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Rural Cooperation &the Renewal of Rural Socialism in AfricaAuthor(s): Peter LawrenceSource: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 96, War & the Forgotten Continent(Jun., 2003), pp. 241-248Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006762 .

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Review of African Political Economy No.96:241-248 ? ROAPE Publications Ltd., 2003 ISSN 0305-6244

Rural Cooperation & the Renewal of Rural Socialism in Africa

Peter Lawrence

This article examines the debates over the role of co-operatives in the building of socialism and more generally their possible role as important organisations for boosting production and creating opportunities for collective decision making in capitalist and transition economies. It does so by putting centre stage the benefits of rural co-operation as well as the historical pitfalls. It stresses the opportunity for cooperatives to boost the democratic imperative for socialist development even at a time of neo-liberal ascendency

Producer cooperation has long been regarded as a critical building-block of socialist development, closely linked as it is to the idea of collective decision-making by a labour force which controls the means of production. The 'forced collectivist' model of rural cooperation exemplified by the Soviet experience, with its 'statist' overtones, gave way to the Chinese version - an apparently 'bottom-up' approach - more popular with the peasantry. A further variant of rural socialism, best represented by Tanzania's Ujamaa, attracted socialists from around the world especially because it appeared to offer something different from the state or social democratic 'socialisms' on offer up to that time.' The Tanzanian version appeared to present a mix of traditional socialist beliefs - the importance of control over the 'commanding heights' of the economy - with a degree of participation from below, especially in the rural areas where most of the population lived and made their livelihoods. The rural socialism of Nyerere's Ujamaa suggested a break with the top-down collectivisation of state socialism. People themselves were to be enabled to build producer co-operatives from the bottom up, building on the egalitarianism and ethic of communal land holding that Nyerere held existed in traditional villages (Nyerere, 1968a; 1968b).

Thirty-five years on, many of the attempts at rural socialism have ended in failure. In both developing and 'transitional' economies, the predominant ideology of liberal economics has pushed agricultural sector policy in the direction of re-privatising the state-owned farms and estates, establishing private property rights to previously collectively farmed land, encouraging the commercialisation of independent small- holder farmers and promoting the further development of contract farming. In the current climate, talking of the possibilities for socialism through rural co-operation might appear particularly utopian. However, it is argued here that it is important to take another look at rural cooperation, particularly in the light of the contemporary shift to de-collectivisation, and suggest a different, and more optimistic, conclusion from the events of the last 10-15 years as they have affected the rural sector in Africa and elsewhere.

I start by considering the prospects for rural co-operation from the standpoint taken by Lionel Cliffe in the early period of ujamaa and running through his work on rural

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242 Review of African Political Economy

class formation and on land reform. Throughout Cliffe's work there is a clear strategy for establishing rural cooperation: building on what exists or is feasible. The second part of this article looks at the process of de-collectivisation begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even as the process has taken place, there has been pressure from those facing this change to protect the elements of cooperation which worked under collectivised agriculture. This also suggests the possibility for the rebuilding of a cooperative system from below on the basis of what worked under state socialism. The third part of the article turns to the question begged until that stage: why argue for rural co-operation? A short final section considers the issue of the functioning and role of rural co-operation in the context of capitalist development, raising the old question of whether it is possible to begin the practice of rural socialism under capitalism.

Building on What Exists If there is an invisible line running through Cliffe's work from the late 1960s through to the present, it is the advocacy of a combination of land reform with elements of co- operation which build on what has previously existed and been experienced. Writing with Luttrell and Moore in 1971, Cliffe argued that one of the bases for developing socialist production relations in the Lushoto district of Tanzania was the traditional system of labour exchange (Cliffe et al. 1975). Writing 17 years later on Zimbabwe, Cliffe (1988) argues much the same principle for building cooperatives in Zimbabwe - arguing for settlement schemes to entail the kind of co-operation in smaller groups with which farmers have some familiarity, rather than working collectively in 'large- scale, technologically complex farming' of which they have little knowledge, let alone experience. Again, 12 years after that, writing on land reform in South Africa:

... any kind of cooperative or collective organisation of produiction is notoriously complex and difficult to introduce and maintain - desirable though such aims may be in terms of equity and social cohesion. Such challenges and difficulties are compounded in circumstances where the members of the group are moving on to new land, where there is limited sense of community, and zvhere the only types offarms with zvhich they are likely to be familiar are those of the inidividual family plot or the authoritative management of a capitalist farm, rather than any form of a self-managed activity (Cliffe, 2000:282).

There is a great deal of evidence to support a picture of forms of co-operation among small-scale agricultural producers in developing countries. The co-operative labour exchange parties of Lushoto referred to above are but one element of such mutuality. Other elements in that Lushoto case concerned the co-operative construction of private houses, schools, dispensaries and roads and the collective holding of land for grazing, though this latter was in the process of disappearing with the onset of land shortage (Cliffe, et al. 1975)

In most developing countries, there is considerable co-operation in the provision of credit. Poor small farmers cannot borrow from formal financial institutions, so they borrow from each other, whether for productive or consumption expenditure (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Udry, 1994). Sometimes forms of co-operation are effectively forced on smallholders. For example, group lending is increasingly common. The borrower group effectively acts as collateral through the peer monitoring of its members. If one reneges on the contract, the lender will not lend to anyone in the group again. There is some debate about whether these schemes work effectively, but they do make co-operation an incentive (Wenner, 1995). There is a further question of whether these informal cooperative arrangements in finance

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Rural Cooperation & the Renewal of Rural Socialism in Africa 243

outlive financial liberalisation, as formal lending expands (Besley, 1995; Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998).

The exchange arrangements are based on reciprocity enforced by peer pressure and widely held information about these exchanges. These are not simultaneous exchanges, but ones involving an implicit contract. There is always the possibility of non- reciprocity. But there is a strong incentive to reciprocate where failure to do so means withdrawal of further reciprocal contracts in the future. Such withdrawal will not only be from the person who has been defaulted, but also from others who, as a result of local information, will know not to engage with the defaulter (Ligon et al. 2000).

It would be mistaken to believe that because these forms of co-operation and collective action exist, that producer co-operation is still on the agenda. It is true that there are examples of continuing producer co-operation in countries which do not have a commitment to collective, let alone socialist, solutions, as for example in Cote d'Ivoire (Woods, 1999). Indeed what is most evident in the literature is the gradual shift over a long period from communally organised production systems with strong mutuality towards a more competitive individualistic organisation of production. Yet what is also evident is an increasing fragmentation of land, even, or especially, in areas of land consolidation (Livingstone, 1986). Much of the argument about the sustainability of very small landholdings revolves around technical issues to do with diseconomies of scale and the impossibility of introducing an efficient mechanised agriculture. Pooling land holdings as a co-operative solution to this technical problem has potential gains for all participants.

Yet much of contemporary policy pushes smallholder agriculture with clear property rights to encourage investment and 'modernisation' of production. The model is a classical capitalist one in which farmers compete in the increasingly global agricultural markets. Farms become larger and totally commercial.2 The successful grow, while the remaining small farmers presumably either subcontract or go out of business. The other approach is to see fragmentation as sustainable and as a way of keeping the rural populations in gainful activity (Livingstone, 1986). And a third approach is to accept part of the latter strategy but encourage forms of cooperation as a means for those farmers to increase productivity and incomes.3

One important issue so far ignored in this discussion is class formation. Nyerere's Socialism and Rural Development explicitly refers to the development of capitalist production relations in parts of the country stemming from the 'widespread introduction of cash crop farming'. He argued that 'the small-scale capitalist agriculture we now have is not really a danger'. Yet very early on in the academic analysis of uijamaa villages, class differentiation within villages was clearly identified (Awiti, 1975; von Freyhold, 1979). Its most apparent manifestation was in the difference in farm size, farm incomes, and employment of permanent and casual labour by rich, implicitly capitalist, farmers. A second manifestation was in the political power within uijamaa villages held by the richer farmers. Other accounts noted the ways in which such farmers formed villages in order to maintain their control over land and labour. The top-down, bureaucratic approach to rural co- operation requires results. If these results involve turning a blind eye to such distortions of co-operation, then it is hardly surprising that the process fails to deliver increased output and higher incomes for all participants. The alternative of expropriation of rich farmers' property by the collective requires a political will which a political party with strong rich farmer participation is unlikely to have and where rich farmer resistance is likely to deter even those who see the nature of the

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244 Review of African Political Economy

problem (see Cliffe, 1977). A bottom up approach, which mobilises the poorer farmers, is likely to be more successful, as in China, but is unlikely to be pursued by a party which is strongly influenced by rich farmer interests. It is also important to understand that allying the 'poor and middle peasants' against the rich does not mean that the former are happy to pool their land. Farmers' attachment to their piece of land should not be underestimated, which is why incorporating substantial household plots in the collective organisation is such an important element of success.

Building on what exists is building from below and supporting these forms of co- operation, as farmers demand support rather than forcing support on them. This may also be an unrealistic strategy since the very bureaucrats who are charged with bringing such support to the rural areas may well be those who see the future in the richer more technically advanced farmers who are unlikely to form co-operatives and who may see them and the state support they might get as a threat to their positions. Clearly the principle of building on what exists is important. Practical implementa- tion will vary and will depend on outcomes of political struggle between rural classes for the ear of the bureaucracy. This links to the issue of political competition in multi- partyism and the degree to which nascent co-operatives could pursue their objectives through a democratic political process in which their votes count. The decline of 'vanguardist' socialism with its leaders, hierarchy and discipline potentially facilitates this process.4

De-collectivisation: Keeping What Worked It is instructive to read accounts of the demise of collective farms in the so-called transitional economies (Davis, 1997; Divila and Sokol, 1994; Kitching, 1998b; Pockney, 1994; Swain, 2000). Where collectives worked, their members have been slow to claim their share of the land. The collectives were integrated into a system in which they had state support and guaranteed markets. Their members were as ready to enter into private competitive farming, as independent peasants have been to enter collectives. Potential loss of security has dampened many farmers' desire for the break-up of the collectives, although this differs from country to country and between regions in countries in part according to the relative success of collective farming. In Hungary for example, the collective system was designed to create a 'symbiotic' relationship between successful small private plots and successful collectives (Swain, 1985). Collectives sub-contracted to private plots and supplied them with necessary inputs, while their ability to do this depended on their success as a collective. So that individual members had an incentive to make the collective farm a success not least because they were further incentivised by the ability to sell their household produce directly to decontrolled markets. It is not surprising then, that the process of returning to private family farming is slow (Swain, 2000).

The symbiotic relationship which evolved in Hungary, was also a feature of Soviet collectivisation. What has been remarkable about the process of de-collectivisation has been the maintenance of the collective-private plot relationship by farmers whom we might have expected to want 'their' share of the land. The old collectives have been turned into joint stock companies with the former members as shareholders and the former management continuing to manage. Reading Kitching's (1998a, 1998b) accounts of Russian de-collectivisation reveals one of the ironies of transition. Under the new system, collectives are increasingly sub-contracting to household plots labour-intensive activities where there are no economies of scale, while maintaining production and service activities where there are such economies. The irony is that this intensifies the decentralisation to household plots which was a feature of

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Rural Cooperation & the Renewal of Rurwal Socialism in Africa 245

experimentation under state socialism and which held out the prospect of a successful collectivist alternative to capitalist development. A further irony is that just as in the time of state socialism numerous ways were found to circumvent the rules and conduct organisational experiments, in the time of de-collectivisation various devices, including the setting up of a limited liability company quoted on the stock exchange, have been used to maintain as many as possible of the old forms of co- operation (Swain, 2000).

What these two accounts of de-collectivisation also reveal is that people who left the co-operatives, took their shares and decided to try farming alone, did not do as well as they were expected to do by those who argued for the break-up of the co-operatives into small-scale farms. Part of the reason, as Kitching suggests, might be that the post- socialist state, certainly in Russia, did not offer independent farmers the kind of support the co-operative members got on their private plots from the kolkhoz in its new or old form. The conclusion which can be drawn from these pioneering studies of de-collectivisation, is that co-operative members well understood the advantages of the old system and while they were happy to lose the socialist bathwater, they did not want to lose the co-operative baby.5

Begging the Question: Why Push Co-operation? For socialists, co-operation has always been regarded as part of the process of developing collective decision-making by labour through its ownership and control over the means of production. Proposals for workers' cooperatives and for labour- managed economies, as part of this process, have a long pedigree. As Estrin (1989:169) notes, these ideas are associated with nineteenth century utopian socialist thinking. Workers' co-operatives satisfied the socialist goals of workers' control over their own labour power, through democratic decision making over production, reducing alienation, humanising the workplace and producing a more egalitarian distribution of income (Estrin, 1989:171-2; Vanek, 1977:167; Putterman, 1986:3).

However, there are issues of incentives and motivation and of monitoring of performance. Consideration of these has usually led to the conclusion that output and productivity of such co-operatives is likely to be lower than under a hierarchical organisation found under capitalism where the output of the workers is monitored to ensure work discipline (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972:778; Putterman, 1986:21). While competition produces losers and winners, under co-operation, everyone is a winner if they play the game. After all, in game-theoretic economics, co-operation is usually the best strategy, but it requires commitment. Commitment to the welfare of the group may be a strong motivation in individual behaviour, and ideological commitment to the co- operative ideal might move individuals to behave more altruistically (Putterman, 1986:71). Co-operative members may well be prepared to be more flexible in their participation in work if they believe that through cooperation and control over their productive activity, they achieve greater security of employment (Estrin, 1989:171).

This gives two main motives for pushing co-operative solutions: first, an ideological one based upon the need for collective decision-making about commonly owned property. Secondly, a practical one: for groups of small agricultural producers, the development of capitalism is a slow process, and their ability to increase productivity is constrained by their lack of access to more technologically advanced solutions. The process of developing co-operative approaches to agricultural production may also result in a strengthening of a collectivist ideological base, which sees the possibilities of similar solutions in other sectors of the economy.

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246 Review of African Political Economy

This will undoubtedly depend on context. Within a context of the dismantling of 'socialist' structures, as in Hungary, it is difficult to see the persistence of a co- operative as a joint stock company, as anything else than the development of capitalist enterprise, even if its members are shareholders. After all, there is nothing new about such ESOPs (Employee Share Ownership Schemes) and they figured highly in Hungarian ideas about enterprise transition.

Yet in the case of many sub-Saharan African countries, the pursuit of rural co- operation makes sense whether in countries with explicitly socialist strategies or not. In pre- and post-colonial Africa, rural co-operatives were promoted by very different political regimes. This existence of forms of cooperation within very different regimes continued after independence. Woods's (1999) account of co-operatives in C6te d'Ivoire is instructive. He notes how the agricultural parastatals, specialising in the production of single export cash crops, sought to organise individual farmers into co- operatives as part of a relationship in which the farmers would adopt the techniques of production given by the parastatals and in return the latter would purchase the farmers' crops. But to do this efficiently required grouping farmers into co-operatives. To do this was seen to be in line with a characterisation of rural villages as not being 'structured around class divisions' thus enabling the parastatals 'to draw on traditional communitarian values such as reciprocity in getting peasants to join rural co-operatives' (Woods, 1999:496-7). This is the kind of support, which characterised the role of the producer co-operatives of state socialism. Pooling land for the cultivation of crops which benefit from scale economies in mechanical and biological inputs, such as grain, while encouraging farmers to use their household plots to cultivate labour intensive crops and rear animals, is an obvious model. What is interesting about the Ivorian case is that the top-down approach to organising co- operatives did not work. According to Woods, this was because of 'conflicts between ethnic, age and class groups'. In the aftermath of structural adjustment, the 'retreat of the state' has resulted in the loss of the monopoly power of the parastatals and the growth of independent producer associations, which see their role as 're-animating' rural co-operatives, although as yet they do not have the resources to do so. The model may be 'privatised', but it is still co-operative.

Marshall and Roesch's (1993) study of the Nampula 'green zones' in Mozambique again shows this paradox of moves to liberalisation resulting in more voluntary cooperation, This is more obviously a survival strategy, as compared with the top- down more forced-collectivist state socialist strategy that preceded it. Here the authors see possibilities for co-operatives as popular movements mitigating the effects of a shift towards capitalist development. There are obvious questions here. What happens as the economic situation improves and the need for a defensive coalition to survive the transition recedes? What does it mean to have the co-existence of rural co-operation within the framework of a capitalist economy? Can such co- operation, renewed in conditions of adversity act as a basis for a more popular-based movement for rural socialism?

Coexistence De-collectivisation in the transitional economies is clearly seen by its proponents as part of the capitalist development of the countryside. The existence of rural co- operation, whether voluntary or under pressure from the state or private capital or both, clearly cannot be read as signifying a process of socialist development. While the new rural institutions are based on capitalist legal forms - e.g. joint stock companies, their internal organisation continues to resemble previous collectivist-

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Ruiral Cooperation & the Renezval of Ruiral Socialism in Africa 247

household plot structures in which the members, now shareholders, still 'own' the means of production, perhaps rather more closely than they did before. Of course, they are integrated into a capitalism that is both national and global but their internal organisation sends a different ideological message: co-operation can work. This co- operation may be a stage in the development of large scale rural capitalism in which the farm joint stock companies become listed on the stock market as corporate co- operatives, and the small shareholders sell their shareholdings to institutions and revert to a the status of semi-agricultural proletariat which they became under the old regime. It may also be the location for the assertion of values that counter competitive capitalism. It may also be a holding stage while non-agricultural development draws large sections of the rural population into industrial and service employment, after which a true agricultural capitalism emerges.

Conclusions It is clearly possible for democratically managed producer co-operatives to exist under capitalism, and for co-operatives under state or 'actually-existing' socialism to contain co-operatives which are far from democratically managed. Under whichever dominant mode of production, there is a role for rural producer co-operation in a process of agricultural development. There is a rationale for individual small farmers to join together in forms of co-operative activity alongside continuing private activity; for land reform schemes to incorporate the possibility of co-operation as part of a process of making those reforms viable; and for co-operative members undergoing 'de-collectivisation or structural adjustment' to re-group to gain the benefits of a democratic co-operative organisation. Much of this logic is economic. For sub- Saharan Africa, the agricultural sector is the major source of income and of export earnings. Co-operative solutions are still very much on the agenda as part of a 'development' process. For socialists there is also a political logic. Pursuing collective and democratic solutions that work is an important part of the process of persuading others that such solutions are more rational than 'competitive' capitalism. Making rural co-operation work could be a way (certainly not the only way) of influencing the course of that process in a socialist direction, an objective which has been at the root of Lionel Cliffe's work, which this article celebrates.

Peter Lawrence, Department of Economics, University of Keele; e-mail: p.r.lawrence@econ.keele.ac.uk.

Endnotes

1. See for example Arrighi and Saul (1973) and Saul (1979), two collections of essays which span a decade of thinking on the course of African (and socialist African) development and the nature of socialist development.

2. See for example Bernstein (1998:14) on the South African case: '... the dominant tendency is to preserve (and expand) the most 'efficient' ('progressive') branches and enterprises of capitalist agriculture, and to appendage 'emergent' farmers to them ideally and in practice: tutelage and apprenticeship in effect'.

3. Deininger (1995) proposes individual rather than collective produictioni as a solution for the transition economies, but cooperation in services such as credit, inputs and marketing, where there are economies of scale. He advocates competition between these 'service cooperatives' in order to increase efficiency, and he makes no suggestion that service cooperatives might form the basis for production co-operation.

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248 Review of African Political Economy

4. 1 owe this very helpful point to John Saul.

5. It is interesting to compare these experiences of de-collectivisation with Bramall's (1993) study of Chinese de-collectivisation. He finds that it did not account for the post-Maoist agricultural boom and that voluntary co-operation did not provide an effective substitute.

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