“Ningún país entrega a sus hijos” Extradition, Nationalism, and Presidential Legitimacy in Belisario Betancur’s Colombia
(1982-1984)
byJamie Shenk
HIS 400: Revolution and Counterrevolution in 20th Century Latin AmericaProfessor Robert Karl
January 6, 2015
My name is Jamie Shenk, and I am in the Department of History at Princeton University pursuing certificates in Latin American Studies and Global Health and Health Policy. I will graduate in June
2016. Thank you for your consideration.
Introduction
“When I say that I will make a national government, I mean ‘national’ that includes
everyone, for the good of everyone… not only for the desires of the political class or only those
privileged groups with the power to make themselves heard by the public administration.”1 With
this assertion, the 1982 presidential candidate, Belisario Betancur, introduced a new model for
Colombian politics. The Colombian political system was in the midst of a contentious transition.
The end of the sixteen-year long National Front period in 1974 facilitated a reevaluation of the
political system as a new generation of leaders attuned to popular politics advocated for inclusion
beyond the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties. However, the power of the entrenched
political elite proved a formidable barrier for the transition to a truly democratic system. Thus, the
success of politicians like Betancur depended on their ability to balance their plans to address the
needs of the general populace with the desires of the traditional ruling class, all the while navigating
a highly bureaucratic system. Meanwhile, the rising influence of the drug mafia and its permeation
through all levels of Colombian society and politics added another dimension to these political
tensions.
The debate over the extradition of Colombian nationals in the early half of the 1980s
provides a useful lens to examine Betancur’s struggle for presidential legitimacy. The national
dialogue about extradition and the drug mafia raised broader concerns about Colombian
governance, incorporating questions of sovereignty, citizenship, and the limits of government
power. Interestingly, Betancur supported both sides of the debate during his presidency, first
denying, then approving, extradition requests from the United States. To explain this reversal, this
1Quote from title page is taken from Semana’s interview with Lucas Gómez van Griekan’s attorney in 1893. “Extradición de colombianos,” Semana, May 16, 1983, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/extradicion-de-colombianos-un-caso-insolito/2388-3. All translations from Spanish are the author’s own. “450.000 Liberales votaron por mi,” Semana, June 7, 1982, http://www.semana.com/enfoque/articulo/450000-liberales-votaron-por-mi/53142-3.
1
paper will explore the political and social contexts that motivated these seemingly contradictory
decisions. First, this paper will discuss the denial of the US extradition request for Emiro de Jesus
Mejía as an attempt to legitimize Betancur’s presidency by affirming the domestic focus of his
administration through a strengthening of state institutions. Second, this paper will examine
Betancur’s invocation of the extradition treaty after the drug mafia’s assassination of Justice
Minster Rodrigo Lara Bonilla’s as an effort to reestablish state control. I argue that a shift in the
Colombian public’s priorities from enacting political reform to combatting the drug mafia in the
aftermath of Lara’s assassination forced Betancur to reverse his stance on extradition; Betancur’s
ability to frame both decisions within his broader nationalist political goals, however, allowed him
to use both the denial and application of the extradition treaty as political tools to consolidate
popular support for his administration.
Scholars of this period in Colombian history tend to exclude the majority of Betancur’s
presidency from their analysis of extradition and the drug crisis in Colombia and begin their
narrative around 1985 when the drug mafia’s violence escalated in an attempt to dissuade the
government from enforcing extradition. Thus, historians tend to focus on Betancur’s peace process
with the armed guerrilla groups and economic policy as the hallmarks of his presidency. This
narrative affords the drug mafia and Lara’s assassination only a cursory description. However,
extending this time period earlier to include Betancur’s decision on the Mejía extradition case
complicates the prevailing narrative of Colombia’s role vis-à-vis the United States in the war
against drugs. Scholars of the era, like the Colombian sociologist, Francisco Leal Buitrago, argue
that the Colombian government exerted little autonomy in forming their policies on drug
trafficking. Instead, official government policies “mirrored” US initiatives and therefore reflected
US interests and control over the region.3 Betancur’s decisions, however, indicate a more complex
set of motives. An analysis of his decisions on extradition in 1983 and 1984 indicates that he
2
responded more to domestic concerns over sovereignty and security, sometimes directly challenging
US pressures.2
A Broken System
To understand the political context of Betancur’s administration, it is necessary to examine
the legacy of the National Front period of Colombian politics, which created the framework for the
issues that Betancur would grapple with. Colombia’s democratic system holds the honor of being
one of the oldest in the Western hemisphere, a fact often cited by scholars of the region for its
uniqueness in a region characterized by a history of dictatorships and military regimes.3 However,
Colombia’s democratic system did not necessarily engender truly democratic processes, an issue
exemplified by the National Front’s rule from 1958-1974. After the long period of partisan violence
known simply as La Violencia and subsequent rule by the military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla,
the leading families of the two traditional political parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, designed
what Colombian historian Marco Palacios describes as a “gentlemen’s agreement.” The ruling
class’s compromise consisted of a set of alliances and truces to split lower levels of government
between the two parties and alternate the presidency every four years.4
While the coalition prevented violent clashes between Liberals and Conservatives, the
rigidity of its structure rendered the political system unable to address the needs of a rapidly
changing populace. Between 1951 and the time Betancur took office in 1982, the urban population
2 “GOC Denies Extradition for Emiro Mejía,” US Embassy, Bogotá to Secretary of State and Department of Justice, November 1983, 1, Digital National Security Archive.3 See: Jorge P. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1989); Steven Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia (New York: Routledge, 2004); Robert H. Dix, The Politics of Colombia (New York: Praeger, 1987); John D. Martz, The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1996).4 Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002, trans. Richard Stoller (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 245.
3
exploded, climbing from 40 percent to 65 percent of the total population.5 Urbanization caused
problems beyond strains on cities’ infrastructure and employment; it changed the country’s political
landscape. For example, the rapid migration resulted in a breakdown of the traditional dichotomy
between Liberal and Conservatives. With few real differences between the political agendas of the
two parties, Colombians historically had inherited their affiliations as Liberal or Conservative as
they inherited their family name. For example, a profile on Betancur in the popular news magazine
Semana attributed his membership of the Conservative party to it being a product of his “being born
a Betancur. It was inevitable. If he had been born a Cano he would be Liberal.”6 Urbanization broke
this pattern. When Colombians moved from the countryside to the major cities of Bogotá, Cali, and
Medellín they left their political affiliations behind with their family homes, creating a new party-
less class. With power entrenched in the ruling class and without a true opposition, however, the
National Front had little incentive to react to social changes and acknowledge new sources of
power.7 National Front historians, including Colombians like Leal, agree that the political system’s
inability to react to “the most pressing concerns of the country” and subsequent loss of legitimacy
functioned as a primary motivation to end the National Front in 1974.
The official end of the National Front, however, did not immediately usher in significant
changes in the political system. The election of Alfonso López Michelsen technically represented
the start of the post-National Front period, but none of the candidates offered a true alternative to
the traditional ruling class. Perhaps the most indicative representation of the entrenchment of the
political elite lies in the familial ties of the candidates in the 1974 election—all were children of
5 Ibid., 226, 240.6 “Es conservador porque nació Betancur. Era inevitable. Si hubiera nacido Cano sería liberal.” The family name Cano refers to the Betancur family’s Liberal rivals in their home region of Amagá. “El hijo del arriero,” Semana, June 28, 1982, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-hijo-del-arriero/292-3.7 Francisco Leal Buitrago, “Estabilidad macroeconómica e institucional y violencia crónica,” in En busca de la estabilidad perdida, ed. Francisco Leal Buitrago (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1995), 25.
4
former presidents.8 Four years later, López Michelsen’s presidency had done little to restore
Colombians’ faith in the political process and the government’s crisis of legitimacy continued with
increasing voter apathy. Only 34% of eligible voters participated in the 1978 presidential election
with turnout even lower in urban areas that were not under the influence of rural political bosses.9
Even so, the 1978 election featured hints of change, as Betancur, the Conservative candidate
proposed a new style of Colombian politics.
“The Non-conformist that Colombia Needs”
Betancur’s campaigns in 1978 and 1982 promised the Colombian people a new era of
politics that also created a new era of expectations that would shape the extradition debate.
Beginning with his campaign in 1978, Betancur eschewed traditional party politics in favor of a
program built on nationalism and resolved to create a “democratic opening” to dissolve the National
Front’s legacy of exclusivity. Designed as a reversal of the past twenty years of Colombia’s
political history rather than an ideology in itself, Betancur’s nationalism took a broad definition.
First, although he operated as a member of the Conservative party, Betancur framed his
Movimiento Nacional as an option divorced from the traditional Liberal/Conservative dichotomy by
arguing that Colombia’s problems were national issues, “neither Conservative or Liberal.”10
According to Francisco Thoumi and Rensselaer W. Lee’s regionalist analysis of the Colombian
drug trade, this represented a substantial break from the country’s history. Colombia, they argue,
had no tradition of nationalism, due, at least in part, to the country’s rugged geography, which
created a decentralized state. In the absence of a strong central government, Colombians identified
8*Section heading taken from one of Betancur’s campaign slogans from the 1982 election. López Michelsen was the son of Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934-38, 1942-45); Álvaro Gómez Hurtado was the son of Laureano Gómez (1950-1951); and María Eugenia Rojas was the daughter of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). Buitrago, “Estabilidad macroeconómica e institucional y violencia crónica,” 33.9 Martz, The Politics of Clientelism, 179.10 Quote from ibid., 202.
5
first and foremost by political party as decided by their local leaders.11 While this analysis may be
especially true for the department of Antioquia, the home of the Medellín cartel and a region known
for its pride, and urbanization may have diminished this trend elsewhere, Betancur’s substitution of
nationalism for traditional party politics represented a significant change in political rhetoric.
After losing to the Liberal candidate, Julio César Turbay Ayala, in 1978, Betancur expanded
his nationalist platform for the 1982 election to highlight the failures of Turbay’s administration.
Reacting to political violence by armed guerrilla groups and US pressure to address the marijuana
trade in the Guajira peninsula, Turbay’s administration had implemented severe restrictions on civil
rights, including the invocation of the State of Siege statute in all departments. The statute served as
a perfect embodiment of the political system’s legacy of repression. It allowed the president to rule
by decree and the use of military tribunals to try civilians accused of political crimes.12 Due to its
restrictive measures, the State of Siege thus became associated with a certain “psychological
environment” of fear among the general public.13 As a result, the State of Siege became a focal
point for Betancur’s campaign. Betancur expanded his definition of nationalism to include the
protection of all citizens’ political rights and the reversal of Turbay’s repressive tactics. In an
interview with Semana, the candidate clarified the Movimiento Nacional’s mission, stating,
“’national’ means that I will seek real participation from the communities whose destinies will be
shaped by our decisions” and reiterated his commitment to pursuing a peace process with the
guerrillas groups.14 Furthermore, his rejection of Turbay’s policies indicated his intention to build
11 Rensselaer W. Lee III and Francisco E. Thoumi, “Drugs and Democracy in Colombia,” in Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration Around the World, ed. Roy Godson (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 74.12 See Martz’s chapter, “Traditionalism and Repression: Turbay (1978-1982)” for a full description of Turbay’s policies. Martz, The Politics of Clientelism.13 “Muerte anunciada,” Semana, June 4, 1984, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/muerte-anunciada/5241-3.14 “450.000 Liberales votaron por mi.”
6
an administration with a domestic and regional focus that would prioritize the needs of Colombians
rather than submit to US pressures.
It is important to note that Betancur was neither the first, nor the only politician advocating
for political reform. Turbay’s opponent for the Liberal candidacy in 1978, Carlos Lleras Restrepo,
was also a vocal critic of Colombian politics. However, one could argue that Lleras represented a
flawed spokesperson for a political opening, as his own family name—one of the most storied in the
Liberal party—undermined his critique.15 Betancur’s family history, on the other hand, lent him
more credibility. Born in a small town in Antioquia as one of 22 children of a muleteer, Betancur’s
upbringing distinguished him from the insular political elite. He was a perennial outsider despite his
long career in the Conservative party.16 Recognizing this advantage, Betancur emphasized this
distinction throughout his campaigns to legitimate both his conviction to change the political system
and his commitment to programs addressing poverty. Betancur’s outsider status allowed him to
employ a moralistic tone in his criticism of the political system and assert a unique ability to
“destroy the existing political chieftanships. I can do it because I have no connections to them,
because I owe them nothing.”17 Meanwhile, he used personal stories of the deaths of 17 of his
siblings in childhood to “an illness called ‘underdevelopment'” to illustrate his commitment to
Colombians ignored by the interests of the ruling class.18 Betancur not only promised programs and
reforms that would change politics, but also as a leader born far outside the political elite he
represented a change in itself that no other politician could offer.
Betancur’s promise for a democratic opening and his emphasis on social programs, like
affordable housing and other programs aimed to alleviate poverty and support Colombians
15 The Lleras family had played a crucial role in negotiating the creation of the National Front.16 “El hijo del arriero,” Semana, June 28, 1982, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-hijo-del-arriero/292-3.17 Martz, The Politics of Clientelism, 202.18 “El hijo del arriero.”
7
struggling through the country’s economic crisis yielded wide popular support for his candidacy.
Consequentially, historians generally characterize Betancur as populist leader. However, throughout
his campaign, Betancur carefully avoided that label, even when asked explicitly if he was a
populist.19 His decision demonstrated a shrewd awareness of the many factors at play in the
electoral system recognizing that the term’s historical association with ANAPO might seem overly
threatening to the political elite. In fact, in his Semana interview, Betancur skillfully evaded any
question designed to stir controversy, steering questions about his plan for amnesty for guerillas or
social programs back to a reaffirmation of his broader themes of nationalism and the need to
dismantle the traditional political system. His tactic ultimately proved successful when on May 30,
1982, Betancur was declared the new president of the Republic.
Most historiographical narratives attribute Betancur’s electoral victory to a split in the Liberal
party between two candidates, former president López and an upstart politician, Luis Carlos Galán.
With this narrative, historians draw comparisons between the 1982 election and the two other
instances, in 1930 and 1946, when control shifted from one party to the other because of a split in
votes. This explanation, however, ignores the unifying force that Betancur’s campaign had on
voters from both parties as the first instance that a candidate had reached across party lines for
support. A breakdown of the electoral results supports this argument. The election not only inspired
the biggest voter turnout seen in years, “demolishing,” as Semana described, “the traditional myth
of an apathetic and abstentionist Colombian electorate.” More importantly, it also upset traditional
voting patterns that usually reflected geographic party distribution. Liberal strongholds like the
coastal region and urban areas did the unimaginable by voting for Betancur. To many Colombians’
surprise, “bastion[s] of liberalism” Barranquilla, which López Michelsen had dominated before the
election; Bogotá, which teemed with Galán supporters; along with Cali, Medellín, and Cartagena
19 “450.000 Liberales votaron por mi.”
8
went for Betancur. An article published after Betancur’s victory summarized the election succinctly:
“it is the triumph of a man, not a party.”20
The election offered Colombians a new sense of hope. The country seemed almost
incredulous; an opinion piece noted that Betancur’s “displacement of votes from one party to the
other is a phenomenon of democracies more advanced than ours.” That the transfer of power
occurred through clean elections merited even greater excitement. Truly democratic elections were
an anomaly in Latin America, a region beset by coups and military regimes and with four major
countries, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, still under military rule. Nervous anticipation,
however, tempered this hope. The same article warned that Betancur’s great triumph brought risk
with its accomplishment; Betancur’s promises for monumental changes set high expectations. If
Betancur succeeded, he would be “the spearhead of a new force that could alter our traditional
political equation.” His failure, however, would relegate his election “to just a parenthesis” within
Colombia’s political history.21 These concerns would heighten the stakes for the extradition debate,
particularly as Betancur’s plan for nationalistic reform faltered under challenges from multiple
sectors.
Nationalism’s Complications
Opening the political system after more than twenty years of the political elite domination,
Betancur’s administration faced the unique challenge of balancing two competing and often
contradictory sources of power: the popular class that had elected him and the existing political
bureaucracy that he had to work within. Betancur’s election, while representing monumental
triumph of popular politics, did not inherently change the bureaucracy of the political system, which
20 Quotes and figures taken from “Un domingo que cambió muchas cosas,” Semana, June 28, 1982, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/un-domingo-que-cambio-muchas-cosas/291-3.21 Ibid.
9
remained governed by party politics and a small political elite. This immediately proved
problematic for the new president. Though Betancur’s campaign engendered him to the general
populace, the ruling class who controlled the bureaucracy greeted him with instinctual hostility. As
Palacios posits, Betancur’s outsider status, a chief selling point of his campaign, was also “his chief
liability” in his interactions with the exclusive political elite, particularly since his platform
explicitly threatened their oligarchy.22 Party politics within his government only exacerbated this
issue.
Betancur’s nationalist rhetoric united voters from both Liberal and Conservative parties for
the presidential election, but did not unite the political system. Betancur entered office facing a
Liberal congressional majority, and to the frustration of the Colombian public, Betancur’s need for
political support to force controversial legislation, like his social programs and the peace process,
forced the president to acknowledge the need to appease the opposition. However, this also proved
complicated with the Liberal party itself split between followers of Turbay and López’s traditional
politics and Galán’s New Liberalism movement. The chain of resignations from Betancur’s political
commission in early 1983 illustrated the tensions between these two Liberal factions. Shortly after
his inauguration, Betancur attempted to placate his opponents by appointing Liberals to his political
commission, assigning Rodrigo Escobar Navia to the important post of Government Minister. Less
than a year later, Escobar abruptly resigned from his post. In his resignation letter, Escobar stated he
felt that he could not continue to represent the Liberal party in its totality and alluded to a lack of
support from his own party.23 Subsequent resignations by other ministers forced Betancur to
restructure his entire political commission.
22 Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 201.23 “Más que puro mecánica,” Semana, September 5, 1983, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/mas-que-pura-mecanica/3473-3.
10
In addition to unveiling tensions within the Liberal party, this restructuring also raised
concerns among the Colombian populace, as prominent journalists like María Isabel Rueda
questioned if Betancur’s decisions demonstrated a lack of control over his own government.24 The
appointment of Escobar’s replacement, Alfonso Gómez Gómez, heightened concern. Many
perceived the choice of Gómez, a traditional Liberal, to be the product of Liberal maneuvering
representative of previous tactics, such as those that had facilitated Turbay’s election. This led to
harsh criticism by the public in newspapers like El Espectador, as well as by progressive Liberals
like Galán, who called Gómez’s appointment a “a few steps backwards” for Betancur’s promise to
dismantle the ruling class hegemony of the political system.25 This episode also illustrated a greater
trend in the public’s perception of the president. Colombians were growing increasingly frustrated
with Betancur’s slow progress in implementing his promised programs. This frustration would play
a role in informing Betancur’s decisions regarding extradition.
In addition to his difficulties maneuvering within the political bureaucracy, Betancur also
faced the growing issue of the drug trade and its disintegration of political integrity and rule of law.
High rates of urbanization continued during the post-National Front years, contributing to rising
levels of unemployment, particularly in cities like Medellín, where urbanization also coincided with
a decline in the city’s main industry, textiles.26 Palacios argues that urbanization, combined with
economic stagnation that Turbay’s government had failed to correct may have contributed to the
rise of drug trafficking, a crime he describes as born of an urban society under hypercompetitive
capitalism.27 Historian, Mary Roldán, who as a the daughter of a landowning family in Medellín,
watched the region change firsthand, presents a narrative of the drug trade as a more disruptive
24 María Isabel Rueda, “Bobadas de la gente del montón,” Semana, May 9, 1983, http://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/bobadas-de-la-gente-del-monton/3426-3.25 “Más que puro mecánica.”26 Mary Roldán, “Colombia: Cocaine and the "Miracle of Modernity in Medellín,” in Cocaine: Global Histories, ed. Paul Gootenberg (New York: Routledge, 1999), 168.27 Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 240, 242.
11
force. She posits that the cocaine boom transformed the city’s culture to value a new standard of
wealth, citing the popular saying that “no one knew how poor Medellín’s rich really were until the
arrival of the cocaine Mafia.”28 Martz offers a similar, if more tempered analysis. The drug trade, he
argues, quickly became the best way for Colombians with few options to “rise within the stratified
class system and better themselves financially.”29 Regardless of the reason, all scholars agree that
the drug trade grew rapidly during the 1970s. Colombia’s history as a hub for the smuggling of
other goods, such as emeralds, facilitated the trade’s early expansion, which allowed traffickers to
build onto existing routes and infrastructure. Furthermore, despite Turbay’s use of military tactics to
squash the drug trade, by the early 1980s, the drug mafia’s influence had become an integral part of
Colombian society and politics. Politician’s responses to the drug mafia varied from an implicit
acceptance to categorical rejection, a position voiced most forcefully by Galán. 30 This range of
attitudes reflected the complicated relationship that existed between the illicit trade and Colombian
politics.
The power of the drug trade in Colombia created a paradox wherein traffickers served as
both a stabilizing and destabilizing force for the country. On one hand, Colombia’s economy
heavily relied on drug trade profits. Palacios describes drugs as one of the three key legs of
Colombia’s external trade along with coffee and oil. He argues that the government in fact
facilitated the exchange by opening the “sinister window” at the central bank where dollars could be
exchanged for pesos, no questions asked. Palacios further claims that the importance of the drug
trade’s profits and its possibilities as investment capital provided a basis for the acceptance of the
“emerging bourgeoisie” of drug traffickers into the mainstream, particularly in light of Colombia’s
“tradition of fortunes based on contraband and tax evasion making the transition to respectability.”31
28 Roldán, “Colombia,” 170.29 Martz, The Politics of Clientelism, 226.30 Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 197, 204.31 Ibid., 204.
12
Drug traffickers’ charitable contributions to their communities worked toward that end by
bolstering their public image, while the press’s coverage often supported that image. For example,
an article published by Semana in 1983 entitled “Un Robin Hood paisa” documented Pablo
Escobar’s building of public housing in his home city of Medellín, but never mentioned the illegal
origin of his wealth.32 Thus, the public usually accepted the trade as a simple fact of life in
Colombia. Furthermore, Restrepo argues that the drug mafia’s primary goal of self-enrichment lent
to its stabilizing power. Unlike guerrilla groups, the mafia had no desire to change the state
structure. Instead, drug traffickers like Pablo Escobar aimed to gain acceptance into the political and
economic elite and in fact were “among the regime’s most ardent defenders.”33 Other Colombian
scholars like Leal are more critical of the trade in their analyses, but their work was likely
influenced by contemporary events; Leal, for instance, published much of his work at the height of
the drug mafia’s violent period in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
On the other hand, the infiltration of the drug trade into Colombian politics created a crisis
of legitimacy in the eyes of foreign investors and governments on whom Colombia depended. This
was particularly true of the United States. The drug trade had served as the US government’s
primary focus in its relations with Colombia since President Richard Nixon announced his war on
drugs in 1971, and US pressure on Turbay’s administration served as a primary driver for Turbay’s
military campaign to eradicate the trade. US State Department and CIA documents from 1982
demonstrate how drug trafficking continued to be a concern for the US government during and after
Betacur’s election. Various intelligence memoranda concentrated on the election’s implications for
the war on drugs, detailing each candidate’s likely support for cooperation with the United States in
32 “Paisa” refers to people from Antioquia, the department where Medellín is located. “Un Robin Hood paisa,” Semana, May 16, 1983, http://www.semana.com/gente/articulo/un-robin-hood-paisa/2398-3.33 Luis Alberto Restrepo, “The Crisis of the Political Regime and Its Possible Outcomes,” in Violence in Colombia, ed. Bergquist, Charles, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalo Sánchez (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992), 289.
13
drug matters. A subsequent eight-page report on Betancur in particular released after the election
provides further evidence of US concern.34
The US government began pressuring Betancur immediately after the election to encourage
him to follow Turbay’s example of collaborating with the United States to address the drug issue.
Acquiescence to US demands and US insistence on military actions, however, directly contradicted
Betancur’s program of nationalism and his promise to avoid Turbay’s repressive measures, like the
State of Siege. More tangibly, it complicated Betancur’s actions in other areas, particularly his
peace process with the armed guerrilla groups. For example, in order to legitimize his government’s
negotions with the guerrillas, Betancur actively tried to distance Colombia from the United States,
pushing for Colombia to join the non-aligned movement. As Palacios describes, “Betancur hoped
that these foreign policy moves would show the guerrillas that Colombia was leaving behind a Cold
War orientation and adopting a more nationalist and regionalist political identity.”35 Collaboration
with the United States, including the implementation of the extradition treaty, would jeopardize that
program. Thus, the drug trade not only tarnished Colombia’s image abroad, but also indirectly
undermined Betancur’s other political programs. The need to weigh the stabilizing and destabilizing
forces of the drug trade would serve as a crucial determinant in Betancur’s decisions on extradition
and feature heavily in the debate over Mejía’s extradition in late 1983.
The Mejía Case
34 “Colombian Presidential Election: Impact on US Narcotics Policy,” Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, May 1982. Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CD/00349/all.pdf.; “Colombian Anti-narcotics Policies: Domestic Problems and Prospects for Change,” US State Department, November 3, 1982, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CD/00359/all.pdf. 35 Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 201.
14
On the morning of February 7, 1983, agents from the Departamento Adminstrativo de
Seguridad (DAS) captured Emiro de Jesús Mejía in Cartagena at the request of the US government.
A US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) raid on drug traffickers in Miami, dubbed Operation
Swordfish, had uncovered information linking Mejía to money laundering and drug trafficking
operations in Colombia and the United States, and the United States sought to extradite Mejía to
face these charges in the US courts. Meanwhile, the Colombian public had already begun to
question the treatment of Colombian nationals arrested in US territory following the sentencing in
Florida of another Colombian citizen, Luis Carlos Arango García, to the electric chair. Mejía’s case
brought a new angle to this discussion as the first test of the extradition of a Colombian captured in
Colombia to the United States. The extradition treaty was a relatively new tool against the drug
mafia. Until 1980, Colombian penal codes written in 1936 expressly prohibited the extradition of
Colombian nationals to foreign states, ordering that they instead by tried in Colombian courts. This
changed in 1979 when, under pressure from the United States to combat the internationalized drug
trade, Turbay signed a Mutual Legal Assistance treaty with the United States that included a
provision allowing extradition. Colombian legislation signed the treaty into law one year later in
1980, but it remained untested until 1983. Interestingly, the Colombian public paid little attention to
the treaty after its signing, but the Mejía case stirred the first public debate.36
Though the United States and Turbay’s government designed the extradition treaty as a
measure specific to addressing the internationalized drug trade, the debate concerning extradition
primarily reflected the public’s preoccupation with their political system rather than a dialogue
about the drug mafia. Betancur’s nationalist platform in particular played a central role in the
36 Colombians’ lack of knowledge about the provisions of the treaty was evidenced by the great detail that “Extradición de colombianos” went into about its history. Subsequent articles provided less information, including referring to the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty by its shorthand rather than its full name. “Extradición de colombianos,” Semana, May 16, 1983, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/extradicion-de-colombianos-un-caso-insolito/2388-3.
15
debate, as Colombians questioned what the prospect of US involvement in Colombian justice would
mean for the president’s promise of a nationally and regionally focused administration. Approving
extradition, opponents of the treaty argued, seemed to directly challenge that ideal. For example,e
Semana’s profile of the case asked outright if the approval of Mejía’s extradition would “affect the
nationalist image and credibility of the current government, which has proclaimed its
independence” from US power.37 Opponents from a wide range of the political spectrum also
perceived extradition as a threat to the country’s sovereignty by letting the United States coopt
Colombian justice. This is not to say that the drug trade did not factor into the debate; Colombians
were concerned with the rising power of drug traffickers. The drug issue, however, was framed as a
concern over the strength of state institutions. The government, opponents argued, should address
the drug trade by asserting its independence from the United States and continuing its inward-facing
programs by working to strengthen its own justice system. As Colombia’s ambassador to the United
States asserted, “Colombia cannot depend on punishments meted out by foreign courts as the only
way to defend the country from the drug mafia.”38
The opportunity to strengthen Colombian justice came at a crucial time. Two months before
Betancur published his decision on the Mejía case, one of the “strangest political scandals of the
past few years” rocked the Ministry of Justice and jeopardized public perception of the integrity of
Lara, who had just taken office as Betancur’s new Justice Minster. Considered the rising star of the
political scene, Lara had garnered respect and admiration by building a successful career at the head
of the New Liberalism party. Betancur’s appointment of Lara as Justice Minister captured wide
national attention. Colombians expected the young, exciting politician to bring new life to the
37 Ibid.38 “Perdiendo terreno,” Semana, November 14, 1983, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/perdiendo-terreno/4125-3.
16
ministry.39 To everyone’s surprise, not two weeks into his new post, Jairo Ortega, a representative
from the Medellín cartel’s home department of Antioquia, publically accused Lara of accepting
money from Evaristo Porras, a known drug trafficker.40
Initially, public opinion supported Lara. The press hesitated to question the honesty of the
Justice Minister, instead speculating that the accusations were intended as retribution for Lara’s
revelation that Ortega’s alternate, Pablo Escobar, had ties to both the drug trade and the paramilitary
group Muerte a Secuestadores (MAS).41 However, the release of a tape recording of a conversation
between Porras and Lara invalidated his initial defense that he had never met Porras.42 Despite calls
from the ruling class for Lara’s resignation, Betancur refused to concede victory to the drug mafia
by dismissing his Justice Minister. Nevertheless, it remained abundantly clear to both men that the
only way to restore Lara’s honor would be to take a hard line against the drug traffickers.43
Thus, the Mejía case presented an opportunity to resuscitate the image of Colombian justice
by publically asserting Lara’s commitment to strengthening the justice system, and most important
to the debate, Colombia’s ability to process the drug mafia in its own courts. This second point
directly addressed arguments by the US and Colombian supporters of extradition, who cited
previous incidents that had exposed the justice system’s inability to prosecute major players of the
drug mafia. For example, public prosecutors had aggressively investigated charges of murder and
drug trafficking against members of the mafia, unearthing a 1976 homicide charge against Escobar,
but Escobar’s political immunity as Ortega’s alternate prevented his prosecution.44 Prosecutors also
39 “Se prendió la mecha,” Semana, September 19, 1983, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/se-prendio-la-mecha/3618-3.40 Ironically, the accusations came during a meeting on drug money that Lara himself was leading. Ibid.41 Ibid.42 “El pulso de la nación,” Semana, September 26, 1983, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-pulso-de-la-nacion/3663-3.43 “Muerte anunciada.”44 The judicial branch in Colombia functions independently from the executive branch. Therefore, neither Lara nor Betancur should have been able to influence public prosecutors’ decision to investigate Escobar. However, I agree with Semana editors that it seems like more than mere coincidence that the charges were
17
failed to bring Carlos Lehder, another prominent member of the Medellín cartel to trial after he
escaped to neighboring Brazil.45 Relevant to Colombians’ every day concerns, the justice system
had proven equally incompetent when addressing lower level criminals. Lara himself acknowledged
the failures of the Colombian justice system, conceding that in late 1983, 1.3 million cases had yet
to be handled, only 6,000 of 30,000 cases had gone to trial, and 90 percent of crimes went
unreported.46 Many argued that only a restructuring of Colombian justice, not the implementation of
extradition, could solve these issues.
The strong opposition to the extradition treaty also reflected deep-seated fears among the
Colombian public that had arisen during Turbay’s presidency regarding the executive branch
exercise of excessive powers. Opponents like Rafael Nieto Navia, a judge from the Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos and columnist from the Conservative El Siglo, expressed
concern that the political system would not responsibly use the power that extradition created. He
argued, “in countries like ours, where respect for the law, democracy and the rights of others are not
completely developed, the Prosecutor’s ability to receive all types of reports practically without
limitation—political and military crimes being the only exception—could prove dangerous.”47 Nieto
voiced further concerns that the intimate connection between a Colombian president and
Washington would allow Betancur “absolute” authority to extend extradition from drug trade-
related crimes to include political dissent. These fears seem directly connected to the State of Siege
and Turbay’s cooperation with the United States. Extradition, its opponents argued, would only
facilitate the return of these repressive measures. Thus, the stage was set for Betancur’s decision on
November 13, 1983.
filed immediately following the Lara scandal. “Esta es Colombia, Pablo,” Semana, October 24, 1983, http://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/esta-es-colombia-pablo/3906-3.45 “Contra las cuerdas,” Semana, October 17, 1983, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/contra-las-cuerdas/3837-3.46 Martz, The Politics of Clientelism, 224.47 “Perdiendo terreno.”
18
Betancur’s Decision
After months of public debate and anticipation for his decision, Betancur’s memorandum
denying Mejía’s extradition served a greater purpose than a simple diplomatic reply to the US
request. Rather, the content and publication of the memorandum spoke directly to concerns raised
by the public. Most importantly, the way Betancur framed his decision allowed him to construct an
image as the protector of the rights of Colombian citizens. Because Mejía’s alleged crime occurred
in both Colombian and US territory, Betancur argued, the Colombian justice system could claim
jurisdiction over the case and deny Mejía’s extradition. Significantly, Betancur chose to push his
reasoning further to make a statement on the constitutional rights of Colombians in general.
Claiming “it is only natural that a citizen should be prosecuted preferably in his country, by his
judges, under his laws and traditions, and in his own language. All of which guarantee his
constitutional rights,” Betancur denied that extradition would endanger those rights. Thus, by
acknowledging the public’s fear of losing their constitutional protections and framing his decision
refer Mejía’s case to the Colombian justice system in reference to that argument, Betancur
presented himself as a protector of Mejía’s, and by extension all Colombians’, constitutional rights.
Though it may seem a minor point, this declaration also affirmed the extension of citizenship to
Colombian criminals. Even though Mejía allegedly committed an international crime, Betancur still
considered him first and foremost a Colombian citizen and as such should be afforded full
constitutional protections. This distinction would prove important in comparison to Colombian
justice in the wake of Lara’s assassination.48
Betancur also used his memorandum as an opportunity to respond to a central theme of the
public debate by affirming his commitment to strengthening the enforcement of Colombian justice.
48 “GOC Decision on Mejía Extradition,” US Embassy, Bogotá to Secretary of State, Department of Justice, November 15, 1983, 3. Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CD/00388/all.pdf.
19
To do this, Betancur devoted a substantial portion of his policy announcement—nearly a full page
in the US Embassy’s translation—to cite specific articles of penal procedure codes, implying
exactly which aspects of the system he planned to target. For example, Betancur addressed the
justice system’s weak investigative capacity, which Lara had cited as a particular problem, by
reminding public officials and investigators of their obligation to start an investigation “without
delay” when made aware by any means of any act that might be considered an offense. Betancur’s
memo continued by asserting the public’s responsibilities to the justice system and citing the legal
requirement for all Colombian residents over the age of sixteen to inform authorities of criminal
acts that they might be aware of. This portion is important for two reasons. First, it indirectly
addressed Colombians’ lack of faith in the justice system and the phenomenon that Palacios
describes as a dependence on counter-violence as Colombians’ primary reaction to crime.49
Betancur’s resolution attempted to steer citizens back toward the official legal system and thus
legitimate its authority. Second, by reminding Colombian citizens of their responsibility in creating
a functional justice system, Betancur effectively created a space for formal interaction between
Colombians and the state. This measure mirrored the president’s program to open politics to
community participation by giving Colombians a role to play in the justice system. Just as
Betancur’s presidential campaign had promised that he would react to Colombians’ needs for low
cost housing and better education, the justice system under Betancur would value the public’s
participation.50
The resolution’s immediate publication also serves to illustrate Betancur’s purpose in
affirming his domestic focus. Before the decision reached the US government through official
diplomatic channels, El Tiempo, Colombia’s leading newspaper, had already printed the full text of
49 Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 199.50 “GOC Decision on Mejía Extradition, 4.”
20
the resolution, a fact that further emphasized Betancur’s national focus.51 Betancur signaled that
Colombia and its citizens’ concerns would remain his primary priority before US interests by
reaching out to the Colombian public first. The president thereby maintained his nationalist image.
Aside from its implications for his Colombian audience, Betancur’s push against US pressure and
expectations is also interesting in how it complicates the popular historical narrative of the
Colombian government’s agency in the war against drugs. Leal, for example, argues that the
Colombian government operated with little to no autonomy from the United States in its official
drug policies.52 Betancur’s decision, on the other hand, directly countered US interests. In fact, US
State Department documents detail the US government’s frustration with Betancur and displeasure
with his decision. One cable fumes that “while the decision might represent a neat solution for the
nationalistic Betancur, it is likely to have negative effects for him and Colombia” and continues by
implying that the decision might sour future United States-Colombian relations.53
The majority of Colombians responded favorably to Betancur’s denial of the US extradition
request. Of the eleven lawyers and ex ministers consulted by the leading newspapers El Tiempo, El
Espectador, and El Mundo, nine supported the measure. Additionally the Semana article that
published the results noted that the two who expressed dissenting views, Carlos Lemos Simmonds
and Felio Andrade Manrique, played integral roles in the treaty’s negotiations during the previous
administration and, thus, had obvious motivations to continue supporting the treaty.54 Press
treatment of the resolution, however, indicated that the debate over extradition remained open. An
“editorial war” between the country’s major publications reflected the greater political trends that
51 “GOC Denies Extradition for Emiro Mejía,” US Embassy, Bogotá to Secretary of State and Department of Justice, November 1983, 3. Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CD/00387/all.pdf.52 Francisco Leal Buitrago, “Structural Crisis and the Current Situation in Colombia,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 14, no. 28 (1989): 44.53 “GOC Denies Extradition for Emiro Mejía, 1.”54 “El primer fallo,” Semana, December 19, 1983, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-primer-fallo/4409-3.
21
the extradition debate had brought to light. On one side, the editorial board of El Tiempo criticized
the resolution and argued that the decision would result in impunity for drug traffickers and
jeopardize relations with the United States. 55 Coming from a publication owned by the politically
prominent, Liberal, Santos family, this criticism echoed the concerns of an elite acutely aware of the
economy’s dependence on foreign investment. Editorials published around this period, including an
article defending the Colombian ruling class as one of the “best” in Latin America further indicate
the newspaper’s sympathy toward the elite.56 In response, an article from Semana, a magazine that
claimed to be founded on the principle of an independent and pluralist press, and articles from El
Espectador, which demonstrated its tendency to take an activist role in defending the Colombian
public with its campaign against the drug mafia in the late 1980s, vehemently defended Betancur’s
decisions.57 The decision’s defense of national sovereignty, these publications argued, held more
importance than its repercussions for Colombia’s international agreements. However, El Tiempo’s
skepticism of Betancur and Lara’s abilities to sufficiently attack the drug mafia would prove well
founded after Lara’s assassination less than a year later.
Making a Martyr
During the period between the Mejía decision and Lara’s assassination, little progress was
made to halt the mafia’s growing power despite Lara’s work. Acting on his promise to strengthen
Colombian justice, Lara immediately began an all-out assault on the drug mafia. He attacked its
operations from multiple angles, first pursuing the cases he had opened against its leaders, Escobar
and Lehder, in early 1983. Lara also struck at corporations he suspected of laundering the mafia’s
55 Ibid.56 See “A comer gerentes...,” El Tiempo, March 4, 1984.57 It must be noted that Semana’s founder Felipe López Caballero was the son of former president López Michelsen, but Felipe López actively sough to maintain the magazine’s pluralist voice. “El cerebro detrás de Semana, la revista más influyente del país,” eltiempo.com, August 27, 2012, sec. Política, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12166212.
22
money, most famously targeting the country’s professional soccer teams, which had flourished with
the influx of drug money.58 Despite the Mejía decision’s rejection of US involvement in Colombian
justice, Lara quickly realized the need to cooperate with the United States to supplement
Colombia’s underfunded military in operations against the mafia. He quietly sought help from the
DEA to run counternarcotic raids. These proved fruitful in March 1984 with the seizure of
Tranquilandia, an operation run by the Medellín cartel and the largest cocaine-processing site in
Latin America, with a cache of $1 billion worth of cocaine.59
Lara’s successes, however, won him few fans. The Porras scandal continued to cast a
shadow on Lara’s work. The ruling class, which had called for his resignation after the scandal,
remained bitter, and Lara’s simultaneous assault on the business elite for financial crimes and
money laundering only exacerbated the ruling class’s contempt for the minister. For example,
Lara’s order for an arrest warrant for financial crimes against the Medellín businessman Jorge Mejía
Salazar provoked a hostile reaction by the economic elite. El Tiempo’s editorial board warned that
the rigorous dismantling of the elite would result in instability, claiming, “to us, it seems extremely
damaging to attack the best exponents of the economic elite, and this smear campaign, sooner or
later will pose a real danger to Colombian institutions and democratic systems.”60 In contrast, the
public initially reacted favorably, viewing Lara’s actions against financial giants as a blow against
ruling class’s hegemony. Nevertheless, fear mongering by Fabio Echeverri Correa, the president of
the Asociación de Industrias de Colombia, who claimed that such accusations might endanger the
58 “La columna que tiene indignados a los hinchas de Nacional,” El Tiempo, March 12, 2014, http://www.eltiempo.com/deportes/futbol/columna-de-ezequiel-fernandez-moores-sobre-atletico-nacional/14925619.59 Alonso Salazar J., La parábola de Pablo: Auge y caída de un gran capo del narcotráfico (Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana Editorial, S.A., 2001), 122; El Tiempo’s report of the Tranquilandia raid did not mention the role of the DEA, instead it attributed the operation’s success to the Colombian military. It is unclear whether the publication knew of the active role the DEA played in the offensive, but regardless, the high level of US involvement remained unreported to the Colombian public. German Acero Espinosa, “Cae gigantesco laboratorio de coca,” El Tiempo, March 12, 1984.60 “A comer gerentes...”
23
country’s political and economic stability, and the El Tiempo editorial swayed public opinion. As a
result, many Colombians began to question whether Lara had overstepped his authority.61 This
uneasiness was compounded by the leak of a letter Lara had written to the judge investigating the
Porras scandal. In the letter, Lara launched insults toward the judge, repeatedly calling him a
“coward” for not ordering Porras’s detention. Lara immediately issued an apology, but the gaffe
once again soured the public’s opinion of the minister. One Semana article noted, “a bad taste was
left in the mouth of public opinion after seeing Lara cross the line for the second time.”62
Amidst these blows, Lara found little political support, even from his own party. Following
the Porras scandal, Galán had distanced New Liberalism movement from Lara by ordering an
ethical tribunal to investigate the case, effectively diminishing Lara’s place in the party.63
Meanwhile, Betancur, who had been Lara’s main advocate during the scandal, could not offer
additional support. The president was preoccupied with issues related to his own popularity,
principally his inability to reverse the high levels of unemployment and massive foreign debt that
plagued the economy. A survey conducted by the Centro de Estudios Liberales in March 1984
provides a clear illustration of this trend. Only 43 percent of respondents replied that the president
was doing a “very good” or “good” job, compared to 62 percent in August 1983. Meanwhile, the
percentage of respondents who viewed the president’s administration as “bad” or “very bad” rose
from 3.8 percent to 10 percent.64 These numbers translated directly to the polls when the Liberal
party reaffirmed their majority in local and congressional elections.65
The country’s economic troubles represented only one source of the public’s frustration with
the president. Betancur’s peace process, which served as a cornerstone of his campaign platform in
61 “Justicia pa’ los de FRAC,” April 9, 1984, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/justicia-pa-los-de-frac/5008-3.62 Ibid.63 Salazar J., La parábola de Pablo, 177.64 Daniel Samper Pizano, “B.B. contra el resto del mundo,” El Tiempo, May 5, 1984.65 “Fuerte majoría del liberalismo,” El Tiempo, March 12, 1984.
24
1982, proved to be one of his biggest obstacles in consolidating popular support. His administration
had succeeded in bringing three major guerrilla groups, FARC, EPL, and M-19, to the negotiating
table, but the peace talks did not calm the wave of political violence terrorizing the country. Enrique
Santos Calderon, a prominent Colombian journalist and writer tried to mitigate some of the
criticism of Betancur in an opinion piece in El Tiempo. The guerrilla groups, he argued, were the
main culprits for the peace process’s failure, and it was not Betancur’s doing that the guerrillas
played an unfair game by engaging in the talks while simultaneously intensifying their assaults.
However, the pictures of exploded buses that filled the newspapers and the stories of bombings that
rocked the country served as spectacular examples of the process’s failures, and by extension,
Betancur’s ineptitude.
The public was not the only group frustrated with Betancur’s peace process. Liberals in
Congress denied Betancur the political support he needed to make the legislative changes necessary
for his amnesty program, blocking numerous bills.66 Betancur’s plan also alienated the military,
which viewed the proposal for a ceasefire and amnesty for guerrillas as an affront to the military
establishment. Steven Dudley, a US human rights observer, describes the military’s sense of
betrayal. The military, he writes, could not believe that the president would abandon their war
against subversion.67 Dudley admits that his analysis of the Colombian military was likely
influenced by personal sympathies toward guerrillas developed while reporting on the
assassinations of members of Unión Patriótica, the political party established by FARC in 1985.68
Arturo Alape’s 1985 volume of interviews with prominent Colombian figures about the country’s
history of political violence and future prospects for peace confirms this description with its insight
into General Fernando Landázabal Reyes’s opinions on Betancur. Landázabal served as Betancur’s
66 Martz, The Politics of Clientelism, 221.67 Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia, 33.68 Ibid., 1.
25
defense minister until 1984 when the president dismissed him and the army and air force
commanders for questioning the president’s peace process.69 After the president publically
denounced Landázabal in a speech in Cartagena, the former defense minister spoke with contempt
for the president and leveled harsh criticism against Betancur’s peace process. The president, he
argued, underestimated the military’s role in ensuring the country’s stability, claiming “its incorrect
to think that the fight is between the military and the guerrillas. It is the Colombian institution that is
being attacked by subversion.” The military, he continued, was carrying out their “constitutional
mission” as the country’s protector from the guerrillas’ subversive threat.70 However, Landázabal’s
attacks on Betancur’s peace policies took a mild tone in comparison to his criticism of the
president’s leadership. Landázabal directly challenged the image that Betancur championed during
his election as a representative for all Colombians. The military, Landázabal countered, served as
the true representative of the nation:
“We are the nation. Among our soldiers are all social classes. There are campesinos, there are laborers, there are workers. It is not a military made of a conglomerate that doesn’t participate in the idiosyncrasies of our country. It is a national military. It is not the military fighting against the guerrillas, the military is what is supporting the Nation [sic].”71
Landázabal’s vocal criticism threatened to undermine Betancur’s presidential legitimacy, both by
demonstrating a lack of control over the armed forces and by directly challenging Betancur’s
authority to represent the Colombian people. Looking forward, Lara’s murder would offer Betancur
a much-needed opportunity to assert his leadership by guiding Colombia through the tragedy.
In the meantime, these challenges to Betancur’s presidency had direct consequences for
Lara’s fight against the drug mafia. Betancur was forced to prioritize the consolidation of support
for the peace process over the effort to control drug trafficking. In fact, an El Tiempo contributor
69 Martz, The Politics of Clientelism, 219.70 Alape Arturo, La Paz, La Violencia: Testigos de Excepción (Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana Editorial, S.A., 1985), 475.71 Ibid.
26
noted that mere hours before Lara’s murder, Betancur met with a member of parliament with known
ties to drug money and whose intervention in congress had impeded Lara’s investigation into the
drug mafia’s influence in politics.72 Thus, with Betancur desperately chasing validation for other
political priorities, Lara stood alone against the drug mafia. As the same contributor remembered,
“it practically became a personal battle: it was Lara against the mafia. It wasn’t the country against
the mafia. It wasn’t even the government against the mafia. It was Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Justice
Mister, against the mafia.”73 It would take a monumental event for the rest of the country to join
him.
“An Empire Without Borders”
On the night of April 30, 1984, Lara’s car sat on Calle 127 in the north of Bogotá as the
Justice Minister made his way home from work. He had received daily death threats as a result of
his crusade against the mafia. Betancur, for the reason, had ordered that Lara’s entourage take
certain precautions. The minister frequently changed the routes his driver took around the city and
traveled with a security detail. That night, none of the security measures protected Lara from two
assassins who pulled up to his car, aimed a machine gun into the back seat, and fired fourteen
bullets into his body. The shots killed Lara instantly. His assassination transformed the country’s
attitude toward the mafia nearly as quickly.74 As one New York Times reporter reflected, “Mr. Lara’s
murder three weeks ago appears to have achieved what the head been unable to accomplish during
eight months in office; the government is waging its first full scale offensive against drugs and
Colombians have suddenly awakened to the damage caused by narcotics to their entire society.”75
72 Daniel Samper Pizano, “¿Qué Tan Solo Dehamos a Lara?,” El Tiempo, May 3, 1984.73 Ibid.74 “Muerte anunciada” provides a detailed account of Lara’s final day.75 Alan Riding, “Colombia Starts to Feel Side Effects of the Drug Trade,” The New York Times, May 20, 1984, sec. Week in Review, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/20/weekinreview/colombia-starts-to-feel-side-effects-of-drug-trade.html.
27
Lara’s assassination transfixed the Colombian public. News of the murder dominated front-
page headlines across the country for days, and radio broadcasts reported the details of the case
without interruption from 8:00 in the morning onward the following day.76 Although the
investigation into the case had barely begun and no group formally claimed responsibility, almost
everyone immediately believed that the Medellín cartel had ordered the hit, and the identification of
two Medellín teens as Lara’s assassins confirmed those suspicions.77 It is important to note that
Lara’s murder was not the first assassination of a political figure by the mafia; assassins had gunned
down the lawyer Jorge González Vidales earlier that year for speaking out in favor of the
extradition treaty.78 But as the Human Rights Watch researcher Robin Kirk notes, Lara was the first
government minister in Colombian history to be killed while in office.79 Thus, Lara’s assassination
represented a “crime without precedent in the country’s history” as the mafia’s first high profile
assault on the Colombian state institution, a distinction that heavily influenced the public’s
perception of the mafia.80
Despite the abundance of conspiracy theories entertained by Colombians, scholars agree that
Escobar, the capo of the Medellín cartel, ordered Lara’s murder as retribution for the minister’s
assault on the mafia. Thus, scholars like Palacios, Leal, and Martz identify the murder as an
important turning point in the history of the drug mafia.81 By targeting the Justice Minister, the
personification of and the most prominent figure in the Colombian justice system, the mafia
symbolically decapitated the justice system. The assassination served as a powerful demonstration
of the extent of the mafia’s power over the state and exposed the extremity of its threat to the
76 “Ola de indignación del país,” El Tiempo, May 2, 1984.77 “Asesinado ministrio de justicia Lara Bonilla,” El Tiempo, May 1, 1984.78 Enrique Santos Calderon, “Justicia y droga: mal de muchos...,” El Tiempo, March 4, 1984.79 Robin Kirk, More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 87.80 “Ola de indignación del país.”81 See Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence, 205; Buitrago, “Estabilidad macroeconómica e institucional y violencia crónica,” 45; Martz, The Politics of Clientelism, 227.
28
country’s stability and security. That Lara was weeks away from leaving his post to assume the
ambassadorship to Czechoslovakia only underscored the mafia’s cold-blooded nature and elicited
further outrage from the public. It is also worth noting that the Colombian press lent an air of
poeticism to the tragedy that further cemented Lara’s importance in Colombian lore. For example,
the title of Semana’s article “Muerte anunciada” was drawn from Crónica de una muerte
anunciada, the title of the newest book by the Nobel-Prize winning, Colombian author, Gabriel
García Márquez.82
This new preoccupation with the mafia’s uncontrolled power played a crucial role in
discussions over the government’s role in confronting the growing group. Whereas the debate over
extradition in 1983 demonstrated Colombians’ willingness to turn a blind eye to the mafia in order
to reap its economic benefits, Lara’s murder upset the drug trade’s precarious balance of stabilizing
and destabilizing effects. The assassination exposed the level of impunity that the mafia enjoyed.
Consequentially, the mafia’s delegitimizing influence became too public for Colombians to ignore.
This newfound concern about the mafia raised a call for the country to adopt Lara’s mission to
combat the drug trade. “Sitting to cry over the body of a man who offered his life for a just cause,”
one El Tiempo editorial argued, “would be the worst response to his sacrifice.”83 Politicians like
Galán echoed these calls by referring to Lara as a martyr. 84 Again, the implementation of the
extradition treaty arose as a central issue, but just as the public’s attitude toward the mafia had
changed since the Mejía case, so did their stance on extradition. An El Tiempo survey of Bogotanos
conducted the day after Lara’s murder found widespread support for extradition, while its editorial
called for the reversal of the “falsely nationalist and anti-American position of denying extradition.”
Although El Tiempo’s opinions could have been self-congratulatory given the periodical’s
82 “Muerte anunciada”; See Gabriel García Márquez, Crónica de una muerte anunciada (Bogotá: Editorial La Oveja Negra Ltda., 1981).83 “Consternación por el asesinato de Lara,” El Tiempo, May 1, 1982.84 “Hora de decisiones,” El Tiempo, May 2, 1984.
29
vehement opposition of Betancur’s 1983 decision, Semana’s assertion that almost all Colombians
supported extradition, including those who had previously advocated against it, supported the
results of El Tiempo’s survey.85
The national outcry over the tragedy created a tricky situation for Betancur. Strong public
opinion in favor of a forceful government crackdown on the mafia offered Betancur the opportunity
to build support for his administration by taking up Lara’s fight against the mafia. Furthermore,
such a decision would placate foreign investors and importantly the United States, whose
confidence in Colombia’s stability plummeted after the assassination. However, the El Tiempo
columnist Santos warned that Betancur’s use of extradition, the State of Siege, and other
traditionally repressive measures directly contradicted earlier rulings, including the Mejía decision,
and more importantly his commitment to a democratic opening.86 In order to navigate these
conflicting pressures, Betancur used the language of his speeches immediately following the
assassination to reframe his position on the drug mafia. Whereas Betancur previously afforded
criminals, like Mejía, protections according to the Colombian constitution, the president stripped the
mafia of their citizenship and accompanying rights by delineating a distinction between the mafia
and the Colombian state.
Betancur immediately indicated his plan to confront the mafia. Speaking mere hours after
Lara’s death, the president announced his commitment to fight against the mafia. He referred to the
murder as a “challenge” to Colombia rather than a tragedy, a phrase that implied that the state
would respond accordingly. Betancur declared a “war without quarter” against the mafia and called
for the expansion of the State of Siege to all departments in order to realize that goal. Betancur’s
justification for these measures rested on the perception of the mafia as an enemy of the Colombian
state. Betancur called for national solidarity in line with the image of a unified Colombia that he had
85 “Muerte anunciada.”86 Enrique Santos Calderon, “¿Hacia dónde vamos?,” El Tiempo, May 3, 1984.
30
promoted during his election against the mafia and asked the public to rise up “to tell [the mafia] in
a great, national chorus, ‘Enough!” 87 All Colombians could participate in the effort against a
common enemy that threated to “continue driving our society insane.”88
Three days later, on the steps of the cathedral in Lara’s hometown of Neiva, Betancur made
his intentions even clearer. After announcing that he would apply the extradition treaty to the mafia,
Betancur directly addressed the concerns over sovereignty that the Mejía debate had emphasized.
Colombians, he proclaimed, should continue to be judged by their compatriots. However, he
continued, “We are in a time to reflect on what it is we call la patria, about what it is we call the
nation, about what it means to say the word citizen. And those who have created an empire without
borders, with a black flag as their sign and death and indignity as their only goals are destroying
these concepts.”89 By invoking the ideals of nationhood and citizenship and then explicitly
presenting the mafia as an affront them, Betancur asserted that the state no longer had a moral
obligation to protect members of the mafia as Colombian citizens. Furthermore, his description of
the drug mafia “empire without borders” allowed the president to present his fight against the mafia
as a war between two distinct nations—the mafia’s empire replaced Colombia as the mafia’s
primary identification. This allowed the argument for extradition to take a patriotic tone. Extradition
became a means to protect the Colombia from external aggression and lost its controversy in
relation to the 1983 debate. Rather than a method to export the country’s problems, as argued by
some before the Mejía decision, extradition transformed into a tool to “recover the national dignity
that had been robbed by the drug trade.”90
87 “...decirle en un gran coro nacional ¡Basta!” “Aceptamos desafío a narcotraficantes,” El Tiempo, May 1, 1984.88 “...seguir desquiciando nuestra sociedad.” Ibid.89 “Colombia extraditará a criminales,” El Tiempo, May 3, 1984.90 “Aceptamos desafío a narcotraficantes”; “Colombia extraditará a criminales.”
31
In addition lending a patriotic tone to the fight against the mafia, Betancur’s redefinition of
Colombian citizenship acknowledged Colombians’ fears of repression. The State of Siege statute’s
allowance for rule by decree inherently contradicted the principles of Betancur’s democratic
opening. However, by referring to the mafia as a separate empire and “enemies of all humanity,”
Betancur made a distinction between the mafia and Colombia that implied that the statute would not
be used as a tool against Colombians generally. The president also addressed this issue more
specifically. While earlier presidents had enforced the State of Siege statute as a broad mandate,
Betancur explicitly called for a more limited use. The president explained, “our duty and the duty of
society is to separate the two camps.” His government would make an effort to distinguish between
political violence, which was ideologically driven and elicited sympathy from many Colombians,
and violence related to the drug trade. Thus, the statement served to protect Betancur’s peace
process from criticism related to the State of Siege as well as to address the public’s fear of the
statute that had become apparent during the debate in 1983.
The country reacted to Betancur’s speeches with widespread support. Figures from all
sectors of Colombian society praised the president for his aggressive stance against the mafia, and
his declaration garnered the president support even from his tradition Liberal opponents. A survey
conducted by the Senate’s press office found bipartisan support among members of Congress for
extradition and the State of Siege, including politicians who generally disapproved of Betancur’s
policies.91At least for the moment, Betancur had united Colombia against a common enemy.
Conclusion
The change in Betancur’s stance on extradition between the Mejía case and Lara’s
assassination in the early 1980s reflected the Colombian public’s shifting priorities. As the drug
91 Leonel Fierro T., “El país entero respalda la lucha contra la violencia,” El Tiempo, May 4, 1984.
32
trade transformed from a stabilizing economic power into a destabilizing threat to state legitimacy,
Colombians’ views on the mafia moved from acceptance to outrage. Meanwhile, the legacy of the
National Front and Turbay’s presidency created a political environment that forced Betancur to
balance the desires of the public with those of the ruling class. In order to maintain presidential
legitimacy, Betancur’s decisions on extradition needed to both respond to public opinion with its
mutual fears of the State of Siege statute and the drug mafia, and maintain a consistent political
platform. Betancur’s emphasis on strengthening the Colombian Justice system in his resolution on
the Mejía case allowed the president to present the denial of the US extradition request for Mejía as
a measure to protect Colombian sovereignty and uphold Colombians’ constitutional rights. With
this justification, the denial of extradition complemented Betancur’s promise for a democratic
opening. Later, Betancur’s characterization of the drug trade as a threat to la patria framed the
extradition treaty as a tool to reclaim the country’s image from the drug mafia. These two
frameworks for extradition thus reconciled the contradictory decisions as affirmations of Betancur’s
nationalist program.
These two instances, however, represent only the beginning of the debate over extradition in
Colombia. In response to Betancur’s declaration of war, the drug mafia adopted Escobar’s famous
preference for a “grave in Colombia” over a prison cell in the United States as their slogan. Under
the name, “the Extraditables,” traffickers launched an all-out assault against both the government
and civilians to pressure politicians into repealing the treaty.92 In sum, the issue of extradition
created an era of violence in Colombia that spanned more than a decade. Issues related to
Colombian nationalism and citizenship remain important, particularly as the country tries to grapple
with the legacy of the violent period in the late 1980s and 1990s. The questions asked in the late
92 Alma Guillermoprieto, The Heart That Bleeds: Latin America Now (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1994), 5.
33
1970s of how to restore Colombians’ faith in the political system are just as pertinent now as they
were forty years ago. Perhaps, eventually, someone will offer an answer.
34
Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Press Articles:
El Tiempo (Bogotá), 1982-2014, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=N2osnxbUuuUC&dat=19851122&b_mode=2&hl=en.
El Espectador (Bogotá), 2009, http://www.elespectador.com.
Semana (Bogotá), 1982-1984, http://www.semana.com/.
Published Primary Sources:
Arturo, Alape. La paz, la violencia: testigos de excepción. Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana Editorial, S.A., 1985.
US Government Documents:
“Colombian Presidential Election: Impact on US Narcotics Policy,” Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, May 1982. Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CD/00349/all.pdf.
“Colombian Anti-narcotics Policies: Domestic Problems and Prospects for Change,” US State Department, November 3, 1982, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CD/00359/all.pdf.
“GOC Denies Extradition for Emiro Mejía,” US Embassy, Bogotá to Secretary of State and Department of Justice, November 1983, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CD/00387/all.pdf.
“GOC Decision on Mejía Extradition,” US Embassy, Bogotá to Secretary of State, Department of Justice, November 15, 1983, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CD/00388/all.pdf.
Secondary Sources:
Buitrago, Francisco Leal. “Estabilidad macroeconómica e institucional y violencia crónica.” In En busca de la estabilidad perdida, edited by Francisco Leal Buitrago. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1995.
———. “Structural Crisis and the Current Situation in Colombia.” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 14, no. 28 (1989): 31–49.
Dix, Robert H. The Politics of Colombia. New York: Praeger, 1987.
35
Dudley, Steven. Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. New York: Routledge, 2004.
García Márquez, Gabriel. Crónica de una muerte anunciada. Bogotá: Editorial La Oveja Negra Ltda., 1981.
Guillermoprieto, Alma. The Heart That Bleeds: Latin America Now. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1994.
Kirk, Robin. More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia. New York: PublicAffairs, 2003.
Lee III, Rensselaer W., and Francisco E. Thoumi. “Drugs and Democracy in Colombia.” In Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration Around the World, edited by Roy Godson. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003.
Martz, John D. The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1996.
Osterling, Jorge P. Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1989.
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002. Translated by Richard Stoller. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
Restrepo, Luis Alberto. “The Crisis of the Political Regime and Its Possible Outcomes.” In Violence in Colombia, edited by Bergquist, Charles, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalo Sánchez. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992.
Roldán, Mary. “Colombia: Cocaine and the "Miracle of Modernity in Medellín.” In Cocaine: Global Histories, edited by Paul Gootenberg, 165–83. New York: Routledge, 1999.
Salazar J., Alonso. La parábola de Pablo: Auge y caída de un gran capo del narcotráfico. Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana Editorial, S.A., 2001.
36
