Reading On War for the First TimeA. Bradley Potter

Johns Hopkins University, SAISFebruary 2016

Where to begin? Forests have been felled in pursuit of analyzing On

War, the seminal work of Carl von Clausewitz. Renowned strategic thinkers in

each age since its publication have expanded on, clarified, or critiqued its

insights into the conduct of war. In this light, the vast collections of materials

associated with On War would hardly seem to call an addition to their midst.

What else is there to say?

As it turns out, there is a good deal to discuss with a particular group

of students – first-time readers of the classic. While there are plenty of

specialized sources for experts, few offer an introduction suitable for the

earnest novice. Of course those especially committed to the study of On War

benefit from these ranging sources; however, even these intrepid scholars

need a starting point. Herein lies the goal of this essay – offering a primer to

On War suitable as a first step. Such a step does not consider each idea

offered up in the pages of On War nor does it examine every scholar who

weighed in on the major debates; rather, it highlights concepts most closely

associated with this influential work and outlines the larger debates

surrounding them.

This essay follows a careful roadmap especially designed for new

readers of On War. After a brief sketch of Carl von Clausewitz’s life, it

explores particular arguments from the classic in some detail. It proceeds to

examine a sampling of scholarship from the vast body of work analyzing the

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classic with an eye toward giving readers a chance to explore how On War

fits into the broader strategic studies literature. Finally, the essay concludes

with suggestions for how to build from this foundation in future studies. None

of these are simple tasks given the richness of Clausewitz and his writing,

but each is earnestly approached with the sincere hope of making this

important work of strategy accessible.

The Man Behind On War

It seems the examination of the Carl von Clausewitz’s life and On War

never goes out of style. Indeed, from the moment his treatise on the conduct

of war was published, the man behind the ideas was increasingly the subject

of study. To this end, several modern looks at the Clausewitz offer

comprehensive coverage of his career and the experiences that informed his

thinking on war.1 For the purposes of introducing On War to new students,

however, only a few features of the military-man turned philosopher of war

are needed to place his work in context.

Clausewitz was born on 1 July 1780 in Burg, Prussia, today a part of

modern-day Germany. As a teen he joined the Prussian army and fought

against France as its Revolution spilled across Europe. After service in the

field, he studied under Gerhard von Scharnhorst at the Institute for Young

Officers in Berlin where he began to develop his notions on the nature of war

and strategy (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online). As an officer in the Prussian

army during the Napoleonic Wars he witnessed first the defeat of his country

1 See the bibliography for a listing of recently published titles.

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and then the subsequent downfall of Napoleon at the hands of an allied

Europe. In the intervening years of the war he, alongside Scharnhorst and

other forward thinking officers, went about reforming the Prussian military,

including advocating for mass enlistment in the service of fighting the French

emperor (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online). After Prussia was compelled to

fight on the side of France, Clausewitz fled east where he offered his services

to the Russian army as it defended against Napoleon’s invasion. After the

failed French campaign in Russia and the defection of Prussia from France,

Clausewitz served as the chief of staff to one of the Prussian army corps that

ultimately helped defeat Napoleon. Following the war, he was the long-

serving head of the Military Academy in Berlin where he found the time to

pen On War (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online). Clausewitz died in 1831 while

serving as chief of staff to the Prussian army, his treatise examining war

unfinished.

On War reflects the evolving views of Clausewitz regarding the nature

and fighting of war and is largely informed by his understanding of the

Napoleonic era. Its age should not disqualify the work, and in fact the book

remains essential reading for students of strategy. Today it is one of the

most carefully considered works of military strategy in history and is taught

in military academies and universities around the world. It continues to

inform not just the conduct of war, but also a wide range of activities in

which strategy broadly defined is paramount, business not least among

them. Clausewitz’s influence on Western militaries since his death is firmly

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established, and the ideas set forth in On War have been and are influential;

however, just how to interpret them is no easy task.

On War as a Study

Theory and a Peculiar Trinity

Any new reader of On War needs a few words of warning before

opening its pages. First is the issue of completeness. In short – the book is

unfinished. Written over the last twelve years of Carl von Clausewitz’s life, it

was left incomplete when he died of cholera before finalizing revisions. As a

result, some ideas, most importantly the concept of “absolute war,” vary

depending on the chapter under consideration. Of all eight Books included in

the final product, Clausewitz considered only the first fully revised.

Thankfully most important concepts are introduced here, and these may be

used as a guide to decipher later portions. Second, the Prussia strategist

employs a dialectic form of analysis, most clearly on display in the very first

chapter of On War. Dialectic analysis essentially makes two arguments at

once in an effort to get at the underlying nature of a problem. One position is

heartily argued before a second argument is employed to replace or amend

the first. Often used by philosophers, this style of inquiry can be challenging

to decode for first time readers. In the case of Clausewitz, this form of

analysis has long been the root of several misinterpretations of his work.

On War is seemingly contradictory and scattered not just because it

was left unfinished, but also because translations from German to England

are of disparate quality, and the choice of language often confounds readers

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and undermines the important concepts offered up by the Prussian officer;

however, reading a scholarly edition of the book helps mitigate this issue. To

this end, the most commonly used edition in the academic study of On War

is the 1976 Princeton University Press version, edited and translated by

renown scholars Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Other printings may be

cheaper or easier to obtain, but this edition ensures a high-quality translation

and its intuitive editing and formatting help break down at least a few

barriers to entry.

From an epistemological perspective, On War employs a particular

view on the utility of theory in the study of war, and it is this view that

informs the underlying goal of the entire work. Clausewitz argues that theory

“is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more

accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the

battlefield” (Clausewitz 1976, 141). This classical understanding of theory is

distinct from the scientific conception common in the social sciences today,

which stresses explanatory and predictive power. Indeed, Clausewitz calls

this modern vision of theory into question when he claims that “theory

cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark

the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a

hedge of principles on either side” (Clausewitz 1976, 578).

He is responding especially to notions strategy employed by what he

called the “scribblers of systems” who were interested in mathematical

explanations for how battles might be won and wars prosecuted (Clausewitz

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1976, 117). Antoine-Henri Jomini, a contemporary of Clausewitz, was one of

the targets against which the Prussian aimed this comment and others like it

later in life (Strachan 2007, 7 – 10). Jomini was famous for appropriating the

language of mathematics to proscribe “general principles” from which

strategy might be derived, and after the death of Clausewitz, his writings

represented the principal counterpoint to On War among students of military

affairs (Strachan 2007, 7). Regardless, from Clausewitz’s viewpoint, because

of the uncertain nature of war, the variable inputs into it, the interaction

between combatants, and the human factor, there was no hope for scientific

theories. Clausewitz launched his own analysis from this perspective.

It begins with defining war. Succinctly, war is “an act of force to

compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz 1976, 75). War is not some

blind explosion of violence, though emotion and violence play an important

role in it, but rather “war is a continuation of political intercourse, carried on

with other means” (Clausewitz 1976, 87).2 A “political object” motivates war

(Clausewitz 1976, 80). This is both a subjective and objective statement – it

is what war should be and what really differentiates war from fits of rage.

2 The translation of this and related concepts bedevil those presenting On War to an English speaking audience. The citation here is from the body of On War, however, the subtitle of Book I Chapter 1 from which it comes uses the word “by” in place of “with” and so reads “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.” Several scholars suggest that Howard and Paret get this translation wrong and that “by” really ought to be consistently translated as “with” from the original German. The implication being that using the word “with” allows war to occur alongside other political activities like diplomacy rather than be a distinct form of politics all its own. In a related spirit, translations of “policy” and “politics” here and in other mentions can also vary in clarity, serving only to muddle conversations about just how tightly tied war is to political interaction. For a discussion of translations issues stemming from On War, see James R. Holmes, “Everything You Know about Clausewitz is Wrong,” The Diplomat, November 12, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/everything-you-know-about-clausewitz-is-wrong/, accessed February 3, 2016.

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And from this conceptualization of war several implications flow. Chief

among them is that war is a “true political instrument” (Clausewitz 1976,

87). The political object, the thing that animates the fighting, also informs

the setting of military objectives and establishes the appropriate level of

effort to achieve these objectives (Clausewitz 1976, 88 – 81). The political

object and the military objectives may be the same, but they are generally

different. Indeed, quality military objectives are those whose attainment

ultimately supports achieving the political object.

Clausewitz’s understanding of war suggests that policy “will permeate

all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will

have a continuous influence on them” (Clausewitz 1976, 87). Generals do not

have the final say on issues of strategic importance, rather, policymakers

may exercise their influence at all levels of the military activities as they see

fit. The generals work for the policymakers, not the other way around, and

military leaders are beholden to interjection from those in office. Still, both

statesmen and commanders must make the same important judgement,

namely, determining “the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither

mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its

nature” (Clausewitz 1976, 88). This is to say, leadership must determine the

scale and characteristics of a war before they subsequently plan to fight it.

This determination will influence the strategies employed, conception of the

enemy’s center of gravity, level of effort, and a host of other considerations

that weight on the commander, political leadership, or most often both.

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War in the service of policy or as an extension of politics might suggest

the undertaking is supremely rational. This is only partly true. Clausewitz

notes that “war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its

political object” and thus there is a certain level of rational calculation

occurring that matches ends with means (Clausewitz 1976, 92). However, he

qualifies the rationality of war in no uncertain terms:

… it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between

civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the

part of the governments and to convince of war as a gradually

ridding itself of passion so that in the end one would never really

need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces –

comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That

would be a kind of war by algebra…. If war is an act of force, the

emotions cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from

them, but they will still affect it in some degree, and the extent

to which they do so will depend not on the level of civilization but

on how important the conflicting interests are and on how long

their conflict lasts (Clausewitz 1976, 76).

Thus, emotion (or irrationality) and rationality each have a partial but

important influence over the conduct of war. Neither should be neglected.

The excerpt above also serves to further highlight Clausewitz’s distain for

those attempting to analyze war from a mathematical or purely scientific

perspective.

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Beyond the roles of politics and emotion in war, Clausewitz introduces

a third central feature – chance, or nonrationality. Because a commander is

forced to assess probabilities “in light of the circumstances” that he or she

faces, there is a natural, non-deterministic feature to war (Clausewitz 1976,

85). “No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with

chance,” argues the Prussian officer (Clausewitz 1976, 85). While strategy,

training, and planning may mitigate this feature, it is an ever-present aspect

of warfare that cannot be avoided. Chance ultimately makes engaging in war

a gamble (Clausewitz 1976, 85). Nothing is known for certain, and how the

many actors engaged in a fight might break upon one another, work

amongst themselves, or understand the progress of the conflict, are all

subject to chance.

This discussion leads to what Clausewitz calls war’s “trinity.” Standing

on three legs, war is characterized by:

[1] primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be

regarded as a blind natural force; [2] of the play of chance and

probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; [3]

and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy,

which makes it subject to reason alone (Clausewitz 1976, 89).

The Prussian officer attaches each of these legs to a particular constituency

engaged in war. The first, violence, deals principally with a people at war.

While wars may not spring to life because of blind passion or rage, the

citizenry enlisted to support and fight the war certainly falls to these base

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emotions. The second, chance, deals mostly with military leadership and the

armies they command. Commanders may exploit or fall prey to chance and

probability depending on how well they craft their strategy. Finally, policy is

most associated with the government waging a war. It is on political leaders

to exercise their control over military activities and to synchronize them with

the ultimate political end of the war. Together these three features form a

trinity that embodies war; however, there yet is an important caveat. Just

because one group is associated with a particular leg in the trinity does not

mean it cannot experience the other two legs. Governments may run into

chance. Militaries may come to know rage. The trinity is not cleanly one-for-

one with constituencies.3 Reality is more malleable.

War in Theory, War in Reality

The dialectic between absolute war, or war in theory, and limited war,

or war in practice, is a source of great confusion for readers of Clausewitz.

For significant portions of Book I and Book IV, among others, absolute war is

discussed at some length. In short, absolute war is what would result from

merely following the logic of combat to its rational conclusion (Clausewitz

1976, 77). It is an ideal type of war characterized by three “extremes”

resulting from “interaction” among the combatants. In war, if each side

subscribes to a universal logic of combat, there is a mutual action-reaction

dynamic that develops between the combatants. This is called interaction,

and it is actually the same type of reasoning that motivates many game

3 Dr. Thomas Keaney has often made this observation in his lectures at Johns Hopkins University, SAIS.

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theoretic inquiries today. Readers of On War must understand the notion of

absolute war, but they cannot stop there. Students must ultimately

understand how reality modifies war in theory; if they fail here, they

fundamentally misread the classic.

The first extreme and source of interaction resides in the use of force.

Clausewitz argues that “war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to

the applications of that force” as each side attempts to defeat the opposing

military, barring their political objective (Clausewitz 1976, 77). The rational

result is each side employing maximal force. Second, each side in war shares

the same fundamental aim – to disarm or overthrow its opponent (Clausewitz

1976, 77). Only after this is complete is the political objective guaranteed. So

long as each opponent remains in the field, neither is in complete control of

the war’s outcome and both are driven to the same extreme (Clausewitz

1976, 77). Finally, each side in a war adjusts its level of effort to the other.

Because this is a dynamic interaction and each side holds the same aim, the

level of effort on each side will logically be driven to the maximum given

physical resource constraints (Clausewitz 1976, 77). This is the third and final

extreme interaction. Because all three work in combination, absolute war

would represent a type of warfare characterized by massive mobilizations,

enormous battles, and war until the complete subjugation of one side or the

other.

Clausewitz sets up absolute war as an ideal type, a theoretical form of

conflict that is never actually observed. This is for three reasons. First, “war

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is never an isolated act” but rather a series of moves and countermoves

(Clausewitz 1976, 78). Commanders on each side may thus adjust their plans

in accordance with what their opponents actually do over time rather than

what they ought to do in theory. Second, “war does not consist of a single

short blow” (Clausewitz 1976, 79). Instead, it is often characterized by a

series of smaller ones. After all, time and space present obvious logistical

challenges, making it impossible to concentrate forces on each side at

precisely the same moment and in the same location to fight a war in a

single all-encompassing battle. Finally, “in war the result is never final,”

meaning that it may be re-adjudicated in the future (Clausewitz 1976, 80).

Those defeated may fight again on another day to reclaim some loss. All

told, these three mitigating factors prevent war from ever reaching its

extreme. Absolute war exists only in the minds of theorists, not on the fields

of battle, and war in reality actually limited.

Combat, Defense, and Strategy

Even if war does not reach its logical extreme, that does not prevent it

from being bloody business. Clausewitz takes a strong position on the

centrality of combat in war. He argues “… it is inherent in the very concept

of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from combat”

(Clausewitz 1976, 95). As a result, “the whole of military activity must

therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement,” which is to say,

preparing to meet the enemy in battle becomes the central purpose of

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strategy (Clausewitz 1976, 95). In his most vivid description of combat

Clausewitz wrote:

Battle is the bloodiest solution. While it should not simply be

considered as mutual murder – its effect is rather a killing of the

enemy's spirit than of his men -- it is always true that the

character of battle, like its name [Schlacht] is slaughter, and its

price is blood (Clausewitz 1976, 259).

While this is perhaps a startling view, the Prussian took it quite seriously.

Indeed, from his perspective, it was actually foolhardy to think that war

might be fought without the loss of blood. (Clausewitz 1976, 75).

Still, it is possible to misunderstand the implications of Clausewitz’s

position. Pursuing combat may be the only way to prosecute a war, but that

does not necessarily mean that combat always occurs. While “combat is the

only effective force in war”, Clausewitz makes clear that “its aim is to

destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end” (Clausewitz 1976,

97). Combat is not the end in and of itself. Thus, Clausewitz admits that

fighting may not come to pass. Why? It is “because the outcome rests on the

assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed”

(Clausewitz 1976, 97). If an enemy knows he will be defeated in a fight, he

may not risk the death and destruction and instead leave open the path to

achieving the political objective without a fight. This is a subtle nuance that

is easy to miss if a reader focuses on the notion of battle itself.

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There are additional nuances to the concept of combat. In combat not

everything is equal. Rather, Clausewitz argues that there are “two distinct

forms of action in war: attack and defense” (Clausewitz 1976, 83). He goes

on to maintain that “the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger

than the offensive” (Clausewitz 1976, 358). This does not mean that a

commander merely digs in his men and waits for his opponent to attack.

Rather, defense is relative (Clausewitz 1976, 357). A wise military

commander might employ offensive strikes as part of a wider defensive war;

for example, “a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles”

(Clausewitz 1976, 357). Still, the defense should only be employed until an

army is strong enough to attack, since it is the offense that achieves the

“positive aim” of war, namely the military objective in support of a political

aim (Clausewitz 1976, 358). Once the defense has yielded a more favorable

“balance of strength,” only then can the offense be used to win a war

(Clausewitz 1976, 358).

If combat is central to war, how is strategy employed to bring about

battle on the most favorable terms? Indeed, this is the question many

students of strategy are most interested in answering. Book III is entirely

devoted to discussing the details of sound strategy. Clausewitz defines

strategy as “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war”

(Clausewitz 1976, 177). Several elements of strategy ultimately affect the

engagement, including “moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and

statistical” considerations (Clausewitz 1976, 183). Of these the most

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important may be the moral. It is made up of the “skill of the commander,

the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit”

(Clausewitz 1976, 186). Additionally, Clausewitz suggests that the very best

strategist will “define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that

will be in accordance with its [political] purpose” (Clausewitz 1976, 177).

Designing a strategy may be simple in theory, but executing one is a

challenge suitable only for a commander who has “great strength of

character” and who has a “firmness of mind” necessary to see a strategy

through to completion (Clausewitz 1976, 178). The human factor becomes

essential to effective strategy, and it is here that concept of “genius” comes

to the fore in On War.

To Clausewitz, genius does not suggest anything about the intellectual

capability of a commander. While smarts might be useful, they do not

constitute the makings of a great captain nor do they ensure that such a

leader can establish or carry out a successful strategy. When speaking of

military genius Clausewitz had other characteristics in mind. First, the

courage to act in the face of danger and to accept responsibility for the

prosecution of a campaign are essential for the commander, and ideally he

or she holds “a compound of both” (Clausewitz 1976, 101). Second, there

must be a “strength of body and soul” that is necessary to see a commander

through the suffering of war (Clausewitz 1976, 101). Third are the “powers of

intellect” characterized by a “sensitive and discriminating judgment” for

cutting to the truth of a matter (Clausewitz 1976, 101).

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The first and third features of genius, courage and the ability to

perceive truth, are essential for any military commander given the

“relentless struggle with the unforeseen,” or chance, that partly

characterizes combat (Clausewitz 1976, 102). But the ability to find truth is

not enough; indeed, the courage to pursue it, embodied in a “strong rather

than a brilliant” mind is essential (Clausewitz 1976, 103). Here an element of

instinct becomes important. Throughout Chapter 3 of Book I Clausewitz goes

into even greater detail about the making of military genius. He ultimately

concludes that the ideal commander embodying this characteristic will have

an “inquiring rather than the creative mind,” “the comprehensive rather than

the specialized approach,” and finally “the calm rather than the excitable

head” (Clausewitz 1976, 112). This is the man or women who can be trusted

to lead an army.

Victory in War

One of the most difficult concepts to grasp in On War is the “center of

gravity.” Sometimes abbreviated as CoG for short by military professionals, it

is a term Clausewitz uses repeatedly throughout his classic but in varying

ways. In fact, rarely does he use it to describe precisely the same thing more

than once. Consequently, it is an easy place for confusion to degrade

understanding. One way to approach this concept is to accept the multitude

of meanings as they come. It is impractical to review each mention of central

of gravity in detail – indeed an entire paper could easily be written on just

this concept – some references are sufficiently congruent to serve as a

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starting point. Exploring the center of gravity also begins to give a sense for

how wars might be won.

In Book IV, Clausewitz writes that “since the essence of war is fighting,

and since the battle is the fight of the main force, the battle must always be

considered the true center of gravity in war” (Clausewitz 1976, 248). He goes

on to argue that “the major battle is therefore to be regarded as

concentrated war, as the center of gravity of the entire conflict or campaign”

(Clausewitz 1976, 258). In this conceptualization, the center of gravity is

something akin to the enemy’s forces, the point against which an attack is

launched, and battle that occurs at this point. It is an understanding that

naturally flows from Clausewitz’s arguments about the centrality of combat.

Later, in Book VI, this vision seems extended, if just slightly. Clausewitz

writes that “a center of gravity is always found where the mass is

concentrated… [i]t presents the most effective target for a blow” (Clausewitz

1976, 485). Here Clausewitz seems to suggest that the center of gravity is

not just a target for attack, but rather the point where the greatest benefit

from attacking will be realized. Finally, in his last Book, the Prussian

strategist expands the meaning to the most general strategic perspective.

Here he writes that the center of gravity is “the hub of all power and

movement, on which everything depends” (Clausewitz 1976, 595 – 596).

Thus, it might include leadership, a capital city, or an essential ally rather

than just an opposing military force (Clausewitz 1976, 596). New readers of

On War should take careful note of this last, broader definition.

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Beyond the center of gravity, two additional concepts especially

associated with Clausewitz have bearing on the termination of war – the

“culminating point of attack” and the “culminating point of victory.” Though

the defense is viewed as stronger than the attack, it is often the offense that

wins a war through attaining the “positive aim.” These attacks may provide

gains to the side employing them, provided they do not go beyond the

“culminating point of attack,” the point at which the commander has pressed

an attack so far that his or her remaining strength is just enough to defend

the gains won (Clausewitz 1976, 528). At this point the strength of the

defense can be used to hold the winnings resulting from the offense. Should

a commander push beyond this point, the counterattack from the opponent

will drive him back and force the loss of any gains made in the initial attack.

A wise commander must therefore “detect the culminating point with

discriminative judgment” so as to not step beyond it (Clausewitz 1976, 528).

If this is possible, the gains from the initial attack may be held and affect the

negotiations at the end of the war.

The “culminating point of victory”, meanwhile, is a similar but distinct

concept. Clausewitz writes that “… it is not possible in every war for the

victor to overthrow his enemy completely,” as would be the case in

theoretical, absolute war; instead, “even victory has a culminating point”

(Clausewitz 1976, 566). Generally the side of superior strength wins the

victory (Clausewitz 1976, 566). Superior strength allows a commander to

seek complete destruction of his opponent or at least take steps to improve

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his side’s negotiation positioning, perhaps through taking and holding

territory (Clausewitz 1976, 570). Superiority is merely the means to an end.

However, when the enemy cannot be destroyed outright, a commander

should not press beyond the point where gains cannot be defended

(Clausewitz 1976, 570). The “culminating point of victory” thus takes the

dynamic insights of the “culminating point of attack” and applies them to the

strategic level. Pushing beyond this point invites the possibility of damaging

one’s position in negotiations since any additional gains would only be lost to

an opponent’s reaction.

All three of these concepts offer insights into the dynamics of war

termination, yet formalization of this process remains to be demonstrated.

Book I of On War offers the clearest insights along these lines and proposes

three paths to victory. The simplest analytically and the path to victory most

preferred by aims to “bring about the enemy’s collapse – the destruction of

his armed forces and the conquest of his territory” (Clausewitz 1976, 92).

This is the surest way to achieve the political object held in the balance of

war, and Clausewitz outlines this logic clearly in the introduction to chapter

eleven on “the engagement.” In short, the destruction of enemy forces is the

chief means to achieve the political object in war and fighting is generally

the only way to bring about this destruction. Thus, the greatest successes

toward achieving the goals of a war are won in major engagements, ideally

in “one great battle” aimed at the enemy’s center of gravity (Clausewitz

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1976, 258). While this is theoretically easy to understand, it is not always

possible in reality, as discussed earlier.

The second path to victory centers on adjusting the probability of

winning. Of course increasing the probability for one side naturally decreases

the probability for the other since it is a zero-sum game between two

combatants. Clausewitz observes:

Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the

motives and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that the

very faintest prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one

side to yield. If from the very start the other side feels that this is

probable, it will obviously concentrate on bringing about this

probability rather than take the long way round and totally

defeat the enemy (Clausewitz 1976, 91).

He goes on to discuss specific ways these probabilities might be

altered:

It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without

defeating the enemy’s forces. I refer to operations that have

direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place

to disrupt the opposing alliance, or paralyze it, that gain us new

allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. (Clausewitz 1976,

92).

While combat and battle might offer the surest theoretical route to success,

in reality, altering the probabilities for success will matter a great deal in

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determining if one party will still keep up the fight. One can see the concepts

of the “culminating point of attack” and the “culminating point of victory”

playing a role in this vision for war termination, since an enemy dug in and

defending from the culminating point of victory sends a clear message that

the odds of winning the war have settled in its favor.

The last path to termination aims to make continuing war an

“unacceptable cost” for one’s opponent (Clausewitz 1976, 91). Costs may be

increased four ways, though the magnitude of each varies given the natures

of the combatants and governments involved. The first is the “wastage of his

forces” and conquest, or permanent holding, of his territory (Clausewitz

1976, 93). Second is invasion and the “seizure of enemy territory,” not with

the aim of holding it indefinitely, but rather to gather financial resources at

the enemy’s expense or to “lay it waste” so that the enemy might not

benefit from it (Clausewitz 1976, 93). Third “is to wear down the enemy,”

meaning to use “the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion

of his physical and moral resistance” (Clausewitz 1976, 93). And finally, one

may simply drag the war on by waiting for the enemy to attack (Clausewitz

1976, 93). This last method will not yield any major object, but it certainly

can help achieve a minimal object of political survival. Regardless of how

costs are amplified, an opponent engaged in a cost-benefit analysis may

reconsider ongoing participation in a war under such circumstances.

In a sense, each of these alternatives paths to victory corresponds to

one of the legs in the trinity: outright destruction of the enemy might be the

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outcome of hatred and violence, altering the probabilities of success plays in

the world of chance, and forcing new cost-benefit analyses relies on the

rational government. Still, these alternative paths to victory are often lost on

readers of On War, but this is understandable since they are buried in the

classic and hardly receive the same coverage as victory through battle. This

teaching about battle is ultimately the thing most closely associated with

Clausewitz. A particular quote from Book IV is often cited to support this

narrow view:

We are not interested in generals who win victories without

bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must

make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for

gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner

or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack

off our arms (Clausewitz 1976, 260).

A second is also often quoted:

Kind-hearted people might of course think that there was some

ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much

bloodshed, and might imagine that this is the true goal of the art

of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed:

war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come

from kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is

in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect

(Clausewitz 1976, 75).

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Yet, Clausewitz provides clear visions for victory that do not entail bloodshed

alone. What should be made of this seeming contradiction? Returning to the

text of Book I is essential. It is this text, after all, that was subject to the most

revisions before its author’s death. In its pages, readers find all three recipes

for alternative endings to war. Perhaps the compromise view, the view most

closely representing that of Clausewitz at the end of this life, might be this:

there are alternatives to complete destruction of the enemy that might lead

to attainment of the political object, although the most certain way to

achieve the political end is through battle. This insight, however, requires

careful reading.

Two Underlying Features of War

While this essay does not address every important insight into war

offered by Clausewitz, it does aim to cover the most essential. Up to this

point two have been neglected – the fog of war and friction. Each of these

contributes to the chance and probabilities that are so closely associated

with war and that pose universal challenges and opportunities to

commanders. “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors

on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser

uncertainty,” writes Clausewitz (Clausewitz 1975, 101). The “fog” to which

he refers has come be known as the fog of war, and in his discussion of

military genius, Clausewitz stresses the importance of sound intuition and

the ability to discover truth as essential characteristics of a commander who

will operate effectively in this fog (Clausewitz 1976, 101 – 103). This insight

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into the uncertain and hazy features of war has profound implications for the

utility of military intelligence in combat. From the viewpoint of Clausewitz “…

most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and

inaccuracies” (Clausewitz 1976, 117). Intelligence reports often do not help

cut away the fog, but rather they compound it by spreading misinformation

or disinformation. Thus it is even more important for a commander to have

the genius necessary to divine truth out of the fog. Truth will not come along

easily.

The fog of war, meanwhile, is just one source of friction. “Everything in

war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties

accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction...” (Clausewitz 1976,

119). In some ways the concept of friction is akin to Murphy’s Law –

everything that can go wrong will go wrong at some point or another during

war. Weather might gum up transportation. Mechanical failures might delay

an offensive. Disease might render large swaths of troops unfit for duty.

These are all examples of how friction might manifest itself in wartime. It is

friction that “that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish

real war from war on paper” (Clausewitz 1976, 119). Friction is one brake

preventing the dynamics of war in theory from being realized in reality.

Ultimately, Clausewitz links friction to the behavior of a commander and the

preparation of the army. A high-quality leader “must know friction in order to

overcome it whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard of

achievement in his operations which this very friction makes impossible”

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(Clausewitz 1976, 120). Meanwhile an army especially well trained or

exercised may minimize friction. As the peculiar trinity reminds us, war is in

part governed by chance, and it is friction, along with the fog of war, from

which this element of chance springs.

The Study of On War

The incomplete status of On War left its author conflicted. On one hand

he issued a stern warning. A note found amongst the papers of his draft

cautioned that “should the work be interrupted by my death, then what is

found can only be called a mass of conceptions not brought into form… open

to endless misconceptions” (Hart 1967, 357). Yet his prefatory note to the

manuscript, dated July 1827, suggests a different vision:

Despite the manuscript’s incomplete form, I believe an unbiased

reader, who thirsts after truth and conviction, will not fail to

recognize in the first six books the fruits of many years of

considering and diligently studying war; perhaps he will even find

in them the principal ideas from which a revolution in military

theory might emerge (Echevarria II 2007, 1).

Unfortunately, it seems there may have been few unbiased readers in the

history of studying On War. As Michael Howard puts it, “Clausewitz, as it

turned out, had less cause to hear his critics than to be wary of many of his

professed admirers” since they often selectively quoted the Prussian

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strategist’s writings to suit their own arguments (Howard 1976, 28). And this

spotty treatment of the classic has proved to be a source of confusion for

centuries now. Thankfully, there are several scholars who might be relied on

to help navigate these difficult straits even as they offer their own analysis

and critique of the Prussian strategist.

One of the foremost authorities on military strategy today is Colin

Gray, and in his own studies Gray liberally refers to and helps put into

perspective several of Clausewitz’s central ideas. Gray, like Clausewitz,

believes that “there are elements common to war and strategy in all periods,

in all geographies, and with all technologies,” and consequently the modern

scholar sees himself writing in the same tradition as the Prussian staff officer

(Gray 1999, 1). In many ways, Gray is largely neo-Clausewitzian, clarifying

and showing the universality of the ideas developed in the early 19th century.

He certainly argues for the centrality of policy as the guiding force behind

military power (Gray 1999, 5). Additionally, he lauds Clausewitz’s insight into

the role of chance in war as relevant today just as it was in the past (Gray

1999, 6). The notion of friction also remains a central aspect of war (Gray

1999, 41). These timeless features, argues Gray, are ignored at the peril of

modern commanders.

Still, Gray does diverge from the Prussian in some subtle ways. While

he admits that the purpose of war may be to “impose our will on the

enemy,” he argues that force is not be the sole instrument of strategy;

rather, “diplomacy, propaganda, cultural subversion and demoralization,

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trade embargoes, espionage and sabotage can all have a strategic effect”

and play a role in winning victory (Gray 1999, 162).4 He also points out

shortcomings in the writings of Clausewitz that modern history has laid bare.

Gray writes that “Clausewitz offers little help to educate the policymaker or

the military commander for their mutual dealings” even as the Prussian is

“eloquent on the subject of the political instrumentality of war” (Gray 1999,

60). Such education is left to other strategists, it would seem. Still, scholars

like Gray who build on the foundation of Clausewitz continue to show not just

the continuing academic relevance of On War, but just how important its

ideas are for the conduct of war today.

Not all modern analysts are so complementary of Clausewitz. British

strategist B. H. Liddell Hart, one of the foremost strategic thinkers of the 20 th

century, argued forcefully that not only is Clausewitz wrong about a great

many aspects of war, but his confused writings were the cause of calamitous

death during World War I and World War II. At least five major criticisms of

On War are offered in Hart’s major work on strategy. First, Hart contends

that Clausewitz vastly underestimated the utility of sea-power in war (Hart

1967, 353). The Prussian wrote nearly nothing about the use of navies in the

pursuit of military victory. Second, Clausewitz overemphasizes the

importance of superior numbers in achieving victory, and it is this

overestimation that helped kill so many in the trenches of the Great War

(Hart 1967, 353). Third, On War’s author “…was carried away by a passion 4 Depending on the translation and interpretation of Clausewitz being used, this criticism may be overstated. Consider the earlier discussion on the implications of translating war as a continuation of politics “with” or “by” other means.

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for pure logic…” especially as it related to war in theory (Hart 1967, 354).

Fourth, Hart claims great harm was done to history by the statement that

only bloodshed can overcome an enemy, even if its author qualified the

notion in other portions of On War (Hart 1967, 355). Finally, Hart argues “…

worse was the effect of his theoretical exposition, and exaltation, of the idea

of ‘absolute’ warfare – in proclaiming that the road to success was through

the unlimited application of force” (Hart 1967, 356). To be fair, the British

strategist does acknowledge that Clausewitz attempted to differentiate

between theoretical war and war in reality; however:

… it was the ideal, and not the practical, aspect of his teaching

on battle which survived. He contributed to the distortion by

arguing that it was only to avoid the risks of battle that ’any

other means are taken’. And he fixed the distortion in the minds

of his pupils by hammering on the abstract ideal (Hart 1967,

355).

While aspects of Hart’s critiques are perhaps overblown – for example, he

often confuses the effects of misinterpretations with the text itself – his

views form the foundation for ongoing criticisms of Clausewitz.

Perhaps the very best writings analyzing On War, however, appear in

the 1976 edition of the book edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.

Howard and Paret, joined by well-known strategist Bernard Brodie,

collectively offer three introductory essays and one follow-on guide that do

an admirable job placing the book, its author, and its major ideas into

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context suitable for a new student of strategy. Howard explains the enduring

influence of Clausewitz on the conduct of war while Parrott walks through the

origins of the book and the history poured into it (Howard 1976; Paret 1976).

Brodie, not to be outdone, takes on double duty. After making the case for

the continued relevance of On War, he crafts a book-by-book, chapter-by-

chapter guide to the entire work that distilled the major themes and

concepts of each section down into a brief overview (Brodie 1976a; Brodie

1976b). While certainly suppressing the color of each chapter, the guide

succeeds in offering a digestible abridged introduction to the text that makes

some of its more challenging portions easier to understand. Indeed, had

earlier readers had access to these materials, many of the misinterpretations

so chastised by Hart may not have come to pass.

Because On War is such a central book to Western strategy and offers

so many insights into the nature and conduct of war, it continues to receive

critical consideration by scholars publishing today. One of the more prolific

has been Hew Strachan. Of the many points Strachan raises, one of the most

thought-provoking centers on challenging the particular perspective Howard

and Paret brought to their translation of On War. He argues that their 1976

translation “gave priority to Clausewitz the rationalist, who stressed the

relationship between war and policy;” this particular reading plays up just

one of Clausewitz’s many important ideas, perhaps to the determent of

others and to the confusion of readers (Stratchan 2007, 25 – 26). Stratchan

also takes careful aim at those who outright reject Clausewitz, suggesting

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that they do so only “on the basis of a selective reading” (Stratchan 2007, 26

– 27). Instead, when On War is viewed in the context of Clausewitz’s life, the

history of its times, and with a careful eye, it offers subtle, relevant insights

into the nature and conduct of war (Stratchan 2007, 26 – 27).

Read and Reread

The very tone in which On War is written suggests implicitly what Colin

Gray explicitly calls out – Clausewitz viewed strategy as a timeless endeavor.

Modern scholars and commanders are often quite taken with seemingly new

features of warfare, and revolutions in military affairs driven in part by novel

technologies and their creative application are well documented throughout

history. However, a hallmark of On War, what makes it still so powerful

today, is that it taps into features of war that will not change with the

passage of time. The importance of politics, policy, friction, fog, combat –

wise strategists have identified these and many other concepts championed

by Clausewitz as outside of time’s flow. For this reason, serious students of

strategy and diplomacy should commit themselves not just to reading On

War once, but rereading it with some regularity. The first time should not be

the last time, and rest assured, students who open its pages many times

over will find something fresh to consider each time.

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Bibliography

Aron, Raymond. Clausewitz, Philosopher of War. 1st Touchstone ed. New York: Simon &

Schuster, 1986.

Aron offers both an analysis of Clausewitz and his major ideas in this often cited work. After tackling the life of the Prussian strategist, Aron considers the central dialectics of war examined in On War, namely means and ends, moral and physical, and defense and attack. He moves on to examine the history that influenced Clausewitz’s views on war and its implications for theory before concluding with what Clausewitz has to offer modern strategists in the nuclear age. A thoughtful and thorough book, this should be read by serious students of strategy.

Brodie, Bernard. “The Continuing Relevance of On War.” In On War, translated and edited by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

This short essay is an enjoyable read that quickly makes the case for why modern students of strategy ought to read Clausewitz in some detail. Written by one of the foremost strategic thinkers of the 20th century, this is one of the first bits of scholarship that a pupil new to strategic studies should to consider, and it may even be worth looking at before tackling the On War itself.

Brodie, Bernard. “A Guide to Reading On War.” In On War, translated and edited by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

This is Brodie’s boiled down summary of On War. To be sure, details are suppressed, richness of language lost, and subtle implications glossed over, but this serves as a useful reference to students struggling to come to grips with Clausewitz’s words on their own terms. While this should not be read as a stand-alone piece, it is a useful guide when used alongside the original text.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

This has become the starting point and standard translation for most scholars aiming to understand the evolution of Western military strategy. Given its major influence on the development of strategy and enduring relevance, On War is still taught in most military schools of higher education and in a wide range of civilian international affairs programs. Sometimes difficult read and often a bit convoluted, it is still a must read for any serious student of strategy.

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Echevarria II, Antulio J. Clausewitz and Contemporary War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,

2007.

Antulio Echevarria has long been associated with the U.S. Army War College and is one of the leading Clausewitz scholars. This book aims to make Clausewitz’s central teaching relevant to a modern audience. Accessible and easy to read, this source should be used for students seeking to broaden their understanding of Clausewitz’s ongoing relevance and contemporary application.

Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Carl von Clausewitz", accessed January 17, 2016, 

http://www.britannica.com/biography/Carl-von-Clausewitz.

This is a quick, easy-to-read biography of Clausewitz most appropriate for quickly orienting students to his life and professional experiences. It is a good place to begin considering his life, but is really just a first step for those interested understanding the man behind On War.

Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Colin Gray is one of the most widely read modern strategists. His work builds neatly on that of Clausewitz, and Gray does a very good job helping make the central ideas of On War relevant and accessible to a modern audience. His Modern Strategy in many ways is a neo-Clausewitzian book that expands on the classic observations of the Prussian officer while amending those that have been confused over time or misapplied.

Hart, B.H. Liddell. Strategy, Second Revised Edition. New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers,

1967.

While not his first attempt at sharing his insights regarding the indirect approach to strategy, it is certainly Hart’s best known and most relevant. Assigned reading in many strategic studies programs, Strategy is a necessary companion to the study of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Moltke, Fuller, and a host of other well-known thinkers on military affairs. While not a flawless book or perfect conceptualization of military strategy, its clear style offers an easy entry point into larger debates on the use of military force.

Howard, Michael. “The Influence of Clausewitz,” In On War, translated and edited by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Howard is legendary among the strategic studies and military history communities. Like Paret’s essay on the origins of On War, this short article ought to be read even before reading the classic itself. Not only does it put the Clausewitz’s book in context, it helps explain the importance of the book

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to the development of Western strategic thought over many years. This knowledge makes approaching On War easier and more meaningful, especially given the investment of time and energy such a pursuit requires.

Paret, Peter. “The Genesis of On War,” In On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1976.

This brief essay in the opening pages of the Howard and Paret translation traces origins and development of On War. It is a must-read piece, useful to look at even before examining the words of Clausewitz himself. Additionally, Paret is enjoyable to read, making the distant life of the Prussian strategist come alive for new students of strategy.

Strachan, Hew. Clausewitz’s On War, A Biography. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007.

Strachan’s book, as its title suggests, is a detailed discussion of On War’s development. By putting the book into its historical context and by examining several of Clausewitz’s other writings, Strachan attempts to construct the lens through which to read the classic work of strategy. This is an excellent source for students seeking to gain a deeper appreciation for how On War came to exist and move beyond the outline provided by Paret in his introduction to the 1976 translation.

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