Warfighting - The US Marines Chapter 1. The Nature of War War Defined * Friction * Uncertainty *...

FMFM 1

Warfighting

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 139 000050 00

Provided by www.marines.cc

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-0001

6 March 1989

FOREWORD

This book describes my philosophy on warfighting. It is the MarineCorps’ doctrine and, as such, provides the authoritative basis for howwe fight and how we prepare to fight.

By design, this is a small book and easy to read. It is not intended as areference manual, but is designed to be read from cover to cover. Thereis a natural progression to its four chapters. Chapter 1 describes ourunderstanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war.Chapter 2 derives a theory about war based on that understanding. Thistheory in turn provides the foundation for how we prepare for war andhow we wage war, chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

You will notice that this book does not contain specific techniquesand procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in theform of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.

I expect every officer to read and reread this book, understand it, andtake its message to heart. The thoughts contained here represent notjust guidance for actions in combat, but a way of thinking in general.This manual thus describes a philosophy for action which, in war and inpeace, in the field and in the rear, dictates our approach to duty.

A.M. GRAY General, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: TJE


Warfighting

Chapter 1. The Nature of War

War Defined * Friction * Uncertainty * Fluidity * Disorder *The Human Dimension * Violence and Danger * Moral and PhysicalForces * The Evolution of War * Art and Science of War

Chapter 2. The Theory of War

War as an Instrument of Policy * Means in War * The Spectrum ofConflict * Levels of War * Offense and Defense * Styles of Warfare *Combat Power * Concentration and Speed * Surprise and Boldness *Exploiting Vulnerability and Opportunity

Chapter 3. Preparing for War

Planning * Organization * Doctrine * Leadership * Training *Professional Military Education * Equipping

Chapter 4. The Conduct of War

The Challenge * Maneuver Warfare * Philosophy of Command *Shaping theBattle * Decision Making * Mission Tactics * Commander’s Intent *Focus of Effort * Surfaces and Gaps * Combined Arms

Notes

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Chapter 1

The Nature of War

“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. Thedifficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that isinconceivable unless one has experienced war.” 1

- Carl von Clausewitz

“In war the chief incalculable is the human will.” 2

- B.H. Liddell Hart

“Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but al-most invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind thatthe position cannot be held.” 3

- A.A. Vandegrift


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To understand the Marine Corps’ philosophy of warfighting, wefirst need an appreciation for the nature of war itself — its moraland physical characteristics and demands.4 A common viewamong Marines of the nature of war is a necessary base for thedevelopment of a cohesive doctrine.

WAR DEFINED

War is a state of hostilities that exists between or among nations,characterized by the use of military force. The essence of war isa violent clash between two hostile, independent, and irreconcil-able wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.

Thus, the object of war is to impose our will on our enemy. Themeans to that end is the organized application or threat of vio-lence by military force.

When significant disagreements cannot be settled throughpeaceful means, such as diplomacy, nations resort to war.Nations not at war with one another can be said to be at


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peace. However, absolute war and peace rarely exist in prac-tice. Rather, they are extremes between which exist the relationsamong most nations. The need to resort to military force of somekind may arise at any point within these extremes, even duringperiods of relative peace. Thus, for our purposes war may rangefrom intense clashes between large military forces backed by anofficial declaration of war to covert hostilities which barely reachthe threshold of violence.5

FRICTION

So portrayed, war appears a simple enterprise. But in practice,Because of the countless factors that impinge on it, the conductof war becomes extremely difficult. These factors collectivelyhave been called friction, which Clausewitz described as “theforce that makes the apparently easy so difficult.”6 Friction is theforce that resists all action. It makes the simple difficult and thedifficult seemingly impossible.

The very essence of war as a clash between opposed willscreates friction. It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is notan inanimate object but an independent and animate force. Theenemy seeks to resist our will and impose his own will on us. It isthe dynamic interplay between his will and ours that makes wardifficult and complex. In this environment, friction abounds.



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Friction may be mental, as in indecision over a course of ac-tion. Or it may be physical, as in effective enemy fire or a terrainobstacle that must be overcome. Friction may be external, im-posed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere chance. Orfriction may be self-induced, caused by such factors as lack of aclearly defined goal, lack of coordination, unclear or complicatedplans, complex task organizations or command relationships, orcomplicated communication systems. Whatever form it takes,because war is a human enterprise, friction will always have apsychological as well as a physical impact.

While we should attempt to minimize self induced friction, thegreater requirement is to fight effectively, within the medium offriction. The means to overcome friction is the will; we prevailover friction through persistent strength of mind and spirit. Whilestriving to overcome the effects of friction ourselves, we mustattempt at the same time to raise our enemy’s friction to a levelthat destroys his ability to fight.

We can readily identify countless examples of friction, butuntil we have experienced it ourselves, we cannot hopeto appreciate it fully. Only through experience call we come toappreciate the force of will necessary to overcome friction andto develop a realistic appreciation for what is possible inwar and what is not. While training should attempt to approxi-mate the conditions of war, we must realize it can neverfully duplicate the level of friction of real combat.


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UNCERTAINTY

The next attribute of the environment of war is uncertainty. Wemight argue that uncertainty is just one of many sources of fric-tion, but because it is such a pervasive trait of war we will treat itsingly.

All actions in war take place in an atmosphere of uncertainty,or the fog of war. Uncertainty pervades battle in the form ofunknowns about the enemy, about the environment, and even aboutthe friendly situation. While we try to reduce these unknowns bygathering information, we must realize we cannot eliminate them.The very nature of war makes absolute certainty impossible; allactions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or evencontradictory information.

At best, we can hope to determine probabilities. This implies acertain standard of military judgment: what is probable and whatis not? Through this judgment of probability we make an estimateof our enemy’s designs and act accordingly. But, having said this,we also realize that it is precisely those actions which fall outsidethe realm of probability that often have the greatest impact on theoutcome of war.

We must learn to fight in an environment of uncertainty, whichwe can do by developing simple, flexible plans; planning for con-tingencies; developing standing operating procedures; and foster-ing initiative among subordinates.



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By its nature, uncertainty invariably involves the estimationand acceptance of risk. Risk is inherent in war and is involved inevery mission. Risk is also related to gain; normally, greater po-tential gain requires greater risk. Further, risk is equally commonto action and inaction. The practice of concentrating combat powerat the focus of effort necessitates the willingness to accept pru-dent risk. However, we should clearly understand that the accep-tance of risk does not equate to the imprudent willingness to gamblethe entire likelihood of success on a single improbable event.

Part of risk is the ungovernable element of chance. The ele-ment of chance is a universal characteristic of war and a continu-ous source of friction. Chance consists of turns of events thatcannot reasonably be foreseen and over which we and our en-emy have no control. The uncontrollable potential for chancealone creates psychological friction. We should remember thatchance favors neither belligerent exclusively. Consequently, wemust view chance not only as a threat but also as an opportunity,which we must be ever ready to exploit.

FLUIDITY

Like friction and uncertainty, fluidity is an integral attribute ofthe nature of war. Each episode in war is the temporary


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result of a unique combination of circumstances, requiring an origi-nal solution. But no episode can be viewed in isolation. Rather,each merges with those that precede and follow it - shaped by theformer and shaping the conditions of the latter - creating a con-tinuous, fluctuating fabric of activity replete with fleeting opportu-nities and unforeseen events. Success depends in large part onthe ability to adapt to a constantly changing situation.

It is physically impossible to sustain a high tempo of activityindefinitely, although clearly there will be times when it is advan-tageous to push men and equipment to the limit. Thus, the tempoof war will fluctuate from periods of intense activity to periods inwhich activity is limited to information gathering, replenishment,or redeployment. Darkness and weather can influence the tempoof war but need not halt it. A competitive rhythm will developbetween the opposing wills, with each belligerent trying to influ-ence and exploit tempo and the continuous flow of events to suithis purposes.

DISORDER

In an environment of friction, uncertainty, and fluidity, wargravitates naturally toward disorder. Like the other attributesof the environment of war, disorder is an integral char-acteristic of war; we can never eliminate it. In the heat of



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battle, plans will go awry, instructions and information will be un-clear and misinterpreted, communications will fail, and mistakesand unforeseen events will be commonplace. It is precisely thisnatural disorder which creates the conditions ripe for exploitationby an opportunistic will.

Each encounter in war will usually tend to grow increasinglydisordered over time. As the situation changes continuously, weare forced to improvise again and again until finally our actionshave little, if any, resemblance to the original scheme.

By historical standards, the modern battlefield is particularlydisorderly. While past battlefields could be described by linearformations and uninterrupted linear fronts, we cannot think oftoday’s battlefield in linear terms. The range and lethality of mod-ern weapons has increased dispersion between units. In spite ofcommunications technology, this dispersion strains the limits ofpositive control. The natural result of dispersion is unoccupiedareas, gaps, and exposed flanks which can and will be exploited,blurring the distinction between front and rear and friendly- andenemy-controlled areas.

The occurrences of war will not unfold like clockwork.Thus, we cannot hope to impose precise, positive controlover events. The best we can hope for is to impose a general


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framework of order on the disorder, to prescribe the general flowof action rather than to try to control each event.

If we are to win, we must be able to operate in a disorderlyenvironment. In fact, we must not only be able to fight effectivelyin the face of disorder, we should seek to generate disorder forour opponent and use it as a weapon against him.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the hu-man dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension whichinfuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped byhuman nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies,and peculiarities which characterize human behavior. Since waris an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it willinvariably inflame and be shaped by human emotions.

War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strengthand stamina. Any view of the nature of war would hardlybe accurate or complete without consideration of the effectsof danger, fear, exhaustion, and privation on the men who must do the fighting.7 However, these effects vary greatlyfrom case to case. Individuals and peoples react differently



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to the stress of war; an act that may break the will of one enemymay only serve to stiffen the resolve of another.

No degree of technological development or scientific calcula-tion will overcome the human dimension in war. Any doctrinewhich attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons,and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the con-duct of war and is therefore inherently false.

VIOLENCE AND DANGER

War is among the greatest horrors known to mankind; it shouldnever be romanticized. The means of war is force, applied in theform of organized violence. It is through the use of violence or thecredible threat of violence, which requires the apparent willing-ness to use it that we compel our enemy to do our will. In eitherevent, violence is an essential element of war, and its immediateresult is bloodshed, destruction, and suffering. While the magni-tude of violence may vary with the object and means of war, theviolent essence of war will never change.8 Any study of war thatneglects this characteristic is misleading and incomplete.

Since war is a violent enterprise, danger is a fundamentalcharacteristic of war. And since war is a human phenomenon,


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fear, the human reaction to danger, has a significant impact on theconduct of war. All men feel fear. Leadership must foster thecourage to overcome fear, both individually and within the unit.Courage is not the absence of fear; rather, it is the strength toovercome fear.9

Leaders must study fear, understand it, and be prepared to copewith it. Like fear, courage takes many forms, from a stoic cour-age born of reasoned calculation to a fierce courage born of height-ened emotion. Experience under fire generally increases cour-age, as can realistic training by lessening the mystique of combat.Strong leadership which earns the respect and trust of subordi-nates can limit the effects of fear. Leaders should develop unitcohesion and esprit and the self-confidence of individuals withinthe unit. In this environment a Marine’s unwillingness to violatethe respect and trust of his peers will overcome personal fear.

MORAL AND PHYSICALFORCES

War is characterized by the interaction of both moral andphysical-forces. The physical characteristics of war are gener-ally easily seen, understood, and measured: hardware,technology, physical objectives seized, force ratios, lossesof materiel or life, terrain lost or gained, prisoners or materielcaptured. The moral characteristics are less tangible. (The



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term moral as used here is not restricted to ethics although ethicsare certainly included, but pertains to those forces of psychologi-cal rather than tangible nature, to include the mental aspects ofWar.10) Moral forces are difficult to grasp and impossible to quan-tify. We cannot easily gauge forces like national and military re-solve, national or individual conscience, emotion, fear, courage,morale, leadership, or esprit. Yet moral forces exert a greaterinfluence on the nature and outcome of war than do physical.11

This is not to lessen the importance of physical forces, for thephysical forces in war can have a significant impact on the moral.For example, the greatest effect of fires on the enemy is gener-ally not the amount of physical destruction they cause, but theeffect of that physical destruction on his moral strength.

Because the moral forces of war are difficult to come to gripswith, it is tempting to exclude them from our study of war. How-ever, any doctrine or theory of war that neglects these factorsignores the greater part of the nature of war.

THE EVOLUTION OF WAR

War is both timeless and ever changing. While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we useevolve continuously. These changes may be gradual in somecases and drastic in others. Drastic changes in the nature


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of war are the result of developments that dramatically upset theequilibrium of war, such as the rifled bore and the railroad.

One major catalyst of change is the advancement of technol-ogy. As the physical hardware of war improves through techno-logical development, so must the tactical, operational, and strate-gic usage of those means adapt to the improved capabilities, bothto maximize our own capabilities and to counteract our enemy’s.

We must stay abreast of this process of change, for the bellig-erent who first exploits a development in the art and science ofwar gains a significant, if not decisive, advantage. Conversely, ifwe are ignorant of the changing face of war, we will find our-selves unequal to its challenges.

ART AND SCIENCE OF WAR

From the discussion to this point, we can conclude that wardemonstrates characteristics of both art and science. Variousaspects of war, particularly its technical aspects, fall principallyin the realm of science, which we will describe as the methodicalapplication of the empirical laws of nature. The science of war includes those activities directly subject to thelaws of physics, chemistry, and like disciplines; for example, the



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application of fires, the effects of Weapons, and the rates andmethods of movement and resupply. However, these are amongthe components of war; they do not describe the whole phenom-enon. Owing to the vagaries of human behavior and the countlessother intangible factors which contribute to it, there is far more tothe conduct of war than can be explained by science. The sci-ence of war stops short of the need for military judgment, theimpact of moral forces, the influence of chance, and other similarfactors. We thus conclude that the conduct of war is ultimately anart, an activity of human creativity and intuition powered by thestrength of the human will. The art of war requires the intuitiveability to grasp the essence of a unique battlefield situation, thecreative ability to devise a practical solution, and the strength ofpurpose to execute the act.

CONCLUSION

At first glance, war seems a rather simple clash of interests. Butat closer examination, it takes shape as one of the most demand-ing and trying of man’s endeavors. Fog, friction, and chaos are itsnatural habitat. Each episode is the unique product of the dy-namic interaction of myriad moral and physical forces. Whilefounded on the laws of science, war demands, ultimately, the in-tuition and creativity of art.


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FMFM 1 The Theory of War

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Chapter 2

The Theory of War

“The political object is the goal, war is the means of reach-ing it, and the means can never be considered in isolationfrom their purposes.” 1

—Carl von Clausewitz

“Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory inthe attack. One defends when his strength is inadequate; heattacks when it is abundant.” 2

—Sun Tzu

“Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuvre. The greaterthe general, the more he contributes in manoeuvre, the lesshe demands in slaughter.” 3

—Winston Churchill


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Having arrived at a common view of the nature of war, we pro-ceed to develop from it a theory of War. Our theory of war will inturn be the foundation for the way we prepare for and wage war.

WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

War does not exist for its own sake. It is an extension of policywith military force.4 The policy aim that is the motive for warmust also be the foremost determinant for the conduct of war.

The single most important thought to understand about our theoryis that war must serve policy. As the policy aims of war mayvary from resistance against aggression to complete annihilationof the enemy, so must the application of violence vary in accor-dance with those aims. Of course, we may also have to adjust ourpolicy objectives to accommodate our means; we must not estab-lish goals outside our capabilities.

When the policy motive of war is intense, such as theannihilation of an enemy, then policy and war’s natural militarytendency toward destruction will coincide, and the warwill appear more military and less political in nature. On


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the other hand, the less intense the policy motive, the more themilitary tendency toward destruction will be at variance with thatmotive, and the more political and less military the war will ap-pear.5

The aim in war is to achieve our will. The immediate require-ment is to overcome our enemy’s ability to resist us, which is aproduct of the physical means at his disposal and the strength ofhis will.6 We must either eliminate his physical ability to resist or,short of this, we must destroy his will to resist. In military terms,this means the defeat of the enemy’s fighting forces, but alwaysin a manner and to a degree consistent with the national policyobjective.

MEANS IN WAR

At the national level, war involves the use of all the elements ofnational power, including diplomacy, military force, economics,ideology, technology, and culture.7 Our primary concern is withthe use of military force as an instrument of policy. But while wewill focus on the use of military force, we must not consider it inisolation from the other elements of national power. The use ofmilitary force may take any number of forms, from intense war-fare with sophisticated weaponry to mere demonstrations. Theprincipal means for the application of military force is combatviolence in the form of armed conflict between military or para-military forces.



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THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Conflict can take a wide range of forms, constituting a spectrumwhich reflects the magnitude of violence involved. At one endare those conflicts of low intensity in which the application ofmilitary power is restrained and selective. The other end of thespectrum represents conflicts of high intensity, such as nuclearwar. The place on the spectrum of a specific conflict depends onseveral factors. Among them are policy objectives, military meansavailable, national will, and density of fighting forces or combatpower on the battlefield. In general, the greater the density, themore intense the conflict. As a result, we may witness relativelyintense actions within a low-intensity conflict or relatively quietsectors or phases in an intense war.

Low-intensity conflicts are more probable than high-intensityconflicts. Many nations simply do not possess the military meansto wage war at the high end of the spectrum. And, unless nationalsurvival is at stake, nations are generally unwilling to accept therisks associated with wars of high intensity. However, a conflict’sintensity may change over time. Belligerents may escalate thelevel of violence if the original means do not achieve the desiredresults. Similarly, wars may actually de-escalate over time; forexample, after an initial pulse of intense violence, the belligerentsmay continue to fight on a lesser level, unable to sustain theinitial level of intensity.


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The Marine Corps, as the nation’s force in readiness, must havethe versatility and flexibility to deal with military and paramilitarysituations across the entire spectrum of conflict. This is a greaterchallenge than it may appear; conflicts of low intensity are notsimply lesser forms of high-intensity war. A modern military forcecapable of waging a war of high intensity may find itself ill-pre-pared for a “small” war against a poorly equipped guerrilla force.

LEVELS OF WAR

War takes place simultaneously at several correlated levels, eachwith differing ends, means, characteristics, and requirements.

Activities at the strategic level focus directly on national policyobjectives. Strategy applies to peace as well as war. Within strat-egy we distinguish between national strategy, which coordinatesand focuses all the components of national power to attain thepolicy objective,8 and military strategy, which is the applicationof military force to secure the policy objective.9 Military strategythus is subordinate to national strategy. Strategy can be thoughtof as the art of winning wars. Strategy establishes goals in the-aters of war. It assigns forces, provides assets, and imposes con-ditions on the use of force. Strategy derived from national policymust be clearly understood to be the sole authoritative basis of alloperations.



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Activities at the tactical level of war focus on the applicationof combat power to defeat an enemy in combat at a particulartime and place.10 Tactics can be thought of as the art and scienceof winning engagements and battles. It includes the use of fire-power and maneuver, the integration of different arms, and theimmediate exploitation of success to defeat the enemy. Includedwithin the tactical level of war is the sustainment of forces duringcombat. The tactical level also includes the technical applicationof combat power, which consists of those techniques and proce-dures for accomplishing specific tasks within a tactical action.These techniques and procedures deal primarily with actions de-signed to enhance the effects of fires or reduce the effects ofenemy fires methods such as the call for fire, techniques of fire,the technical operation of weapons and equipment, or tacticalmovement techniques. There is a certain overlap between tacticsand techniques. We make the point only to draw the distinctionbetween tactics, which are the product of judgment and creativ-ity, and techniques and procedures, which are generally performedby repetitive routine.

The operational level of war links the strategic andtactical levels. It is the use of tactical results to attain strategic objectives.11 The operational level includes decidingwhen, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemyin battle—and when, where, and under what conditions torefuse battle with reference to higher aims. Actions at thislevel imply a broader dimension of time and space than dotactics. As strategy deals with wars and tactics with


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battles and engagements, the operational level of war is the artof winning campaigns. Its means are tactical results, and its endis the military strategic objective.

OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

Regardless of its type and nature or the level at which it is fought,combat manifests itself in two different but complementary forms:the offense and the defense. The offense and defense are neithermutually exclusive nor clearly distinct; as we will see, each in-cludes elements of the other.

The offense contributes striking power. The offense gener-ally has as its aim some positive gain; it is through the offense thatwe seek to impose some design on the enemy. The defense, onthe other hand, contributes resisting power, the ability to pre-serve and protect oneself. Thus, the defense generally has a nega-tive aim, that of resisting the enemy’s will.

The defense is inherently the stronger form of combat. Weret h i snot the case, there would be no reason ever to assume the defen-sive. The offense, with its positive aim, would always be prefer-able.12 But in fact, if we are weaker than our enemy, we assumethe defensive to compensate for our weakness. Similarly, if weare to mount an offensive to impose our will, we must developenough force to overcome the inherent superiority of the enemy’sdefense.



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At least one party to a conflict must have an offensive inten-tion, for without the desire to impose upon the other there wouldbe no conflict. Similarly, the second party must at least possess adefensive desire, for without the willingness to resist there againwould be no conflict. We can imagine a conflict in which bothparties possess an offensive intention. But after the initial clashone of them must assume a defensive posture out of weaknessuntil able to resume the offensive.

This leads us to the conclusion that while the defense is thestronger form of combat, the offense is the preferred form, foronly through the offense can we truly pursue a positive aim. Weresort to the defensive when weakness compels.

While opposing forms, the offense and defense are not mutu-ally exclusive. In fact, they cannot exist separately. For example,the defense cannot be purely passive resistance. An effectivedefense must assume an offensive character, striking at the en-emy at the moment of his greatest vulnerability. It is “not a simpleshield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows.”13 The trulydecisive element of the defense is the counterattack. Thus, theoffense is an integral component of the concept ofthe defense.

Similarly, the defense is an essential component of theoffense.14 The offense cannot sustain itself indefinitely. At some


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times and places, it becomes necessary to halt theoffense to replenish, and the defense automatically takes over.Furthermore, the requirement to concentrate forces at the focusof effort for the offense often necessitates assuming the defen-sive elsewhere. Therefore, out of necessity we must include de-fensive considerations as part of our concept of the offense.

This brings us to the concept of the culminating point,15 with-out which our understanding of the relationship between the of-fense and defense would be incomplete. Not only can the offensenot sustain itself indefinitely, it generally grows weaker as it ad-vances. Certain moral factors, such as morale or boldness, mayincrease with a successful attack, but these generally cannot com-pensate for the physical losses involved in sustaining an advancein the face of resistance. We advance at a cost lives, fuel, ammu-nition, physical and sometimes moral strength and so the attackbecomes weaker over time. Eventually, the superiority that al-lowed us to attack and forced our enemy to defend in the firstplace dissipates and the balance tips in favor of our enemy. Wehave reached the culminating point, at which we can no longersustain the attack and must revert to the defense. It is precisely atthis point that the defensive element of the offense is most vul-nerable to the offensive element of the defense,—thecounterattack.

This relationship between offense and defense exists simulta-neously at the various levels of war. For example, we may



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employ a tactical defense as part of an offensive campaign, avail-ing ourselves of the advantages of the defense tactically whilepursuing an operational offensive aim.

We conclude that there exists no clear division between theoffense and defense. Our theory of war should not attempt toimpose one artificially. The offense and defense exist simulta-neously as necessary components of each other, and the transi-tion from one to the other is fluid and continuous.

STYLES OF WARFARE

Just as there are two basic forms of combat, there are two essen-tial components: fire and movement. Of all the countlessactivities in combat, we can distill them to these.

It would seem in theory that fire and movement represent op-posite ends of a spectrum. But in reality, one cannot exist withoutthe other, for fire and movement are complementary and mutu-ally dependent. It is movement that allows us to bring our fires tobear on the enemy just as it is the protection of fires-that allowsus to move in the face of the enemy. It is through movement thatwe exploit the effects of fires while it is the destructive force offires that adds menace to our movements.


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Although all warfare uses both fire and movement, these com-ponents provide the foundation for two distinct styles of warfare:an attrition style, based on firepower, and a maneuver style, basedon movement. The different styles can exist simultaneously atdifferent levels. For example, the island-hopping campaign in thePacific during the Second World War was a maneuver campaigncomprising a series of attrition battles.

Warfare by attrition seeks victory through the cumulativedestruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepowerand technology. An attritionist sees the enemy as targets tobe engaged and destroyed systematically. Thus, the focus ison efficiency, leading to a methodical, almost scientific, approachto war. With the emphasis on the efficient application of massed,accurate fires, movement tends to be ponderous and temporelatively unimportant. The attritionist gauges progress in quanti-tative terms: battle damage assessments, “body counts,” andterrain captured. He seeks battle under any and all conditions,pitting strength against strength to exact the greatest toll from hisenemy. Results are generally proportionate to efforts; greaterexpenditures net greater results that is, greater attrition. Thedesire for volume and accuracy of fire tends to lead towardcentralized control, just as the emphasis on efficiency tends tolead to-an inward focus on procedures and techniques. Successthrough attrition demands the willingness and ability also towithstand attrition, because warfare by attrition is costly. Thegreatest necessity for success is numerical superiority,



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and at the national level war becomes as much an industrial as amilitary problem. Victory does not depend so much on militarycompetence as on sheer superiority of numbers in men andequipment.

In contrast, warfare by maneuver stems from a desire to cir-cumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantagerather than meet it straight on. The goal is the application of strengthagainst selected enemy weakness. By definition, maneuver relieson speed and surprise, for without either we cannot concentratestrength against enemy weakness. Tempo is itself a weapon of-ten the most important. The need for speed in turn requires de-centralized control. While attrition operates principally in the physi-cal realm of war, the results of maneuver are both physical andmoral. The object of maneuver is not so much to destroy physi-cally as it is to shatter the enemy’s cohesion, organization, com-mand, and psychological balance. Successful maneuver dependson the ability to identify and exploit enemy weakness, not simplyon the expenditure of superior might. To win by maneuver, wecannot substitute numbers for skill. Maneuver thus makes a greaterdemand on military judgment. Potential success by maneuver unlikeattrition is often disproportionate to the effort made. But for ex-actly the same reasons, maneuver incompetently applied carrieswith it a greater chance for catastrophic failure, while attrition isinherently less risky.


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Because we have long enjoyed vast numerical and technologi-cal superiority, the United States has traditionally waged war byattrition. However, Marine Corps doctrine today is based on war-fare by maneuver, as we will see in the fourth chapter, “TheConduct of War.”16

COMBAT POWER

Combat power is the total destructive force we can bring to bearon our enemy at a given time.17 Some factors in combat powerare quite tangible and easily measured, such as superior numbers,which Clausewitz called “the most common element in victory.”18

Some may be less easily measured, such as the effects of ma-neuver, tempo, or surprise; the advantages established by geogra-phy or climate; the relative strengths of the offense and defense;or the relative merits of striking the enemy in the front, flanks, orrear. And some may be wholly intangible, such as morale, fightingspirit, perseverance, or the effects of leadership.

It is not our intent to try to list or categorize all the variouscomponents of combat power, to index their relative values, or todescribe their combinations and variations; each combination isunique and temporary. Nor is it even desirable to be able to do so,since this would lead us to a formulistic approach to war.



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CONCENTRATION AND SPEED

Of all the consistent patterns we can discern in war, there aretwo concepts of such significance and universality that we canadvance them as principles: concentration and speed.19

Concentration is the convergence of effort in time and space.It is the means by which we develop superiority at the decisivetime and place. Concentration does not apply only to combat forces.It applies equally to all available resources: fires, aviation, the in-telligence effort, logistics, and all other forms of combat supportand combat service support. Similarly, concentration does not applyonly to the conduct of war, but also to the preparation for war.

Effective concentration may achieve decisive local superiorityfor a numerically inferior force. The willingness to concentrate atthe decisive place and time necessitates strict economy and theacceptance of risk elsewhere and at other times. To devote meansto unnecessary efforts or excessive means to necessary second-ary efforts violates the principle of concentration and is counter-productive to the true objective.

Since war is fluid and opportunities fleeting, concentration ap-plies to time as well as to space. We must concentrate not only asthe decisive location, but also at the decisive moment. Further-more, physical concentration - massing makes us vulnerable toenemy fires, necessitating dispersion. Thus, a pattern develops:disperse, concentrate, disperse again.


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Speed is rapidity of action. Like concentration, speed applies toboth time and space. And, like concentration, it is relative speedthat matters. Speed over time is tempo the consistent ability tooperate fast.20 Speed over distance, or space, is velocity-the abil-ity to move fast. Both forms are genuine sources of combat power.In other words, speed is a weapon. Superior speed allows us toseize the initiative and dictate the terms of combat, forcing theenemy to react to us. Speed provides security. It is a prerequisitefor maneuver and for surprise. Moreover, speed is necessary inorder to concentrate superior strength at the decisive timeand place.

Since it is relative speed that matters, it follows that we shouldtake all measures to improve our own tempo and velocity whiledegrading our enemy’s. However, experience shows that we can-not sustain a high rate of velocity or tempo indefinitely. As a re-sult, another pattern develops: fast, slow, fast again. A competi-tive rhythm develops in combat, with each belligerent trying togenerate speed when it is to his advantage.

The combination of concentration and speed is momentum 21

momentum generates impetus. It adds “punch” or “shock effect”to our actions. It follows that we should strike the decisive blowwith the greatest possible combination of concentration and speed.



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SURPRISE AND BOLDNESS

We must now acknowledge two additional considerations that aresignificant as multipliers of combat power: surprise andboldness.

By surprise we mean striking the enemy at a time or place or ina manner for which he is unprepared. It is not essential that wetake the enemy unaware, but only that he become aware too lateto react effectively. The desire for surprise is “more or less basicto all operations, for without it superiority at the decisive point ishardly conceivable.”22 But, while a necessary condition for supe-riority, surprise is also a genuine multiplier of strength in its ownright because of its psychological effect. Surprise can decisivelyaffect the outcome of combat far beyond the physical meansat hand.

Surprise is the paralysis, if only partial and temporary, of theenemy’s ability to resist.23 The advantage gained by surprise de-pends on the degree of surprise and the enemy’s ability to adjustand recover. Surprise is based on speed, secrecy, and deception.It means doing the unexpected thing, which in turn normally meansdoing the more difficult thing in hopes that the enemy will notexpect it. In fact, this is the genesis of maneuver to circumventthe enemy’s strength to strike him where he is not prepared. Pur-posely choosing the more difficult course because it is less ex-pected necessarily means sacrificing efficiency to some degree.The question is: Does the anticipated advantage gained compen-sate for the certain loss of efficiency that must be incurred? 24


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While the element of surprise is often of decisive importance,we must realize that it is difficult to achieve and easy to lose. Itsadvantages are only temporary and must be quickly exploited.Friction, a dominant attribute of war, is the constant enemy ofsurprise. We must also recognize that while surprise is alwaysdesirable, the ability to achieve it does not depend solely on ourown efforts. It depends at least as much on our enemy’s suscep-tibility to surprise—his expectations and preparedness. Our abil-ity to achieve surprise thus rests on our ability to appreciate andthen dislocate our enemy’s expectations. Therefore, while sur-prise can be decisive, it is a mistake to depend on it alone for themargin of victory.

Boldness is a multiplier of combat power in much the sameway that surprise is, for “in what other field of human activity isboldness more at home than in war?”25 Boldness “must be granteda certain power over and above successful calculations involvingspace, time, and magnitude of forces, for wherever it is superior,it will take advantage of its opponent’s weakness. In other words,it is a genuinely creative force.”26 Boldness is superior to timidityin every instance and is at a disadvantage only in the face ofnervy, calculating patience which allows the enemy to commithimself irrevocably before striking a form of boldness in its ownright. Boldness must be tempered with judgment lest it border onrecklessness. But this does not diminish its significance.



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EXPLOITING VULNERABILITYAND OPPORTUNITY

It is not enough simply to generate superior combat power. Wecan easily conceive of superior combat power dissipated overseveral unrelated efforts or concentrated on some indecisive ob-ject. To win, we must concentrate combat power toward adecisive aim.27

We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrat-ing strength against enemy weakness rather than against strength.So we seek to strike the enemy where, when, and how he is mostvulnerable. This means that we should generally avoid his front,where his attention is focused and he is strongest, and seek outhis flanks and rear, where he does not expect us and where wecan also cause the greatest psychological damage. We shouldalso strike at that moment in time when he is most vulnerable.

Of all the vulnerabilities we might choose to exploit, some aremore critical to the enemy than others. It follows that the mosteffective way to defeat our enemy is to destroy that which ismost critical to him. We should focus our efforts on the one thingwhich, if eliminated, will do the most decisive damage to his abil-ity to resist us. By taking this from him we defeat him outrightor at least weaken him severely.


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Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a critical en-emy vulnerability. Obviously, the more critical and vulnerable,the better.28 But this is by no means an easy decision, since themost critical object may Rot be the most vulnerable. In selectingan aim, we thus recognize the need for sound military judgment tocompare the degree of criticality with the degree of vulnerabilityand to balance both against our own capabilities. Reduced to itssimplest terms, we should strike our enemy where and whenwe can hurt him most.

This concept applies equally to the conflict as a whole the warand to any episode of the war any campaign, battle, or engage-ment. From this we can conclude that the concept applies equallyto the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the highestlevel a critical vulnerability is likely to be some intangible condi-tion, such as popular opinion or a shaky alliance between twocountries, although it may also be some essential war resource ora key city. At the lower levels a critical vulnerability is more likelyto take on a physical nature, such as an exposed flank, a chokepointalong the enemy’s line of operations, a logistics dump, a gap inenemy dispositions, or even the weak side armor of a tank.

In reality, our enemy’s most critical vulnerability will rarely beobvious, particularly at the lower levels. We may have to adoptthe tactic of exploiting any and all vulnerabilities until we uncovera decisive opportunity.



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This leads us to a corollary thought: exploiting opportunity. De-cisive results in war are rarely the direct result of an initial, delib-erate action. Rather, the initial action creates the conditions forsubsequent actions which develop from it. As the opposing willsinteract, they create various, fleeting opportunities for either foe.Such opportunities are often born of the disorder that is natural inwar. They may be the result of our own actions, enemy mistakes,or even chance. By exploiting opportunities, we create in increas-ing numbers more opportunities for exploitation. It is often theability and the willingness to ruthlessly exploit these opportunitiesthat generate decisive results. The ability to take advantage ofopportunity is a function of speed, flexibility, boldness, andinitiative.

CONCLUSION

The theory of war we have described will provide the foundationfor the discussion of the conduct of war in the final chapter. Thewarfighting doctrine which we derive from our theory is one basedon maneuver. This represents a change since, with a few notableexceptions Stonewall Jackson in the Valley, Patton in Europe,MacArthur at Inchon the American way of war traditionally hasbeen one of attrition. This style of warfare generally has workedfor us because, with our allies, we have enjoyed vast numericaland technological superiority. But we can no longer presume sucha luxury. In fact, an expeditionary force in particular must be pre-pared to win quickly, with minimal casualties and limited externalsupport, against a physically superior foe. This requirementmandates a doctrine of maneuver warfare.


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FMFM 1 Pr eparing for War

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Chapter 3

Preparing for War

“The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: thedecision born of thought, the order or preparation for ex-ecution, and the execution itself. All three stages are gov-erned by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for theman of action character is of more critical importance thanintellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will withoutintellect is dangerous.”1

—Hans von Seekt

“The best form of welfare for the troops is first class training,for this saves unnecessary casualties.” 2

—Erwin Rommel

“Untutored courage is useless in the face of educatedbullets.” 3

—George S. Patton, Jr.


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During times of peace the most important task of any military isto prepare for war. As the nation’s rapid response force, theMarine Corps must maintain itself ready for immediate employ-ment in any clime and place and in any type of conflict. Allpeacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness.This implies a high level of training, flexibility in organization andequipment, qualified professional leadership, and a cohesivedoctrine.

PLANNING

Planning plays as important a role in the preparation for war as inthe conduct of war. The key to any plan is a clearly defined ob-jective, in this case a required level of readiness. We must iden-tify that level of readiness and plan a campaign to reach it. Acampaign is a progressive sequence of attainable goals to gain the objective within a specified time.4

The plan must focus all the efforts of the peacetime MarineCorps, including training, education, doctrine, organization, andequipment acquisition. Unity of effort is as important during thepreparation for war as it is during the conduct of war. This sys-tematic process of identifying the objective and planning a courseto gain it applies to all levels.


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ORGANIZATION

The Fleet Marine Forces must be organized to provide forward-deployed or rapidly-deployable forces capable of mounting expe-ditionary operations in any environment. This means that, in addi-tion to maintaining their unique amphibious capability, the FleetMarine Forces must maintain a capability to deploy bywhatever means is appropriate to the situation.

The active Fleet Marine Forces must be capable of respondingimmediately to most types of conflict. Missions in sustained high-intensity warfare will require augmentation from the Reserveestablishment.

For operations and training, Fleet Marine Forces active andReserve will be formed into Marine Air-Ground Task Forces(MAGTFs). MAGTFs are task organizations consisting of ground,aviation, combat service support, and command components. Theyhave no standard structure, but rather are constituted as appro-priate for the specific situation. The MAGTF provides a singlecommander the optimum combined-arms force for the situationhe faces. As the situation changes, it may of course be necessaryto restructure the MAGTF.

To the greatest extent practicable, Fleet Marine Forces mustbe organized for warfighting and then adapted for



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peacetime rather than vice versa. Tables of organization of FleetMarine Force units should reflect the two central requirements ofdeployability and the ability to task-organize according tospecific situations. Units should be organized according to typeonly to the extent dictated by training, administrative, and logisticrequirements. Further, we should streamline our headquarters or-ganizations and staffs to eliminate bureaucratic delays in order toadd tempo.

Commanders should establish habitual relationships betweensupported and supporting units to develop operationalfamiliarity among those units. This does not preclude nonstandardrelationships when required by the situation.

DOCTRINE

Doctrine is a teaching advanced as the fundamental beliefs of theMarine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory toits preparation and conduct.5 Doctrine establishes a particularway of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy forleading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and acommon language. In short, it establishes the way we practiceour profession. In this manner, doctrine provides the basisfor harmonious actions and mutual understanding.


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Marine Corps doctrine is made official by the Commandantand is established in this manual. Our doctrine does not consist ofprocedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it estab-lishes general guidance that requires judgment in application.Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive.

LEADERSHIP

Marine Corps doctrine demands professional competence amongits leaders. As military professionals charged with the defenseof the nation, Marine leaders must be true experts in the con-duct of war. They must be men of action and of intellect both,skilled at “getting things done” while at the same time conversantin the military art. Resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, theymust also be energetic and insistent in execution 6.

The military profession is a thinking profession. Officers par-ticularly are expected to be students of the art and science of warat all levels tactical, operational, and strategic with a solid founda-tion in military theory and a knowledge of military history andthe timeless lessons to be gained from it.



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Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility oftheir office; the resources they will expend in war are humanlives.

The Marine Corps’ style of warfare requires intelligent leaderswith a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowestlevels. Boldness is an essential moral trait in a leader, for it gener-ates combat power beyond the physical means at hand. Initiative,the willingness to act on one’s own judgment, is a prerequisite forboldness. These traits carried to excess can lead to rashness, butwe must realize that errors by junior leaders stemming fromoverboldness are a necessary part of learning. We should dealwith such errors leniently; there must be no “zero defects” men-tality.7 Not only must we not stifle boldness or initiative, we mustcontinue to encourage both traits in spite of mistakes. On theother hand, we should deal severely with errors of inaction ortimidity. We will not accept lack of orders as justification for inac-tion; it is each Marine’s duty to take initiative as the situationdemands.

Consequently, trust is an essential trait among leaders - trust byseniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in thecompetence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned,and actions which undermine trust must meet with strict censure.Trust is a product of confidence and familiarity. Confidence amongcomrades results from demonstrated professional skill. Familiar-ity results from shared experience and a common professionalphilosophy.


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Relations among all leaders from corporal to general should hebased on honesty and frankness, regardless of disparity betweengrades. Until a commander has reached and stated a decision,each subordinate should consider it his duty to provide his honest,professional opinion even though it may be in disagreement withhis senior’s. However, once the decision has been reached, thejunior then must support it as if it were his own. Seniors mustencourage candor among subordinates and must not hide behindtheir rank insignia. Ready compliance for the purpose of personaladvancement the behavior of “yes-men” will not be tolerated.

TRAINING

The purpose of all training is to develop forces that can win incombat. Training is the key to combat effectiveness and there-fore is the focus of effort of a peacetime military. However, train-ing should not stop with the commencement of war; training mustcontinue during war to adapt to the lessons of combat.

All officers and enlisted Marines undergo similar entry-leveltraining which is, in effect, a socialization process. This trainingprovides all Marines a common experience, a proud heritage, aset of values, and a common bond of comradeship. It is theessential first step in the making of a Marine.



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Basic individual skills are an essential foundation for combateffectiveness and must receive heavy emphasis. All Marines,regardless of occupational specialty, will be trained in basic com-bat skills. At the same time, unit skills are extremely important.They are not simply an accumulation of individual skills; adequacyin individual skills does not automatically mean unit skills aresatisfactory.

Commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficienttime and freedom to conduct the training necessary to achieveproficiency at their levels. They must ensure that higher-leveldemands do not deny subordinates adequate opportunities forautonomous training and that oversupervision does not preventsubordinate commanders from training their units as they believeappropriate.

In order to develop initiative among junior leaders, the conductof training like combat - should be decentralized. Senior com-manders influence training by establishing goals and standards,communicating the intent of training, and establishing a focus ofeffort for training. As a rule, they should refrain from dictatinghow the training will be accomplished.

Training programs should reflect practical, challenging, and pro-gressive goals beginning with individual and small-unit skills andculminating in a fully combined-arms MAGTF.


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In general, the organization for combat should also be the organi-zation for training. That is, units including MAGTFs should trainwith the full complement of assigned, reinforcing, and supportingforces they require in combat.

Collective training consists of drills and exercises. Drills are aform of small-unit training which stress proficiency by progres-sive repetition of tasks. Drills are an effective method for devel-oping standardized techniques and procedures that must be per-formed repeatedly without variation to ensure speed and coordi-nation, such as gun drill or immediate actions. In contrast, exer-cises are designed to train units and individuals in tactics undersimulated combat conditions. Exercises should approximate theconditions of battle as much as possible; that is, they should intro-duce friction in the form of uncertainty, stress, disorder, and op-posing wills. This last characteristic is most important; only inopposed, free-play exercises can we practice the art of war.Dictated or “canned’, scenarios eliminate the element of inde-pendent, opposing wills that is the essence of combat.

Critiques are an important part of training because critical self-analysis, even after success, is essential to improvement. Theirpurpose is to draw out the lessons of training. As a result, weshould conduct critiques immediately after completing thetraining, before the memory of the events



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has faded. Critiques should be held in an atmosphere of open andfrank dialogue in which all hands are encouraged to contribute.We learn as much from mistakes as from things done well, so wemust be willing to admit and discuss them. Of course, asubordinate’s willingness to admit mistakes depends on thecommander’s willingness to tolerate them. Because we recog-nize that no two situations in war are the same, our critiques shouldfocus not so much on the actions we took as on why we tookthose actions and why they brought the results they did.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARYEDUCATION

Professional military education is designed to develop creative,thinking leaders. A leader’s career, from the initial stages of lead-ership training, should be viewed as a continuous, progressive pro-cess of development. At each stage of his career, he shouldbe preparing for the subsequent stage.

Whether he is an officer or enlisted, the early stages of a leader’scareer are, in effect, his apprenticeship. While receiving a foun-dation in professional theory and concepts that will servehim throughout his career, the leader focuses on understandingthe requirements and learning and applying the proceduresand techniques associated with his field. This is when


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he learns his trade as an aviator, infantryman,artilleryman, or logistician. As he progresses, the leader shouldhave mastered the requirements of his apprenticeship and shouldunderstand the interrelationship of the techniques and procedureswithin his field. His goal is to become an expert in the tacticallevel of war.

As an officer continues to develop, he should understand theinterrelationship between his field and all the other fields withinthe Marine Corps. He should be an expert in tactics and tech-niques and should understand amphibious warfare and combinedarms. He should be studying the operational level of war. At thesenior levels he should be fully capable of articulating, applying,and integrating MAGTF warfighting capabilities in a joint andcombined environment and should be an expert in the art ofwar at all levels.

The responsibility for implementing professional military edu-cation in the Marine Corps is three-tiered: it resides not only withthe education establishment, but also with the commanderand the individual.

The education establishment consists of those schoolsadministered by the Marine Corps, subordinate commands,or outside agencies - established to provide formal educationin the art and science of war. In all officer education particularly,schools should focus on developing a talent



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for military judgment, not on imparting knowledge through rotelearning. Study conducted by the education establishment canneither provide complete career training for an individual nor reachall individuals. Rather, it builds upon the base provided bycommanders and by individual study.

All commanders should consider the professional developmentof their subordinates a principal responsibility of command. Com-manders should foster a personal teacher-student relationship withtheir subordinates. Commanders are expected to conduct a con-tinuing professional education program for their subordinates whichincludes developing military judgment and decision making andteaches general professional subjects and specific technical sub-jects pertinent to occupational specialties. Useful tools for gen-eral professional development include supervised reading pro-grams, map exercises, war games, battle studies, and terrainstudies. Commanders should see the development of theirsubordinates as a direct reflection on themselves.

Finally, every Marine has a basic responsibility to study the pro-fession of arms on his own. A leader without either interest in orknowledge of the history and theory of warfare the intellectualcontent of his profession is a leader in appearance only. Self-study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importanceand should receive at least equal time to maintaining physical con-dition. This is particularly true among officers; after all, anofficer’s principal weapon is his mind.


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EQUIPPING

Equipment should be easy to operate and maintain, reliable, andinteroperable with other equipment. It should require minimal spe-cialized operator training. Further, equipment should be designedso that its usage is consistent with established doctrine andtactics. Primary considerations are strategic and tactical lift theMarine Corps’ reliance on Navy shipping for strategic mobilityand on helicopters and vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraftfor tactical mobility from ship to shore and during operationsashore.

Equipment that permits overcontrol of units in battle is inconflict with the Marine Corps’ philosophy of commandand is not justifiable.

In order to minimize research and development costs and field-ing time, the Marine Corps will exploit existing capabilities - “off-the-shelf” technology to the greatest extent possible.

Acquisition should be a complementary, two-way process. Es-pecially for the long term, the process must identify combat re-quirements and develop equipment to satisfy these requirements.We should base these requirements on an analysis of critical en-emy vulnerabilities and develop equipment specifically to exploitthose vulnerabilities. At the same time, the process should notoverlook existing equipment of obvious usefulness.



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Equipment is useful only if it increases combat effectiveness.Any piece of equipment requires support: operator training, main-tenance, power sources or fuel, and transport. The anticipatedenhancement of capabilities must justify these support require-ments and the employment of the equipment must take theserequirements into account.

As much as possible, employment techniques and proceduresshould be developed concurrently with equipment to minimizedelays between the fielding of the equipment and its usefulness tothe operating forces. For the same reason, initial operator trainingshould also precede equipment fielding.

We must guard against overreliance on technology. Technologycan enhance the ways and means of war by improving man’sability to wage it, but technology cannot and should not attempt toeliminate man from the process of waging war. Better equipmentis not the cure for all ills; doctrinal and tactical solutions to combatdeficiencies must also be sought. Any advantages gained by tech-nological advancement are only temporary, for man will alwaysfind a countermeasure, tactical or itself technological, which willlessen the impact of the technology. Additionally, we must notbecome so dependent on equipment that we can no longer func-tion effectively when the equipment becomes inoperable.


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CONCLUSION

There are two basic military functions: waging war and preparingfor war. Any military activities that do not contribute to the con-duct of a present war are justifiable only if they contribute topreparedness for a possible future one. But, clearly, we cannotafford to separate conduct and preparation. They must be inti-mately related because failure in preparation leads to disasteron the battlefield.


FMFM 1 The Conduct of War

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Chapter 4

The Conduct of War

“Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowingwater avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so anarmy avoids strength and strikes weakness.”1

—Sun Tzu

“Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’sunpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike himwhere he has taken no precautions.” 2

—Sun Tzu

“Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an of-ficer, I was poring over the ‘Principles of War,’ listed in theold Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major cameup to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. ‘Don’tbother your head about all them things, me lad,’ he said.‘There’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the otherfellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, whereit hurts him most, when he ain’t lookin’!’”3

—Sir William Slim


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The sole justification for the United States Marine Corps is tosecure or protect national policy objectives by military force whenpeaceful means alone cannot. How the Marine Corps proposesto accomplish this mission is the product of our understandingof the nature and the theory of war and must be the guidingforce behind our preparation for war.

THE CHALLENGE

The challenge is to identify and adopt a concept of warfightingconsistent with our understanding of the nature and theory of warand the realities of the modern battlefield. What exactly does thisrequire? It requires a concept of warfighting that will functioneffectively in an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment in fact,one that will exploit these conditions to advantage. It requires aconcept that, recognizing the time-competitive rhythm of war,generates and exploits superior tempo and velocity. It requires aconcept that is consistently effective across the full spectrum ofconflict, because we cannot attempt to change our basic doctrinefrom situation to situation and expect to be proficient. It requiresa concept which recognizes and exploits the fleeting opportunitieswhich naturally occur in war.


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It requires a concept which takes into account the moral as wellas the physical forces of war, because we have already con-cluded that moral forces form the greater part of war. It requiresa concept with which we can succeed against a numerically su-perior foe, because we can no longer presume a numerical ad-vantage. And, especially in expeditionary situations in which pub-lic support for military action may be tepid and short-lived, it re-quires a concept with which we can win quickly against a largerfoe on his home soil, with minimal casualties and limited externalsupport.

MANEUVER WARFARE

The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions isa warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunisticmaneuver. But in order to fully appreciate what we mean bymaneuver we need to clarify the term. The traditional under-standing of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver inspace to gain a positional advantage.4 However, in order to maxi-mize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver intime as well; that is, we generate a faster operational tempo thanthe enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuverin both dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisivesuperiority at the necessary time and place.



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Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy thatseeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a seriesof rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which cre-ate a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation withwhich he cannot cope.

From this definition we see that the aim in maneuver warfareis to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering hismoral and physical cohesion his ability to fight as an effective,coordinated whole rather than to destroy him physically throughincremental attrition, which is generally more costly and time-consuming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength thatremain are irrelevant because we have paralyzed his ability touse them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continuesto fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnantswith relative ease because we have eliminated his ability tofight effectively as a force.

This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On thecontrary, the suppressive effects of firepower are essential toour ability to maneuver. Nor do we mean to imply that we willpass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We willconcentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemyelements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fitsour larger purposes. But the aim is not an unfocused applicationof firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing theenemy’s physical


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strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower insupport of maneuver to contribute to the enemy’s shock and moraldisruption. The greatest value of firepower is not physical de-struction the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowlybut the moral dislocation it causes.

If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy’s cohe-sion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situationin which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek to posemenacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly andfaster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy mustbe made to see his situation not only as deteriorating, but deterio-rating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic andparalysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.

Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize theinitiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy offbalance, thereby increasing his friction. Through the use of greatertempo and velocity, we seek to establish a pace that the enemycannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increas-ingly late until eventually he is overcome by events.

Also inherent is the need for violence, not so much as a sourceof physical attrition but as a source of moral dislocation.Toward this end, we concentrate strength against



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critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where,when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy’sability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must bepressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlesslyopportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against whichwe will direct all available combat power. And when the decisiveopportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, com-mitting every ounce of combat power we can muster andpushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.

The final weapon in our arsenal is surprise, the combat value ofwhich we have already recognized. By studying our enemy wewill attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception wewill try to shape his expectations. Then we will dislocate them bystriking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear un-predictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibitimagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threat-ening, we should operate on axes that offer several courses ofaction, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.

PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND

It is essential that our philosophy of command support the waywe fight. First and foremost, in order to generate the


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tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the un-certainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command must bedecentralized. That is, subordinate commanders must make de-cisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding oftheir senior’s intent, rather than passing information up the chainof command and waiting for the decision to be passed down.Further, a competent subordinate commander who is at the pointof decision will naturally have a better appreciation for the truesituation than a senior some distance removed. Individual initia-tive and responsibility are of paramount importance. The princi-pal means by which we implement decentralized control is throughthe use of mission tactics, which we will discuss in detail later.

Second, since we have concluded that war is a human enter-prise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimen-sion, our philosophy of command must be based on human char-acteristics rather than on equipment or procedures. Communica-tions equipment and command and staff procedures can enhanceour ability to command, but they must not be used to replace thehuman element of command. Our philosophy must not only ac-commodate but must exploit human traits such as boldness, initia-tive, personality, strength of will, and imagination.

Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human abilityto communicate implicitly.5 We believe that implicit



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communication - to communicate through mutual understand-ing, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or evenanticipating each other’s thoughts is a faster, more effectiveway to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicitinstructions. We develop this ability through familiarity and trust,which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience. This concept has several practical implications. First, we shouldestablish long-term working relationships to develop the neces-sary familiarity and trust. Second, key people - “actuals” shouldtalk directly to one another when possible, rather than throughcommunicators or messengers. Third, we should communicateorally when possible, because we communicate also in how wetalk; our inflections and tone of voice. And fourth, we should com-municate in person when possible, because we communicate alsothrough our gestures and bearing.

A commander should command from well forward. This al-lows him to see and sense firsthand the ebb and flow of combat,to gain an intuitive appreciation for the situation which he cannotobtain from reports. It allows him to exert his personal influenceat decisive points during the action. It also allows him to locatehimself closer to the events that will influence the situation so thathe can observe them directly and circumvent the delays and inac-curacies that result from passing information up the chain ofcommand.


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Finally, we recognize the importance of personal leadership. Onlyby his physical presence by demonstrating the willingness to sharedanger and privation can the commander fully gain the trustand confidence of his subordinates.

We must remember that command from the front doesnot equate to oversupervision of subordinates.

As part of our philosophy of command we must recognize thatwar is inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic, and dominatedby friction. Moreover, maneuver warfare, with its emphasis onspeed and initiative, is by nature a particularly disorderly style ofwar. The conditions ripe for exploitation are normally also verydisorderly, For commanders to try to gain certainty as a basis foractions, maintain positive control of events at all times, or shapeevents to fit their plans is to deny the very nature of war. We musttherefore be prepared to cope even better, to thrive in an envi-ronment of chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction. Ifwe can come to terms with those conditions and thereby limittheir debilitating effects, we can use them as a weapon against afoe who does not cope as well.

In practical terms this means that we must not strive forcertainty before we act for in so doing we will surrenderthe initiative and pass up opportunities. We must not try to maintain positive control over subordinates since this willnecessarily slow our tempo and inhibit initiative. We must



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not attempt to impose precise order to the events of combat sincethis leads to a formulistic approach to war. And we must be pre-pared to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit opportuni-ties as they arise, rather than adhering insistently topredetermined plans.

There are several points worth remembering about our com-mand philosophy. First, while it is based on our warfighting style,this does not mean it applies only during war. We must put it intopractice during the preparation for war as well. We cannot rightlyexpect our subordinates to exercise boldness and initiative in thefield when they are accustomed to being oversupervised in therear. Whether the mission is training, procuring equipment, ad-ministration, or police call, this philosophy should apply.

Next, our philosophy requires competent leadership at all lev-els. A centralized system theoretically needs only one competentperson, the senior commander, since his is the sole authority. Buta decentralized system requires leaders at all levels to demon-strate sound and timely judgment. As a result, initiative becomesan essential condition of competence among commanders.

Our philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades be-cause only through a shared understanding can we develop theimplicit communication necessary for unity of effort. And, per-haps most important, our philosophy demands confidence amongseniors and subordinates.


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SHAPING THE BATTLE

Since our goal is not just the cumulative attrition of enemy strength,it follows that we must have some scheme for how we expect toachieve victory. That is, before anything else, we must conceiveour vision of how we intend to win.

The first requirement is to establish our intent; what we want toaccomplish and how. Without a clearly identified intent, the nec-essary unity of effort is inconceivable. We must identify that criti-cal enemy vulnerability which we believe will lead most directlyto accomplishing our intent. Having done this, we can then deter-mine the steps necessary to achieve our intent. That is, we mustshape the battle to our advantage in terms of both time and space.Similarly, we must try to see ourselves through our enemy’s eyesin order to identify our own vulnerabilities which he may attackand to anticipate how he will try to shape the battle so we cancounteract him. Ideally, when the moment of engagement arrives,the issue has already been resolved: through our orchestration ofthe events leading up to the encounter, we have so shaped theconditions of war that the result is a matter of course. Wehave shaped the action decisively to our advantage.

To shape the battle, we must project our thoughts forward intime and space. This does not mean that we establish a detailedtimetable of events. We have already concluded that war is in-herently disorderly, and we cannot expect to shape its terms with



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any sort of precision. We must not become slaves to a plan. Rather,we attempt to shape the general conditions of war; we try toachieve a certain measure of ordered disorder. Examples includecanalizing enemy movement in a desired direction, blocking ordelaying enemy reinforcements so that we can fight a piecemealedenemy rather than a concentrated one, shaping enemy expecta-tions through deception so that we can exploit those expectations,or attacking a specific enemy capability to allow us to maximize acapability of our own such as launching a campaign to destroy hisair defenses so that we can maximize the use of our own avia-tion. We should also try to shape events in such a way that allowsus several options so that by the time the moment of encounterarrives we have not restricted ourselves to only one courseof action.

The further ahead we think, the less our actual influence be-comes. Therefore, the further ahead we consider, the less preci-sion we should attempt to impose. Looking ahead thus becomesless a matter of influence and more a matter of interest. As eventsapproach and our ability to influence them grows, we have al-ready developed an appreciation for the situation and howwe want to shape it. 6

Also, the higher our echelon of command, the greater is oursphere of influence and the further ahead in time and space wemust seek to impose our will. Senior commanders


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developing and pursuing military strategy look ahead weeks,months, or more, and their areas of influence and interest willencompass entire theaters. Junior commanders fighting the battlesand engagements at hand are concerned with the coming hours,even minutes, and the immediate field of battle. But regardless ofthe spheres of influence and interest, it is essential to have somevision of the final result we want and how we intend to shapethe action in time and space to achieve it.

DECISION MAKING

Decision making is essential to the conduct of war since all ac-tions are the result of decisions or of nondecisions.7 If we fail tomake a decision out of lack of will, we have willingly surrenderedthe initiative to our foe. If we consciously postpone taking actionfor some reason, that is a decision. Thus, as a basis for action,any decision is generally better than no decision.

Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we cannot makedecisions in a vacuum. We must make our decisions in light of theenemy’s anticipated reactions and counteractions, recognizing thatwhile we are trying to impose our will on our enemy, he istrying to do the same to us.



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Whoever can make and implement his decisions consistentlyfaster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. Decisionmaking thus becomes a time-competitive process, and timelinessof decisions becomes essential to generating tempo. Timely deci-sions demand rapid thinking, with consideration limited to essen-tial factors. We should spare no effort to accelerate ourdecision-making ability.

A military decision is not merely a mathematical computation.Decision making requires both the intuitive skill to recognize andanalyze the essence of a given problem and the creative ability todevise a practical solution. This ability is the product of experi-ence, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character.

We should base our decisions on awareness rather than onmechanical habit. That is, we act on a keen appreciation for theessential factors that make each situation unique instead offrom conditioned response.

We must have the moral courage to make tough decisions inthe face of uncertainty and accept full responsibility for thosedecisions when the natural inclination would be to postpone thedecision pending more complete information. To delay action inan emergency because of incomplete information shows a lackof moral courage. We do not want to make rash decisions, but wemust not squander opportunities while trying to gain moreinformation.


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We must have the moral courage to make bold decisions andaccept the necessary degree of risk when the natural inclinationis to choose a less ambitious tack, for “in audacity and obstinacywill be found safety.”8

Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncer-tainty and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solu-tion to any battlefield problem. Therefore, we should not agonizeover one. The essence of the problem is to select a promisingcourse of action with an acceptable degree of risk, and to do itmore quickly than our foe. In this respect, “a good plan violentlyexecuted now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.”9

MISSION TACTICS

Having described the object and means of maneuverwarfare and its philosophy of command, we will next discuss howwe put maneuver warfare into practice. First isthrough the use of mission tactics. Mission tactics arejust as the name implies: the tactic of assigning a subordinatemission without specifying how the mission must beaccomplished.10 We leave the manner of accomplishing the mis-sion to the subordinate, thereby allowing him the freedom andestablishing the duty to take whatever steps he deems necessarybased on the situation. The senior prescribes the method



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of execution only to the degree that is essential for coordination.It is this freedom for initiative that permits the high tempo of op-erations that we desire. Uninhibited by restrictions from above,the subordinate can adapt his actions to the changing situation.He informs his commander what he has done, but he doesnot wait for permission.

It is obvious that we cannot allow decentralized initiative with-out some means of providing unity, or focus, to the various ef-forts. To do so would be to dissipate our strength. We seek unity,not through imposed control, but through harmonious initiativeand lateral coordination.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

We achieve this harmonious initiative in large part through the useof the commander’s intent. There are two parts to a mission: thetask to be accomplished and the reason, or intent.11 The taskdescribes the action to be taken while the intent describes thedesired result of the action. Of the two, the intent is predominant.While a situation may change, making the task obsolete, the intentis more permanent and continues to guide our actions. Under-standing our commander’s intent allows us to exercise initiative iin harmony with the commander’s desires.


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In order to maintain our focus on the enemy, we should try toexpress intent in terms of the enemy. The intent should answerthe question: What do I want to do to the enemy? This may notbe possible in all cases, but it is true in the vast majority. Theintent should convey the commander’s vision. It is not satisfac-tory for the intent to be “to defeat the enemy.” To win is alwaysour ultimate goal, so an intent like this conveys nothing.

From this discussion, it is obvious that a clear explanation andunderstanding of intent is absolutely essential to unity of effort. Itshould be a part of any mission. The burden of understanding fallson senior and subordinate alike. The senior must make perfectlyclear the result he expects, but in such a way that does not inhibitinitiative. Subordinates must have a clear understanding of whattheir commander is thinking. Further, they should understand theintent of the commander two levels up. In other words, a platooncommander should know the intent of his battalion commander,or a battalion commander the intent of his division commander.

FOCUS OF EFFORT

Another tool for providing unity is through the focus of effort.Of all the efforts going on within our command, we recognizethe focus of effort as the most critical to success.



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All other efforts must support it. In effect, we have decided: Thisis how I will achieve a decision; everything else is secondary.

We cannot take lightly the decision of where and when to focusour efforts. Since the focus of effort represents our bid for vic-tory, we must direct it at that object which will cause the mostdecisive damage to the enemy and which holds the best opportu-nity of success. It involves a physical and moral commitment,although not an irretrievable one. It forces us to concentrate deci-sive combat power just as it forces us to accept risk. Thus, wefocus our effort against critical enemy vulnerability, exercisingstrict economy elsewhere.

Normally, we designate the focus of effort by assigning oneunit responsibility for accomplishing that effort. That unit becomesthe representation of the focus of effort. It becomes clear to allother units in the command that they must support that unit in itsefforts. Like the commander’s intent, the focus of effort becomesa harmonizing force. Faced with a decision, we ask ourselves:“How can I best support the focus of effort?”

Each commander should establish a focus of effort for eachmission. As the situation changes, the commander may shift thefocus of effort, redirecting the weight of his combat power in thedirection that offers the greatest success. In this way he exploitssuccess; he does not reinforce failure.


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SURFACES AND GAPS

Put simply, surfaces are hard spots enemy strengths - and gapsare soft spots enemy weaknesses. We avoid enemy strength andfocus our efforts against enemy weakness, since pitting strengthagainst weakness reduces casualties and is more likely to yielddecisive results. Whenever possible, we exploit existinggaps. Failing that, we create gaps.

Gaps may in fact be physical gaps in the enemy’s dispositions,but they may also be any weakness in time or space: a moment intime when the enemy is overexposed and vulnerable, a seam inan air defense umbrella, an infantry unit caught unpreparedin open terrain, or a boundary between two units.

Similarly, a surface may be an actual strongpoint, or it may beany enemy strength: a moment when the enemy has just replen-ished and consolidated his position or an integrated airdefense system.

An appreciation for surfaces and gaps requires a certain amountof judgment. What is a surface in one case may be a gap in an-other. For example, a forest which is a surface to an armored unitbecause it restricts vehicle movement can be a gap to an infantryunit which can infiltrate through it. Furthermore, we can expectthe enemy to disguise his dispositions in order to lure us againsta surface that appears to be a gap.12



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Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanentand will usually be fleeting. To exploit them demands flexibilityand speed. We must actively seek out gaps by continuous andaggressive reconnaissance. Once we locate them, we must ex-ploit them by funneling our forces through rapidly. For example, ifour focus of effort has struck a surface but another unit has lo-cated a gap, we shift the focus of effort to the second unit andredirect our combat power in support of it. In this manner we“pull” combat power through gaps from the front rather than“pushing” it through from the rear.13 Commanders must rely onthe initiative of subordinates to locate the gaps and must have theflexibility to respond quickly to opportunities rather than followingpredetermined schemes.

COMBINED ARMS

In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the availableresources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrineof combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of armsin such a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy mustmake himself more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy notjust with a problem, but with a dilemma a no-win situation.


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We accomplish combined arms through the tactics and tech-niques we use at the lower levels and through task organization athigher levels. In so doing, we take advantage of the complemen-tary characteristics of different types of units and enhance ourmobility and firepower. We use each arm for missions that noother arm can perform as well; for example, we assign aviation atask that cannot be performed equally well by artillery. An ex-ample of the concept of combined arms at the very lowest level isthe complementary use of the automatic weapon and grenadelauncher within a fire team. We pin an enemy down with thehigh-volume, direct fire of the automatic weapon, making him avulnerable target for the grenade launcher. If he moves to escapethe impact of the grenades, we engage him with the automaticweapon.

We can expand the example to the MAGTF level: We use as-sault support to quickly concentrate superior ground forces for abreakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to supportthe infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdictenemy reinforcements. Targets which cannot be effectively sup-pressed by artillery are engaged by close air support. In order todefend against the infantry attack, the enemy must make himselfvulnerable to the supporting arms. If he seeks cover from thesupporting arms, our infantry can maneuver against him. In orderto block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly withhis reserve. But in order to avoid our deep air support, he muststay off the roads, which means he can only move slowly. If hemoves slowly, he cannot reinforce in time to prevent ourbreakthrough. We have put him in a dilemma.



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CONCLUSION

We have discussed the aim and characteristics of maneuver war-fare. We have discussed the philosophy of command necessaryto support this style of warfare. And we have discussed some ofthe tactics of maneuver warfare. By this time it should be clearthat maneuver warfare exists not so much in the specific meth-ods used we eschew formulas - but in the mind of the Marine. Inthis regard, maneuver warfare like combined arms applies equallyto the Marine expeditionary force commander and the fire teamleader. It applies regardless of the nature of the conflict, whetheramphibious operations or sustained operations ashore, of low orhigh intensity, against guerrilla or mechanized foe, in desertor jungle.

Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in and about war thatshould shape our every action. It is a state of mind born of a boldwill, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state ofmind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by para-lyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quicklyand aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking himin the way that will hurt him most. In short, maneuver warfare isa philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect againstthe enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves a philosophyfor “fighting smart.”


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The Nature of War

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howardand P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p.119.

2. B.H. Liddell Hart, as quoted in Encyclopedia Britannica,1929.

3. A.A. Vandegrift, “Battle Doctrine for Front Line Lead-ers,” (Third Marine Division, 1944) p. 7.

4. For the definitive treatment of the nature and theory ofwar, see the unfinished classic, On War, by Clausewitz. All Ma-rine officers should consider this book essential reading. Read thePrinceton University Press edition, the best English translationavailable. This version also includes several valuable essays onthe book and author and a useful guide to reading On War.

5. In the strict legal sense, the United States enters a state ofwar only by formal declaration of Congress, which possesses thesole constitutional power to do so. The United States has de-clared war on five occasions: with Britain (1812); with Mexico(1846); with Spain (1898); with Germany and Austria-Hungary(1917); and with Japan, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, andRumania (1941-2). A President, as commander in chief, may com-mit U.S. Forces to military action without a declaration of warwhen the circumstances do not warrant or permit time for such adeclaration. Militarily there will be little if any distinction betweenwar and military action short of war. Within this context, this bookwill focus on the military aspects of war, and the term war asdiscussed here will apply to that state of hostilities between oramong nations regardless of the existence of a declaration of war.


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6. Clausewitz, On War, p. 121.7. For a first-hand description of human experience and re-

action in war, read Guy Sajer’s The Forgotten Soldier (Annapo-lis, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1988), a powerfulaccount of the author’s experience as a German infantryman onthe eastern front during the Second World War and ultimately atribute to the supremacy of the human will.

8. Clausewitz: “Kind-hearted people might, of course, thinkthere was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemywithout too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the truegoal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy thatmust be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mis-takes which come from kindness are the very worst . “This ishow the matter must be seen. It would be futile even wrong to tryto shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at itsbrutality.” On War, pp. 75-76.

9. For an insightful study of the reaction of men to combat,see S.L.A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire (New York: WilliamMorrow and Co., 1961).

10. The American Heritage Dictionary, (New York: DellPublishing Co., 1983).

11. In his often-quoted maxim, Napoleon assigned an actualratio: “In war, the moral is to the material as three to one.”


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The Theory Of War

1. Clausewitz, On War, p. 872. Sun Tzu, The Art Of War, trans. SeB. Griffith (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 85. Like On War, The Art ofWar should be on every Marine officer’s list of essential reading.Short and simple to read, The Art of War is every bit as valuabletoday as when it was written about 400 B.C.

3. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: CharlesScribner’s Sons, 1923) vol. II, p. 5. The passage continues: “Nearlyall battles which are regarded as masterpiecee of the military art,from which have been derived the foundation of states and thefame of commanders, have been battles of manoeuvre in whichthe enemy has found himself defeated by some novel expedientor device, some queer, swift, unexpected thrust or stratagem. Inmany battles the losses of the victors have been small. There isrequired for the composition of a great commander not only mas-sive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination,but also an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch,which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten. It is becausemilitary leaders are credited with gifts of this order which enablethem to ensure victory and save slaughter that their profession isheld in such high honour . “There are many kinds of manoeuvre inwar, some only of which take place upon the battlefield. Thereare manouevres far to the flank or rear. There are manoeuvres intime, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which areremoved from the battlefield, but react often decisively upon it,and the object of all is to find easier ways, other than sheerslaughter, of achieving the main purpose.


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4. Clausewitz, On War, p. 87. We prefer the phrase withmilitary force rather than by military force as translated sincemilitary force does not replace the other elements of national power,but supplements them.

5. Ibid., pp. 87-88.6. Clausewitz, On War, p. 77.7. The National Security Strategy of the United States

(Washington: The White House, 1988), pp. 7-8. lists the elementsof national power as moral and economic example, militarystrength, economic vitality, alliance relationships, public diplomacy,security assistance, development assistance, science and tech-nology cooperation, international organizations, and diplomaticmediation.

8. Also referred to as grand strategy or the policy level.From JCS Pub. 1-02: “National Strategy (DOD, IADB) The artand science of developing and using the political, economic, andpsychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces,during peace and war, to secure national objectives.”

9. JCS Pub. 1-02: Military Strategy - (DOD, IADB) Theart and science of employing the armed forces of a nation tosecure the objectives of national policy by the application of forceor the threat of force.”

10. JCS Pub. 1-02: “Tactical Level of War - (DOD) Thelevel of war at which battles and engagements are planned andexecuted to accomplish military objectives assigned to tacticalunits or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the orderedarrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to eachother and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.”


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11. JCS Pub. 1-02: “Operational Level of War - (DOD)The level of war at which campaigns and major operations areplanned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objec-tives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this levellink tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectivesneeded to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing eventsto achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and apply-ing resources to bring about and sustain these events. These ac-tivities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tac-tics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tacticalforces, and provide the means by which tactical successes areexploited to achieve strategic objectives.”

12. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 84, 357-359.13. Ibid., p. 357.14. Clausewitz argued (p. 524) that while the offense is an

integral component of the concept of defense, the offense is con-ceptually complete in itself. The introduction of the defense intothe concept of the offense, he argued, is a necessary evil and notan integral component.

15. Clausewitz, On War, p. 528.16. The United States Army has also adopted a doctrine based

on maneuver, called “AirLand Battle.” The principal doctrinalsource is Field Manual 1OO-5, Operations (1986).

17. JCS Pub. 1-02: “Combat Power (DOD, NATO) Thetotal means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a mili-tary unit/formation, can apply against the opponent at a given time.”


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18. Clausewitz, On War, p. 194.19. Ibid., p. 617.20. Tempo is often associated with a mental process known

variously as the “Decision Cycle,” “OODA Loop,” or “BoydCycle,” after retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd who pioneeredthe concept in his lecture, “The Patterns of Conflict.” Boyd iden-tified a four-step mental process: observation, orientation, deci-sion, and action. Boyd theorized that each party to a conflict firstobserves the situation. On the basis of the observation, he orients;that is, he makes an estimate of the situation. On the basis of theorientation, he makes a decision. And, finally, he implements thedecision he acts. Because his action has created a new situation,the process begins anew. Boyd argued that the party that consis-tently completes the cycle faster gains an advantage that increaseswith each cycle. His enemy’s reactions become increasingly slowerby comparison and therefore less effective until, finally, he is over-come by events.

21. From basic physics, momentum is the product of massand velocity: M=mv.

22. Clausewitz. On War. p. 198.23. Edward N. Luttwak. Strategy: The Logic of War and

Peace (Cambridge. MA: Belknap Press of Harvard UniversityPress, 1987) p. 8.

24. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, pp. 8-10.

25. Clausewitz, On War, p. 190.26. Ibid.


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27. We should note that this concept is meaningless in attri-tion warfare in its purest form, since the identification of criticalvulnerability by definition is based on selectivity, which is a for-eign thought to the attrionist. In warfare by attrition, any target isas good as any other as long as it contributes to the cumulativedestruction of the enemy.

28. Sometimes known as the center of gravity. However,there is a danger in using this term. Introducing the term into thetheory of war, Clausewitz wrote (p. 485): “A center of gravity isalways found where the mass is concentrated the most densely.It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, theheaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity.” Clearly,Clausewitz was advocating a climactic test of strength againststrength “by daring all to will all” (p. 596). This approach is con-sistent with Clausewitz’ historical perspective. But we have sincecome to prefer pitting strength against weakness. Applying theterm to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy’scenter of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rathera critical vulnerability.

Preparing for War

1. Hans von Seekt, Thoughts of a Soldier, trans. G.Waterhouse (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1930) p. 123.

2. Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. LiddellHart, trans. P. Findlay (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1985) p.226.

3. George S. Patton, Jr., Cavalry Journal, April 1922, p.167.


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4. JCS Pub. 1-02: “Campaign Plan-(DOD, IADB) A planfor a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish acommon objective, normally within a given time and space.” Asdefined, a campaign plan pertains to military operations, but thethought applies equally to preparations.

5. JCS Pub. 1-02: “Doctrine-(DOD, IADB) Fundamentalprinciples by which the military forces or elements thereof guidetheir actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritativebut requires judgment in application.”

6. Field Manual 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regula-tions (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939) p. 31.

7. Clausewitz: “In a commander a bold act may prove to be ablunder. Nevertheless it is a laudable error, not to be regarded onthe same footing as others. Happy the army where ill-timed bold-ness occurs frequently; it is a luxuriant weed, but indicates therichness of the soil. Even foolhardiness that is, boldness withoutobject-is not to be despised: basically it stems from daring, whichin this case has erupted with a passion unrestrained by thought.Only when boldness rebels against obedience, when it defiantlyignores an expressed command, must it be treated as a danger-ous offense; then it must be prevented, not for its innate qualities,but because an order has been disobeyed, and in war obedienceis of cardinal importance.” On War, pp. 190-191.

The Conduct of War

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 101.2. Ibid., p. 134.


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3. Sir William Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Casselland Co. Ltd, 1956) pp. 550-55].

4. JCS Pub. 1-02: “Maneuver-(DOD. NATO) . . . 4. Em-ployment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combi-nation with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advan-tage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.”

5. Boyd introduces the idea of implicit communication as acommand tool in his lecture, “An Organic Design for Commandand Control.”

6. Hence the terms area of influence and area of interest.JCS Pub. 1 -02: “Area of Influence - (DOD, NATO) A geo-graphical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influ-encing operations, by maneuver or fire support systems normallyunder his command or control.” “Area of Interest - (DOD,NATO, IADB) That area of concern to the commander, includingthe area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending intoenemy territory to theeobjectives of current or planned opera-tions. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forceswho could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.”

7. Much of the material in this section is adapted from JohnF. Schmitt’s article, “Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle,”Marine Corps Gazette, March 1988, pp. 18-20.

8. Napoleon Bonaparte. “Maxims of War,” Napoleon andModern War; His Military Maxims, annotated C.H.eLanza(Harrisonburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1953) p. 19.


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9. George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (New York:Houghton Mifflin, 1979) p. 354.

10. JCS Pub. 1-02: “Mission Type Order-(DOD, IADB) .. . . 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifyinghow it is to be accomplished.”

11. JCS Pub. 1-02: “Mission-(DOD, IADB) 1. The task,together with the purpose, which clearly indicates the action to betaken and the reason therefor.”

12. The well known Soviet fire-sack defense, for example.13. Hence the terms reconnaissance pull and command push

respectively. See William S. Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Hand-book (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) pp. 18-19.


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