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Weber and Direct DemocracyAuthor(s): J. J. R. ThomasSource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 216-240Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science

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J. J. R. Thomas

Weberanddirectdemocracy

ABST RACT

At the end of WorldWar Max Weberwasdeeply,if equivocally,involvedwith radicalopinion. It would havebeen extraordinaryhad his workfailedto treat attemptsto end domination n all itsforms.Yet just such a failurehasbeen attributed o him becauseof allegedconfusionsin his accountof rationalityand legitimatedomination.By contrast,Weber'sviewson directdemocracyrediscussedhere. It is shownthathe heldthisto be a rationaloptionpossible, however, only under certainconditions absent in themodernworld,notablythoseconcerningpopulation ize andcom-

plexity of economic function. Direct democracyas a form ofpolitical life has a relationto value-rationality. alue-rationality,however, s more likely to giverise to legaldominations it mustinvariably emaina marginal nd transitoryphenomenon. t is t;hisview which defined the terms of Weber'sbrief participationnGerman olitics.

I WEBER AND RADICAL POLITICS

In May 1919 the leadersof the short-lived nd catastrophically n-successfulsovietrepublic(Rateregierung)n Bavariawentto trialfortreason.Two of them, the Commissaror the Socializationof theEconomyand the student,Toller,who hadbrieflybeenleaderof therepublic,calledin theirdefencea formermemberof the HeidelbergCouncilof Workers' nd Soldiers'Deputies-one of the Rlersaillesnegotiatorssoon to become professorat MunichUniversity.Thisincidentis richwith historicalpolitical rony,for the Commissar asthe positivistOtto Neurath,subsequentlya prominentmemberofthe Vienna Circle,and the professor,of course,was Max Weber.Weber's nterventionon behalf of Toller's visionary haracter'wasperhapsto some effect, Tollerwas sentencedto only 5 years im-prisonment.Weber's nvolvement n these eventsis reasonablywell

The Bntish Journal of Sociology Volume XXXV Number 2 June 1984

216







Weber nd d rect democracy 217

documented, in view of which the characterization f him as some-one systematically ncapableof grasping he radical(as opposed to

the constitutional) conception of democracy is curious. I do notintend to arguethat Weberwas 'really'a radical hinker, o the con-trary, his preference n 1918 for a constitutionalmonarchy s wellknown, as is his belief that this option had been foreclosedby thedistinctly moral and personal failings of the Hohenzollernand ofLudendorff.2

Weber'scontact with radicaland socialist opinion was greatestatthe end of the war and during he periodof revolution hat inaugur-ated the WeimarRepublic.It began howeverat a much earlierdate.

In 1906 he had attendeda socialistconventionbut concluded hat itspetit bourgeoischaracter endered t an unsuitable ehicle for radicalchange. Still earlier,his acceptance of the editorshipof the Archivfur Sozialwissenschaftund Sozialpolitikbrought him directly intothe heartlandof the world of academic ocialism.His editorshipwasat the invitationof Edgar affe who had acquired hejournal n 1903.Some years later, the sameJaffe servedas Minister f Finance n therevolutionary Bavariancabinet. MarianneWeber has written thatWeber's ympathieswith the proletariathad led him time and again

to consider oining the socialists,only to be held back by his inabilityto share he faith in a socialist uture.3This ast sumsup someof the ambiguity ypicalof Weber's elation-

ship to the socialists.Muellerhas recently writtenof Weber's elationto socialism: A deep-seatedaversion, ometimesbursting nto openhatred, of the feudal-bureaucraticstablishment ccasionallypusheshim further o the left than be belongs.'4And this seems true enough.CertainlyWebernever committed himself to any overtly and defin-itely socialist position. On the contrary, his speeches during thetroubled period of 1918-19 provoked hostile reactions from theleft as much, or almost as much, as they provokeddisturbance nddissension from the right. Yet ironically, only shortly after that,Weberwas associatedwith the radicalwing of the Deutsche Demo-k.ratischePartei; and at least one commentatorhas attributedhisfailure to be given a prominent place on the election ticket forFrankfurt Hesse-Nassau o the opposition generated (within theparty) by Weber's rticles n the FrankfurtZeitungcalling for largemeasuresof socialization.5What is of decisive mportance, hough,to a considerationof his politicalviews, is a recognitionof the con-

tact he had with young and radicalopinion, opinion which rangedalong the spectrum from Independent Socialists to pure utopiandleamers.6 In 1917 and 1918 Weberheld regular nformalseminarsat his home in Heidelberg n which socialist and pacifist studentstook part. Before Toller became, brieflysthe leader of the BavarianSoviet he had urgedWeber o be leader of a youth movementdedi-cated to 'Erosand the abolitionof poverty'.Weberwas also involved







218J.. R. Thomas

indebate with those who sought to set up communistutopian

communitiesn whichyoungpeople mightfree themselvesromthe

toils f capitalism,workingfor 'theanarchisticdeal,liberation rom

thepolitical forms of domination'.The young enthusiastswere

reportedlyisappointed hat Weberofferedonly to advisethem on

economicmatters,that he commended heir 'chiliastic' nergiesbut

declinedtronger upport.7Thus,it seemsclearthat Weber's ejectionof socialismn both its

scientificnd utopianformsoccurred romwithina milieu n which

such deas were to the fore. Just as Weberhad debatedwith the

academicocialistsfromwithinthe Vereinfur Sozialpolitikand the

editorial oardof the Archiv,so too it wasfromwithina contextof

personal ebate with Toller,with Neurathand with youngradicals

thatWebermade his politicalinterventions.Whata curiousstate it

wouldbe therefore, f Weber'sworkwereto show an ignoranceof

theconcept of a world free from domination,of the ideal of the

utopiancommunityor of (in a word) direct democracy.Yet just

suchan accusationhasbeenlaid,notonce,butrepeatedly, t Weber's

door.Ingeniousaccountshavebeendevisedof why it is thatWeber's

work, o richin notionsof coercion,conflictanddomination hould

bedisfiguredby the absenceof anytheoretical ccountof democracy

inits absoluteform. Suchcuriousattributionsoverlook he fact thatWeber's ccount of legitimatedomination s alwaysset againsthis

understandingf illegztimatedominationon the one handandof the

attemptto be free of all dominationon the other.Weber's ccount

of directdemocracy,and the theoreticalpositionsimplicitin it, has* .

.

recelved cantattentlon.Perhapsat this point it is necessary o clarifywhat is meantby a

'radical'or 'direct'conception of democracy:preciseformulations

varyfrom one authorto another,but the key intellectualsourceis,

of course,Rousseauandthe conceptionof a stateof affairs n whicheach,by obeyingthe GeneralWill,obeyshimselfalone;thatis to say,

it is the antithesisof all formsof domination,not of any particular

form.8Thisbourgeoisconceptionof libertywastakenup by diverse

political tendencies;hrxism, Kropotkiniteanarchism,and Jeffer-

sonianradicalismn the U.S.A.all sharea visionof a societyin which

domination is dissolvedby Reason. It has been this connexion

between reasonand 'absolute'democracywhich has been decisive

for critiquesof Weber,whose concernwith the interactionbetween

rationalityand domination s well known.ThusMarcuse ndedhiscritiqueof Weberwiththe query and hisyoucallReason?9Lukacs 0

sought to link Weber'sconceptionof dominationto a specifically

Gennanicirrationalism, ndin the Englishspeakingworlda certain

puzzling over the vicissitudesof svaluerationality has been the

vehiclefor the critiqueof Weber's llegedpessimism.Hereit willbe

recalledthat Weberoutlinedfour types of action (purpose-rational,







Weber nd directdemocracy 219

value-rational,affectual and traditional) and also three types oflegitimate domination (legal, charismaticand traditional).By con-

structinga neat schema:

Ac tion DominationTraditional TraditionalAffective CharismaticPurpose-rational LegalValue-rational ?

we would easily observe the 'gap' in Weber's heorizing created

precisely by his inability to orient himself to a traditionof radicaldemocratic speculation. The connexion between rationality in itsinstrumental orm and bureaucratic ominationhas been made, butthe antithetical connexion between reason and the dissolution ornegation of domination s denoted only by a lacuna.However, haverather too curtly stated the argumentsagainst Weberhere, whichvary from author to author. Thus, Spencerll argued that a fourthtype of domination was indeed missing,and that if one were to beconstructedon the basis of value rationality t would have to corres-

pond to democracy-democracy in its 'constitutional' atherthanits 'absolute' sense to be sure, but the linkage is precisely to the'ultimate'characterof democraticsystems, the notion of universalpopularconsent, the 'will of the people';at this point Spencer's iewlinks with that of the radicalor Rousseauesque ritique.Albrow,l2 inseeking to criticize Spencer,placed the centre of the argumenton amore acute conception of democracy with the explicit view thatvalue-rationalhuman interaction would of necessity approximateRousseau's deal. Since my values are preciselymy values, to actvalue-rationally,he argues, is to act freely; therefore Weber waslogically bound to omit value-rationalityromany schemespecificallyconcerned with domination. More recently this ground has beenretracedby Barker;l3 althollghhe tries to constructhis accountwith-out referenceto the Spencer/Albrow ebate,he seeks to incorporateelements of both arguments-thus that value-rationalitys missingfrom the dominationscheme and that the realm of salue-rationalitycorresponds o the ideal of freedom. Barker'sposition amply illus-trates the confusion of Weber's ritics as he seemsto be arguing hatWeber s to be criticizedfor failing to includeamong ypes of domi-nation something that is (by his own account) not a type of domi-nation. Barker alls this a 'paradox on Weber's art.Mommsen14 hastriedbriefly to correct hese views by indicating hat value-rationalitydoes indeed have a place in Weber's ccount of authority.His correc-tion, though, is cursoryand makesno reference o direct democracy.The same criticismcrops up in Prager'sl5 comparison f Weber's ndDurkheims political sociologies, n Mueller's 6 claim that Weberhad







220

J.J..Thomas

noonception of non-bureaucratic forms of socialism and even

Turner,ormally a sensitive commentator of Weber, affects to

maintainhat democraticconsent is absent from Weber'stypology.17

Allhese commentators are, in their different ways, moving over

groundade familiar within the Frankfurt School's approach to

Weber'segacy, the search for a non-instrumentalform of substantive

reasonhich could be linked to an emancipatory project.

The arious critical comments on Weberhere could be fused to-

gethernto a concise set of arguments:

(a)That Weber failed to include the concept of value-rationality

inhisaccount of domination.

(b)That value-rationality is linked, internally and conceptually

tothe ideal of democracy.

(c)That Weber therefore systematically fails to comprehend the

radicalconception of democracy.

Theain contention of this paper is that each of these three proposi-

tionss quite strikingly wrong.

IION HE CONCEPTOF VALUE-RATIONALITY

Thedea that Weber omitted the concept of value-rationality from

hisccount of domination is readily and simply dealt with. The idea

thathe concept somehow 'disappeared' s possible only by virtue of

a rude reading of Weber which treats his work as an aternporal

unity. t is well known that between 1918 and 1920 Weber drafted

andredrafted the 'Kategorienlehre' that was to become the first

chapterof Economy and Society.l8 In this drafting he abandoned

theolder terminology of the 1913 'Logos'essay and it was here, in

therecreation of the fundamental categories of sociological thought,

that he proposed the term 'value-rationality', a concept which he

clearlyfelt required special defence and whose roots would seem to

lie in the sociology of religion that he was strugglingto complete at

the same time. The types of domination, however, had been drafted

in their essentials some years earlier (a version dating from 1914 is

present in Volume II of 'Economy and Society' and a still earlier

draft from 1913 or thereabouts is contained in the 'Gesammelte

Aufsatze zur \\lissenschaftslehre').These, slightly tiresome, issues of

dating allow us to see that Barkerand Spencer, like Marcusebefore

them, have precisely reversed he direction of Weber'sthought. Far

from dealing with a suppression, omission or closure in Webers

thinking, what is at stake here is an expansionof Weber'sconception

of reason. A scrupulous regardfor the Weberiantext w-illsoon lead

to the dissipation of the idea that strict ratios of correspondence can







Weber nddirectdemocracy 221

be constructedbetween the various evels of analysis.A schematicsummarywouldhaveto look somethingike this:

A B C D E

Types of Motives for Groundsfor Grounds for Types of

action maintaining ascribing staff-leader domination

alegal validity to bond

order an order

1 Traditional 1 Subjective 1 Tradition 1 Custom 1 Traditional

(affective,v-r,religious)

2 Affective 2 Interest 2 Faith 2 Affective 2 Charismatic

situations (affective,v-r)

3 Value- 3 Enactment 3 Ideal 3 Legal

rational motives

4 Purpose- 4 Material

rational interests

It is surelyclearthat a commonset of themesis at workhere,butequally t isclear hatany attemptto drawhorizontalarrowsof directconceptuallinkagemust founderon the fact that not only do the

numbersof categoriesand sub-categories ary, but so too do thedesignatoryerms.

What is vital to note hereis that Weberregardsboth reasonandcharismaticnspirationas revolutionaryorcesin relationto custom

and tradition. Both are forces that shattersimplehabituationbutwhich are in turn subject to repossessionby habit in differentand

variousways. Inattempting o thinkout the involvement f rational-ity in humanaffairsWeber'shoughtat that time revolvedabout a

numberof definitethemes:the roleof rationality n the creationandarticulationof interest situations,as a device for the conceptual-izationandpresentationof ends,as an inner-oriented evicefor the

systematizationof behaviouror of interiordispositions.To attempt

to build these themes into a schemaor systemis to underestimatethe fluid andprovisional haracter f Weber'shought,andto render

himanall too familiardisservice.

It mightbe objectedhere,thatif Weberwasconstantlyengagednredrafting he conceptualapparatuswith which to articulatethesethemes,why did he not modify his types of dominationn the lightof his reworkedcasuistic?Thesimpleanswer o whichis thathe did.Comparej or example,the accountof the basesof legitimacyfrom1913, which uses the term 'purpose-rationality'ut includesnoreferenceto value forms, to that of ChapterIII of 'Economyand







222

Society' which substitutes he more general erm 'rational haracter'.But such close textual hermeneutics re hardlynecessary o convince

us that legal authority may have a value-rational haracter,whenWeber's efinition s that

Legal authority rests on the acceptance of the validity of thefollowing mutually interdependent ideas. ( 1) That any givenlegal norm may be establishedby agreementor by impositionon groundsof expediencyor value-rationalityr both.19

Now, this statement,that legal authoritycan be grounded n either

value-orpurpose-rationalitys surelyclearenough,yet Barker rguedthat he could 'nowhere' ind evidence for such a view, and Albrowlikewisemaintained hat Weberwas logicallycompelled o omit value-rationalityfrom his account of domination.Whatmakes these com-ments doubly extraordinarys that the passage ust quoted is theopeningsentence of Weber's iscussionof the type of legalauthority.The point is underscored hortly afterwards n Weber'sobservationthat: tThe rules which regulate the conduct of the office may betechnical rules or norms.'20 In his footnote, Parsonsconfesses to

perplexity over this sentence,assertinghat it must mplya distinctionbetween criteria hat relate to efficiency and those that dv not. Yetagain, it is surely a distinction between a rationality oriented toinstrumentalrules and one oriented to moral rules that is at stake.In discussing domination the distinction that Weber constantlyemphasizes s that between the loyalty owed to a person (traditional

and charismaticauthority) and that owed to an impersonal et ofrules which embrace all members includingthose specifically em-powered by the domination scheme. It is this distinction which

forms the groundof the idea of pure egality,and whether he sourceof those rules s in criteriaof efficiency or in moralcriteria s second-ary; it is orientation to rules which sets legal authorityapart fromany other.

Whyshoulda system of domination hat is basedon value-rational-ity tend to a democraticcharacter? t is as though Weber's riticscould conceive of no values other than democraticones. Spencerspeaks of sultimategrounds',such as the consent of the people, asthough non-democraticsystems could not also invoke 'ultimate'justification.Barkerenjoins us to: 'Try to imaginewhat such a typewould look like'andthen eapsat once to a 'free,rational,co-operativeand non-dominatorysociety'.21 Yet when Weber discusses value-rationality t is in the context of such characteristic xperiences orthe actor as the 'demand'or 'command'made upon him or her by'duty', 'loyalty' or 'honour'. Value-rational ction is, in particular,action which is 'regardless f cost to itself'.22Weber oughtto relatevarioustypes of behaviour o the concept of value-rationality,nd to

J. J. R. Thomas








link it to variouskinds of association;neverthelessfor an earlytwentieth century German, he conceptsof duty, loyalty and sacri-

fice did not automaticallypoint in the directionof absolute iberty.Quite the contrary,they indicatedthe Prussianarmy,the PrussianmonarchyandPrussian fficialdom

But would it be domination o obey a command hat conformedto one's own values?Albrowbasesthe 'omission'of value-rationalityfrom dominationon just such a ground:that if I am given a com-mand and obey it because it conforms to my values,then I am'obeyingmyself alone'. But the crucialpoint hereis that thereis adistinctionbetweena valueandanend, (indeed hat is theverybasisof the distinction between purpose-and value-rationality)

nd asystemof endsrelating o conductin this worldcannotbe deducedfrom a givenvalue in a way that is indefeasible.A soldiermay beprofoundly oriented to the complex of militaryvalues: honour,courageand so on. But this does not guarantee hat any specificcommandappears o him to be logicallyrelated to the valuesor theobjectivesof the organization.Thus any specific commandcouldseemto him:

(a)To be immoral n relationto some furthervalueor valueset;e.g. Christian thics havea notorioustension withmilitaryvirtues.(b) To be tacticallyincompetent,that is to be irrelevantlyelatedto the immediateobjectivesof the army.(c) To be incoherentlyrelated o the overallpatternof objectives.

Orindeedit may appear o him to be allof theseat once. Yet if thesoldierconceives t hisduty to obey in spiteof all thatandregardlessof possibleconsequences or himself,andif he does obey, not fromhabit or calculationsof personaladvantageor love of his superior

officer,but purelyfromthe ideathat it is hisduty so to do, thenheis actingvalue-rationallynd participatingn the ascriptionof legiti-macy to a hierarchical ystem of domination.In his 'Politics as aVocation',Webermakesexactly this point in regard o bureaucrats.Discussinghe honourandvaluesof the officialhe states:

The honourof the civil servant s vestedin his ability to executeconscientiously he order of the superiorauthorities,exactly as ifthe orderagreedwith his own conviction.This holds even if the

order appearswrong to him and if, despite the civil servant'sremonstrances, he authority insists on the order.Withoutthismoral disciplineand self-denial, n the highestsense, the wholeapparatuswouldfallto pieces.23

The fact that the actor obeys out of a sense of the moralvalueofobediencemay, and has, been a groundfor arguing hat the actor







224

shares he moralresponsibilityor the act,-butsharedmoralrespons-ibility does not dissolvethe relationof commandandobedience.Totry to arguethat

in this sort of situation he soldier s 'obeyinghim-self alone'is puresophistry.If two peopleconcurthatit is rightforA alwaysto obey B, then, assumingheiractionsareconsistentwiththat value, far from dissolving relationshipof domination,theyhavecreatedone.

III WEBER ON DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Referencesto Weber's Realpolitik'and hisfascinationwith power,togetherwiththe ideathat 'democracy'n anabsolutesenseis absent

from his categorialarmoury,seem to involvethe assertion hat hecontinuallyover-emphasizeshe role of compulsion n the establish-ment of an order and accordinglyunder-emphasizeshe role ofrational agreement.But throughouthis conceptual discussionhedrawsa distinctioneverybit as vital as that between the types ofrationalconduct,namelythe distinctionbetweenthe voluntaryandinvoluntaryaspects of relationships('Vereinbarung',Paktierung'and 'Oktroyierung').e also lists various ormsand types of

order,of empiricalregularity,within which dominationappearsas onlyonesource.To be sure, it is a source of orderto whichWeberas-cribesgreatimportancenoting, for example, ts historicalmpactonlanguage.24But none the less it is crucialto note that legitimatedomination, tself founded either by impositionor by voluntaryagreement,xists alongsideothersourcesof uniformityin humanconduct: illegitimatedomination, power, habit, interest constel-lations,mutualagreements nd so on. Allarerealhistoricalphenom-enaand all typicallyproducedifferentkindsof regularity r differentaspects f one uniformity. nfactthedistinctionbetweenanimposedorderand one reachedby agreement s a threadwhich runs con-sistentlyhroughWeber's onsiderationof typesof organization ndassociationto the point wherehe notes that an organizationm-posingan order may itself be established(as an order)by eitherimpsitionoragreement.5

Two questions necessarilyarise from this. First, albeit Weberidentifies ational agreement,voluntary associationand commonsolidarity s themes in human conduct, what scopedoes he give

themn hisgeneralaccountof human ociation?Andsecond,Weber'sinterestn domination s overwhelminglyn the areaof administra-tion.To what extent thereforedoes he considerrationalagreementashe basis for the administration f things?At this point we con-front irectly the questionof Weber'sviews on direct or absolutedemocracy.Takingthis secondquestionfirst,(whichwill thenyieldananswer

J. J. R. Thomas








to the first), againa curiousoversight ppearson the partof Weber'scritics. Dominationcan, of course, typify any area of conduct, a

family,a businessor economicenterprise, he state or a churchandso on;however,Weberquite explicitlystatesthathis interest s in theareaof administration, nd in bothhalvesof 'EconomyandSociety'he movesdirectlyfromthe consideration f administrationasedondominationto a considerationof administrationbased on directdemocracy.6

Webergivesconcreteexamplesof attempts o administer iadirectdemocracy:or it mightherebe better to sayattemptsto administerwhich are governedby radicaldemocraticthinking27 the SwissLandesgemeinden,ertain Americantownships, certain groups ofacademicsor associationsof aristocrats, ertainreligioussects. Thiscurious assortmenthas in common that membershave extrelnedifficulty in conceivingof othersas super-ordinated.n the case ofthe aristocrats and the academics)considerations f statushonourare involved, n the Swissand Americancasespowelful conceptionsof personalautonomywereat stalie,often linked,as in the case ofthe sects, to religiousconceptions.NeverthelessWeber's nterest isnot primarilywith directdemocracyas an actualhistoricalphenom-enon but ratheras a comparisonor contrasttype to legitimate and

illegitimate)domination.It is a startingpoint for an investigationwhich points up, as it were from beneath,the centralfeaturesofWeber'sargumentabout domination: ts universality,ts stability, tsprofoundsignificance or the establishment f an orderedcondition.

Typifyingdirect democracy s the interactionof two ideas,'equal-ity' and 'minimization'.The idea that all are equallyqualifiedtooccupy any positionof civicresponsibility ivesriseto the character-istically'democratic'orm of choosingofficialsby rote. The notionof 'minimization'both entailsthat thepowersof the incumbentof

any office will be strictlylimited,subjectto recalletc. and thatthenumbers f offices will be strictlycurtailed.Weberists a numberofmeasuresall or someof whichmaybe employed n the administrationof directdemocracy.All of these areinspiredby the sameobjectives,the reductionof any functionary o the statusof a 'servantof thepeople'.Weber'sater discussionof directdemocracynsiststhat theaccumulationof a minimunlof powersinto someone'shandsis un-avoidable, n whichcase the characteristicesponseof directdemoc-racy is the attemptto reduce,restrictor minimize uch powers.Nor

are any such attempts illusory,in small groupsdirectdemocracy shighlypossible.It has also been attempted n relativelyargegroups,thoughit must be notedthatthe term'relativelyisa littlemisleading,ancientAthens or the mediaeval taliancitiesthatWeberhasin mindarehardly'large'by the standards f the modernnationstate.Webermoreoverspecificallycharacterizesdirect democracyas a rationalform of administration.28 y this he meansto differentiate t from







226J.. R. Thomas

whatMarxistshave termed primitivecommunism'.Therationality

of irectdemocracy ies in its precisearticulation f a set of political

and dministrativenorms, and in its awarenessof(undesirable)

alternative,ominatorymodes of administration.The instancesof

direct emocracycited by Weberhavespecificallyarticulatedheir

democraticorm as a political objectiveand as an administrative

means nderprecisehistoricalcircumstances.The political devices

deployedo securethese endsarealsofarfromrudimentary.Weber,

inhis later discussionof the topic, lists 8 characteristicechniques

forhe minimizationand equalizationof administration ndercon-

ditionsf directdemocracy:

(a) Short termsof office, if possibleonly runningbetween two

generalmeetings of the members; b) Liabilityto recallat any

time;(c) Theprincipleof rotationor of selectionby lot in filling

offices so thateverymember akesa turnatsometime.Thismakes

it possibleto avoid the position of powerof technically rained

personsor of those with longexperienceandcommandof official

secrets;(d) A strictly definedmandate or the conductof office

laid downby the assemblyof members.Thesphereof competence

is thus concretelydefinedand not of a generalcharacter;e) A

strictobligationto renderan accounting o the generalassembly;

(f) The obligation o submiteveryunusualquestionwhichhasnot

been foreseen to the assemblyof membersor to a committee

representinghem;(g) The distributionof powersbetweena large

numberof offices each with its own particularunction;(h) The

treatmentof officeasanavocation ndnotafulltimeoccupation.29

Equally,n the earlierdraft,Weber ightlynsists hatneitherdrawing

lots,rotation of office nor election can be considered'primitive'

devices.If anythingthe converse,both the Swissand the Arrserican

experiencesbeingderived roma reactionagainstmorecrudeforms

of dominating dministrations.Weberakesthe typical nstrument f

directdemocracy o be the assemblyof allmembersof the commun-

ity (andin some casestheirunivocality).Weberalsoinstantiateshe

RussianSoviets' ormof mandatory epresentationsa substitute or

direct democracyundermassconditions.30 f directdemocracys a

rationalandsophisticatedormof administration hichis linkedto a

definite set of political idealswhich historicallyhave arisenunder

specific conditions and is a form capableof occurring n diversesettings, t is alsounstable.

The instabilityof direct democracystandsin directcontrastto

Weber'sassertionthat dominationhas vital consequencesfor the

establishmentof humanorder,of regularityn humanaffairs.The

instabilityalso accounts,at least in part, for the relativehistorical

infrequencyof direct democracy.Weberset direct democracyas a







Weber nddirectdemocracy227

contrasttype to administration y domination pecifically o under-score the frequencyof occurrenceand stabilityof operationof the

latter. This instability s related o the conditionsunderwhichdirectdemocracy is able to flourish;these are, of course, necessarynotsufficientconditions,their occurrencedoes not guarantee he emer-gence of direct democracyfor this arisesonly in the presenceof adefinite set of political ideas whose provenancewill be discussedbelow. Theseconditionsare:

(a) that the scope of the organization s localwith a definite imitto the numberof members;(b) thatan equalityof statusprevails mongthe members;(c) thatthe administrativeunctionsare both stableand simple;(d) and that thereis none the less some minimal rainingn waysand means.

The negationof any one of these conditionscanengender he declineof directdemocracy. t is the secondelement hatat first most attractsWeber'sattention, directdemocracy s unstable n relation o, and inso faras,the differentmembersof the communityaredifferentlyableto devote timeto the community'sservice.Thishas a doubleconse-quence;first, it createsa tendencyfor administrativeositionsto fallincreasinglynto the hands of the wealthy or of those in someotherway specifically qualifiedto devote time. Second, it makesdirectdemocracypeculiarly nappropriateo industrialsocieties in whichneither entrepreneurnor proletarians able easilyto abandonworktasks in response to the call for communaladministration.t is thenature of industrialwork in which machine time dominatesovernaturalor intentional time that militatesagainstdirect democracy.This crucialquestion of who is ableto devotetime to administrative

work gives rise also to the characteristicorm of degenerationofdirect democracyinto rule by 'honoratiores' 'notables')-thosespecificallyqualifiedfor office eitherby income or by the peculiarprestige n which they areheld. Sucha groupwillalreadybe a signifi-cantly dominatingorganization rom the moment that it seeks toanticipatethe wishesof the community n general.Where dministra-tion falls into the hands of notablesa particularpatternof socialstrife emerges:the radical houghtwhich underpins he notion ofdirect democracynow becomes the basis on which the poor and/or

those other groupsexcludedfrom the status of 'notables'challengethis appropriation f decision-making.n short, the undeveloped ndundifferentiatedcharacterof power is dissolvedand in its place allthe mechanismsof appropriation nd strugglecome to the fore, andwith themadministrationecomesa focus andaprize or domination.It is not only, however,the issueof differential conomicsuitabilityfor office which can underminedirect democracy.Weberalso cites







228

the ocialalienationonsequenteitherupon an increasen sizeor in

oneof complexity of administrativeunction. By 'alienation'here

Webereemsto meanthatthe abilityof eachcitizento identifyhim-selfor herselfwiththe communityandits interests s undermined y

thencrease n size orin technicaldifferentiation f thatpopulation.

Somuch is this the case that in largescale industrial ocietiesthe

verymeaning f the term 'democracy'mustbe different,elidedin

thedirectionof constitutional ule,collegiateor monocratic.

To some extent, of course,this is ground ong familiar romthe

writings f Rousseau:the crucialrole of the massassembly,the

appropriatenessf smallstatesto truedemocraticorganization,he

useof the Swiss Protestantcommunitiesas a politicalsource;all

theseare common enough themes in eighteenthcenturypolitical

thought.3lThesearealso themeswhichWeberdoes not repudiate;32

massorganization nd massadministrationre, forhim,by virtueof

sizealone,radicallydifferentphenomenaromtheadministrationf

'pure'democracy.None the less, in his earliercommentson the

conditionsfor directdemocracy,Weber's oncernwith the destruc-

tive role of social alienation s virtuallyan afterthought, t is dif-

ferential racticalqualificationn respect of the tasks facingthe

communityand in respectoftime that most attractsWeber's tten-

tion. In the later version,however,there is a greaterstresson the

significanceof the natureof the tasksconfronting he community,

mirroringhe stressWeberplacedon the wayin which egalformsof

domination are grounded in technicalexpert2se nd functional

spectalization.t is the absenceof qualitativeunctionswhichcon-

stitutes the vital necessarycondition of direct democracy.The

existenceof particularpheresof technicalcompetencemustunder-

mine direct democracyby alteringthe basis of qualificationfor

office:

Both immediatedemocracyand governmentby notablesaretech-

nically inadequate,on the one hand in organizationsbeyond a

certainlimit of size, constitutingmorethana few thousandfull-

fledged members,or on the other hand, where functions are

involvedwhichrequire echnicaltrainingor continuityof policy.

If, in such a case, permanenttechnical officials are appointed

alongsideof shifting heads, actualpower will normallytend to

fall into the handsof the fcxrmer, ho do therealwork,whilethe

latterremainessentiallydilettantes.33

Once technicalexpertisehas a significantrole in administration

then the processesof recall,of subjection o a generalassembly,of

'answering',ake on, at bestSpurelyritualsignificance;mose likely

they are devalued,or abolished,or come to constitutean ongoing

source of conflict with those practisingdiurnaladministration.The

J..R. Thomas







Weberand direct democracy229

office-holder s qualifiedby his orher technicalexpertise, he laymanis disqualifiedby lack of technicalknowledgeand is thereby,at leastto a degree,disfranchised.The extent of this processwill dependonthe extent to which technicalspecializations a necessary omponentof the culture in question. In so far as technicalspecialization snecessarywithin any given population,to the same*egreemust thatspecializationconstitute an obstacle to direct democracy. Theattempt to solve this problem by placing technicaladvisersalong-side democraticrepresentatives r delegates simplyconcealsa shiltof power in the direction of the technicallycompetent. Once astructureof permanent or semi-permanent fficials exists, so too

does a structureof dominationcapableof being the sourceand thefocus of socialconflicts.The deathknellof a community hatis undif-ferentiated rom the stand-pointof domination,s finally soundedbythe emergenceof parties,themselvesstructuresof domination hatare oriented o the appropriation f mechanisms f domination:

Immediatedemocracyand governmentby notables exist in theirgenuine forms, free from Herrschaft, nly so long as partieswhichcontendwith each other and attemptto appropriate ffice do not

develop on a permanentbasis. If they do, the leader of the con-tendingand victoriousparty andhis staff constitutea structureofdomination, egardless f how they attainpower and whether heyformallyretainthe previousmodeof administration.34

It is clearat this point that Weber's iews on directdemocracy on-stitute a definite theory in respect of advanced ndustrialsociety;namely, that there is a proportionalrelation between increasedpopulationsize, increased echnicalcomplexityandlegaldomination,

and an inverserelationbetweenpopulation ize, technical omplexityand direct democracy.Versionsof this sametheoryare, of course,tobe found in other twentiethcenturysocial scientific iterature,but itneeds statinghere because here isa curious eluctance mongWeber'scritics to engagewiththis theory directly.Thus, t is not enoughhereto challengeWeber'sconceptionof reason, for his views on domi-nation arepreciselynot analyticallyderived roman a prioriconcep-tion, but are on the contrary,as he repeatedlynsists,the productofempiricalreflection.Indeed, the only convincingrebuttalof Weber

on this point would be a demonstrationof how direct democraticmodes of administration ould sustainlargenumbersof people via acomplexdivisionof labourwithoutcreatinga bureaucracyndthere-with a mode of domination.The essenceof Weber's iew of radicallydemocraticmodes of administrations thus far from an assertionoftheir irraticonality,till less an inability heoretically o conceivesucha thing,rather, t is the insistence hat this too is a rational orm,butone whichcan retaina stability only in so far as the tasksbefore it







230J.. R. Thomas

aretechnically)simpleandthe numbersnvolved mallandrelatively

undifferentiated.one the less,thisstillleaves he questionof where

theadicaldemocraticdeaswhichinformdirectdemocracyemerge

from-i.e. whatsustains hisbrandof politicalrationality?

Weberwas carefulto distinguishdirectdemocracy,whichsought

todispensewith all formsof dominationof manby man, fromthe

moreamiliarplebiscitary orm.None the less,a numberof political

themesreessentially ommon o both,notably hatanyoffice-holder

is he servantof the people and that leadership xistsonly by virtue

ofthe graceof the following.An enquiry nto the originsof direct

democracys thus not only an inquiryinto the conditionsunder

whicht mayflourish,butalsoone into thesourceof thoseideas.35

Theproximatesourcecitedby Weberstheroutinization f charis-

matic uthority.Routinizationcan tend in eithertraditional r legal

directions, ut one suchdirection s the re-interpretationf charisma

inananti-authoritarianay. (Webers poorlyservedbyhistranslators

here,his 'herrschaftstremde mdeutung'being renderedas 'trans-

formationn a democraticdirection').Theforceof thatsherrschafts-

fremde' s that the authoritarianprinciplepresent in charisma s

radically ndermined. n the courseof that undermining-,he recog-

nitionof the leadernowbecomes the basisratherthanthe conse-

quence f legitimacy,deasaboutprocesses f nomination, f election,

of the rightto enactand repeal awscome to supplantprocesses or

rather,to supplant interpretationsof processes) of designation,

recognition nddecreeing.Theseprocesses endto produceplebiscit-

aryleadership, he archetype or which is the modernpartyleader.

kSuch changeof interpretation outinizescharisman the direction

of legalauthorityandthe formationof abureaucratictaff.However,

in the extreme case this democratic ransformationmay come to

the resultantcannot be called 'bureaucracy' s the office-holdersderive their legitimacyindependentlyfrom the will of those who

installthem, and instead,the notion of an administrationubjectto

recall develops. It is above all in the adaptationof revolutionary

charismato the conditionsof the economy that basic democratic

conceptionsarelikely to emerge.Weber itesboth Cromwell ndthe

FrenchRevolutionaryeadersas examplesof suchprocessesof the

routinizationof charisma.36The case of the FrenchRevolutions of

particularnterestfor herecharismamakesits 'last'appearance,nd

does so in the semi-secularizedormof 'Reason'.It is ultimatelytothisrevolutionaryppearancef Reason hatMarcuse,Lukacs,Barker

or other criticsof Weber'snotion of 'rationality' rient themselves.

The heartof theircriticisms, indeed,thatWeber's seof theconcept

of reasondistortsthe revolutionarycharacterof Reason.Yet it is

clearthat Weberwasat painsto distancehimselffromthe Enlighten-

ment'shypostatizationof humanrationality,notablyin so farashe







Weber nddirectdemocracy

231employs, in discussingrationalization,not the Enlightenment erm'Vernunft'but the latinate 'Ratio'. The crucialdemocratic dea of

the autonomyof the individual s intimatelyboundup with the ideaof 'rights', tself a productof the critique of Reason.What s espec-ially at stake is the Enlightenment dea that natural aw could beerected as a basis for the criticismand supplanting f traditionalismand as the ground or legitimateenactment nd egislation.Of course,a legal order oundedon natural awpostulates s no less a legal orderfor that-indeed the FrenchCivilCode was in partbasedon naturallaw postulatesand is takenby Weber s an archetypeof formal law.37Becauseit operates as a standardoutside law itself, naturallaw is

taken by Weberas the specific formof legitimacyof a revolutionaryorder. Thus, the origin of radical democratic deas is located, byWeber, n part in the disintegration f charisman a particular irec-tion, andin part in theparticular ormthat this routinization ook inwesternEuropeanhistory, the conjoiningof a notion of Reason toconcepts of Rights and of Nature. If the necessaryconditionsfordirect democracyhaveprogressively anished n an industrialworld,so too has the intellectual complex which sustainedsuch radicaldemocratic hought asa specificallyrational,politicalandntellectual

mode. The source of this complex of thoughtwas overwhelminglythe rationalsect of inner-wordly sceticism.38Webercites variousother sources for the historicalphenomenonof natural aw, the in-fluence in Englandof MagnaCarta, he Renaissancenterestin thenatural and so on. But overwhelminglyhe sourceboth of naturallaw thinkingand of the concept of rights is the rationalasceticsect.The problemof the relation between the religioussphere and thepolitical is, of course, a generalproblemfor all religions, o whichthere have been, according o Weber, our maintypes of solution:

passive indifferenceby the religious o the politicaldomain,violentresistanceo it, partialwithdrawalrom he politicalsphereor positiveevaluationof it. The rational sect, however,had a specialaffinitywith direct democracy.

A definite relation occurs between the voluntarycharacterofsectarianorganization,ts 'acosmistic raternalism, its inner-orientedrationaltheology and its direct democratic rganizationandalso itsambivalentattitude to the state). It is within this institutional rame-work thatideas of rights,of naturalaw, of absolutepersonalrespons-ibility and of ethically conditionedaction arise.It is the sphereofthe 'Gesinnungsethiker. 9 The communityof the Gesinnungsethikeris the archetypeof the voluntaryassociationof individuals ctingtoserve a cause, a voluntaryassociation,that is, with value-rationalcommitment.Thereas then a relationship etweendirectdemocracyand value-rationalonduct,but it is not a logicalrelationof concepts,it is an hastoricalrelationpivotal to which is the history of the vicis-situdes of the Protestantsects. The sects havean affinity with direct







J. J. R. Thomas32

democracyand a tendency to ethicallyconditioned(value-rational)conduct.But it is not the case that alldirectdemocratic dministra-tions mustbe rooted in value-rationalonduct,still lessis it the casethat all valuesand with them all value-rationalitymustbe orientedtowardradical,egalitariandemocracy.WhenWeberspoke in ErnstToller'sdefenceit was to praisehim as a Gesinnungsethikerthoughnot thereby to endorsehis politics)-as perhaps omethingof thelast of a rarebreed,for the declineof the rational ectsdoesindeedentail, for Weber,a relativedeclinein the scope of value-rationalityin the modernworld.The progressive rosionof the valueelementsto the legaldominationof modernsocietyandwith it the expansionandproliferation f the bureaucraticpparatuss preciselyconnectedto the dissolution of the nexus of rationaltheology, the exclusivesect and directdemocraticorganization. hesechanges re, of course,part of the processes of rationalization nd disenchantment.Webercharacterized he belief that the dominationof manby mancouldbe ended as Utopian. His groundfor this was the specifictheoret-ical intersectionof populationsize, complexindustrialprovisioningand legaldomination;but it was also the recognitionof the histori-cal erosion of the ground for such belief. This erosion was not

worked from without, but from within, for it was precisely thevalue-rationalaith of the sects and of the ideologuesof naturalawwhich created the basis for formal rationality n the politicalandeconomicspheres:

Thischarismatic lorificationof 'Reason',which oundacharacter-istic expression n its apotheosisby Robespierre,s the last formthat charismahasadopted n its fatefulhistorical ourse.It is clearthat these postulates of formal egalequalityandeconomicmobil-

ity pavedthe wayfor the destructionof allpatrimonial ndfeudallaw in favourof abstractnormsandhence,indirectlyof bureacrat-ization. It is also clearthat they facilitated he expansionof cap-italism.The basicRightsof Manmade t possible or the capitalistto use things and men freely,just as the this-wordlyasceticism-adoptedwithsomedogmatic ariations-and the specificdisciplineof the sects bredthe capitalist piritand the rational professional'who wasneededby capitalism.40

The value-rational, evolutionarysect with an affinity for directdemocracy,forms a majorsource of its apparentantithesis, ormallegaldomination.But the implicationof this cansurelyonly be thatof some internal nstability o the idea of value-rationality,ninsta-bility already mplicit n Weber's haracterizationf value-rationalityas a marginalase.4l








IV VALUE-RATIONALITY AND DOMINATION

Why s it that Weberdrewa connexionbetween egaldominationandvalue-rationality? artof the answer o that is thatrationality s, forWeber,always tied up withruleswhatever ormthe rationalitymighttake. But furtherwe have to considerwhy it is that the elaborationof systems of explicit value-rationality as for example in the caseof naturalaw42)musttake the form of legality nd of domination.

Weber'sdescription of value-rationality as a curiously 'inner'quality.Many of the terms he uses to illustrate he theme refer,notto concrete values that an individualmay seek to realize,liberty,nationalglory,extirpationof heresyor whatever,but rather o termslike 'duty', 'honour', a call', 'the importancef a cause' (no matterin what it consists).They refer, in other words,to the wayin whichan act may inwardlybe experienced as incumbent, obligatory orsupererogator-y. n actor mightpursuethe extirpationof heresyforany numberof reasons,from the most devoutto the mosthypocrit-ical, from purecalculationof material nterest, or whatever;but hecan act from a senseof duty only by actingfrom a sense of duty. Ifthe actor is retrospectively onvincedby somethirdpartythat whathe or she had conceived as theirduty was not in fact so, that in no

way altersex post facto the circumstance hat the action was per-formed from a sense of obligation. Weberbrings this out well byreferring o the experienceof the actor thatsomething s 'demanded'or 'commanded' f him or her, and further hatthe act must be per-formedregardless f all consequences.For thisreason oo the cousin,as it were, of value-rationalitys affectiveconduct,actionthat springsdirectlyfrom love or hatred, ealousy orjoyfulness,again,regardlessof consequence. (The differencebetween the two of course, is thedegreeof systematicntellectualormulation.43)he concept'sorigins

in the sociology of religionare implicit in the very language sed todescribe t, though it by no means ollows thatit is exclusive o thatsphere. If heedlessness of consequences inks value-rationality oaffectivity, it is the very samething that separates t frompurpose-rationality;purpose-rationalitys preciselyaction which is teleolog-ically consistent.What hen of the relationship etweenpurpose-andvalue-rationality?There can be a number of different relationsbetween them. For instance, value-rationalitymay be setting theendsof the conduct and the purposiveelementbe restricted o the

choice of appropriatemeans; or value elements may be excludedentirelyfrom the choice of both ends and means, or the means o apurely functional goal may be assessedagainst(value)standards flegitimacyand so on. It is this multiplicityof possible relationsbetween the two types of rationality that is critical for Weber'saccountof directdemocracy,and for thatmatter,for hisaccountofreligion.It is, moreover, mportantto bear in mind that the term







J.J.R.Thomas34

'value' s not referring, or Weber, o anyentity that is valued, o doso would make a nonsense of his attempt to distinguishbetween

values and purely subjectivewants;rather, he term denotesan over-archingmoral mperative, ften reinforcedby his use of the adjective'ultimate'.

To bringout some of this distinctionwith a hypotheticalexample:Supposethat a group of people holding he sanctityof human ife assuch an 'ultimate'value came increasinglyo be appalledat the num-ber of deaths causedby trafficon local roads.How mightthey act inrelation to that value? They might, perhaps,following a vigorousconsciousness-raisingampaign, leave each driver, pedestrian and

cyclist to take the rationallycorrect decisionsabout speed,positionand road procedureat each moment and at each place; but such adecision would be remarkably nlikely, the sheerpossibilityof well-intentioned errorwould make the proposal nadequate n relation othe professedvalue. No, the most likely outcome of their attempttoreduce road deaths would be that they would recast he trafficrulesprevailing n the area. But to do that, some body of people with theappropriate echnical competence, would have to devise rules thatwould maximize afety, and somebody of people, not necessarily he

same one, would have to take the relevantpracticaldecisionsabouthow those rules were to be mapped(literallyand figuratively) ntothe streets-where traffic ights shouldbe sited, which streetsshouldbe one-way and so on. Now, there are a numberof points to notehere. First, the relationshipbetween the two groupsand the widerpopulationusing the roads s a relationship f domination.t is of nouse to object, as Albrowhas done, that such situationsare instancesof the volontegeneralenasmuchas everyoneconcurswith the needfor the new set of rules, for that is preciselywhat Webermeant n his

insistenee hat the natureof legitimatedomination nvolves ninterestin domination.44Moreover, t is simply untrue. If I am a memberofthe community t is not I who have decided that a system of trafficlights s superior o a system of roundabouts, till less am I the one todecide that this and not that is the best place to locate the trafficlight, and even less still am I the one to decide that it would be redon this occasion late at night in deserted streets as I hurryhome.Whatthis example illustrates s that it is by no means he case that aspecific set of behaviours follows'self-evidently rom sharing spec-ific value. There are many differentways in which the 'sanctityoflife' can, as a value, be built into traffic rules;even if the rules ofseveraldifferentcountriesare compared, nd one system found to bebest in relation o the value, t none the less may still be the case thatan as yet unknownset would satisfy the demands f moral entimentsstill better. It is thus perfectly conceivable hat an individualmaydisagreewith a particular ule, or indeedwith the whole set, and yetstzllbe oriented to obey them on value-rational rounds, .e. if and








when the consequencesof disobeyingarepotentiallyworse,from thestandpointof the ultimatevalue,thanthoseof obeying.

To continuewith the example,to recastthe rules n the light of amore stringentapplicationof the value would involvea numberofsteps: (a) it would involveshowingthat the new set of rules didindeed satisfy the value better. That is, the rate of accidentsunderthe old system would haveto be calculatedand a rate for the newsystem projected, in short the apparatusof formaland technicalrationalitywouldbeginto be involved; b) the new set wouldhavetobe made explicit, i.e. promulgatedas a system of regulationsandthen (c) implemented.How could this be characterizeds anythingbut a system of legal domination?Moreover,one whose claim to

legitimacy,i.e. whose claim to generalobediences s rooted in thefact that a derivateof an ultimatevalue srationallyandconsistentlybeingapplied.

Now, it might be objected that trying to implementa safetyobjectivein a set of rulesis a purposive-not a value-rationalction,and this objection,thoughit in fact seeksto pre-empt he discussioncomes close to the heartof the dilemma.Inasmuchas obedienceisowed to the traffic rulesfromfeelingsof civic duty andthe absolutedemandsof a beliefin the sanctityof human ife then, to thatextent

the dominations legaldominationand it is value-rationalegaldomi-nation.But in practiceother interestsareat stake,the obviousone ofmovinggoodsand personsaboutvia traffic.Onepossibilityopentothe group devisingthe rules in questionis to treat safety as oneobjectivealongsideothers,cheapness,efficiency,preservation f theenvironmentor whatyou will,andthen further o treatthesevariousobjectivesas a set of wants amongwhich, employingprinciplesofdecisiontheory, an optimumsolutioncanbefound.Afurtherchangein values,say in favourof greaterpreservationf land, simplyresults

in an alterationin the rankingof the 'wants'and a new optimalsolutionemerges.And this,of course, s just how Weber haracterizesone of the ways in whichvariousends and meanscometogetherandareadjudgedby a purposive eason.

Choicebetween alternativeand conflictingends and resultsmaywell be determinedn a value-rationalmanner.b that case actionis instrumentally ationalonly in respectto the choice of means.On the otherhand, he actormay, nsteadof decidingbetweenalter-

nativeand conflictingends in termsof a rationalorientation o asystem of values,simplytake them as givensubjectivewants andarrangehemin a scaleof consciouslyassessed elativeurgency.Hemay then orienthisactionto thisscale in sucha waythat they aresatisfiedas faras possible n orderof urgency,as formulatedn theprincipleof 'marginal tility'.Value-rationalction may thushavevariousdifferentrelations o the instrumentallyationalaction.45







236 J.. R. Thoma.s

At this point what hasappearedas anambiguityn Webers clari-

fied.Truly value-rationalaction rejects all compromisewith the

worldnd is rare;but equallyWebercharacterizeshe attitudeof a

bureaucrato his office asone of value-rationality. ndthisis surely

correct,nasmuchas behaviourarisesfromconsiderationsf value t

is alue-rational, ut in practicecompromisewith the worldis the

generalonditionof existence,as existence s alwaysexistence-in-the-

world.The importanceof the 'Ztschenbetrachtung'46with its

emphasisn religiousrejectionsof the world lies here, in the fact

thatt is anaccountof the possibilities, icissitudes ndnatureof the

applicationf reasonto absolutevaluesby the Gesinnungsethiker.

The rounds orWeber's lighthesitation n introducing he type of

value-rationalehaviourwould seemto be twofold:on the one hand

the endency for all humanaction to haveto compromisewith the

worldrendersvalue-rationality ither unstable or marginal o the

mainstreamf human conduct. Second, systems of thought and

meaningapableof sustaining he individualn the tensionwiththe

world mplicit in value-rationalconduct have progressivelybeen

erodedas secularizationhas removeda transcendentalworldto set

against his one. The 'last' such value system was the natural aw

philosophyof the Enlightenmentn which 'Nature'and 'Reason'

figureas secularizeddivinities.But Weber's cepticismabout theabilityof naturallaw to sustain the individuals commitmentto

livingn tensionis abundantly lear:

Comparedwith firm beliefs in the positive reliplouslyrevealed

characterof a legal norm or in the inviolablesacrednessof an

age-oldtradition,even the most convincingnormsarrivedat by

abstractionseem to be too subtle to serveas the basesof a legal

systern.47

V CONCLUSION

The critiqueof Weber'saccount of dominationand his conception

of rationality hat hasbeen discussedhereis one whoserooeslie in

the Enlightenmentconception of Reason.Barker akes Kantas a

point of departure,Horkheimer,Wellmer ndothers ikewiserelated

themselvesto the Enlightenmentonceptionof a reasoncapableof

establishing ranscendentalnormsagainstwhich prevailingaw andrealityitself can be measured. t is curious hatin assaultingWeber's

notion of rationality,none of them has noted the extent to which

Webersought to distancehimself from that tradition.Thisis slear

in the terminologyWeberemployed.The standardEnlightenment

term for reason, 'Vernuntt' s employedby Weberonly in his dis-

cussion of Enlightenmentthought; elsewhere, the reason which








underpins he rationalforms is designatedby the term 'Ratio'.Morestriking though, is the fact that that Enlightenmentraditionof a

critical Reason s itself the objectof Weber'study.To criticizeWeber

on the basisof the assertionof the possibilityof a rationalconsensuson values,is simply to take a standat some point in the historicalevolution of the idea of reason whose social foundation s the veryobject of Weber's ccount.In thiscontext Weber's ption for 'value-neutrality' s not only a methodologicalnorm, it is a strategzc move

which allows Weberto step outside the arenaof philosophicalandlegaljuristicdebate in order to enquire nto the provenanceof thatdebate.Weberhas, as it were, alreadycut the ground rom underthefeet of hisfuturecritics.Forthe Enlightenment,he notion of Reasonwas constitutedby a 'properregardfor Nature',but it is just thistraditionwhich disintegrated nder he impactof nineteenthcenturyclass ideologieswhich dissolvedthe account of nature and naturallas. The eighteenthcentury concept of Reasonwas one in whichthere was held to be an internalconnexionbetweenReason, ibertyand the 'natural'.The extent to whichthis wasa spurious onnexionhas long been a subjectof debate,but Weber's ontribution o thatdebate was to demonstratehat therewas a linkage,historicallyandtheoretically,betweenrationality, egaldominationand the existence

of largepopulationsprovisionedhtougha complexdivisionof labour.It is not enough thereforeto assaultWeber's onception of reasonand rationality,giventhat the thrustof his workwas to dissolve hemetaphysical eighteenth century conception into its componentapplications.Whatmust be stressedhere, thoughit ought hardlytobe necessary,is that Weber'sconcern with rationalitywas not aphilosophicalbut a sociological one. He was concerned not tocharacterize eason tself but to tracethe lineamentsof the applica-tions of reason to humanaffairs.But once this is grasped, omething

of the futility of the discussionof the 'validity'of the notion ofreason in Webercan be seen. Weber's ase wasnot that thereis onlyone kind of 'reason', till less that there is only one 'real'type, noryet was his case that domination s the unique and sole sourceofhuman order. To the contrary,he sought to show the varietyofways by which reason can enter human affairs, and equally thevariety of sources of order in human societies. But, within thiskaleidoscopeof patterns,one is of crucial mportance or the modernwestern world: the pattern of legal dominationand instrumental

rationality.The importanceof this pattern derives n part from thefact that the bases of alternatives,ncluding hat of value-rationality,have been eroded by the processesof secularizationand by thefragmentationof the natural aw tradition, tself of relativelysmallcommand over men's allegiances. The specifically value-rationalreligioussect focussedabout the ideal of rejectionof the worldhas,or rather had, a peculiar'affinity'with democracy n its absolute







238J.. R. Thomas

sense-butsuchdemocraticdeasarerooted na numberof processes

all f which are improbablen the context of advanced ndustrial

society.Weber'scritics havebased their criticalcommentsin the

typeof thinkingtypically associatedwith the Russian'mir', the

Swissantonor the naturalawphaseof religiouscharisma.Buteach

of hese, in so farasitrepresentsaprincipleoforganizationisalreadyunderminedn respect of the modernworld. Any movementcon-

cernedvithadministrations alreadybound,by the verynatureof

the dministrativeask, to makea 'compromisewiththe world',and

has lready, herefore,entered he sphereof instrumentalationality.

Themovementof world-rejection,f the absolutedemandsof a con-

summatoryalue-rationality re all progressivelyabsent from the

world.Populationsize,the industrialconomy,theparticularwestern

Europeanevelopmentof law,the secularizationf westernsocieties

allcombineto place this-wordlyattitudes to the forefrontand to

erodehe baseson whichanytranscendentalvalue) ationalitymight

develop.Weknow fromMarianneWeber's iography f herhusband

thatalthoughhe consideredthat an ethic of responsibilitywasthe

onlyone still possible n the contemporaryworld,he alsoconsidered

himself omethingof a Gesinnungsethiker,andwas concernedwith

thepreservationf the transcendental imensionof reason,hencehis

appearanceorthe defencein the trialsof TollerandNeurath;ndeedthatwas the defenceof Toller,that he wasa Gesinnungsethikerand

so representedthose qualitieswhich increasinglyare absent from

complexndustrial ocieties.Finally,the claim madeagainstWeberhas been that he failedto

givea majorplace to a substantive enseof democracybecausehe

failedto think through he implicationsorauthority ypesof value-

rationality.Againstthat claim I havetriedto show that Weberdid

discussdirect democracyas an (unstable)attemptto be free of all

domination;and further that he showed that value-rationality,preciselyinasmuchas it is rational,must issuefinallyin legaldomi-

nation, f, thatis, it is ableandpreparedo sustain tself in time.

J. J. R. Thomas

Department of Economics and Social Science

BrtstolPolytechnic

NOTES

1. Marianne Weber, Max Weber: a the Weimar Rep7lblic, Cambridge

Biography, tr. H. Zohn, New York, Massachusetts, Harvard University

John Wiley, 1967, pp. 632, 661 and Press, 1967, p. 50.

707. See also Richard Grunberger, Red 2. Marianne Weber, op. cit. pp

Rising in Bavaria, London, Barker, 65 7-8. Edward Baumgarten, Max

1973, p. 50. Erich Eyck, A History of Weber, Werk und Person, Tubingen








16. G. Mueller,op. cit., p. 161.17. Bryan S. Turner, 'Nietzsche,

Weberand the devaluationof politics:the problem of state legitimacy',Sociological Review, vol. 30, no. 3,August 1982, pp. 367-91. Turner'sassertion that Weber's constructionofthe legitimacy problem was skewedtowards the ruler rather than to theruled' (p. 370) contradicts Weber'sremark that: 'Domination does notmean that a superiorelementary orceasserts itself in one waw or another; itrefers to a meaningful nter-relationshipbetween those giving orders and thoseobeying, to the effect that the expec-tations toward which action is orientedon both sides can be reckoned upon. . .', M. Weber, 'Some CategoriesofInterpretative Sociology (1913)appearing as an appendix to Weber(1978), op. cit., p. 1378.

18. See for examplethe Introductionby Guenther Roth to Max WeberEconomy and Society, Berkeley, Uni-versity of CaliforniaPress, 1978. Also,F. H. Tenbruck, 'The Problem ofthematic unity in the works of MaxWeber', British Zournal of Sociology,vol. 31,1980, pp. 313-51.

19. M. Weber, 1978, op. cit., p. 217.20. Ibid., p. 218. M. Barker,op. cit.,

1980, p. 243. M. Albrow, op. cit.,1972, p. 485.

21. M. Barker, op. cit., 1980, pp.238-9.

22. C.f. M. Weber, 1978, op. cit.,p. 25.

23. In H. Gerth and C. WrightMills(eds), From Max Weber, London,Routledge Kegan Paul, 1970, p. 95.

24. Ibid., pp. 215 and 941.25. Ibid., cap. 1, secs.12 and 13.-26. Ibid., pp. 289-98 and 948-53

(the earlierdraft).27. Ibid., p. 290.

28. Ibid., p. 949.29. Ibid.,p.289.30 Ibid., p. 293.31. C.f. the rather disingenuous

opening paragraph o The Social Con-tract, Rousseau,op. cit., p 165.

32. C.f. here MarianneWeber's eportof Weber's discussions with Utopiansocialists who: 'had in mind not only

Mohr, 1964 and K. Loewenstein, Max

Weber's Political Ideas in the Contextof our Time, Boston, University ofMassachusetts Press,1966.

3. Marianne Weber, op. cit., pp.705, 277, and 630.

4. Gert H. Mueller, 'Socalism andCapitalism in the Work of Max Weber',Britzsh Journal of Sociology, vol. 33,no.2,June 1982, p. 154.

5. Modris Eksteins, The Limits of

Reason, Oxford Historical Monographs,London, Oxford University Press,

1975, p. 48.

6. A good account of Toller's viewscan be found in S. Lamb, 'Ernst Tollerand the Weimar Republic' in K. Bulli-vant (ed.), Culture and Society in theWeimar Republic, Manchester, Man-chester University Press, 1977, pp.71-93.

7. Marianne Weber, op. cit., pp.

601 and 675.8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'The

Social Contract', Everyman edition,The Social Contract e Discourses,London, J . M Dent Sons, 1973,p.174, tr. G. D. H. Cole.

9. H. Marcuse, 'Industrialism andCapitalism in the Work of Max Weber',in Negations, London, Allen Lane,1968, c.f. p. 226, tr.J. Shapiro.

10. G. Lukacs, The Destruction of

Reason, London, Merlin Press, 1980,pp. 601-19, tr. Peter Palmer.

11. Martin E. Spencer, 'Weber onLegitimate Norms Authority ',

British Journal of Sociology, vol. 21,1970, pp. l 23-34.

12. Martin Albrow, 'Weber on legiti-

mate norms and authority: a commenton Martin E . Spencer's Account',Bntish Journal of Sociology, vol. 23,1972, pp. 483-7.

13. Martin Barker, 'Kant as a Prob-lem for Weber', Bntish Journal of

Sociology, vol. 31, 1980j pp. 224-45.14. Wolfgang Mommsen, The Age ofBureaucracy, New York, HarperRow, 1974, pp.76-7 and 86.

15. Jeffrey Prager, 'Moral Integra-tion and Political Inclusion: A Com-parison of Durkheim's and Weber'sTheories of Democracy', Social Forces,vol. 59, no. 4, June 1981, pp. 918-50.







J. J. R. Thomas40

communallivingandworking,but alsothe anarchisticideal, Iiberationfrom

the political forms of domination.Weberendeavoredto make it cleartothem that only small,familylike com-munities but not larger ones canbe organizedwithout lawsandwithoutforce ' MarianneWeber,op cit.,p.675.

33. M. Weber,1978, op. cit., p.291.34. Ibid.,p. 292.35. C.f., ibid., p. 266-71.36. Ibid.,p.268.37. In fact it was also extensively

based on traditionallaw of the Nordregion of France.See ibid., pp. 865,876 and 878. For Weber'suse of theword'ratio' ee,forexample, 'ReligiousRejections of the World and theirDirections (Zwischenbetrachtung)nGerth H. and C. WrightMills (eds),From Max Weber, p. 324, or theGerman edition of Economy andSociety, M. Weber, WirtschaftundGesellschaft,Mohr,Tubingen,p. 142.

38. C.f. Weber, 1978, op. cit., pp.1204-11.

39. 'Gesinnungsethik' .e an ethicof conviction, contrasted with anethic of responsibility ('Verantwor-tungsethik') (C.f. Gerthand Mills,op.cit., pp. 120-1) . Both refer to thesphere of values, but the former is

more typically value-rationalin itsheedlessness of consequences. The

latter is, so to speak, an ethical formof purposerationality.

40. M. Weber, 1978, op. cit., pp.1209-10.

41. Ibid.,pp. 25-6.42. In fact this is something of an

over-simplification.Weberstates that:'The purest type of legitimacybasedon value-rationality is natural law(Weber,1978, p. 37). But in his dis-cussion of natural law the principal

contrast is the tensionbetweenformaland substantive rationality (by nomeans identical with purpose- andvalue-rationality), (C.f. ibid., pp.865-80), and elsewhere he describesnaturallaw as a product of Charisma(ibid.,p. 1209).

43. Ibid.,pp. 25-6.44. 'Every genuine form of domi-

nationimpliesa minimumof voluntarycompliance, that is an interest (based

on ulterior motives or genuineaccep-tance)in obedience.'Ibid.,p. 212.

45. Weber,1978, op. cit., p. 26.46. Translatedas 'Religious Rejec-

tions of theWorld ndtheirDirections,H. Gerthand C. WrightMills,op. cit.,pp. 323-59.

47. Ibid.,p. 874.

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