)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make theworld more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In thisera of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few

politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes

would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character fora pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's noteven clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can andshould take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a

nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclearweapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war

between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate

how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, theleading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We nowhave 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for thatsubstantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why — and why the

next 64 years are likely to play out the same way — you need to start by recognizing that all states arerational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to dothings only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fightonly when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddamwaged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make

the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side — and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclearweapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly,when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button — and everybody

knows it — the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with anuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win

and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destructionis so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch sincethe end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did

fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matchedthe furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50

million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's verygood reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases

is fundamentally reassuring — because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safeconclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October

1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But bothcountries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains

for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev'saide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that,maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemiesslide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India andPakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998.

Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it diddramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html




another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were

careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, anIndiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has foundthat on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962.The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in

each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists — and there are many — insist thateven if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first isthat today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Takethe sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or MahmoudAhmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, accordingto some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear

obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes — and there's no deterring rogues.But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way

from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" theUnited States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad

because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang andTehran support terrorism — but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch

of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both wereresponsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, theirregimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's

antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its lifeis on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington andJerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win.

North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; itsoverwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a

few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to returnto the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behaviorsuggests they have a death wish.

Peacekeeping contains rogue states and rising powersGoldstein, professor emeritus of international relations at American University, 2011

(Joshua S., Sept/Oct, Foreign Policy, ―Think Again: War,‖http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war?page=0,0&wp_login_redirect=0,

accessed 7-15-13, EB)In response, the United Nations commissioned a report in 2000, overseen by veteran diplomat Lakhdar

Brahimi, examining how the organization's efforts had gone wrong. By then the U.N. had scaled back peacekeeping personnel by 80 percent worldwide, but as it expanded again the U.N. adapted to lessonslearned. It strengthened planning and logistics capabilities and began deploying more heavily armed

forces able to wade into battle if necessary. As a result, the 15 missions and 100,000 U.N. peacekeepersdeployed worldwide today are meeting with far greater success than their predecessors. Overall, the

presence of peacekeepers has been shown to significantly reduce the likelihood of a war's reigniting aftera cease-fire agreement. In the 1990s, about half of all cease-fires broke down, but in the past decade thefigure has dropped to 12 percent. And though the U.N.'s status as a perennial punching bag in American

politics suggests otherwise, these efforts are quite popular: In a 2007 survey, 79 percent of Americansfavored strengthening the U.N. That's not to say there isn't room for improvement -- there's plenty. But

the U.N. has done a lot of good around the world in containing war. "Some Conflicts Will Never End." Never say never. In 2005, researchers at the U.S. Institute of Peace characterized 14 wars, from NorthernIreland to Kashmir, as "intractable," in that they "resist any kind of settlement or resolution." Six yearslater, however, a funny thing has happened: All but a few of these wars (Israel-Palestine, Somalia, and

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war?page=0,0&wp_login_redirect=0

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war?page=0,0&wp_login_redirect=0




Sudan) have either ended or made substantial progress toward doing so. In Sri Lanka, military victoryended the war, though only after a brutal endgame in which both sides are widely believed to have

committed war crimes. Kashmir has a fairly stable cease-fire. In Colombia, the war sputters on, financed by drug revenue, but with little fighting left. In the Balkans and Northern Ireland, shaky peacearrangements have become less shaky; it's hard to imagine either sliding back into full-scale hostilities. Inmost of the African cases -- Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, and Ivory Coast (notwithstanding the violent flare-up after elections there in late 2010, nowresolved) -- U.N. missions have brought stability and made a return to war less likely (or, in the case ofCongo and Uganda, have at least limited the area of fighting). Could we do even better? The late peaceresearcher Randall Forsberg in 1997 foresaw "a world largely without war," one in which "the vanishingrisk of great-power war has opened the door to a previously unimaginable future -- a future in which waris no longer socially-sanctioned and is rare, brief, and small in scale." Clearly, we are not there yet. But

over the decades -- and indeed, even since Forsberg wrote those words -- norms about wars, andespecially about the protection of civilians caught up in them, have evolved rapidly, far more so than

anyone would have guessed even half a century ago. Similarly rapid shifts in norms preceded the ends ofslavery and colonialism, two other scourges that were once also considered permanent features of

civilization. So don't be surprised if the end of war, too, becomes downright thinkable.

Miscalculation is unlikely and doesn’t escalateMueller, professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, 2010

(John, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, p. 100, EB)However, even if a bomb, or a few bombs, were to go off, it does not necessarily follow that war wouldresult. For that to happen, it is usually assumed, the accident would have to take place at a time of highwar- readiness, as during a crisis, when both sides are poised for action and when one side could perhaps

be triggered — or panicked — into major action by an explosion mistakenly taken to be part of, or the

prelude to, a full attack." This means that the unlikely happening — a nuclear accident — would have tocoincide precisely with an event, a militarized international crisis, something that is rare to begin with,

became more so as the cold war progressed, and has become even less likely since its demise.Furthermore, even if the accident takes place during a crisis, it does not follow that escalation or hastyresponse is inevitable, or even very likely. As Bernard Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially

impute to both sides "a well-nigh limitless concern with saving face" and/or "a great deal of ground-inautomaticity of response and counterresponse." None of this was in evidence during the Cuban missile

crisis when there were accidents galore. An American spy plane was shot down over Cuba, probablywithout authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the SovietUnion. As if that weren't enough, a Soviet military officer spying for the West sent a message, apparently

on a whim, warning that the Soviets were about to attack." None of these remarkable events triggeredanything in the way of precipitous response. They were duly evaluated and then ignored. Robert Jervis

points out that "when critics talk of the impact of irrationality, they imply that all such deviations will bein the direction of emotional impulsiveness, of launching an attack, or of taking actions that are terriblyrisky. But irrationality could also lead a state to passive acquiescence:" In moments of high stress and

threat, people can be said to have three psychological alternatives: (1) to remain calm and rational, (2) torefuse to believe that the threat is imminent or significant, or (3) to panic, lashing out frantically and

incoherently at the threat. Generally, people react in one of the first two ways. In her classic study ofdisaster behavior, Martha Wolfenstein concludes, "The usual reaction is one of being unworried."32 Inaddition, the historical record suggests that wars simply do not begin by accident. In his extensive surveyof wars that have occurred since 1400, diplomat-historian Evan Luard concludes, "It is impossible toidentify a single case in which it can be said that a war started accidentally; in which it was not, at the

time the war broke out, the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." GeoffreyBlainey, after similar study, very much agrees: although many have discussed "accidental" or"unintentional" wars, "it is difficult," he concludes, "to find a war which on investigation fits this




description." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, "Despite popular myths, large military units do notfight by accident."

Silo location and smaller arsenals rule out nuclear winterBall, Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University,

2006

(Desmond, May 2006, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, ―The Probabilities of On the Beach:Assessing ‗Armageddon Scenarios‘ in the 21st Century,‖ working paper, p. 4, EB)

The leading populariser of the ‗Nuclear Winter‘ hypothesis was Carl Sagan, the brilliant planetaryscientist and humanist. He had noticed in 1971, when Mariner 1 was examining Mars, that the planet was

subject to global dust storms which markedly affected the atmospheric and surface temperatures. Largeamounts of dust in the upper atmosphere absorbed sunlight, heating the atmosphere but cooling thesurface, spreading ‗cold and darkness‘ over the planet. He recognised that wholesale ground-bursts of

nuclear weapons and the incineration of hundreds of cities could produce sufficient dust and smoke tocause a similar effect on the Earth. Sagan even postulated the existence of some threshold level — around

100 million tonnes of smoke —for production of ‗Nuclear Winter‘.7 I argued vigorously with Sagan aboutthe ‗Nuclear Winter‘ hypothesis, both in lengthy correspondence and, in August-September 1985, when Iwas a guest in the lovely house he and Ann Druyan had overlooking Ithaca in up-state New York. I

argued that, with more realistic data about the operational characteristics of the respective US and Sovietforce configurations (such as bomber delivery profiles, impact footprints of MIRVed warheads) and more

plausible exchange scenarios, it was impossible to generate anywhere near the postulated levels of smoke.The megatonnage expended on cities (economic/industrial targets) was more likely to be around 140-650than over 1,000; the amount of smoke generated would have ranged from around 18 million tonnes to

perhaps 80 million tonnes. In the case of counter-force scenarios, most missile forces were (and still are)located in either ploughed fields or tundra and, even where they are generally located in forested or

grassed areas, very few of the actual missile silos are less than several kilometres from combustiblematerial. A target-by-target analysis of the actual locations of the strategic nuclear forces in the United

States and the Soviet Union showed that the actual amount of smoke produced even by a 4,000 megatoncounter-force scenario would range from only 300 tonnes (if the exchange occurred in January) to 2,000tonnes (for an exchange in July) — the worst case being a factor of 40 smaller than that postulated by the

‗Nuclear Winter‘ theorists. I thought that it was just as wrong to overestimate the possible consequencesof nuclear war, and to raise the spectre of extermination of human life as a serious likelihood, as to

underestimate them (e.g., by omitting fallout casualties). The current US-Russian nuclear forces The sizesof the US and Russian nuclear stockpiles have declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Theynow have only about 20 percent of the peak number of around 70,000 in 1986, when the Soviet Union

had about 45,000 and the United States about 24,000 (down from a peak of 32,500 in 1967), of which33,800 and 10,550 respectively were classed as tactical or ‗theatre‘ weapons and 11,200 and 13,450 as

strategic. Most of the tactical and theatre weapons have been dismantled and the numbers of strategicweapons halved.

Scenarios for nuclear extinction are exaggerated – scientists ignore the possibility of

adaptation

Martin, research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics at Australian National University, 1984(Brian, May 1984, Scientists Against Nuclear Arms Newsletter, ―Extinction politics,‖ number 16, p. 5-6,

EB)The promotion of beliefs in massive death and destruction from war has been an important facet of theefforts of many peace movements. In the 1930s, British military planners estimated the effects of aerial

bombardment by extrapolating linearly from the very limited experience of bombardments and casualtiesin World War I. On the basis of such assumptions, people such as Philip Noel Baker in the 1930s

predicted the obliteration of civilization from war. But the experience of World War II showed that the1930s military expectations of casualties per tonne of bombs were sizeable overestimates.[1] By the




1950s, a large number of people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world's population would result from global nuclear war. This idea was promoted by the peace movement, among

which the idea of 'overkill' - in the sense that nuclear arsenals could kill everyone on earth several timesover - became an article of faith. Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there wasalmost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach,[2]with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific

evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclearexplosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global fallout has no potential forcausing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over manydecades).[3] In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressedthe question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefsin nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about

stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell's book The Fate ofthe Earth.[4] Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on

effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth's surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclearexplosions. Schell's book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the

book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirelyevaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from

multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozonefrom even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels, andextinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question.[3] The latest stimulus for doomsday

beliefs is 'nuclear winter': the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke fromfires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures,mainly in the northern mid-latitudes.[5] The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths

of up to several hundred million more people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat andradiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The

impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to besignificant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remainsspeculative at present. As in the previous doomsday scenarios, antiwar scientists and peace movements

have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics. Few doubts have been voiced about the evidence

about nuclear winter or the politics of promoting beliefs in nuclear extinction. Opponents of war,including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schellcontinually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack isinevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people

having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecologicalresilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of thescientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoidexamination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilitiesfor migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people

changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatlyextending reserves of food.

A small chance of solving existential risk outweighs every other impactBostrom, Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford University, 2012

(Nick, Global Policy, ―Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority,‖ Volume 4, Issue 1, p. 15 -31, EB)But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk. What makes existentialcatastrophes especially bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the one in figure 3,

causing a precipitous drop in world population or average quality of life. Instead, their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would destroy the future. The philosopher Derek Parfit made a similar pointwith the following thought experiment: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcomewill be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that




kills 99% of the world's existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than(1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe

that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is verymuch greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began onlya few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tinyfraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the

difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible historyto a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. (Parfit 1984, pp. 453-454). To calculatethe loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how much value would come to existin its absence. It turns out that the ultimate potential for Earth-originating intelligent life is literallyastronomical. One gets a large number even if one confines one's consideration to the potential for

biological human beings living on Earth. If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable

for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on itsustainably, then the potential exist for at least 1016 human lives of normal duration. These lives could

also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life, which is so often marred bydisease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through

continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people couldlive on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of

biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is1034 years.7 Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented incomputational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-

brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1071 basic computational operations) (Bostrom 2003).8 If wemake the less conservative assumption that future civilizations could eventually press close to theabsolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher

estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number ofyears of subjective experience that could be realized.9 Even if we use the most conservative of these

estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find thatthe expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1016 human lives. This impliesthat the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at

least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The more technologically comprehensive

estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makesthe same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output

potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that theexpected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point

is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.

Extinction outweighs ethicsBostrum, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, directs the Oxford Future of

Humanity Institute, 2012(Nick, 3-6-12, The Atlantic―We‘re Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,‖ interview with Ross

Anderson, correspondent at The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821, accessed 7-15-12, EB)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papersthat human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society.Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscureor even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from humantechnology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his

concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is alongtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human natureitself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humansmust cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the

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tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as aspecies might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the

most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuriesto come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to bedirecting our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, becausemany of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk

mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can youexplain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth asmuch as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at thecurrent time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point ofview, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less becauseyou move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that

moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you getthis very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much

anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future ifhumanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might

colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than existcurrently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will

tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would betremendous under ordinary standards.

Factors preventing war aren’t reversible Fettweis, professor of political science at Tulane University, 2006

(Christopher J., December, ―A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller IsRight?‖ International Studies Review, Volume 8, Issue 4, EB)

However, one need not be convinced about the potential for ideas to transform international politics to believe that major war is extremely unlikely to recur. Mueller, Mandelbaum, Ray, and others may give

primary credit for the end of major war to ideational evolution akin to that which made slavery anddueling obsolete, but others have interpreted the causal chain quite differently. Neoliberal institutionalistshave long argued that complex economic interdependence can have a pacifying effect upon state behavior

(Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1999) has contended that evolution in socio-economic organization has altered the shortest, most rational route to state prosperity in ways that make

war unlikely. Finally, many others have argued that credit for great power peace can be given to theexistence of nuclear weapons, which make aggression irrational ( Jervis 1989; Kagan et al. 1999). With somany overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations, at times the end of major war may seem to be

overdetermined ( Jervis 2002:8 –9). For purposes of the present discussion, successful identification of theexact cause of this fundamental change in state behavior is probably not as important as belief in its

existence. In other words, the outcome is far more important than the mechanism. The importance ofMueller‘s argument for the field of IR is ultimately not dependent upon why major war has becomeobsolete, only that it has. Almost as significant, all these proposed explanations have one important point

in common: they all imply that change will be permanent. Normative/ideational evolution is typicallyunidirectional. Few would argue that it is likely, for instance, for slavery or dueling to return in this

century. The complexity of economic interdependence is deepening as time goes on and going at aquicker pace. And, obviously, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and (at least at this point) nofoolproof defense against their use seems to be on the horizon. The combination of forces that may have

brought major war to an end seems to be unlikely to allow its return. The twentieth century witnessed anunprecedented pace of evolution in all areas of human endeavor, from science and medicine to philosophy

and religion. In such an atmosphere, it is not difficult to imagine that attitudes toward the venerableinstitution of war may also have experienced rapid evolution and that its obsolescence could become

plausible, perhaps even probable, in spite of thousands of years of violent precedent. The burden of proofwould seem to be on those who maintain that the ‗‗rules of the game‘‘ of international politics, including




the rules of war, are the lone area of human interaction immune to fundamental evolution and that, due tothese immutable and eternal rules, war will always be with us. Rather than ask how major war could have

grown obsolete, perhaps scholars should ask why anyone should believe that it could not.




Neg

War is possible – defense buildup and international tensionsMearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, 99 (John, 2-25-99, ―Is Major War Obsolete?‖ http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10, accessed 7-15-13, EB)

Now I think the central claim that‘s on the table is wrong-headed, and let me tell you why. First of all,

there are a number of good reasons why great powers in the system will think seriously about going towar in the future, and I‘ll give you three of them and try and illustrate some cases. First, states oftentimescompete for economic resources. Is it hard to imagine a situation where a reconstituted Russia gets into awar with the United States and the Persian Gulf over Gulf oil? I don‘t think that‘s im plausible. Is it hardto imagine Japan and China getting into a war in the South China Sea over economic resources? I don‘t

find that hard to imagine. A second reason that states go to war which, of course, is dear to the heart ofrealists like me, and that‘s to enhance their security. Take the United States out of Europe, put the

Germans on their own; you got the Germans on one side and the Russians on the other, and in between ahuge buffer zone called eastern or central Europe. Call it what you want. Is it impossible to imagine theRussians and the Germans getting into a fight over control of that vacuum? Highly likely, no, but feasible,

for sure. Is it hard to imagine Japan and China getting into a war over the South China Sea, not forresource reasons but because Japanese sea-lines of communication run through there and a huge Chinese

navy may threaten it? I don‘t think it‘s impossible to imagine that. What about nationalism, a thirdreason? China, fighting in the United States over Taiwan? You think tha t‘s impossible? I don‘t thinkthat‘s impossible. That‘s a scenario that makes me very nervous. I can figure out all sorts of ways, none of

which are highly likely, that the Chinese and the Americans end up shooting at each other. It doesn‘tnecessarily have to be World War III, but it is great-power war. Chinese and Russians fighting each other

over Siberia? As many of you know, there are huge numbers of Chinese going into Siberia. You startmixing ethnic populations in most areas of the world outside the United States and it‘s usually a

prescription for big trouble. Again, not highly likely, but possible. I could go on and on, positing a lot ofscenarios where great powers have good reasons to go to war against other great powers. Second reason:There is no question that in the twentieth century, certainly with nuclear weapons but even before nuclear

weapons, the costs of going to war are very high. But that doesn‘t mean that war is ruled out. The presence of nuclear weapons alone does not make war obsolescent. I will remind you that from 1945 to1990, we lived in a world where there were thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides, and there wasnobody running around saying, ― War is obsolescent.‖ So you can‘t make the argument that the mere

presence of nuclear weapons creates peace. India and Pakistan are both going down the nuclear road. You

don‘t hear many people running around saying, ― That‘s going to produce peace.‖ And, furthermore, ifyou believe nuclear weapons were a great cause of peace, you ought to be in favor of nuclear

proliferation. What we need is everybody to have a nuclear weapon in their back pocket. You don‘t hearmany people saying that‘s going to produce peace, do you? Conventional war? Michael‘s right;

conventional war was very deadly before nuclear weapons came along, but we still had wars. And thereason we did is because states come up with clever strategies. States are always looking for cleverstrategies to avoid fighting lengthy and bloody and costly wars of attrition. And they sometimes find

them, and they sometimes go to war for those reasons. So there‘s no question in my mind that the costs ofwar are very high, and deterrence is not that difficult to achieve in lots of great-power security situations.But on the other hand, to argue that war is obsolescent-I wouldn‘t make that argument. My third and final

point here is, the fact of the matter is, that there‘s hardly anybody in the national security establishment-and I bet this is true of Michael-who believes that war is obsolescent. I‘m going to tell you why I think

this is the case. Consider the fact that the United States stations roughly 100,000 troops in Europe and

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100,000 troops in Asia. We spend an enormous amount of money on defense. We‘re spending almost asmuch money as we were spending during the Cold War on defense. We spend more money than the next

six countries in the world spend on defense. The questions is, why are we spending all this money? Whyare we stationing troops in Europe? Why are we stationing troops in Asia? Why are we concentrating onkeeping NATO intact and spreading it eastward? I‘ll tell you why, because we believe that if we don‘tstay there and we pull out, trouble is going to break out, and not trouble between minor powers, but

trouble between major powers. That‘s why we‘re there. We know very well that if we leave Europe, theGermans are going to seriously countenance, if not automatically go, and get nuclear weapons. Certainlythe case with the Japanese. Do you think the Germans and the Japanese are going to stand for long not tohave nuclear weapons? I don‘t think that‘s the case. Again, that security zone between the Germans andthe Russians-there‘ll be a real competition to fill that. The reason we‘re there in Europe, and the reasonthat we‘re ther e in Asia is because we believe that great-power war is a potential possibility, which

contradicts the argument on the table. So I would conclude by asking Michael if, number one, he believeswe should pull out of Europe and pull out of Asia, and number two, if he does not, why not?

Great power war is possible and is a prior questionsGonsell, Lieutenant Commander, and Orzetti, US Marine Corps, 12 (April and Michael, USNI, ―Now Hear This - ls Great-Power War Still Possible?‖

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-04/now-hear-great-power-war-still-possible, accessed7-15-13, EB)

The Center for Naval Analyses recently published Grand Strategy: Contemporary Contending AnalystViews and Implications for the U.S. Navy , a survey of potential U.S. strategies being debated in theacademic and defense communities. The study identifies four competing lines of strategic thought:maintaining American hegemony, selective engagement, offshore balancing, and integrating collectiveinternational efforts. Two additional options — isolationism and world government — are noted and

disregarded as not viable. Under this list of strategic options a sharp division is apparent, dictated by thequestion, ―Is great- power war obsolete?‖ This fundamental question must be answered before any logical

strategic decisions can be made. If great-power war is possible, then the de facto existential threat to U.S.interests, latent in the international system, must be addressed before all others. There are enormousimplications for weapon procurement, operational doctrine, and force levels driven by this single issue.

Global strategists point to economic globalization and the proliferation of nuclear weapons as modernguarantors of peace among major powers. However, we contend that these very rational hedges against

violence can still be shattered by decidedly irrational and reactionary forces. Thus, the possibility ofgreat-power war between China and the United States cannot be ruled out. Economic interdependenceoffers benefits beyond the sheer transfer of capital and goods — there can be no doubt of that. However,

history renders globalization‘s deterrent ef fects at least somewhat questionable. Substantial economicinterdependence existed throughout Europe prior to World War I, and Japan was hugely dependent on

American oil imports in the years leading up to World War II. It was this dependence that made the U.Soil embargo intolerable, ultimately motivating the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, theexistential threat of nuclear weapons has certainly resulted in a universal desire keep Pandora‘s Box

firmly shut. While we concede the remarkable ability of weapons of mass destruction to dampen theoscillations of great-power relations, it is unclear that the nuclear restraint against total war ever

takes limited war off the table as a strategic option. More fundamentally, though, the arguments for anuclear- based ―state of peace‖ are constrained by the limits of rationality. Rational bounds do not apply tothe ephemeral — yet extremely powerful — waves of bellicose nationalism that can sweep up an entirenation. National pride is embedded in the Chinese DNA — and rightly so. In certain segments of society,however, the sentiment manifests itself with a particular fervor, and some elements of the People‘s

Liberation Army (PLA) epitomize this zeal. Alarmingly, the Communist Party leadership appears

increasingly unable to act as a check on the military. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping hadironclad control over the PLA, having earned unquestionable credibility during the Long March. NeitherGeneral Secretary of the Communist Party Hu Jintao nor First Secretary Xi Jinping can claim a similar

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rapport with the PLA. Neither possesses a comparable level of control. Any surge of aggressivenationalism, either in the PLA or among the greater masses, could conceivably compel contemporary

party leadership toward a bellicosity it does not desire. How might this happen? The two most likelyscenarios deal with Chinese ―core interests‖ in the Pacific: sovereignty in the South China Sea andTaiwan. The South China Sea is no stranger to conflict. Its location and material promise have led to ahost of conflicting territorial claims and brought the Chinese and Vietnamese to armed conflict over the

Spratly Islands in the late 1980s. After a period of relative calm, tensions have once again begun to flare.American commitment to freedom of the seas in the region, exemplified by Secretary of State HillaryClinton‘s July 2010 speech in Hanoi, Vietnam, provides ample opportunity for a Sino -American buttingof heads. Similarly, the Republic of China remains a perennially sore issue for the Chinese; the furor overthe sale of American F-16s provides an ample platform for future, more-polarizing interactions overTaiwan. War between China and the United States is unlikely. Economic interdependence and nuclear

weapons are powerful, persuasive deterrents against it. However, Sino-American dealings, particularly inTaiwan or the South China Sea, provide instances in which the powder keg of Chinese nationalism could

explode, effectively forcing party leadership into a series of irrational but irreversible actions. As such,the possibility of great-power war, unlimited or otherwise, cannot be ruled out. U.S. policymakers must

plan accordingly.

Nuclear deterrence failsDoyle, senior policy analyst at Science Applications International Corporation, , 2009

(James, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: a Debate, ―Eyes on the Prize: A Strategy for Enhancing GlobalSecurity,‖ http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf, accessed 7-15-13, EB)In their essay, Perry, Shultz, Kissinger, and Nunn assert that nuclear deterrence is ―increasingly hazardous

and decreasingly effective.‖ In essence, they reject the prevailing belief within national securityestablishments that nuclear weapons still provide powerful security benefits in the evolving international

security environment. Theirs is an unprecedented challenge to the existing nuclear order, and theirarguments deserve serious analysis. In many ways, they are consistent with traditional critiques of therisks of nuclear deterrence. But they also go deeper to demonstrate why nuclear deterrence is more

unstable in the current environment than in the Cold War and why continued nuclear proliferation islikely to exacerbate rather than attenuate these instabilities, increasing the risks yet further. Nuclear

deterrence is increasingly hazardous because a large surplus of nuclear weapons and materials left overfrom the Cold War is, in some cases, not adequately secured. In addition, an entirely new threat inconnection with these weapons and materials has emerged in the form of extremist groups that are willing

to carry out catastrophic terrorist attacks. Several states that are acquiring nuclear weapons or increasingexisting arsenals are located in conflict-prone regions and have limited financial and technical resources

to devote to nuclear security. Nuclear deterrence is decreasingly effective because the conditions thatenabled mutual deterrence during the Cold War have changed. In today‘s world, nuclear-armed statesshare disputed borders, have limited experience with nuclear weapon safety and security, and have

vulnerable early warning and nuclear weapon control capabilities. Moreover, nuclear deterrence cannoteffectively reduce the chance of nuclear terrorism. The more states acquire nuclear weapons for

―deterrence,‖ the more they will also risk providing weapons and materials to terrorists who wish to carryout a nuclear attack. These realities refute the view held most notably by Kenneth Waltz that nuclearweapons provide concrete benefits for states and will have a stabilizing influence on the internationalsystem.1 The authors of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons do not give enough emphasis to the transformednature of the security environment and the implications of that transformation for traditional nuclear

strategies. Strategic thought on nuclear arms evolved within a global security environment that no longerexists. That security environment was defined by a single primary state adversary, whose threat of nuclearattack against the United States and its allies could be successfully deterred by a reciprocal threat ofnuclear retaliation.

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Taboo and deterrence aren’t credible Gerson, Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, 2009

(Michael S., 9-29-9, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Rethinking U.S. Nuclear Posture,http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0929_transcript_nuclear_posture1.pdf, accessed 7-15-13, EB)So thus my argument stands in contrast to those who believe that the more options the better, and that

ambiguity aids deterrence by creating uncertainty and incalculable risks. My argument comes from a

position that a fundamental tenet of deterrence is that limiting your options can in fact enhance deterrenceand make you safer. This notion of deliberately tying one‘s hands or limiting one‘s options is of courseattributed to the work of Tom Schelling who argued that limiting one‘s own options could be acommitment tactic to enhance the credibility of one‘s threats. Examples in this context are burning a

bridge – having your army cross and then burning a bridge so that one could not retreat, or moreimportantly, making your commitments public. Making statements public in fact becomes a commitmenttactic by increasing the cost of going back. The example is, if you‘re going to go on a diet, one of the bestways to make sure you actually keep on that diet is to tell everybody you know that you‘re going on the

diet. So that‘s the sort of position that I‘m come from, is that while the traditional view has been that asmany options as possible is the best way to go, and in some ways the military thinks that way in part

because their – their job is to put military options in the toolbox of national power, what I want to argue is

that limiting our options, limiting U.S. options to use nuclear weapons first by declaring a no-first-use

policy will in fact make us safer. My argument is essentially this: Nuclear first use is one of two things.It‘s either not credible, in which case it adds nothing to U.S. security, but rather is politically complicatingin the nonproliferation context. Or, if it is credible, it‘s potentially dangerous by fostering crisisinstability. So that‘s – I‘m going to talk a few more minutes about that. On the one hand, I think you can

make a case that U.S. threats, whether they‘re implicit or explicit – and really what we‘re talking abouthere is the ambiguous threat – are simply not credible. It‘s not credible for a variety of reasons. I mean,one is the nuclear taboo, this moral and political aversion to using nuclear weapons that has emerged inthe long absence of nuclear use and conflict. In the nuclear arena, the United States is largely seen ascool-headed, risk-averse and sensitive to casualties and collateral damage. The United States does not

seem to be able to benefit from the sort of rationality of irrationality type argument. The prospect that theUnited States would unilaterally shatter the almost seven-decade record of non-use in conflict I thinkcontributes to the belief that the United States would in fact not use nuclear weapons. Another argument

is I think that one could make the case that an unintended consequence of the United States first use – theUnited States efforts to lead to the global non-proliferation regime is that it reduces the credibility of the

United States to use nuclear weapons first. If the United States spends all of this time working on theefforts to prevent others from getting nuclear weapons, it seems – it makes it less credible that the UnitedStates would risk shattering that and throwing it all away by using nuclear weapons first. And finally, in

the Gulf War, despite the threats of calculated ambiguity and the ambiguous threat of nuclear weapons,which some believe deterred Saddam, Bush, Scowcroft, Powell, and Baker, all said after the conflict that

they had actually never intended on using nuclear weapons. And such public admission I think reducesthe credibility of those threats.

Nuclear war causes extinction — prefer the latest studies

Choi, 2011 (Charles Q., 2-22-11, National Geographic, ―Small Nuclear War Could Reverse Global Warming forYears?,‖ http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/02/110223-nuclear-war-winter-global-warming-environment-science-climate-change/, accessed 7-15-13, EB)

Even a regional nuclear war could spark "unprecedented" global cooling and reduce rainfall for years,according to U.S. government computer models. Widespread famine and disease would likely follow,

experts speculate. During the Cold War a nuclear exchange between superpowers — such as the one fearedfor years between the United States and the former Soviet Union — was predicted to cause a "nuclearwinter." In that scenario hundreds of nuclear explosions spark huge fires, whose smoke, dust, and ash blot

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out the sun for weeks amid a backdrop of dangerous radiation levels. Much of humanity eventually diesof starvation and disease. Today, with the United States the only standing superpower, nuclear winter is

little more than a nightmare. But nuclear war remains a very real threat — for instance, betweendeveloping-world nuclear powers, such as India and Pakistan. To see what climate effects such a regionalnuclear conflict might have, scientists from NASA and other institutions modeled a war involving ahundred Hiroshima-level bombs, each packing the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT — just 0.03 percent

of the world's current nuclear arsenal. (See a National Geographic magazine feature on weapons of massdestruction.) The researchers predicted the resulting fires would kick up roughly five million metric tonsof black carbon into the upper part of the troposphere, the lowest layer of the Earth's atmosphere. In

NASA climate models, this carbon then absorbed solar heat and, like a hot-air balloon, quickly loftedeven higher, where the soot would take much longer to clear from the sky. (Related: "'NuclearArchaeologists' Find World War II Plutonium.") Reversing Global Warming? The global cooling caused

by these high carbon clouds wouldn't be as catastrophic as a superpower-versus-superpower nuclearwinter, but "the effects would still be regarded as leading to unprecedented climate change," research

physical scientist Luke Oman said during a press briefing Friday at a meeting of the AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C. Earth is currently in a long-term

warming trend. After a regional nuclear war, though, average global temperatures would drop by 2.25degrees F (1.25 degrees C) for two to three years afterward, the models suggest. At the extreme, the

tropics, Europe, Asia, and Alaska would cool by 5.4 to 7.2 degrees F (3 to 4 degrees C), according to themodels. Parts of the Arctic and Antarctic would actually warm a bit, due to shifted wind and ocean-circulation patterns, the researchers said. After ten years, average global temperatures would still be 0.9

degree F (0.5 degree C) lower than before the nuclear war, the models predict. (Pictures: "Red Hot" Nuclear-Waste Train Glows in Infrared.) Years Without Summer For a time Earth would likely be acolder, hungrier planet. "Our results suggest that agriculture could be severely impacted, especially in

areas that are susceptible to late-spring and early-fall frosts," said Oman, of NASA's Goddard SpaceFlight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. "Examples similar to the crop failures and famines experienced

following the Mount Tambora eruption in 1815 could be widespread and last several years," he added.That Indonesian volcano ushered in "the year without summer," a time of famines and unrest. (See

pictures of the Mount Tambora eruption.) All these changes would also alter circulation patterns in the

tropical atmosphere, reducing precipitation by 10 percent globally for one to four years, the scientists

said. Even after seven years, global average precipitation would be 5 percent lower than it was before theconflict, according to the model. In addition, researcher Michael Mills, of the National Center forAtmospheric Research in Colorado, found large decreases in the protective ozone layer, leading to muchmore ultraviolet [uv] radiation reaching Earth's surface and harming the environment and people. "The

main message from our work," NASA's Oman said, "would be that even a regional nuclear conflict wouldhave global consequences."

The convergence of hyper-competition and hyper-power status make conflict increasingly likely

Capie 11 — Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, Visiting Scholar at the Weatherhead Center for

International Affairs at Harvard University, Research Associate in the ASEAN Studies Centre at American University, co-editor of the journal Political Science,

member of the editorial board of Asian Politics and Policy [7/6, David, ―Welcome to the dark side? Mittelman's encounter with global insecurity‖, Global Change,

Peace & Security, Volume 23, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis, AL]

The book's thesis is that there are two systemic drivers of contemporary security and insecurity. The first is what

Mittelman calls hypercompetition, the ‗intensified competition that agglomerates markets‘. Accelerated by ‗new

technologies, the rise of transnational capital and increasing labour mobility‘, national production systems are

giving way to global firms with supply chains extending across the world. The language of war has permeated commerce, withcorporations embracing aspects of a Hobbesian ‗warre of all against all‘ as they seek to cut costs, raise

efficiency and dominate markets. Hypercompetition is ‗heavily but not totally Amer ican‘ in several of its facets, including the long reach of US

markets, investment in R&D, the prevalence of neoliberal ideas about the ordering of the economy and society as well as the p revalence of American popular culture.

The second is the concentration of power in an historically unprecedented hegemonic actor: the United States of

America. The book puts aside the traditional vocabulary of geopolitics, arguing that the USA is not a superpower or even a great power enjoying a unipolar moment.

Rather, ‗in light of the large distance between the United States and the other major powers in a globalizing world‘, the




preferred term is hyperpower.3 The idea builds on the notion of hyperpuissance coined by French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine in 1998, but,

drawing on Gramscian notions of consensual hegemony and Foucauldian biopolitics, Mittelman gives it more

precision and extracts greater analytic leverage from it. Notably, in his vision, although there can be only one hyperpower, theconcept extends beyond the USA as a state. Instead, hyperpower is imperial in character, a ‗weblike structure, including a

net of overseas military bases, a clutch of allies, aspects of ideological appeal, and an educational system that widely propagates values associated withthose at the epicentre of globalization‘.4 When hypercompetition and hyperpower converge (or coincide), the

conditions point to the book's third core concept: hyper conflict. This arises ‗out of the tension between the logic ofstatecentric and polycentric worlds‘ and when ‗a medley of nonstate actors both accommodates and more assertively resists s tate initiatives‘.5

Although only in a ‗nascent‘ phase, hyperconflict expresses itself as ‗heightened coercion and weakening consensus‘,

‗ pervasive uncertainty‘ and ‗a rising climate of fear ‘.6 Contrasting the ‗old‘ order of war with the ‗new‘ order of militarized globalization,

Mittelman argues that the old order was ‗ permeated by wars between states and within them, as well as partial safeguards with rules to manage

them‘. This has been ‗partly supplanted by hyperpower enmeshed in various conflicts, but the most flagrant conflicts deny

military solutions. In fact, the application of more and more coercion inflames tensions, emboldens unconventionalenemies, and inspires recruits for their causes.‘7 The three concepts serve less as a model or formal explanation of contemporary insecurity

and work more as a heuristic, ‗a grammar for thinking about evolving forms of world order‘.8 The author seeks to provide a vocabulary through which the

links between globalization and insecurity can be understood holistically and critically explored. One of Hyperconflict's most significant contributions is the wide-

ranging theoretical discussion that fills its first two chapters, offering a sophisticated distillation of the vast literatures on globalization and peace and conflict to form a

compelling and provocative account.

Nuclear war causes the earth to explodeChalko, Ph.D., Head of Geophysics Research, Scientific E Research P/L, 2003 (Tom J., Scientific Engineering Research, ―Can a Neutron Bomb Accelerate Global Volcanic Activity?‖

http://sci-e-research.com/neutron_bomb.html, accessed 7-15-13, EB)Consequences of using modern nuclear weapons can be far more serious than previously imagined. These

consequences relate to the fact that most of the heat generated in the planetary interior is a result ofnuclear decay. Over the last few decades, all superpowers have been developing so-called "neutron

bombs". These bombs are designed to emit intensive neutron radiation while creating relatively little localmechanical damage. Military are very keen to use neutron bombs in combat, because lethal neutronradiation can peneterate even the largest and deepest bunkers. However, the military seem to ignore thefact that a neutron radiation is capable to reach significant depths in the planetary interior. In the process

of passing through the planet and losing its intensity, a neutron beam stimulates nuclei of radioactiveisotopes naturally present inside the planet to disintegrate. This disintegration in turn, generates moreneutron and other radiation. The entire process causes increased nuclear heat generation in the planetaryinterior, far greater than the initial energy of the bomb. It typically takes many days or even weeks for thisextra heat to conduct/convect to the surface of the planet and cause increased seismic/volcanic activity.Due to this variable delay, nuclear tests are not currently associated with seismic/volcanic activity, simply

because it is believed that there is no theoretical basis for such an association. Perhaps you heard that afterevery major series of nuclear test there is always a period of increased seismic activity in some part of theworld. This observable fact CANNOT be explained by direct energy of the explosion. The mechanism ofneutron radiation accelerating decay of radioactive isotopes in the planetary interior, however, is a VERYPLAUSIBLE and realistic explanation. The process of accelerating volcanic activity is nuclear in essence.

Accelerated decay of unstable radioactive isotopes already present in the planetary interior provides the

necessary energy. The TRUE danger of modern nuclear weaponry is that their neutron radiation iscapable to induce global overheating of the planetary interior, global volcanic activity and, in extreme

circumstances, may even cause the entire planet to explode.

Nuclear war destroys the environmentNissani, Professor at Wayne State, 1992(Moti, Lives in the Balance: The Cold War and American Politics 1945-1991,

http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html, accessed 7-15-13, EB)

http://sci-e-research.com/neutron_bomb.html

http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html

http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html

http://sci-e-research.com/neutron_bomb.html




There will be fewer people and less industrial and commercial activity long after the war, hence someserious environmental threats will be ameliorated. By killing billions and destroying industrial

infrastructures, nuclear war might, for instance, halt or slow down the suspected trend of global warming.On balance, however, the war's overall environmental impact will almost certainly be on the negativeside. Radioactive fallout will contaminate soils and waters. We shall probably learn to adjust to these newconditions, perhaps by shunning certain regions or by carrying radioactivity meters everywhere we go the

way our ancestors carried spears. Still, this will lower the quality of human life. Nuclear explosions mightcreate immense quantities of dust and smoke. The dust and smoke might blanket, darken, and cool theentire planet. Although the extent of the damage is unclear,

24 it would be far more severe during the

growing season-late spring and summer in the northern latitudes. One Cassandran and controversial prediction sounds a bit like the eerie twilight described in H. G. Wells' The Time Machine. This "nuclearwinter" projection forecasts freezing summertime temperatures,25 temporary climatic changes (e.g.,

violent storms, dramatic reductions in rainfall), lower efficiencies of plant photosynthesis, disruption ofecosystems and farms, loss of many species, and the death of millions of people from starvation and cold.

However, even these pessimists expect a return to normal climatic conditions within a few years.26a,27

Probability comes first – magnitude is always exaggerated

Stern, Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former National Security Council Member,1999

(Jessica, The Ultimate Terrorists, 1999, p. 32, EB)Poisons have always been seen as unacceptably cruel. Livy called poisonings of enemies "secretcrimes." Cicero referred to poisoning as "an atrocity." But why do poisons evoke such dread? Thisquestion has long puzzled political scientists and historians. One answer is that people's perceptions

of risk often do not match reality: that what we dread most is often not what actually threatens us

most. When you got up this morning, you were exposed to serious risks at nearly every stage of your progression from bed to the office. Even lying in bed exposed you to serious hazards: 1 in 400

Americans is injured each year while doing nothing but lying in bed or sitting in a chair--becausethe headboard collapses, the frame gives way, or another such failure occurs. Your risk of suffering alethal accident in your bathtub or shower was one in a million. Your breakfast increased your risk of

cancer, heart attack, obesity, or malnutrition, depending on what you ate. Although both margarineand butter appear to contribute to heart disease, a new theory suggests that low-fat diets make you fat.

If you breakfasted on grains (even organic ones), you exposed yourself to dangerous toxins: plants produce their own natural pesticides to fight off fungi and herbivores, and many of these are moreharmful than synthetic pesticide residues. Your cereal with milk may have been contaminated by mold

toxins, including the deadly aflatoxin found in peanuts, corn, and milk. And your eggs may havecontained benzene, another known carcinogen. Your cup of coffee included twenty-six compounds

known to be mutagenic: if coffee were synthesized in the laboratory, the FDA would probably ban

it as a cancer-causing substance. Most people are more worried about the risks of nuclear power plants than the risks of driving to work, and more alarmed by the prospect of terrorists with chemical

weapons than by swimming in a pool. Experts tend to focus on probabilities and outcomes, but public perception of risk seems to depend on other variables: there is little correlation between

objective risk and public dread. Examining possible reasons for this discrepancy will help usunderstand why the thought of terrorists with access to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons fillsus with dread. People tend to exaggerate the likelihood of events that are easy to imagine or recall.

Disasters and catastrophes stay disproportionately rooted in the public consciousness, and evokedisproportionate fear. A picture of a mushroom cloud probably stays long in viewers'

consciousness as an image of fear.




Focusing on magnitude creates policy paralysisRescher, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, 1983

(Nicholas, 1983, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management, p. 50, EB)

The stakes are high, the potential benefits enormous. (And so are the costs - for instance cancer

research and, in particular, the multi-million dollar gamble on interferon.) But there is no turning backthe clock. The processes at issue are irreversible. Only through the shrewd deployment of science and

technology can we resolve the problems that science and technology themselves have brought uponus. America seems to have backed off from its traditional entrepreneurial spirit and become a risk-

aversive, slow investing economy whose (real-resource) support for technological and scientificinnovation has been declining for some time. In our yearning for the risk-free society we may wellcreate a social system that makes risk-taking innovation next to impossible. The critical thing is to

have a policy that strikes a proper balance between malfunctions and missed opportunities - a balancewhose "propriety" must be geared to a realistic appraisal of the hazards and opportunities at issue. Man

is a creature condemned to live in a twilight zone of risk and opportunity. And so we are led back toAaron Wildavski's thesis that flight from risk is the greatest risk of all, "because a total avoidance

of risks means that society will become paralyzed, depleting its resources in preventive action, and

denying future generations opportunities and technologies needed for improving the quality of life. Byall means let us calculate our risks with painstaking care, and by all means let us manage them with

prudent conservatism. But in life as in warfare there is truth in H. H. Frost's maxim that "every mistakein war is excusable except inactivity and refusal to take risks" (though, obviously, it is needful todiscriminate between a good risk and a bad one). The price of absolute security is absolute

stultification.








reaching thresholds beyond which the effects on the global climate will be irreversible, such as themelting of polar ice sheets and loss of rainforests. "This is the critical decade. If we don't get the curves

turned around this decade we will cross those lines," said Will Steffen, executive director of theAustralian National University's climate change institute, speaking at a conference in London. Despitethis sense of urgency, a new global climate treaty forcing the world's biggest polluters, such as the UnitedStates and China, to curb emissions will only be agreed on by 2015 - to enter into force in 2020. "We are

on the cusp of some big changes," said Steffen. "We can ... cap temperature rise at two degrees, or crossthe threshold beyond which the system shifts to a much hotter state."




Blackouts Supplement

Nuclear meltdowns cause extinctionIBT Science, 2011

(International Business Times, 9-14-11, ―Solar Flare Could Unleash Nuclear Holocaust Across PlanetEarth, Forcing Hundreds of Nuclear Power Plants Into Total Meltdowns,‖

http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/213249/20110914/solar-flare-could-unleash-nuclear-holocaust-across- planet-earth-forcing-hundreds-of-nuclear-power-pl.htm, accessed 7-15-13, EB)Fukushima was one power plant. Imagine the devastation of 100+ nuclear power plants, all going intomeltdown all at once across the planet. It's not the loss of electricity that's the real problem; it's the globaltidal wave of invisible radiation that blankets the planet, permeates the topsoil, irradiates everything that

breathes and delivers the final crushing blow to human civilization as we know it today. Because if youhave 100 simultaneous global nuclear meltdowns, the tidal wave of radiation will make farming nearly

impossible for years. That means no food production for several years in a row. And that, in turn, means anear-total collapse of the human population on our planet.

http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/213249/20110914/solar-flare-could-unleash-nuclear-holocaust-across-planet-earth-forcing-hundreds-of-nuclear-power-pl.htm




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