Warlord Inc Compress

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Warlord, Inc.Extortion and Corruption Along

the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan

Repor o he Majoriy Saep. John F. ierney, Chair

Subcommitee on Naional Securiy and Foreign AairsCommitee on Oversigh and Governmen eormU.S. House o epresenaivesJune 2010


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June 22, 2010

To the Members of the Subcommittee:

Today I present to you a report entitled, Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along

the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, which has been prepared by the Majority staff of the

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform. After a six-month investigation, the report exposes the circumstances

surrounding the Department of Defenses outsourcing of security on the supply chain in

Afghanistan to questionable providers, including warlords.

The ndings of this report range from sobering to shocking. In short, the Department

of Defense designed a contract that put responsibility for the security of vital U.S. supplies on

contractors and their unaccountable security providers. This arrangement has fueled a vast

protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt

Afghan ofcials, and perhaps others. Not only does the system run afoul of the Departments

own rules and regulations mandated by Congress, it also appears to risk undermining the U.S.

strategy for achieving its goals in Afghanistan.

To be sure, Afghanistan presents an extremely difcult environment for military

operations, logistics, and business practices. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that little

attention was given to the cost-benet analysis of allowing the system to continue in a fashion

that injected a good portion of a $2.16 billion contracts resources into a corruptive environment.

The fog of war still requires a direct line of sight on contractors.

This report is conned to the facts pertaining to the Host Nation Trucking contracts, and

in that limited sphere there are constructive changes that can be made to the U.S. supply chain in

Afghanistan to improve contracting integrity while mitigating corrupting inuences. This report

offers some realistic recommendations to serve as a catalyst for what appears to be a much-

needed reconsideration of policy.

However, the Department, the Administration, and Congress will have to determine if

the information presented here, along with other information and developments, will require

reconsideration of the overall strategic approach to our mission in Afghanistan. The critical new

information contained in the report will inform the Subcommittee and Congress as a whole as it

formulates and oversees an Afghanistan policy that must serve vital U.S. interests. In turn, theDepartment of Defense would be well served to take a hard look at this report and initiate prompt

remedial action.

Sincerely,

John F. Tierney

Chairman


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Noe on Mehodology

In November 2009, a he behes o Chairman John ierney, he Majoriy sa o heSubcommitee on Naional Securiy and Foreign Aairs iniiaed a preliminary inquiry inohe Deparmen o Deenses Aghan Hos Naion rucking (HN) conrac. Tis inquiry

was promped by a repor rom Aram oson in TeNaion1 regarding allegaions ha U.S.rucking conracors were making proecion paymens or sae passage hrough insecureareas in order o supply U.S. roops in he eld. In December 2009, Chairman ierney senleters o he Deparmen o Deense and o he eigh HN conracors requesing documensand inormaion relaed o he operaion o he conrac. In oal, he Deparmen and heconracors produced over 25,000 pages o documens o Chairman ierney and ankingMember Je Flake.

Aer receiving documens, Majoriy and Minoriy sa ormally inerviewed 31 winesses inconnecion wih he invesigaion, including miliary personnel, HN conracors, privaesecuriy providers, and expers on poliics and corrupion in Aghanisan. Te Majoriy sarecorded deailed noes rom each meeing and subsequenly provided memoranda summarizingindividual inerviews o he Minoriy sa or commen. Tose inerview memoranda are on lewih he Subcommitee. Te Majoriy sa conduced preliminary inerviews wih hree seniorDeparmen o Deense ocials reerenced in his repor bu were prohibied rom conducingormal inerviews by he Deparmens decision o resis access o miliary personnel deployed inAghanisan.

Te Majoriy and Minoriy sa also received several relevan inelligence briengs, bu, or

purposes o public disseminaion, no classied inormaion is conained in his repor.

Due o he securiy risks aced by conracor personnel supporing he U.S. mission inAghanisan, his repor does no specically disclose he names or ideniies o manycooperaing winesses.

Wih some imporan excepions, he Subcommitee evenually received subsanial cooperaionwih is invesigaion rom he Deparmen o Deense and mos o he HN conracors.Noably, aer almos six monhs o requess, he Deparmen only provided a criically relevandocumen relaing o is own invesigaion ino he allegaions a issue on June 14, 2010 eigh

days beore he scheduled hearing on he Subcommitees invesigaion. Ta documen has beenwihheld rom inclusion in his repor a he Deparmen o Deenses reques. A he ime oprining, discussions regarding he origin and conex o ha documen are ongoing.


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CONENS

I. EXECUIVE SUMMARY...............................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND................................................................................................6

III. FINDINGS.........................................................................................................17

1. Securiy or he U.S. Supply Chain Is PrincipallyProvided by Warlords............................................................................17

2. Te Highway Warlords un a Proecion acke............................29

3. Proecion Paymens or Sae Passage Are a SignicanPoenial Source o Funding or he aliban.....................................34

4. Unaccounable Supply Chain Securiy ConracorsFuel Corrupion......................................................................................41

5. Unaccounable Supply Chain Securiy ConracorsUndermine U.S. Counerinsurgency Sraegy...................................44

6. Te Deparmen o Deense Lacks EeciveOversigh o Is Supply Chain and PrivaeSecuriy Conracors in Aghanisan...................................................49

7. HN Conracors Warned he Deparmen o DeenseAbou Proecion Paymens or Sae Passage o No Avail...............55

IV. RECOMMENDAIONS...............................................................................67

Endnoes.........................................................................................................................69


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Cover Phoo Credi: Adam Ferguson/Te New York imes/edux

For urher inormaion relaed o his repor, please conac he Subcommitee on NaionalSecuriy and Foreign Aairs a (202) 225-2548 or visi:htp://naionalsecuriy.oversigh.house.gov


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I. EXECUIVE SUMMARY

We have o do a beter job in he inernaional side o coordinae our aid, o ge moreaccounabiliy or wha we spend in Aghanisan. Bu much o he corrupion is

ueled by money ha has poured ino ha counry over he las eigh years. And i iscorrupion a every sep along he way, no jus in Kabul.

You know, when we are so dependen upon long supply lines, as in Aghanisan, whereeveryhing has o be impored, is much more dicul han i was in Iraq, where wehad Kuwai as a saging ground o go ino Iraq. You ooad a ship in Karachi andby he ime whaever i is you know, muns or our soldiers breakass or ani-IEDequipmen ges o where were headed, i goes hrough a lo o hands. And one o themajor sources o unding or the aliban is the protection money.

Secreary o Sae Hillary odham Clinonesimony beore he Senae Foreign elaions CommiteeDecember 3, 2009

In Aghanisan, he U.S. miliary aces one o he mos complicaed and dicul supply chainsin he hisory o warare. Te ask o eeding, ueling, and arming American roops a over 200orward operaing bases and comba ouposs sprinkled across a dicul and hosile errain

wih only minimal road inrasrucure is nohing shor o herculean. In order o accomplishhis mission, he Deparmen o Deense employs a hihero unprecedened logisics model:responsibiliy or he supply chain is almos enirely ousourced o local ruckers and Aghan

privae securiy providers.

Te principal conrac supporing he U.S. supply chain in Aghanisan is called Hos Naionrucking, a $2.16 billion conrac spli among eigh Aghan, American, and Middle Easerncompanies. Alhough here are oher supply chain conracs, he HN conrac providesrucking or over 70 percen o he oal goods and maeriel disribued o U.S. roops in heeld, roughly 6,000 o 8,000 ruck missions per monh. Te rucks carry ood, supplies, uel,ammuniion, and even Mine esisan Ambush Proeced vehicles (MRPs).

Te crucial componen o he HN conrac is ha he prime conracors are responsible or

he securiy o he cargo ha hey carry. Mos o he prime conracors and heir ruckingsubconracors hire local Aghan securiy providers or armed proecion o he rucking convoys.ransporing valuable and sensiive supplies in highly remoe and insecure locaions requiresexraordinary levels o securiy. A ypical convoy o 300 supply rucks going rom abul oandahar, or example, will ravel wih 400 o 500 guards in dozens o rucks armed wih heavymachine guns and rocke-propelled grenades (PGs).


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Execuive Summary|Warlord, Inc.

Te privae securiy companies ha proec he convoys are requenly involved in armed conficwih alleged insurgens, rival securiy providers, and oher criminal elemens. Te securiyproviders repor having los hundreds o men over he course o he las year alone, hough he

veraciy o hese repors is dicul o judge. Many o he reghs purporedly las or hours andinvolve signican repower and requen civilian casualies. Indeed, in an inerview wih he

Subcommitee sa, he leading convoy securiy commander in Aghanisan said ha he spen$1.5 million on ammuniionper monh.

From one perspecive, he HN conrac works quie well: he HN providers supply almosall U.S. orward operaing bases and comba ouposs across a dicul and hosile errain whileonly rarely needing he assisance o U.S. roops. Nearly all o he risk on he supply chain is

borne by conracors, heir local Aghan ruck drivers, and he privae securiy companies hadeend hem. During he Sovie Unions occupaion o Aghanisan (1979-1989), by conras, isarmy devoed a subsanial porion o is oal orce srucure o deending is supply chain. TeHN conrac allows he Unied Saes o dedicae a greaer proporion o is roops o ohercounerinsurgency prioriies insead o logisics.

Bu ousourcing he supply chain in Aghanisan o conracors has also had signicanuninended consequences. Te HN conrac uels warlordism, exorion, and corrupion, andi may be a signican source o unding or insurgens. In oher words, he logisics conrac hasan ousized sraegic impac on U.S. objecives in Aghanisan.

Te Deparmen o Deense has been largely blind o he poenial sraegic consequences o issupply chain coningency conracing. U.S. miliary logisicians have litle visibiliy ino wha

happens o heir rucks on he road and virually no undersanding o how securiy is acuallyprovided. When HN conracors sel-repored o he miliary ha hey were being exoredby warlords or proecion paymens or sae passage and ha hese paymens were unding heinsurgency, hey were largely me wih indierence and inacion.

Specically, he Subcommitee on Naional Securiy and Foreign Aairs Majoriy sa makes heollowing ndings:

Securiy or he U.S. Supply Chain Is Principally Provided by Warlords1. . Teprincipal privae securiy subconracors on he HN conrac are warlords, srongmen,

commanders, and miliia leaders who compee wih he Aghan cenral governmen orpower and auhoriy. Providing proecion services or he U.S. supply chain empowershese warlords wih money, legiimacy, and a raison dere or heir privae armies.

Alhough many o hese warlords nominally operae under privae securiy companieslicensed by he Aghan Minisry o Inerior, hey hrive in a vacuum o governmenauhoriy and heir ineress are in undamenal confic wih U.S. aims o build a srong

Aghan governmen.


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Te Highway Warlords Run a Proecion Racke.2. Te HN conracors and heirrucking subconracors in Aghanisan pay ens o millions o dollars annually o local

warlords across Aghanisan in exchange or proecion or HN supply convoys osuppor U.S. roops. Alhough he warlords do provide guards and coordinae securiy,he conracors have litle choice bu o use hem in wha amouns o a vas proecion

racke. Te consequences are clear: rucking companies ha pay he highway warlordsor securiy are provided proecion; rucking companies ha do no pay believe heyare more likely o nd hemselves under atack. As a resul, almos everyone pays. Ininerviews and documens, he HN conracors requenly reerred o such paymens as

exorion, bribes, special securiy, and/or proecion paymens.

Proecion Paymens or Sae Passage Are a Signican Poenial Source o3.Funding or he aliban. Wihin he HN conracor communiy, many believeha he highway warlords who provide securiy in urn make proecion paymens oinsurgens o coordinae sae passage. Tis belie is evidenced in numerous documens,inciden repors, and e-mails ha reer o atemps a aliban exorion along heroad. Te Subcommitee sa has no uncovered any direc evidence o such paymensand a number o winesses, including Ahmed Wali arzai, all adamanly deny ha anyconvoy securiy commanders pay insurgens. According o expers and public reporing,however, he aliban regularly exor rens rom a variey o lici and illici indusries, andi is plausible ha he aliban would ry o exor proecion paymens rom he coaliionsupply chain ha runs hrough erriory in which hey reely operae.

Unaccounable Supply Chain Securiy Conracors Fuel Corrupion.4. HN

conracors and heir privae securiy providers repor widespread corrupion by Aghanocials and requen governmen exorion along he road. Te larges privae securiyprovider or HN rucks complained ha i had o pay $1,000 o $10,000 in monhlybribes o nearly every Aghan governor, police chie, and local miliary uni whoseerriory he company passed. HN conracors hemselves repored similar corrupiona a smaller scale, including signican numbers o Aghan Naional Police checkpoins.U.S. miliary ocials conrmed ha hey were aware o hese problems.

Unaccounable Supply Chain Securiy Conracors Undermine U.S.5.Counerinsurgency Sraegy. While ousourcing principal responsibiliy or he supply

chain in Aghanisan o local ruckers and unknown securiy commanders has allowedhe Deparmen o Deense o devoe a greaer percenage o is orce srucure o prioriyoperaions, hese logisics arrangemens have signican uninended consequences orhe overall counerinsurgency sraegy. By ueling governmen corrupion and undingparallel power srucures, hese logisics arrangemens undercu eors o esablishpopular condence in a credible and susainable Aghan governmen.


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Te Deparmen o Deense Lacks Eecive Oversigh o Is Supply Chain and6.Privae Securiy Conracors in Aghanisan. Te Deparmen o Deense has litleo no visibiliy ino wha happens o he rucks carrying U.S. supplies beween he imehey leave he gae o he ime hey arrive a heir desinaion. Despie serious concernsregarding operaions, no miliary managers have ever observed ruck operaions on

he road or me wih key securiy providers. Te Deparmen o Deenses regulaions,promulgaed in response o direcion by Congress, require oversigh o all privae securiycompanies working as conracors or subconracors or he U.S governmen. Teserequiremens include ensuring ha all privae securiy company personnel comply

wih U.S. governmen and local counry rearm laws, ha all privae securiy companyequipmen be racked, and ha all incidens o deah, injury, or propery damage be ullyinvesigaed. Te Deparmen o Deense is grossly ou o compliance wih applicableregulaions and has no visibiliy ino he operaions o he privae securiy companies haare subconracors on he HN conrac.

HN Conracors Warned he Deparmen o Deense Abou Proecion Paymens7.or Sae Passage o No Avail. In meeings, inerviews, e-mails, whie papers, andPowerPoin presenaions, many HN prime conracors sel-repored o miliaryocials and criminal invesigaors ha hey were being orced o make proecionpaymens or sae passage on he road. While miliary ocials acknowledged receivinghe warnings, hese concerns were never appropriaely addressed.

Tere are numerous consrucive changes ha could be made o he U.S. miliary rucking eorin Aghanisan ha would improve conracing inegriy while miigaing corruping infuences.

As he Deparmen o Deense absorbs he ndings in his repor and considers is course oacion, he Subcommitee on Naional Securiy and Foreign Aairs Majoriy sa makes heollowing recommendaions:

Assume Direc Conracual Responsibiliy or Supply Chain Securiy Providers.1. Ihe Unied Saes is going o use small armies o privae securiy conracors o deendis massive supply chain in a war zone, he Deparmen o Deense mus ake direcresponsibiliy or hose conracors o ensure robus oversigh. rucking companies are

wholly incapable o overseeing his scale o securiy operaions. Te U.S. governmenneeds o have a direc line o auhoriy and accounabiliy over he privae securiy

companies ha guard he supply chain.

Review Counerinsurgency Consequences o he HN Conrac.2. Te Deparmeno Deense needs o conduc a op-o-botom evaluaion o he secondary eecs ohe HN conrac ha includes an analysis o corrupion, Aghan poliics and powerdynamics, miliary uiliy, and economic eecs.


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Consider he Role o Aghan Naional Securiy Forces in Highway Securiy.3. In heuure, Aghan securiy orces will have a role o play in road securiy. Proposals o reormhe convoy securiy scheme ough o ake a medium- o long-erm view o he role o

Aghan securiy orces, while developing credible securiy alernaives ha address heimmediae U.S. miliary logisics needs.

Invenory Acual rucking Capaciy Available o he Deparmen o Deense.4. TeDeparmen o Deense should conduc a survey o he available rucking capaciyin Aghanisan under he HN conrac o ensure ha is needs will be me wih headdiional orces under orders o deploy o Aghanisan.

Dra Conracs o Ensure ransparency o Subconracors.5. Conracs beweenhe Deparmen o Deense and is rucking and/or securiy prime conracors needo include provisions ha ensure a line o sigh, and accounabiliy, beween heDeparmen and he relevan subconracors. Where Deparmen o Deense regulaionsalready require such provisions, he Deparmen needs o enorce hem.

Oversee Conracs o Ensure Conrac ransparency and Perormance.6. TeDeparmen o Deense needs o provide he personnel and resources required omanage and oversee is rucking and securiy conracs in Aghanisan. Conracs o hismagniude and o his consequence require ravel ouside he wire. For convoys, hameans having he orce proecion resources necessary or mobiliy o miliary logisicspersonnel o conduc periodic unannounced inspecions and ride-alongs.

Analyze Eec o Coaliion Conracing on Aghan Corrupion.7. Te naionalsecuriy componens o he U.S. governmen, including he Deparmen o Deense, heDeparmen o Sae, he U.S. Agency or Inernaional Developmen, he Deparmeno Jusice, and he inelligence communiy, need o sysemaically rack and analyze heeecs o U.S., NAO, and oher inernaional conracing on corrupion in Aghanisan.


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II. BACKGROUND

Supplying he roops

Aghanisan is a landlocked counry whose neighbors range om uneasy U.S. allies, such as Pakisanand Uzbekisan, o ourigh adversaries, such as Iran. Tiry years o war have devasaed wha litleinasrucure he counry had. In he souh, scatered populaion ceners are separaed by desers; inhe eas, heyre divided by mounains. Winer brings sorms and snow; spring brings oods.2

Te U.S. operaion in Aghanisan has presened he U.S. miliary wih he mos complexlogisical operaion i has ever underaken. By Sepember 2010, under Presiden Barack Obamasplan o increase roop srengh, he Unied Saes will have 100,000 roops in Aghanisan,

wih an addiional 38,000 allied orces under NAO command. Miliary logisics ocers areresponsible or providing he roops wih he ood, waer, sheler, weapons, ammuniion, and

uel hey need o perorm heir duies.

o pu he scope o he logisics operaion ino perspecive, U.S. and NAO orces required 1.1million gallons o uelper day in 2009. Ta year, as roop levels grew rom 31,800 o 68,000, U.S.miliary and conracor planes delivered 187,394 ons o cargo.3 Given ha he backbone o hemiliarys disribuion nework is overland, he cargo ranspored by rucks is nearly en imesha amoun. Eighy percen o goods and maeriel reach Aghanisan by land.4

Geting cargo o Aghanisan is a ricky endeavor. Unlike Iraq, which has access o he PersianGul and is bordered by several U.S. allies, Aghanisan is landlocked beween counries wih

unsable securiy, impenerable geographic barriers, and governmens hosile o he UniedSaes. Te mos direc roue o redeploy goods and maeriel rom Iraq o Aghanisan runshrough Iran and is hereore unusable. o he norh, he governmen in urkmenisan hasreused o allow U.S. supply roues o pass hrough he counry.

Tere are wo main land roues ino Aghanisan, one rom he souh hrough Pakisan and heoher rom he norh hrough Cenral Asia. Te souhern roue is he mos used and he mosdangerous. Cargo is processed in he por o arachi and hen sen norh, where i mus passhrough he Pashun ribal lands, where insurgens unriendly o boh abul and Islamabadhave srong suppor.5 Tese insurgens include he Queta Shura, led by he op leaders o he

deposed Aghan aliban. On June 8, 2010, or example, milians in Pakisan atacked a convoyo conracor supply rucks carrying U.S. goods as i sopped a a depo jus ouside o Islamabad,

burning 30 rucks and killing six.6

Te norhern roue hrough Cenral Asia is saer, bu also longer and signicanly more expensive,adding 10-20 days o ranspor ime and wo o hree imes he cos. Te norhern roue alsopasses hrough several counries, necessiaing signican diplomaic suppor o ensure ha


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Background|Warlord, Inc.

border crossings run smoohly.7 Cenral Asia is also plagued by pockes o poliical insabiliy.In yrgyzsan, or example, he siting presiden was deposed in April. Te counrys souhernregion, which includes imporan rail neworks used or U.S. supplies, has eruped in an ehnicpogrom.8

Te ases roue o Aghanisan is by air. However, he lack o airpor inrasrucure placessignican consrains on he miliarys abiliy o rely on air ranspor o supply he roops.

Aghanisan has only 16 airpors wih paved runways, and o hose, only our are accessible onon-miliary aircra (including conracor-operaed cargo planes).9 Air ranspor is also hemos cosly shipping opion. Tus, while air ranspor is available, i is limied o personnel andhigh-prioriy cargo. Only abou 20 percen o cargo reaches Aghanisan by air.10

Disribuion wihin Aghanisan

Once cargo reaches Aghanisan, i is aken o one o a handul o disribuion hubs, he largeso which are Bagram Aireld in he norh and andahar Aireld in he souh. From here,he supplies mus be disribued hroughou he counry o over 200 U.S. orward operaingbases and comba ouposs, many o which are locaed in remoe and dangerous areas. Whilehelicopers can be used or some ranspor, harsh fying condiions, weigh limis, requenmainenance downimes, high coss, and he sheer size o he counry place signican limison how much helicopers can be uilized.11 Tus, he vas majoriy o in-counry ranspor isaccomplished by ruck.

Aghanisan presens a uniquely challenging environmen or ground ranspor. Te errain is

unorgiving: desers ha kick up sandsorms in he summer become fooded and muddy in hespring, and reacherous mounain roads leave no room or error. Summer hea regularly reaches120 degrees. Mounain weaher can change in an insan, bringing snow and reezing rain. Inhe winer, he single unnel ha connecs abul o norhern Aghanisan is requenly cu o byavalanches. A break-down in he mounains can close a roue or days, unil he vehicle can bedisassembled and airlied ou.12 Te lack o inrasrucure including a dearh o paved roads leaves drivers o ace he elemens unassised.

I errain and weaher were no challenging enough, man-made hazards pose an even biggerhrea o rucks in Aghanisan. Explosives can be easily planed and concealed along ranspor

roues, and insurgens regularly atack. General Duncan McNabb, commander o U.S.ransporaion Command, old Congress las year, [i] you ask me wha I worry abou a nigh,i is he ac ha our supply chain is always under atack.13


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Finally, limied processing capaciy a he disribuion hubscan delay disribuion. For example, andahar Aireld hashad signican problems handling he volume o cargo ireceives, leading o backlogs o rucks waiing o ake goodsor disribuion. A 24-hour ruck yard or rucks conracedo carry miliary supplies has alleviaed he problem o somedegree, bu delays persis.14 Conracors repor ha in someinsances heir drivers have waied ouside andahar Aireldor several weeks unil hey were permited o unload cargo.

aken ogeher, hese elemens pose considerable challengesor he logisics ocers in charge o making sure suppliesreach he roops. Te experience o he U.S. miliary in Iraq

a counry wih decen inrasrucure and manageable errain is no comparable. As a senior

In Iraq, logistics

was on cruise control.

In Aghanistan, its

graduate-level logistics

to make it happen. Senior U.S. Military

Ocial

Southern Route(via Queain Pakistan)

Highway 1

Southern Route(via Peshawar in Pakistan)

Northern Distribution Network(Via Uzbekistan)

BagramAireld

KandaharAireld

Supplemened by Subcommitee sa


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miliary ocial who has spen ime in boh Iraq and Aghanisan noed, [i]n Iraq, logisics wason cruise conrol. In Aghanisan, is graduae-level logisics o make i happen.15 Anoherocial described Aghanisan as he harshes logisics environmen on earh.16

Despie he bes eors o miliary logisicians, he supply chain does no always work, delaying

criical lie suppor o he roops. A miliary ocial who served in Aghanisan in 2007 and2008 noed ha a imes we had guys ou here a he ouposs in my area o operaions sarvingbecause we couldn ge resupply in o hem.17

Aghan rucking

Te U.S. miliary relies on local Aghan rucking companies or almos all o is ground ransporneeds. Te rucking indusry is a key par o he Aghan economy, providing employmenopporuniies or a large segmen o he populaion who oherwise would have rouble nding

work due o he high rae o illieracy. U.S. rucking conracs provide a relaively lucraive sourceo income in his very poor counry. Te owner o one o he rucking companies supporinghe U.S. supply chain repored ha beween he drivers, assisan drivers, managers, andmechanics, his company single-handedly eeds 20,000 people.18

Phoo Credi: Deense Imagery


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According o his owner, ruck drivers are capains o heir own ships.19 Wih litleinrasrucure o suppor hem, a driver and his assisan (usually a young son) mus have he

wherewihal o survive or weeks or even monhs on he road. ruckers will oen decorae heirrucks in an ornae manner, and hese so-called Jingle rucks named or he sound hey makeas hey drive are ound hroughou he roads o Aghanisan.

Te Hos Naion rucking Conrac

Te HN conrac is a $2.16 billion dollar indenie delivery/indenie quaniy (IDIQ)conrac o provide ground ransporaion in Aghanisan or over 70 percen o Deparmeno Deense goods and maeriel, including ood, waer, uel, equipmen, and ammuniion.20 TeDeparmen o Deense iniially requesed a saemen o capabiliies or he curren HNconrac in Augus 2008 and issued a reques or proposals in Sepember 2008. Tiry-veconracors submited bids, and he compeiive range was narrowed o en.21

Te conrac was awarded o six conracors on March 15, 2009, and perormance began onMay 1, 2009.22 Alhough he conrac sared wih a oal conrac cap o $360 million dollars,according o he Deparmen o Deense, []wo weeks aer perormance began requiremensskyrockeed a a pace ha acquisiion planners could no have anicipaed due o he surge inroops.23 In July 2009, Acing Assisan Secreary o he Army Dean Popps signed a Jusicaionand Approval or Ou o Scope Modicaion ha increased he oal conrac size o $2.16

billion, wih an individual cap o $360 million per HN conracor.24 For conex, he oalannual gross domesic produc o Aghanisan was jus over $13 billion in 2009.25

Prior o his HN conrac, he Deparmen o Deenses supply ransporaion was providedunder a blanke purchase agreemen (BPA)26 wih several companies, some o whom are nowprime or sub-conracors or he curren HN conrac. Te new HN conrac was conceivedo add capaciy, simpliy pricing, and solve several problems wih he BPA, including concernsregarding corrupion and bribery among BPA conracors and, in one case, a U.S. Armyconracing ocer.27

Te Conracor is Responsible or All Securiy

Imporanly, he HN conrac included one new criical provision: secion 4.9 o he Saemen

o Work provides ha he Conracor is responsible or all securiy and ha []he Conracorwill conduc convoys independenly, wihou miliary escors, unless oherwise deermined byhe USG [U.S. governmen] a is sole direcion. Te Saemen o Work acknowledges he risko drivers: he USG will no inenionally direc he Conracor o pass hrough an area wherehe chance o hosiliies is high. However, he USG canno oreclose he possibiliy o hosileacs occurring.28


17/86- 11 -


Te Saemen o Work urher regulaes he minimum securiy ha each HN conracor musprovide or each mission: wo securiy vehicles or every ve rucks. In addiion, he conracprovides ha all weapons uilized will be provided by he Conracor and will be wihin heprescribed USG auhorized weapon lising.29

Deparmen o Deense Managemen and Oversigh o HN

Operaional managemen o he HN conrac was iniially handled by he 484h MovemenConrol Batalion o he U.S. Army.30 In February 2010, he 419h Movemen Conrol Batalionook over managemen o he conrac.31 For HN, boh movemen conrol batalions reporedo he 143rd Expediionary Susainmen Brigade.

Acual signing auhoriy or he HN conrac fowed hrough a complex hierarchy o miliarycommands. Te HN conrac is immediaely overseen by he egional Conracing Cener inBagram (CC-Bagram). CC-Bagram is one o a handul o conracing ceners in Aghanisanha repor o he Principal Assisan esponsible orConracing-Aghanisan (PAC-A). Te PAC-A reporso he Join Conracing Command-Iraq/Aghanisan ( JCC-I/A). JCC-I/A ges conracing auhoriy rom he Army

Acquisiion Execuive and he Secreary o he Army, bu asa pracical mater repors o he Commander o U.S. CenralCommand (CENCOM).

Te Contractor

is responsible or

all security. Te

Contractor will

conduct convoys

independently, without

military escorts,unless otherwise

destermined by the

U.S. government at its

sole discretion.

HN Statement o

Work


18/86- 12 -


Deparmen ofDefense

U.S. Forces-Afghanisan(USFOR-A)

143rd ExpediionarySusainemen Command

Join Conracing Command -Iraq/Afghanisan

(JCC-I/A)

U.S. CenralCommand

(CENTCOM)

Movemen ConrolBatalions

(484h, 485h, 419h)

HNT

Principle Assisan Responsiblefor Conracing-Afghanisan

(PARC-A)

Regional ConracingCommand a Bagram

(RCC-Bagram)

Secreary of heArmy

Army AcquisiionExecuive

Management ContractingAuthority


19/86- 13 -


HN Conracors

Te HN conrac was originally awarded o six conracors, our o whom previously heldconracs under he BPA. In lae 2009, wo addiional companies were added, boh o whichhad previous rucking experience under he BPA.32 Te wo companies ha had no been prime

conracors under he BPA had boh worked as subconracors under ha agreemen.

Several o he prime conracors or HN do no own rucks and subconrac ou all o heirrucking needs. In oher words, hey essenially serve as brokers o he local Aghan ruckingcompanies. In several cases, he prime conracors have only a handul o personnel in

Aghanisan, and in a leas one case, he conracor had no prior experience in he ruckingbusiness. Prime conracors repored ha here is a nie pool o rucks in Aghanisan, andmany o he prime conracors compee wih each oher hrough subconracors or he use ohe same vehicles.33

Te ollowing companies are prime conracors under he HN conrac:34

NCL Holdings (NCL) NCL was ounded in May 2005 by Hamed Wardak, he son ohe Aghan Deense Miniser, Abdul ahim Wardak. Te company is based in Norhern

Virginia. Prior o receiving he HN conrac in 2009, NCL perormed securiyoperaions in Aghanisan or Deparmen o Deense conracors. NCL subconracs ouall o is rucking operaions under HN, and had no direc experience wih managingrucking beore his conrac.

Te Sandi Group TeSandiGroup is based in Washingon, D.C. and has worked inprivae secor developmen in boh Iraq and Aghanisan. o perorm HN missions,he Sandi Group has subconraced ou all rucking o local Aghan subconracors.

Mesopoamia Group and EMA, Join Venure Mesopoamia Group, a Delaware-based company and EMA, an Aghan company, received an HN conrac as ajoin venure aer having worked on he BPA conrac in a conracor-subconracorrelaionship, wih EMA as he local subconracor. EMA owns many o is own rucksand also brokers wih owner-operaors rom local ribes. Mesopoamia Group providesmanagemen and capial o he join venure.

HEB Inernaional Logisics HEB is an inernaional logisics and ransporaioncompany based in Dubai. HEB owns some o is own rucks bu principally relies onlocal Aghan subconracors. HEB perormed rucking operaions under he BPA prioro receiving he HN conrac.


20/86- 14 -


Anham, LLC Anham is a parnership ha was ormed in 2004 by a Virginia-basedinvesmen group (HII-Finance), a Saudi conglomerae, and a Jordanian invesmengroup. I is based in Dubai. Anham owns is own rucks and does no subconrac olocal companies, bu i perorms ar ewer missions han he leading HN conracors.

Te Four Horsemen Inernaional (Four Horsemen) and Tree Bulles Incorporaed(Tree Bulles), Join Venure Four Horsemen is a New Jersey-based securiy companywih principal operaions in Aghanisan managed by Wesern miliary expariaes; TreeBulles is an Aghan-based ransporaion company ha owns some o is own rucks andbrokers wih local owner-operaors. Four Horsemen provides he securiy orce or hejoin venure. Four Horsemen had previously perormed securiy operaions under heBPA wih oher companies, and Tree Bulles perormed rucking operaions on he BPA.

Aghan American Army Services (AAA) AAA is Aghan-owned and was added o heHN conrac in November 2009 ollowing a bid proes beore he U.S. Governmen

Accounabiliy Oce. AAA had previously worked under he BPA and had perormedrucking operaions since July 2006. Under HN, AAA subconracs ou ruckingoperaions o several local companies.

Guzar Mir Bacha Ko ransporaion (GM) GM is an Aghan-owned companyha was added o he HN conrac in November 2009 in order o increase ruckingcapaciy. GM was a prime conracor on he BPA and he company has providedrucking services in Aghanisan or more han 15 years. GM provides is own rucksand, beore receiving he HN conrac, worked as a subconracor or oher HN prime

conracors.

Te Aghan Securiy Environmen

Te securiy environmen in Aghanisan has rapidly deerioraed in he pas wo years and, asa resul, rucking operaions have become increasingly dangerous.35 Te number o incidensinvolving rucks on he road, including ambushes, IEDs, and kidnappings, has risen sharply.rucking companies also ace repercussions or working wih he U.S. miliary. One companyowner repored ha he and his drivers receive deah hreas or working wih he Unied Saesand ha he oen has had o pay money o milians o recover he bodies o drivers who were

killed on he roads.36

rucking convoys have become avorie arges o he aliban and oherinsurgens, who requenly sop convoys o demand money, se he rucks on re, and kill orkidnap he drivers.37

As he securiy siuaion has deerioraed, here has been a marked increase in he use o IEDson Aghanisans roads.38 By one accoun, all old, he U.S. miliary recorded 8,159 IEDincidens in Aghanisan in 2009, compared wih 3,867 in 2008 and 2,677 he year beore.39


21/86- 15 -


Lieuenan General Michael Oaes, he direcor o he Deparmen o Deenses Join IED DeeaOrganizaion, was quoed in March 2010: [we] don have years o wai and sar changinghe momenum in Aghanisan.40 o add o he sense o urgency, a June 2010New York imesaricle cied a U.N. repor as nding ha here has been a near-doubling o roadside bombingsor he rs our monhs o 2010 compared wih he same period in 2009.41

Privae Securiy Conracors

According o he Aghan Minisry o Inerior, here are currenly 52 licensed privae securiycompanies wih a oal o roughly 25,000 regisered armed guards in Aghanisan.42 Tere arealso hundreds o addiional unregisered privae securiy providers and some esimae up o70,000 oal privae armed guards.43 Given perilous securiy condiions in Aghanisan, U.S. andallied conracors in Aghanisan have litle choice bu o employ privae securiy companies.

Wheher securing ruck convoys, guarding a road projec, or providing personal securiy deails,privae securiy services are widely used.

Te U.S. miliary increasingly relies on privae securiy conracors in Aghanisan or a varieyo signican securiy needs, rom ransporaion o saic proecion o U.S. bases.44 Unlike inIraq where a majoriy o he armed guards are hird-counry naionals (e.g., Peruvians, Ugandans,Nepalese), 95 percen o he privae armed guards used by he Deparmen o Deense in

Aghanisan are local naionals. Indeed, he Deparmens Aghan Firs campaign direcsconracors o hire a leas hal o all workers rom nearby owns or villages.45

Department of

Defense PrivateSecurity Contractor

Personnel46

Total U.S. Citizens

Third

Country

National

Local/Host

Country

National

Afghanistan 14,439 114 409 13,916

Iraq 11,095 776 9,127 1,192

Regulaion o Privae Securiy Conracors

Tere are signican legal and regulaory resricions on he use o privae securiy conracors.Alhough Deparmen o Deense regulaions provide ha i should only use privae securiyconracors licensed wih he hos naion, he miliary direcly employs a signican number ounlicensed privae securiy conracors or use as guards a is orward operaing bases.47

Noably, in a 2006 memorandum on he legaliy o using privae securiy conracors o proecU.S. personnel and propery in Iraq, a Deparmen o Deense Depuy General Counsel wroe:


22/86- 16 -


[]his opinion should no be consrued o mean ha conracors may perorm allsecuriy uncions in Iraq and Aghanisan. Privae Securiy Companies shouldno be employed in siuaions where he likelihood o direc paricipaion inhosiliies is high. For example, hey should no be employed in quick-reacionorce (QF) missions, local parolling, or miliary convoy securiy operaions

where he likelihood o hosile conac is high.48

Te Deparmen o Deenses use o privae securiy conracors in Iraq and Aghanisan hasreceived signican media atenion over he las several years. High-prole incidens in whichsecuriy conracors were accused o shooing civilians, using excessive orce, being insensiiveo local cusoms or belies, or oherwise behaving inappropriaely promped Congress o call orregulaions o increase oversigh and accounabiliy o privae securiy conracorss employed inconingency operaions.

In July 2009, he Deparmen promulgaed Insrucion 3020.50,Privae Securiy ConracorsOperaing in Coningency Operaions, which esablished policies or selecing, raining, equipping,and managing privae securiy conracors in coningency operaions. Tis regulaion, which

was mandaed under he Naional Deense Auhorizaion Ac o Fiscal Year 2008,49 requires heDeparmen o Deense o accoun or privae securiy conracor equipmen, rack incidensinvolving heir personnel, and invesigae any o he ollowing occurrences:

Te injury or deah o privae securiy conracor personnel;1.Te discharge o weapons by or a such personnel;2.Te injury, deah, or damage o propery caused by he acions o such personnel; or3.

Incidens o alleged misconduc.4.

Te regulaions make clear ha hey also apply o privae securiy conracor subconracorsworking or Deparmen o Deense conracors.50


23/86- 17 -

III. FINDINGS

1. Security or the U.S. Supply Chain Is

Principally Provided by Warlords

Commander uhullah is prooypical o a new class o warlord in Aghanisan. He commands asmall army o over 600 armed guards. His men engage in regular comba wih insurgen orces.He claims exraordinary casualy gures on boh sides (450 o his own men killed in he las

year and many more aliban dead). He readily admis o bribing governors, police chies, andarmy generals. Over a cup o ea in Dubai, he complained o he Subcommitee sa abou hehigh cos o ammuniion in Aghanisan he says he spends $1.5 millionper monh on roundsor an arsenal ha includes A-47s, heavy machine guns,and PGs.51 Villagers along he road reer o him as heBucher.52

Beore Sepember 11, 2001, Commander uhullah wasrelaively unknown in Aghanisan. oday, he is he singlelarges securiy provider or he U.S. supply chain in

Aghanisan. Despie his criical and sensiive role, nobodyrom he Deparmen o Deense or he U.S. inelligencecommuniy has ever me wih him (excep or a brie

deenion by U.S. Special Forces on wha he says are alsedrug charges). Commander uhullah is largely a mysery o boh he U.S. governmen andhe conracors ha employ his services. Indeed, several o he prime HN conracors areapparenly unaware ha Commander uhullah guards heir rucks (heir securiy subconracorsuilize his services wihou he prime conracors knowledge).

Finding: Te principal privae securiy subconracors on he HN conrac arewarlords, srongmen, commanders, and miliia leaders who compee wih he Aghancenral governmen or power and auhoriy. Providing proecion services orhe U.S. supply chain empowers hese warlords wih money, legiimacy, and a raisondere or heir privae armies. Alhough many o hese warlords nominally operaeunder privae securiy companies licensed by he Aghan Minisry o Inerior, he

warlords hrive in a vacuum o governmen auhoriy and heir ineress are inundamenal confic wih U.S. aims o build a srong Aghan governmen.

Commander Ruhullah

is largely a mystery

to both the U.S.

government and

the contractors that

employ his services.


24/86- 18 -

Findings|Warlord, Inc.

Commander uhullah dominaes he privae securiy business along Highway 1, he mainransporaion arery beween abul and andahar. Because mos U.S. supplies are shipped

hrough Pakisan o Bagram Aireld, norh o abul, whilemos U.S. roops are surging ino andahar, in he souh,Highway 1 is he criical roue or he supply chain wihin

Aghanisan.

Commander uhullah says ha he guards roughly 3,500U.S. supply rucks every monh. Te prime conracors andlocal Aghan subconracors ha use his services pay himand he securiy company ha he associaes wih, Waan iskManagemen, handsomely. For securiy beween MaydanShahr (jus souh o abul) and andahar, Commanderuhullah charges up o $1,500 per ruck.53

A he behes o Congress, he Deparmen o Deense haspromulgaed exensive regulaions inended o improveoversigh and accounabiliy o privae securiy conracorsin coningency operaions such as Iraq and Aghanisan.Commander uhullah has never heard o he regulaionsand says ha hey do no apply o him. No privae securiy

companies working or he Unied Saes are supposed o use any weapon more high-poweredhan an A-47. Commander uhullahs men use heavy machine guns and PGs.54

Commander uhullah is jus one o dozens o warlords, srongmen, and commanders whohave ound a niche in providing securiy services o he U.S. miliary in Aghanisan. Someare well-known ribal leaders or ormer mujahedeen who have been in he business o war orhe pas hiry years. Ohers, like Commander uhullah, are relaive newcomers whose powerand infuence are direcly derivaive o heir conracing and subconracing work or he U.S.governmen.

Boh he old and new warlords ineress are in undamenal confic wih a properly uncioninggovernmen. By deniion, warlords wield miliary migh and violence ouside o he heoreicalgovernmen monopoly on hose ools. Warlordism is aniheical o he Aghan sae, and

ulimaely o U.S. counerinsurgency sraegy in Aghanisan, ye hese warlords have fourishedproviding securiy or he U.S. supply chain here.

No private security

companies working

or the United States

are supposed to use

any weapon more

high-powered than an

AK-47. Commander

Ruhullahs men use

heavy machine gunsand rocket-propelled

grenades.


25/86- 19 -


Warlordism in Aghanisan

No all warlords are creaed equal. A he op o he hierarchy are he well-known ribal leaders,ormer mujahedeen commanders, or local power brokers who command he loyaly o men

beyond heir abiliy o provide a paycheck. For hese warlords, providing securiy o U.S. andNAO convoys is jus he laes ieraion o long and colorul careers in war-orn Aghanisan.Long aer he Unied Saes leaves Aghanisan, and he convoy securiy business shus down,hese warlords will likely coninue o play a major role as auonomous ceners o poliical,economic, and miliary power.55

Oher warlords are newer o he scene bu have grown in srengh based on heir abiliy o eedo U.S. and NAO securiy conracing, paricularly he highly lucraive business niche oproviding privae securiy or he coaliion supply chain. Men serve and die or hese warlordsor money, no ribal, ehnic, or poliical loyaly. In Aghan culure, his new class o warlord isundeserving o ha elevaed ile because heir power is derivaive o heir business uncion, noheir poliical or ribal clou.56

Waan Risk Managemen oyoa Hi-Lux securiy ruckequipped wih a .50 caliber ani-aircra DSHK machine gun

Phoo Credi: Deense Imagery


26/86- 20 -


According o one exper on Aghanisan, he parial conversion o Aghan warlords inobusinessmen resembles in many ways he esablishmen o maa neworks, which are aciveboh in he legal and he illegal economy and are able o use orce o proec heir ineress andpossibly o expand.57 Wheher called businessmen, commanders, srongmen, miliialeaders, or warlords, any single individual who commands hundreds or housands o armed

men in regular comba and operaes largely ouside he direc conrol o he cenral governmenis a compeior o he legiimacy o he sae.58

Privae Securiy Companies

Boh Presiden arzai and he American-led coaliion havemade he disarmamen o illegal armed groups (warlords,commanders, and miliias) a op prioriy or successin Aghanisan. Since 2003, however, he disarmamen,demobilizaion, and reinegraion program has largelyailed. aher han disarm, many o he warlords and miliiagroups evaded he program by becoming privae securiycompanies or he coaliion. According o an academic exon disarmamen, [c]ommanders hus appear o be usingPSCs [privae securiy companies] and oher governmensecuriy orces o hide heir miliias... [A] commanderssrengh is expressed less in erms o oensive capabiliyagains an opposing uni han in erms o he abiliy oacquire supporing conracs, o mainain armed unis and o

inegrae ino ocial and quasi-ocial securiy srucures.59

Major General Nick Carer, he Briish head o NAOsegional Command-Souh in andahar, old reporers ha

warlords in andahar had been allowed o build up miliiasha hey claimed were privae securiy companies, and hahese privae securiy companies were a creaion o he inernaional communiy.60 Ahmed

Wali arzai, Presiden Hamid arzais broher, agrees: [he guards] are he ones who know howo make bombs and shoo A-47s. Tey are well-experienced jihadi oo soldiers. Mos o hemare now par o securiy companies. I hey were no working or he securiy companies, Mr.

arzai saed, hey would likely join he aliban.61

Warlords in

Kandahar had been

allowed to build up

militias that they

claimed were private

security companies,

and these private

security companies

were a creation o

the international

community.

UK Major General

Nick Carter


27/86- 21 -


Warlords Conrol he Highways

A warlords power is principally derived rom his abiliy o conrol securiy wihin a denederriory. Te business o warlordism is o seek rens rom hose who would occupy ha space,

wheher he local populaion or rucks atemping o ransi hrough i. Given he exremely

limied road nework in Aghanisan, highways are prime real esae. I a highway also happens obe a criical componen o he U.S. supply chain or he disribuion o goods in Aghanisan, heopporuniy or ren-seeking is massive. O course, he business model depends on he warlordsabiliy o monopolize conrol o he highway and o gh o compeiion.

In Aghanisan, warlords conrol many o he main highways used by he U.S. supply chain,paricularly in he souh, eas, and wes. Sophisicaed consumers o he Aghan road nework(he local Aghan rucking companies) have learned how o navigae his pachwork o highwaywarlords by paying he righ warlord a he righ secion o highway. Like aprix fxe menu, a lisprovided o he Subcommitee by an HN conracor deails which escor provider operaeson which secions o road beween various U.S. orward operaing bases in Aghanisan:62


28/86- 22 -


Commander Ruhullah and Waan Risk Managemen

Commander uhullah dominaes he criical secion o Highway 1 beween abul and andahar,an area ha is he cenral supply arery or he U.S. and NAO mission in souhern Aghanisan

and also happens o be heavily inlraed by he aliban.63

In a ypical convoy movemen, Commander uhullahassembles beween 200-400 rucks carrying U.S. supplies inMaydan Shahr, jus souh o abul. Te U.S. supply chainoperaes on his schedule; his local sub-commanders will

wai several days o gaher as many rucks as possible beoremoving, even i some rucks are days or weeks overdue a heirdesinaion. Commander uhullah guards he convoy wiheams o several hundred men. Te guards ravel in pickuprucks and SUVs. Some rucks have mouned heavy machineguns and many ohers carry PGs. Te rip akes roughlyhree days and a dieren eam handles each leg.64

Commander uhullah operaes under he license o Waanisk Managemen, a regisered securiy company ownedby Ahmed aeb Popaland ashid Popal, wo

cousins o Presiden arzai. Waan isk Managemenhas some Wesern managemen, a websie, and conracs

o proec U.S. orward operaing bases and U.S.-undeddevelopmen projecs. Te Popals welcomed an inerviewwih he Subcommitee sa and spoke candidly abou heiroperaions. Commander uhullah runs convoy securiyoperaions wih relaive auonomy; he Popals provide some

Wesern inerace (hey speak perec English) and heircompanys securiy license. Te Popal brohers are eagero exi he convoy securiy business due o he headache orecen negaive publiciy.65

Wheher hey know i or no, mos o he HN primeconracors use Commander uhullah or securiy. O heeigh prime HN conracors, all bu one conrac direclyor indirecly wih Waan isk Managemen. Only a very small handul o convoy securiyproviders ravel ha secion o Highway 1 wihou employing Commander uhullahs services.66Tose compeiors and he rucks ha hey proec claim o experience abnormally high incidenraes.67

Te U.S. supply chain

operates on Ruhullahs

schedule; his local

sub-commanders will

wait several days to

gather as many trucks

as possible beore

moving, even i some

trucks are days or

weeks overdue at their

destinations.

Whether they know it

or not, most o the HN

prime contractors useCommander Ruhullah

or security. O the eight

prime HN contractors,

all but one contract

directly or indirectly

with Watan Risk

Management.


29/86- 23 -


A a price o up o $1,500 per ruck, and wih several housand HN rucks raveling beweenabul and andahar every monh, Commander uhullah and Waan isk Managemen makeseveral ens o millions o dollars per year providing convoy securiy.68

Kandahar Securiy Force

Wih he Popal brohers eager o leave he convoy securiy business, Commander uhullahhas new aspiraions: esablishing a single brokerage rm ha will serve o connec coaliionconracors o mos o he principal local warlords in heir respecive regions wihin souhern

Aghanisan. Te andahar Securiy Force, as i will be called, will include wo dozen warlordsand commanders who have been providing unregisered privae securiy services in and aroundandahar. Commander uhullah will be presiden o his new venure.69

Commander uhullah explained ha he reason or creaing he andahar Securiy Force was

o legiimize he securiy providers ha are already operaing in he region. Tese securiyproviders will operae under he andahar Securiy Force fag, bu each will be given his ownseparae conracs and Commander uhullah believes here will be no inernal compeiion.70

Ahmed aeb Popal o Waan isk Managemen believes ha he andahar Securiy Forcesimply gives he gloss o an ocial license o a collecion o warlords and commanders. He

wans a clean governmen, bu said ha he curren governmen is oo weak, and ransporers

Phoo Credi: Subcommitee Sa


30/86- 24 -


have no choice bu o rely on hese warlords and commanders. His broher, ashid Popal,agreed and saed ha he curren siuaion creaes a sae o anarchy. In his view, he andaharSecuriy Force will no improve he securiy siuaion.71

In sum, Commander uhullah hopes o creae a conederaion ha would monopolize privae

securiy in and around andahar jus as andahar is becoming he key sraegic ocal poin ohe U.S. mission. His proposal or a license or he andahar Securiy Force is pending beorehe Aghan cabines securiy commitee.72

Operaing under he aade o a regisered privae securiy company will bring he unlicensedwarlords who join andahar Securiy Force ino echnical compliance wih Aghan licensingrequiremens bu i will no undamenally change he way hey operae or improve heiraccounabiliy. When asked wha kind o oversigh and conrol he would have over hecollecion o commanders ha he would lead, Commander uhullah saed simply ha, in heeven o any problems, he would ake care o i.73

I approved, he andahar Securiy Force would become he single larges privae securiyprovider in Aghanisan. According o Commander uhullah and he Popals, he idea o creaehe andahar Securiy Force originaed wih ormer Aghan Inerior Miniser Hani Amar, andhas been approved by he Minisry o Ineriors ani-errorism deparmen.74 Some op Aghanocials have suppored he proposal, osensibly as a means o uniing and conrolling powerul,unregisered groups ha hey depic as compeing violenly or coaliion conracs.75

Ohers have raised concerns ha he consolidaion o privae securiy commanders in souhern

Aghanisan will urher empower Ahmed Wali arzai, he powerul head o he andaharProvincial Council and he broher o Presiden arzai. Carl Forsberg o he Insiue or heSudy o War describes Ahmed Wali arzais modus operandi as gaining he loyaly o miliiacommanders in exchange or disribuing lucraive conracs rom inernaional acors.76Mr. Forsberg adds, Ahmed Wali arzais connecions and infuence allow him o collec a cu omos o he business ransacions occurring in andahar Ciy.77

In an inerview wih he Subcommitee sa, Ahmed Wali arzai denied any operaional orbenecial involvemen in he andahar Securiy Force. He said ha he has never been involvedwih any privae securiy company and ha he only helped o aciliae he meeing in which

he individual commanders had agreed o come ogeher under a single umbrella. Mr. arzaibelieves ha he creaion o he andahar Securiy Force will be benecial because i will allowunregisered commanders o regiser heir guards, vehicles, and weapons. He said ha hecommanders had also been asked o limi heir movemens wihin andahar Ciy and o ranserheir bases o operaion o ouside he ciy.78 Commander uhullah was similarly adaman ha

Ahmed Wali arzai was no involved in any way wih he creaion o he andahar SecuriyForce: He will have no ownership whasoever.79


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In any even, i he andahar Securiy Force does come o ruiion, i will undoubedly ake overrom Waan isk Managemen as he principal privae securiy provider and broker or he U.S.supply chain in Aghanisan.

Commander Maiullah Khan

Maiullah han is he leading privae securiy provider and principal warlord o UruzganProvince, jus norh o andahar. Maiullahs nominal ile is chie o he provincial highwaypolice, despie he ac ha he highway police orce was disbanded years ago. He commandsan armed miliia o over 2,000 men, called he andak Amniane Uruzgan (KU), and conrolsall rac along he main highway beween andahar and arin ow, he provincial Uruzgancapial.80

In a recen ron page prole, heNew York imes described Maiullah as he mos powerul manin Uruzgan:

Maiullah han [is] he head o a privae army ha earns millions o dollarsguarding NAO supply convoys... In litle more han wo years, Mr. Maiullah,an illierae ormer highway parol commander, has grown sronger han hegovernmen o Oruzgan Province, no only supplaning is role in providingsecuriy bu usurping is oher uncions, his rivals say, like appoining publicemployees and doling ou governmen largess. His ghers run missions wih

American Special Forces, and when Aghan ocials have conroned him, he haseiher rebued hem or had hem removed.81

Ahmed Wali arzai credis Maiullah wih almos single-handedly making Uruzgan Province sae.He describes him as a very successul police ocer who is in charge o highway parol andearned he suppor o he people. He claims ha he aliban have been deeaed in Uruzgan,largely because o Maiullah. According o Mr. arzai, Maiullah also uses his armed orce, heKU, o gh aliban in neighboring provinces, including Norhern andahar and Zabol.82

Every HN conracor and subconracor assigned o ake U.S. supplies o Uruzgan exclusivelyuses Maiullahs securiy services a a cos o beween $1,500 and $3,000 per ruck, per mission.Te CEO o a privae securiy company in Aghanisan saed ha, Maiullah has he road romandahar o arin ow compleely under his conrol. No one can ravel wihou Maiullah

wihou acing consequences. Tere is no oher way o ge here. You have o eiher pay him orgh him.83

Privae rucking companies supporing he Duch and Ausralian orces based in Uruzgan alsoexclusively use Maiullah or highway securiy.84 Wih over 200 suppor rucks per monh orhese NAO orces, news accouns esimaed ha he earned $4 million o $6 million per yearrom NAO securiy alone.85


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Maiullah is he nephew o Jan Mohammad han, he deposed governor o Uruzgan. When heDuch ook responsibiliy or Uruzgan in 2006, hey demanded ha Presiden arzai re JanMohammad han or his noorious drug smuggling and human righs abuses. Subsequenly, heDuch blocked Maiullah rom being ormally named as hepolice chie because o his human righs record as his uncles

leading enorcer.86 According o press accouns, [h]e led hehi squads ha killed subborn armers who did no wan osurrender heir land, daughers, and livesock o he ormergovernor.87 One high-ranking Duch ocial claimed haMaiullah is so eared ha, [i] we appoin Maiullah policechie, probably more han hal o all people in he Baluchi

valley would run over o he aliban immediaely.88

Alhough he NAO orces saioned in Uruzgan are oallydependen on Maiullah o permi heir supply convoys o

ravel he roads he conrols, hey publicly disance hemselvesrom him. In response o press inquiries, a Duch governmenspokesman saed ha he Duch Minisry o Deense doesno pay Maiullah direcly, bu i is up o local ransporers

wheher hey nd i necessary o pay or proecion.89 Meanwhile, []he [Ausralian DeenseForces] will neiher conrm nor deny knowledge o paymens o Colonel han, bu privaelyhey acknowledged o reporers ha hey are dependen upon his permission or heir supplyroues.90

Colonel Abdul Razziq

Abdul azziq has many iles Commander, Colonel, General, Direcor bu whamaters is ha he conrols he Chaman-Spin Boldak border crossing, he crucial gaeway orall supplies coming rom Pakisan direcly o souhern Aghanisan. A age 30, Colonel azziqis he chie o he Achakzai ribe which sraddles he border area. His semi-ocial ile is hechie o sa o he provincial border police. According o U.S. miliary ocials, azziq wieldsnear oal conrol over Spin Boldak and he border crossing... [He] owns a rucking company,commands 3,500 police, eecively conrols he local governmen, and reporedly akes inmillions rom exoring passing vehicles and racking drugs.91

During a congressional delegaion o Aghanisan, U.S. and NAO commanders readilyacknowledged ha Colonel azziq akes a major cu o all rucking ha passes hrough he

Friendship Gae a he border crossing, bu hey believe hey are so dependen on his ighgrip over he border hey have no choice bu o work wih him.92 Indeed, in mid-January2010, General Sanley McChrysal himsel few o Spin Boldak o encourage Colonel azziq oincrease rac and improve eciency along he border.93

Matiullah has theroad om Kandahar

to arin Kowt

completely under his

control. You have to

either pay him or ght

him.

Private SecurityCompany Executive


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I is no clear how much Colonel azziq earns rom axing U.S. and NAO supply convoyscrossing he border, bu, according o one ormer high-level member o his border police, hemakes beween $5 million and $6 million per monh rom his various border businesses.94

Pacha Khan Zadran

Pacha han Zadran, also known as he Iron Grandpa, is currenly a member o he UpperParliamen in Aghanisan, owns signican rucking asses, and provides convoy securiy inand around Pakia and hos provinces.95 He is a ormer mujahedeen who helped o opplehe aliban regime in 2001. He was appoined governor o Pakia Province by Hamid arzai inDecember 2001, bu was orced ou o oce in February 2002.96 He responded violenly, manylives were los as his ghers rockeed Gardez rom he surrounding hills.97 He was arresed

by Pakisan in 2003 over renegade aciviies, including atacking governmen orces in Pakia,hough he was allowed o reurn o Aghanisan in 2004.98 Pacha han reporedly commands aprivae miliia o 2,000 men who conrol all major checkpoins on he main roads. Bu, Pachahan objecs o he erm warlord: Tey mus no call us warlords. I you call us warlords, wewill kill you.99

According o heBoson Globe, [a] leas ve people were held or years a Guananamo Bayprison parly because hey allegedly had ies o Pacha han Zadran.100 Pacha han himsel

was never imprisoned here and was pardoned by Presiden arzai ollowing his reurn oAghanisan in 2004.101 He became a member o Parliamen in 2005.102

Pacha han and his hree sons Sediq, au, and Dawala provide securiy services o a

number o HN conracors in he Gardez-hos area.103

According o one HN conracor,Pacha han conrols his region and i is no sae o operae here wihou paying his companiesor securiy.104 A ormer counry manager o anoher HN conracor repored o he miliaryha Pacha han conrols who is able o access he bases o ulll missions and ha hiscompany was asked o pay a ee or rucks o pass hrough he area.105

Koka

Abdul Wali han, who goes by he name oka, is a warlord-cum-police chie in Musa Qaladisric, norhern Helmand Province. His armed orces provide proecion services or U.S. and

NAO supply convoys over a wide swah o souhern Aghanisan.Only one HN rucking company direcly conracs wih oka or securiy, bu ohers may doso indirecly hrough layers o subconracing. epresenaives o ha company saed ha okaprovides securiy o HN rucks in and around orward operaing base Dwyer.106


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oka has had a roller coaser relaionship wih coaliion orces. In 2002, he was imprisonedby he U.S. or 14 monhs a Bagram jail or suspeced insurgen involvemen.107 Aer hisrelease, by one press accoun, he reappeared as a miliia commander and lawman or he AghanGovernmen in Musa Qala, where by 2006 his enure was marked by allegaions o human righsabuses, killings and robberies.108 According o he governor o Helmand, oka ook $20,000 a

day in opium axes and was involved in many mass murders.109

In 2006, he aliban ook over Helmand and he Briish orced Presiden arzai o remove okaas a police ocial. According o he Briish commander a he ime, he U does no wanoka here; all our good work could be undermined by he baggage he brings wih him.110

In 2008, however, Presiden arzai srongly criicized he Briish or doing more harm hangood by orcing he removal o oka and oher ocials. Te misake was ha we removed alocal arrangemen wihou having a replacemen. We removed he police orce. Ta was nogood.111 Under pressure rom Presiden arzai, he Aghan Minisry o Inerior, and he Aghan

Naional Army, he Briish relened, and arzai reinsaed oka as police chie. Having no oherchoice, he Briish embraced him, even decoraing he disric wih posers o oka ending o a

wounded civilian in ron o a mounainous backdrop.112

Oher Privae Securiy Providers

Oher privae securiy providers or HN convoys include Commander ahim, CommanderMasud, Commander Angar, Commander Habibullah Jan, Colonel Haji oorjan, Gul AghaSherzai, and General Gulalai.


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2. Te Highway Warlords Run a ProtectionRacket

ashid Popal, he Presiden o Waan isk Managemen, praised Maiullah han lavishly.Maiullah is a genius. Wihou him, arin ow [he capial o Uruzgan] would all [o healiban]. According o Mr. Popal, Maiullah provides eecivesecuriy and jobs or his province. He can do his becauseany conracor working here mus hire subconracors and

workers rom his province. Everyone, including Mr. Popal,mus pay or Maiullahs securiy services o ravel up he road

rom andahar o arin ow. Tere are no excepions:[n]o one leaves wihou paying... Maiullah will kill anyone onhis highway, aliban or no. A driver inerviewed by heNewYork imes echoed ha assessmen: Is suicide o come uphis road wihou Maiullahs men.113

Along Highway 1, beween abul and andahar, HNconracors repor ha Commander uhullah runs a similar,

bu less eecive, proecion racke. o mos ruckingconracors, Commander uhullah conrols Highway 1. According o he ormer counry

manager o one HN company ha conraced wih Waan, you had o pay uhullah o eiherprovide securiy or le [us] go hrough his erriory. Commander uhullah held his company

hosage; i he did no pay, he believed his rucks would be sho up.114

While a small handul o securiy companies apparenly do operae convoy securiy missionson his roue wihou paying Commander uhullah, hey do so a heir peril. Tese companiesrepor regular inimidaion, conac, and surprises ha hey atribue o Commander

Finding: Te HN conracors and heir rucking subconracors pay ens omillions o dollars annually o local warlords across Aghanisan in exchange orproecion or HN supply convoys o suppor U.S. roops. Alhough he warlordsdo provide guards and coordinae securiy, he conracors have litle choice buo use hem in wha amouns o a vas proecion racke. Te consequences areclear: rucking companies ha pay he highway warlords or securiy are providedproecion; rucking companies ha do no pay believe hey are more likely ond hemselves under atack. As a resul, almos everyone pays. In inerviewsand documens, he HN conracors requenly reerred o such paymens as

exorion, bribes, special securiy, and/or proecion paymens.

While a small

handul o security

companies apparently

do operate convoysecruity missions on

Highway 1 without

paying Commander

Ruhullah, they do so

at their peril.


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uhullah. While here is no comprehensive inciden daa o compare how each securiycompany ares on Highway 1, here is widespread agreemen among HN conracors ha hose

who do no use Commander uhullah ace signicanly greaer risk.115

An execuive rom one privae securiy company ha ravels Highway 1 wihou paying

Commander uhullah said ha U.S. supply convoys guarded by his company had come underatack by Commander uhullahs men on muliple occasions. [He] was rying o scare usino no paricipaing on his roue, atacking our resolve o coninue o service he roue. Heconinued, [Commander uhullah] operaes wih relaive impuniy rom Ghazni o andahar,and even ino Helmand Province He is willing o ruhlessly exploi he lack o miliary conrolalong he roues on which he operaes.116

In an inciden repor rom he summer o 2008, he securiy company repored hosile conacwih 15-20 insurgens. According o he repor:

[Te convoy securiy commander] came o he conclusion ha his ambushwas well planned by ohollah due o he ollowing reason: When [he convoysecuriy commanders] guards were moving wih [he Minisry o Deense]convoy and ohollahs guards, hey were moving ogeher ill aer Baghi Poul,

when he convoy was a Howz-e-mdad, he rohollahs surs [rucks] was inron o convoy and no wih [he convoy securiy commanders] guards, hey

Phoo Credi: Subcommitee Sa


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scatered hemselves rom [he convoy securiy commanders] guards. Close oeskenadkhod, he surs o ohollah were in ron o convoy, minues beore heambush he guards o [he convoy securiy commander] could see ha he guardso ohollah were busy on heir phones and now know ha hey were alking wihhe insurgens. Jus beore he ambush, 2 x Surs (one o hese Surs as a black sur,

he guards recognized his sur as he QF or ohollahs Ass commander) and2 X Corollas, hese vehicles came rom he village and waied or Rohollahssurs o pass beore hey sared engaging wih he weapons ono he guardso [he convoy securiy commander], ha guards o Rohollah never reurnedre ono he insurgens.117

An HN rucking conracor repored similar resuls. Te company used Waan iskManagemen wih ew major incidens in housands o ruck missions. On he handul ooccasions ha he company atemped o provide is own securiy on Highway 1, a seniorexecuive repored ha hey go sho up and suspeced Commander uhullahs ngerprins onhe atack. For ha company, he lesson was plain: i we use Waan i works, i we use [our own]securiy i doesn.118

Documens and Correspondence Refec a Vas Exorion Racke

In a PowerPoin presenaion daed May 9, 2009 (several days aer perormance o he HNconrac began), he counry manager or one HN prime conracor repored ha his company

was having rouble ransporing goods o a U.S. orward operaing base in Sharana, PakikaProvince (key slide excerped below):119


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When he miliary logisicians asked he prime conracors why hey would no suppor missionso cerain paricularly insecure locaions, he conracors vened abou he high cos o specialsecuriy, and proecion paymens. In a whie paper submited o he miliary in he Summero 2009, one conracor complained abou he high cos o securiy:120

In response o he same Deparmen o Deense reques or inormaion on securiy and coss on

cerain roues, anoher HN projec manager responded:

Te cos o securiy or hese vehicles is very high and absorbs mos o any prowe would make. Sub Conracors and drivers reques more money o operae inhis area, urher adding o he problems or our companies Te cos o PrivaeSecuriy is excepionally high, wih companies atemping o raise heir pricesconinually. I is believed ha a par o hese charges are being paid as bribeso local Commanders, and hereore ineviably o he enemy As previouslysaed his is one o he mos volaile regions o he counry. Tere is a coninuoushrea o roadside IED, and ambush. Tere will also be a hrea, no only rom

enemy orces bu rom local commanders who have no been paid heirax.121

In an e-mail daed May 4, 2009 (wihin days o he beginning o he HN conrac), one HNprojec manager wroe o his colleague: he more dangerous he missions, enering areas wherehe aliban conrols, he more corrupion we will have o deal wih which or example requiresan addiional ee o ge your rucks hrough wihou geting hi.122


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In an e-mail daed June 9, 2009 beween senior managers o he same conracor, he projecmanager wroe:

I had a conversaion wih [he CEO o heir rucking subconracor] when I wasdevising he atached OPs plan and he became exremely oensive when I sared

asking him some very hard quesions. Per a conversaion he and I had las weekwe had 80 securiy vehicles so as you can see he plan is based on his number.When we go down o allocaing vehicles per region per he plan he saed hawe may no have 80 vehicles all he ime. (wha ever he F%$#! ha means) Hehen saed ha he money ha is allocaed or he vehicles is someimesuilized o pay he Special Securiy in he souh and souhwes so naurallyI asked i we are using ha money o pay hem hen why he F^%$#@ are webeing charged 14,500 per ruck going o he same areas, are we paying hemwice?????????!!!!!!!!!!!123

Te conracor subsequenly submited a reques or equiable adjusmen o he Deparmeno Deense o raise is conrac price o accoun or he increased coss o special securiy. TeDeparmen denied he reques.


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3. Protection Payments or Sae Passage Area Signicant Potential Source o Funding

or the aliban

Every ruck coss abou $200 as a bribe I pay on he roue o police or aliban. Tealiban don care abou small money: hey ask or $10,000, $20,000 or $50,000when hey kidnap people.

Haji Faa, CEO o Mirzada ransporaion Company, as quoed in a November13, 2009 Financial imes aricle, High Coss o Ge NAO Supplies Pas aliban,by Mathew Green and Farhan Bokhari

Many wihin he HN conracor communiy believe ha a large porion o heir proecionpaymens o local warlords or convoy securiy subsequenly go o he aliban or oher ani-governmen elemens, he orces ha acually conrol much o Aghanisan and many o he keyroues used or ransporaion o U.S supplies. According o a ormer HN projec manager, i is

widely known ha he operaional environmen in Aghanisan requires payos o local warlordsand he aliban or sae passage o rucking convoys.124

A ormer employee o an HN conracor ha uilizes Waan isk Managemen or securiydescribed a symbioic relaionship beween Commander uhullah and he aliban. Accordingo his accoun, Commander uhullah only pays o aliban orces i hey are persisen enougho creae a problem or Waan isk Managemen guards on he road. Many reghs are really

Finding: Wihin he HN conracor communiy, many believe ha he highwaywarlords who nominally guard he rucks in urn make proecion paymenso insurgens o coordinae sae passage. Tis belie is evidenced in numerousdocumens, inciden repors, and e-mails ha reer o atemps a aliban exorionalong he road. Te Subcommitee has no uncovered any direc evidence o suchpaymens and Commander uhullah, he Popal brohers, and Ahmed Wali arzaiall adamanly deny ha any convoy securiy commanders pay insurgens. According

o expers and public reporing, however, he aliban regularly exor rens roma variey o lici and illici indusries, and i is plausible ha he aliban would ryo exor proecion paymens rom he coaliion supply chain ha runs hrougherriory in which hey reely operae.


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negoiaions over he ee.125 Anoher ormer HN program manager who spen many years inhe miliary said ha he had no doub whasoever ha Commander uhullah collaboraed

wih insurgens.126

Asked wheher Commander uhullah coordinaed sae passage wih insurgen groups, one

securiy company execuive saed:

[W]e believe ha uhullah serves his own needs a all imes We are o heopinion ha, when i suis his need, he will engage wih aliban or similarelemens. He will provide supplies and sell weapons o hose elemens bugenerally he is operaing or his own benes. So yes, he has links o [he aliban]

bu he is no aligned wih hem. He doesn consider himsel a par o healiban.127

Documens Refec Concern Regardging aliban Exorion

Documens provided o he Subcommitee by he Deparmen o Deense and conracors alsorefec concerns regarding proecion paymens o hosile acors. For example, according onoes rom a meeing o all HN projec managers and miliary logisicians, he paricipansspecically discussed proecion paymens unding he insurgency:

Te PM [Projec Manager] HN rom [an HN conracor] asked LCol Elwelli here was any progress on he Up Arming Auhoriy [a reques o be able o usegreaer armamens]. I was highlighed ha his auhoriy would enable IDIQ

Carriers he fexibiliy o choose PSC o perorm convoy securiy. By gaininghis auhoriy IDIQ Carriers would sop unding he insurgency o wha isesimaed a 1.6 2 Million Dollars per week.128

In an inciden repor led by an HN conracor in lae 2007 (beore he HN conrac sared),he securiy manager wroe:

Conaced hrough he carrier by he aliban commander ha we have o pay orsae passage i we wan our ruck o go hrough he area [W]e were inormedha his was a saemen rom he aliban ha i we did no wan our asses

engaged we had o pay a proecion ee.129

In addiion, as discussed in Finding 7, ina, many o he miliary logisicians ha oversaw heconrac were under he impression ha he aliban did receive proecion paymens, houghhis inormaion was largely based on inormaion provided o hem by HN conracorrepresenaives.


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Securiy Providers Deny Paying he aliban

Commander uhullah and Waan isk Managemen adamanly deny paying he aliban. ashidPopal saed ha neiher Waan nor convoy securiy companies could be making deals wihhe aliban, and o sugges oherwise represened a lack o undersanding o he alibans

organizaional srucure. He argued ha i would be impossible o pay hem o because healiban is oo decenralized and will no ake money rom indels.130

Commander uhullah poined o his requen reghs wih he aliban as evidence ha hedoes no pay hem. He claims o have los 450 men in he las year alone and saed ha hismen had killed 20 aliban in a major engagemen earlier in he week. In he middle o hisinerview wih Subcommitee sa, Commander uhullah received a call on his mobile phoneand go up o speak in a hushed voice in he corner.131 Laer ha day, his associae said ha hesub-commander who had led he atack ha killed he 20 aliban had himsel been slain in arealiaory ambush. Commander uhullah had been inormed o he slaying on he call duringhe inerview, he said.132

Ahmed Wali arzai also saed ha privae securiy companies were no paying he alibanor sae passage. Is impossible o pay everyone... Te aliban is no one any longer. Tereare dieren ribes and groups. One person does no conrol a 400 kilomeer road. Maybehere is one leadership in Pakisan, bu when you come down here, here are dieren ribes,dieren groups, dieren people. Mr. arzai gave an example: a guy in Helmand bough 30dump rucks and paid one aliban commander o ge hem hrough, bu soon anoher [alibancommander] heard o his and came and burn all he rucks. 133

Mr. arzai argued ha he increased danger on he road was parially a resul o aawa issuedby he aliban ha amouned o a license o seal rom Americans. As a resul, here is no onegroup ha could be bough o, bu hundreds and hundreds o groups rying o seal whaeverhey can along he road. Because unemploymen is so high and he ac ha an A-47 islike a mobile phone, everyone has one he road has become virual anarchy and he privaesecuriy companies mus gh heir way hrough.

Discrepancies in Inciden Reporing

According o he U.S. Armys 2006 Counerinsurgency Manual, [l]ogisic providers are oenno longer he ail bu he nose o a [counerinsurgency] orce Logisic unis are perceived byinsurgens as high-payo arges and poenial sources o supplies; hus lines o communicaions(LOCs) are a main batle area or insurgens.134 Despie he insecuriy o Aghanisan and hevulnerabiliy o he supply lines here, many in he miliary believed ha here were suspiciousdiscrepancies in he inciden raes or dieren HN carriers and dieren securiy providers.135


43/86


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Such proecion paymens are alleged o be widespread across a number o dieren indusriesin Aghanisan: reconsrucion projecs, elecommunicaions sysems, poppy culivaion andsmuggling, and ransporaion.141

A 2009 repor on privae securiy conracors in Aghanisan published by New York Universiy

alleged widespread proecion payos o insurgens:

Illici axaion o PSPs [privae securiy providers] escoring convoys and oherscams on privae ranspor and securiy are also an imporan source o undingor corrup police and insurgensAlhough i is ransporaion and consrucioncompanies, boh inernaional and naional, who are he main source o

proecion revenue, privae securiy escors also pay aliban no o be atacked.According o an Aghan inelligence ocial, here are examples o PSPs paying asmuch as 60 percen o heir gross pros or convoy securiy o he aliban andoher insurgen-cum-criminal groups or proecion.142

Several recen aricles have described aliban exorion o USAID-unded reconsrucionprojecs. According o one auhor, he Aghan Trea Finance Cell, along wih miliary andembassy ocials conrmed he insurgens also use exorion o U.S. developmen money orheir unding, ciing supply convoy shakedowns, consrucion proecion rackes, aliban axeson corrup ocials, pay-os rom NGOs and skims rom poorly overseen governmen projecso he Naional Solidariy Program.143 According o a quoe atribued o a ormer securiyconsulan in Aghanisan, I have ye o nd a securiy company ha doesn rely on payos ohe aliban.144

In anoher aricle, a journalis examined a small $200,000 dam and irrigaion projec: In spie ohe U.S. inervenion in his aliban-ridden region, he dam projec has been couner-inuiivelyree o atack, leaving soldiers here suspicious. [Agri-business Developmen eam] commanderCol. Brian Copes says: Te aliban migh have aken 30 or 40 percen righ o he op, and now[he conracors] sruggling o perorm, because hes go less han 100 percen o budge becausehe aliban ook heir cu righ o he op.145

Te Aghanisan counry direcor or a major inernaional NGO repored ha he aliban andlocal warlords ypically ake beween 10-20% o he value o any projec as he price o provide

proecion. Te Unied Saes and inernaional communiy are uninenionally ueling a vaspoliical economy o securiy corrupion in Aghanisan.146

Allegaions o proecion paymens are no limied o conracors. In Ocober 2009, he imes oLondon repored ha he U.S. Ambassador o ome had launched a ormal proes o he Ialiangovernmen ha heir miliary had a regular pracice o paying he aliban ens o housandsdollars in bribes o mainain peace in Hera, an area under heir supervision.147 eporedly,


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when he French ook over he area rom he Ialians and did no pay hese bribes, hey cameunder immediae atack and en soldiers died.148 Prime Miniser Berlusconi denied ha hisgovernmen had ever auhorized such paymens, alhough his adminisraion was only hree-monhs old when he ransiion rom he Ialians o he French ook place.149

In he ew public inerviews wih members o he aliban, here is addiional evidence hainsurgens eed o o he massive infux o U.S. and coaliion unds. A member o he alibanpublicly bragged in an inerview ha U.S. aid money unds heir operaions. When asked

wha is he source o he alibans nancing, he responded: []rom U.S. dollars rom he U.S.auhoriies! He urher explained, [U.S. auhoriies] disribue dollars o he ribal chies, localadminisraors and oher concerned people or welare projecs No every penny, bu mosgoes ino aliban pockes o reuel heir sruggle.150

For his video series alking o he aliban, journalis Graeme Smih conduced 42 videoinerviews wih aliban ghers. Mr. Smih concluded ha many kinds o negoiaions wihhe aliban have sprung up as he insurgens asser heir presence in he oulying disrics. Aidagencies and cell phone companies regularly negoiae sae passage o heir workers acrossaliban erriory.151

aliban Exorion o Oher Indusries

Te alibans principal and mos lucraive source o income in Aghanisan is is conrol o heopium rade. Te aliban have long proed o o he en percen ushrax levied on opiumarmers, an addiional ax on he rackers, and a per-kilogram ransi ari charged o he

ruckers who ranspor he produc.152

In recen years, however, hey have been aking a pagerom he warlords playbook, and regional and local aliban commanders have been demandingproecion money rom he drug rackers who smuggle goods hrough heir erriory.153 A2007 analysis by he Jamesown Foundaion described arrangemens whereby drug rackersprovide money, vehicles and subsisence o aliban unis in reurn or proecion. 154 In addiion,a even higher aliban command levels, senior leadership in Queta are paid regular insallmensrom narcoics kingpins as a general ee or operaing in aliban conrolled areas.155 Troughhese various orms o axaion and exorion, he aliban have been esimaed o earn nearly$300 million a year rom he opium rade.156

While cerainly he mos lucraive, opium is no he only illici business in Aghanisan andPakisan rom which he aliban exors paymens o und heir operaions. Troughou heNorhwes Fronier Province (NWFP) and Federally Adminisered ribal Areas (FAA) alongPakisans border wih Aghanisan, he aliban have reporedly esablished a symbioic ie wihgroups like he imber maa, or whom hey serve as he cavalry.157


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In Aghanisan, he alibans abiliy o consruc proecion schemes exends beyond ungoverned,unproeced, or illici indusries. Since 2008, hey have repeaedly exraced signican rensrom he counrys cell phone indusry. According o several cell phone company execuivesquoed in a recen Wall Sree Journal repor, cell phone operaors or heir conracors rouinelydisburse proecion money o aliban commanders.158 Tese paymens are in addiion o

money openly passed o local ribal elders o proec a cell-ower sie cash ha oen ends upin aliban pockes.159

In several provinces, including andahar, all o he naional cell phone carriers (some o whichare parly owned by major European companies) have made he join decision o abide by aaliban decree requiring hem o shu o service rom sun-down o sun-up. While he alibansban was iniially imposed o preven poenial inormans rom calling U.S. orces under heproecion o darkness in order o provide ips on aliban locaions, i appears o have evolvedino ye anoher orm o exorion.

Amir Zai Sangin, he Aghan Miniser o Communicaions, originally asked he companies oresis he alibans order. When he companies complied wih he governmens reques andkep mobile service on during he evening, 40 elecommunicaions owers were desroyed a acos o $400,000 each, and company employ

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