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2003 29: 581Philosophy Social CriticismMark Anthony Wenman

Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the Difference

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Mark Anthony Wenman

Laclau or Mouffe? Splittingthe difference

Abstract The majority of those who comment upon the theories ofErnesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe both supporters and critics treatthe w ork of the tw o a uthors a s a coherent unity. I see acute differences thatdemarcate the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe: differences that impede any

straightforw ard delimita tion of the authorial identity Laclau and M ouffe.

The purpose of this paper is to bring to the fore the incommensuratepoliticaldifferences that separate the work of the two authors, and toestablish the superiority o f M ouffes position. At its most basic both authorsview politics as described in their co-authored H egemony and Social istStrategy: i.e. a s a practice of creation, reproduction and transforma tion ofsocial relations (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 153). This agreement, how ever,conceals the fact tha t the authors describe the politica l art iculation of social

relat ions in distinct w ays, and tha t those descriptions are implicated in, andreinforce, contrasting ethico-political commitments and prescriptions.

These differences reflect the differences between the politics of the Marxist

tradition retained by Laclau albeit understood as a negative apparition ofits former (ultimately) fully positive self a nd M ouffes radical democratic

pluralism. This latter perspective in its more recent formulations

represents a political compound of civic-republicanism with a defense ofliberalism; this is a political imaginary that retains little if anything from

the Marxist tradition.

Key wordsdemocracy liberalism metaphor metonymy pa rticularism pluralism post-M arx ism rad ical democracy synecdoche

universalism

The second edition o f Ernesto Laclau a nd C hanta l M ouffes H egemonyand Social ist Strategyhas recently been published complete with a newpreface.1 The most conspicuous responses to the initial publication of

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this text back in 1985 were Marxist-orientated critiques (see, forexa mple, G eras, 1987). A decade and a half on, the book is now w idelyrecognized as a masterpiece of contemporary social and political

thought. There is a grow ing body of seconda ry literat ure tha t w elcomesLaclau and Mouffes introduction of categories from French poststruc-turalism and psychoanalysis into the theorization of social relations.Typica l of these sympa thetic commentaries (as w ell as the critics) is atendency to treat Laclau and Mouffes work as a coherent unity, as asingle contribution to social thought.2 This is probably because of theoverw helming success of H egemony. H ow ever, this success obscures thefact that despite the publication of numerous single-authored worksby both writers with the exception of one short defense written soon

after the initial publication of their book, Laclau and Mouffe have notchosen t o publish t ogether since.3 Although I share the growing enthus-iasm for Laclau a nd M ouffes w ork, I see acute political d ifferences tha tdemarcate the ideas of the two authors, differences that impede anystraightforward delimitation of the authorial identity Laclau andM ouffe. The autho rs alternative descriptions can be directly compa red,as well as their different, even diametrically opposed, ethico-politicalcommitments. Laclau is notoriously elusive regarding the ethico-political dimension of his work.4 Nevertheless, he has recently made itclear tha t his is not a purely descriptive theory (w hich w ould be imposs-ible) and he throws open the challenge to uncover the hidden norma-tive grounds of his descriptions (Laclau in Butler, Laclau and Z izek,2000: 294). I w ill show tha t his post-M arx ism turns the notion of socialtot ality into a fetish, and tha t he also privileges the cat egory o f the uni-versal over the particular. By way of contrast, Mouffe is explicit abouther ethico-political commitments. Her theory of radical and pluraldemocracy is fundamentally although not singularly a defense ofvalue pluralism, and of negative liberty; understood in the manner can-onized by Sir Isaiah Berlin, i.e. as freedom from external constraint (for

Berlins argument see Berlin, 1982: 14152).No doubt I establish a controversial reading of the respective

legacies of these two authors by holding Laclau to account for thepolitics of post-Marxism, and by granting the authority over radicaldemocratic pluralism to Mouffe alone. This is because arguments forbothpost-Marxism andradical democracy are put forward in their co-authored work. Nevertheless, this is not a violation of my temporarilyadva nta ged position as reader in the hermeneutic endeavor. This contro-versial reading is not a misreading. I offer the following reasons why it

is not. The centra l elements of the post-M arxist vision of politics elabor-ated in Chapter 3 of H egemony, are anticipated in a paper written byLaclau called The Impossibility of Society which was first published in1983. This vision of politics has not been altered in any fundamental

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way in his post-H egemonywritings.5 Arguments for radical democracy,on the other hand, have only the status of epiphenomena in Laclausw ork. Indeed, referring to M ouffe in an interview conducted in the late

1980s Laclau described the theory of radical democracy set out in thefourth and final chapter of H egemony as basically her contribution(Laclau, 1990: 180). C ertainly for Mouffe, in her post-H egemonyw ritings, the theory o f ra dical democratic pluralism remains centra l. Asit has already been said, this theory has been reworked drawing uponthe civic-republican tradition and liberal theory. However, I will showthat tensions already existed between post-Marxism and the initialformulation of radical democracy in H egemonyitself. The politicaldifferences between Laclau and Mouffe can in fact be traced to differ-

ences between Chapters 3 and 4 of their co-authored work.6

I propose to use the distinctions made in semiotic theory betweenthe various tropes as a heuristic tool in order to illustrate the alterna-tive ways in which Laclau and Mouffe theorize the central notion ofhegemony. Follow ing Ro man Jakob son (Jakobson, 1956: 5387),Jacques Lacan identifies metaphor and metonymy as the two funda-menta l fi gures of style or t ropes proper to the signifying function (tothe production of meaning) (Lacan, 1977: 156). La can identifies thecreative spark of metaphor as simply the capacity of one signifier toreplace anot her (Lacan, 1977: 157). M eta phor is coextensive w ith thesubstitutive or para digmatic axis of language (Barthes, 1967: 60).M etonymy on the other hand refers to the combinat ion of signifiers orto contiguity, to the wo rd to w ord connection (Lacan, 1977: 156).Metonymy is linked to the combinatorial or syntagmatic axis oflanguage (Barthes, 1967: 60). Also Lacan d raw s para llels betw eenmetaphoric substitution and the notion of condensationin Freudsaccount of the dream-work in The I nterpretation of D reams(Lacan,1977: 160 and Freud in Brill (ed.), 1966: 319467). Freud describeshow certain elements may present themselves as the essential com-

ponents of the manifest dream-content and yet they may actually beof an indifferent nature to the latent dream-thoughts (Freud in Brill(ed.), 1966: 32036). La can likew ise links metonymy to the Freudiannotion of displacementwhereby elements that may be of slight valuein the dream-thoughts may be taken and extensively reinforced inthe dream-content (Lacan, 1977: 160 and Freud in Brill (ed.),1966: 3369). In his most deta iled ana lysis of genera lized tro pologi-cal movement and its implications for the study of politics, Laclauidentifi es synecdoche as the rhetorical fi gure w hich substitutes the part

for the w hole (Laclau, 1998: 158). Laclau agrees with Pa ul de M anthat synecdoche is a borderline figure that creates an ambivalent zonebetween metaphor and metonymy (de Man cited in Laclau,1998: 158). N evertheless, t his tropological movement w ill prove

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central for understanding the political difference between Laclau andMouffe. This is because for Laclau hegemony is intrinsicallya three-fold process of symbolic representation that moves from an initial

moment of metonymy to meta phoric substitution a nd then to a decisive(a lthough necessarily incomplete) synecdoche: the part stand ing in forthe whole. Whereas for Mouffe the sine qua nonof ra dical democratichegemony is the exclusion of synecdoche: the exclusion of anypartstanding in for, or attempting to stand in for, the whole.

The paper is divided into four sections. First La claus post-M arxismis brought to light through a careful read ing of Chapter 3 of H egemonyand also the essay that anticipated the arguments made there. Follow-ing this I explain Mouffes theory of radical and plural democracy as it

is formulated in the final chapter of their book. It will be shown that inthis initial formulation pluralism is already given a privileged status,understood as the endof rad ical democracy. The third part of the paperinvestigates Laclaus theorization in his more recent writings of themutual contamination of the universal and the particular. It will beshown that Laclaus otherwise impeccable logic fails him here, as heoscillates between a post-Marxist reading of the relationship betweenthe universal and the particular, and arguments which are incommen-surate w ith this position. The fina l part of the essay exa mines Mouffesrefinement of her theory in her post-H egemonywritings. Here a dis-tinction is made between her description of liberaldemocracy under-stood as a specific historical tradition and her advocacy of radicaldemocracy that is her preferred ethico-political alternative within thehorizon of that historical t rad ition. I conclude the paper w ith some verybrief remarks (that Mouffes work makes both possible and necessary)on the question of the constitution of the social.

Post-Marxism

The enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its

ow n w ork. (Jacques Derrida, 1976: 24)

Written shortly before the revolutions that shook Eastern Europe andthe Soviet Union in 1989/90, H egemonyis situated in the context ofw hat the authors call the crisis of the left (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 2).The source of this crisis is identified not only in the then tenacity of thenew right mixture of neo-liberal economics and social conservatism inWestern Europe and N orth America (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 1 and

1715), but a lso in the escalat ion o f pa rticularistic struggles associatedwith the politics of the new social movements (such as the womensmovement, the environmentalist movement, the struggles of gays, andof ethnic minorities, etc.). It was Laclau and Mouffes belief that this

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proliferation of particularisms presented insurmountable theoreticaldifficulties for traditional left thought, and especially the privilegeusually accorded to the struggles of the industrial working classes

(Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 2). In order to understa nd the post-M arx istconception of politics that emerges in Chapter 3 of H egemony, it isnecessary to focus on the target of the authors deconstructive critique,i.e. traditional M arxism.7 O n the second pa ge of H egemonyLaclau andMouffe identify what is at stake in the Marxian understanding ofpolitical modernity. According to them, what is fundamental to theclassical discourses of the left is a conception of society understoodas an intelligible structure that could be intellectually mastered on thebasis of certain class positions and reconstituted, as a rational, trans-

parent order, through a founding act of a political character (Laclauand M ouffe, 1985: 2). There are, I think, four important points here.These are as follows, in classical Marxism.

1 M odern society is conceived as an intelligible tota lity. It is con-ceived as (potentially) a single self-identical and self-transparentw hole. This is the notion tha t Laclau (and M ouffe) seeks to ca pturewith phrases such as the positivity of the social (Laclau andM ouffe, 1985: 93), society a s a determinate object (Laclau,1990: 91), and t he fullness of society (Laclau in Butler, Laclau and

Z izek, 2000: 56). In this paper I shall refer to this potentia l objectas society-as-totality.

2 A single social agent understood in terms of its historically givenclass position i.e. the w orld historical proleta riat could poten-tially reconstitute society-as-totality.

3 The result w ould be coextensive w ith a rat ional social order. Thiswould be a society free from power relations. It would be a totallyemancipated society; a social order fully reconciled with itself.

4 The mode of institution or reconstitution of society-as-tot ality

will be political. In other words, the world historical proletariat or at least its representatives in the party is understood as lockedin a struggleto achieve this end against the resistances of variousreactionary forces.

I w ill argue that Laclau (and M ouffes) deconstruction of these tra-ditional left axioms proceeds as follows. They do not deny that we canconceptualizesociety-as-tota lity, tha t w e can conceive of modern societyas an intelligible w hole. What is resolutely rejected, ho w ever, is tha t theworld historical proletariat or any other social agent could ever insti-

tute this object. As I will explain, this is rejected for necessary onto-logical reasons intrinsic to Laclau and M ouffes poststructuralist not ionof discursivity understood as a necessary condition of possibility andalso I w ill show impossibility o f anysocial ob jectivity. Analogo usly,

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neither the proletariat nor any other social agent could ever establish arational social order understood as an emancipated society free frompower relations. However, Chapter 3 of H egemony does not question

the final aspect of the Marxist conception of political modernity.Instead, I w ill argue that the classical left assumption of the proleta rian

strugglefor the institution of society-as-totality is reappropriated andgeneralized to account for all political movements worthy of the name.To be sure, La clau (and M ouffe) de-links the struggle for to ta lity fro mclass or any other essentialism. Nevertheless, any significant politicalstruggle must be understood as engaged in a conflict for what is nowconceived as the impossible object society-as-totality (Laclau andM ouffe, 1985: 112). Not only this, but Laclau (and M ouffe) presents

this necessary but nonetheless impossible struggle for totality as asecond condition of possibility of any partial or temporary socialobjectivity w hatsoever (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 112). According toChapter 3 of H egemony, the Marxist notion of society quaintelligibletotality, quarational and emancipated whole, continues to haunt con-temporary politics in the form of a necessary but absent presence. I willnow explain these points in greater detail.

I have said tha t La clau (and M ouffe) repudiates the idea tha t societycould ever be constituted as totality, and that this is for necessary onto-logical reasons. In order to understand their social onto logy it is requi-site to gra sp Laclau a nd M ouffes conception of d iscourse. La clau a ndMouffe understand discourse to be coextensive with the social (Laclauand M ouffe, 1985: 107). The early M arxist-orienta ted critics of

H egemonymisconstrued this claim as an argument for some sort oflinguistic idealism (see, for example, O sborne, 1991: 209). O n thecontra ry, for La clau and M ouffe discourse signifi es something akin toWittgensteins langua ge-games, w ha t he also ca lls fo rms of life (Laclauand M ouffe, 1985: 108 and Wittgenstein, 2000: 23). A discourse is anarticulation of linguisticand non-linguisticmoments in a differential

and structured system of positions (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 108).This phrase intimates Laclau and Mouffes debt to structural linguistics.Indeed a reworking of the Saussurean notion of semantic value is intrin-sic to Laclau and Mouffes notion of discourse (Laclau and Mouffe,1985: 106 and 11213). For Saussure the meaning of each term orsignifier is dependent upon difference, upon purely negative relationsto tha t w hich it is not (Saussure, 1998: 11020). The meaning of theterm is dependent upon its value as an equivalent term in a seriesof purely formal differences within a closed synchronic system

(Saussure, 1998: 11020). This opens the w ay for a rad ical critique ofthe essentialist understanding of social identity. Once Laclau andMouffe apply Saussures notion of value to the entirety of socialrelations, al lsocial identities or subject positions can be said to be

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intrinsically relationa l (Laclau a nd M ouffe, 1985: 115). This is thecard inal po int in the rejection of class essentialism. The struggles of theproletariat understood as signifier can never groundsocial relations,

because class struggles only ever have meaning in a continently articu-lated relationship to a series of other subject positions or signifiers(ethnic, counter-cultural, gender and environmentalist struggles, forexample).

The appropriation of Saussure serves Laclau and Mouffe well intheir dismantling of class essentialism, but this alone does not preventthe re-emergence of the idea of t ot a lity. This is because the not ion ofto ta lity is not o nly intrinsic to the M arxist tra dition but is a lso a chara c-teristic of structura lism. The former conceives of to ta lity dia chronica lly,

i.e. the teleological/eschatological tot a lity of w orld history: culminat ingin proletarian society-as-totality. Classical structuralism on the otherhand imagined a synchronic or temporally frozen totality where asLaclau and Mouffe put it every moment is subsumed from the begin-ning under the principle of repetition (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 106).In order to avoid repeating this structuralist error, Laclau and Mouffemake a number of characteristically poststructuralist moves. Thesemoves are particularly indebted to D errida. D erridas deconstruction o fthe structuralist no tion of a closed system of fo rmal differences proceedsby w ay of a rad ical unfurling of the Saussurean t heory o f value. D erridaseeks to extend the notion of differenceacross the dimensions of thespat ial and the tempora l (D errida, 1986: 79). H e is concerned w ith thedisruptive aphoristic energy o f w riting (D errida, 1976: 18). Follow ingRudo lphe G asche w e can read the w ell-know n D erridean idioms arche-trace, dif france, supplementarity, iterability, re-mark, etc. asnames for a cluster of q uasi-tra nscendenta l infra structures (G asche,1986: 185225). Together these pre-ontological infra structures form theheterological space of inscription of a ll systems or structures (G asche,1986: 180). They are necessary cond itions of possibility of closed syn-

chronic systems (G asche, 1986: 1845). H ow ever, because the infra-structures name an unnameable play of semantic surplus orheterogeneitythey also necessarily disrupt structural fixity or closure.In other w ords, the infrastructures are para dox ically a lso the conditionsof impossibility o f structura l tota lity (G asche, 1986: 1845). In line w iththis idea Laclau and Mouffe maintain that a given society or discourseis alw ays prevented from becoming a fi xed tot a lity because of the onto-logical necessity that all discourse [totality] is subverted by a field ofdiscursivity, w hich overflow s it (Laclau a nd M ouffe, 1985: 113).

Indeed, discursivity appears to operate as Derridean infrastructure inChapter 3 of H egemony; discursivity is understood as a necessary con-dition of (im)possibility of society-as-totality.8

I have addressed Laclau (and Mouffes) deconstruction of points 1

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to 3 above. To repeat, the ideaof society-as-totality is not repudiated.However, the notion that totality can ever be realized through theagency of the working class or any other social executor is rejected

because of the discursive conditions of (im)possibility o f socia l relat ions.Analogously, no social agent could ever institute a fully rational andtransparent society, a society free from power relations. However, inorder to apprehend the conception of politics that emerges from thedeconstruction of M arx ism w e must a lso a ddress Laclau (and M ouffes)generalization of point 4 above.

According to Laclau (and Mouffe) the openness and indeterminacyof the social and the consequent impossibility of society-as-totality is a necessary but insufficient condition of social relations. Without

some sort of fixity social relations would simply be chaos. As they putit a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is the dis-course of t he psychotic (Laclau a nd M ouffe, 1985: 112). For Laclau,the actual form tha t social relations ta ke at any given time is alw ays theunstable, unintended, and precarious byproduct o f t he discord b etw eenw hat are understood as explicit a ttempts to construct the object society-as-totality and the discursive conditions of (im)possibility of that object(Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 112).

This is the crux o f his post-M arxism. The arguments a re prefi guredin his essay The Impossibility of Society : a ccording to La clau the socia l[quainfinite plurality] always exceeds the limits of the attempts to con-stitute society [quarationa l tota lity] (Laclau, 1990: 912). H ow everthe social [quaunstable/tempora ry social o bjectivity held together con-tinently here and now] only exists as the vain attempt to institute thatimpossible object: society [quarat ional tot ality] (Laclau, 1990: 912).Here, it is crucial to identify what is reappropriated from the classicaldiscourses of the left. The struggle for society-as-totality is de-linkedfrom the historically necessary agency of the working class. In Laclau(and Mouffes) post-Marxism any social agent could potentially be

engaged in this task, and although impossible this struggle is givena transcendental status. Indeed, the Marxist notion of Historicalstruggle for rational and emancipated society (totality) is given an ahis-torical ontological sta tus in the transition to post-M arx ism.9 The neces-sary presence of this (ultimately futile) endeavor is a second conditionof possibility of only ever incomplete social objectivity. The incom-plete and unstable objectivity which is always the result of the failureof the struggle for totalobjectivity is conceptualized as regularity indispersion (a term borrow ed from Foucault) or pa rtial to ta lity (Laclau

and M ouffe, 1985: 1056).We turn now to the pivotal importance of the G ramscian no tion of

hegemony, for Laclau (and Mouffes) transition to post-Marxism. Theirinterest in G ramsci stems from his conception o f the primacy of politics

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(Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 67). For G ramsci and Laclau and M ouffe,politics is primary because it is the very mechanism by which socialrelations are constituted. Unlike other theorists of his generation

G ramsci had a genuine appreciat ion of hegemony understoo d a s w hatLaclau and M ouffe call a rticulation (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 105).Laclau and Mouffe define articulation as any practice establishing arelation among elements such that their identity is modified as a resultof the articulatory practice (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 105). AsG ramsci understood it, the success of the proleta rian struggle dependedupon the working classs capacity to construct a contingent hegemonicformation, which would enlist the consent of other subordinate socialsectors in the forma tion of a new historica l bloc (G ramsci in Forgacs

(ed.), 1988: 2009). The theory o f hegemony understood as cont in-gent and unifying articulatory practice is of course crucial to Laclauand Mouffe once they have rid social identities of any essence. Laclauand Mouffe describe hegemony as quite simply, a political type ofrelation, a form, if one so wishes, of politics (Laclau and Mouffe,1985: 139). H ow ever, this form of politics ta ken over from G ramsci byLaclau has intrinsic features. In Chapter 3 of H egemony, hegemonicpractices are understood as the strategic means by which competingsocial sectors (feminism, anti-racism, the gay movement for example[Laclau a nd M ouffe, 1985: 132]) seek to construct new collectivesocial identities predicated upon widespread acceptance of the contigu-ity of their ow n concrete demands (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 120)w ith the (impossible) object society-as-to ta lity. Unlike G ramscis funda -mental classes, none of the contents or signifieds of these compet-ing alternatives can claim ontological or world historical validity. Andbecause the end of each hegemonic pract ice (i.e. discursive or socia l for-mation quatotality) is an impossible one, each hegemonic formationnecessarily encounters frontier effects with other articulatory practices(Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 1356).10

Laclau (and M ouffe) explicitly reject w hat they see as tw o remnantsof essentialism in G ramscis text. These are (1) his insistence thathegemonic subjects a re necessarily constituted o n the plane of t he funda -mental classes; and (2) his postulate that, with the exception of inter-regna constituted by organic crises, every social formation structuresitself around a single hegemonic center (Laclau and Mouffe,1985: 138). N evertheless, it seems to me tha t w ha t is reta ined fro mG ramsci is fundamenta l. We may fi nd a variety o f hegemonic noda lpoints structuring a given social formation (Laclau and Mouffe,

1985: 139), but these are a ll understood a s instances of a single struc-turing mechanism: the strugglefor society-as-totality. The practice ofhegemony is best seen for Laclau as a threefold process of symbolicrepresentation. This process moves from an initial moment of

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metonymy to a movement of metaphorical substitution, and results ina decisive operation of synecdoche. In Laclaus (and Mouffes) words:

. . . hegemony is basically metonymical: its effects alw ays emerge from asurplus of meaning which results from an operation of displacement. (Forexample, a trades union or a religious organization may take on organiz-

ational functions in a community, which go beyond the traditional prac-tices ascribed to them, and which are combated and resisted by opposing

forces.) (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 142)

This initia l moment of metonymy estab lishes a political frontier a situ-ation of us and them that in turn facilitates a tropic movement ofcondensation. In other words, a plurality of particular struggles now

become equivalent terms in their mutual antagonism to the externaloppressive force, and this equivalence finds expression in the substitu-tion o f a collective social identity for the part icular demands of each o fthese struggles (Laclau, 1988b: 250). Next, and this is the moment ofhegemony proper, there must be widespread acceptance of the contigu-ity of the concrete demands of some particular social sector with thenew collective identity and consequently with the object society-as-tot ality (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 120). This fa cilita tes the decisiveoperation of synecdoche (the part standing in for the whole). This isbest captured in G ramscis call for the proleta riat to transcend itsnarrow corporate class interests and to becomethe interests of othersubordinate groups (G ramsci in Forgacs (ed.), 1988: 205 and La clauin Butler, Laclau and Z izek, 2000: 208).

In addition to the two objections mentioned above, Laclau insists contraG ramsci tha t hegemonic practices only ever esta blish impuresynecdoche (Laclau, 1998: 168). N evertheless, in order to grasp thepolitical difference between Laclau and Mouffe, it is crucial to recog-nize that in al lother respects he reta ins this orthodox G ramscian con-ception of hegemonic practices. This is because, as we shall see for

Mouffe, the political good is (only ever imperfectly) instantiated pre-cisely w hen no self-interested socia l sector seeks to stand in for t hewhole. However, before we turn to her work I wish to conclude thissection by emphasizing that post-Marxism is not a neutral descriptivetheory. Instead, it is my contention that Laclaus post-Marxism is builtaround a fetishismof the category of totality. This object is patholo-gically subject to a certain reviling and also reverences. The first moveof Laclaus (and Mouffes) deconstruction is to reject the category oftotality as a rationalist illusion of Marxian modernism. However,

Laclau is agitated by the absence of this object; he continues toencounter this chimerical o bject. Like the object o f sexua l desire (ob jecta), the object society-as-totality is for Laclau the embodiment of thecause of desire (for hegemony) and yet it always turns out to have no

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positive instantiation. True, this theory could be used to describe anyconcrete social formation regardless of political content, but the formwill always be the same: the (impossible) struggle for totality, a notion

which forecloses alternative forms of politics. What is more: I do notthink that it comes as a surprise that this is the outcome of Laclaus(and Mouffes) encounter with traditional left thought. After all,Derrida maintains that the deconstructor is always forced to borrowthe syntactic and lexical resources of the deconstructed (Derrida,1981: 10), a nd as it ha s already b een said Laclau sees post-M arxismas a moment of reappropriation as well as transgression. It is thecategory of totality that is reappropriated, and refigured as neces-sary/impo ssible.

Radical and plural democracy

In this section I examine (Laclaus and) Mouffes initial formulation ofthe theory of radical and plural democracy in C hapter 4 of H egemony.I show how the fundamental difference between Laclau and Mouffeseems to be already present in the difference between the third and finalchapters of their co-authored text. I suggest tha t w e read M ouffe as fullypartaking in the post-structuralist deconstruction of essential identities elabo rated a bove but notthe orthodox G ramscian conception o f themeans of social integration. In order to grasp the explicitly prescriptivetheory of rad ical democracy w e must fi rst exa mine the historical contextin which Mouffe situates her theory. In her post-H egemonywritingsMouffe insists that we first describe accurately the workings ofliberaldemocra cy in order to understand the possibilities tha t a re opento po litical actors in the w est today (Mouffe, 1996b: 20). O ver the pastcentury and a half liberal-democracy has been established as thedominant political tradition of the west. Adapting the arguments of

Claude Lefort, Mouffe describes liberal-democracy as a politicalregime, understood as a symbolic framework for ordering socialrelations (M ouffe, 1996b: 20; M ouffe, 2000: 2; and Lefort , 1988: 120).As she sees it, this regime represents the histo rical horizo n w ithin w hichviable political prescriptions (including radical democracy) can beart iculated today. This contextua l delimitat ion of the trad ition of liberal-democracy as the political horizon of our times has its antecedent insimilar arguments found in the final chapter of H egemony. There,(Laclau and) Mouffe theorize what they call democratic revolution

(Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 155). Follow ing de Tocq ueville (Laclau and)Mouffe equates democratic revolution with the historical dismantlingof a [medieval] society of a hierarchic and inegalitarian type (Laclauand M ouffe, 1985: 155). This w as replaced w ith a set o f socia l relations

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in w hich it w as possible to propose the different fo rms of inequality a sillegitimate and a nti-na tural (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 155). Subse-quent to the democratic revolution modern social relations have been

structured around the democratic principle of liberty and equalityunderstood as a fundamental nodal point in the constitution of thesocial order (Laclau a nd M ouffe, 1985: 155). At this stage Mo uffe con-ceives of liberty and equality as both legacies of the democratic tra-dition, a view she will later reject. However, she also recognizes thatthese two principles are in some sort of tension with one another, andradical democracy is theorized exclusivelyw ith reference to this tension.

Mouffes ethico-political vision of radical democracy is constructedto counter the hegemony of neo-liberalism (Laclau and Mouffe,

1985: 176). R ad ical democracy is theorized a s an alternative hegemonicproject for the left (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 176). H ow ever, a s soonas we begin to examine the detail of the theory of radical democracythe tensions w ith the basic tenets of post-M arxism begin to emerge. Thestruggle for radical democra tic hegemony is the struggle to superimposea new common sense t hat changes the identity of the different groups,in such a way that the demands of each group are articulated equiva-lently w ith those of the other groups (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 183).For (Laclau and) Mouffe radical democracy issues from an initial dis-placement of the egalitarian imaginary (Laclau and Mouffe,1985: 167). They soon ad d tha t the demand for equality is not suf-fi cient, but needs to be balanced by the demand for liberty, w hich leadsus [her?] to speak o f ra dical and plural democracy (Laclau and M ouffe,1985: 184). In th is initial fo rmulat ion the status of pluralism is estab-lished as fundamental: pluralism is understood as the endof the projectof rad ica l democracy; democracy is the means. As (Laclau a nd) Mouffeput it, the project fo r a rad ical a nd plural democracy, in a primary sense,is nothing other than a struggle for a maximum autonomisation ofspheres [pluralism (liberty)] on the basis of the generalization of the

equivalential-egalitarian logic [democracy (equality)] (Laclau andM ouffe, 1985: 167).

However, if the end of radical democracy is nothing other thanpluralism, w e might a sk how this is compa tible with the monism impliedin the (post-)Marxist notion of synecdoche? For in that theory thecontent of at least oneself-interested sector must be the temporaryrepresentative of the ends of society at any given t ime. What is morelikely today as far a s Laclau understands it is tha t the onesw ho fulfi lthat filling function (at any given time) are numerous and in conflict

w ith one another (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 133). H ow ever, this is notcompatible with pluralism, which in relation to the concrete demandsof each particular sector Mouffe will later argue can be conceivedof o nly negatively. In fact if w e return to t he semiotic categories that I

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have used to analyze Laclaus post-Marxism we can see that the detailof the theorization of radical democracy is quite distinct from hisposition. The construction of a radical democratic hegemony would

move from an initial symbolic displacement (over-investment) not inthe ta sks of some particular social sector but in the democrat ic notionof equality itself. This aspect of the democratic tradition (equality asopposed to liberty) is extensively reinforced to use Freuds terms by a series of particular struggles, regardless of their own concretedemands. This in turn facilitates a metaphoric slide: the representativecondensation of a new common sense, a common sense that is of anindifferent nature again Freuds terms to the content of eachparticular demand, a common sense that ispluralism. There is no talk

here of a decisive moment in w hich a part stands in for the w hole. Whatw e do fi nd, how ever, lat er in the chapter, is the follow ing assertion: nohegemonic project can be based exclusively on a democratic logic, butmust also consist of a set of proposals for the positive organization ofthe social (Laclau a nd M ouffe, 1985: 189). It is not ma de explicit, butwe know that for Laclau at least these positive proposals are under-stood as residing in the contingent synecdochal potential of any one ofthe particular struggles that colors a given political context. However,this adjunct to the initial theorization of radical democracy has thefeeling of a concession on Mouffes behalf, as we shall see, this line ofreasoning is not only explicitly rejected in her later work, but shown tobe antithetical to pluralism.

Laclau: the universal and the particular

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Laclaus post-H egemonywritings is the reworking of the theory of hegemony in terms of themutual contamination of the universal and the particular. This issue

receives detailed treatment in an essay entitled Universalism, Particu-larism, and the Question of Identity in Emancipation(s) (Laclau,1996: 2035), Laclau also returns to this theme repea tedly througho uthis later work. Here I argue that Laclaus theorization of the relation-ship betw een the universal and the part icular o scilla tes betw een a post-Marxist reading and a position that is incommensurate with it. In theabove-mentioned essay La clau once aga in situa tes his reflections in thecontext of the multiplicat ion of political identities cha racteristic of con-temporary politics (Laclau, 1996: 21 and 26). H e suggests tha t this has

given rise to a situation where the point of view of universality isincreasingly put aside as an old-fashioned totalitarian dream (Laclau,1996: 26). La clau explains in some detail the limitations of thehistorical forms in which the relationship between the universal and

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the particular has been conceptualized: ancient philosophy, Christianescha to logy, H egelio-M arxism, Eurocentrism. H ow ever, he also rejectsthe appeal to pure particularism a s a solution to the problems we are

fa cing in cont empora ry societies (Laclau, 1996: 26). This is becauseparticularism cannot be thought in isolation from more general prin-ciples of social integration. Nevertheless, the nature of the preciserelationship between each instance of particularity and these moregenera l principles is a ll-import ant here. We need to read very carefully.First I will expose the position that is incommensurate with post-Marxism.

Laclau writes: the particular exists only in the contradictorymovement of asserting at the same time a differential identity and can-

celing it through its subsumption in the non-differential medium: i.e.the more genera l principles of social integrat ion (Laclau, 1996: 28). Tobe subsumed in the universal, is to be taken in as apart of somethinglarger tha n yo urself: to be included in its terms. This suggests a relat ion-ship between the universal and the particular, whereby each instance ofthe latter is able to make claims on the former on account of being apart of it. Indeed, Laclau theorizes this relationship in precisely thoseterms: he says there is no particularism which does not make appeal to[the more general] principles, in the construction of its own identity(Laclau, 1996: 26). To make appeal to the general principles is to claimyour right to havethose principles applied to you, in the same mannerin which they are applied to everyone else who is subsumed withinthem. Laclau offers the follow ing exa mple: the unsatisfied demands o fan ethnic minority group. He says:

These demands cannot be made in terms of difference, but of some uni-

versal principles that the ethnic minority shares with the rest of the com-

munity: the right of everybody to have access to good schools, or to live adecent life, or to participate in the public space of citizenship, and so on.

(Laclau, 1996: 28)

The presentation here of the universal in terms of rights which onegroup shares w ith the rest of the community is striking on a ccount ofits dissonance with the entire problematic of post-Marxism. This dis-sonance is made all the more obvious when La clau proceeds to advancethe alternative post-M arxist reading of the relat ionship betw een the uni-versal and the particular in the same essay!

On this reading by way of contrast the universal is understoodas the symbol of a missing fullness (Laclau, 1996: 28). Then repeat-

ing the political vision set out in Chapter 3 of H egemony particular-istic social struggles are consigned to the role of forever trying toinstitute this elusive fullness; not to haverecourse to this fullness asright, but to actually becomefullness as such. These alternative positions

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are not commensurate. On this second reading the overwhelminglypredominant one in Laclaus text the terms totality and universal-ity are made identical. According to Laclau the universal has no neces-

sary body and no necessary content; different groups, instead , competebetween themselves to temporarily give to their particularisms afunction of universal representa tion (Laclau, 1996, p. 35). The meansof this competition is of course alternative hegemonic practices,and the threefold metonymico-metaphorico-synecdochal movement ofhegemony is succinctly illustrated in a passage from Laclaus final con-tribution to the debates set out in Cont ingency, H egemony, and Uni -versality(Laclau in Butler, Laclau and Z izek, 2000: 281307). Thispassage is worth quoting at length. Laclau asks us to imagine a strike

for higher wages in the context of the oppression of the Tsarist regime(ibid.: 302). H e continues:

The demand is a pa rticular one, but in the context of tha t repressive regime

it is going to be seen as anti-system activity [the initial moment of

metonymy]. So the meaning of that demand is going to be split, from thevery beginning, between its own particularity and a more universal dimen-

sion . . . this potentially more universal dimension . . . inspire[s] strugglesfor different demands in other sectors. . . . Each of these demands is, in its

particularity, unrelated to the others; what unites them is that they consti-

tute betw een themselves a cha in of equivalences in so fa r a s all of them arebearers of anti-system meaning [the movement of condensation or substi-

tution]. The presence of a frontier separating the oppressive regime fromthe rest of society is the very condition of the universalisation of the

demands via equivalences. . . . H ow ever, the more extended the chain of

equivalences, the more the need for a general equivalent representing thechain as a whole. The means of representation are, however, only the

existing part icularities. So one of them has to assume the representation of

the chain as a whole. This is the strictly hegemonic move: the body of oneparticularity assumes a function of universal representation [the final

moment of synecdoche: the part standing in for the whole]. (Laclau inButler, Laclau, and Z izek, 2000: 302)

Here Laclau conceives of the mutual contamination of the uni-versal and the particular in terms of the hegemonic struggle of variousparticularisms to stand in for or temporarily impersonate the universalas such. H e sometimes presents democra cy a s simply the ga me w herebythis struggle is played out (Laclau, 1996: 35). In a moment I w ill showhow this post-Marxist reading of mutual contamination reveals anadditional ethico-political dimension to Laclaus work. However, we

might first ask whether or not this is a convincing account of con-temporary politics? I have shown that Laclaus work and especiallythe polemic against class essentialism is primarily concerned toaddress the proliferation of social movements advancing localized and

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particularistic demands. However, the idea that these movements aremore often than not engaged in political struggles to constitute a fullyemancipated self-transparent society is very doubtful. There may be

some feminists or those in the environmentalist movement, forexample, who envision some version of universality comparable withthe Marxist vision of the socialized producers. However, these aresurely in a minority. The majority simply desire to see the politiciza-tion o f do mestic violence or they w ant to see eq ual pay and conditionsin the workplace, or they wish to see their fellow citizens recycle theirdomestic waste or their governments adopt more sustainable growthprograms. O f course these demand s alw ays make recourseto a contextof more general principles, but the post-Marxist theorization of con-

temporary politics in terms of the generalized struggle to institute anymad version of society-as-totality (to become universality as such) isunconvincing.

Despite sympathetic commentators making claims to the contrary(Torfi ng, 1999: 173), the post-M arx ist theory of mutual conta minationprivileges the category of the universal over the particular. This is theupshot of Laclaus conscription of particularistic struggles into the onto-logically necessary (but impossible) task of forever a ttempting to imper-sonate the universal. Indeed, Laclau acknowledges with anecdotalevidence dra w n from his ow n political experiences his frustra tion w iththe tendency of particularistic struggles to be satisfied, to be integratedw ithin the system (Laclau in Butler, Laclau and Z izek, 2000: 209). Thisprivileging of the universal is also evident in the pejorative phraseology,which Laclau employs to denote particularistic politics. In one passage,he refers to w hat he calls mere particularism (ibid.: 210). Elsew here heconsiders (but rejects) w ha t he sees as Z izeks belief tha t some strugglesmay b e more prone to part icularism tha n others (ibid.: 292). H e doesnot counter the suggestion that to be more prone to particularismwould be an unfortunate thing. This tendency to privilege the universal

over the particular is in sharp contrast to the ethico-political directionof Mouffes work. As we will now see: this is focused squarely on thechallenge to think a politics that will allow for the healthy expressionof a plurality of particularistic conceptions of the good.

Mouffe: radical democratic pluralism

In this final section I examine Mouffes refinement of the theory of

radical democratic pluralism in her post-H egemonywritings. I arguethat this theory in its developed form is best understood as a combi-na tion of a q ualifi ed civic-republicanism w ith liberalism. The defense ofpluralism, which she now sees as coextensive with liberalism and with

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negative liberty, remains fundamental to Mouffes radical democracy(M ouffe, 1993b: 62). In her w ork there is no (post-)M arxist conscrip-tion of particularistic struggles into the ontologically necessary task of

forever a ttempting to impersona te the universal, w hich is, w e might a dd,as much a violation of ones rights to freedom from interference as anyother. Indeed, it will be seen that the ends of Mouffes radical and pluraldemocracy stand in sharp contra st to Laclaus post-M arx ism. H ow ever,once again, in order to grasp the prescriptive theory of radical demo-cracy w e must fi rst consider the context in w hich she situa tes this theory.As it has already been said, this context is the tradition of liberal-demo-cracy. The most obvious and explicit amendment to the prior theoriza-tion of democratic revolution is M ouffes subsequent recognition that

the principles of liberty a nd equa lity are not boththe legacy of the demo-cratic tradition. Drawing on C. B. Macpherson, she claims that it isnecessary to distinguish two traditions in modern politics: the liberaland the democrat ic (M ouffe, 2000: 23 and M acpherson, 1979). It isthe liberal tra dition and not the tradition o f democracy tha t is the sourceof the principle of liberty and M ouffe sees libera lism as coextensive w ithcontempora ry value and life-style pluralism (M ouffe, 1996b: 20).Indeed, thinkers such as de Tocq ueville and John Stua rt M ill expa ndedthe liberal tradition in the 19th century in response to the dangers theyperceived in the advance of modern democracy: dangers understood asthe tyranny of the majority or the threat of unfettered popular sover-eignty (M ill, 1978: 4 and Tocq ueville, 1998: 1002).11 In the introduc-tion to her most recent book, The D emocrati c Paradox, this theory oftwo traditions is reinscribed as a theory of the mutual antagonism oftwo competing political logics:

On one side we have the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law,

the defense of human rights and the respect of individual liberty; on theother the democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality,

identity between governing and governed and popular sovereignty.(M ouffe, 2000: 3)

Mouffe insists that we only ever find temporary hegemonic articu-lations of some fragile symbolic contiguity of these conflicting logics,and that there is no way that they could be perfectly reconciled(M ouffe, 2000: 5). Returning aga in to the semiotic categories employedabove, we can see that she describes the detail of the struggle forhegemony in a ma nner distinct from Laclau. For M ouffe also, hegemonyis a process of symbolic representation that always issues from an initial

moment of metonymy. This is not the association of some particularsocial sector with tasks that go beyond it, but the temporary stabiliz-at ion of some contingent a nd pa rticular union o f the contextua lly neces-sary signifiers: liberty and equality. From this issues a movement of

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substitution; not the establishment o f a series of equiva lents each under-stood a s exa mples of a nti-system act ivity , but the esta blishment of newrules of the liberal-democratic game. Even though the detail of this

theory is distinct from Laclaus, we might ask whether or not thisrepresentative process results in a decisive synecdoche? Mouffe is clearthat the struggle to stabilize the opposite logics of liberty and equalityalways establishes the hegemony of some political force (Mouffe,2000: 5). These forces, how ever, a re understood a s competing politicalphilosophies or Weltanschauung: for example, conservatism, neo-liberalism, social democracy, radical democracy, etc. (Mouffe,2000: 104). There is no (post-)M arxist account in this description ofliberal-democracy of particular self-interested groups (fundamental

classes for G ramsci, w omen, w orkers, environmentalists, ga ys, ethnicminorities, etc., for Laclau) attempting to stand in for the whole. Theimplication of Mouffes description of the hegemonic struggles charac-teristic of liberal-democracy is that there is often no simple and explicitcontiguity of one particular self-interested social sector with the tem-pora ry estab lishment of the rules of the game. The neo-libera l hegemony(for example) has no doubt impacted differently upon the struggles ofalternative social sectors, assisting the possibilities open to some andhindering others. However, the strict synecdoche of the interests of anysingle identifi able socia l sector w ith neo-liberalism seems implausible.

If the difference betw een La clau a nd M ouffe is evident in the respec-tive ways in which they describe hegemonic practices, it is even moreapparent in their respective prescriptions. The most marked feature ofMouffes reworking of the theory of radical democracy in her post-

H egemonyw ritings, is her turn to classical republican themes. She of tenemphasizes traditional republican notions of citizen participation, thecommon good, civic virtue and so on (Mouffe in M ouffe (ed.), 1992: 4and 12). In her post-H egemonywritings Mouffe does not talk of thehegemonic struggle to constitute society-as-totality; the object of

political struggle has changed. Instead she refers to the struggle to insti-tute the demos or the political community, a struggle of symbolicrepresentation that will only ever result in what she describes as thetemporary hegemonic articulation of the people (Mouffe, 1999: 46).I think this represents more than just a shift in the employment ofidioms. The struggle to constitute a republican community is not theMarxist struggle for emancipation through reason, transparency andtotality. The universal moment in classical republican thought, i.e. themoment of respublica(literally the public thing or the public concern),

was grounded in an ethics of public virtue and substantive citizenship.In a world populated by bellicose city-states this was more often thannot set within a wider celebration of honor and glory and prowess inw ar (Skinner, 1998: 61).

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I have said that Mouffe qualifies her republicanism: she does notendorse an ethics of masculine glory and warlike virtue. Furthermore,despite invoking the ideals of democratic republican citizenship and

civic participation she does not conceive of the ends of political com-munity in pre-modern terms, i.e. as a substantive notion of the commongood (Mouffe, 1993b: 33). She rejects the arguments of communitarianssuch as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre who would reinstate asubstantive Aristotelian conception of moral community (Mouffe,1993b: 36). This conception of political community is at o dds w ith thekind of value pluralism that Mouffe is concerned to protect andadva nce. To comprehend the manner in which Mouffe theorizes radicaldemocratic community, it is necessary instead to invoke a republican

tradition that can be traced to M achiavelli. As she puts it, a republicanconception which draw s its inspirat ion from Ma chiavelli . . . can makeroom for that which constitutes the central contribution of liberalism:the separation of public and private and the defense of pluralism(M ouffe, 1993b: 36). This is because for M achiavelli, if one is toexercise civic virtue and serve the common good , it is in order to guaran-tee oneself a certain degree of personal liberty which permits one toperuse ones ow n ends (M ouffe, 1993b: 20).12

Mouffe also conceptualizes politics in terms of the mutual con-ta mination of the universa l (democratic community) and the particular(value pluralism). However, we see that she theorizes this mutual con-tamination in a manner distinct from even diametrically opposed to Laclaus post-Marxist theory of parts of the latter necessarily seekingto impersonate the former. For Mouffe the challenge of radical demo-cracy is to envisage a form of commonality strong enough to institutea demos but nevertheless compa tible w ith certa in forms of pluralism:religious, mora l and cultura l pluralism, as well as a pluralism of politicalparties (Mo uffe in M ouffe (ed.), 1999: 50). The task is to crea te acommon political identity among persons otherwise engaged in many

different enterprises (M ouffe, 1993b: 67). This common identity isnothing other than a movement of collective identification (metaphor):a recognition of our similarities as radical democratic citizens overand above the other differences we may have and in order toprotectthose differences. Mouffe is explicit: radical democratic communitymustbe devoid of any particular purposive content in order not toviolate the principle of pluralism (M ouffe, 1993b: 667). There can beno (post-)Marxist contiguity of the demands of any particular socialsector with the overall concerns of the respublica. There can be no

decisive moment of synecdoche. To emphasize this point M ouffe invokesMichael Oakeshotts use of the notion of societasas descriptive of thesort of commonality proper to radical democracy (Mouffe,1993b: 667). The follow ing passage clearly demarcates the political

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difference betw een La clau and M ouffe; betw een a G ramscian-inspiredpost-Marxism predicated on the idea that social integration springsfrom explicit a ttempts of particular social sectors to becomethe interest

of all of the others, and radical democratic pluralism:Contrary to that model of association of agents engaged in a common

enterprise defined by a purpose, societasor civil association designates aformal relationship in terms of rules, not a substa ntive relation in terms of

common action. . . . The tie which joins them [radical democratic citizens],and in respect of w hich each recognizes himself to be socius, is not that ofan engagement in an enterprise to pursue a common substantive purpose

or to promote a common interest, but that of loyalty to one another.(M ouffe, 1993b: 66)

This is the sine qua non of a radical democratic pluralism.13

It is Mouffes hope that subsequent to the establishment of theircommon concern, or respublica, radical democratic citizens will meet para dox ica lly a s friendly enemies (M ouffe, 2000: 13). They w ill ofcourse reta in substantive differences of va lue and interest, but the poten-tial for violent antagonism between them will have been transformedinto a constructive agonism (Mouffe, 1996a: 147). Agonistic citizensaccept the rules of the civil association, rules that prescribe norms ofconduct to be subscribed to in seeking self-chosen satisfactions and in

performing self-chosen actions (Mouffe, 1993b: 67). With her theoryof radical democratic pluralism and agonistic citizenship Mouffe explic-itly identifies the content of the political good in a manner that Laclauis not prepared to do. The political good (universality) is not a purevoid, a structural necessity: present only as an absence so that particu-lar self-interested demands can perpetually seek (and fail) to imperson-ate it. On the contrary, the political good isvalue pluralism, whichpara dox ica lly requires a community built upon an empty (formal) good ,a good devoid of any substantive content. In his reflections on thehistorical forms of the relationship between the universal and theparticular, Laclau identifies one crucial distinction between Christianeschatology and its secularization in Marxism. In the former humanbeings are on an equal footing vis--visa power that transcends all ofthem, in the latter there is an essential inequality between theobjective positions of the social agents . . . some of them are going tobe privileged agents of historical change (Laclau, 1996: 25). Thetransgressionimplied in his post-Marxism is to make tragic the tri-umphalism of the Marxist (Calvinist) notion of the privileged agent:tragic, that is, in the manner of a Sisyphean nemesis. Her theory, on the

other hand, secularizes Judeo-C hristian-Islamic eschatology in a ma nnerthat retains as fundamental the notion of the equality of each particu-larism in relation to a universality that subsumes them all. However,Mouffe is also aware that radical democratic pluralism can never be

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fully instantiated. The movement of metaphoric substitution that super-imposes the rules of democratic citizenship is never complete, becausepolitical community is always hegemonically constructed. Community

alw ays follow s from a stabilization o f pow er, so tha t there is necessarilyan excluded remainder (M ouffe in M ouffe (ed.), 1996c: 10). For M ouffe following Derrida the moment of justice implicit in radical demo-cratic inclusion always remains a promise, always remains somethingto come (Mouffe in M ouffe (ed.), 1996c: 11 and D errida, 1992: 27).

Conclusion: community and society

Laclau has recently said that his work seeks to fully respect the par-ticularistic tendencies that the post-modern discourse has brought tolight, w hilst reta ining the notion of articula ting logics (Laclau in Butler,Laclau and Z izek, 2000: 301). This paper has show n that his post-Marxist theorization of hegemony in terms of the generalized strugglefor synecdoche does not achieve this sta ted a im. H is conscription of par-ticularistic struggles into the ontologically necessary role of foreverattempting to impersonate the universal is a violation of personalfreedom. This follows from what is reappropriatedin Laclaus encounterwith traditional left thought: a fetishism of the category of totality andcontempt for mere part icularism. Mouffes theory of rad ical democra ticpluralism is very different. H er theory does respect the part icularistic ten-dencies of contempora ry politics. We have seen that M ouffes w ork isconcerned to protect and advance the rights of particularistic groups(pluralism), a nd that this follow s from a n a rticulatory logic w hich estab-lishes as fundamental a movement of metaphoric substitution: the for-mation of the collective concerns of the respublica. One implication ofM ouffes later w ork is tha t the struggle for hegemony, is the struggle toconstitute community, notsociety. I think that this makes both possible

and necessary a very different conception of the manner in which socialrelations are articulated. Laclau is no doubt correct when he says thatthere is no such thing as society understood as a determinant object.However, there are also fewer and fewer attempts today to institute thatimpossible object. Mouffe says that politics is about the constitution ofthe political community not something that takes place within it(M ouffe, 1993a: 81). This is a mistake. The hegemonic struggle forpolitica l community is an exemplary form of politics tha t establishes therules of civil association; that transforms potential antagonism into

agonism. This does constitute the social but only indirectly. This isbecause hegemony makes possible a myriad of non-hegemonic forms ofpolitical contestation. The social should, I think, be conceived of as an

event: the momentary (quasi-)presence of an incalculable constellation of

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agonistic citizens as they position and counter-position ad infinituminthe pursuit o f their purposes. In G ramscis terms ago nistic citizens nevertranscend their corporate class interests, but this does not reintroduce

the notion of fixed (essential) interests. The non-hegemonic forms ofpolitics that constitute the social quaevent are articulatory (in Laclauand Mouffes sense of the term) in a manner not dissimilar to the gamesof chess or tennis. To position is to force a counter-position; to positionis necessarily to change the identities of other elements of the socialterrain. If the post-Marxist theorization of hegemony is among otherthings unconvincing, the theory of radical democrat ic community needsto be supplemented by a detailed analysis of the many examples of non-hegemonic forms of politics.

Staffordshir e Universit y, U K

Notes

1 H enceforth cited as H egemony.2 This tendency is evident (for example) in tw o book-length texts each o f

w hich w as w ritten by a gradua te student of Laclaus. The first isL aclau andM ouff e: the Radical D emocratic Imaginary, by Anna M arie Smith (see, for

example, 1998: 4). The second is N ew Theor ies of D iscourse: Laclau,M ouffe, Z izek, by Jacob Torfi ng (see, for example, 1999: 3). Each of thesetexts describes in turn the arguments of La clau and o f M ouffe w ithout q ues-

tioning whether or not they are commensurate.3 The defense w as a text entitled Post-M arxism without Apologies first

published in the N ew L eft Review166 Nov/D ec (1987): 79106. This wasreproduced in Laclaus N ew Reflections on the Revolut ions of our Time(1990: 97132).

4 See (for example) Slavoj Z izeks comments in Cont ingency, H egemony,Universality(Butler, La clau and Z izek, 2000: 22830).

5 The Impossibility of Society w as later reproduced in Laclaus N ewRefl ections on the Revolut ions of our T imes(1990: 8992). The refer-ences here are taken from the later publication. Laclau initially made no

apologies for his post-Marxism. He was emphatic that his is a post-M arxism and not an ex-M arxism (Laclau, 1988a: 77). H ow ever, in the

new preface to the second edition of H egemonyhe is more circumspect.H e (and M ouffe) maintains that they did not invent this label, and thatthey are prepared to accept it only if it is properly understood: as a

process of reappropriation of an intellectual tradition, as well as the

process of going beyond it (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: ix). In this paperI w ill expla in this process of reappro pria tion/tra nsgression in precise

detail.6 Laclau and M ouffe are apparently unwilling to explore these differences.

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The new preface deals first with his concerns and then hers; no mention is

made of any differences between them.

7 The arguments advanced in H egemonydo not follow any set methodo-

logical procedures or axioms. Instead the authors borrow freely from bothdeconstruction and Foucauldian genealogy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 3and 7). Derrida has described H egemonyas w ritten in a deconstructivestyle (D errida, 1994: 180), and La clau and M ouffe reaffi rm the debt to

deconstruction in the preface to the new edition (Laclau and M ouffe, 2001:xi).

8 At a number of points in H egemonyLaclau (and Mouffe) theorizes thelimits of society in terms drawn from Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. The

authors identify an onto logical lack, understood a s a fundamental moment

of nega tivity or antagonism: the ta sk of hegemonic struggles is to suture

or fi ll in this constitutive emptiness (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985: 88 and 125).This psychoanalytical conception of the limits of society-as-totality has

become a predominant feature of Laclaus subsequent work (see, forexa mple, Laclau and Z ac, 1994: 15). With Z izek, Laclau perceives the ideo-

logical-political field in terms of fantasy construction in the psychoana-lytical sense (Laclau and Z ac, 1994: 315). There is not the scope here to

explore the question of the compatibility of these psychoanalytical notions

w ith the Derridean-inspired notion of discursivity (conceived as semanticand temporal excess). Laclau considers both of these alternatives necessary

and complementary (Laclau in Butler, Laclau and Z izek, 2000: 74). Never-theless, it is worth pointing out that there are only scattered references to

psychoanalysis in Mouffes post-H egemonywritings (see, for example,Mouffe, 1993b: 71). By way of contrast, she continues to make persistentuse of the Derridean not ion of constitutive externa lity in order to concep-

tua lize the experience of social a lterity (see, for example, M ouffe, 1993b: 2

and 114); her conception of the political understood a s a possible ant ag-onistic event seems to be partly inspired by the phenomenologicaltradition. Perhaps there are also significant philosophical differences thatseparate the work of Laclau and Mouffe.

9 Z izek has made this point . As he puts it: for Laclau hegemony is somewha t

unambiguously articulated as a kind of Heideggerian existential structureof social life; Z izek then describes Laclaus conception of hegemony a s a

Kantian timeless existential a priori (Zizek in Butler, Laclau and Z izek,2000: 1067).

10 It is importa nt to note that this theory does not reintroduce an essentialism

of particularistic demands understood as subject. Laclau a nd M ouffe stressthat the category of subject is penetrated by the same ambiguous, incom-

plete and polysemical character which overdetermination assigns to every

discursive identity (Laclau and M ouffe, 1985, p. 121).11 Laclau does not share Mouffes insight. M istakenly, he continues to contrast

democracy as an attempt to construct the people as one which hedescribes as a tradition which runs from Robespierre to Pol Pot withdemocracy as respect for difference (Laclau, 1998: 1689). A more

generous way to fi gure the fi rst tradition w ould run from P ericles, throughRousseau, to H ab ermas. Democracy has never meant respect for difference.

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12 For a detailed a ccount of the republican tradition to w hich Mouffe alludes,

see the work of Quentin Skinner (especially Skinner, 1998: Chapters 1 and

2). For Mouffes enthusiastic endorsement of Skinners work see Mouffe,

1993b: 38. I have shown tha t M ouffe embraces the republican t rad ition a sa means to defend negative liberal freedoms. We should add that Berlin who is credited with having most clearly exposed the distinction between

positive and negative liberties would not accept this account of their

compatibility. Like many liberals he is wary of the notion of positivefreedom on account of its potentially authoritarian implications (Berlin,

1982: 151). Skinners w ork is an explicit critique of this liberal position(Skinner in Rorty et al. (eds), 1984: 1978). We should also note tha tMouffes apparent priority of liberal freedoms (as end) over democratic

republicanism (as means) is again in sharp contrast to Laclau. In one

passage he has made explicit his belief in the pre-eminence of democracyover the ideals of liberalism. As he puts it: though my preference is for a

liberal-democra tic-socialist society, it is clear to me that if I am forced undergiven circumstances to choose one out of the three, my preference will

alw ays be for democracy (Laclau, 1996: 121).13 This is an appropriate point to note the following: it is difficult to see

any traces of Marxism whatsoever in Mouffes developed theory of

rad ical democracy. Indeed t he references tha t she makes to M arx and toM arx ism in her post-H egemonyw ritings are negligible. H er recent w orkcannot credibly be described as post-Marxist, which is not to denyMouffe her credentials as a socialist. Because all rights (freedoms)

including property rights are politically articulated there can be no

necessa ry link betw een liberalism and ca pita lism: a defense of t he formerneed no t a nd in M ouffes case does not lead to an uncritical a ccept-

ance of the latter.

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