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Weaponizing Space: Technologies and Policy Choices

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Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely the views of the author and not of her employer, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, the RAND Corporation, or of the U.S. Government. Weaponizing Space: Technologies and Policy Choices. Dana J. Johnson, Ph.D. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Weaponizing Space: Technologies and Policy Choices Dana J. Johnson, Ph.D. Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University 20 April 2005 Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely the views of the author and not of her employer, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, the RAND Corporation, or of the U.S. Government.
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Page 1: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

Weaponizing Space: Technologies and Policy Choices

Dana J. Johnson, Ph.D.

Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University

20 April 2005

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely the views of the author and not of her employer, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, the RAND Corporation, or of the U.S. Government.

Page 2: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions

Page 3: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Characterizing the “Space Weaponization Debate”

Pro Arguments Just as other environments are used for offensive military purposes, so will the

environment of space be used Emerging threats to our national interests and assured access to space require

we develop and maintain capabilities to protect our space assets The U.S. economy and way of life depend on space systems The space weaponization debate is a red-herring. Space was weaponized long

ago by the transit of ballistic missiles

Con Arguments Space should remain a sanctuary for peaceful scientific uses Space weaponization is:

Not inevitable and international agreements barring weaponization are possible and desirable

Pre-mature and the sanctuary status of space is in the interests of the United States

Use of space weapons would create harmful orbital debris There is no conceivable scenario in which space weapons provide a benefit

greater than their harm

Page 4: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions

Page 5: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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National Space Policy (1996)

The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. "Peaceful purposes" allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of sovereign nations to acquire data from space. The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights.

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National Space Policy (1996) (Cont.)

National security space activities shall contribute to U.S. national security by:

(a) providing support for the United States' inherent right of self-defense and our defense commitments to allies and friends;

(b) deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending against enemy attack; (c) assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space; (d) countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile

purposes; (e) enhancing operations of U.S. and allied forces; (f) ensuring our ability to conduct military and intelligence space-related

activities; (g) satisfying military and intelligence requirements during peace and

crisis as well as through all levels of conflict; (h) supporting the activities of national policy makers, the intelligence

community, the National Command Authorities, combatant commanders and the military services, other federal officials, and continuity of government operations.

Page 7: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Importance of Space to the U.S.

Contributed $100 billion to US economy in 2000

Weather satellites – improved severe weather predictions

Communications – point to point and broadcast

GPS– Navigation—commercial and civil exceed military applications– Ubiquitous timing signal—enables global Internet

Environmental monitoring– Geodesy– Mapping– Terrain Characterization

Page 8: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Space: An Economic Center of Gravity and Thus, a Vital National Interest

Today:

Over 600 Active Satellites (200+ US Satellites)

Over $100 Billion US Dollars Invested

Future: Forecast 20% annual growth in space investments

GPS-related products: $8 Billion (2001) projected to grow to $50 Billion by 2010

ResourceManagementPrecision

Farming

WeatherPrediction Communications

Surveying

Page 9: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions

Page 10: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Space Missions*

Space Force Support: launching satellites and day-to-day management of on-orbit assets

Space Force Enhancement: includes all space operations aimed at increasing effectiveness of terrestrial military operations

Space Control: ensuring our use of space while denying the use to our adversaries

Space Force Application: combat operations in, through, and from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict

*United States Strategic Command Fact File, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/spacemissions.htm

Page 11: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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• Ensure Use of Space Assets• Enhance Survivability

• Maneuver• Harden• Redundancy

Protect• Detect, Identify and Track Man-made

Space Objects• Worldwide Network

• Radar• Optical Trackers• Infrared

Surveil

NegatePreventPrevent Adversaries From Exploiting US or Allies Space Services

Disrupt, deny, degrate, deceive or destroy adversary space capabilities

• Encryption• Shutter Control Lin

k

Space Control

Assure Freedom of Action in Space and Deny SameAssure Freedom of Action in Space and Deny Same

SPACE SEGMENT

GROUND SEGMENT

Page 12: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Space Control: ASAT Concepts

Direct Ascent (Ballistic Trajectory) Ground-launched Air-launchedCo-orbital Interceptor Space mineDirected Energy Weapons Ground-based Air-based Space-basedElectronic Warfare Ground-based Space-based

Conventional explosive Nuclear warhead Pellet cloud Aerosols Hit-to-kill Induced fragmentation Component burnout Power disruption Jamming Takeover Physical tampering

Source: Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space, Jane’s, 1987, p. 138.

Types of NegationASAT Systems

Page 13: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Legacy ASAT Development Project SAINT (SAtellite INTerceptor) (1950s-1962) Early Spring: conventional ASAT, Polaris launch (1960s) Program 505: prototype Nike Zeus DM-15S ABM (1962-1966) Program 437: Thor launch, Mk 49 nuclear warhead (1964) Program 922: Thor IRBM launch, non-nuclear suborbital ASAT in development

(late 1960s)May 1972 signing of SALT I Treaty prohibited interference with NTM SPIKE: suborbital conventional ASAT air-launched from F-106; MHV with non-

nuclear kill capability (1970s) Conventional ASAT: low-risk, off-the-shelf technology alternative using pellets

(1970s) USB: platform for space-borne weapons, crewed, Proton launch (late

1970s/early 1980s) Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile: F-15 launch, 2-stage + MHV, successful

intercept 1985 (1977-1980s) Terra-3: ground-based laser, Sary Shagan (1970s-1980s) RP: space-based rocket interceptor (similar to US Brilliant Pebbles) (1980s)

Note that dates are approximateUS Activity USSR Activity Other

Page 14: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Legacy ASAT Development (Cont.) Zenith Star: prototype space combat satellite using Alpha laser (1987) KS: space station with military free-flying autonomous modules dispensing

nuclear warheads (1980s) Polyus: combat satellite testbed using Energia launcher; launch failure in 1987

(1985-1987) KE ASAT: Army direct ascent kinetic energy ASAT, with kinetic kill vehicle

launched by rocket booster (1989-1990s) Gun-launched ASAT: supergun design by Gerald Bull for Iraq, for blinding

Western satellites (1995) Star Lite: space laser concept, to be launched on Titan 4 (1991) HERTF: High Energy Research and Technology Facility, Kirtland AFB, NM,

high-powered microwave and advanced technology weapon system development

Space-Based Laser: Operational SBL Orbital Vehicle, chemical laser system, part of SDI program (1996)

Space Laser Demo: concept (1996)

Note that dates are approximateUS Activity USSR Activity Other

Page 15: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Polyus (USSR)

Page 16: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Space Control: Protecting Space Assets

Hardening/shielding of system

components

Developing robust battle management

Improving system maneuverability

Attaining adequate force protection

Developing adequate defensive

information operations

Threat warning and assessment

reporting

Space weather sensor systems

Mobile mission processors

Diagnostics and repair technology

Quick launch recovery

Modeling and simulation

Detect and report

threat/attacks

Identify, locate, and classify

threats

Withstand and defend

Reconstitute and repair

Assess missions impact

Functional CapabilitiesOperational Needs

Page 17: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Space Force Application

Apply Force From SpaceApply Force From SpaceApply Force From SpaceApply Force From Space

• Currently no weapons in Space

• DoD Space Policy (1999) tasks US military to plan for Force Application from space

• International law & treaties prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space

• “Conventional” weapons are not prohibited

Page 18: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Space Force Application:Influencing the Terrestrial Battlespace

Defined as: “…things intended to cause harm that are based in

space or that have an essential element based in space. The degree of harm…may range from temporary disruption to permanent destruction or death.”*

Generic alternatives: Space-based directed-energy and kinetic-energy

weapons against missile targets Kinetic-energy weapons against ground targets Conventional weapons against ground targets

*Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND, 2002, p. 23.

Page 19: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Comparison of Weapon Types and Their Operational Utility

Targets

Effects

Responsiveness

Number of Weapons in Constellation

Directed Energy Mass-to-Target Weapons

Laser, RF, particle beam, etc.

Kinetic energy against missile targets

Kinetic energy against surface targets

Space-based conventional weapons

Soft, located from the surface to space, any speed

Hardened targets above 60 km moving at great speed

Hardened fixed or slow-moving targets on Earth

Hardened targets, either fixed or moving at moderate speeds, surface or air

Several dozens for each needed to reach a particular target in desired time

Lethal impact Vertical, limited-depth penetrator

Inherited from conventional munitions

Seconds A few minutes A few hours About 10 mins plus time it takes weapon to reach target after delivery from space

Several dozens

Range from nonlethal jamming to lethal heating; finite, inherently “thin” defense

About 6 in reserve for each needed to reach a particular target in desired time

About 6 in reserve for each needed to reach a particular target in desired time

Source: Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND, 2002.

Page 20: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions

Page 21: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Emergence of Space Competitors? Currently, no peer in space to threaten U.S. national interests However, concern for developments in:

China Human spaceflight Navigation, communications, remote sensing, weather, oceanography,

microgravity, science and astronomy, and microsatellites KE ASAT, jammers, “parasite” satellites, ground-based lasers

Russia: long-standing interests and capabilities Nuclear proliferation and weapons delivery programs in North

Korea, Iran, Libya, Pakistan Continued transfer of ballistic missile-related technology by

Russia and China Bottom line:

Technically challenging but doable Legal constraints on WMD do not prohibit space weapons Countermeasures are possible – asymmetric strategies by

competitors, allowing competition without having to become space-faring nations

Page 22: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Concern for Vulnerability of U.S. Space-Based Assets

“If U.S. is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems”*

What might be a “Space Pearl Harbor”? Lethal actions, such as:

Debilitating/destroying attack on U.S. and allied space assets through electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event staged by hostile forces in orbit

Non-lethal actions (i.e., for a limited period of time, for specific objectives)

Jamming, spoofing, blinding

*Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (January 2001)

Page 23: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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If the U.S. Were to Acquire Space Weapons, How Might It Happen?

Under what circumstances might the U.S. decide to acquire? Deliberately Incidentally

Once the decision is made, how might the transition occur? Possible strategies Possible consequences

Page 24: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Possible Circumstances Requiring Purposeful Decision-Making

Responding to threat(s) by undeterred adversaries

Responding to another nation’s decision to acquire, whether adversaries or allies

With another nation(s), to forestall, control, or influence their independent acquisition of space weapons

Unilaterally, in absence of compelling threat, to demonstrate global leadership, protect U.S. and allied economic investments, improve efficiency and effectiveness of military capabilities, etc.

Page 25: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Possible Circumstances Involving Incidental Decision-Making

Commercial or civil development of technologies with applicability to military purposes

Incremental decision – hedging strategy as way to shape security environment

Monolithic decision and implementation – reactive strategy to deal with emerging threat that may be defensive and stabilizing in nature

Page 26: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Transition Period (1)

Ideally, no consequences for U.S. deployment Worst case:

Adversaries take lethal action to deny U.S. ability to launch and deploy first space weapon

Adversary’s options are numerous Deterrent capability, possibly nuclear, leading to

possible launch on warning/launch under attack policy Physical attack – on launch sites Burying targets Developing/deploying “silver bullets,” such as ASATs “Seize moral high ground against U.S. hegemony”

Page 27: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Transition Period (2)

Responses by allies Potential political pressure Potential fallout in other non-space-related areas (e.g.,

foreign policy issue of great importance to U.S. interests) Adversary attempt at coercive behavior to influence ally Commercial companies’ reaction to possible orbital

debris that, depending on orbits, may last forever World may view U.S. acquisition and deployment decision

as risky behavior, with long term consequences for U.S. global leadership

Page 28: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Policy Context for Deciding to Acquire and Deploy Space-Based Weapons

Some sensitivities have underpinning them the notion of space as a sanctuary: U.S. has most to lose because of dependence on space assets Absence of imminent threats to U.S. freedom of space could lead to

perceptions of U.S. aggressive behavior Potentially trigger arms race in space

Others argue that U.S. inhibitions against space weapons deployment do not necessarily apply to others U.S. needs to press ahead with development and deployment

• From a narrow, operational viewpoint:– Technical feasibility

– Strategic desirability

– Cost

• However, other sensitivities:– Political will

– Legal restrictions and ramifications

– Reactions of allies, neutrals, and adversaries

Page 29: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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What If Others Decide to Acquire Space Weapons? Range of “others”

Peer competitors U.S. friends and allies Non-peer competitors Neither friend nor foe Non-state coalition of entities (possibly state-assisted)

Decisions will be driven by national interests Security, e.g.:

Regional threats requiring long-range force projection Overcoming competitor’s military strengths

Economic and technological Political:

National prestige, peer recognition Global reach and power projection Enhanced freedom to act regionally/globally Promotion of internal security

Page 30: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Agenda

Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate

National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.

Space Control and Force Application missions

Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others

Policy choices and conclusions

Page 31: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Policy Choices Facing the United States

Continue to maintain consistency in long-held space-related principles, yet be prepared to acquire and deploy space-based weapons should circumstances change

Move now, through explicit policy, programmatic, and budgetary decisions, to deploy space-based weapons based on national interests and emerging threats

Prepare for the inevitable: pursue a deliberate, long-term hedging strategy

Page 32: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Irregular Unconventional methods adopted

and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents. (Erode our power)

Disruptive International competitors developing and

possessing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant U.S. advantages in particular operational domains. (Marginalize our power)

Traditional States employing legacy and advanced

military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict. (Challenge our power)

Catastrophic Acquisition, possession, and possible

employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against vulnerable, high-profile targets by terrorists and rogue states. (Paralyze our power)

LIKELIHOOD

VU

LN

ER

AB

ILIT

Y

Lower Higher

Higher

Lower

Impact of Security Challenges Facing U.S. Defense Planning in 2006 QDR

Do space weapons contribute to “filling the gaps” in capabilities to respond?

Page 33: Weaponizing Space:  Technologies and Policy Choices

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Conclusion

Space will become yet another environment for the full spectrum of human activities, including conflict

Not a matter of should space weapons be deployed, but when

Prudent approach to protect U.S. national interests is a proactive strategy for shaping political, technological, diplomatic, and security environment


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