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Warfare and the Evolution of the State: A ReconsiderationAuthor(s): David WebsterSource: American Antiquity, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), pp. 464-470Published by: Society for American ArchaeologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/279334 .

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AMERICAN ANTIQUITY AMERICAN ANTIQUITY

(I-S) to explain an event is to show that it was to be expected, i.e., that it was highly probable.

It is not appropriate here to give a detailed presentation of the SR model. I have used it as an example to show the deep logical differences between different models of explanations in spite of their agreement as to the requirement for laws in explanations, as well as to point out some serious shortcomings of the D-N model. The systems theorists' objections to the D-N model seem to be well-taken, and are dismissed too easily by LeBlanc. The type of explanation which systems theorists propose seems to me to represent an attempt to come to grips with the problem of relevance. Moreover, since systems theorists do not require explanations to be arguments, they avoid the difficulties surround- ing this view.

I share the "new archaeologists"' commit- ment to the scientific nature of archaeology, to the use of archaeology for studying past cul- tures, and to the relevance of archaeology for understanding contemporary cultural processes. I also share LeBlanc's belief that hypothesis testing is necessary for the development of scientific archaeology. In actual practice, scientific archaeologists use much more sophisticated methods of hypothesis testing than that characterized by the simple H-D method. My point in criticizing the H-D method is not to discourage hypothesis testing, but to prevent misunderstanding and unfavor- able criticism of the techniques and methods actually employed by the "new archaeologists."

LeBlanc's chief concern with explanation is his insistence that laws are required in explana- tions. And with this point I am in complete agreement. But to identify the insistence on the importance of laws with acceptance of the D-N model (or even with the acceptance of D-N and I-S models) is seriously misleading. It leaves

(I-S) to explain an event is to show that it was to be expected, i.e., that it was highly probable.

It is not appropriate here to give a detailed presentation of the SR model. I have used it as an example to show the deep logical differences between different models of explanations in spite of their agreement as to the requirement for laws in explanations, as well as to point out some serious shortcomings of the D-N model. The systems theorists' objections to the D-N model seem to be well-taken, and are dismissed too easily by LeBlanc. The type of explanation which systems theorists propose seems to me to represent an attempt to come to grips with the problem of relevance. Moreover, since systems theorists do not require explanations to be arguments, they avoid the difficulties surround- ing this view.

I share the "new archaeologists"' commit- ment to the scientific nature of archaeology, to the use of archaeology for studying past cul- tures, and to the relevance of archaeology for understanding contemporary cultural processes. I also share LeBlanc's belief that hypothesis testing is necessary for the development of scientific archaeology. In actual practice, scientific archaeologists use much more sophisticated methods of hypothesis testing than that characterized by the simple H-D method. My point in criticizing the H-D method is not to discourage hypothesis testing, but to prevent misunderstanding and unfavor- able criticism of the techniques and methods actually employed by the "new archaeologists."

LeBlanc's chief concern with explanation is his insistence that laws are required in explana- tions. And with this point I am in complete agreement. But to identify the insistence on the importance of laws with acceptance of the D-N model (or even with the acceptance of D-N and I-S models) is seriously misleading. It leaves

archaeologists open to attack (such as that by Morgan 1973) on the deficiencies of these models, when a more careful statement of the archaeologists' requirements could have avoided this.

It is my hope in presenting some of these issues and suggesting alternative models, that fruitful discussions of confirmation and explanation in archaeology will ensue. The task of the new archaeology is an important and exciting one, but a misleading impression of commitment to a narrow philosophical view which equates "scientific method" with ac- ceptance of H-D confirmation and D-N explana- tion is detrimental to the cause.

Acknowledgments. I am deeply grateful to William A. Longacre, Wesley C. Salmon, and the editor of American Antiquity for advice, instruction, and en- couragement in connection with this paper.

Davis, Martin, and Reuben Hersh 1973 Hilbert's 10th problem. Scientific American

229(5):84-91. Hempel, Carl

1962 Explanation in science and in history. In Frontiers of science and philosophy, edited by R. C. Colodny, pp. 7-33. University of Pitts- burgh Press, Pittsburgh.

LeBlanc, Steven A. 1974 Two points of logic. In Research and theory

in current archaeology, edited by Charles L. Redman, pp. 199-214. John L. Wiley, New York.

Lewis, C. I. 1962 An analysis of knowledge and valuation.

Open Court, La Salle. Morgan, Charles G.

19 7 3 Archaeology and explanation. World Archaeology 4:259-276.

Salmon, Wesley C. 1967 The foundations of scientific inference.

University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 1 97 1 Statistical explanation and statistical

relevance. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pitts- burgh.

archaeologists open to attack (such as that by Morgan 1973) on the deficiencies of these models, when a more careful statement of the archaeologists' requirements could have avoided this.

It is my hope in presenting some of these issues and suggesting alternative models, that fruitful discussions of confirmation and explanation in archaeology will ensue. The task of the new archaeology is an important and exciting one, but a misleading impression of commitment to a narrow philosophical view which equates "scientific method" with ac- ceptance of H-D confirmation and D-N explana- tion is detrimental to the cause.

Acknowledgments. I am deeply grateful to William A. Longacre, Wesley C. Salmon, and the editor of American Antiquity for advice, instruction, and en- couragement in connection with this paper.

Davis, Martin, and Reuben Hersh 1973 Hilbert's 10th problem. Scientific American

229(5):84-91. Hempel, Carl

1962 Explanation in science and in history. In Frontiers of science and philosophy, edited by R. C. Colodny, pp. 7-33. University of Pitts- burgh Press, Pittsburgh.

LeBlanc, Steven A. 1974 Two points of logic. In Research and theory

in current archaeology, edited by Charles L. Redman, pp. 199-214. John L. Wiley, New York.

Lewis, C. I. 1962 An analysis of knowledge and valuation.

Open Court, La Salle. Morgan, Charles G.

19 7 3 Archaeology and explanation. World Archaeology 4:259-276.

Salmon, Wesley C. 1967 The foundations of scientific inference.

University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 1 97 1 Statistical explanation and statistical

relevance. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pitts- burgh.

WARFARE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE: A RECONSIDERATION

DAVID WEBSTER

Warfare is seen as an adaptive ecological choice under conditions of population growth and resource limitation. Its major significance in the formation of the state lay in its ability to negate evolutionary constraints inherent in ranked societies. The evolutionary significance of warfare is discussed in terms of processes of cultural change which are largely internal.

WARFARE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE: A RECONSIDERATION

DAVID WEBSTER

Warfare is seen as an adaptive ecological choice under conditions of population growth and resource limitation. Its major significance in the formation of the state lay in its ability to negate evolutionary constraints inherent in ranked societies. The evolutionary significance of warfare is discussed in terms of processes of cultural change which are largely internal.

American archaeology has recently experi- enced a laudable shift away from preoccupation with functional, holistic interpretations of pre-

American archaeology has recently experi- enced a laudable shift away from preoccupation with functional, holistic interpretations of pre-

historic behavior toward those emphasizing the dynamic aspects of cultural systems, including "... conflict, marginality, and dissonance as

historic behavior toward those emphasizing the dynamic aspects of cultural systems, including "... conflict, marginality, and dissonance as

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sources of creativity and change" (Adams 1968:1192). As a result of my own work on the defensive system at Becan, an early Low- land Maya center (Webster n.d.a), I have be- come increasingly convinced that a pre- dominant form of conflict-warfare-has played a significant role in cultural evolution. Warfare has been singled out as an important evolution- ary mechanism by a number of authors, in- cluding Service (1962), Fried (1961, 1967), and Carneiro (1970); while there is considerable difference of opinion among them about the significance of warfare on various sociopolitical levels, all seem to agree that conflict, ultimately related to ecological stresses, played a role in the emergence of primary states.

The most seminal consideration of the role of warfare in the process of state-formation is that of Carneiro (1970) who postulates that population growth in environmentally circum- scribed regions generates conflict over dwindling basic resources, especially land. De- feated groups, unable to escape, are sub- ordinated to the victors, thus establishing the basis for social stratification. I would agree with Carneiro's assertion that population pressure and resource limitation can generate intense, evolutionarily "creative" warfare, but his model leaves a number of problems unsolved. The following discussion represents an extension and refinement of Carneiro's argument in an attempt to overcome the following problems.

First, the criterion of well-defined environ- mental circumscription seems inappropriate to many areas where early states developed. One cannot quarrel with the example Carneiro himself chooses-the desert-bounded valleys of coastal Peru. Here circumscription is obvious. But I find it difficult to see Mesopotamia, the mesoamerican highlands and lowlands, or north China as circumscribed in Carneiro's sense. The latter are characterized, rather, by zones of high demographic and agricultural potential sur- rounded by more marginal zones. If we accept (for purposes of argument only) one of Carneiro's own basic assumptions-i.e., that no group ever willingly relinquishes its political autonomy to another-it is very difficult to conceive how effective subordination (and hence stratification) could occur under these conditions. Defeated groups would face the choice of subordination or lower standards of living in more marginal zones, and presumably the second choice would have been the more

attractive. Carneiro has partially circumvented this difficulty by appealing to "social circum- scription," in itself an elegant concept with, I feel, more utility than "environmental circum- scription"; unfortunately he did not sufficient- ly elaborate on this concept.

Another problem lies in explaining why states did not appear in such obviously circum- scribed and populous environments as the "high" islands of Polynesia. It is true that here the circumscribing element-the sea-was also an avenue of transportation, but migration was a desperate gamble even for such intrepid mariners as the Polynesians (Sharp 1957). Sahlins (1958) cites many examples of defeated groups accepting politically and economically subordinate roles, at least temporarily.

An even more fundamental difficulty in- volves structural constraints on evolutionary potential inherent in well-developed ranked societies, from which early states presumably developed. Such societies present us with some- thing of an evolutionary paradox. On one hand, the structure of ranked society, with its hier- archical organization of political authority, centralization of some forms of economic activity, and at least incipient forms of wealth accumulation and differential consumption, prefigures basic characteristics of the state- concentration of wealth and coercive force in the hands of a small segment of society. On the other, the kinship idiom which integrates ranked societies would seem to frustrate the evolution of state-type institutions in several fundamental ways. In such societies wealth accumulation is limited by the reciprocal rela- tions of the chief to his producer-kinsmen. Effective monopolization of coercive force is difficult because what limited access to force the chief possesses is largely derived from his redistributional activities, which continually re- inforce his political support and authority. But because those supporting the chief themselves produce most of the surpluses they receive from him through the redistributional network, the chief can only attempt to augment his political prestige (and consequent force at his disposal) by, paradoxically, increasing his demands on the very people who support him. Obviously there are limits beyond which these demands cannot go without undermining the support-base itself. Chiefs in such societies tread the fine line between receipt of gifts due to senior kinsmen on the one hand (with the

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expectation of reciprocity), and outright coercive mobilization of labor and taxation on the other. Here is a source of instability in such systems, since the (usually) insufficient coercive force at the disposal of the chief is unable to counteract fissioning tendencies produced when he overreaches himself in his demands.

Another fundamental weakness of ranked societies is that withdrawal of support results in increased authority of competing individuals or factions. Because the status of chief is highly desirable, it is coveted by others. But the kinship idiom which sanctions the hierarchical organization precludes the attainment of similar status by others through their own economic activities or personal qualities. However, pre- cisely because there are other members of the society of nearly equivalent rank (and because genealogies can be so easily manipulated), other individuals can usurp the chief's position and enjoy his prerogatives provided the force at their disposal is superior. Force, in other words, becomes for the first time a significant political tool, but it is significant because it is diffuse, not concentrated. This explains the internal instability of many chiefdoms, which often

appear to be more political arenas than political entities.

Territorial expansion seems to provoke inter- nal stresses which, given the limited amount of force at the disposal of the chief, eventually frustrate effective consolidation. Even if expan- sion occurs, integration of new population elements, defeated or otherwise, is commonly achieved through assimilation or adoption into the dominant group-i.e., inclusion in the kin-

ship structure. Such assimilation is probably related to the diffuse nature of force in ranked societies, which makes it difficult to institution- alize political or economic subordination. What emerges is a larger (and probably more fragile) chiefdom, not an incipient state. Any theory of the origin of the state through warfare must demonstrate how these weaknesses are over- come, and this is not clear from Carneiro's model.

That the successful internal transition from ranked society to stable primary state was difficult and unusual is demonstrated by the fact that it occurred on only a handful of occasions (a point which cannot be made too strongly, since it negates the oversimplistic identification of ranked societies in general as

evolutionary "stages" on the inevitable road to

statehood). Under what circumstances could warfare have facilitated the development of state-type institutions? I suggest that warfare would have had its greatest impact under the following conditions.

(1) The environmental context must be one of closely juxtaposed zones of markedly differ- ent productive and demographic potential. The total area must be quite large, allowing the co-existence of many politically autonomous local societies on varying levels of complexity, but there should be no marked natural barriers impeding interaction of these groups or fission- ing of population into marginal zones.

(2) There must be sufficient agricultural potential so that even extensive techniques of agriculture are capable of generating surpluses, but the possibility of effective agricultural intensification must also be present.

(3) Even within regions of grossly similar overall productive capacity there must be con- siderable local variability in basic resources, especially land and/or water; this condition encourages incipient economic stratification and the development of patterns of economic redistribution so fundamental to ranked soci- eties.

(4) Rapid population growth must occur, and fissioning of excess populations from densely settled "core" zones into more margin- al zones must be an initial attractive solution to population growth, as opposed to internal population controls or agricultural intensifica- tion. This pattern is especially likely if the larger environment is a relatively open frontier being colonized by people already possessed of effective agricultural economies (e.g., the Basin of Mexico or the Maya lowlands).

Let us assume rapid population growth with consequent resource limitation in such an en- vironmental setting (and both of these assump- tions are congruent with Carneiro's model) and the eventual establishment of a series of more or less well-developed ranked societies, especial- ly in the highly productive "core" areas which would have been earliest settled and had great- est demographic potential. The organizational features of ranked societies would obviously have been very adaptive, with chiefs fulfilling redistributive, adjudicative, ritual, and military functions partially as a response to the stresses of resource limitation. Let us further assume

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continued rapid population growth, which cer- tainly seems indicated in several areas where early states appeared. Once the landscape had been filled to the point where fissioning was no longer a viable equilibrium-maintaining mechan- ism, a number of alternatives would have presented themselves:

(1) Accept increasingly lower standards of living;

(2) Institute effective internal population controls;

(3) Adopt more intensive agricultural tech- niques;

(4) Acquire additional basic productive resources through warfare.

Obviously the first solution is no good in the long run. The second, to judge from the apparent rapid growth of populations in areas where early states emerged, may either have been impossible or undesirable. Intensification of agriculture is a good alternative, but is usually a long-term proposition entailing high labor costs and the development of new skills, techniques, and forms of social organization. I would suggest, as does Carneiro, that the last alternative-warfare-was an immediately at- tractive solution in some areas, specifically the high density zones in which initial expansion would be at the expense of less dense and well organized populations in the marginal zones.

Let me make two points here. I do not mean to suggest that all local groups simultaneously selected rampant expansion out of the possible alternatives open to them. Obviously a variety of adaptive choices was theoretically available to local populations at different times and under different circumstances. But constraints on adaptive choices must not be seen only in terms of internal or natural variables, but also in choices made by other groups in the larger system of interacting populations-i.e., informa- tion from the larger system conditions local choices. Thus, if only a few groups selected aggressive expansion others would be at a competitive disadvantage if they did not respond in kind by developing their own military capabilities. There would be a kind of "snowball" effect analogous to the prolifera- tion of modern armament in industrialized countries, but in prehistoric times this would have been more frequently expressed in organ- izational rather than technological innovations.

A second point is that aggressive expansion is not, in the perspective of the larger system, adaptive in any direct sense, since it provides neither for increases in overall resources or radical decreases in overall population (except possibly in extreme cases). Warfare must rather be seen as a short-term, local solution to problems of resource limitation as conditioned by the limited information available to the local populations.

Initial expansion of the core area chiefdoms would, as pointed out above, be very likely successful, since it would be at the expense of marginal populations unable to resist effective- ly. But continued expansion would eventually create confrontations between these large, well organized core area chiefdoms themselves. Carneiro here would seemingly anticipate eventual successful military domination of one contending group over others, setting the stage for effective subordination and the develop- ment of stratification. I would disagree. Suc- cessful territorial expansion and long-term, ef- fective subordination of conquered populations seems unlikely for reasons discussed previously. Instead I would envision conditions of rather constant tension and conflict, with occasional military successes counterbalanced by destruc- tive stresses generated by political and ter- ritorial overextension. But rather than viewing this military situation as one of stable equilibri- um, I would suggest that it produces a potent environment for evolutionary change by render- ing ineffective many of the internal constraints on sociopolitical evolution otherwise present in ranked societies.

The first effect would be to promote in- creased internal stability. Continued warfare between well-matched chiefdoms would place great adaptive value on stable military leader- ship. To the extent that chiefs successfully fulfilled this function, internal power struggles and political factionalism, prime constraints on the leadership hierarchy of ranked societies, would be significantly dampened. The political authority of the successful war chief would, in other words, be augmented to the extent that internal challenges to his position were reduced. Insofar as conflict was reasonably constant, this augmentation of his authority would be permanent. This is not to suggest that in- creasing emphasis on military ability as a criterion for leadership in itself promotes inter-

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nal stability; indeed it may set up its own concomitant stresses. Rather the potency of external military threat counteracts these stresses since it selects for stable internal organization in spite of them.

Aggressive expansion of some chiefdoms in the high density zones would allow the success- ful incorporation of small amounts of addition- al land. Such land would represent a resource external to the traditional system in the sense that no local individuals or kin groups had claims to it. It therefore would constitute a capital resource which could effectively be monopolized by the highly-ranked managerial groups whose success in military leadership was largely responsible for its acquisition in the first place. The interplay between wealth, prestige, and political authority common to complex ranked societies would provide motivation for such monopolization. If the political authority of a chief is largely due to his redistributional role and his ability to exhibit impressive status symbols, which enhance his prestige, he will have a strong tendency to continually attempt to augment his control of basic resources. So long as he pursues this aim within the tradition- al society, his actions will promote dissension since they will be at the expense of his kinsmen. But no such limitations will affect external resources, especially if there is a high degree of public acquiescence that the chief was responsible, through military leadership, for their acquisition. The chief can be "rewarded" by differential access to them since this reward takes nothing tangible from his traditional kinsmen. Warfare, in short, may place an entirely new dimension of wealth, with all of its political ramifications, at the disposal of the chief, at precisely the same time as he has acquired heightened prestige and public support from successful war leadership. Wealth is here taken to mean basic productive goods (e.g., land or water) which are in scarce supply, and which have the potential to be manipulated in a self-serving manner to the economic advantage of some and disadvantage to others.

This new wealth could be manipulated in several ways, the most effective of which would be judicious and differential redistribution of it (a continuation of a basic economic pattern fundamental to most ranked societies). For example, redistribution might benefit close kinsmen (military supporters?).

Such a pattern could exaggerate whatever incipient economic stratification was already present due to local variations in productive resources (assuming that local kin groups al- ready possessed of slight economic advantages "floated" to the highest-ranked positions dur- ing the process of chiefdom-formation). Land could also be redistributed to potentially dis- contented (and hence dangerous) elements within the expanding ranked society itself.

The ideal situation for the appearance or intensification of economic stratification would be the gradual conquest of small amounts of land in marginal zones, and perhaps the temporary subjugation of groups occupying them, and not the widespread conquest of vast new areas. Small scale accumulation of territory would perpetuate most of the economic im- balances in the expanding society, at the same time as some individuals were acquiring inordinate control of new resources. Dis- advantaged kin groups or individuals would have sought out patronage relationships with those controlling more than adequate resources. Moreover, small, temporarily subordinated groups would become captive "clients."

Concentration of power is integrally related to concentration of wealth, and derives from it. Here power (following Fried 1967:13) refers to the ability to channel the behavior of others through the application of sanctions more potent than (or unrelated to) personal prestige. This definition includes, but is certainly not limited to, the more common notion of control of coercive force in terms of physical violence. Obviously the power of highly ranked in- dividuals would increase to the extent that redistribution of "external" wealth created economic dependents or dampened internal competition for high status positions. Another possibility is the emergence of bodies of quasi- professional soldiers, an organizational adaption which would be extremely valuable in agricul- tural societies where there are strong seasonal constraints on full-time farmers, thus restricting military activity. Insofar as military units of this type were differentially rewarded they would constitute special power groups intimate- ly related to the highly-ranked war leaders.

What emerges from this context is a series of economic and political special interest groups apart from the traditional web of kinship relations, an important step toward a

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society " . . . organized on a basis superior to kinship" (Fried 1967:229). These special interest groups would have a stake in preserving the political and economic status quo, including continued warfare.

Flannery, in discussing the evolution of the state, has stressed the concepts of "system- serving" and "self-serving" behavior (1972). Under conditions of chronic warfare those in positions of political authority could simulta- neously pursue system-serving and self-serving ends. Precisely because effective, long-term military leadership became an adaptive neces- sity, opportunities for self-serving accretions of political and economic influence existed.

Processes of state-formation capitalized, paradoxically, on the weaknesses of the com- peting political units, which prevented any sort of widespread political integration. Whatever internal stresses were caused by the emergent state-type institutions were counteracted by a climate of external competition which made those institutions necessary or bearable.

I emphasize that warfare cannot be seen as any sort of "single cause" in the evolution of the state. Its ultimate evolutionary significance was more subtle. Although it facilitated, along with other factors, the emergence and survival of privileged managerial groups it was, in the long run, an ineffective solution to the basic ecological problems of resource limitation and population growth and may even have ex- acerbated those problems. But the existence of effective political structures made possible a number of new adaptive solutions, especially agricultural intensification and effective eco- nomic specialization. These in turn strengthen- ed the managerial roles of leadership hierarchies and increased the potential scope of their self-serving activities. To judge from known archaeological sequences these innovations did not cause a decline in warfare, but rather provided additional pretexts for it, and are thus components in systems characterized to a high degree by positive feedback.

CONCLUSION

The model of warfare and state evolution outlined above emphasizes many of the ele- ments of Carneiro's model, including popula- tion growth and pressure, resource limitation, social circumscription, and conflict. Much more important, however, are the ways in which it is

different. First, strongly delimited environ- mental circumscription is not a factor. The suggested mosaic pattern of juxtaposed zones of differing productive and demographic potential seems more consistent with condi- tions under which most early states arose.

A second major difference is that the emergence of state-type institutions is con- ceived as largely an internal rather than external process; for Carneiro the dynamic, expansive, and incorporative dimensions of warfare are all important-especially territorial acquisition and the effective subjugation of defeated popula- tions. In my own view the role of warfare was much less dramatic but no less fundamental. Rather than being the active driving force behind the evolution of early states, it provided the supportive climate which initially ensured the survival and/or intensification of fragile political and economic evolutionary processes (i.e., incipient concentration of wealth and power), inherent in complex ranked societies, which under other circumstances would have generated self-destructive stresses.

Constant warfare not only provided an important and highly adaptive managerial func- tion for emergent elite segments of society, but it also stimulated the acquisition of small amounts of "wealth" (i.e., basic resources) which were external to the traditional system and could be manipulated in various self-serving ways by these same groups to dampen internal dissension and attract supporters. Out of this milieu developed political and economic special interest groups which ultimately provided the basis for social stratification.

Another major difference is that while Carneiro seems to emphasize concentration of power I would see concentration of wealth, from which power is derived, as more funda- mental. Power is often envisioned as a kind of internal cement which strengthens the fragile but all important economic differentials upon which social stratification is based. Power per- forms the same function in my model, but is expressed more in the form of external threat, which produces a solid external matrix ex- capsulating and preserving evolutionary ten- dencies toward state-type institutions already present in ranked societies, and providing op- portunities for their intensification. If effective (i.e., institutionally stable) concentration of coercive force is taken to be a prime character-

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istic of state-type societies as some scholars have maintained (e.g., Krader 1968) then I would see most early pristine states as incipient states only. I have suggested elsewhere (Web- ster, n.d.b) that the "theocratic" quality of many early states is related to this inability to effectively consolidate coercive force and provides an alternative, though shakier, sanc- tion for stratified political structures.

A further advantage of my warfare model is that it builds upon processes, structures, and weaknesses commonly found in ranked soci- eties. It assumes that the peculiar institutions common to many ranked societies are (under special circumstances) preconditions rather than obstacles to the formation of state-type institutions.

Finally, in accordance with current concep- tions of cultural evolution as an enormously complex systemic phenomenon, I would de- emphasize warfare as any sort of "single" or "primary" cause. Warfare was inextricably bound up with many other systemic processes. Its major contribution to the evolution of complex societies was short-term and in a sense ephemeral; it encouraged (along with many other factors) the emergence or intensification of incipient state-type institutions and helped to preserve them until they became at least superficially "traditional" and acquired further valuable adaptive functions (e.g., management of intensive agriculture and commerce) which insured their survival.

I certainly do not believe that the model sketched out above can be indiscriminately applied to all known instances of primary state formation. The details of its "fit" will no doubt vary considerably with obvious variations in population growth and spacing, local environ- mental conditions, and the differential weighing of related variables such as trade or potential for agricultural intensification. I have recently completed an extensive test of the model against the data pertaining to the evolution of lowland Maya society between 1000 B.C. and

A.D. 600 (Webster, n.d.b). I would further suggest that it may have a great deal of validity (in modified form) for the emergence of Sumerian states in southern Mesopotamia between 3200 and 2500 B.C., especially in the consolidation of political and economic power in the hands of the lugal during the later phases of this period (Adams 1966). One final note of caution. Although I have emphasized warfare in conjunction with the evolution of the state I would strongly disagree with Fried's (1967) seeming contention that it has evolutionary significance on this level alone.

Adams, R. M. 1966 The evolution of urban society. Aldine,

Chicago. 1968 Archaeological research strategies. Science

160:1187-1192. Carneiro, R.

1970 A theory of the origin of the state. Science 169.

Flannery, K. 1972 The cultural evolution of civilization. An-

nual Review of Ecology and Systematics 8. Fried, M.

1961 Warfare, military organization, and the evolution of society. Anthropologica 3.

1967 The evolution of political society. Random House, New York.

Krader, L. 1968 Formation of the state. Prentice-Hall, Engle-

wood Cliffs. Sahlins, M. D.

1958 Social stratification in Polynesia. University of Washington Press, Seattle.

Service, E. 1962 Primitive social organization. Random

House, New York. Sharp, A.

1957 Ancient voyages in the South Pacific. Penguin Books, Baltimore.

Webster, D. n.d.a The fortifications of Becan, Campeche,

Mexico. Publications of the Middle American Research Institute, Tulane. (In press, ms. 1972.)

n.d.b Warfare and the evolution of Maya civiliza- tion. In papers of the Symposium on Maya Origins, edited by Richard E. W. Adams. University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. (In press, ms. 1974.)

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