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A Journey Through Shari'a Law: Justifying Jihad and Punishment

Photo:REUTERS/Majed Jaber Muslim Sharia judges attend the first Arabconference on Islamic law held in AmmanSeptember 3,2007

At a time when extremist groups such as the Islamic State that claim to be seeking Islamic rule in the Middle East threaten global stability, the world is becoming more and more suspicious of Islam itself. Some have gone as far as to suggest that the Shari'a law which extremists seem to have instrumentalized is a malicious legal system that has no right to be stripped of its “legality”. The false association of Islamic Shari'a with extremist ideologies has been taken at face value by policymakers, which impedes cultural dialogue and does not help in identifying ways to counter violent extremism.

In this regard, Sadakat Kadri’s book “Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari’a Law” which was first published in 2012 is even more timely today than it was four years ago. The book presents a comprehensive historic perspective on Shari'a law, how and why it came to be as well as how it has changed over the centuries. An exciting mix of the author’s notes about his encounter with the Islamic tradition in different Muslim countries and a highly detailed history of Islamic law, the book makes for an excellent read, both for Muslims themselves as well as Western policy makers who fear all things Islam.

Kadri to a lesser extent goes through the norms of Shari'a law, of which there are plenty; instead he deconstructs it from the historic perspective explaining how certain events influenced its formation.

The author shows how the teachings of Prophet Muhammad gradually turned into concepts of justice. To do this, the author divides the book into two parts, first looking at the 1,400 years of Islamic history in part one “The Past” and then introducing the idea of modernity in Islam in part two “The Present.”

Sadakat Kadri’s book “Heaven on Earth:A Journey Through Shari’a Law”

Modern Islamic ideologues paint two starkly different and mutually-exclusive images of Islam when it comes to discussing Shari'a. Some cite passages from the Qur’an that advocate love and compassion towards all, while others use it as a justification for the mass killing of non-believers. Both groups cite the same book and often the same passages from the book in coming to opposite interpretations.

The application of Shari’a varies across the schools of Islamic jurisprudence. There are four main schools of Sunni fiqh (jurisprudence) and two main Shia fiqh. Consequently the rules that regulate everything from simple domestic chores to the use of violence and even capital punishment are starkly different in each. Kadri’s personal encounter with Islam in different parts of the Muslim world reveals just that: modern Shari'a is not uniform across different countries and legal claims attributed to it may at times even be conflicting.

The author’s journey around the Middle East presents a juxtaposition of what the Shari’a law has been in the 7th century and today, as well as that of the theory and practice. The author explains, for example, that many of the first judges in Islam refused to decide cases fearing a mistake. On one of his trips to Karachi, Kadri learns that even today many judges avoid authorizing violence and giving death sentences. “It was as though a penalty’s existence was somehow more important than its use - and as I was to find out, his [jurists’s] view reflected an equivocation that is common across the Muslim world,” notes Kadri.

While Islam and the Shari’a law have a distinct flare of intolerance in modern political discourse, Kadri’s book is highly illuminating as it portrays Islam not as a religion of love or violence but a religion that is constantly adapting to reality. The book is full of facts that today may seem absurd to those who see the Qur’an as a source of violence and extremism. “The most striking fact … is the one that today is most likely to be overlooked: physical punishment was authorized just five times in the entire Qur’an,” Kadri writes.

Modern Islamic ideologues paint two starkly different and mutually-exclusive images of Islam when it comes to discussing Shari'a. Some cite passages from the Qur’an that advocate love and compassion towards all, while others use it as a justification for the mass killing of non-believers.

The topic of the authorization of punishment in the Qur’an is indeed central in the book. The author provides compelling evidence to disprove the myth that violence is entrenched in Shari’a law. Out of fifty states with majority Muslim populations, Qur’anic penalties (hadud) are theoretically applicable in less than a dozen, most of which have been legalized in the last thirty years and whose application in practice is exceptional: “Stonings are recorded just

once in Ottoman legal history - where the only known case occurred three centuries before the Prophet Muhammad’s birth, when a certain Elias was stoned according to Roman law for preaching Christianity.” Sadakat Kadri concludes that despite the track record of violent preaching, Islamic jurists have historically seen Qur’anic penalties as symbolic. Upholding them in theory has never been the same as their actual imposition.

Understanding jihad

AFP / LOUAI BESHARAShiites and Sunnis: The Danger of Major War   from Syria to Pakistan

Kadri’s book, published before the notorious Islamic State came to prominence in Iraq and Syria, is a must-read for those scholars who want to understand where exactly in the history of Islamic jurisprudence the group places its beliefs. The role of Sayiid Qutb, an ideologue of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, is crucial in understanding the nature of modern jihad for that matter. According to Qutb, Muslims must follow Shari’a and Shari'a alone. Obeying means worshipping to Qutb, and if a Muslim obeys anyone but God he fails to worship God exclusively. This tenet entrenched in Sayiid Qutb’s book “Milestones” that guided the Muslim Brotherhood for many years translated into the rejection of any authority but Islam.

But the most toxic teaching in Qutb’s Milestones was that about jahiliyyah (ignorance), the word that denotes the pre-Islamic period in the Arab world. In Qutb’s view when each Muslim embraced Islam at the time of Prophet Muhammad, he had to reject jahiliyyah for it is profoundly unislamic. The Milestones, however, advanced a view of modern jahiliyyah as something corrupt and associated with the West, meaning that anyone faithfully professing Islam needs to reject anything associated with the Western way of life. Therefore Sayyid Qutb believed that the use of force is necessary against all those who in his view belong to jahiliyyah and have usurped the power of God.

A conflict of two interpretations of jihad still exists today and is more acute than ever. One group of Islamic scholars and jurists sees it as a purely spiritual struggle, while others attach a much broader meaning to it and see it as a struggle against non-believers.

And yet in his book Sadakat Kadri brilliantly deconstructs Qutb’s teachings to show that his ideas were not original in their nature and came precisely from the jahiliyyah that he was trying to reject: “The idea that people should be forced to be free originated with Rousseau, not the Prophet Muhammad. The specter haunting Milestones looked more like Marx’s capitalist alienation than the jahiliyyah. And Qutb’s belief in the righteous vanguard came straight from Lenin: for all the talk of God, salvation for the masses would come from a dedicated band of revolutionaries with a rigor sufficient to overcome the laxness of the age.”

A conflict of two interpretations of jihad still exists today and is more acute than ever. One group of Islamic scholars and jurists sees it as a purely spiritual struggle, while others attach a much broader meaning to it and see it as a struggle against non-believers [1]. Sadakat Kadri explains in his book that the Qur’an’s calls for violence all refer to “fighting” but scholars and jurists started linking the same calls to jihad. However, unlike a spiritual struggle of an individual, jihad as an act of war was a collective obligation directed by the caliph.

REUTERS/Ahmed Saad

Unislamic Ideology of the Islamic State

According to Kadri, at the time of the Crusades the caliphs of Baghdad were reluctant to refer to military resistance to Europeans as jihad. Moreover, during the ninth century non-Muslims were appointed as ministers of war twice, which alone makes the idea of jihad as a struggle against non-believers absurd.

But while the Crusades left the Muslim world fragmented, it was the Mongol invasion that largely shaped the idea of jihad as a violent response to aggression. It is this period of Islamic history that Ibn Taymiyya comes to prominence as an Islamic scholar whose interpretation of jihad would transpire through time. Ibn Taymiyya issued a fatwa in the Mamluk’s war saying that jihad against the Mongols was “an obligation of all faithful Muslims” glorifying death on jihad as martyrdom [2]. Despite the fact that the Mongol invaders had all converted to Sunni Islam they ruled according to man-made laws as opposed to the Shari’a, meaning that they lived in a state of jahiliyyah. “The response to Mongol encroachments then confirmed just how far from its origins the concept of jihad had travelled,” says Sadakat Kadri.

One of the classical Sunni jurists Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence defined jihad as a war “waged by a Muslim against a disbeliever, with whom he has no oath, to raise the word of God Almighty, or against his presence in or penetration into the [Muslim] territory.” [3] This definition essentially means that jihad is lawful in Islam only for the purpose of suppressing aggression, a view supported by the majority of Muslim jurists. In that regard the Qur’an specifically says that “To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight).”

Out of 12 works by Muslim scholars republished by the Islamic State, seven are by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the 18th-century jurist, whose teachings serve as the basis for the Saudi legal system. One may ask then how did the Islamic State and other extremist groups operating in the Middle East today manage to put Shari’a that explicitly limits the use of force to their service.

Today’s calls of the Islamic State to wage war against the West appeal to the same sentiments of Muslims that made them oppose the Crusades, the Mongol invasion and the European colonial rule, all of which Kadri discusses in his book. Much like Ibn Taymiyya, the Islamic State ideologues idolize death and martyrdom by cherry-picking Islamic scripture as a justification, which is more often than not taken out of context to justify the killing for a dubious cause.

New Syria Ceasefire: Same Old Story

Photo:REUTERS/SANA

Syria ceasefire deal, announced on September 9, 2016 after marathon talks between Russia and the United States, has been labelled as the best chance yet to halt the bloodshed in Syria’s five-year civil war. Although it is quite unlikely that the ceasefire will bring a breakthrough, it is still a positive development which indicates that Russia and the U.S. can negotiate, agree and cooperate on particular issues.

The first Syria ceasefire agreement reached in February 2016 by Russia and the U.S. demonstrated the limits of such approach, while simultaneously proved that major backers of the confronting parties in the Syrian war – Russia and the U.S. – can discuss sensitive and complicated issues and even conclude agreements.

Naturally, implementation of such agreements is a whole different story as it does not entirely depend on its authors, still putting serious responsibility on them. There are several reasons for why recent Syria ceasefire agreement is going to be very challenging to implement on the ground. The question is what are the obstacles for the successful implementation of the Russia-U.S. Syria deal and how they are actually different from the roadblocks which were present six months ago.

Who are the terrorists?

This question is still at place and it presents one of the major obstacles to the successful implementation of the ceasefire. The absence of the agreed (at least by Russia and the U.S.) list of terrorist groups operating in Syria complicates one of the major goals of the ceasefire which is to separate moderate rebels from terrorists. Failure to do so will start the ‘game’ all over again. Reports about Syrian or/and Russian jets bombing moderate rebels will never end while Moscow will keep blaming the U.S. for inability to control opposition and separate it from jihadists. It will eventually result in the ceasefire collapsing as there are always going to be groups trying to exploit this situation in their favor. As of now, there are only two organizations that everyone agrees to view as terrorists in Syria: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat Fateh ash-Sham (former Jabhat an-Nusra).

REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque A Subtle Approach: Lavrov   and Kerry’s Agreement

Besides, given recent rebranding of Jabhat an-Nusra which is now called Jabhat Fateh ash-Sham, it further complicates the situation. By publicly announcing its separation from Al-Qaeda, Nusra aimed at creating more positive image embracing more and more moderate forces. As they cooperate closely with many Syrian rebel groups, including moderates, they hope to improve its image and in a way legitimize itself.

Although the High Negotiation Committee supported the U.S.-Russia deal, its key concerns include how the deal would define terrorist groups that can continue to be targeted and how violations of the truce would be responded.

Where to bomb?

U.S.-Russia Syria agreement envisions establishment of the Joint Implementation Center (JIC). However, the U.S. ties JIC creation to the successful implementation of the ceasefire. If it holds for a week and the UN is able to deliver aid to the besieged areas in Aleppo, then Russia and the U.S. are to establish the JIC that will work on joint targeting against ISIS and Jabhat an-Nusra.

The absence of the agreed list of terrorist groups operating in Syria complicates one of the major goals of the ceasefire which is to separate moderate rebels from terrorists. Failure to do so will start the ‘game’ all over again.

Even if the ceasefire majorly holds and both parties to the agreement launch the JIC it will not work properly until the first issue is resolved. Thus, the first thing to do is to effectively separate moderate rebels from the terrorists on the ground. Moreover, there are plenty of groups on the ground that would like to sabotage the ceasefire. There are no guarantees that the JIC work will not be stopped and there are no mechanisms (at least known to the public) that would help to avoid such developments.

Besides, the mechanisms which will delineate the areas controlled by terrorists and moderates as well as the secession of hostilities being monitored and enforced remain unclear. Although Russia’s Defense Ministry set up monitoring groups in every Syrian province and even launched live-webcast of the situation in Aleppo which is available to the public, it is hard to imagine that the U.S. will treat this initiative as one increasing the ceasefire monitoring transparency.

Can Russia and the U.S. control their proxies?

Political Extremist Groups   and Islamic Movements in the Middle   East and North Africa

Six years into the Syrian crisis created quite clear struggling structures where the Syrian authorities backed by Russia and Iran are on the one side and numerous opposition groups of various level of extreme backed by the U.S., Turkey and Saudi-led Gulf countries on the other.

The big number of external actors in the Syrian conflict complicates implementation of anyone’s interests and hinders any attempt to settle the conflict as everyone tries to satisfy its own needs and reach its own goals. These are complicated lines of communication between the parties throughout all dimensions of the conflict – global, regional, local. While the major diplomatic efforts happen on the global level and are initiated by the major powers, the latter play the main role in transmitting any agreement to their clients in the region.

In Syria, the U.S. and Russia project their power to the regional and local level through their network of clients. From Washington, it goes to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Syrian moderate opposition groups and the Kurds. From Russia, it goes to Iran, Hezbollah, the Syrian government and pro-government militia.

The big number of external actors in the Syrian conflict complicates implementation of anyone’s interests and hinders any attempt to settle the conflict as everyone tries to satisfy its own needs and reach its own goals.

However, it should not be forgotten that many clients often act not in full compliance with their patrons’ interests, creating high risks of escalation. Thus, there is no guarantee that proxies will comply with the agreement reached by Moscow and Washington. For example, Turkey continues to attack Syrian Kurds and neither U.S. nor Russia can effectively stop Ankara from doing so. Ahrar ash-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam which are sponsored by Saudi Arabia and Qatar already defied the ceasefire and do not follow it. As for Moscow and its main client, Syrian President Bashar al-

Assad, he repeatedly made statements to take the entire territory of Syria which basically defied any Russian diplomatic attempts.

Six months since the first Syria ceasefire agreement was reached another one came into effect. Having the same obstacles for the successful implementation as the first one, the current cessation of hostilities agreement is more likely to succeed as the parties already have an experience in dealing with it. Thus, despite the fact that current U.S.-Russia Syria deal has relatively small chances for success those chances are higher than those of the previous agreement.

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Alexey Khlebnikov, “New Syria Ceasefire: Same Old Story,” Russian International Affairs Council, 19 September 2016, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=8129

After Brexit: An Uncertain New Reality

Photo:REUTERS/Neil Hall

The United Kingdom referendum on its membership in the European Union has given rise to countless expert opinions, assessments and publications, ranging from moderate to radical, from optimistic to extremely pessimistic predictions that the United Kingdom, the European Union and the entire world order will soon collapse. One thing that all commentators appear to agree on, however, is that the United Kingdom and the European Union have entered a phase of uncertainty, adding a number of new – and for the most part unclear – variables to the already difficult situation in Europe and around the world. According to most experts, the situation is likely to develop in the following manner: the longer uncertainty reigns, the worse the consequences will be for all actors, as will the direct and indirect negative effects on integration processes and the global market. Brexit has created a new and unexpected reality in which the roles of certain states in regional and global processes, including that of Russia, could change drastically.

Euro-Integration versus Euro-Scepticism

At first glance, the very fact that a referendum was held speaks to a combination of the political short-sightedness of the British establishment and a flirtation with public opinion, whose influence on politics was, yet again, underestimated. All the rational arguments championing Euro-integration and the free movement of people, goods and services around Europe failed to tip the scales in the “remain” camp’s favour. The referendum played another important role: it finally legitimized the arguments of the populists and Euro-sceptics in the mainstream media who, until recently, had been considered, if not marginal, then at least incapable of casting a serious shadow over the European path of British development.

The referendum finally legitimized the arguments of the populists and Euro-sceptics in the mainstream media who, until recently, had been considered, if not marginal, then at least incapable of casting a serious shadow over the European path of British development.

However, the cautious attitude of the British people towards the European institutions is hardly anything new; it has existed for as long as the idea of a united Europe has, and has reared its head repeatedly during election campaigns. Interestingly, the Conservative Party has not always been the stronghold of Euro-scepticism in the United Kingdom. In the early 1980s, it was the Labour Party that made an exit from Europe a focus of its election campaign. But it was forced to abandon the idea following a crushing defeat at the hands of the Conservatives led by the “progressive Euro-sceptic” Margaret Thatcher in 1983. What is more, it was the Conservative government under Harold Macmillan that took the historic steps towards Euro-integration in the 1960s. Thus there has been little in terms of the parties’ official attitudes towards European integration. After the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993, the leading parties favoured continued integration, preferring to mildly criticize Brussels while securing special conditions for London. And while a number of conservatives made attempts to move closer to continental Euro-sceptics in the early 2000s, they received no support from the party’s leaders or from the majority of the Conservatives themselves (including David Cameron).

The only political party that has not only maintained an open anti-European position, but has made it the central focus of its campaigns, is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The party was formed in 1991 by a number of university intellectuals and public figures who opposed the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. During the first 15 years of its existence, UKIP received more attention from the tabloids than it did from leading political commentators and respected experts. But that all came to an end in 2006, when Nigel Farage took control of the party. It is under Farage’s leadership that UKIP enacted a small revolution in the seemingly stable political landscape of the United Kingdom, securing the votes of disparate social groups, uniting them not only against European integration, but also against globalization and the influx of foreigners and multilateral corporations, among other things.

REUTERS/Vincent Kessler 

Farage and his associates did not hesitate to use populist rhetoric, calling for restrictions to be placed on migration, for Britain to be made great again, and for a complete break with the bureaucrats in Brussels – a set of anti-liberal slogans that had begun to gain more and more traction around Europe in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–2009. The UKIP’s success (the party conducted a number of successful regional campaigns before beating out the big three UK parties in the elections to the European Parliament, winning 28 per cent of the votes) has provoked a number of schisms among the conservatives, as well as within the Labour Party. As a result, the right- and left-wing factions within these parties, led by Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbin, respectively, started to gain popularity.

Dysfunctional Democracy

John F. Kennedy once wrote: “The voters selected us, in short, because they had confidence in our judgment and our ability to exercise that judgment from a position where we could determine what their own best interests are, as a part of the nation’s interest. This may mean that we must on occasion lead, inform, correct and sometimes even ignore constituent opinion, if we are to exercise fully that judgment for which we were elected.” [1] The very fact that a referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union was called was the result of errors made by a part of the moderate British conservatives led by David Cameron, who stood firm in the belief that they could

simultaneously deal with the Euro-sceptics within the country as well as that part of society for whom globalization and integration are synonymous with the failures of the UK economy and the decline of the nation. Although statistics show that the United Kingdom is by no means worse off as a result of its membership in the European Union: GDP per headincreased from £5,500 in 1998 to almost £7,000 in 2015, and the number of private companies registered in 2015 reached a record 5.4 million, up from 3.5 million in 2000. The United Kingdom successfully dealt with effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The unemployment rate, which spiked in 2008–2012, returned to a much more manageable 6 per cent in 2014, which is comparable with that of the late 1990s and a far cry from the fluctuations in the labour market that occurred in the 1970s to the 1980s. The British media perpetuated the entirely false stereotype that “Big Business” was leading the campaign to remain in the European Union, while small business owners favoured Brexit. While large enterprises may have stood firm in their support for continuing on the European path, small business owners soon began to show signs of division. Many of them considered the EU rules and standards excessively complicated and wanted greater freedom from the bureaucrats in Europe. At the same time, it is largely thanks to these very same EU standards that the UK economy has become far more competitive over the past 25 years, overcoming the numerous recessions and crises of the 1970s and 1980s.

While large enterprises may have stood firm in their support for continuing on the European path, small business owners soon began to show signs of division.

Ultimately, however, the standoff between the “leave” and “remain” camps had little to do with rational arguments and devolved into the usual fight for votes: the media was as split as the campaigns were themselves; politicians and celebrities gave impassioned speeches; and over-the-top rallies that could rival a ships regatta on the Thames were held. But a dangerous trend was lurking behind these campaigns – the reliance on public opinion at a time when serious and well thought out decisions were required from the country’s top brass. Interestingly, the regions that voted most heavily in favour of leaving the European Union were England and Wales, two countries that, objectively, had suffered the consequences of deregulation and austerity the most. But these arguments were not used by the leaders of the Brexit campaign. On the contrary, the campaign was based on criticism of the European Union and migration, and these issues were singled out as the main reasons for the falling quality of life and growing unemployment in the United Kingdom.

It is clear that, in times of crisis, the public is drawn towards answers that are easier and more understandable. What would happen if there was a referendum in Germany on the issue of providing financial aid to Greece? What would the French people say if they were asked to vote on restricting migration from Muslim countries? The majority of people in these cases would have clear answers. But would these answers be in the best interests of their respective countries, and of Europe in general?

The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum is a clear demonstration of what a dysfunctional democracy is capable of. The plebiscite was used at a time when a balanced parliamentary procedure in which all interested parties could voice their opinions was needed. And it is the lack of serious consultations and expert work that led to one third of the EU countries being wholly unprepared to deal with the United Kingdom’s possible exit from the Union.

The Economic Implications of Brexit

Lack of serious consultations and expert work that led to one third of the EU countries being wholly unprepared to deal with the United Kingdom’s possible exit from the Union.

As a rule, financial markets are nervous places – they tend to react to any kind of international crisis with volatility. But Brexit was an unexpected crisis. The willingness of the British people to abandon the accepted rules of the game became a new variable to which the markets, including the UK markets, simply cannot work out a clear position. Now, leading economic institutions, governments and companies are forced to work with a number of possible scenarios simultaneously, from positive to extremely negative. The possibility of any of these scenarios panning out depends on a number of factors, which are mainly linked to the speed and effectiveness with which London and Brussels can reach a new status quo.

Having said this, it would be somewhat premature to suggest that Brexit could act as the propeller of a new global financial crisis. The media is traditional rather fond of painting the bleakest picture possible, but the UK economy is in fairly robust shape. This is supported by the fact that the pound appears to be strengthening and the panic that reigned on the stock markets in the weeks after the shock referendum result has subsided. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) lowered its forecasts for global economic growth in 2017 by 0.1 per cent, with anticipated growth in the Euro zone dropping 0.2 per cent, as a direct result of Brexit. However, these figures are very speculative in nature, as

much will depend on which scenario will unfold, as well as on negotiations with Brussels. And it is equally impossible to predict just what the implications for the UK economy will be in the wake of Brexit. A month before the referendum, the Institute for Fiscal Studies in London published a paper quantifying the financial effect of Brexit: in the worst-case scenario, the United Kingdom will owe additional £74 billion; in the best-case scenario, it will have a surplus of £30 billion. The figures are so far apart that no economist worth his or her salt would dare put even an approximate number on the cost of Brexit.

What whole will the United Kingdom want to become a part of?

It should be noted that the Euro zone has more clear-cut risks to be thinking about – risks that are associated with the pre-crisis state of the Italian financial sector and the risky operations of Deutsche Bank. Should anything untoward happen in the Italian or German banking systems, the consequences for the European economy will be more immediate and far more devastating than Brexit. The structural problems related to high levels of unemployment, low productivity and poor credit dynamics remain. Brexit has only added economic uncertainty to the region, which could further increase the burden on the financial sector. The for The United Kingdom’s contributions to the European Union (around 15 billion per year) will have to be made up elsewhere, with the other members – primarily Germany – picking up the slack.

AFP PHOTOBritain and EU Stand United on Russia DespiteBrexit

Those who see a clearly thought-out strategy in London’s divorce with Brussels believe that, outside the European Union, the United Kingdom will be free from the burden of the systemic problems that loom over continental Europe and will be able to breathe life back into the country’s economy. The main vulnerability of this position is that independence in today’s world is conditional. Self-sufficient services markets, financial systems, innovation industries, etc., simply do not exist. So the question is: what whole will the United Kingdom want to become a part of?

The most optimistic scenario, as described by the “Out” campaigners, looks like this: now it has the right to enter into trade agreements with whomever it chooses, the United Kingdom will not only remain within the European free trade area (or will sign separate agreements for various sectors), but will also expand its sphere of influence significantly by creating new free trade zones with the world’s major economies – the United States, China, India, etc. In the opinion of one journalist for   The Telegraph , this will turn the United Kingdom into a unique trade and financial hub, a new Switzerland or Singapore. One of the nuances of a possible new agreement between London and Brussels is the fact that, as a non-EU member, the United Kingdom will almost definitely not be granted free access to the EU markets. In particular, Switzerland, where financial services account for a greater share of the country’s GDP than in the United Kingdom, has a negative trade balance with the European Union – in the financial services sector. Being a privileged partner of the European Union is not the same as being a full member.

One of the nuances of a possible new agreement between London and Brussels is the fact that, as a non-EU member, the United Kingdom will almost definitely not be granted free access to the EU markets.

The uniqueness of the United Kingdom before Brexit was that the country served as a kind of investment bridge between the European Union and the rest of the world. The United Kingdom accounted for more direct investments that the rest of the European Union combined. According to research carried out by   Ernst & Young   in 2015 , most investors (72 per cent) cited free access to the European market as one of the major advantages of the United

Kingdom. In other words, investors saw the country as more than just a recipient of capital investments, but as an important transit zone as well. So far, the “leave” camp has been unable to convince global investors that the situation will not change moving forwards. This is because, in order for this to be the case, a one-of-a-kind agreement has to be signed with Brussels, the likes of which has never been seen before in Europe. Such an agreement must include free access to the single market and at the same time restrict the movement of people (i.e. migration), which was one of the key policy points of the “Out” campaign. If the victorious fraction of conservatives and Euro-sceptics, as well as the other social and political forces in the countries that supported Brexit abandon this populist point, then they will lose the support of the “disgruntled” part of the population and devalue their own efforts. In a sense, this is the most difficult and unpredictable “fork” in the negotiating process, as Brussels, Berlin and Paris are unlikely to agree to remove the word “people” from the concept of free movement. After all, this would mean violating, or at least revising in part, the legal framework of the entire European Union.

At the end of the day, UK businesses are not interested in losing the European Union as its main market for products and services (44 per cent of exports from the United Kingdom are to the European Union), and investors do not want to cease their activities in London as a leading global financial centre (in 2013, 40.9 per cent of global Forex trade took place in London). Nevertheless, this possibility is being studied by a number of leading multinational banks that are worried about the institutional links between the United Kingdom and continental Europe being destroyed. If the new Theresa May-led government does set the wheels in motion for an exit from the European Union, then it will need to provide certain guarantees – first of all, to global businesses and financial institutions, and secondly to Scotland and Northern Ireland, where neither the elites nor regular people understood the supposed political and economic advantages of leaving the European Union. Of course, no one is in a position right now to give such guarantees, as there is no consensus in the UK establishment or among EU politicians on how the exit should work and how the negotiation process should be handled.

Brexit and Russian Integration

A Weaker Europe After Brexit?

For Russia, the short-term effects of Brexit will be negligible at best and will be felt primarily through fluctuations in the commodity and currency markets caused by the continuing uncertainty. It is possible that some large companies that have traditionally traded on the London Stock Exchange will want to avoid financial volatility and suspend trading or sell a part of their shares. At the same time, it should be noted that Russian companies had expressed a desire to pull out of the London Stock Exchange long before the referendum took place, and for completely different reasons: the global decline in raw materials prices, the loss of interest on the part of a number of key investors in Russian shares as a result of the recent geopolitical tensions, and the economic stagnation in Russia. These adverse factors are to varying degrees responsible for the delisting of Uralkali, Polyus and Burovaya Kompaniya Eurasia. And a number of Russian companies (Otkritie Bank, for example) have expressed the desire to move their trade operations to the more attractive Asian markets. We should not expect a mass exodus of the remaining Russian companies (31 Russian companies continue to trade on the London Stock Exchange) any time soon, however, as the ties between Russian business leaders and London financiers that appeared as a result of the explosion of Russian IPOs in the mid-2000s would seem to be too strong. If interest does fade – not on the part of the Russian side, but on the part of disillusioned foreign investors – then transferring trade operations to Hong Kong, Shanghai or Singapore is unlikely to save these companies from losing liquidity.

UK businesses are not interested in losing the European Union as its main market for products and services, and investors do not want to cease their activities in London as a leading global financial centre.

Interestingly, many leading western politicians who backed the “remain” campaign, including David Cameron himself, said that Moscow would be the first to benefit from a Brexit and the subsequent weakening of the European Union. From a rational point of view, this is a weak argument, and was most likely used as a way to give a simple answer to the question on everyone’s lips: “Why is leaving the European Union a bad idea?” In terms of extending or gradually lifting the sanctions against Russia, Brexit will most likely play a role, but not a decisive role. In reality, the European Union continues to extend the sanctions unanimously. Even if the United Kingdom no longer has an official voice in the European institutions after it leaves the EU, there are plenty of countries that are ready to adopt a tough stance towards Russia; and, as a major regional actor, the opinion of the United Kingdom will always be valued. However, the situation seems to be developing in the opposite direction – an increasing number of major political groups and representatives of the business communities in EU member countries are calling for the sanctions regime to be softened. If these groups achieve critical mass, particularly in the economically stronger states, then the pendulum could start to swing backwards. It is clear that the United Kingdom, whether it is part of the European Union or not, will not be able to reverse the situation on its own.

In any case, the sanctions regime is a temporary stumbling block in Russia–EU relations. What is more important is how Russia and the European Union will build their strategic relations moving forward and the role that Brexit might play in the dynamics of these relations. In recent years, Russia has adopted the position of observer, or has remained passive entirely (depending on the connotation), with regard to European integration. The current military and political uncertainty, often bordering on hysteria, does not provide a rational basis for Russia to be more deeply involved.

This still rather puzzling and largely populist step taken by disparate political circles in the United Kingdom has the potential to change the regional space significantly and open the door to new possibilities, of which Russia could well be a beneficiary.

The often-criticized and still largely misunderstood possibility of linking Eurasia and the European Union continues to have enormous potential. However, if such a project is to see the light of day, then both political will and serious efforts on the part of experts are required. While the Russian elite has for the most part shifted attention to another integration project (with the Silk Road Economic Belt), this does not mean that Russia should turn its back on similar processes in the West.

In this respect, Brexit creates an entirely new reality. Strange as it may sound, this still rather puzzling and largely populist step taken by disparate political circles in the United Kingdom has the potential to change the regional space significantly and open the door to new possibilities, of which Russia could well be a beneficiary. In the context of the shift that has begun in the ruling elite in the United Kingdom and the European Union’s search for new development models and integration projects (such as the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), the Russian leadership should introduce strategic thinking into the mix and think about extracting, if not Machiavellian (power and influence), then Smith-like (economic rationalism) benefits from the emerging new reality.

Europe has entered a phase of uncertainty, and Moscow needs to start exploring not only the risks, but also the potential benefits – in terms of new trade and finance formats for working with London – of opportunities to reverse, in a constructive way, relations with the European Union and reduce geopolitical tensions.

So far, analysts have only made rather timid attempts to comprehend the potential thateconomic rapprochement with an independent United Kingdom or   reassessing relations with the European Union  could have for Russia, even if some of what has been written sounds somewhat like a utopia.

Brexit really does create a number of opportunities – not from the point of view of a weakened European Union, which would supposedly be beneficial for Moscow, but rather in terms of reformatting the European economic space, a space in which Russia could take part on terms that are favourable for Europe.

A Subtle Approach: Lavrov and Kerry’s Agreement

Photo:REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

The Russia–U.S. agreement on ceasefire in Syria signed on September 10, 2016 in Geneva became the high point of 14-hour talks and many months of diplomatic efforts on the part of Sergey Lavrov and John Kerry. Prior to that, the agreement received an important impetus during a short meeting between presidents Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in China, where the Syrian issue was treated with particular attention.

Sceptical assessments concerning the prospects of the agreement’s actual implementation dominate nearly all analysis of the Geneva accord, and they do have grounds. The parties themselves appear to emphasize different aspects of the document as its principal part, stressing their own diplomatic achievements. The United States focuses on the fact that it has convinced Russia to “restrain the forces of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria from conducting any air operations over areas held by Nusra and other opposition forces.” Moscow, in turn, is counting on Washington’s ability to ensure that the ceasefire is actually maintained by U.S.-supported opposition groups, as well as on its contribution to delimitating areas held by a part of these groups and by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (known as Al-Nusra Front prior to July 2016). Thus, each party expects the other to be mostly responsible for potential breaches of the ceasefire.

Each party expects the other to be mostly responsible for potential breaches of the ceasefire.

It is difficult to ensure the implementation of the agreement even from a geographical point of view. Over the last few months, Syria has become even more fragmented in respect to security and “control areas” held by various groups and foreign troops. This significantly hampers the possibility of the agreement’s jurisdiction covering the entire country (even excluding Islamist-controlled areas), which requires different tools to be used in different provinces.

The actual content of the agreement remains undisclosed, which is one of the main points of criticism in the West and in some Middle Eastern countries. Its opponents were quick to elaborate on all the phobias linked to such an approach, saying that the agreement was “forced on Syria.” At the same time, Sergey Lavrov stated that non-disclosure is linked to the fact that the documents “contain sensitive and serious information. We [Russia and the United States] do not want this information in the hands of those who would try to disrupt the implementation of humanitarian access measures and other parts of our agreements.”

REUTERS/Murad Sezer: Possibilities of a Strategic Relationship   Between Russia and Saudi Arabia

Finally, the position of the Syrian conflict’s regional “sponsors,” such as Turkey, the Arabian monarchies of the Gulf, and Iran, could become another challenge for the accord. The agreement has created the perception that Russia and the United States have strengthened their positions, and there is a strong temptation to manipulate the respective Shia and Sunni groups inside Syria to undermine the initiative of the “great powers.” In particular, Iran and Saudi Arabia voice their concerns that the accord does not take into account the greater part of their interests. Thus, even though Tehran and Riyadh publicly show their support, it would be erroneous to underestimate their pessimism in regard to the accord’s ultimate success and in regard to the actions it might prompt the parties to take. At the same time, very few believe that Iran and Saudi Arabia could suggest something constructive today, while a “war of attrition” is hardly in line with both Tehran and Riyadh’s long-term interests.

Washington and Moscow also did not hide how difficult it was to reach the agreement, particularly on the part of the United States. During the talks, the Pentagon and some intelligence services were the staunchest opponents of closer military cooperation and intelligence exchange between Russia and the United States. It should be particularly emphasized, however, that recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense made a statement supporting closer coordination between Russia and the United States. In Russia, there was criticism of a different kind: bloggers were particularly sceptical, and one person even noted that the parties reached an agreement concerning their own interests, but presented it as a compromise or a consensus. Yet even if this is true, the accord means one important thing: Russia and the United States, whether in their own interests or otherwise, are ready to show political will to implement the accord and influence the warring parties.

The key issue is how precise Moscow and Washington are in assessing their ability to influence their allies and even those groups they support.

In this regard, the question of whether Moscow and Washington understand all the risks implied by the agreement is a non-issue: the diplomats who held the talks and prepared the accord are experienced and professional enough to foresee potential difficulties at least as well as an outside observer. The key issue is how precise Moscow and Washington are in assessing their ability to influence their allies and even those groups they support. Past experience and current cooperation demonstrate that when it comes to ceasefire implementation, they cannot always be duly controlled and pressured.

REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser Is a Collective Security System   Possible in the Middle East?

It is all the more important in this connection to preserve the political will demonstrated by both parties in Geneva. What is of primary importance in this regard is to minimize the influence of “unwanted irritants” on the decision-makers. In Russia, it is the growing criticism of “the passivity of the United States in promoting delimitation” of the opposition and the radicals. In the United States, it is the media’s constant references to “the White House once again losing to the Kremlin” and “Moscow’s attempts to use the accord for its own political purposes, primarily, to subtly criticize the sanctions and to show the world that the American policy of ‘isolating Russia’ has failed.” It puts additional pressure on the administration and President Obama, who is interested, if not in settling the Syrian crisis before his

term in office ends, then in paving a visible institutionalized way to such a settlement, which could ultimately be “packaged” as his achievement.

At the same time, the accord should serve as a litmus test for all the interested actors, revealing the extent of their responsibility and the earnestness of their intentions to establish peace in Syria, and demonstrate the true degree of their readiness to put the country’s security above their own political interests, which often lack any “strategic depth” whatsoever.

The accord should serve as a litmus test for all the interested actors, revealing the extent of their responsibility and the earnestness of their intentions to establish peace in Syria, and demonstrate the true degree of their readiness to put the country’s security above their own political interests.

Despite all the existing concerns, the political importance of the agreement for U.S.–Russia relations goes far beyond Syria and could become a positive precedent for working together on other aspects of Middle Eastern politics. As Fyodor Lukyanov justlynotes, “Moscow and Washington have returned to a fairly long-forgotten state when the dialogue between the two countries used to resolve the crucial issues of international politics. And it is not a matter of the unbelievable might of Russia and the United States, as their capabilities to manage global processes have shrunk significantly compared to 30 years ago. It is simply a matter of the number of capable states having dropped drastically.”

Sergey Lavrov’s phrase about “the beginning of a new relationship” sounded more like a wish than a real assessment of the situation. At the same time, if the parties do establish a Joint Implementation Centre “in which the Russian and U.S. militaries and special services will work together on practical issues,” it will be of real use for both Moscow and Washington. It will give a new lease on life to bilateral cooperation on the Syrian question. It will not be strategic, but rather tactical at best. But it might be enough to plug up what appears to be a giant Syrian non-security vortex and prevent further destruction and disintegration of a region that has entered a period of long-term systemic instability.

 

Barack Obama’s Nuclear Finale

Photo:REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

Tensions in bilateral relations between Russia and the United States mean that Russia needs to adopt a position, and rather quickly,should official U.S. initiatives  in nuclear weapons materialize during the remaining months of Barack Obama’s term in office. With this in mind,  the available information on the potential nature of such initiatives should be analysed.

Off to a Good Start

As he began his term at the helm of the most powerful nation on the planet, President of the United States and Nobel Pease Prize winner Barack Obama shared his aspirations towards a world free of nuclear arms. Even though nuclear terrorism was singled out as the main threat at the end of the first decade of this century and the new U.S. administration was planning to focus on the safety of fissile materials, talks with Russia on a new strategic nuclear

forces treaty reappeared on the agenda too. The general atmosphere of “reset” in U.S.–Russia relations was one of the key factors that led to the signing of the New START treaty, as both parties proved ready to compromise. For instance, the Americans adjusted their plans to deploy a missile defence system in Europe, something that Russia welcomed quite enthusiastically.

Yet missile defence has remained a hot topic and a stumbling block for “strategic” U.S.–Russia relations. It was during the treaty talks that efforts were first made to stipulate some sort of “legally binding” provisions on the subject, with a compromise eventually materializing in the “Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defence.” According to this statement, a qualitative and quantitative build-up of U.S. missile defence capabilities that would create a threat for the Russian strategic nuclear potential is to be viewed as an exceptional circumstance threatening Russia’s supreme interests, which, under Paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the Treaty, would lead to its termination within three months’ (or any other stated period of time) notification of the other Party.

Given the existing balance between military capabilities of the United States, Russia and China an adjustment of U.S. conceptual approaches to the use of “Judgement Day weapons” would lead to a real military-political aggression against their allies.

At the same time, the United States Senate passed a resolutionfollowing the ratification of the Treaty which, among other things, exempted the United States from any restrictions on the creation of missile defence systems and the development of long-range non-nuclear weapons, and stressed the need for upgrading the nuclear potential of the United States and holding negotiations with the Russian Federation on tactical nuclear weapons.

What is more, according to certain sources, the United States Congress debated spending $85 billion on nuclear weapons modernization over the next ten years, as well as the prospects for the new B61-12 nuclear bomb.

Revising the Legacy

In July 2016, reports appeared in the U.S. media about a series of executive actions contemplated by the Obama administration to advance the nuclear agenda during its final months in office. The proposed measures are both conceptual and technical, and they have already caused serious debates on both sides of the Atlantic.

The options include:

Declaring a “no first use” policy for the United States’ nuclear arsenal.

Preparing and adopting a UN Security Council resolution supporting a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. This would be a way to formalize the commitment of the United States to not test weapons without first getting ratification from the Senate of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which us very unlikely under current circumstances (and in the future).

Offering Russia a five-year extension of the New START treaty (until 2026).

Cancelling or delaying the development of the new Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) nuclear cruise missile.

Removing the most deployed nuclear weapons from high (“hair trigger”) alert.

Cutting back long-term plans for modernizing the United States’ nuclear arsenal (which will have reached $350 billion in the decade since the New START talks began, with the overall cost of the programme estimated at $1 trillion over three decades).

Fighting over the Legacy

The potential implementation of the “no first use” principle, combined with removing the nuclear weapons from  “hair trigger” alert have led to heated debates. According to a number of experts, such steps would reduce the deterring effect of nuclear weapons and could provoke Russia and China to engage in a more aggressive foreign policy. Strangely, the continuing qualitative and quantitative advantage of the United States Armed Forces is ignored. It appears that, given the existing balance between military capabilities of the United States, Russia and China (in both conventional and nuclear weapons), an adjustment of U.S. conceptual approaches to the use of “Judgement Day weapons” would lead to a real military-political aggression against their allies.

A revision of U.S. nuclear weapons modernization programs is quite possible and, under certain circumstances, inevitable.

At the same time, according to sources from The New York Times, the no-first-use pledge is likely to be taken off of the agenda – not least because of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme, which gained serious momentum in 2016 and is “unnerving” Japan and South Korea. United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter points to the need to have the option of threatening a nuclear response in case of a non-nuclear (for example, biological) attack, while Secretary of State John Kerry suggested that allies of the United States could be tempted to obtain their own nuclear weapons if they perceived the U.S. nuclear umbrella as unreliable.

The initiative to extend the New START treaty can only be welcomed: perhaps at the current ratio of carriers and warheads, the treaty is still useful to Russia.

Figure 1. Russia and U.S. warhead and carrier ratio; illustration by the author based on U.S. Department of State data.

The projected modernization of the nuclear triad elements is among the top five most expensive programmes.

 

Figure 2. Twenty-five programmes by spending volume: blue – actual spending; orange –Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) allocations;grey–  future estimates.1.                     The SSBN Ohio replacement program for the U.S. Navy (it is so expensive that Congress has created a special fund to finance it)

2.                     The B-21 stealth bomber for the Air Force

…

5.                    A new intercontinental ballistic missile for the Air Force, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)

An even starker illustration of the bow wave effect (i.e. a substantial increase in spending on a weapons programme as it is being carried out) is available for the top entry of the list:

Figure 3. Estimated spending on the SSBN Ohio replacement, based on likely understated official estimates.

A serious discussion about the LRSO aircraft-launched cruise missile has been going on for a while now. Back in December 2015, a number of senators petitioned Barack Obama to cancel the development of the missile, for both economic and military-political reasons; in addition to the programme’s rather substantial cost ($20–30 billion for 1,000–1,100 missiles), the senators believe the above-mentioned B61-12 nuclear bomb, combined with the future B-21 bomber would make the missile redundant. Remarkably, the development of the B-21 has not been questioned (perhaps because of established cooperation involving companies from eight states, all with lobbying capabilities) and, moreover, its funding has been classified.

pogo.org

It must be noted that Russia has already adopted the new-generation Kh-101/Kh-102 aircraft-launched cruise missile. The proponents of LRSO development point this out too, as they emphasize the need for continued modernization of all the kinds of nuclear weapons that existed during the first nuclear century to guarantee deterrence of a potential adversary nowadays.

A revision of U.S. nuclear weapons modernization programs is quite possible and, under certain circumstances, inevitable. I believe that the Obama administration could play this card effectively and kill two birds with one stone by “patching up” the image of the United States as a leader of nuclear disarmament while optimizing its budget, e.g. by reallocating funding in favour of non-nuclear strategic weapons.

An article that appeared in The Washington Post revealed to the world the possible “nuclear” initiatives of the Obama administration, stressing a key problem related to their viability: by doing it unilaterally, without congressional buy-in, Obama risks launching policies that might not last much longer than the remaining months of his presidency. The “pendulum law” might well come into play after the change of guard at the White House, and nobody is insured against an increase in funding and a fast-tracking of “nuclear” projects, leading to the opposite of what is desired now.

www.revealnews.orgRifle Hanging on the Wall.US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

The International Dimension

Seeking a UN Security Council resolution affirming a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons looks quite feasible and promising, yet several adverse effects should be mentioned. First of all, this would in fact establish a precedent for substituting a UN Security Council resolution for a legally binding international non-proliferation treaty the ratification of which has stalled. The matter of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions is generally related to the possibility of its enforcement, to which modern history abundantly bears witness. Admittedly, international treaties per se offer no panacea either, if the current state of the NPT is any indication.

On the other hand, the degree of attention paid by the United States to the UN Security Council’s opinion became evident during military campaigns in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. A more than 20-yearbreak in the production of new nuclear weapons combined with scientific and technological progress are good enough reasons to assume that there are motives for transitioning to a new generation of nuclear weapons. Modern technology makes it possible to simulate a wide variety of processes, yet it is doubtful that radically innovative weapons could be adopted without actual testing. As Hans M. Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, rightly pointed out, the story of the B61-12 in the context of a very serious scale of nuclear arsenal modernization programmes in the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and China is jeopardizing the outlook for new breakthroughs in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Potential initiatives by Barack Obama as his term in office runs out can and must become the drivers for discussing this matter too, and ways to engage “third countries” in this conversation must be sought.

Round table "Russia-U.S. Nuclear Relations"

Russia’s Interests

Russia (if such negotiations do indeed begin, even in a traditional bilateral format) faces a difficult task: it needs to strike a careful balance between readiness to support the above-mentioned initiatives and counter-proposals on matters of more immediate interest. In particular, the “initiatives” completely ignore a number of “new” elements of modern strategic stability. While restrictions on U.S. missile defence are not on the agenda right now, given the launch of Aegis Ashore in Romania and the decision to deploy the THAAD in South Korea, it is possible to address the matters of non-nuclear strategic weapons (at least in the context of developing common terms and definitions) and the impact of cyber activities on strategic stability, and finally dot the i’s on endless mutual recriminations regarding medium- and short-range missiles.“No first use” adjustment of the U.S. nuclear strategy could be linked to a clarification of the provision of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation on the conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is considered possible.

A scenario of the United States asking Russia (and/or China) through official or unofffical channels to take similar measures “in exchange” for the implementation of some of its initiatives is also possible. In particular, I believe that a “no first use” adjustment of the U.S. nuclear strategy (if this matter remains on the agenda) could be linked to a clarification of the provision of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation on the conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is considered possible.

At the same time, unrealistic preconditions should not be set; given the current crisis in U.S.–Russia relations, any interaction on international security is valuable in and of itself, and more so in such a sensitive area. Besides, the

expiration of the New START treaty (even with a possible extension) is not that far off – ten years can fly by in the blink of an eye in today’s world – but a number of problems remain unchanged.

 

NATO’s Cyber Defense Evolution

Photo:REUTERS/Jonathan ErnstWarsaw, July 8, 2016.

At the NATO summit in Warsaw on July 8–9, 2016, particular attention was paid to the issues of the Alliance’s activity in cyberspace. NATO adopted a “Cyber Defence Pledge” which contains a development plan. What is more, NATO once again confirmed certain political aspects of its activities in this area, described in more detail in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué. In particular, cyberspace was recognized as a “domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea.” The decision to expand cooperation with the European Union in cyber defence was reflected in the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council and the Secretary General of NATO.

NATO’s New Digital Wall

The need for NATO to defend itself from cyber-attacks was discussed back in 1999, when hackers attacked NATO websites during its military operation in Yugoslavia. The first practical steps were taken at the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, when the decisionto enhance defence against cyber-attacks was adopted. Subsequently, a cyber defence programme appeared, which involved creating a NATO cyber-attack response capability.

Since it is difficult to determine the source of a cyber-attack, states that were not involved in it may be attacked.

When the governmental bodies in Estonia (2007) and then Georgia (2008) suffered cyber-attacks, NATO adopted its first ever cyber defence policy, revised in 2011. The 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration stated that the cyber defence policy “emphasises the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack.” Special attention was also paid to strengthening links between NATO and national authorities. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was established in Estonia for joint defence against cyber-attacks. According to the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), ensuring the security of cyber systems is one of NATO’s priorities. The Concept also emphasizes the need to “develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks.” The NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) established in 2012 was in charge of creating a centralized cyber defence system.

www.nato.int EU-NATO Signing Ceremony

In 2014, NATO endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy mentioned in the Wales Summit Declaration. The policy states that Article 5 of the North Alliance Treaty is applicable to cyber space. In particular, the declaration states that “cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence.” It was decided that “adecision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” Despite this qualification, a dangerous precedent is being created: since it is difficult to determine the source of a cyber-attack, states that were not involved in it may be attacked. Thus, cyber-attacks on the Estonian and Georgian governmental bodies in 2007 and 2008 were initially attributed to Russia. Later, however, an independent investigation ruled out this information. The Summit’s participants recognized cyberspace as a domain of NATO’s operational responsibility, which entails creating command bodies and attracting the necessary financing and workforce.  

There is still no answer to the question of how international law should be applied.

Efforts are being consolidated in several areas. In early 2016, an agreement was signed between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU). The agreement provides for exchanging technical information between these two bodies, which is intended to facilitate the detection, response to, and prevention of incidents in both bodies. The NATO – EU Joint Declaration signed at the Warsaw Summit also demonstrates the desire to work together. This cooperation could be viewed as something more than just an attempt to bring together cyber-attacks detection and response capabilities; it could also be viewed as an attempt on the part of NATO to optimize expenses for defending strategically important national infrastructure and shift the burden onto the states themselves while retaining NATO’s standards and approaches. Attracting private businesses into developing cyber defence is another way to optimize expenses, and it is gaining ever greater popularity around the globe.

In July 2016, NATO announced its plans to spend 3 billion euros on cutting-edge defence capabilities, including 70 million allocated for a cyber-refresh. Invitations to take part in tenders will be sent out in 2017, and the first investment round will be completed by 2018.

Enhancing NATO’s cyber capabilities may lead to the spread of specialized ICT tools, i.e., cyber weapons.

The NATO Information Assurance and Cyber Defense Symposiumtook place in Mons (Belgium) on September 7–8, 2016; it served as a platform for links between NATO on the one hand and experts and representatives of companies working in cyber security on the other.

The Shaky Foundations of Cyber Defence

NATO’s cyber defence is based on several serious problems which, taken, together, may act as a destabilizing factor for international security as a whole.

Firstly, in its 2013 report, the UN Group of Governmental Experts stated “that international law and in particular the United Nations Charter, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.” However, there is still no answer to the question of how international law should be applied. NATO is preparing its answer to that question. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 2.0 is set for release in 2016; the manual is a revised version of the 2013 document. The new edition prepared by the international law experts commissioned by NATO and created

under its auspices pays special attention to the application of the general norms of international law (sovereignty, jurisdiction, due diligence and the prohibition of intervention) in the cyberspace domain. The first edition failed to solve an entire series of issues; in particular, it failed to address the issue of what cyber-attacks are under international humanitarian law. And there are no mechanisms for their attribution. This means that charges of carrying out a cyber-attack can be levelled without any substantial proof, which has happened many times. At present, we do not know what the experts are going to suggest in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, yet the attribution problem has not yet been solved technologically.

scmagazineuk.com

Secondly, enhancing NATO’s cyber capabilities may lead to the spread of specialized ICT tools, i.e., cyber weapons. Many NATO countries have already incorporated provisions validating the right and necessity to develop such special means into their doctrines. For instance, the United Kingdom’s second Cyber Security Strategypresented in 2011 declares the need to develop a proactive approach to cyber defence. In the same year, the UK Secretary of State for Defence said, “The UK is developing a cyber-weapons programme that will give ministers an attacking capability to help counter growing threats to national security from cyberspace.”

The Wales Summit Declaration states the need to further develop national cyber defence capabilities and enhance the cyber security of the national networks upon which NATO depends in carrying out its core tasks. That means that in the future, all NATO members can either have attack and defence capabilities in cyberspace and possess appropriate technologies, or they can host such capabilities and technologies, much like Europe hosts U.S. nuclear weapons. Cyber weapons have low “entry threshold,” they can be developed without a powerful industry or an academic foundation. The simplest of attacks can be carried out using regular computers with internet access.Mercenary hackers are ready to offer their services to paying customers. A more powerful attack directed against critically important infrastructure requires larger resources and lengthy preparations by a team of professionals using models of systems under attack, but it costs significantly less  than developing nuclear weapons [1]. In the computer age, virtually any country can become a superpower in cyberspace.

REUTERS/Christian Hartmann 

Vaccinated Atom: Cybersecurity   for Nuclear Plants

NATO’s current policies in cyberspace are based on defence and deterrence. The Alliance’s experts study various options of such deterrence. Yet when considered in detail, it turns out any analogies with “traditional” deterrence applicable to the real, physical world, are irrelevant in the virtual world. Nuclear deterrence entails the possibility of a retaliatory strike, and there is a whole range of tools that allow the aggressor to be determined. Even though such tools are being rapidly developed for cyber-attacks, they are virtually unusable. When talking of a symmetrical

retaliatory strike, it should be noted that cyber weapons cannot be seen, much less qualitatively and quantitatively measured using any direct methods. As some experts note, while nuclear deterrence entails a demonstration of power, in cyber space, demonstration is replaced with the effects of using the weapons [2]. The known instances of using cyber weapons (for instance, a strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure facilities with the Stuxnet virus) can give an idea of their possible effects and effectiveness. As of today, we have no examples of any state openly using cyber weapons, and cyber-attack deterrence is based, among other things, on the policy of responding to cyber-attacks by any means available, from sanctions to military action (depending on damage sustained). When the source of a cyber-attack is hard to determine, such an attack may lead to escalating tensions or serve as a cause for retaliatory measures.

NATO’s Cyber Defence Tomorrow

Considering the dynamics of NATO cyber defence development as a whole and drawing parallels with similar processes in individual states, primarily in the United States, we can distinguish certain trends.

Toward U.S.-Russia Bilateral Cooperation   in the Sphere of Cybersecurity

The development of U.S. cyber defence policy has gone through several stages. Initially, just like NATO, it had as its core task ensuring the security of military networks and systems. In 2001, cyberspace was officially recognized as a new battle ground. In 2010, Cyber Command became operational; it had the following tasks: conducting defence and attack cyber operations; defending military systems and networks; and coordinating cyber defence links between all branches of armed forces. The United States possesses appropriate specialized ICT tools (cyber weapons), which has beenconfirmed several times, including by U.S. officials. The issue of the applicability of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to cyberspace was discussed at the 2010 Atlantic Council meeting. The main participant was Hillary Clinton, then United States Secretary of State. In particular, she stated that such threats to NATO’s computer networks and infrastructure as cyber-attacks should be considered from the point of view of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO recognized the applicability of Article 5 and then declared cyberspace its sphere of responsibility. We should not rule out the possibility of new plans to create a NATO Joint Cyber Command being announced at the next summit to be held in Belgium in 2017. The prospects of such a decision will hinge, among other things, on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections.

In order to carry out full-fledged cyber defence, it is necessary to solve the deterrence and attribution issues. It is also necessary to determine the universal format for applying international humanitarian law to actions unfolding in cyberspace. If these issues are not resolved, a build-up of cyber capabilities could have a negative effect on international security. Russia and several other states adhere to the position of recognizing the need for limiting, and

ultimately prohibiting, the use of cyber weapons as a tool that undermines international stability. A certain consensus on the issue has been achieved within theShanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. The Basic Principles of the State Policy of the in the Field of International Information Security Until 2020 state that the conditions need to be created for the establishment of an international legal regime of non-proliferation of information weapons as one of the means for decreasing the risk of using ICT when carrying out hostile actions and acts of aggression.

Europe's Reluctant Leader

AN EVOLVING UNIONWhen U.S. President Barack Obama visited Europe early in 2016, he voiced concern about two central issues: recent political and economic strife in Europe and Germany’s duty to take on a more active leadership role in these turbulent times. The political landscape in and around Europe has changed significantly over the past decade, leading to a realignment in the balance of power between the European institutions and the member states on the one hand, and among the individual member states on the other. In the process, Germany has become the central player in the European Union, even more so with the British vote in June 2016 to leave the EU. This evolving role comes with the potential for conflicts, misunderstandings and mishaps. Germany is now at a crossroads as it navigates its newfound position as a leader in Europe.HOSTAGES TO HISTORYAlthough Germany’s role in World War II is widely seen as the defining moment of German and European history, the complications of its position in Europe predate that conflict by centuries. In the 16th century, Germany—or, more accurately, the collection of small German-speaking states in central Europe—attracted the attention of its neighbors because of its central geographical position, economic strength and high population density. Historian Brendan Simms has described “the paradox of German power and powerlessness in Europe.” Germany, according to Simms, was seen as “too important to be left solely to the Germans.” Thus, Europeans occupied themselves for centuries with the question of “how to order the European centre in such a way that it was robust enough to master domestic and external challenges without at the same time developing hegemonic tendencies.” German strength was not the only threat in this context; a weak Germany would translate quickly into instability for the continent. So European states shared an interest in keeping Germany a stable, but not overpowering, center for Europe.

In the first half of the 20th century, two world wars added another layer of complexity to the “German question.” Germany’s unbridled aggression and perpetration of genocide left deep scars across Europe and the world. Furthermore, it created an identity crisis at home as Germans slowly came to terms with the atrocities that their country had committed. Not only did its neighbors fear a strong Germany, but Germany itself had lost its appetite for power and feared its own strength.As a result of this shift, Germany’s foreign policy changed tack. Political scientist Hans Kundnani explains that Germany shifted its focus to “international integration in multilateralist institutions—in particular NATO and what became the European Union.” The Federal Republic prioritized setting international norms over pursuing its own interests abroad.

LEADERSHIP VERSUS RESPONSIBILITYIn large part because of this long history, Germany has not actively sought out its new leadership role and indeed has been reluctant to accept it. Germany’s responsibility for the future of the European Union is often talked about on official occasions and at public gatherings, but political prudence and the general code of conduct preclude overt discussions of Germany’s interests or power. Expressions such as “hegemon” or “leading power” are studiously rejected, despite any friendly adjective one might be tempted to attach to them. However, in private conversations one notices that the new state of affairs is starting to change the way that Germans think about their role in the European Union and the world. Political elites in Berlin may be wary of certain labels, but in the rest of Europe people are less reserved when it comes to talking about Germany’s leadership role. Often Germany’s neighbors are critical of the Federal Republic and its strategy for taking on new responsibilities.

Germany’s evolution can best be explained as having three distinct phases: first, a phase of “reluctant leadership” between 2009 and 2013, followed by “confident leadership” between 2014 and 2015, and finally “lonely leadership” from 2015 to the present. Each of these phases began with an external shock and emerged as Germany developed its response.

WHEN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY GIVES YOU LEMONS…The global financial crisis set in motion dramatic changes in Europe. It began with the collapse of the American real estate market, and continued with convulsions of the banking system in the United States and around the world.

This crisis in the private sector soon created serious problems for public budgets. The strain was more than some EU member states could take, which could have led to their collapse and insolvency if the eurozone states had not acted together. They implemented a rescue policy against an extremely complex economic, political and legal backdrop.

There was no clear consensus in Europe about the root causes of or solution to the crisis. Furthermore, existing European treaties ruled out mutual financial assistance. The so-called "no-bailout clause" was considered one of the central pillars of the eurozone. Indeed, it was deemed to be one of the basic conditions under which the federal government was able to agree to the creation of a common currency. However, in the face of crisis, the German government was expected to throw this basic rule overboard in order to save the eurozone.

The government of Chancellor Angela Merkel deliberated for nearly a year before it committed itself wholeheartedly to saving the euro. At the time, many thought that this commitment was too little, too late, a criticism that has been often been applied to German politics ever since. However, many other countries were also waiting to see what would happen and tried to stabilize the situation with a series of modest policy interventions. Germany’s economic and financial clout meant that it had to give its approval to any step forward, and many felt that its early ambivalence was counterproductive.

However, when the federal government finally and reluctantly reached its decision on how to resolve the crisis, there was an immediate outcry. Germany’s strategy centered on legal and systemic approaches to crisis management, which proponents of an economics-based solution considered to be flawed. Those advocates believed, instead, that crises should be addressed by stimulating the economies of the affected states, which would require significant financial resources. However, the German government believed that such a strategy would not address the root of the problem. It argued that the fundamental problem was wanton deficit spending by governments. If this was not resolved, no sum of money would lead to any appreciable improvement over the status quo.

Despite opposition from some quarters, Germany was not alone in its approach to crisis resolution. For example, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria agreed with the German strategy that emphasized cutting costs and reforming state structures. These states saw little need for financial stimulus to foster economic growth, particularly when compared with the deficit spending defended by many economists. Some critics argue that such a stimulus translates to “buying your way out of the crisis.” Those countries that did not share the German austerity approach, especially France and Italy, were only gradually able to influence the course of events. Germany’s dominant role has led to a great deal of frustration and strife in Europe.

TAMING THE RUSSIAN BEAROn the heels of the euro crisis, another external shock drew attention away from the financial meltdown. The Ukrainian crisis began in 2013 with then-President Viktor Yanukovych suddenly refusing to sign a trade agreement between the European Union and a politically divided Ukraine. In Kiev, this led to protesters occupying the capital city’s central Maidan Square. Protests intensified and sometimes led to bloodshed and death. Ukraine slid into a conflict between those advocating pro-Western policies and those favoring closer ties with Russia.

From the beginning, the Russian government played an active role in the escalation. This involvement began with Russian opposition to the EU-Ukraine trade agreement, and culminated with the annexation of Crimea and the military destabilization of eastern Ukraine. Years of European-Ukrainian and Russo-European rapprochement went up in smoke. Europe reeled from the violence as it grappled with the appropriate response to counter Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threats and aggression. Above all, the situation revived fears of a revanchist Russia among the EU’s eastern member states.

In recent years, Germans sought to forge closer economic ties with Russia. They quickly found themselves at the forefront of a crisis management effort as the Russo-European relationship deteriorated. For the political class in Berlin, this crisis was also a kind of internal stress test. Many in both the public and private sectors had worked for years to establish good relations with Russia’s political and business communities, but they were forced to accept that these improved relations might not be permanent. They had not anticipated Putin’s aggression, and they were powerless to stop him. However, it was precisely the combination of European policy know-how and competence in the area of the Eastern Partnership that enabled Berlin to manage this crisis effectively. In the face of Russian aggression, Germany entered a phase of confident leadership in the European Union.

Two elements of the European response to Russian aggression were of central importance: the joint presence of Germany and France at all negotiations and the decision to counter Russian military might with the power of the European internal market. In order for the approach to work, all of the 28 member states of the European Union had to be persuaded to adopt the sanctions strategy. Although some found the commitment difficult, all 28 states ultimately agreed to the sanctions. Russian aggression continues to be a largely abstract problem for some southern member states, especially those with weak economies. These states argue that they should not have to accept the losses from the battered Russian market. Rome has been particularly critical of the sanctions policy. Italy experienced losses in the agricultural exports sector as a result of the sanctions, which have been felt deeply given the current struggles of the Italian economy. Nevertheless, the European Union as a whole remains committed to its policy on Russia, and the EU has maintained unity despite internal disagreements and ongoing attempts by Moscow to create discord among the European member countries.

A CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE AND CAPACITYHowever, widespread support for Germany over its handling of the Ukraine crisis was short-lived. The German government experienced its loneliest moments when Europe faced its next shock. Refugees, and migrants more generally, are not a new phenomenon in Europe. For years, Italy has been the front line of these migration flows, receiving thousands of refugees per year from Africa and the Middle East.

However, as discussed in the migration chapter of Newpolitik, the flow of refugees reached an unprecedented level in 2015. After an intermediate stop in Turkey, hundreds of thousands of people seeking refuge made their way via Greece to other destinations in Europe. Most hoped to reach Sweden, Denmark, Germany or Austria. As some states turned their backs, closing their borders and failing to provide basic necessities to the refugees, Merkel reacted swiftly and decided to keep Germany’s borders open. For Syrian refugees, Germany also suspended the Dublin Regulation, which stipulates that asylum claims must be processed in the first EU state in which a person enters. With its open borders and relatively welcoming policy, the Federal Republic may have raised the hopes of many other desperate people who fled from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Other migrants joined the refugees, some from the Balkans and others from Africa and parts of the Middle East, seeking to escape bleak economic and political prospects in their home countries.

Some states with large inflows of refugees, like Germany, quickly reached their systemic and logistical capacity. German policymakers and officials faced a situation for which they were simply not prepared. More than 1 million people arrived within a year, and administrative processes were too slow to adjust to the increased migration flows.

Although Merkel has called for a common European solution, many EU member states did not want to take on any of the shared responsibility. Some states were still recovering from the economic crisis. Some were up against strong right-wing populist parties. Others preferred to set their own refugee policies. These reactions were also due in part to resentment that had accumulated during the euro crisis, when Germany had taken on a similarly prominent (albeit reluctant) leadership role.

Due to pushback from some EU member states, the German government failed in its first attempt to find a common European solution to the refugee crisis. This was not a failure of the European institutions—that is, the European Commission and the European Parliament—but rather due to opposition from individual member states, which clearly rejected Germany’s primary goal of sharing the burden. Few member states wanted to accept distributional quotas for refugees.

Berlin then attempted to forge a coalition of the most affected countries, including both destination and transit countries. However, in the meantime the political pressure had reached a point where many countries began to develop an “every man for himself” attitude, closing borders and imposing harsh new asylum policies. The Schengen Area, one of the pillars of the European Union, was in danger of collapsing, much like the eurozone a few years earlier. It was at this same point that political pressure in Germany increased as Merkel decided, in a moment of high political drama, to act in accordance with humanitarian policy and keep Germany’s borders open.

The popularity of the chancellor, who for many years had seemed unassailable, began to wane, even within her own party. The Christian Social Union (CSU), the sister party of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), repeatedly attacked her and her migration policy. European neighbors also criticized Merkel’s approach. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has accused her of “moral imperialism.” Many have argued that her welcoming approach exacerbated the situation by encouraging more refugees, as well as economic migrants, to come to Europe.

Because other EU states were opposed to burden-sharing within the European Union, the federal government turned its attention to slowing migration flows along the Aegean route between Turkey and Greece. While the plan that finally emerged was framed as European and given the go-ahead by the EU, it was a fundamentally German project, formulated in the Office of the Federal Chancellor and negotiated by Merkel herself. The deal rests on two pillars. The first is an international agreement with Turkey, promising far-reaching financial assistance to support the millions of refugees living in that country. The agreement also enshrines the so-called “one-in, one-out” principle, meaning that people who enter Greece without a visa will be sent back to Turkey, and that for every returnee, one refugee in Turkey will be permitted to enter the EU legally. The second pillar involves far-reaching improvements on an intra-European level, beginning within the Schengen zone, in migration and asylum policy and the internal security architecture. The EU still has a long way to go, but the first effects of these measures are already visible. In the months following the agreement, the number of new arrivals declined rapidly from the same period in 2015, thus averting the collapse of the Schengen Area for the time being.

The Merkel government managed to do what few observers would have thought possible a few months earlier: develop and pursue an effective pan-European path to solving the refugee crisis. Although Germany has achieved results, this was the federal government’s loneliest hour in its history as a member of the European Union. It faced displeasure, mistrust and fear from across Europe. Some corners even felt quiet satisfaction about the difficulties faced by oversized Germany, a country that in other recent crises had been so impressively self-confident. Berlin quickly became the “lonely leader.”

STRIKING A STRATEGIC BALANCE Berlin will continue to play a central role in European politics, and this role will become even more pronounced with Britain’s exit from the EU. Although the United Kingdom has played little or no part in the management of various

European crises in recent years, its exit will disturb the current balance of power in the EU. This inevitable increase in German visibility is frightening to Berlin, perhaps rightly so given Europe’s longstanding discomfort with “the German question.”

The European Union is a legal community based on finely balanced common institutions. In one of these institutions, namely the European Council, the representatives of the member states—at least in theory—make decisions on the basis of equality. The qualifier is necessary: Although (or perhaps precisely because) member states have a right to veto on many issues, over the years a system of consensus, compromise and inclusion has developed. This gives all the members the opportunity to see themselves as part of a common process, even if a few member states have more influence than others in de facto terms. For many years, Germany was considered a master of navigating this system, creating balance and reconciliation through restraint. With regard to both the process and the results, Germany has been most successful when it has combined its own strengths with an inward-looking approach to integration with the EU. Berlin should continue to follow this path in the years ahead.

German political elites are acutely aware of the power they wield. They have tested their strength in the face of German, European and global challenges and discovered that they are capable of effecting real change. However, leaders must not abandon their traditional approach entirely. Power and the ability to compromise should be combined, which means going back to a stronger and more systematic approach to building coalitions.

The Franco-German partnership is a classic example of such an alliance. For many years, it might have been best described by the saying, “The reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.” The periodic cries of doom and destruction and the valedictory utterances are an enduring part of this friendship. And so are the regular attempts by both countries to find other friendships, options and room to maneuver. But none has hitherto proved to be as stable, reliable and fruitful as the Franco-German friendship. It will also be indispensable in order to hold the European Union together through the British exit and beyond, and to ensure long-term stability and peace.

However, a strong partnership with France will not be sufficient. There are many other members of the European Union that also share interests with the Federal Republic. Almut Möller and Joseph Janning of the European Council on Foreign Relations named a few of these partners, including the Netherlands, Scandinavian states, the Benelux countries and Austria, in their paper entitled “Leading from the center: Germany’s new role in Europe.” Enlisting these countries’ support in a more resolute and systematic manner—and at earlier stages—to develop solutions will yield positive results for Germany. A number of other EU member states are now trying to improve their bilateral relations with Berlin, and Germany should try to foster these relationships as well.

Germany has a good chance of improving its reputation in Europe and relationships with its neighbors. According to a 2015 Bertelsmann Stiftung Eupinions survey, 55 percent of Europeans found German leadership to be “good,” while 45 percent found it to be “bad.” These numbers suggest that Germany still stands at a crossroads in Europe, and also that it has a chance to improve its relationships with its neighbors.

Finally, Berlin should resist the temptation to accept praise for what it has achieved. If its leadership style is integrational and invisible, it will become far more effective on the European level. Germany should share credit for its successes, especially with the European institutions. In recent years, Berlin has repeatedly criticized the European Commission. However, in the context of the German “invisibility strategy,” it would be prudent to treat European institutions with more respect.

The concept of an integrational leadership style was outlined by German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen in a speech given to the Munich Security Conference in 2015. She described this approach as “leading from the center,” and emphasized the significance of a common European approach of inclusion, cooperation and burden-sharing. At the same time, she rejected the idea of a leadership style based on the American type of situation-dependent coalition building. This analysis can also be applied beyond security policy to European policymaking in its entirety.

However, this is no easy task. External shocks can impact the EU suddenly and unexpectedly. The nature and the structure of the crises vary significantly—just like the instruments needed to resolve them. The internal political

structure of the Federal Republic is parliamentary and federal, and does not have a strong executive bias. The German federal government requires robust internal support in order to be effective. In keeping with its new role, it must now try to achieve a greater degree of European coordination. It does not have a great deal of time, and resources are limited. This is a test of Germany’s willingness to embrace and evolve into its new role.

Furthermore, Germany’s EU policy is part of a larger picture, and Germany also faces growing demands in foreign and security affairs. For many years, Germany’s international partners have urged it to play a greater role on the global stage. German policymakers must balance their allies’ expectations with the views of the electorate, which generally disapproves of military engagement. This criticism will not disappear overnight. However, as Daniel Keohane observed, leading figures, including the federal president, the foreign minister and the minister of defense, have been trying to prepare the general public for the challenges that lie ahead. These efforts may slowly change public perception at home about Germany’s prominent position in the world.

Henry Kissinger once argued that Germany was “too big for Europe, but too small for the world.” In the end, Berlin has no choice if it wants to solve this dilemma. It must now try to use its strengths to support the European Union in order to enable Europe to effectively address European and global challenges.

Южный Кавказ: кто кого переиграет сегодня?Политика

АЗАМИГРАНЯН

16 СЕНТЯБРЯ, 15:21

 

Об интересах региональных игроков и перспективах рыночной экономики на Северном Кавказе рассказывает Кавказскому геополитическому клубу ведущий научный сотрудник Центра постсоветских исследований Института экономики РАН, руководитель отдела экономики Института стран СНГ, доктор экономических наук Аза Мигранян.

- Видите ли Вы предпосылки к перезагрузке экономических отношений региональных игроков на Южном Кавказе по итогам недавних встреч лидеров России, Азербайджана и Ирана, России и Армении?- Скорее, можно говорить не о перезагрузке, а об эволюции внешнеэкономических отношений всех стран региона в контексте смягчения санкций (их частичной отмены) относительно Ирана. Именно этот фактор становится катализатором активности стран региона. Прослеживаются как конкурирующие предложения (со стороны Азербайджана и Армении), так и интегрирующие проекты, в которых более заинтересованы Россия и Иран.В любом случае, стимулом экономической активности по инициированию различных проектов сотрудничества с Ираном странами региона является их желание получить максимум выгод от растущего потенциала ИРИ. Поэтому все экономические проекты, в том числе и транспортно-логистические, будут определяться более крупными игроками - Ираном, Россией и Китаем, которые способны обеспечить окупаемость большинства проектов.  Не стоит забывать и интересы Турции, которая активно работает в регионе, в основном через Азербайджан, вовлекая в свою орбиту и Грузию. Именно позиция Грузии в сложившейся конфигурации сил в регионе будет определяющей для развития разных направлений интеграции. С экономической точки зрения интересы Грузии тяготеют к ирано-армянскому вектору сотрудничества. Это позволит ей как диверсифицировать транзитный потенциал, так и решить проблемы энергозависимости через подключение к газопроводу Армения-Иран и

электрической системе. Сдерживающим фактором были санкции против Ирана и замороженные отношения с Россией.При этом Армения вполне бы могла использовать свой статус члена ЕАЭС и стать представителем Союза в торговых отношениях с Ираном, что существенно бы повысило интерес к республике.Именно фактор экономической целесообразности и ресурсный потенциал стран определяет скорость и направление развития проектов. Так, основные транспортные коридоры «Север-Юг» и «Запад-Восток» (часть проекта Шёлкового пути) в большей степени охватывают транзитный потенциал Азербайджана и Грузии. Армения участвует лишь в проекте автодороги, которая не имеет пока стратегического значения.

Всерьез изменить ситуацию в регионе под силу только России, которая способна привести к общему знаменателю все разногласия стран как минимум в экономическом формате отношений. Для этого необходимо возобновить отношения с Грузией, что реанимировало бы связь по линии «Север-Юг» и создало условия для формирования глобальной интегрированной сети транспортных коридоров между Азией и Европой через Черное море. Кроме того, это позволило бы снизить конкуренцию между Ираном и Турцией, объединив их в едином транспортном коридоре.- Каковы перспективы российско-армянских отношений, изменится их содержание?- Что касается российско-армянских отношений, то прогнозировать существенные изменения не приходится без оздоровления

инвестиционного климата в Армении и формирования скоординированной промышленной политики в рамках ЕАЭС. Будет сохраняться инерционное движение во взаимной торговле и во внешнеэкономической деятельности в целом.В рамках транспортного коридора «Восток-Запад» Азербайджан имеет ключевую роль, тандем Грузия-Азербайджан является стратегическим, а Армения фактически отстранена от проекта. В фазе завершения находится строительство железной дороги Баку-Тбилиси-Ахалкалаки-Карс. Нет оснований полагать, что в обозримом будущем1 откроется железная дорога Иран-Джульфа (Нахичевань)-Ереван-Гюмри-Карс.На сегодня указанные коридоры более жизнеспособны по причине большего экономического потенциала Азербайджана, поддерживаемого турецкими интересами в регионе. Но ситуация меняется со снятием санкций с Ирана и с изменением геополитических интересов России. Ни одна страна не заинтересована в формировании монозависимости от одного государства, даже самого дружественного. Поэтому шансы Армении усилить свое присутствие в интеграционных проектах высоки (например, ветка нефтепровода из Ирана со строительством НПЗ, расширение газового сотрудничества с Ираном с включением России по взаимным поставкам через республику, расширение торгового представительства интересов Ирана в ЕАЭС вплоть до создания свободной экономической зоны). Т.е. необходимо предлагать новые экономические проекты, которые будут способствовать сбалансированию сил в регионе, тогда и будет расширяться присутствие в транспортных проектах.Железнодорожные компоненты проекта «Север-Юг» сегодня не закрыты. Находится в фазе реализации строительство участка Астара (Азербайджан)-Астара (Иран)-Решт-Казвин железнодорожного проекта Россия-Азербайджан-Иран, в котором Азербайджан имеет ключевое значение. Оно обусловлено не только географическим положением, но и экономическим наполнением, поэтому необходимо расширять экономическое сотрудничество, максимально используя статус Армении как члена ЕАЭС.Кроме того, необходимо учитывать интересы Ирана, направленные против влияния Турции в регионе. В данной ситуации существенно возрастает роль России, которая, единственная из стран региона, может предложить всем заинтересованным сторонам экономические проекты реальной интеграции. Речь идет о сопряжении интересов Китая (Шелковый путь), Ирана, Турции и собственных интересов путём формирования объединенного транспортного хаба за счет объединения двух векторов - «Север-Юг» и «Восток-Запад».  Железная дорога Россия-Абхазия-Грузия-Армения-Нахичевань-Иран закрыта в двух звеньях и нет оснований полагать, что в обозримом будущем она откроется. Это одна из сложных проблем с точки зрения политики, но и самая очевидная с точки зрения экономической целесообразности. Именно открытие (восстановление) этой дороги крайне важно для стимулирования экономического сотрудничества и

роста взаимной торговли стран региона, прежде всего, Армении. Основания для полноценного функционирования этой дороги есть: она экономически выгодна всем странам. Мешают политические разногласия, которые могут быть преодолены только в том случае, когда экономические интересы перевесят политические амбиции (например, рост объемов торговли между Ираном и Россией, Россией и странами Закавказья с обязательным вовлечением Абхазии в интеграционный проект).В фазе реализации находится автомобильная магистраль Иран-Армения-Грузия (с ответвлениями на Поти и Батуми). Эта магистраль включает Армению в интеграционный проект Иран-ЕС. Однако нет оснований полагать, что в обозримом будущем магистраль – как предполагается – будет продолжена в Россию. Этот факт имеет потенциал генерирования латентного напряжения между Арменией и Россией.На самом деле конфликтного потенциала для России и Армении эта дорога не представляет, так как она дает возможность Армении наращивать своё экономическое присутствие в регионе. Более того, она балансирует российские связи с другими игроками. Что же касается гипотезы о потери российского влияния на Армению из-за ее переориентации на другие рынки, то они совершенно не оправданы. Ни в одной из стран региона емкость национального рынка не может быть сопоставима с российским, поэтому Россия останется центром экономического притяжения не только Армении, но и всех стран региона – и в этом ее интеграционная компонента.Таким образом, Армения исключена из сухопутных транспортных проектов ЕАЭС, а Азербайджан, имея в ключевую роль в обоих транспортно-коммуникативных проектах, повысит свою геополитическую цену в стратегиях союзников Армении – России и Ирана.Географически и ресурсно Азербайджан, несомненно, имеет преимущества, но союзнические отношения Армении и с Ираном, и с Россией основаны не на этих конкурентных преимуществах, а на геополитических интересах стран. Эти интересы не изменятся с участием или неучастием какой-либо страны в транспортных коридорах - изменятся лишь формы и способы их обеспечения. Поэтому нужно трезво оценивать все факторы сложной геополитической и экономической конфигурации в регионе.- Могут ли претерпеть изменения действующие углеводородные маршруты в регионе? - Нет, для этого нет оснований. Изменений цен, существенно влияющих на национальные интересы стран, не имеется. Небольшие колебания, допустимые в соответствии с меняющейся рыночной конъюнктурой в сторону уменьшения, вполне бы устроили Армению. Возможности поставок со стороны Ирана могут стимулировать подобные уступки со стороны Газпрома, но прогнозировать эти

переговоры невозможно из-за неустойчивости ветвей власти в Армении.- С Вашей точки зрения, какие экономические темы могли бы вывести из тупика отношения Москвы и Тбилиси? - Прежде всего, усиление экономического кризиса в Грузии, рост потребности в грузинском транзитном потенциале со стороны России (возможно опосредованное влияние Армении и  Ирана).Однако без готовности грузинской стороны к смене своей политической риторики ожидать уступок от Москвы не стоит, ибо она рассчитывает на трансформацию экономического допуска Грузии на свой рынок и политическое примирение при сохранении имеющейся конфигурации, особенно в контексте признания Абхазии и Осетии. Здесь, скорее, важна позиция этих двух стран, их готовность начать диалог с Грузией (почему бы и нет - как только Армения и НКР начнут «диалог» с Азербайджаном – прим.ред.).- Логистический коридор «Север-Юг» осуществляется главным образом в интересах Ирана. Нужен ли на самом деле постиндустриальной России коридор с таким маршрутом? Что будет экспортировать Россия на фоне Китая? - Безусловно, нужен. Именно для того, чтобы не оказаться за бортом интересов Китая и сохранить свое присутствие в регионе. Здесь важен транзитный потенциал, который может обеспечить не только хорошие доходы, но и мощный рычаг влияния. Торговать России есть чем. Кроме того, коридор может открыть новые возможности для расширения сотрудничества со странами региона.- В случае, если Китай решит интегрировать проект «Север-Юг» в «Великий Шёлковый путь-2», РФ придётся смириться с потенциальным конкурентом в собственном экономическом пространстве. Проявит ли Поднебесная стратегическую мудрость, замедлив темпы поглощения «догоняющей» экономики России? - Решения Китая, как и любой страны, будут зависеть от экономического наполнения и окупаемости проекта. Стоит отметить, что рекламируемый мегапроект - «Великий Шёлковый путь-2» - вовсе не является интеграционным проектом, а позиционируется как концепция, согласно которой Китай приглашает все страны выстраивать новые транспортные коридоры по указанному маршруту. Поэтому проект «Север-Юг» – это проект стран региона, а не Китая. И здесь определяющими являются Иран, Россия и страны Закавказья, конечно же, с учетом интересов Турции. Что же касается поглощений, то это вопрос эффективности собственно российской экономики, а не данных проектов.- В силу каких причин – управленческих, или  низовых - Северо-Кавказский регион медлит с экономической модернизацией?- Здесь комплекс проблем, и прежде всего, необходимость выстраивания экономической переориентации. Невозможно назначить модернизацию экономики региона, необходимо создать предпосылки

для этого. Процесс развивается, но медленно, соразмерно общей экономической конъюнктуре в стране. К тому же определенную инертность обуславливает имеющийся в регионе уровень террористических угроз. Это приводит к смещению приоритетов из-за сужения финансовых возможностей российской экономики в целом.- Агропромышленный  Северный Кавказ не располагает собственными торговыми объектами на ёмком московском рынке. Соглашения, подписанные экс-мэром Москвы, в частности, с Кабардино-Балкарией, не реализованы. Вопрос о неэффективности Минкавказа и постоянных представительств кавказских субъектов в Москве задавать Вам, наверное, не вполне корректно, поскольку Вы представляете «экономический мозг» госсектора России – Институт экономики РАН. Но Ваше мнение и комментарии, несомненно, представили бы интерес. - Проблемы АПК северокавказских республик обусловлены не отсутствием доступа на московский рынок (кроме него есть необъятный российский рынок), а в отсутствии целенаправленной работы по продвижению собственной продукции внутри страны. Это проблема низкой эффективности менеджмента на самих предприятиях и руководства республик в целом.В той же ситуации находились отрасли сельского хозяйства Краснодарского края и Ставрополья, однако там острота проблем снижена. Вопрос эффективности бизнеса – это вопрос уровня квалификации, и неспособность Кабардино-Балкарии продвинуть подписанный проект в Москве – это показатель низкой конкурентоспособности системы управления. Другое дело, что центр не способствует решению этой проблемы, и это, безусловно, является очевидным фактом провала работы названных вами ведомств и органов власти.- Отток интеллектуального слоя населения Кавказа в Москву, в Питер, почти во все страны мира стал нормой. Каким образом минимизировать растущую социальную проблему? - Лишь только решая проблемы экономического роста, создавая условия посредством системы стимулов для данного слоя населения. У них высок уровень патриотизма, родственных скреп – это создает благоприятные условия для стимулирования сохранения «мозгов», но только при условии перспектив развития экономики.- Капиталистический уклад экономики не в цене на пассионарном Кавказе. Реален ли процесс «выравнивания» уровня жизни населения путём создания в кавказском регионе адаптированной макроэкономической модели социального типа? - Именно на Кавказе всегда был большой разрыв по уровню доходов среди населения, но специфика национального уклада с высоким уровнем общинной взаимопомощи может быть использована для создания коллективных форм решения социальных проблем, обеспечения доступа к социальным благам всех слоев населения. Поэтому на Кавказе рыночные отношения будут работать не в их

классической форме - их необходимо адаптировать с целью извлечения максимальных выгод от устоявшихся общинно-родовых систем связей в обществе.