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Watergate Powerpoint

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What really hurts in matters of this sort is not the fact that they occur, because overzealous people in campaigns do things that are wrong. What really hurts is if you try to cover it up. -President Richard Nixon, August 29 th , 1972
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Page 1: Watergate Powerpoint

What really hurts in matters of this sort is not the fact that they occur, because overzealous people in campaigns do things that are wrong. What really hurts is if you try to cover it up.-President Richard Nixon, August

29th, 1972

Page 2: Watergate Powerpoint

Washington Post Investigations of Watergate

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A Timeline of Events

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Mark Felt “Deep Throat” (left) and Bob Woodward (right)

1970

Bob Woodward, a lieutenant in the US Navy, met Mark Felt

while delivering mail to the White House.

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March 1971

Committee to Re-Elect the President (CRP) formed. H. R. Haldeman, White House chief of staff, chose Jeb

Magruder and Hugh Sloan, his former aides, to be in charge of political and financial operations. Magruder was named Deputy Campaign Director and Sloan was named Treasurer.

Haldeman MagruderSloan

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August 16, 1971

A telephone was installed in the Executive Office Building under the name of Kathleen Chenow.

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April 7, 1972

Federal Campaign Expenditures Act went into effect. The act was intended to impose stricter

regulations for campaign donations and required that all expenses were accurately reported.

Herbert W. Kalmbach resigned as deputy finance chairman of CRP.

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April 11, 1972

Kenneth Dahlberg, midwest finance chairman of CRP, wrote a check for $25,000 out of money from the Nixon campaign. He gave the check to Maurice Stans, finance chairman of CRP. The check then ended up in the bank account of Bernard L. Barker, future burglar of the Watergate complex.

Maurice Stans

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Saturday, June 17, 1972

At 2:30 am, five men dressed in business suits and wearing Playtex gloves were arrested in the Watergate Complex in downtown Washington. The men had “a walkie-talkie, 40 rolls of

unexposed film, two 35-millimeter cameras, lock picks, pen-size tear gas guns, and bugging devices (All The President’s Men).”

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June 17, 1972

This is a copy of Woodward’s notes from the preliminary hearing for the 5 burglars. At the hearing it was revealed that one of the burglars, James McCord, had previously worked for the CIA. The other 4 burglars were all Cubans from Miami with CIA and anti-Castro ties.

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Sunday, June 18, 1972

The Washington Post published an article on the front page with the leading sentence; "Five men, one of whom said he is a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, were arrested at 2:30 a.m. yesterday in what authorities described as an elaborate plot to bug the offices of the Democratic National Committee here."

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June 19, 1972

Bernstein's day off. Woodward called Howard Hunt and asked why his name was in the address book of two of the Watergate burglars.

Hunt responded "good god" and hung up the phone.

Woodward then learned that Hunt worked for the CIA from 1949 to 1970. Deep Throat told Woodward that Hunt was a primary suspect for the break-in for other reasons as well.

Howard Hunt

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June 22, 1972

President Nixon made his first public comment "The White House has no involvement whatever in this particular incident."

Richard Nixon

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June 23rd, 1972

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June 28, 1972

In a meeting with John Ehrlichman (assistant to the president for domestic affairs) and John Dean (counsel to the president), L. Patrick Gray (acting director of the FBI) was told that files from the FBI’s investigation of Watergate were "political dynamite" and should "never see the light of day.” The files “could do more damage than the Watergate bugging itself." Gray was told to destroy the files and he did so in December 1972.

John DeanJohn Ehrlichman

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July 1, 1972

John Mitchell resigned as manager of the Nixon campaign. He claimed that his wife wanted him to quit.

John Mitchell

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July 31, 1972

Bernstein went to Miami to trace the burglars. He found the $25,000 check in Bernard Barker's account payable to Kenneth H. Dahlberg.

These are Woodward’s notes from his conversation with Dahlberg.

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August 1, 1972

Washington Post published a story claiming that Maurice Stans, Nixon's chief fundraiser, received a $25,000 check on a golf course. The check then went into the bank account of Bernard Barker, one of the burglars. This article was significant because it was the first to tie the Watergate break in directly to Nixon's campaign money.

Maurice Stans

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August 22, 1972 The Washington Post reported that CRP "had mishandled more

than $500,000 in campaign funds- including at least $100,000 maintained in an apparently illegal 'security fund.’”

Nixon was nominated as Republican party candidate for the 1972 election.

US District Court Judge Charles R. Richey reversed a previous ruling and thus ensured that statements given to the grand jury by John Mitchell and Maurice Stans would not be made public before the election. He then called Bernstein, unsolicited, to suspiciously assure him that no one from CRP threatened him to change his ruling.

John Mitchell Maurice Stans

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August 29, 1972 President Nixon held a press conference at his home in

California. "With regard to the matter of the handling of campaign funds,

we have a new law here in which technical violations have occurred and are occurring, apparently on both sides.”

When asked what the Democrat’s violations were, Nixon responded "I think that will come out in the balance of this week. I will let the political people talk about that, but I understand that there have been violations on both sides."

He then said "I can say categorically that this investigation indicates that no one on the White House staff, no one in this administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident. What really hurts in matters of this sort is not the fact that they occur, because overzealous people in campaigns do things that are wrong. What really hurts is if you try to cover it up.”

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September 11, 1972

The Washington Post ran a story about the participation of an unknown former FBI agent (later determined to be Alfred C. Baldwin III) in Watergate. The agent supposedly had reports of 3 weeks of wire tapping.

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September 14, 1972

Bernstein first visited a CRP bookkeeper and learned that Maurice Stans had a secret safe that contained illegal cash donations to the Nixon campaign. Money from the safe funded the Watergate burglary.

He also learned that Gordon Liddy (finance counsel at CRP) as well as John Mitchell's assistants received money.

Maurice Stans Gordon Liddy

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September 15, 1972

The grand jury indictments came out. In a suspiciously narrow report, only Howard Hunt, Gordon Liddy, and the 5 burglars were indicted and only because of "conspiracy, burglary and the federal wiretapping statute".

The indictments never even mentioned the trail of illegal campaign donations.

Howard Hunt Gordon Liddy

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September 17, 1972

After confirming the bookkeeper's remarks with Deep Throat, the Washington Post reported that "Funds for the Watergate espionage operation were controlled by several principle assistants of John N. Mitchell, the former manager of President Nixon's campaign, and were kept in a special account at the Committee for the Re-election of the President."

That night, both Woodward and Bernstein revisited the bookkeeper to confirm the CRP officials’ names using initials.

John Mitchell

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September 18, 1972 Bernstein visited Hugh Sloan and confirmed the

information he received from the bookkeeper. Of all the sources they interviewed, Woodward and

Bernstein established a special connection with Sloan and felt particularly bad when interviewing him because he was so young and honest.

Sloan once said “I was I was in your place, wish I could write. Maybe then I could express what is going through my mind. Not the cold, hard facts of Watergate necessarily- that wasn’t really what was important. But what it was like for young men and women to come to Washington because they believed in something and then to be inside and see how things worked and watch their own ideals disintegrate.”

“People in the White House believe they are entitled to do things differently, to suspend rules, because they were fulfilling a mission; that was the only important thing, the mission. It was easy to lose perspective. I’ve seen it happen. My wife and I want to get out of Washington before we lose ours.”

Hugh Sloan

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September 20, 1972 Washington Post published an article claiming that Robert

Mardian (political coordinator of CRP) and Fred LaRue (deputy director of CRP) were hired by CRP to facilitate the destruction of documents after Watergate.

After Watergate, Mardian and LaRue advised employees to "stay away from certain areas," "don't talk," "hold ranks,” and "keep the ship together." Employees who had damaging information were promoted.

The article also claimed that Robert Odle (director of administration and personnel at CRP) secretly removed and destroyed records.

When asked for a comment about the article, Van Shumway (director of public affairs at CRP) responded that "the sources of the Washington Post are a fountain of misinformation." Mardian responded that it was "the biggest load of crap I have ever heard in my life."

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September 21, 1972

Woodward flew to New York to get information from Mrs. Mitchell. She refused to talk and it was a wasted trip.

Nonetheless, the trip is important because it demonstrates the lengths to which Woodward and Bernstein would go to obtain information.

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September 25, 1972

Over a drink at her apartment, Ken Clawson (deputy director of communications at the White House) told Marilyn Berger, a Post reporter and friend, that he wrote the Canuck Letter.

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September 28, 1972

Bernstein received a call from a government lawyer who had a friend named Alex Shipley who had been asked to work for the Nixon campaign. According to the lawyer, Shipley had been asked to disrupt Democratic campaigns.

This call marked the first moment the reporters heard about the “dirty tricks” campaign.

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September 29, 1972

Bernstein interviewed Alex Shipley over the phone and learned about dirty tricks. These are his notes.

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September 29, 1972

That night, Bernstein and Woodward visited Hugh Sloan again. They learned that 5 men had the authority to hand out money from Stans's bank fund. John Mitchell, Maurice Stans and Jeb Magruder were 3 of those 5.

Sloan conceded that neither of the other two worked for the committee. One of them worked for the White House The other was not a Washingtonian (he did not work for CRP or the White House.)

Stans also revealed that Bart Porter, Gordon Liddy and Jeb Magruder received the largest amounts of money.

Hugh Sloan

John Mitchell Maurice Stans

Jeb Magruder

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September 30, 1972 The Washington Post published an article revealing that Mitchell,

Stans and Magruder had control of the secret fund. CRP's comment was "I think your sources are bad; they're providing

misinformation. We're not going to comment beyond that." When Bernstein called Mitchell for a comment, Mitchell kept

repeating "Jeeeeeeeeeesus.” He also said in a threatening tone "did the committee tell you to go ahead and publish that story? We're going to do a story on all of you."

Bernstein was scared and noted in All the President’s Men that "once the election was over, they could do almost anything they damn well pleased. And get away with it."

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October 4, 1972

The Los Angeles Times ran a story on Alfred C. Baldwin III (the former FBI agent) and his involvement in Watergate. He gave a thrilling 1st person account of the break in, the buggings, and Hunt's panic when the men were arrested.

The story was a major breakthrough that the Washington Post missed.

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October 6, 1972

The Washington Post ran a story claiming that Alfred Baldwin named Robert Odle and William E. Timmons as men who had seen the wiretap memos. The story also revealed that Baldwin had named Glenn Sedamn when shown a list of other possible suspects.

Ironically, neither the White House nor CRP denied the story. This was ironic because this was one of the few Post stories that turned out to be incorrect and also one of the few that the White House did not deny.

The article turned out to contain false allegations and the three men faced problems in finding a job for the rest of their lives. The publication of this story is evidence that Woodward and Bernstein made a few critical mistakes in their reporting.

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October 7, 1972

Bernstein interviewed a Justice department official who tied Donald Segretti with "ratfucking." The official reported that "basic strategy goes all the way to the top.“

In All the President’s Men, Bernstein notes that “The phrase unnerved him. For the first time, he considered the possibility that the President of the United States was the head ratfucker."

Donald Segretti

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October 8, 1972

Woodward meets with Deep Throat who says “everyone was tied in."

There were 4 basic personnel groupings: The November Group coordinated CRP advertising, The Convention Group handled intelligence gathering and sabotage of Democrats and other Republican contenders, The Primary Group did so for primaries, and the Howard Hunt Group did "really heavy operations."

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October 9, 1972

Marilyn Berger casually mentioned at the Post water cooler that Ken Clawson told her he wrote the Canuck Letter. She was immediately required to file a memo of the conversation and then to call Clawson and ask to meet. At 1:00, they met for lunch and Clawson denied having ever made the statement.

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October 10, 1972 The Post ran the headline "FBI Finds Nixon Aides

Sabotaged Democrats." The story reported that Watergate was the result of a long campaign of sabotage directed by the White House and CRP. It was all part of a campaign to re-elect Nixon made possible because of a a fund of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The article then went on to list examples of the "dirty tricks." It also named Clawson as the author of the Canuck Letter and published the Don Segretti findings.

CRP's non denial response was "The Post story is not only fiction but a collection of absurdities."

That afternoon, Ron Ziegler held a White House press conference. He refused to discuss the Post story 29 times.

Also that afternoon, executive editor of the Post, Ben Bradlee met with Woodward and Bernstein over lunch to ensure that their sources are solid.

Finally, Bernstein met with Muskie who related the mysterious troubles of his campaign. For example, Muskie had to hire a lawyer because his children were being followed.

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October 11, 1972

Despite Woodward's protestations, the Post ran the headline "Democrats Step Up Sabotage Charges" based on testimony from Frank Mankiewicz from the McGovern campaign. The article blamed CRP for a series of mishaps in the McGovern campaign.

It was an unwise publication because the White House would later argue that McGovern and the Post were conspiring to blacken Nixon's reputation in the days leading up to the election.

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October 14, 1972

The Post published the story "Key Nixon Aide Named as Sabotage Contact." This story connected Dwight Chapin (deputy assistant to the president) with Don Segretti.

In All the President’s Men, the reporters note that after “almost 4 months after the break-in at Democratic headquarters, the spreading stain of Watergate had finally seeped into the White House."

Dwight Chapin

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October 15, 1972

The Washington Post published the story "Lawyer for Nixon Said to Have Used GOP's spy fund." Based on evidence from a Time article, a Justice Department official, and Hugh Sloan, the article established a connection between Herbert Kalmbach and the "special projects fund."

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October 16, 1972

Bob Dole connected George McGovern and the Post in "unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations" or "mud slinging."

That afternoon, Clark MacGregor scheduled a press conference. He refused to answer questions but again tied McGovern and the Post together.

Ben Bradlee drafted a response to the White House counterattacks and pointed out that while administration officials denounced the reporting, “the facts are on the record, unchallenged by contrary evidence."

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October 18, 1972

The New York Times published Don Segretti's phone records. It thus provided evidence of calls between Segretti and the White House as well as calls between Segretti and Dwight Chapin's home.

That afternoon, Ron Ziegler issued a statement. "I will repeat again today that no one presently employed at the White House had any involvement, awareness, or association with the Watergate case."

Ron Ziegler

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October 19, 1972

Woodward met with his source Deep Throat in a deserted parking garage in downtown Washington. In order to schedule a meeting with Deep Throat, Woodward would move a flowerpot with a red flag in it from one end of his deck to the other. If Deep Throat wanted a meeting, he would circle page 20 of Woodward’s New York Times and draw a clock indicating the time of day.

On this particular day, Deep Throat did not show up and Woodward waited for hours in the pitch black garage, panicking that Deep Throat had been discovered. It turned out that Deep Throat did not see the flowerpot.

This moment was important because it demonstrates that Woodward and Bernstein believed they were being followed and their lives were possibly in danger.

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October 20, 1972

Woodward met with Deep Throat. The reporters believed that H.R. Haldeman was the 5th controller of the secret fund. Deep Throat semi-confirmed this Haldeman connection.

However, it was clear that Deep Throat was scared of Haldeman which was very unusual.

Haldeman

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October 23, 1972

Woodward and Bernstein visited Hugh Sloan again and confirmed that Haldeman was the 5th controller of the secret fund. Bernstein confirmed it with 2 FBI agents.

Hugh Sloan

Haldeman

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October 24, 1972

Woodward and Bernstein wrote and edited the Haldeman story.

Because Haldeman was so important in the Nixon administration, the editors asked for a 4th source.

Bernstein called a lawyer in the Justice Department. He asked the lawyer hang up to warn the reporters off the story or to stay on the line until Bernstein counted to 10 if they could go ahead with it. The man said “hang up right?” Bernstein counted to 10 and the man stayed on the phone. Bernstein believed it was a confirmation.

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From left to right: Katherine Graham, Bernstein, Woodward, Simmons and Bradlee

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October 25, 1972

The Washington Post published a story claiming that Hugh Sloan named Haldeman before the grand jury as the 5th person in charge of the secret fund.

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October 26, 1972 Woodward and Bernstein were called into Bradlee’s office to see on TV that

Hugh Sloan gave a deposition. Sloan was then asked about the Post's report of his grand jury testimony. His lawyer answered " Mr. Sloan did not implicate Mr. Haldeman in that testimony at all.“

The reporters were shocked and realized they must have made a grave mistake.

Ron Ziegler then held a 30 minute press conference denouncing the Washington Post and Ben Bradlee for hating Nixon and using hearsay.

That night, Woodward met with Deep Throat who was very angry. Deep Throat said "when you move on somebody like Haldeman, you've got to be sure you're on the most solid ground. Shit, what a royal screw-up... [This story] is the worst possible setback. You've got people feeling sorry for Haldeman. I didn't think that was possible. A conspiracy like this... a conspiracy investigation... the rope has to tighten slowly around everyone's neck. You build convincingly from the outer edges in, you get ten times the evidence you need against the Hunts and Liddys. They feel hopelessly finished- they may not talk right away, but the grip is on them. Then you move up and do the same thing at the next level. If you shoot too high and miss, then everyone feels more secure... You've put the investigation back months. It puts everyone on the defensive."

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October 27, 1972

George McGovern claimed on Meet the Press that the Post reporters were respectable and that their facts were correct. This was a further embarrassment for Woodward and Bernstein who knew that their facts were incorrect.

That evening, Vice President Spiro Agnew attacked the Post as "journalistically reprehensible" on ABC's Issues and Answers.

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November 5, 1972

Charles Colson, special counsel to the president, told a Washington Star reporter that “as soon as the election is behind us, we're going to really shove it to the Post. All the details haven't been worked out yet, but the basic decisions have been made- at a meeting with the President."

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November 7, 1972

President Nixon re-elected.

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November 11, 1972

Bernstein flew to Los Angeles to talk to Don Segretti. Segretti was very young, naïve, and genuinely upset that everyone hated him and the White House was blaming him for all of the "dirty tricks." Bernstein stayed for 5 days trying to get Segretti to go on the record but Segretti refused.

Don Segretti

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November 14, 1972 Charles Colson gave a speech saying "If Ben Bradlee

ever left the Georgetown cocktail circuit, where he and his pals dine on third hand information and gossip and rumor, he might discover out here the real America. And he might learn that all truth and all knowledge and all superior wisdom doesn't just emanate exclusively from that small little clique in Georgetown and that the rest of the country isn't just sitting out here waiting to be told what they're supposed to think."

This was the one of many “elitist liberal” attacks in a campaign to alienate the Post from average American readers.

Charles Colson

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November 26, 1972 On a tip-off, Bernstein and Woodward visited

someone they believed was on the grand jury for Watergate. After 10 minutes, they realized they were misinformed but the visit sparked the idea of finding the list of real grand jury members and trying to get them to talk. Talking would be illegal for the jury members but technically not for the reporters.

That afternoon, Bernstein called the chief prosecutor Earl Silbert and asked for a list of the 23 grand jury members. Silbert refused.

So Woodward went to the courthouse and spent hours memorizing 5 names at a time, then rushing to the bathroom and secretly copying them down.

Earl Silbert

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December 2, 1972

Woodward and Bernstein worked separately over the weekend. They each called grand jury members and tried to get them to talk by simply asking them about Watergate. No one would.

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December 3, 1972

Bradlee called the reporters into his office because one of the grand jurors told the prosecutors that a Washington Post reporter had called. The prosecutors took the complaint to the Judge John Sirica. The two were ordered to stop the grand jury interview attempts and await further notice from the judge.

Judge John Sirica

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December 6, 1972

Kathleen Chenow, in whose name the Executive Office telephone was ordered, was discovered to be a secretary for the “Plumbers.”

When contacted, she named Howard Hunt, Gordon Liddy, David Young, and Egil (Bud) Krogh as the Plumbers.

The job of the Plumbers was to investigate leaks to the media and report to John Ehrlichman.

Chenow claimed the phone was in her name because "they apparently wanted it in my name because they didn't want any ties with the White House- for what reason I don't know."

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December 7, 1972

Bernstein wrote a story on the secret phone and on Chenow's report of the Plumbers.

That afternoon, he and Woodward flew to Los Angeles, hoping to talk again to Don Segretti.

After meeting with Segretti on the 11th and learning nothing, the reporters returned to Washington.

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December 19, 1972 In response to the grand jury attempted interviews,

Judge Sirica ordered Bernstein and Woodward to his courtroom for punishment. Without naming them, Sirica told a room full of reporters that some among them had committed a "potentially contemptuous offense.” The reporters were relieved that they were not named and escaped quickly while other reporters speculated as to the identity of the unnamed offenders.

Judge John Sirica

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December 21, 1972

While visiting Earl Silbert, the prosecutor, Woodward noticed a letterhead for the Watkins Johnson Company of Rockville, Maryland on Silbert's desk. He remembered that the company was connected with Watergate burglar James McCord.

Earl Silbert

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December 22, 1972

Woodward called the Watkins Johnson company and discovered that McCord ordered the Watergate bugging equipment and paid with 35 $100 dollar bills.

James McCord

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December 23, 1972

Woodward's McCord-Watkins Johnson article ran on the inside of the newspaper.

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December 25, 1972

Woodward and Bernstein got called back into Silbert's office. They were in trouble for having seen the letterhead on Silbert's desk and followed up on it.

This, along with Judge Sirica’s admonitions, is further evidence that Woodward and Bernstein repeatedly got in trouble for the forwardness and sometimes pushiness of their investigation.

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January 8, 1973

Opening day of the trial for the 7 indicted. Judge Sirica's stated that he wanted to

question the following questions: "What did these men go into that headquarters

for? Was their sole purpose political espionage? Were they paid? Was there financial gain? Who hired them? Who started this?"

Judge John Sirica

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January 11, 1973

Senator Sam Ervin was assigned to preside over an investigation of Watergate and the 1972 presidential campaign.

Sam Ervin

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January 12, 1973

After the trial, Bernstein followed Henry Rothblatt, the attorney for the 4 Miami burglars. As he and his clients jumped in a taxi to the airport, Bernstein chased after them. Bernstein flew with them back to Miami in order to get more information.

Bernstein learned that Howard Hunt, who had changed his plea to guilty on opening day, was pressuring the men to change their pleas to guilty as well.

Howard Hunt

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January 15, 1973

Based on Bernstein’s interview with the Miami men, The Washington Post ran a story on Hunt's attempts to change the innocent pleas of the burglars to guilty.

In court the same morning, the Miami men fired Rothblatt (who wouldn't allow them to change their pleas) and then changed their pleas to guilty.

After essentially refusing to answer any questions, or responding "I don't know", the Miami men went to jail.

That afternoon, Woodward met with Katherine Graham to go over sources.

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January 24, 1973

In court, the CRP witnesses testified: Jeb Magruder, Bart Porter, Rob Odle, and Hugh Sloan.

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January 24, 1973

Woodward met with Deep Throat who told him "What obviously makes this a Mitchell-Colson operation is the hiring of Liddy and Hunt. That's the key. Mitchell and Colson were their sponsors."

Bernstein then wrote a story saying that Mitchell and Colson were guilty but escaped indictment because they were "insulated" and because the scope of the trial was way too narrow.

Woodward objected to the story on the grounds of lack of proof so it was not published. This is evidence of the care with which each story was written and checked. If one of the reporters objected to it, the story was not published.

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January 25, 1973

Senator Sam Ervin requested a meeting with Woodward and Bernstein.

He essentially asked them what they knew and which sources they could reveal.

Ervin then explained his plan to interview Presidential aides and challenge executive privilege.

Sam Ervin

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February 5, 1973

Senator Ervin introduced a resolution to allocate $500,000 and create a Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.

Two days later, Ervin's bill passed 77-0.

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February 10, 1973

The Washington Post published a story detailing how Howard Hunt was hired to investigate Edward Kennedy's life (and particularly Chappaquiddick) because the Nixon administration was worried about a potential Kennedy presidency.

A book Howard Hunt checked out from the White House library

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February 12, 1973

The Washington Post reported that Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy received information from wiretaps sent to them by David Young, another Plumber.

Gordon LiddyHoward Hunt

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February 26, 1973

Time published a story with a detailed account of CRP's attempt to stop press leaks.

The same day, CRP issues subpoenas for 5 Post employees: Bernstein, Woodward, Jim Mann, Howard Simmons, and Katherine Graham.

Graham agreed to go to jail if necessary.

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February 28, 1793

In a strange move, President Nixon nominated acting director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray, to become officially the director. The Senate hearings for this confirmation had the potential to re-open the Watergate scandal.

On this day, the confirmation hearings began. Gray told the Senate that investigation files on Watergate were turned over to Jean Dean who then probably showed them to Don Segretti. This information was shocking!

Gray's testimony was a huge vindication for the Post because it tied the White House to Watergate, a tie that had long been denied.

John Dean

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March, 2 1973

For the first time, Nixon claimed executive privilege. He announced that despite Gray’s mention of the Dean connection, Dean would not testify at the Gray confirmation hearing.

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March 21, 1973 CRP's subpoenas of the Post reporters' information

are thrown out of court. It was later revealed by an associate of John Dean

that on this day, John Dean went in and told the President about Watergate. He explained that he, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman were going to have to reveal everything and resign. Dean listed all those guilty and told the President that the three would have to take the blame and tell everyone that the President had known nothing about any of it. The president then told Dean to take a vacation to Camp David. When he got back a few days later, the German shepherds (Haldeman and Ehrlichman) had convinced the president to sacrifice Dean. In doing so, the President had been convinced he would save himself, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

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March 23, 1973

James McCord, one of the Watergate burglars, sent a letter to Judge Sirica saying essentially that "political pressure had been applied to the defendants to plead guilty and remain silent. Perjury had occurred during the trial. Others involved in Watergate were not identified in testimony.“

This was a huge deal!

James McCord Judge Sirica

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March 25, 1973 Senator Samuel Dash called a press conference.

He stated that McCord "named names" and began to "supply a full and honest account" of Watergate.

The same day, The Los Angeles Times reported that McCord named Jeb Magruder and John Dean as among those who knew about Watergate ahead of time. The news about Dean was huge because Nixon had appointed Dean to investigate Watergate.

Jeb Magruder John Dean

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March 26, 1973

Ron Ziegler, press secretary, gave a statement announcing that President Nixon had called John Dean and declared his 'absolute and total confidence' in him.

Ron Ziegler

Page 83: Watergate Powerpoint

March 29, 1973

The previous day, James McCord had given testimony to the 7 senators of the Senate Watergate committee.

After hearing reports of that from 2 senators and a staff member, the Washington Post reported that McCord made a number of convincing hearsay accusations, claiming that Liddy, Mitchell and Colson knew about Watergate ahead of time.

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April 9, 1973

The New York Times reported that James McCord testified that CRP funds were used to pay off Watergate burglars.

According to McCord, Stans's secret fund had not disappeared after Watergate but had instead gone to pay the burglars to not talk.

Woodward then called a CRP official and confirmed that Fred LaRue paid the burglars not to talk. Thus the fund was used for the Watergate bugging itself and also for the cover-up.

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April 16, 1973

Claiming an emergency, Woodward called Deep Throat from a phone booth and then waited an hour in the booth for Deep Throat to call him back.

Deep Throat told Woodward that John Dean and H.R. Haldeman would resign because it was too risky for the president to continue protecting them.

John DeanH.R. Haldeman

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April 17, 1973

President Nixon called a press conference. He announced that "he would suspend 'any person in the Executive Branch or in government' who was indicted in the case."

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April 19, 1973

The previous day, a CRP official met with Woodward, telling him that "Magruder is your next McCord. He went to the prosecutors last Saturday (April 14th) and tucked it to Dean and Mitchell."

So the Washington Post ran a story that Mitchell and Dean were guilty of planning Watergate and "buying the silence" of the burglars.

That day, a friend of Deans told Bernstein that Dean believed he was the scapegoat, being sacrificed to save Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

A White House official reported that in the White House "old loyalties shattered, little work getting done, confusion about who on the staff might be indicted, who ordered what and who ordered whom, who would resign and who would be saved. 'It's every man for himself- get a lawyer and blame everyone else.'"

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April 29, 1973

The Washington Post published an article claming that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were involved in the cover-up of Watergate.

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April 30, 1973

H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman resigned! Kleindienst also resigned and John Dean was fired.

At 9pm that evening, the President addressed the nation. He acknowledges the resignations and claimed he was taking responsibility for everything.

Ehrlichman Haldeman Dean

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April 31, 1973

A UPI wire story reported "White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler publicly apologized today to the Washington Post and two of its reporters for his earlier criticism of their investigative reporting of the Watergate conspiracy... I would apologize to the Post, and I would apologize to Mr. Woodward and Mr. Bernstein."

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May 14, 1973

New acting FBI director William D. Ruckelshaus announced that 17 wiretaps had been ordered between 1969 and 1971.

Woodward called Dr. Kissinger to see if Kissinger ordered the wiretaps. After the conversation, during which Kissinger said he "almost never" ordered wiretaps, Kissinger asked to be put on background. Woodward refused.

Kissinger was not pleased.Dr. Kissinger

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May 16, 1973 Woodward met with Deep Throat. When he arrived back home, he called Bernstein and told him to

come over. When Bernstein arrived, Woodward shut the curtains and put on a Rachmaninoff piano concerto.

He then typed "everyone's life is in danger" on his typewriter. "Deep Throat says that electronic surveillance is going on and we had better watch it."

He then went on to type that the President had threatened John Dean not to reveal undercover information. Also, apparently Howard Hunt blackmailed the President in order to get more money.

At 2am, the two reporters drove to Ben Bradlee's house. They talked until 4am in his front yard to avoid surveillance.

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May 17, 1973

Senate hearings began.

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June 3, 1973

On May 5, 1973, Newsweek reported that Dean was going to implicate Nixon based on two events-a meeting in September 1972 and one in December 1972- that led him to believe Nixon knew about Watergate.

This predication came true.

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July 13, 1973

Woodward persuades the Senate committee to interview Alexander Butterfield, in charge of “internal security” at the White House.

Butterfield testified as to the existence of a tape system in the White House.

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July 14, 1973

After hearing about the tapes, Woodward called Ben Bradlee and asked if he should write a story on them. Bradlee responded that he thought the story was a “b-plus” and not to worry too much about it.

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August 14, 1973

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October 21, 1973

Nixon fired the special Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox because he Cox was threatening to prosecute the president himself.

Then Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his deputy William Ruckelhaus resigned.

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November 21, 1973

Deep Throat had told Woodward that there were gaps in the tape “of a suspicious nature” which “could lead someone to conclude that the tapes have been tampered with.”

On this particular day, Ziegler called Bernstein to tell him there was an 18.5 minute gap in one of the tapes.

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December 28, 1973

The Washington Post published a story claiming that Operation Candor, the President’s methods to protect himself, had been abandoned.

Another story reported that the President was providing lawyers for Haldeman and Ehrlichman. In fact, Nixon remained very close to his two advisors despite Kissinger’s pleas for him to abandon them.

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January 30, 1974

At his State of the Union address, President Nixon announced “One year of Watergate is enough.”

He went on to say “I want you to know that I have no intention whatever of ever walking away from the job that the American people elected me to do for the people of the United States.”

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March 1, 1974

Grand jury charged Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Mitchell, Strachan, Mardian and Kenneth Parkinson with “conspiracy to obstruct justice.”

A week later, Ehrlichman, Colson, Liddy, Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez were charged with “conspiracy” to burglarize Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office.

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May 24, 1974

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July 14th, 1974

July 14, 1974

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August 8, 1974

This is a fan letter addressed to Woodward and Bernstein.

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August 8, 1974

This is a thank you note from publisher Katherine Graham to Woodward and Bernstein for their persistence, patience and quality reporting.


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