WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE LAV III LIFE … · C6 of the LAV III. Results According to the...

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE LAV III LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM CAEn WARGAME NICKEL TIGER P. Dobias LFORT K. Sprague LFORT S. Bassindale LFORT D. Sinclair Ajilon J. Demaine Ajilon

Defence R&D CanadaCentre for Operational Research and Analysis

Land Forces Operational Research Team

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038September 2009

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE LAV III LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM CAEn WARGAME NICKEL TIGER

P. Dobias LFORT

K. Sprague LFORT

S. Bassindale LFORT

D. Sinclair Ajilon

J. Demaine Ajilon

DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

September 2009

Authors

Original signed by

Dr. Peter Dobias & Dr. Kevin Sprague

Approved by

Original signed by

Dr. Dean Haslip

Section Head, Land and Operational Command OR

Approved for release by

Original signed by

Mr. Dale Reding

Chief Scientist DRDC CORA

The information contained herein has been derived and determined through best practice and adherence to the highest levels of ethical, scientific and engineering investigative principles. The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed therein, remain those of the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official opinion or position of DND or the Government of Canada.

© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2009

© Sa Majesté la Reine, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2009

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038 i

Abstract

The Chief of Staff Land Strategy requested that an operational research (OR) study be conducted to assess the effectiveness of a light remote weapon station (RWS) mounted on a LAV III, in comparison to the current two-man Delco turret. The Land Forces Operational Research Team (LFORT) consequently performed a wargame study to compare the effectiveness of various weapon configurations for the RWS on LAV III vehicles in addition to the currently used 25 mm cannon (baseline). The assessment was based on a series of modeled scenarios whereby the vehicles performed convoy protection and patrol operations in complex urban and open terrains during daylight conditions. The chosen locale allowed for ambush and chance encounters with insurgent forces to occur. The study was denoted as NICKEL TIGER. The BLUE force consisted of either a LAV Platoon or Company and in some cases involved BLUE dismounts. The RED force consisted of dismounts having machine guns or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at their disposal, in addition to soft-skinned vehicles and light armoured vehicles having either a medium machine gun (MMG) or a 30mm cannon as the main weapon. In the study, the following weapon options were considered for the RWS: a notional 25 mm low velocity (LV) cannon, a 40 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL), a .50 calibre heavy machine gun (HMG), a 20 mm cannon, a 7.62 mm C6 machine gun, and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The wargame results indicate that the current weapon/turret configuration for the LAV III is the best option overall. The performances of the 25 mm LV cannon and 40 mm AGL were comparable to the baseline option in the open terrain scenarios, but they proved less lethal in the urban scenarios, in part due to their lack of penetrability of structures that were providing cover for dismounted insurgents. The .50 calibre performance was comparable to the baseline option in the urban scenarios, but was not as effective in the open terrain scenarios. The 20 mm cannon was evaluated as an excursion in a single, open terrain scenario. In that scenario, its overall performance was similar to that of the .50 calibre HMG (beneath baseline, LV 25mm and 40mm AGL options).

ii DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

Résumé Le Chef d’état-major – Stratégie terrestre a demandé qu’une recherche opérationnelle (RO) soit effectuée pour évaluer l’efficacité d’un système d’arme télécommandé (SAT) léger monté sur un VBL III, en comparaison à la tourelle Delco à deux actuelle. L’équipe de recherche opérationnelle des forces terrestres (EROFT) a par conséquent effectué une étude de jeux de guerre en vue de comparer l’efficacité de diverses configurations d’armes pour le SAT sur les véhicules VBL III en plus des canons de 25 mm (de référence) actuellement en utilisation. L’évaluation était basée sur une série de scénarios modélisés où des véhicules effectuaient de jour des opérations de protection de convoi et de patrouille sur des terrains urbains et découverts complexes. L’emplacement choisi permettait des embuscades et des rencontres aléatoires avec des rebelles. L’étude était appelée NICKEL TIGER. L’équipe des BLEUS était composée d’un peloton ou d’une compagnie de VBL et, dans certains cas, comportait des BLEUS à pied. L’équipe des ROUGES était composée de soldats à pied ayant à leur disposition des mitrailleuses ou des grenades propulsées par fusée (GPF), en plus de véhicules non blindés et de véhicules blindés légers avec mitrailleuse moyenne (MM) ou un canon de 30 mm comme arme principale. Dans l’étude, on a tenu compte des options d’armes suivantes pour le SAT : canon de 25 mm faible vitesse (FV), lance-grenades automatique (LGA) de 40 mm, mitrailleuse lourde (ML) de calibre .50, canon de 20 mm, mitrailleuse C6 de 7.62 mm et missiles guidés antichar (MGA). Les résultats des jeux de guerre indiquent que la configuration arme/tourelle actuelle pour le VBL III est la meilleure option globale. Les rendements du canon FV de 25 mm et du LGA de 40 mm étaient comparables à l’option de référence dans les scénarios en terrain découvert, mais ils étaient moins mortels dans les scénarios urbains, en partie à cause de leur manque de pénétrabilité des structures qui protègent les rebelles à pied. Le rendement du calibre .50 était comparable à l’option de référence dans les scénarios urbains, mais n’était pas aussi efficace dans les scénarios en terrain découvert. Le canon de 20 mm a été évalué dans une excursion dans un seul scénario en terrain découvert. Dans ce scénario, son rendement global était semblable à celui de la ML de calibre .50 (sous les options de référence, de FV de 25 mm et du LGA de 40 mm).

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038 iii

Executive summary Introduction

The NICKEL TIGER study was conducted by the Land Forces Operational Research Team (LFORT) at the request of the Chief of Staff Land Strategy to assess how well LAV III vehicles mounted with a light remote weapon station (RWS) could fulfill their combat roles, relative to the current configuration for the vehicles consisting of a two-man Delco turret fitted with a 25 mm stabilized cannon and two C6 machine guns (baseline). LFORT carried out a wargame to test and compare the effectiveness of various weapon configurations for the RWS mounted on LAV III vehicles in addition to the currently used baseline. The assessment was based on three scenarios consisting of the following:

• Scenario 1: Convoy ambush in urban terrain;

• Scenario 2: Combat patrol in urban terrain (open market square);

• Scenario 3: Combat patrol in open terrain.

The BLUE force consisted of a mounted Infantry Platoon in Scenarios 1 and 2 and a Company in Scenario 3. In Scenario 1, the RED force consisted of dismounts having machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at their disposal. Weapons fire exchanges typically occurred at close ranges (25 m – 200 m). Scenario 2 was gamed both with and without BLUE dismounts. Also in Scenario 2, RED dismounts were supported by soft-skinned vehicles and light armoured vehicles having either a medium machine gun (MMG) or a 30 mm cannon as the main weapon. Ranges of engagement were medium (400 m to 800 m). Furthermore, civilians occupied the two urban scenarios (1 and 2) so as to make targeting more realistic in that the gunner could not assume that every detection was an enemy and therefore could be fired upon. The civilians typically ran for cover at the onset of the weapons fire exchanges. Scenario 3 featured BLUE armoured vehicles against a variety of RED vehicles at long ranges (up to 2000 m, but averaging near 1000 m) in the absence of dismounts and civilians.

In the study, the following primary weapon options were considered for the RWS:

• 40 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL);

• .50 calibre heavy machine gun (HMG);

• 20 mm cannon;

• 7.62 mm C6 machine gun (MG);

• Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs);

• 25 mm low velocity (LV) cannon.

Differences in situational awareness capability between the baseline LAV III and those fitted with an RWS were quantified by equipping the RWS variants with inferior sensing capability in comparison to that of the baseline, reflecting the notion that viewing arcs for an RWS configuration without an enhanced sensor capability would be restricted in comparison to that of the two-man turret configuration. Also, the LAV III was modeled as being in a ‘hatches down’ configuration as it was not possible to represent an exposed crew commander that

iv DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

could be killed by small arms fire or shrapnel, nor was it possible to model the pintle-mounted C6 of the LAV III.

Results

According to the quantitative results of the three scenarios gamed and also the judgement and insights of the wargame interactors, the current weapon and turret configuration of the LAV III fighting vehicle is the most robust choice overall in comparison to the other options gamed. However, in most cases the differences in performance between leading and near-leading options, although statistically significant, were not profound. Several RWS options were comparable to the baseline in some of the scenarios, most notably when fitted with either an LV 25 mm cannon or 40 mm AGL in more open terrain (Scenarios 2 and 3), and to a lesser extent the .50 cal HMG in close urban combat (Scenario 1). None of the alternative options scored consistently high in all three scenarios. Note that the 20 mm cannon cannot enter into the overall evaluation since it was only present as an excursion in Scenario 3 (where it ranked second). The LV 25 mm cannon, although a strong contender in Scenarios 2 and 3, performed poorly in the close-action urban environment of Scenario 1. This seemed to be related to the insufficient anti-structure capability of the modeled airburst ammunition utilized for this weapon system which made it difficult to kill insurgents using walls or other structures as cover. Coupled with the fact that the .50 cal HMG was mid- or bottom-ranked in the open terrain scenarios when fighting armoured vehicles, and setting all scenarios as equally important, the wargame results indicate that the best alternative to the current 25mm / C6 weapon system is the 40 mm AGL / C6. This weapon system was top-ranked in Scenarios 2 and 3 alongside the LV 25 mm / C6 option, and ranked third in Scenario 1 above the LV 25 mm / C6 option. AGL use in Scenario 1 had distinctive benefits and drawbacks. On the positive side, 40 mm airburst rounds were lobbed over structures and made to effectively impact hidden, dismounted enemies behind walls or on rooftops. On the negative side, the close-action combat of Scenario 1 was impeded by the arming distance of the 40 mm AGL, which was set to 36 m in the CAEn database. In this case the co-axial C6 MG was required to engage proximal targets.

A few caveats must be included at this point to aid the comparison between the 40 mm AGL and the LV 25 mm Cannon. First, an added consideration in extended range, open terrain scenarios is that use of the 40 mm AGL may be increasingly problematic at longer ranges against fast moving targets due to the low velocity and curved trajectory of these rounds, and consequently their long flight time. Second, lack of a dual feed mechanism for the AGL limits its flexibility for most RWS systems in comparison to the LV 25 mm Cannon.

Recommendations

From a turret/weapon mix effectiveness perspective, it is recommended that the current configuration of the LAV III be maintained or improved upon through upgrades.

Also, it is recommended that before any of the RWS options are adopted, that sensing aspects at all relevant ranges, in simple and complex terrains, be studied more thoroughly in terms of the differences between synthetic vision and natural vision (eyeballs) when scanning the environment to acquire targets under realistic restrictions for viewing arcs. In addition, the nature of the vulnerability of the RWS to small arms fire requires more in-depth study. This vulnerability must be assessed for any RWS candidate under consideration before a final acquisition decision is made. Lastly, new developments in 25 mm low velocity ammunition should be monitored closely, especially programmable airburst munitions (PABM) having

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038 v

significant penetrating power against structures common to an urban environment (e.g., concrete, brick).

P. Dobias, K. Sprague, S. Bassindale, D. Sinclair, J. Demaine, Weapon System Effectiveness for the LAV III Life Extension Program: CAEn Wargame Nickel Tiger, DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

vi DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

Sommaire Introduction

L’étude NICKEL TIGER a été effectuée par l’équipe de recherche opérationnelle des forces terrestres (EROFT) à la demande du Chef d’état-major – Stratégie terrestre pour évaluer l’efficacité des véhicules VBL III comportant un système d’arme télécommandé (SAT) léger à remplir leurs rôles de combat, en rapport à la configuration actuelle des véhicules comportant une tourelle Delco à deux équipée d’un canon stabilisé de 25 mm et deux mitrailleuses C6 (de référence). EROFT a effectué un jeu de guerre pour faire l’essai et comparer l’efficacité de diverses configurations d’armes pour le SAT monté sur les véhicules VBL III, en plus de la référence actuellement utilisée. L’évaluation était basée sur trois scénarios sous forme de ce qui suit :

• Scénario 1 : Embuscade de convoi en terrain urbain;

• Scénario 2 : Patrouille de combat en terrain urbain (place de marché découvert);

• Scénario 3 : Patrouille de combat en terrain découvert.

L’équipe des BLEUS était composée d’un peloton d’infanterie portée dans les scénarios 1 et 2 et d’une compagnie dans le scénario 3. Dans le scénario 1, l’équipe des ROUGES était composée de soldats à pied ayant à leur disposition des mitrailleuses et des grenades propulsée par fusée (GPF). Des échanges de tirs se sont produits typiquement à courtes distances (de 25 m à 200 m). Le scénario 2 s’est déroulé à la fois avec et sans les soldats de l’équipe des BLEUS à pied. Également dans le scénario 2, les soldats de l’équipe des ROUGES à pied étaient appuyés de véhicules non blindés et de véhicules blindés légers comportant une mitrailleuse moyenne (MM) ou un canon de 30 mm comme arme principale. Les distances d’engagement étaient moyennes (de 400 m à 800 m). De plus, des civils faisaient partie des deux scénarios urbains (1 et 2) de façon à rendre le choix des objectifs plus réaliste puisque le canonnier ne pouvait pas tenir pour acquis que chaque détection était un ennemi et pouvait par conséquent servir de cible. Les civils couraient se cacher dès le début des échanges de tirs. Le scénario 3 opposait des véhicules blindés des BLEUS à divers véhicules des ROUGES à de longues distances (jusqu’à 2 000 m, mais en moyenne près de 1 000 m) en l’absence de soldats à pied et de civils.

Dans l’étude, on a tenu compte des options d’armes principales suivantes pour le SAT :

• lance-grenades automatique (LGA) de 40 mm;

• mitrailleuse lourde (ML) de calibre .50;

• canon de 20 mm;

• mitrailleuse (M) C6 de 7.62 mm;

• missiles guidés antichar (MGA);

• canon faible vitesse (FV) de 25 mm.

Les différences dans la capacité de connaissance de la situation entre les VBL III de référence et ceux équipés du SAT ont été quantifiées en équipant les versions du SAT d’une capacité de détection inférieure en comparaison à celle des véhicules de référence, ce qui permettait de tenir compte de la notion que les arcs d’observation pour la configuration du SAT sans

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038 vii

capacité de détection améliorée seraient restreints en comparaison à celle de la configuration de tourelle à deux. De plus, le VBL III a été modélisé comme étant dans une configuration à « trappes baissées », car il n’était pas possible de représenter un chef d’équipage à découvert pouvant être tué par le tir aux armes légères ou le shrapnel, et il n’était pas possible de modéliser le C6 sur pivot du VBL III.

Résultats

Selon les résultats quantitatifs des trois scénarios des jeux de guerre et également selon le jugement et les connaissances des interacteurs des jeux de guerre, la configuration actuelle d’arme et de tourelle du véhicule de combat VBL III est dans l’ensemble le choix le plus solide en comparaison aux autres options évaluées. Toutefois, dans la plupart des cas, les différences de rendement entre les meilleures options et les options classées tout près, même si statistiquement significatives, n’étaient pas profondes. Plusieurs options SAT étaient comparables à l’option de référence dans certains des scénarios, particulièrement lorsque équipé d’un canon FV de 25 mm ou d’un LGA de 40 mm sur terrain plus découvert (scénarios 2 et 3) et, à un moindre degré, la ML de calibre .50 en combat au contact urbain (scénario 1). Aucune des options de rechange n’a obtenu de bons résultats de façon constante dans les trois scénarios. Remarquez que le canon de 20 mm ne peut pas faire partie de l’évaluation d’ensemble puisqu’il n’était présent que comme excursion dna sle scénario 3 (où il s’est classé deuxième). Le canon FV de 25 mm, même s’il était un aspirant sérieux dans les scénarios 2 et 3, a eut un mauvais rendement dans l’environnement de combat au contact urbain du scénario 1. Ceci semblait être relié à une capacité anti-structure insuffisante des munitions modélisées à éclatement aérien utilisées pour ce système d’arme qui rendait difficile la neutralisation des rebelles cachés derrière des murs ou d’autres structures. Ajouté au fait que la ML de calibre .50 s’est classée au milieu ou à la fin du peleton dans les scénarios en terrain découvert pour les combats contre des véhicules blindés, et en établissant tous les scénarios comme également importants, les résultats des jeux de guerre indiquent que la meilleure solution au système d’armes 25 mm / C6 actuel est le LGA de 40 mm / C6. Ce système d’arme s’est placé dans les scénarios 2 et 3 avec l’option FV 25 mm / C6, et s’est classé troisième dans le scénario 1 avant l’option FV 25 mm / C6. L’utilisation du LGA dans le scénario 1 avait de nets avantages et inconvénients. Du côté positif, des obus à éclatement aérien de 40 mm ont été projetés par dessus des structures et ont eut un impact efficace sur des enemis à pied cachés derrière des murs ou sur des toits. Du côté négatif, le combat rapproché du scénario 1 a été entravé par la distance d’armement du LGA de 40 mm, qui était réglée à 36 m dans la base de données CAEn. Dans ce cas, la M co-axiale C6 devait engager des cibles proximales.

Quelques mises en garde doivent maintenant être présentées pour aider à la comparaison entre le LGA de 40 mm et le canon FV de 25 mm. Premièrement, une autre considération pour grande distance, les scénarios en terrain découvert qui utilisent le LGA de 40 mm peuvent être de plus en plus problématiques à de plus grandes distances contre des cibles mobiles rapides à cause de la faible vitesse et de la trajectoire courbe de ces obus et, par conséquent, leur long temps de vol. Deuxièment, l’absence d’un mécanisme à alimentation double pour le LGA limite ses possibilités pour la plupart des systèmes SAT en comparaison au canon FV de 25 mm.

Recommandations

D’une perspective d’efficacité tourelle/arme, on recommande que la configuration actuelle du VBL III soit gardée ou améliorée par des mises à niveau.

viii DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

On recommande également qu’avant d’adopter quelconque option SAT, d’étudier plus profondément les aspects de détection à toutes les distances pertinentes, en terrains simples et complexes, afin d’évaluer les différences entre la vision synthétique et la vision naturelle (yeux) lorsqu’on balaie l’environnement pour acquérir les objectifs en restrictions réalistes pour les arcs d’observation. De plus, la nature de la vulnérabilité du SAT au tir aux armes légères exige une étude plus profonde. Cette vulnérabilité doit être évaluée pour tout candidat SAT à l’étude avant d’effectuer toute décision finale en matière d'acquisitions. Finalement, les derniers progrès des munitions à faible vitesse de 25 mm doivent être examinés de près, en particulier les munitions à éclatement aérien programmables (MEAP) ayant une puissance de pénétration importante contre les structures habituelles d’un environnement urbain (par ex., le béton, la brique).

P. Dobias, K. Sprague, S. Bassindale, D. Sinclair, J. Demaine, Weapon System Effectiveness for the LAV III Life Extension Program: CAEn Wargame Nickel Tiger, DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

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Table of contents

Abstract........................................................................................................................................ i

Résumé ....................................................................................................................................... ii

Executive summary ................................................................................................................... iii

Sommaire................................................................................................................................... vi

Table of contents ........................................................................................................................ x

List of figures ..........................................................................................................................xiii

List of tables ............................................................................................................................ xiv

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. xv

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1

1.1. Background ...................................................................................................... 1

1.2. Aim................................................................................................................... 2

1.3. Objectives......................................................................................................... 2

1.4. Scope ................................................................................................................ 2

2. Methodology.................................................................................................................. 6

2.1. Tools................................................................................................................. 6

2.1.1. CAEn................................................................................................... 6

2.1.2. Database Verification and Validation ................................................. 7

2.1.3. Modeling vehicles in CAEn ................................................................ 7

2.1.4. Modeling the two-man turret vs. RWS ............................................... 8

2.1.5. Modeling anti-armour weapon systems .............................................. 8

2.1.6. Other weapon systems......................................................................... 9

2.2. Wargame interactors......................................................................................... 9

2.3. Analysis ............................................................................................................ 9

2.3.1. Statistical analysis ............................................................................... 9

2.3.2. Ranking options ................................................................................ 10

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038 xi

3. Scenario 1: convoy ambush, urban terrain .................................................................. 13

3.1. Scenario description and setting..................................................................... 13

3.1.1. General setting .................................................................................. 13

3.1.2. Terrain...............................................................................................13

3.1.3. Forces ................................................................................................14

3.1.4. Blue plan ........................................................................................... 15

3.1.5. Red plan ............................................................................................ 15

3.1.6. Games and replications ..................................................................... 16

3.1.7. Measures of effectiveness ................................................................. 16

3.1.8. Relative importance of MOEs........................................................... 17

3.1.9. Measures of performance.................................................................. 17

3.2. Results for Scenario 1..................................................................................... 18

3.2.1. Game history ..................................................................................... 18

3.2.2. Qualitative: military judgements and insights................................... 18

3.2.3. Quantitative results for Scenario 1.................................................... 19

3.3. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1 ................................................................. 20

3.4. Summary of Scenario 1 findings .................................................................... 22

4. Scenario 2: combat patrol, urban terrain ..................................................................... 24


4.1.1. General setting .................................................................................. 24

4.1.2. Terrain...............................................................................................25

4.1.3. Forces ................................................................................................25

4.1.4. Blue plan ........................................................................................... 27

4.1.5. Red plan ............................................................................................ 27






4.2.1. Game history ..................................................................................... 29



xii DRDC CORA TM 2009-038



5. Scenario 3: combat patrol, open terrain....................................................................... 36


5.1.1. General setting .................................................................................. 36

5.1.2. Terrain...............................................................................................37

5.1.3. Forces ................................................................................................37

5.1.4. Blue plan ........................................................................................... 39

5.1.5. Red plan ............................................................................................ 39






5.2.1. Game history ..................................................................................... 41





6. Summary and recommendations ................................................................................. 46

6.1. Summary ........................................................................................................ 46

6.2. Recommendations .......................................................................................... 48

7. References ................................................................................................................... 51

List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms .................................................................................. 53

Distribution List........................................................................................................................ 55

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038 xiii

List of figures

Figure 1. Terrain layout for Scenario 1. The grid spacing is 100 m......................................... 14

Figure 2. Force dispositions for Scenario 1. ............................................................................. 15

Figure 3. Terrain layout for Scenario 2. The grid spacing is 100 m......................................... 25

Figure 4. BLUE and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 2. The grid spacing is 100 m. ...... 26

Figure 5. Terrain layout for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000 m....................................... 37

Figure 6. BLUE Force disposition for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000m........................ 38

Figure 7. RED Force disposition for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000 m. ........................ 39

xiv DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

List of tables

Table 1. Weapon System/Station Options................................................................................ 10

Table 2. Scenario 1 Options ..................................................................................................... 13

Table 3. MOE Weights for Scenario 1. .................................................................................... 17

Table 4. MOE Results for Scenario 1....................................................................................... 19

Table 5. MOP Results for Scenario 1. ...................................................................................... 20

Table 6. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1.............................................................................. 21

Table 7. Scenario 2 Options ..................................................................................................... 24

Table 8. Summary of Wargames Played for Scenario 2........................................................... 28

Table 9. MOE Weights for Scenario 2. .................................................................................... 29

Table 10. MOE Results for Scenario 2..................................................................................... 31

Table 11. MOP Results for Scenario 2. .................................................................................... 32

Table 12. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 2. ......................................................................... 33

Table 13. Scenario 3 Options ................................................................................................... 36

Table 14. Summary of Wargames Played for Scenario 3......................................................... 40

Table 15. MOE Weights for Scenario 3. .................................................................................. 41

Table 16. MOE Results for Scenario 3..................................................................................... 42

Table 17. MOP Results for Scenario 3. .................................................................................... 43

Table 18. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 3. ......................................................................... 44

Table 19. Rank Category Tally for Main Weapons Common to All Scenarios. ...................... 46

DRDC CORA TM 2009-038 xv

Acknowledgements The authors would like to recognize the contributions made by reviewers of this report over the multitude of iterations that preceded this final version.

xvi DRDC CORA TM 2009-038


DRDC CORA TM 2009-038 1

1. Introduction

1.1. Background Currently, the Canadian Forces relies on the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III in support of infantry operations. The LAV III in its present configuration is equipped with the two-man Delco turret armed with a 25 mm stabilized cannon. This configuration provides sufficient versatility for a wide range of missions—from combat operations, through convoy force protection, to peacekeeping. Nevertheless, it has been proposed that the current turret be replaced with a light remote weapon station (RWS) for at least a part of the LAV III fleet. One of the primary differences of making such a change is that the vehicle would be forced to operate under reduced situational awareness (SA)—arcs of observation from vehicle body hatches would be limited since the hatches would no longer be above the weapon station, and episcopes would be more obstructed. Crew members (particularly the gunner) would spend more time in the protected hull of the vehicle or with limited exposure, while still being able to acquire targets and engage them via remote control of the weapons station. This has the obvious benefit of providing more shielding to crew members from small arms fire, shrapnel, improvised incendiary weapons (e.g., Molotov cocktails) and other such threats. However, it comes at the expense of losing the SA benefits of having two crew members above the turret scanning the environment. In addition, significant fire inhibit zones would be required to protect crew members from their own vehicle weapon systems while observing the environment through a hatch at lower elevation than the weapon station. Other possible benefits of moving to a light RWS include apparent space and weight savings, however, the extent of the savings are currently under investigation [1]. Any weight saved could be utilized to add more body armour (under-armour especially) or free up carrying capacity for additional equipment. On the downside, the RWS is not as heavily armoured as the two-man turret and furthermore only supports less massive, lower recoil weapons in comparison to the 25 mm cannon employed by the LAV III. The former point exposes the RWS to higher incidence of firepower kills and the latter relates to the subject of this paper, that being to determine if a combination of RWS-mounted weapons, supported by synthetic vision sensors only, can still permit the LAV III to fulfill its varied combat roles.

An operational research (OR) study was requested in July 2008 by the Chief of Staff Land Strategy to assess the effectiveness of various light RWS configurations. A part of the analysis was performed by the Land Capability Development OR Team (LCDORT), with the wargaming portion falling to the Land Forces Operational Research Team (LFORT). Concurrently, LFORT was asked by the Director of Land Requirements 3 (DLR 3) to perform a study to assess the effectiveness of the RWS mounted on a newly proposed Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV), and compare it to the current reconnaissance vehicle (Coyote), which is equipped with the same two-man turret as the LAV III. This analysis, designated as NICKEL SCORPION, began in the fall of 2008 and will both draw on and supplement the results of this study.

Therefore, LFORT performed a wargame study assessing the effectiveness of several possible weapon configurations on the RWS for the LAV III and comparing them to the effectiveness of the currently used 25 mm cannon. This study was designated NICKEL TIGER.

2 DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

1.2. Aim The aim of this study is to compare the effectiveness of the current LAV III 25 mm cannon / two-man turret with a set of possible main weapons fixed to a light RWS (~200-300 kg) against mounted and dismounted targets in complex urban and open terrains.

1.3. Objectives The objective of the study is as follows:

• To aid in the determination of whether or not a light RWS fitted with one or more of the available weapon options can effectively fulfill/replace the role of the 25 mm cannon / two-man turret on a LAV III in a number of different scenarios against a variety of mounted and dismounted targets in urban and rural terrain.

1.4. Scope The scope of the study was as follows:

• This project was based on the results of two scenarios gamed at the Platoon level and one scenario at the Company level. The two Platoon level scenarios included a convoy operation in urban terrain and a combat patrol in urban terrain. These two scenarios allowed for short to medium range engagements (up to 800 m). The Company level scenario considered a combat patrol in open terrain, which allowed for long range engagements (up to 2000 m);

• Each scenario utilized a slightly different set of weapon options. Due to this fact, the specific options utilized for each scenario are reported in that specific section of this report;

• Due to time constraints, the sensing differences between the two-man turret and RWS were modeled in a granular fashion based on the notion that SA for the RWS vehicle would be limited in comparison to that of the two-man turret baseline (see Section 2.1.3). Also, the LAV III was modeled as being in a ‘hatches down’ configuration as it was not possible to represent an exposed crew commander that could be killed by small arms fire, nor was it possible to model the pintle-mounted C6 of the LAV III;

• The RED Force included dismounts, soft-skinned vehicles and lightly armoured vehicles (armoured personnel carriers (APCs)) such as the Russian BTR-60 and BRDM. Not all RED units were present in all scenarios; and

• The Close Action Environment (CAEn) software system was used as the wargaming tool for modeling the scenario. A brief description of CAEn appears later in this document.


The following additional assumptions have been made for this study:

A1. External support, such as close air, indirect fire or direct fire, was not modeled;

A2. The composition of the RED Force remained constant for each individual scenario;

A3. Each BLUE vehicle variant remained constant for each individual scenario;

A4. Since no single RWS was under investigation1, the only differences in the vehicles modeled were the sensing capability (as noted above) and the weapons mounted on the RWS. In particular, for lack of detailed data, the chance of a firepower kill was the same for both vehicles.

A5. Sensors could not be destroyed by small arms fire as the software does not permit sensor kills. Thus sensors performed properly until the host vehicle was killed.

A6. Differences in weapon reload times that would likely exist between RWS and non-RWS weapon mountings were not modeled2. Since the scenarios are of short duration, it was expected that reload times would not significantly contribute to the final results. Furthermore, since no particular RWS was under study and the vehicle configuration and weapon loading mechanisms were not fixed (e.g., under armour reloading3 vs. ammunition box(es) mounted on top of the vehicle), reliable data for this aspect was not attainable.

A7. With the exception of the anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), all weapons were provided with more ammunition than they were expected to require. In part, this was due to not fixing the particular RWS under investigation or the ammunition feed/storage mechanisms. Also, it allowed the vehicle and weapon system files to remain constant from one scenario to the next.

A8. It was assumed that airburst ammunition rounds would not damage buildings and walls within the urban scenarios, which were of concrete/brick construction. Other rounds had varying degrees of affects on such structures.

1 At project inception, it was desired that the RWS not be specified (i.e., make, model, etc.) since procurement options were open and there were many potential contenders. 2 The wargame software does not directly model single feed versus dual feed mechanisms for weapons. If two types of ammunition are available, either can be loaded and fired, subject to a reload penalty time for switching ammunition types. The reload penalty also applies when replenishing an unloaded (empty) weapon. This was not adjusted to take into account the configuration of the RWS and additional time it may take to reload the weapon. This assumption impacts Scenario 2 (Section 4), wherein BLUE engaged both mounted and dismounted RED forces using the RWS. The weapon most impacted is the 40mm AGL, since to the knowledge of the authors, dual feed 40mm AGLs are not available. Dual feed mechanisms are available for LV25mm-type weapons (e.g., the ATK Light Weight 25mm [2]), .50 calibre machine guns (e.g., the ATK .50 calibre Bushmaster [2]), and of course the baseline 25mm cannon. All other weapons considered only utilized one variety of ammunition. 3 As per, for example, the Oto Melara Hitrole RWS (http://www.otomelara.it/OtoMelara/EN/Business/Land/Hitrol/index.sdo).


A9. The following ammunition loads and burst rates were used in the CAEn wargame for each weapon system:

a. 25 mm Cannon: 105 rounds (rds) high-explosive incendiary tracer (HEIT), 105 rds armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot - tracer (APFSDS-T), burst rate of 3 rds (load capacity 160 rds) 4, 5;

b. C6: load of 1740 rds, burst rate of 4 rds (load capacity 220 rds)6;

c. .50 calibre (cal): load of 300 rds Standard (Std), 300 rds AP, burst rate of 7 rds (load capacity 220 rds);

d. 40 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL): 300 rds high-explosive dual purpose – armour piercing (HEDP-AP) at a burst rate of 1 round , 200 rds Std at a burst rate of 3 rds (load capacity 48 rds);

e. 20 mm Cannon: 200 rds armour-piercing discarding sabot (APDS), burst rate of 3 rds (load capacity 100 rds); and

f. Anti-tank guided missile (ATGM): 2 rds;

g. Low velocity (LV) 25 mm Cannon: load of 210 rds air burst (AB), 105 rds armour-piercing (AP), burst rate of 3 rds (load capacity 160 rds).

A10. The AGL was modeled as the Stryker AGL (Mk 19) and the ATGM was modeled as the Javelin. The LV 25 mm cannon was notional and modeled as a less-lethal version of the 25 mm cannon (similar in terminal effects to expectations of a Lightweight (LW) 25mm cannon), but having greater lethality against vehicles than the 20 mm cannon and also the .50 cal HMG7. The 20 mm cannon was modeled as the 20 M 621.

4 A load of 210 rounds (rds) armour-piercing discarding sabot tracer (APDS-T) was also available for the 25 mm cannon, but was not used in any of the scenarios. 5 The real LAV III has a 150 round bin and a 60 round bin with the ability to switch between them (dual feed). The standard load is 150 rds APDS-T and 60 rds HEIT or vice versa. The modeled LAV III carries a balanced load of 105 rds each of HEIT and APFSDS-T ready ammunition to maintain a constant configuration when transitioning from scenarios against vehicles to those against dismounts. 6 The standard load for the LAV III co-axial 7.62mm machine gun is 440 rounds. 7 The effects of the modeled AP round against armoured vehicles are also in line with expectations of LW 25 mm HEDP ammunition, at time of writing. Detailed ballistics and terminal effects were not available for this weapon which was under development at the time of the study.




2. Methodology

2.1. Tools For the conduct of this study a combat modeling tool, CAEn, was used for modeling the scenarios. The generated effectiveness data was organized using the Post-game Analysis Tool (PGAT) [3], and analyzed using Microsoft Excel.

2.1.1. CAEn

CAEn [4] is a close-combat interactive wargame that allows human interactors to play out conflict scenarios by controlling synthetic representations of military equipment on a synthetic battlefield. It is also capable of producing numerous non-interactive ‘replications’ of a scenario previously gamed by the interactors. It is a multi-sided, multi-layered model that simulates combat systems and the environment at the tactical level. CAEn is a versatile tool for simulating ground combat mostly at the individual soldier, section and platoon levels and is capable of modeling many of the factors that influence the mission outcome. The interactors are wargame players that have military experience appropriate for the study at hand. They control the movement of forces and react to detections and engagements by interacting with the computer, each through a personal computer screen, keyboard, and mouse. The screens provide each player with a two-dimensional, map-like overhead view of the battlefield and representations of various “sensor-eye” viewing as applicable (see illustrations in Section 3.1, for instance). In the overhead view, icons represent the forces involved and an array of menus allows the user to control his/her icons. The probability of each system detecting and killing other systems must be accurately defined in the CAEn database (see Section 2.1.2, below). The replications are created by re-running the interactive game under a regeneration of the random chance events (e.g., ‘re-rolling the dice’ for detection, hit and kill probabilities). CAEn’s replication capability allows the analyst to generate large amounts of data for subsequent analysis.

CAEn results, like those of any wargame/simulation, are affected by the assumptions and modeling techniques used by the model’s developers. For example, the user interacts with a graphical screen that provides perfect SA of the players’ own forces. Therefore, it may be necessary to input external controls, such as start times for activities to account for communication delays, on those users who would not normally have access to battlefield management systems which allow commanders near-perfect command and control capabilities. Human factors such as training, morale, fatigue, fear and aiming error are not explicitly modeled. Consequently, weapon systems perform at their theoretical maximum rather than at their operational norm. These and other modeling limitations/anomalies do not diminish the CAEn output credibility, but require consideration when evaluating results. CAEn, while unable to provide definitive absolute outcomes for particular battles, is a powerful tool for supporting analyses of a wide range of options, such as operational impact assessment, and including the effectiveness of combat systems, technology alternatives, force structure alternatives and the development and validation of new and current Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for different operations like conventional warfare, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in urban and rural environments.

The study was conducted using CAEnXP Version 9.3.0.11 and DRDC CORA’s unclassified CAEn database. The parameters of the weapon systems that were used were defined in conjunction with the subject-matter experts (military staff and interactors).


2.1.2. Database Verification and Validation

The Canadian CAEn database maintains representations of the various units in a wargame including vehicles, weapon systems, dismounted soldiers, and sensors. The units within the database were originally derived from JANUS, a previous wargaming system and predecessor of JCATS. Subject-matter experts (SMEs) (military, defense scientists, interactors) typically provide the data to fill in the CAEn system unit templates. In cases where hard data was not obtainable, military judgment was used. The SMEs test the system effects to confirm that they are in line with performance expectations. Wargaming activities do not commence until confidence is obtained for the modeled entities and their interactions. Methods of testing vary from study to study. To date, references for most units in the database are catalogued, however, in most cases the methods of data transfer, assumptions made and test results gathered have not been formally recorded and are generally not traceable.

2.1.3. Modeling vehicles in CAEn

Vehicles in CAEn are modeled using the following parameters: acceleration, speed, size, number of sensors, types of sensors, types of weapons, types of ammunition, and a type of vehicle (e.g., tracked, wheeled, up-armoured). For NICKEL TIGER, all of the required information was gathered from Jane’s [5]. The base vehicles used in the wargame are described in the CAEn database documentation and are indexed as follows [6]:

• LAV III is Unit 26;

• BMP-2 (OPFORCE) is Unit 59;

• BRDM (OPFORCE) is Unit 68;

• BTR-60 (OPFORCE) is a modified Unit 55 (BTR-70) possessing lighter armour.

Of all the enemy systems, the BLUE vehicles (LAV III) were only vulnerable to the RPG’s fired by dismounts and the 30 mm cannon mounted on the BMP-2.

The base LAV III vehicle in the CAEn database (Unit 26) was modified as specified below in order to capture the proposed differences between the baseline LAV III and the RWS variants. Time constraints did not allow for a detailed sensor model to be developed. Differences in SA were quantified by equipping the RWS variants with inferior sensing capability in comparison to that of the two-man turret configuration. The justification follows. In a ‘hatches down’ configuration (i.e., no possibility for natural vision scanning), episcopes in the baseline LAV III would be higher and less restricted in view than they would be with an RWS configuration—in the latter case they would be mounted on the vehicle body and obscured by the weapon station itself. In the former case the episcopes stem from the turret. In a ‘hatches up’ mode under an RWS configuration, natural vision scanning also would be impeded by the RWS equipment, whereas the view in the baseline configuration would not be so obstructed. Consequently, to capture these differences in a coarse manner, the RWS version was modeled as having a weapon sight only. This weapon sensor was kept constant for all weapon configurations, including the baseline. The 2-man turret (baseline) version was modeled as having an additional sensor compared to the RWS. This sensor simulated a 360 degree, top-of-vehicle view (called the ‘eyeball’ sight). No other sensors were utilized.

The sensing differences are best likened to the vehicles being in a ‘hatches down’ configuration (both RWS and baseline options), since it was not possible to represent an exposed crew commander of the baseline LAV III that could be killed by small arms fire or shrapnel.


The sensors used in Nickel Tiger on the BLUE side were:

• Eyeball: max dist. 1000 m, magnification x 1, Field of View (FOV) 1.047 radians8, eyepiece diameter 0.040 m; and

• Optical 25mm sight, narrow field of view (NFOV): max dist. 5000m, magnification x7, FOV azimuth (AZ) 0.072 radians, FOV elevation (EL) 0.029 radians, eyepiece diameter 0.039 m.

The weapons and ammunition selected by the unit are designated in the ammunition target files. The unit will automatically select the default weapon. The interactor can override the automatic selection during a wargame if he or she so chooses.

2.1.4. Modeling the two-man turret vs. RWS

There were two differences assumed between the turret and the RWS—one was the weapon systems, and the second difference was the sensors, as discussed above in Section 2.1.3. The turret was modeled as having a top-mounted, 360 degree view sensor.

2.1.5. Modeling anti-armour weapon systems

The anti-armour (AA) weapons are modeled based on the information provided in Jane’s [5]. The considered parameters include the minimum and maximum range, velocity of a round, time of flight, and armour penetration. BLUE weapons in the study having anti-armour capability are as follows: 25 mm cannon, LV 25 mm cannon, 20 mm cannon, .50 calibre HMG, 40 mm AGL and ATGM. It must be noted that the LV 25mm was not available in Jane’s, and was modeled based mainly on projections of its capabilities relative to other weapon systems. Specifically, as mentioned in Section 1.4 (Assumption A10.), it was assumed that the LV 25 mm would have greater lethality against armoured vehicles than the 20 mm cannon or .50 calibre HMG, but less lethality than the 25mm cannon.

The accuracy and destructive power of AA weapons (e.g., a weapon firing armour-piercing rounds) is represented by tabulated values located in the CAEn single-shot kill probability (SSKP) file. The SSKP file is used to determine if a round has struck the target and the consequent damages. The possibilities include: no damage, mobility kill, firepower kill, combined mobility and firepower kill, and catastrophic kill. In the damage determination the angle of strike, the natural cover of the vehicle, movement of vehicle and shooter, thickness of armour, and explosive reactive armour (ERA) or other add-ons are considered.

High-explosive (HE) weapons are generally not modeled against armoured targets, but rather against dismounted soldiers. To enable modeling IEDs, an HE weapon with anti-armour capabilities was added to the database.

AA weapons can also be used against structures. The penetrating power of the round, in conjunction with its HE power, is weighed against the relative strength of walls. The relative strength can be adjusted to represent the material and quality of the wall. If the round is sufficiently powerful to knock down or punch a hole through a wall, it will. Depending on the calibre, it might require more than one round. For example, bunker buster rounds have been designed and added to the CAEn database [7]. These rounds can quite easily knock down

8 Although a typical FOV for a person is approximately 160 degrees, 60 degrees was chosen to represent that part of the FOV concentrated on for scanning purposes and which is non-peripheral.


walls and entire buildings if enough rounds are used. A limitation of CAEn is that the smallest hole it is able to represent is one square meter. Thus, even holes created by small calibre rounds are at least one meter square. The limitation leads to an over estimation of the effect of the .50 calibre HMG within the urban settings of this study (Scenario 1 (Section 3) and, to a lesser extent, Scenario 2 (Section 4)).

2.1.6. Other weapon systems

A number of small arms were considered in the modeled scenarios. Dismounted BLUE forces used the C7A1, C8 and C9 light machine guns (5.56 mm), as well as the Carl Gustaf anti-armour weapon. RED employed the AK47, PKM, and the RPG 16. These simulated weapons rely on parameters from the standard Canadian CAEn database.

The effects of small arms on personnel are modeled using the CAEn body armour file. If a bullet is aimed and fired at a dismounted unit the aiming errors, velocity, and time of flight are weighed against the size, cover, speed, and body armour of the target unit. The round will either hit and kill, miss entirely, or hit and be rendered ineffective by the unit’s body armour.

2.2. Wargame interactors The CAEn wargame interactors are involved in scenario design, unit design, and they also play out the various sides in a wargame by controlling the CAEn units over a two-dimensional (2-D) plan view of the battlefield with the additional option of viewing limited scenes in three dimensions (3-D). Two or three wargame interactors were utilized, depending on the scenario. At minimum, one BLUE player and one RED player commanded friendly and opposition forces respectively. In the urban scenarios, a third interactor controlled the movements of civilians. The interactors for the study have had military combat experience, in addition to varying levels of experience with the two-man turret and RWS configurations.

2.3. Analysis The results of the study are dependent upon the assumptions made for the sensor and weapon capabilities. No human factor considerations were available at the time of this study, therefore assumptions needed to be made with respect to target acquisition timing for both the RWS and the turret. This has to be kept in mind when considering the results of this study.

There are two types of results presented in this study:

Qualitative Results. Qualitative results were based on Military Judgments and Insights (J&I). They are the opinions of the wargame interactors gathered during and after the gaming, and should be considered in relation to the quantitative results and analysis. The results of J&I are based on careful synthesis of players’ observations during wargaming combined with individual expertise and background. J&I are supported by quantitative analysis where possible.

Quantitative Results. Each interactive game was replayed twenty (20) times using the automated CAEn replicator. Quantitative results are based on the statistical analysis of specific measures of effectiveness (MOEs) extracted from the CAEn replication output files.

2.3.1. Statistical analysis

The results for the individual measures (MOEs) are presented as mean (average) values together with 95% confidence intervals [8] and are reported for each option. For a given


option, the MOEs were combined to obtain final scores for the analyzed options. These final scores are also presented as mean values together with 95% confidence intervals. The options were ranked using a software tool called ‘Breakpoint Analysis with Nonparametric Data Option’ (BRANDO) [9]. BRANDO employs statistical significance testing and analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine how options should be grouped together and also how the groups should be sorted from best to worst. A group constitutes an equivalence class in the sense that the mean values of options within the group are considered not to be significantly different from one another. However, members of one group are considered to be significantly different from members of other groups. This allows one to both group and rank the options.

2.3.2. Ranking options

The various turret and weapon system combinations evaluated through wargaming are listed in Table 1. Options combining a C6 with another weapon had the C6 mounted co-axially. The options were measured and ranked based on their performance in some or all of three distinct scenarios. For brevity, the options are assigned call signs.

Table 1. Weapon System/Station Options

Option Call Sign Station Weapons Scenarios

Baseline Two-man Turret 25 mm cannon + C6 1, 2 and 3

LV25mm/C6 RWS LV 25 mm cannon + C6 1, 2 and 3

HMG/C6 RWS .50 cal + C6 1, 2 and 3

AGL/C6 RWS 40 mm AGL + C6 1, 2 and 3

HMG RWS .50 cal 1, 2 and 3

C6 RWS C6 1 and 2

20mm RWS 20mm cannon 3

ATGM RWS ATGM 3

For option ranking, an absolute scale was devised for each MOE to minimize rank-switching in case one or more options happened to be removed from consideration in the post-analysis stage9 [10]. Scores for a given MOE were percentage-based and ranged between zero (0) and one hundred (100), with 100 being the most favourable for BLUE. This scoring system was common for all measures in a given scenario to enable consistent comparisons across them. The detailed option scoring tables were scenario dependent, and are shown in Sections 3.2.3, 4.2.3 and 5.2.3. In the end, the options were scored based on a numerically computed weighted sum of the individual MOEs to obtain the final weighted scores (and ranks) of the considered options, or aggregate MOE scores. In general, the higher an option’s score, the higher its rank, although high variance and/or close mean score values can obscure option distinctiveness.

9 To reiterate, the scales used to score MOEs did not depend on the data collected. For instance, the highest MOE value was NOT assigned a rank of 100% and then used to scale other values relative to that maximum.


As indicated in Section 2.3.1, the ranking of the options was categorical and was based on significance testing to determine equivalence classes via BRANDO [9].

Rank categories for options were determined as follows:

1. The options were sorted from best to worst, based primarily on the mean value of the weighted sum of MOEs for a given option (as per the software BRANDO). That is, the weighted sum of the individual MOEs determined the rank category of an option;

2. BRANDO was used to determine how to group the options. This does not change the order of the options in step 1, it merely separates them into statistically ‘equivalent’ groups (the mean values of distinct groups are statistically separable).

3. All options in the highest scoring group were assigned a rank of ‘1’;

4. All options in the second highest scoring group were assigned a rank of ‘2’, and so on until all options received a rank value.

The main caveat about this process is that options that are not significantly different from one another by a simple T-test might end up in different rank categories. Another issue is that small scale differences in one study might still be split into several rank groups whereas relatively large differences in another (similar) study may be grouped together as one. As with all ranking schemes, however, hard boundaries must be determined somewhere. The latter issue can be addressed by defining a numerical ‘Effect Size’ such that any differences less than this quantity are ignored in the ranking process. Although such a quantity introduces some arbitrariness into the option ranking process, it also introduces a sense of realism, or in other words a ‘reality check’, with regard to what constitutes a difference that will matter to the decision maker10. In general, through effect size or some other means, attention must be paid to differences in MOE scores in addition to the rank-order to help quantify performance variances. Furthermore, the rank does not necessarily reflect absolute suitability and it is possible (albeit rare) that other factors, such as a judgement by the authors, may weigh in to alter the rankings. Such instances are highlighted if and when they occur. In any event, the actual scores and confidence levels also appear in the option ranking tables to help the reader better discern finer differences between the options.

Sensitivity of the rank order with respect to variations (i.e., uncertainty) in the relative MOE weights was also tested. This technique provides a measure of the robustness of the rankings under a wide variety of weighting schedules. If the rank order does not change under the sensitivity analysis, it means that the manner in which the sponsor weighed the importance of the individual MOEs factors out of the determination, up to the range of variation investigated. In this case, the rank order boundaries can be considered as ‘black and white’. On the other hand, if the rank order of an option changes substantially in the sensitivity analysis, then the result is not robust and lies within what might be considered a ‘gray area’ of the decision making boundaries—depending, of course, on the definitiveness of the original weighting scheme. As an example, the rank of the option may depend heavily on a particular decision weight (or range of weights) being assigned to a particular MOE.

10 Defining an ‘Effect Size’ was not deemed necessary for this study.




3. Scenario 1: convoy ambush, urban terrain

3.1. Scenario description and setting This scenario tested the options in a convoy escort/force protection role in a close urban environment. The ranges of engagement were between 25 and 200 m.

Table 2. Scenario 1 Options

Option Call Sign Station Weapons

Baseline Two-man Turret 25 mm cannon + C6

LV25mm/C6 RWS LV 25 mm cannon + C6

HMG/C6 RWS .50 cal + C6

AGL/C6 RWS 40 mm AGL + C6

HMG RWS .50 cal

C6 RWS C6

3.1.1. General setting

The BLUE Force (Infantry Platoon) was tasked with escorting five supply vehicles along a route that includes traversing a built-up area containing a number of buildings. The ranges of engagement were very close due to the terrain. The options listed in Table 2 were considered for this scenario. The options included one (1) turret configuration while the remainder utilized the RWS configuration.

3.1.2. Terrain

The terrain used for this scenario was custom built to incorporate the features required for the study. Figure 1 shows the area of interest—urban terrain consisting mainly of city streets and buildings. The grid spacing in the figure is 100m. The light green dots in the figure represent trees (most are on the West (left) side of the figure), and Northward the light green shading represents a tree line. In order to test the weapon systems in close quarters, the scenario had been set to ensure that the BLUE Force had limited mobility and was unable to leave the site. An IED placed at the main T-junction in the roadway caused the lead LAV to halt, forcing the convoy to stay and fight as manoeuvrability was too restrictive to allow for continuation along the route. All of the buildings are one storey with windows and a flat roof top, with the exception of the most northerly building which is a three-storey building. The roads that the convoy traversed are considered to be hard packed.


Figure 1. Terrain layout for Scenario 1. The grid spacing is 100 m.

3.1.3. Forces

The RED and BLUE force dispositions are shown in Figure 2. The BLUE Force consisted of an Infantry Platoon of four LAV III vehicles that had the task of escorting five supply vehicles to a forward base. The LAV III vehicles were outfitted as per Table 2. The supply vehicles had no fighting capability for the interactive gaming. The LAV III vehicles were positioned in the convoy to provide maximum control and protection under the circumstances. The RED Force consisted of eight insurgents. They were armed with two rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, two machine guns (PKM) (7.62 mm) and four assault rifles (AK47) (7.62x39 mm). The following were the ammunition loads for each weapon system; AK47 – 300 rds, PKM – 880 rds and RPG – 3 HEAT rds. The RED Force also had one IED which was used to disable the lead vehicle of the convoy, effectively stopping the convoy. There were twenty civilians included in the scenario in order to make targeting more realistic and challenging in that the gunner could not assume that every detection was an enemy and therefore could be fired upon. They were located alongside the road and near buildings. The civilians were neutral with regard to the two warring parties. When first detected, RED and civilian dismount entities are not distinguishable from one another. BLUE only engaged targets positively identified as RED. Minimal separation distances between RED dismounts and civilians or unidentified detections were not enforced as a rule of engagement.

NORTH


Figure 2. Force dispositions for Scenario 1.

3.1.4. Blue plan

BLUE’s objective was to ensure the safe arrival of the convoy to the forward base. The BLUE Force had a chosen route and part of this route included traveling through a built-up area, which could not be avoided. The BLUE Force had set TTPs for any situation that may be encountered while on a convoy escort task. In this case, however, BLUE’s action reduced to defending the convoy on the spot as best they could under the restrictive set of circumstances given. BLUE manoeuvrability was limited to near the road. Since the purpose of the study was to assess the performance of the vehicle weapon systems only, BLUE dismounts were not gamed. Such a decision, which is at the discretion of the Platoon Commander, is entirely realistic in this scenario. The reason is that the RED ambush (described below) involves significant machine gun fire, RPGs and likely shrapnel. In such a case, if the Commander perceived that it would be better to fight the vehicles rather than expose the soldiers to the gunfire and shrapnel, then dismounts would not be used until the Commander deemed appropriate.

3.1.5. Red plan

Initially, the RED Force had positioned themselves in hidden positions in and around the buildings. Their intent was to attack the convoy and cause maximum casualties in a quick and well planned action. The attack was initiated with the detonation of an IED on the first


vehicle in the convoy11. The intent here was to stop the convoy at a place of RED’s choosing by targeting the first vehicle. While the BLUE Force surveyed the situation and followed their TTPs (previous section), barring early identification and elimination by BLUE a RED RPG gunner fired at the rear of the convoy with the aim of boxing it in. As well, targets of opportunity within the convoy were engaged by other insurgents along the RED-occupied strip of territory.

3.1.6. Games and replications

As part of the learning process, the players used practice games to better acquaint themselves with the tactics to be employed as well as to reduce any learning curve effects that may have been present. The actions of RED and BLUE forces are scripted to be realistic and as consistent as possible between individual runs, as opposed to trying to explore a wide set of varying circumstances. Otherwise, with only a few games played per option it could become extremely difficult or even impossible to distinguish between options if the main variable in the game happened to be, for example, RED behaviour. Once players were familiar with the scenario, each of the weapon options was gamed four times for a total of 24 games. For each game played, 20 non-interactive replications were generated.

3.1.7. Measures of effectiveness

The following MOEs were used to assess the relative capabilities of the BLUE Force in Scenario 1. Each is defined such that the higher the value of the MOE, the more favourable it is for BLUE:

• BLUE Residual Combat Strength. This measure represents the combat capabilities of BLUE after the battle and assesses the effectiveness of RED fire. A destroyed or disabled BLUE vehicle counted against the residual combat strength (RCS). Each vehicle could be counted as disabled once only and upon the first instance of damage to that vehicle not including the IED (see Footnote 11). The RCS was calculated as ((initial number of LAVs) – (Number of killed or disabled LAVs)) / (initial number of LAVs) x 100%. A score of 100% corresponds to zero losses and completely intact combat capabilities in terms of vehicle fighting systems (irrespective of ammunition expended, battle fatigue, etc.); 12

• % RPGs Prevented. While not every RPG fired kills a LAV, the number of shots that the RPG gunners were able to launch provides information about the effectiveness of BLUE in swiftly eliminating this threat. Consequently, this measure supplements the information provided by the number of BLUE kills (RCS). It helps to distinguish between the ability of RED to fire at LAVs and their ability to actually cause damage. For the purpose of scoring, an inverse measure—the percentage of RPGs that were not fired—was used13.

11 The Scenario was scripted such that the IED event would force the Commander of the lead vehicle to halt, but not affect the vehicle systems or damage it otherwise. The vehicle could still fire from a fixed position until sufficiently damaged by subsequent RED fire. The first such instance of post-IED event damage for this vehicle factors into the BLUE RCS. 12 Note that, in the wargame, small arms fire by RED cannot disable the sensors on a BLUE vehicle. Thus the vehicle sensors are assumed to operate at their maximum capability until the vehicle itself is disabled by a catastrophic vehicle kill. 13 The usefulness of this measure depends somewhat on the consistency of how the RED forces were played by the RED commander. Recall that the interactors practice to keep the behaviour of the forces


• % RED Losses. The number of RED killed provides information about the lethality of BLUE weapon systems against dismounted personnel in an urban environment. The Percentage of RED Losses MOE is computed as (number of RED killed) / (initial number of RED) x 100%.

3.1.8. Relative importance of MOEs

Table 3 contains the weights of individual MOEs arrived at in consultation between the research team and the sponsor. The weights convey the relative importance of each MOE to the decision concerning which option is better. A sensitivity analysis was performed to quantify the dependence of the outcome on the relative MOE weights that were chosen.

Table 3. MOE Weights for Scenario 1.

Measure of Effectiveness Weight (%)

BLUE Residual Combat Strength 40

% RPGs Prevented 30

% RED Losses 30

TOTAL 100

Since all of the MOEs were expressed as percentages (on a scale of 0 – 100%), it was straightforward to assign an overall score to all of the options. To compute the overall scores, the MOE percentages were simply multiplied by the weights of individual MOEs and then the values were summed.

3.1.9. Measures of performance

A set of measures of performance (MOPs) were used to provide further insight into the results. The MOPs characterize weapon performance rather than operational effectiveness towards achieving the mission goal, and therefore were not used in ranking the considered options. However, they still can provide useful information, or flag potential problems associated with a particular option. The following MOPs were used:

a. Time of Engagement – RED by BLUE. This measure considers the time between the first RED killed and the last RED killed to assess the effectiveness of the BLUE fire.

under their control as consistent as possible. Note that this measure potentially could fail if all four vehicles were destroyed before all of the RPGs were expended. The data indicate that this possibility did not occur in any of the 480 replications.


b. Time of Engagement – BLUE by RED. This measure was defined as the time between the IED explosion and the last RPG fired. It served as an indicator of how fast BLUE was able to identify the main RED threat and eliminate it14.

c. Range of Engagement. This is the average engagement range at which a particular type of ammunition round was fired, resulting in damage or destruction of an enemy target. It may also be interpreted as the average killing distance.

3.2. Results for Scenario 1

3.2.1. Game history

All of the games played out according to the initial plan. There were no problems or difficulties in executing the RED and BLUE plans. Recall that the scenario was set up so that BLUE was not able to avoid the ambush or escape it once initiated. RED fought to the last man. The key to BLUE success was to identify the threat early and to eliminate the RPG gunners quickly, as it was the only weapon that could damage the LAVs.

3.2.2. Qualitative: military judgements and insight s

J&I are the opinions of the wargame interactors gathered during and after the gaming. It should be considered in relation to the quantitative results and analysis to follow. The following J&I were gathered for Scenario 1:

i. It was believed that the Baseline option (25 mm / C6) was the best for this scenario. One of the contributing factors was the extra set of sensors (‘eyeball’) available for this option.

ii. The interactors also noticed that, due to the close ranges in this scenario and a

dismounted RED Force, the C6 was used a lot and was quite effective in all options that contained a C6.

iii. The AGL/C6 option was believed to be the worst for this scenario. This was mainly

due to the close engagement ranges as contrasted to the arming distance required for the AGL (36 m). As well, the concern for this option was the collateral damage.

iv. It was also noted that the 40mm AGL could be useful in an indirect role. This was

dependent upon the location of the RED Force. If the RED Force was hiding around a corner, in a room or on the top of a building, then the AGL could be very effective.

v. The larger calibre weapons (i.e., 25 mm cannon) allowed for better penetration of

buildings and structures. This allowed for the destruction of RED even if they tried to hide behind walls.

14 Note that this measure can potentially backfire in the event that both RPG gunners manage to fire all of their RPGs before being eliminated. The data indicate this possibility did not have a significant affect on the values (occurred in 2 of 480 replications).


3.2.3. Quantitative results for Scenario 1

A summary of the computed MOE values for Scenario 1 together with their corresponding 95% confidence intervals appear in Table 4. With regards to the first MOE (BLUE RCS), recall that the lead vehicle, although stopped by the IED, could still fight until subsequently damaged (see Footnote 11) and the rear vehicle, although targeted by an RPG gunner, has only a chance to be hit before the RPG gunner is killed (getting a shot off in time was not automatic). As stated previously, the IED did not directly enter into this measure.

On BLUE RCS, the Baseline option and the HMG option performed the best whereas the LV25mm/C6 option performed the worst. The options that recorded the lowest number of LAVs killed (Baseline and HMG) were also the ones that had the lowest number of RPGs fired (i.e., the highest %RPGs Prevented), which is in line with expectations. The worst performers with regard to the %RPGs Prevented MOE were the LV25mm/C6 and the C6, wherein one third of all of the available RPG rounds were used, on average (2 rounds fired of 6 available). There was less differentiation between the options with regard to the %RED Losses MOE, since the game was played in such a way that almost all of the RED were killed (RED fought to the last man).

The best overall score was attained by the current baseline, making it the top-ranked option for Scenario 1. The two .50 calibre options ranked second. However, it is easy to see from Table 4 that the HMG option (.50 cal only) was very nearly top-ranked, with a mean score of 93 compared to 94 for the leading option. This point is discussed further in the sensitivity analysis below (Section 3.3). The AGL/C6 option ranked third ahead of the LV 25 mm and C6 options, which shared the bottom rank category (fourth). After discussions with the interactors, it was determined that the most likely reason for the poor performance of these two particular systems were the (modeled) characteristics of the respective ammunition. The LV 25 mm ammunition was the AB round, but it did not have the explosive force of a 40 mm HE ammunition, or the penetrability of a standard 25 mm round or a .50 cal round. Therefore it was more difficult to eliminate RED hiding in buildings or on roof tops. The same holds true for the 7.62 mm round. This led to longer survival times for the RED RPG gunners and enabled them to cause more damage.

Table 4. MOE Results for Scenario 1.

Call Sign Weapon

Mix BLUE

RCS (%) %RED Losses

%RPGs Prevented

Total Score (0..100) Rank

weight 40% 30% 30%

Baseline 25mm / C6 96 ± 2 94 ± 2 90 ± 4 94 ± 2 1

LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm / C6 83 ± 3 87 ± 3 68 ± 4 80 ± 3 4

HMG/C6 .50 cal / C6 93 ± 3 91 ± 3 81 ± 5 89 ± 3 2

AGL/C6 40mm AGL / C6

89 ± 3 93 ± 2 75 ± 3 86 ± 2 3

HMG .50 cal 96 ± 2 94 ± 2 89 ± 4 93 ± 2 2 (1) 15

All

Gam

es

C6 C6 88 ± 4 88 ± 3 67 ± 5 82 ± 3 4

15 Despite significance testing results marginally to the contrary, the authors concur that this option should be considered as top-ranked. See the discussion below for justification (Section 3.3).


The results for the MOPs appear in Table 5. The duration of the engagement of RED by BLUE formed three distinct groups. The AGL/C6 combination was the most time efficient with regards to eliminating the insurgents. Next in line, the Baseline, HMG/C6, HMG and C6 options performed comparably well, whereas use of the LV 25 mm weapon resulted in the longest times. Obviously, in the LV25mm/C6 option, BLUE were not very effective in reducing the RED threat. In terms of the duration of the engagement of BLUE by RED, the Baseline option performed the best.

For the range of engagement (RgOE), maximum and minimum ranges were obtained. The maximum range varied from 50 - 66 m. The minimum RgOE was almost at point blank (11 - 12 m). This was closer than the arming distance of the AGL (36 m), and helps to explain the worse-than-expected performance of this particular system in the urban conflict environment.

Table 5. MOP Results for Scenario 1.

Time (sec) RgOE (m) Call Sign

Weapon Mix

RED by BLUE

BLUE by RED Mean Max Min

Baseline 25mm cannon + C6 158 47 27 50 11

LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm cannon + C6 252 64 26 50 11

HMG/C6 .50 cal + C6 145 53 26 53 12

AGL/C6 40mm AGL + C6 96 73 31 66 12

HMG .50 cal 170 63 28 56 12

C6 C6 150 101 29 65 12

3.3. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1 Following is a sensitivity analysis of the results for Scenario 1 focusing on the influence of the assigned weights on the final rankings. As a test of rank-order stability, four possibilities were considered:

i. BLUE RCS, RED Losses and RPGs Prevented at 33.3% each (appearing as ‘Equal Weights’, below);

ii. BLUE RCS 80%, RED Losses and RPGs Prevented at 10% each (appearing as ‘B80/R10/P10’, below);

iii. BLUE RCS 10%, RED Losses at 80% and RPGs Prevented at 10% (appearing as ‘B10/R80/P10’, below);

iv. BLUE RCS 10%, RED Losses at 10% and RPGs Prevented at 80% (appearing as ‘B10/R10/P80’, below).


Table 6 contains a summary of sensitivity testing scores and final ranks for Scenario 1. The results demonstrate that indeed the best options are the Baseline and the HMG, with the HMG/C6 option consistently ranked second, independent of the weights assigned to the individual MOEs. The AGL/C6 option most often ranked third, rising to second only when heavy emphasis was placed on the %RED Losses MOE. The LV25mm/C6 and C6 options were consistently bottom-ranked. Note that the HMG option is first in three of the four cases tested—even under only a slight change in the weighting scheme—and in the single case where it ranks second, the mean scores of the HMG and baseline options are identical, up to the reported accuracy. Furthermore, in the base ranking scheme, the MOEs and final rankings of the same two options are nearly identical. Since the MOE weights are at least somewhat subjective, this analysis supports the notion that pairing the HMG option with the Baseline option, in preference to the HMG/C6 option, is the most robust choice, given that the HMG/C6 option consistently scored second under all variations in the weighting scheme investigated. For this reason, the authors concur that it should be considered a top ranking option for this scenario, alongside the Baseline option.

Table 6. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1.

Call Sign Weapon Mix

Total Score

Equal

Weight

Rank

Equal

Weight

Total Score

B80 R10 P10

Rank

B80 R10 P10

Total Score

B10 R80 P10

Rank

B10 R80 P10

Total Score

B10 R10 P80

Rank

B10 R10 P80

Baseline 25mm cannon + C6 93 ± 2 1 95 ± 2 1 94 ± 2 1 91 ± 3 1

LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm cannon + C6 79 ± 3 4 82 ± 3 4 85 ± 3 3 71 ± 3 3

HMG/C6 .50 cal + C6 88 ± 3 2 92 ± 3 2 90 ± 3 2 83 ± 4 2

AGL/C6 40mm AGL + C6 86 ± 2 3 88 ± 3 3 91 ± 2 2 79 ± 3 3

HMG .50 cal 93 ± 2 1 95 ± 2 2 94 ± 2 1 90 ± 3 1

C6 C6 81 ± 3 4 86 ± 4 4 86 ± 3 3 71 ± 4 3


3.4. Summary of Scenario 1 findings For Scenario 1, J&I concluded that the current baseline (turret with 25 mm cannon and an additional C6 machine gun) was the best of the considered options. This finding was supported by the quantitative analysis. Furthermore, the J&I conclusion that the overall performance of the 40 mm AGL was not overly impressive is also supported. However, while in the J&I it was concluded that the C6 could be used quite effectively in the urban terrain, the quantitative analysis suggested that the C6 on its own is not a viable option, especially if RED can hide in buildings or on roofs. The LV 25 mm cannon airburst rounds lacked penetrating power against walls making it difficult to engage insurgents using walls as cover, which seemed to play a significant role in this scenario16.

Overall, the quantitative analysis suggests that the 25 mm cannon and the .50 cal HMG were the most effective systems17. The sensitivity analysis confirmed that these findings are robust, and almost independent of the weighting scheme used. Note, however, as a reality check that the RED ambush was not very effective at destroying the BLUE vehicles in this scenario. The BLUE RCS scores for all weapon systems indicate that overall, chances of losing a single vehicle only varied by up to ~13% between the weapon systems, not including the IED that halted the convoy. Furthermore, RED losses were always high and only varied by ~7% between options. Whether or not this constitutes a practical difference from an operational or strategic perspective depends on how the information is to be applied. For example, if the BLUE vehicles were plentiful, the RED forces constant and the operation was of the ‘one-off’ variety, then the difference may not be overly significant. On the other hand, if, for instance, the BLUE vehicles were scarce and twenty such attacks were to be expected in a given month, or if the RED opposition forces became stronger, then the results very well could be significant. As a final note, the ‘RPGs Prevented’ MOE showed the largest variation at ~23% (~1.4 RPGs), and therefore best characterizes the differences between the options in this scenario. To reiterate, the biggest difference was in how quickly the insurgent RPG gunmen were killed or otherwise prevented from firing their weapons (e.g., suppression).

16 Note that, at the time of writing, programmable airburst munitions (PABM) for a Lightweight 25mm cannon and having significant penetrating power are under development by ATK Inc (partially demonstrated, to date, based on a personal communication with ATK Inc.). 17 It is interesting to note that the HMG option faired slightly better than the combined HMG/C6 option when the sensitivity testing is taken into account, suggesting that perhaps having to choose between the two machine guns decreased BLUE’s performance and that overall the HMG was a better choice than the C6 for engaging the enemy. This notion is supported by the poor performance of the ‘C6 only’ option (bottom-ranked), but otherwise it is unsubstantiated and would require further study to confirm or deny.




4. Scenario 2: combat patrol, urban terrain

4.1. Scenario description and setting This scenario tested the options in an open urban environment. The ranges of engagement varied between 400 and 800 m for vehicle-on-vehicle exchanges, and approximately 100 and 400 m when vehicles engaged dismounts.







HMG RWS .50 cal

C6 RWS C6


The BLUE Force (Infantry Platoon) was tasked with clearing a specific route through a built-up area. During the patrol they came into contact with mounted enemy forces on the far side of a large city square. Upon contact, the enemy force dismounted, and used both vehicles and dismounted troops against BLUE. This enabled the comparison of the effectiveness in simultaneously engaging multiple types of targets at the given ranges.

The options listed in Table 7 were gamed in this scenario, which included one turret configuration while the remainder utilized the RWS configuration. A subset of these options, namely the first five listed, was gamed in two additional excursions. In one excursion, a BMP-2 was added to the RED Force. No BMP-2s had been present in the main scenario. In a second excursion, the BMP-2 was again present and the BLUE Force infantry dismounted to combat the RED Force. The C6 option was not gamed in the excursions as it was deemed unrealistic that it would be used against a BMP-2 armoured vehicle. In retrospect, there was little value gained in gaming the C6 option in any scenario where RED armoured vehicles were present (e.g., BRDM or BTR-60)18.

18 Having said that, the C6 assessment in urban scenarios combined with the ATGM assessment in the open terrain scenario (to follow, in Scenario 3) provides an indication of how the combination ATGM / C6 might fair overall, given that the C6 is not likely to be used against armoured vehicles and the ATGMs are not likely to be used in urban scenarios due to collateral damage considerations.



4.1.2. Terrain

The urban terrain used for this scenario was custom built to incorporate the features required for the study (Figure 3). The grid spacing in the figure is 100 m. The size of the city square is approximately 700 m x 500 m. The terrain allowed for a chance contact to occur. With the given combination of flat terrain, open space, and some available cover (buildings), it was expected that a fair assessment of the weapon packages at medium ranges in an open urban environment could be achieved.

4.1.3. Forces

BLUE Force and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 2 appear in Figure 4.

The BLUE Force consisted of an Infantry Platoon of four LAV III vehicles that had the task of patrolling a particular route in an urban environment. The LAV III vehicles were outfitted with the weapon systems as described above (Table 7). In one scenario excursion thirty-one (31) BLUE dismounts were present, armed with six C9 light machine guns, five C8 assault carbines, eighteen C7 assault rifles, one C6 machine gun, and one CARL GUSTAF short range anti-armour weapon (medium) (SRAAW(M)). Note that this differs from doctrine in that there were eight dismounts per section vehicle rather than seven dismounts as per reference [11]. This difference reflects the reality as experienced by the wargame interactors (for example, 1RCR roto 2, 2006-2007).

City Square


The RED Force consisted of eight insurgents. They were armed with two RPGs (3 HEAT rds each), two PKM machine guns (880 rds each) and four AK47 rifles (300 rds each). These RED dismounts were supported by up to three armoured vehicles (depending on the scenario variant) and two soft-skinned vehicles as follows: one BMP-2 (excursions only), one BTR-60, one BRDM and two Pickup trucks armed with 14.5 mm medium machine guns (MMGs). The following were the ammunition loads for each vehicle weapon system:

• BMP-2 (excursions only): 30 mm APT-160 rds, 30 mm HET-450 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds;

• BTR-60: 14.5 mm-2000 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds;

• BRDM: 14.5 mm-500 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds; and

• Pickup Truck: 14.5 mm MMG – 1100 rds.

Twenty civilians populated the urban scene in order to create a sense of realism with regard to the challenges of target recognition in that the gunner could not assume that every detection was an enemy and therefore could be fired upon. They were concentrated in the general vicinity of the RED Force (top right, Figure 4). The civilians were neutral with regard to the two warring parties, and typically headed for cover as soon as the engagement began. BLUE responded to the presence of civilians as per Scenario 1 (see Section 3.1.3).

Figure 4. BLUE and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 2. The grid spacing is 100 m.

RED Force Disposition

BLUE Force Patrol


4.1.4. Blue plan

BLUE’s objective was to patrol a specific route and clear any small pockets of enemy forces encountered. As the BLUE Force approached the city square, they surprised a small group of insurgents that had gathered in the opposite corner of the square. A follow-on engagement occurred as BLUE advanced on the RED forces. This plan was the same for all of the Scenario 2 games including those in which only the vehicles fought and also the excursion whereby the infantry dismounted and fought alongside the vehicles. As per Scenario 1 (Section 3.1.4) the decision to dismount lies with the Platoon Commander or Crew Commander. Realistically, the decision of if and/or when to dismount would be determined after an initial advance to close in on the objective (the RED position), and would be based on how the commander perceived the RED force strength relative to that of BLUE after the advance and also the available cover offered by the terrain for dismounts.

4.1.5. Red plan

A small group of insurgents had gathered at the corner of the city square to regroup and discuss their next intentions. They were completely caught off guard by the BLUE Force patrol and quickly found themselves in a fire fight that they were not able to disengage from. Their only course of action was to fight and destroy as much of the BLUE Force as possible.


As a part of the learning process, the players used practice games to better acquaint themselves with the tactics to be employed as well as to reduce any potential learning curve effects. The actions of RED and BLUE forces are scripted to be realistic and as consistent as possible between individual runs, as opposed to trying to explore a wide set of varying circumstances. Otherwise, it could become extremely difficult or even impossible to distinguish between options if the main variable in the game happened to be, for example, RED behaviour. Due to the large number of options tested, coupled with multiple scenario variants, time constraints allowed for only one or two games for most scenario variants once players were familiar with the games. For each game played, 20 non-interactive replications were generated. Note that the results for the HMG and HMG/C6 options were combined, since the same primary weapon (.50 cal) was used in both options and the C6, which was available only in the HMG/C6 option, was not utilized by the interactors19. The combined options are simply referred to collectively as ‘HMG’ in this section. The number of games and replications, delineated by scenario variant and turret/weapon mix option, is shown in Table 8.

19 In fact, the C6 was used sparingly, if at all, by the interactors in all options having a second weapon available for Scenario 2. Contributing factors were: 1) having vehicle targets to contend with required more use of the main weapon; 2) the longer ranges of engagement provided more opportunity to use the main weapon, especially in the case of the AGL; and 3) in the HMG/C6 option, the HMG and C6 are similar weapons (both machine guns) that can be used to fulfill similar roles.


Table 8. Summary of Wargames Played for Scenario 2.

Scenario Or Variant Call Sign Main Weapon

Total Games Played

Total Replications Processed

Baseline 25mm cannon 2 40 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm cannon 2 40 HMG .50 cal 4 80 AGL/C6 40mm AGL 2 40

Open Urban Square

C6 C6 2 40 Baseline 25mm cannon 2 40 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm cannon 2 40 HMG .50 cal 4 80

+BMP2 Opponents

AGL/C6 40mm AGL 2 40 Baseline 25mm cannon 2 40 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm cannon 1 20 HMG .50 cal 2 40

+BLUE Dismounts

AGL/C6 40mm AGL 1 20


Similar to Scenario 1, the following MOEs were used to assess the relative capabilities of the BLUE Force in Scenario 2. Each is defined such that the higher the value of the MOE, the more favourable it is for BLUE:

• BLUE Residual Combat Strength (RCS). As in Scenario 1, BLUE RCS is an aggregate measure of the capability of the BLUE Force to be able to conduct another mission, without reinforcements. For a mixed force of armoured vehicles and dismounts, armoured vehicles are defined as contributing 80% to the BLUE RCS, whereas dismounts contribute the remaining 20%20. The desired end state for this MOE is 100%, corresponding to no BLUE losses. The relative contributions that the various BLUE Forces made to this MOE were set by the authors and are somewhat arbitrary. They reflect the notion that in this scenario vehicle losses have a large effect on combat capabilities relative to dismount losses;

• % RED Losses. Although slightly more complicated than its Scenario 1 counterpart, this MOE still measures overall RED losses after the engagement. As with BLUE RCS above, for mixed RED forces the various constituents must be assigned weights. For a mixed force of armoured vehicles, soft-skinned vehicles and dismounts, each constituent must be weighed relative to the others. When RED dismounts were present with both types of RED vehicles, armoured vehicles were defined as contributing 50% to this MOE, soft-skinned vehicles 30% and dismounts the remaining 20%. When there were no dismounts, preserving the relative vehicle weights leads to 62.5% for armoured vehicles and 37.5% for soft-skinned vehicles. The desired end state for this MOE is 100%, corresponding to complete annihilation of the RED forces. The relative contributions that the various RED Forces made to this MOE were set by the authors and are consistent with BLUE RCS (above).

20 The RCS formula for dismounts is: ((initial_dismounts – dismounts_killed) / initial_dismounts) x100%.



Table 9 contains the weights of the individual MOEs, arrived at in consultation between the research team and the sponsor. The weights convey the relative importance of each MOE to the decision concerning which option is better. A sensitivity analysis was performed to quantify the dependence of the outcome on the relative MOE weights that were chosen.




%RED Losses 30

TOTAL 100


In keeping with Scenario 1, the following MOPs were used:

a. Range of Engagement. The average killing distance for a given type of ammunition; and

b. Ammunition Effectiveness. For a given ammunition type, this quotient is defined as the total number of kills of the intended type (vehicle or dismount) divided by the total number of bursts fired for the entire set of games. The kills represent either disabled/destroyed vehicles (AP rounds) or killed dismounts (all other rounds). To obtain the (effective) lethality per round, divide by the number of rounds in a burst (see Section 1.4).


4.2.1. Game history

All of the games played out according to the initial plan. There were no problems or difficulties in executing the RED and BLUE tasks.


The following J&I were gathered during gaming of Scenario 2:

i. It seemed that the Baseline option was the best for this scenario. The combination of the 25 mm and C6 in a turret configuration coupled with an extra sensor (‘eyeball’) seemed to make a difference.


ii. The C6 option appeared to be the worst in this scenario. This was deemed in part due to its inability to destroy the RED Force vehicles.

iii. It seemed as though the AGL was effective when fired at a dismounted RED Force

when they were hidden from direct fire.

iv. An excursion was played, whereby the BLUE Force dismounted close to the objective. It seemed as though there were no real gains achieved by doing this, as it was the vehicle weapon systems that caused the majority of the RED casualties.


The quantitative results summarize statistical measurements made on the game replications of Scenario 2 to reveal how well the options could be utilized by BLUE to meet mission goals. Simply stated, the goal was to engage and eliminate RED, causing maximal damage at minimal expense. The scenario variants were analyzed independently of one another. The ranking of the options was categorical and was based on significance testing via BRANDO, as described in Section 2.3.2.

Table 10 contains a summary of scores and final ranks for Scenario 2 using the primary MOE weighting scheme of Table 9. Note that 95% confidence intervals are shown in Table 10 to illustrate the amount of variation in the replication sets, however, they were not specifically used to rank the options (see Section 2.3.2). Features of the three scenario variants are listed:

i. Open Urban Square (basic): The .50 cal option ranked second. All others were in the top-ranked group and were not significantly different from one another to warrant further distinction.

ii. +BMP-2 Opponents: As per item i., above, except that the C6 option was not tested.

iii. +BLUE Dismounts: The Baseline option was the only top-ranked weapon mix in this excursion. All of the remaining options gamed had significantly lower scores. Furthermore, they were statistically indistinguishable from one another and thus all were ranked second.

Overall, the Baseline option alone proved to be a good performer in all three scenario variants. The HMG option consistently underperformed in comparison to the others (always ranked second). The C6 option performed well in the scenario variant where it was available, but mainly on the strength of BLUE RCS since it proved to be ineffective against RED armoured vehicles. In this case, BLUE firepower was concentrated on the targets that could be destroyed by the C6 (RED dismounts and soft-skinned vehicles) while engagements with armoured vehicles were avoided.



Scenario Or Variant Call Sign Main

Weapon BLUE RCS

%RED Losses

Total Score (0..100) Rank

weights 70% 30% Baseline 25mm 51 ± 7 97 ± 2 65 ± 5 1 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm 67 ± 6 97 ± 1 76 ± 5 1 HMG .50 cal 48 ± 4 93 ± 2 61 ± 3 2 AGL/C6 40mm AGL 61 ± 7 99 ± 1 72 ± 5 1

Open Urban Square

C6 C6 81 ± 8 39 ± 3 69 ± 6 1 Baseline 25mm 51 ± 9 93 ± 3 63 ± 7 1 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm 42 ± 10 91 ± 4 57 ± 8 1 HMG .50 cal 26 ± 5 84 ± 3 43 ± 4 2

+BMP2 Opponents

AGL/C6 40mm AGL 31 ± 9 87 ± 5 48 ± 8 1 Baseline 25mm 66 ± 8 97 ± 1 75 ± 6 1 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm 37 ± 12 90 ± 6 53 ± 10 2 HMG .50 cal 37 ± 9 90 ± 4 53 ± 7 2

+BLUE Dismounts

AGL/C6 40mm AGL 53 ± 9 82 ± 4 61 ± 7 2

MOP results are listed in Table 11. The range of engagement against vehicles was comparable for the various weapon systems at approximately 500 m. The range of engagement against dismounts measured between approximately 170-350 m.

In terms of weapon lethality against vehicles in this scenario, the 25 mm APFSDS-T 3-round burst, the LV 25 mm AP 3-round burst, and the .50 cal AP 7-round burst were comparable at approximately 0.4 or higher kills/burst. The 40 mm AGL HEDP AP grenade was slightly lower at 0.3 - 0.4 kills/burst. For eliminating dismounts, the 25 mm HEIT burst, the LV 25 mm AB burst and the 40 mm AGL Std grenade proved more-or-less equally effective at approximately 0.5 to 0.9 kills/burst. The .50 cal Std bullet (7-round burst) measured less than .1 kills/burst. Note, however, that a machine gun is often used to provide suppressive fire, which typically lowers the lethality measure, despite its obvious utility.



Scenario Or Variant Call Sign Primary

Weapon Ammo Round RgOE (m)

Ammo

Effectiveness (kills / burst)

Baseline 25mm APFSDS-T HEIT

544 ± 29 228 ± 17

0.43 0.81

LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm AP AB

558 ± 29 242 ± 16

0.43 0.78

HMG .50 cal AP Std

522 ± 21 219 ± 13

0.39 0.04

AGL/C6 40mm AGL HEDP AP AGL Std

535 ± 32 184 ± 12

0.33 0.69

Open Urban Square

C6 C6 Std 268 ± 19 0.08


536 ± 22 206 ± 18

0.44 0.87


520 ± 23 244 ± 23

0.39 0.93

HMG .50 cal AP Std

473 ± 17 166 ± 12

0.39 0.09

+BMP2 Opponents


461 ± 23 257 ± 22

0.31 0.79


523 ± 21 232 ± 18

0.44 0.64


504 ± 33 212 ± 17

0.46 0.69

HMG .50 cal AP Std

473 ± 26 221 ± 24

0.50 0.08

+BLUE Dismounts


544 ± 33 348 ± 19

0.36 0.53

4.3. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 2 The following is a sensitivity analysis of the results for Scenario 2, focusing on the influence of the assigned weights on the final rankings. As a test of rank-order stability, the following MOE weighting possibilities were considered:

i. BLUE RCS and RED Losses at 50% each (appearing as ‘Equal Weights’, below);

ii. BLUE RCS 80% and RED Losses 20% (appearing as ‘B80/R20’, below);

iii. BLUE RCS 20% and RED Losses 80% (appearing as ‘B20/R80’, below).

Table 12 contains a summary of scores and final ranks for the Scenario 2 sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity features of the three scenario variants are listed:

i. Open Urban Square (basic): The LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options were consistently top-ranked, in agreement with the primary weighting scheme (Table 10). The main inconsistency was that the ranking of the C6 option was quite unstable under sensitivity testing, ranging from a rank of 1 to 4. Rank 1 was obtained only when low emphasis was placed on the %RED Losses MOE. The Baseline option (25 mm / C6) was ranked second in all cases followed by the HMG option which consistently ranked third.

ii. +BMP-2 Opponents: The Baseline, LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options were consistently top-ranked in all cases and the HMG option ranked second, in exact agreement with the results found using the primary weighting scheme shown in Table 10.


iii. +BLUE Dismounts: The Baseline option consistently was the only top-ranked weapon mix and all other options ranked second, in exact agreement with the results found using the primary weighting scheme shown in Table 10.

Overall, it can be concluded that the rankings for Scenario 2 are robust, and nearly independent of wide variations in the weights. The Baseline, LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options proved to be good performers in all three scenario variants. The HMG option consistently underperformed in comparison to the others (always ranked second or lower). The rank-order of the C6 option depended heavily on the weighting scheme used, and only performed well when heavy emphasis was placed on BLUE RCS (and consequently, low emphasis on %RED Losses).

Table 12. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 2.

Scenario Or Variant Call Sign

Total Score

Equal Weight

Rank

Equal Weight

Total Score

B80 R20

Rank

B80 R20

Total Score

B20 R80

Rank

B20 R80

Baseline 74 ± 4 2 60 ± 5 2 88 ± 2 2 LV25mm/C6 82 ± 4 1 73 ± 5 1 91 ± 2 1 HMG 70 ± 3 3 57 ± 4 3 84 ± 2 3 AGL/C6 80 ± 4 1 68 ± 6 1 91 ± 2 1

Open Urban Square

C6 60 ± 5 4 73 ± 7 1 47 ± 4 4 Baseline 72 ± 6 1 59 ± 8 1 84 ± 4 1 LV25mm/C6 67 ± 6 1 52 ± 8 1 81 ± 5 1 HMG 55 ± 4 2 38 ± 4 2 73 ± 3 2

+BMP2 Opponents

AGL/C6 59 ± 7 1 42 ± 8 1 76 ± 5 1 Baseline 82 ± 4 1 72 ± 7 1 91 ± 2 1 LV25mm/C6 64 ± 9 2 47 ± 11 2 80 ± 7 2 HMG 63 ± 6 2 48 ± 8 2 79 ± 5 2

+BLUE Dismounts

AGL/C6 67 ± 6 2 59 ± 8 2 76 ± 4 2

4.4. Summary of Scenario 2 findings J&I combined with quantitative results establish the following three options as top performers in the Open Urban Square scenario: Baseline (25 mm / C6), LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6. Fidelity limits prohibit finer distinction between these three options based solely on the MOEs of the Scenario 2 wargame. Furthermore, the MOPs do not portray any one weapon as advantageous overall compared to the others. By and large, ranges of engagement were comparable for the weapons as was ammunition effectiveness.

The HMG option (which is equivalent to the HMG/C6 option, in this scenario) consistently ranked second or third, and in all cases beneath the top three identified above.

On the whole, under the primary weighting scheme variations in the total option scores ranged from 15-20%, depending on the scenario. The variation was mainly due to BLUE RCS, since RED Losses were consistently high with the exception of the C6 option. BLUE could expect to lose anywhere from one to three of the four available vehicles in total depending on the scenario variant and weapon selection—high enough to be of practical concern.


The sensitivity analysis revealed that, overall, the results are robust over a wide range of MOE weight assignments. The only exception was the C6 option; the rank order of this option varied drastically with the weighting scheme. This indicates that its success in the primary weighting scheme is one-sided, depending heavily on high BLUE RCS emphasis.




5. Scenario 3: combat patrol, open terrain

5.1. Scenario description and setting This scenario tested the options in a meeting engagement operation in open terrain. The ranges of engagement were long, up to 2000 m, typically varying between 800 and 1200 meters.







HMG RWS .50 cal

20mm RWS 20 mm cannon

ATGM RWS ATGM


Scenario 3 featured a BLUE patrol encountering a mounted enemy force in open terrain during a cordon operation. Both forces remained mounted. This scenario evaluated the anti-vehicle effectiveness of the considered systems at extended ranges. The BLUE Force was tasked with seizing and securing an airfield and destroying any enemy pockets. The options listed in Table 13 were gamed in this scenario. The 20mm and ATGM options were late additions to the wargame, which underlies why they were not gamed in the other scenarios. The options included one turret configuration while the remainder utilized the RWS.



5.1.2. Terrain

The terrain used for this scenario was custom built to incorporate the features required for the study (Figure 5). The grid spacing in the figure is 1000 m. The terrain allows for chance contact to occur. With the given combination of flat terrain and open space, a fair baseline assessment of the weapon packages at extended ranges can be achieved.

5.1.3. Forces

BLUE and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 3 appear in Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively.

The BLUE Force consisted of an Infantry Company of 12 LAV III vehicles that had the task of securing the airfield (lower right, Figure 6) for future operations and destroying any enemy pockets in open terrain. Enemy pockets were encountered as the BLUE Force moved towards the airfield/town to complete their mission. The LAV III vehicles were outfitted with the weapon systems as per Table 13. There were no BLUE dismounts present in this scenario.

The RED Force consisted of seven armoured vehicles and four soft-skinned vehicles as follows: three (3) BMP-2s, four (4) BTR-60s and four (4) Pickup trucks armed with MMGs.

Town Airfield


The following were the ammunition loads for each RED vehicle weapon system:

• BMP-2: 30 mm APT-160 rds, 30 mm HET-450 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds;

• BTR-60: 14.5 mm-2000 rds and 7.62 mm-2000 rds; and

• Pickup Truck: 14.5 mm MMG – 1100 rds.

There were no civilians present in this scenario.

Figure 6. BLUE Force disposition for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000m.


Figure 7. RED Force disposition for Scenario 3. The grid spacing is 1000 m.

5.1.4. Blue plan

BLUE’s objective was to secure the airfield and destroy any enemy pockets. The company was to move to designated positions around the town in platoon formations, spread out, and destroy any enemy forces that they encountered. Once in position, the BLUE Force would set up to secure the airfield. Figure 6 shows the initial BLUE Force layout and the general direction of their movement.

5.1.5. Red plan

The RED Force was attempting to seize the town and airfield by force. The town’s airport was required for future RED Force activities. The RED Force was determined to seize the town for their use at all costs. It was a crucial part of their overall plan that would affect future RED activities. Figure 7 shows the initial RED Force layout and the general direction of their movement.



As part of the learning process, the players used practice games to better acquaint themselves with the tactics to be employed as well as to reduce potential learning curve effects. The actions of RED and BLUE forces were scripted to be realistic and as consistent as possible between individual runs, as opposed to trying to explore a wide set of varying circumstances. Otherwise, it could become extremely difficult or even impossible to distinguish between options if the main variable in the game happened to be, for example, RED behaviour. Due to the large number of options tested, time constraints allowed for only three games per option once the players were familiar with the game circumstances. For each interactive game, 20 non-interactive replications were generated. Note that as in Scenario 2, the results for the HMG and HMG/C6 options were combined, since the same primary weapon (.50 cal) was used in both options and the C6, which was only available in the latter option, was not utilized by the interactors owing to the fact that the RgOE and the strength of the opponent rendered it insufficient. The combined option was assigned the call sign ‘HMG’. The number of games and replications for the various options is shown in Table 14.

Table 14. Summary of Wargames Played for Scenario 3.

Scenario Or Variant Call Sign Main Weapon Total Games

Played

Total Replications Processed

Baseline 25mm cannon 3 60 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm cannon 3 60 HMG .50 cal 6 120 AGL/C6 40mm AGL 3 60 20mm 20mm cannon 3 60

Open Terrain

ATGM ATGM 3 60


The MOEs utilized in Scenario 2 (above) were repeated for Scenario 3 with some changes. They consisted of:

• BLUE Residual Combat Strength. As per Scenario 2, but without BLUE dismounts. Only armoured vehicles contributed to BLUE RCS. The desired end state for this MOE is 100%, corresponding to no BLUE vehicle losses; and

• % RED Losses. As per Scenario 2, but without RED dismounts. Armoured vehicles contributed 62.5% of the weight to this MOE, while soft-skinned vehicles filled in the remaining 37.5%. The desired end state for this MOE is 100%, corresponding to complete annihilation of the RED vehicles.


Table 15 contains the weights of individual MOEs arrived at in consultation between the research team and the sponsor. These weights are the same as those chosen for Scenario 2 and, as described above, convey the relative importance of each MOE to the decision


concerning which option is better. The overall score of an option is determined by a weighted sum of the individual MOEs. A sensitivity analysis was performed to quantify the dependence of the outcome on the relative MOE weights that were chosen.




%RED Losses 30

TOTAL 100


In keeping with Scenarios 1 and 2, the following MOPs were used:

a. Range of Engagement. The average killing distance for a given type of round, as per Scenarios 1 and 2; and

b. Ammunition Effectiveness. The total number of vehicle kills divided by the total number of bursts of a given ammunition type fired for the entire set of games. Note that there were no dismounts in this scenario, meaning that only one type of ammunition was used for each weapon. To obtain the (effective) lethality per round, divide by the number of rounds in a burst (see Section 1.4).


5.2.1. Game history

All of the games played out according to the initial plan. There were no problems or difficulties in executing the RED and BLUE plans.


The following J&I were gathered during gaming of Scenario 3:

i. The best option for this scenario seemed to be the Baseline option. It was noticed that the earlier RED was engaged and destroyed, the better;

ii. The worst option seemed to be the HMG option. The .50 cal heavy HMG was not

able to kill the RED Force vehicles quickly enough; iii. This scenario allowed for open, long range engagements. It was observed that those

weapon systems capable of effective long range engagements faired the best. In particular, this was noticed with the 20 mm as it had a shorter range and less effectiveness in comparison to the 25 mm;


iv. The ATGM seemed to be effective, but it would always run out of ammunition (two

missiles only). Once this occurred, the depleted vehicle could not further contribute to the remainder of the conflict; and

v. The BMP-2 was a formidable target; it was the most difficult RED target to destroy.

Consequently, the BMP-2 destroyed a large number of LAVs.


The quantitative results summarize statistical measurements made on the game replications of Scenario 3 to reveal how well the options could be utilized by BLUE to meet mission goals. Simply stated, the goal was to engage and eliminate RED, causing maximal damage at minimal expense.

Table 16 shows the MOE results for Scenario 3. Note that since this scenario did not involve dismounts, the C6, a secondary weapon for several options and the only available weapon for one of them, was not utilized. This fact made the HMG/C6 and HMG options functionally equivalent. Thus they are shown in combination. Furthermore, the C6 option was not gamed since the weapon does not provide sufficient firepower against armoured vehicles.

The ranking of the options was categorical and was based on significance testing via BRANDO, as per Scenario 2. Note that 95% confidence intervals are shown in Table 16 to illustrate the amount of variation in the replication sets; they were not specifically used to rank the options (see Section 2.3.2).


Scenario Call Sign Main Weapon BLUE

RCS %RED Losses

Total Score

(0..100) Rank

weights 70% 30% Baseline 25mm cannon 60 ± 7 89 ± 3 69 ± 5 221 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm cannon 77 ± 4 90 ± 2 81 ± 3 1 HMG .50 cal 53 ± 5 86 ± 3 63 ± 4 2 AGL/C6 40mm AGL 70 ± 4 90 ± 2 76 ± 3 1 20mm 20mm cannon 57 ± 7 78 ± 5 63 ± 6 2

Open Terrain

ATGM ATGM 44 ± 5 73 ± 5 52 ± 5 3

Table 17 shows the MOPs for the primary weapon of each option applied to Scenario 3. Note, as mentioned above, that the C6 was not employed as a primary or secondary weapon in this scenario due to its lack of lethality against armoured vehicle targets.

The range of engagement was comparable for the 25 mm, LV 25 mm and 40 mm AGL at approximately 1100 m. The .50 cal, 20 mm and ATGM engagements occurred at closer ranges on average, entering in at approximately 850 m, 940 m and 770 m respectively.

21 The rank of this option is questionable due to an anomalous game, as discussed later in this Section and in the Summary (Section 5.4).


In terms of weapon lethality against vehicles, the ATGM topped the list at 0.7 kills/burst (missile). This coupled with the RgOE results for the ATGM vs. other weapons suggests that perhaps it could have been used more effectively—the ATGM is effective at longer ranges than employed and the RgOE results indicate that opportunities for engaging RED at such ranges existed. The 25 mm APFSDS-T 3-round burst and the .50 cal AP 7-round burst were comparable at 0.3 kills/burst, and the remaining weapons (LV 25 mm, 40 mm AGL and 20 mm) measured approximately 0.2 kills/burst.


Scenario Call Sign Main Weapon Ammo

Round RgOE (m)

Ammo Effectiveness (kills/burst)

Baseline 25mm cannon APFSDS-T 1116 ± 39 0.28 LV25mm/C6 LV 25mm cannon AP 1094 ± 31 0.21 HMG .50 cal AP 853 ± 23 0.29 AGL/C6 40mm AGL HEDP-AP 1062 ± 43 0.22 20mm 20mm cannon APDS 941 ± 36 0.21

Open Terrain

ATGM ATGM Std 765 ± 51 0.70

The LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options both ranked number 1 in the MOE table (Table 16).

In the second-ranked category, the HMG option and 20 mm option were roughly equivalent in performance (both had a mean score of 63). As evidenced in Table 17, the marginally superior lethality of the .50 cal 7-round burst was offset by a shorter range of engagement compared to the 20 mm 3-round burst. The Baseline option was also ranked second, with the mean score falling roughly midway between the other second-ranked options and that of the 40mm AGL.

The third-ranked category was filled solely by the ATGM option. As noted in the J&I (above), the two ATGMs available per vehicle did not provide sufficient firepower to allow BLUE to prevail in a head-on confrontation with the RED Force.

Had the lone C6 option been tested in Scenario 3, it surely would have ranked last, since no RED kills would have been possible under the given circumstances.

It is surprising that the Baseline option (25 mm/C6) ranked lower on the MOE scale than the LV25mm/C6. A model feature comparison with the LV 25 mm suggests that, in this scenario, it should have done at least as well (better sensors, more lethal weapon). This conclusion is further supported by J&I and the recorded lethality (Ammunition Effectiveness MOP is higher for the 25 mm round, see Table 17). One reason that the LV 25 mm faired better than the baseline 25 mm option was that significantly more LV rounds were fired down range (11.4% vs. 8.4% of 105 available rounds per vehicle, on average). Even taking this into account, however, evidence suggests that an unusual or unlikely game may have swayed the results. Indeed, closer analysis of the individual games revealed an anomaly—in replications of the first game of the Baseline option series, BLUE suffered unusually high casualties and BLUE RCS came in at only 30%. Also, on average, replications of this game lasted nearly twice as long as replications of the other two games with most of the BLUE casualties occurring long after the other games had finished. This particular game turned out, by far, to exhibit the largest deviation of any MOE within all of the Scenario 3 gaming sets. It is not unusual for individual games to exhibit high variability, and with only three games played for each option,


one somewhat extreme result can have a large influence on the averaged quantities of interest. Unfortunately, time and resource constraints did not permit more games to better stabilize such effects. At any rate, it is worth noting that if the single, extreme game is dropped, the Baseline option falls in line with the LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options as top-ranked. Having said that, there is not enough evidence to simply do so and the point is discussed further in the Summary (Section 5.4 below).

5.3. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 3 Following is a sensitivity analysis of the MOE results for Scenario 3, focusing on the influence of the assigned weights on the final rankings. The same four possibilities were considered as in Scenario 2.

Table 18 contains a summary of scores and final rankings for the options in Scenario 3. The final rankings for all variations in the weighting scheme are identical to those obtained for the (unaltered) primary study weights (Table 16). The LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options were consistently top-ranked, Baseline, 20 mm and HMG options were mid-ranked, and the ATGM option faired the worst in every case. Thus it can be concluded that the rankings for Scenario 3 are robust, and independent of wide variations in the assigned MOE weights. As a final note, BLUE RCS was the better discriminator of the two MOEs, exhibiting a greater range of variation than %RED Losses.

Table 18. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 3.

Scenario Call Sign

Total Score

Equal Weights

Rank

Equal Weights

Total Score

B80 R20

Rank

B80 R20

Total Score

B20 R80

Rank

B20 R80

Baseline 75 ± 4 2 66 ± 6 2 83 ± 3 2 LV25mm/C6 83 ± 3 1 80 ± 3 1 87 ± 2 1 HMG 70 ± 5 2 60 ± 6 2 80 ± 4 2 AGL/C6 80 ± 3 1 74 ± 4 1 86 ± 2 1 20mm 68 ± 5 2 61 ± 6 2 74 ± 5 2

Open Terrain

ATGM 58 ± 4 3 50 ± 5 3 67 ± 4 3

5.4. Summary of Scenario 3 findings J&I combined with quantitative results establish the following two options as top performers in the Open Terrain scenario: LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6. Fidelity limits prohibit finer distinction between these options based solely on the MOEs of the Scenario 3 wargame.

Mid-level performers consisted of the HMG and 20 mm options, both of which yielded comparable performance results. The .50 calibre HMG option yielded higher weapon lethality; however, it was at the expense of a closer range of engagement. The Baseline (25 mm cannon) was also mid-ranked. However, as an indicator of how well the weapon would perform in this scenario, this ranking is suspect since 1) it directly contradicts J&I where it was stated that Baseline option was the best; 2) the 25 mm cannon is modeled as a superior weapon to the LV 25 mm cannon for this scenario (which was top-ranked); 3) The sensing for


the Baseline option is superior to that of the RWS options; and 4) a single, anomalously bad game for BLUE is driving the statistical measures below the top-ranked threshold. Bearing in mind all of the evidence, the author’s judge that realistically, the 25 mm cannon may be considered as a top option for this scenario relative to the other weapon systems. For purposes of evaluation in this study, however, the given ranking for the Baseline option must stand as is (2).

The bottom performer of the options gamed was the ATGM option, owing to the fact that only two ATGM missiles were available and the setting was a head-on confrontation with no plans to disengage. Also, the range of engagement was the shortest, thus exposing BLUE to higher lethality from RED weaponry. Given the high kill probability of the ATGM, it may yet prove its worth as a controlled withdrawal weapon for disengaging the enemy, or in support of other firepower assets.

On the whole, under the primary weighting scheme the total option scores varied up to 29%—higher than the variation observed in Scenarios 1 and 2. The variation was mainly due to BLUE RCS for all but the 20 mm cannon and ATGM options, which had a low result for the RED LOSSES MOE. BLUE could expect to lose anywhere from three to seven of the twelve available vehicles in total depending on the weapon selection—a figure that is certainly high enough to be of practical concern.

The sensitivity analysis revealed that, overall, the results are robust over a wide range of MOE weight assignments.


6. Summary and recommendations

6.1. Summary Overall in the three scenarios, the baseline weapon/turret mix, consisting of the 25 mm cannon and co-axial C6 machine gun mounted on a two-man turret, was the most consistent high-ranking performer (see Table 19 for a comparison of the (unaltered) rankings). This was most evident in Scenario 1, which was typified by close-quarters urban combat. In that scenario, both of the .50 calibre HMG options, with or without the C6, also performed well. Next, the AGL/C6 option performed reasonably well compared to the top Scenario 1 options. Lastly, the LV25mm/C6 and C6 options were the worst options for Scenario 1. Differentiation in Scenario 1 results is mostly based on BLUE RCS and the ability of BLUE to effectively eliminate the RPG gunners, since %RED Losses were comparable across all of the options. These results for Scenario 1 are consistent with J&I, where it was indicated that having an extra sensor available was advantageous when employing the Baseline option, and the limited effectiveness of the AGL/C6 option was mainly due to the close ranges and the arming distance required for the 40 mm AGL. The poor performance of the LV25mm/C6 option was not commented on in the J&I, however post-analysis discussions suggested that it was possibly caused by the lower performance of LV 25 mm AB rounds compared to both standard 25 mm (lower penetrability) and 40 mm HE rounds (lower explosive power). This lack of anti-structure capability provided the RPG gunners with a better chance of engaging the LAVs while hidden behind walls or on rooftops. In Scenario 1 it was noted that, at the time of writing, programmable airburst munitions (PABM) having significant penetrating power are under development for a Lightweight 25mm cannon (see Footnote 16). The availability of such a round could significantly increase the performance of the notional LV25mm in urban terrain.

Table 19. Rank Category Tally for Main Weapons Common to All Scenarios.

Main Weapon Counts

Baseline 25mm

LV25mm AGL HMG

# scenarios option was top-ranked 2 2 2 0*

# scenarios option was ranked second 1 0 0 3

# scenarios option was ranked third or below 0 1 1 0

*The HMG option was very nearly in the top-ranked group in Scenario 1, whereas the HMG/C6 option clearly ranked second.

The situation changes somewhat when moving to more open terrain and longer ranges. In part, this was due to a lesser distinction between SA derived from Baseline versus RWS sensor configurations coupled with a reduced requirement to penetrate structures that provide cover for RED.

J&I combined with quantitative results establish the following three options as top performers in both the Open Urban (Scenario 2) and the Open Terrain (Scenario 3) scenarios: Baseline (25 mm / C6), LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6. Fidelity limits prohibit finer distinction between the latter two options based solely on the MOEs of the two scenarios, however, the Baseline option came in a close second in Scenario 3. Looking at the MOPs does not help to further


distinguish between the options; overall average killing distances and effective weapon lethalities were comparable for all three options.

Mid-level performers in Scenarios 2 and 3 consisted of the HMG and 20 mm options, both of which yielded comparable performance results in Scenario 3 (recall that the 20 mm was not gamed in Scenario 2). The .50 calibre HMG options yielded higher weapon lethality; however, it was at the expense of a closer range of engagement.

The bottom performer in Scenario 2 was judged to be the C6. It was not effective against armoured vehicles and thus exposed an unacceptable vulnerability to the RED forces. Had RED sent their armoured vehicles on attack and disengaged the remainder of their assets, results suggest that BLUE may have been obliterated and few losses would have been incurred by RED. The bottom performer in Scenario 3 was the ATGM option, owing to the fact that only two ATGM missiles were available and the setting was a head-on confrontation with no plans to disengage.

The sensitivity analysis for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 revealed that, overall, these results are robust over a wide range of MOE weight assignments.

Taking both the qualitative and quantitative results from all three scenarios into account, in addition to their sensitivities, it appears as though the Baseline option is the favoured choice overall. However, it must be noted that differences in the performance of the Baseline option compared to the HMG option in Scenario 1 were not profound, and neither were differences between the Baseline option and the LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options in Scenarios 2 & 3.

The LV25mm/C6 and AGL/C6 options are particularly strong contenders; however, their function in a close urban environment must be further assessed and possibly supplemented if employed. In particular, ammunition for the LV 25mm with a higher lethality against insurgents utilizing structures for cover would improve weapon performance in the urban setting. The HMG and 20 mm options were mid-ranked overall, while the C6 and ATGM options faired poorly. Note that since the C6 can only be considered as viable against dismounts and the ATGM option is only viable against vehicles in open terrain, this coupled with the fact that each performed poorly indicates that a combined ATGM / C6 option would not fair well in the scenarios gamed in this study.

A few caveats must be included at this point to aid the comparison between the 40 mm AGL and the LV 25 mm Cannon. First, an added consideration in extended range, open terrain scenarios is that use of the 40 mm AGL may be increasingly problematic at longer ranges against fast moving targets due to the low velocity and curved trajectory of these rounds, and consequently their long flight time. This did not appear to be overly significant in the modeled scenarios, but the results are subject to the fidelity limits of the represented entities and thus a more in-depth analysis of the utility of the 40 mm AGL as an effective weapon against moving targets at extended ranges would be prudent. Although hit and kill probabilities are discounted in CAEn based on the motion of the firer and the target, an in-depth study of this aspect of the wargame was not performed. Such a study must take into account any fire control systems employed and the method of target acquisition for dismount and vehicle sized targets at all required ranges (e.g., RWS synthetic vision sensor system vs. natural vision in a ‘hatches up’, limited viewing arc configuration). Second, lack of a dual feed mechanism for the AGL limits its flexibility for most RWS systems in comparison to the LV 25 mm Cannon. Third, the apparent LV 25 mm deficiency in urban terrain potentially could be remedied in the near future via programmable airburst munitions (PABM) having significant penetrating power. Such rounds are known to be under development at the time of writing by ATK Inc. for their Lightweight 25 mm Cannon.


A final, but important point needs to be made here. The mechanism and synthetic vision sensors of the RWS are more vulnerable than the ones protected by a turret. Thus the likelihood of a firepower kill might be higher than considered in this study. Furthermore, the RWS might be disabled using small arms (such as assault rifles or light machine guns) that would not damage the current turret. With this knowledge, RED might try to target the RWS (top of the vehicle), rather than firing at the centre of the mass as is assumed in CAEn. This is something that should be considered carefully when evaluating vehicle kill probabilities for future studies. On the other hand, for the baseline two-man turret, the ‘eyeball’ sensors could not be destroyed either. Personnel kills via small arms fire for crew members in the turret were not modeled.

6.2. Recommendations According to the quantitative results of the three scenarios gamed and also the judgement and insights of the wargame interactors, the current weapon and turret configuration of the LAV III fighting vehicle is the most robust choice overall in comparison to the other options gamed. However, in most cases the differences in performance between leading and near-leading options, although statistically significant, were not profound. Several RWS options were comparable to the baseline in some of the scenarios, most notably when fitted with either an LV 25 mm cannon or 40 mm AGL in more open terrain (Scenarios 2 and 3), and to a lesser extent the .50 cal HMG in close urban combat (Scenario 1). None of the alternative options scored consistently high in all three scenarios. Note that the 20 mm cannon cannot enter into the overall evaluation since it was only present as an excursion in Scenario 3 (where it ranked second). The LV 25 mm cannon, although a strong contender in Scenarios 2 and 3, performed poorly in the close-action urban environment of Scenario 1. This seemed to be related to the insufficient anti-structure capability of the modeled airburst ammunition utilized for this weapon system which made it difficult to kill insurgents using walls or other structures as cover. Coupled with the fact that the .50 cal HMG was mid- or bottom-ranked in the open terrain scenarios when fighting armoured vehicles, and setting all scenarios as equally important, the wargame results indicate that the best alternative to the current 25mm / C6 weapon system is the 40 mm AGL / C6. This weapon system was top-ranked in Scenarios 2 and 3 alongside the LV 25 mm / C6 option, and ranked third in Scenario 1 above the LV 25 mm / C6 option. AGL use in Scenario 1 had distinctive benefits and drawbacks. On the positive side, 40 mm airburst rounds were lobbed over structures and made to effectively impact hidden, dismounted enemies behind walls or on rooftops. On the negative side, the close-action combat of Scenario 1 was impeded by the arming distance of the 40 mm AGL, which was set to 36 m in the CAEn database. In this case the co-axial C6 MG was required to engage proximal targets.

From a turret/weapon mix effectiveness perspective, it is recommended that the current configuration of the LAV III be maintained or improved upon through upgrades.

Also, it is recommended that before any of the RWS options are adopted, that sensing aspects at all relevant ranges, in simple and complex terrains, be studied more thoroughly in terms of the differences between synthetic vision and natural vision (eyeballs) when scanning the environment to acquire targets under realistic restrictions for viewing arcs (see reference [12] for preliminary work in this area). In addition, the nature of the vulnerability of the RWS to small arms fire requires more in-depth study. This vulnerability must be assessed for any RWS candidate under consideration before a final acquisition decision is made. Lastly, new developments in 25 mm low velocity ammunition should be monitored closely.


Future Work

As a final note, it is recommended that environment-specific human factors considerations be explored more carefully to better capture the nuances of target acquisition and time to having a round on target under the operating constraints of the various turret/weapon/sensor combinations under consideration, whatever they might consist of in future studies.




7. References

1. Pond G., Chapman B., Cazzolato F. (2009), A General Comparison Between Remote Weapon Stations, Remote Turrets and Conventional Turrets (U), (DRDC CORA (under review)) Defence R&D Canada - CORA..

2. Alliant Techsystems Inc. (online), ATK gun systems, http://www.atk.com/ammo_PDFs/gunsystems.pdf (Access Date: August 2009)

3. Bernier, M.Y. (2001), CAEn Post-gaming Analysis (PGA) Tool (U), (DRDC ORD RN 2001/03) Defence R&D Canada - ORD.

4. Bernier, M.Y. and Jensen, G.K. (2005), CAEnXP Training Program (U), (DRDC ORD TM 2005-16) Defence R&D Canada - ORD.

5. Jane’s Armour and Artillery, Jane’s Data Services, 2007-2008; Jane’s Ammunition Handbook, Jane’s Data Services, 2007-2008; Jane’s Electro-Optic Systems, Jane’s Data Services, 2008-2009; Jane’s Infantry Weapons, Jane’s Data Services, 2008-2009.

6. Jensen, G.K. and Dobias, P. (2009), The DRDC CORA CAEn Database Documentation v3.0 Volume I: Units, Weapons, Sensors and Ammunition (U), (DRDC CORA TN 2009-001) Defence R&D Canada - CORA.

7. Woodill, G. and Bassindale, S. (2006), Titanium Mongoose: Portable Multiple Effects Weapon Study (U), (DRDC CORA TR 2006-21) Defence R&D Canada - CORA.

8. Box, G.E.P, Hunter, J.S., Hunter, W.G (2005), Statistics for experimenters: Design, Innovation, and Discovery, Wiley, ISBN 978-0-471-71813-0, 2005.

9. Emond, E.J. and Turnbull, A.E. (2006), BRANDO: Breakpoint Analysis with Nonparametric Data Option (U), (DRDC CORA TM 2006-40) Defence R&D Canada - CORA.

10. P. Dobias, K. Sprague, G. Woodill, P. Cleophas, W. Noordkamp (2008), Measures of Effectiveness and Performance in Tactical Combat Modeling (U), (DRDC CORA TM 2008-032) Defence R&D Canada - CORA.

11. LAV Company Tactics (Interim), B-GL-321-007/FP-001, DND/MDN 2003. http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/ael/pubs/B-GL-321-007-FP-001.pdf

12. Unrau, D. and Pyke, A. (2009), Final Report – TAPV Task Network Modelling: IPME Based Task Network Modelling for the Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle Project, (under revision at time of writing), Defence R&D Canada.




List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms

AA Anti armour AB Air burst AGL Automatic grenade launcher AP Armour piercing APC Armoured personnel carrier APDST Armour piercing discarding sabot – tracer APFSDS-T Armoured piercing fin stabilized discarding sabot – tracer ATGM Anti-tank guided missile BMP Boyevaya Mashina Pechoty, meaning “fighting vehicle of infantry” BRANDO Breakpoint Analysis with Nonparametric Data Option

BRDM Boyevaya Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina, meaning “Combat Reconnaissance Patrol Vehicle”

BTR Bronetransportyor, meaning “armoured transporter” CAEn Close Action Environment CF Canadian Forces CORA Centre for Operational Research and Analysis DGLCD Director General of Land Capability Development DLR Director of Land Requirements DND Department of National Defence DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada ERA Explosive reactive armour FOV Field of view HE High Explosive HEAT High explosive anti-tank HEDP-AP High explosive dual purpose – armour piercing HEIT High explosive incendiary tracer HMG Heavy Machine Gun IED Improvised Explosive Device J&I Judgements and Insights LAV Light armoured vehicle LCDORT Land Capability Development Operational Research Team LFORT Land Forces Operational Research Team LV Low velocity MCDA Multi-criteria decision analysis MMG Medium machine gun MOE Measure of Effectiveness MOP Measure of Performance NFOV Narrow field of view


OR Operational Research RCS Residual Combat Strength RgOE Range of Engagement RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade RWS Remote Weapon Station SB Suicide Bomber SME Subject Matter Expert SSKP Single-shot kill probability TAPV Tactical armoured patrol vehicle TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures


Distribution List DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

Internal Dr. Peter Dobias (hard copy, CD) Dr. Kevin Sprague (hard copy, CD) Maj Steve Bassindale (hard copy, CD)

DG DRDC CORA (CD) DDG DRDC CORA (CD) Chief Scientist DRDC CORA (CD) Section Head, Land and Operational Commands (email) LFORT (CD, hard copy) LCDORT (CD) CEFCOM ORT (CD) CANSOFCOM ORT (CD) CanadaCOM ORT (CD) DRDC CORA Library (Hard copy, CD) Total internal copies: 13

External

ADM(S&T) (for distribution) (CD) Director S&T Land (CD) DRDKIM 3 (CD) DG DRDC Valcartier (CD) CF College Library CFANS Library Fort Frontenac Library COS(Ops) [DGLS] (BGen Poulter) (e-mail) [email protected] COS(Strat) [DGLCD] (BGen Tremblay) (e-mail) [email protected] COS LFDTS (Col MacLean) (e-mail) [email protected] DLS [DLSP] (Col M Lavoie) (e-mail) [email protected] G3 [DLFR] (Col C King) (e-mail) [email protected] DLCD (Col Crosman) (e-mail) [email protected] DLR (Col Lanthier) (CD, hard copy) [email protected] DLSE (LCol Bassarab) (e-mail) [email protected] DLSE 4 (LCol Lefebvre) (e-mail) [email protected] DLR 3 (Maj Sauvé) (e-mail, hard copy) [email protected] DLFD (Col Harvey) (e-mail) [email protected] DLCI (Col Saulnier) (e-mail) [email protected] DAT (Col Thomas) (e-mail) [email protected] DAD (Col Rutherford) (e-mail) [email protected]

UNCLASSIFIED


International Dr David Galligan (CD, e-mail), Head Operations Analysis, Defence Technology Agency, HMNZ Naval Base Auckland, Private Bag 32901 Auckland, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Jason Field (CD) Land Battlespace Systems Dstl Integrated Systems Fort Halstead Sevenoaks, Kent, UK, TN147BP

Document Exchange Manager (CD) DSTO Research Library Defence Science & Technology Organisation PO Box 44 Pyrmont NSW 2009, AUSTRALIA

Dr. Neville J Curtis (CD) Research Leader Land Operations Research 75 Labs Land Operations Division PO Box 1500 Edinburgh SA 5111, AUSTRALIA

(for dist’n and library) (CD) Chief Technologist Land Battlespace Systems Dstl Integrated Systems Room 31, Bldg A3, Fort Halstead Sevenoaks, Kent, UK, TN14 7BP

Mr. Bob Barbier (CD) TNO Defence, Security and Safety Information and Operations P.O. Box 96864, 2509 JG The Hague, The Netherlands

Director, US AMSAA (CD) ATTN: AMSRD-AMS-S) 392 Hopkins Road APG, MD 21005-5071

Mr. Patrick O’Neill (CD) Chief, Combat Support Analysis Division USAMSAA (ATTN: AMSRD-AMS-S) 392 Hopkins Road APG, MD 21005-5071

Dr. James T. Treharne (CD) OCA Division Center for Army Analysis 6001 Goethals Road Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230

Mr. Robert Barrett (CD) Chief, International Activities Center for Army Analysis 6001 Goethals Road Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230

Mr. John Hughes (CD) HQ, TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) Programs & Resources Directorate (PRD) 255 Sedgwick Avenue Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2345

Total external copies: 32 Total copies: 45

UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FORM


(highest classification of Title, Abstract, Keywords)

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA (Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified) 1. ORIGINATOR (the name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared e.g. Establishment Sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in Section 8).

DRDC CORA Department of National Defence Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (overall security classification of the document, including special warning terms if applicable)

UNCLASSIFIED

3. TITLE (the complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in parentheses after the title)

Weapon System Effectiveness for the LAV III Life Extension Program: CAEn Wargame Nickel Tiger (U) 4. AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials—ranks, titles, initials not to be used)

Dobias, P., Sprague, K., Bassindale, S., Sinclair, D., Demaine, J. 5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (month Year of Publication of document) September 2009

6a. NO OF PAGES 51

6b. NO OF REFS 12

7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (the category of document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.)

Technical Memorandum 8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (the name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development. Include the address).

CLS DGLCD/COS Land Strat; DRDC CORA / LFORT 9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.) N/A

9b. CONTRACT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.) N/A

10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (the official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.) DRDC CORA TM 2009-038

10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NOS. (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)

11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.) (X) Unlimited distribution ( ) Distribution limited to defence departments and defence contractors: further distribution only as approved ( ) Distribution limited to defence departments and Canadian defence contractors; further distribution only as approved ( ) Distribution limited to government departments and agencies; further distribution only as approved ( ) Distribution limited to defence departments; further distribution only as approved ( ) Other (please specify): 12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in 11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.) NONE



13. ABSTRACT (a brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the test is bilingual).

The Chief of Staff Land Strategy requested that an operational research (OR) study be conducted to assess the effectiveness of a light remote weapon station (RWS) mounted on a LAV III, in comparison to the current two-man Delco turret. The Land Forces Operational Research Team (LFORT) consequently performed a wargame study to compare the effectiveness of various weapon configurations for the RWS on LAV III vehicles in addition to the currently used 25 mm cannon (baseline). The assessment was based on a series of modeled scenarios whereby the vehicles performed convoy protection and patrol operations in complex urban and open terrains during daylight conditions. The chosen locale allowed for ambush and chance encounters with insurgent forces to occur. The study was denoted as NICKEL TIGER. The BLUE force consisted of either a LAV Platoon or Company and in some cases involved BLUE dismounts. The RED force consisted of dismounts having machine guns or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at their disposal, in addition to soft-skinned vehicles and light armoured vehicles having either a medium machine gun (MMG) or a 30mm cannon as the main weapon. In the study, the following weapon options were considered for the RWS: a notional 25 mm low velocity (LV) cannon, a 40 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL), a .50 calibre heavy machine gun (HMG), a 20 mm cannon, a 7.62 mm C6 machine gun, and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The wargame results indicate that the current weapon/turret configuration for the LAV III is the best option overall. The performances of the 25 mm LV cannon and 40 mm AGL were comparable to the baseline option in the open terrain scenarios, but they proved less lethal in the urban scenarios, in part due to their lack of penetrability of structures that were providing cover for dismounted insurgents. The .50 calibre performance was comparable to the baseline option in the urban scenarios, but was not as effective in the open terrain scenarios. The 20 mm cannon was evaluated as an excursion in a single, open terrain scenario. In that scenario, its overall performance was similar to that of the .50 calibre HMG (beneath baseline, LV 25mm and 40mm AGL options).

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus-identified . If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

Remote weapon station Weapon effectiveness Wargame


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WEAPON SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE LAV III LIFE … · C6 of the LAV III. Results According to the...

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