8/12/2019 Were the Bush Neo-cons Duped by Chalabi Into Invading Iraq Ledeen, Fascism, Chalabi ... NewsFollowup.com http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/were-the-bush-neo-cons-duped-by-chalabi-into-invading-iraq-ledeen-fascism 1/15 en, fascism, Chalabi ... NewsFollowup.com //www.newsfollowup.com/ledeen_chalabi_3.htm#use by intelligence committee, INC[5/29/2014 2:05:26 PM] NewsFollowUp.com pictorial index Franklingate search sitemap hom Chalabi, Iraq Invasion, Bush fascism page 12, 3 4, 5, 6 7 8 go to searchable text file Senate Intelligence Committee, Phase II, 2008 Plamegate, AIPAC, the Rosen Weissman espionage case, Bush's run-up to the Iraq War. ........ Sibel Edmonds and Valerie Plame discovered Bush / Neocon WMD proliferation.... its just spin that Plame was outed because Joe Wilson opposed Bush. Did Ahmed Chalibi hijack the neo-con fascist mass manipulation and fear mongering that proceeded the Iraq War? Did Ahmad Chalabi trick the neo-cons and open the door to a Shiite-dominated Iraq government to Iran? more below and see Senate report and from Senate Intelligence Committee: Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress and conclusions and summary below Connect the Dot Plamegate AIPAC (Frankl Rosen, Weissma indictments ) Niger forged documents Bush 2003 State the Union Speec lies. Iraq Invasion, I Regime Change Neo-con Middle failure or design Index of Abramoff / Ledeen / Fascism connections pages Page 1 Page 2, 3 Page 4,5, 6 Page 7 8 Related pages Ledeen Fascism Chalabi, Iraqi National Congress, Ledeen Rove's Brain & Ahmad Chalabi Ledeen, Niger forgeries Fascism roots of Bush Administration Schmitt, Strauss, Heidegger, Nietzsche Senate Iraqi National Congress Report summary p.3 Chalabi, Iraqi National Congress, Ledeen House report, text version House Government Reform Report, Abramoff page 8, emails analysis links Ledeen, Silberman, Barbara, Ricky, IWF Ledeen, Abramoff, Chalabi, Israel Tom DeLay / Abramoff What was Judith Miller / Ahamed Chalabi relationship? go to: Plamegate Timeline & Slate Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress go to link original source. Slate Ahmad and Me, Christopher Hitchens "new indictment ... Chalabi tricked the U.S. into war, possibly on Iran's befalf, and that he has given national secrets to Iran." Please help NewsFollowUp and sta continue this work. See Plamegate Timeline and how it relates to ran, Iraq, Chalabi, Judith Miller, Cheney, Libby, Armitage, Novak, Condoleeza Rice..... The Rule 21 procedure that finally got
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8/12/2019 Were the Bush Neo-cons Duped by Chalabi Into Invading Iraq Ledeen, Fascism, Chalabi ... NewsFollowup.com
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s u m m a r y b e lo w or g o t o : Se n a t e r e p o r t : Th e U s e b y t h e
n t e l l i g en c e Com m u n i t y o f I n f o r m a t i on P r o v id e d b y t h e I r a q i N a t i o n a l
C o n g r e s s , o r ig i n a l r e p o r t or NFU copy or
SEARCHABLE TEXT Ahmad Chalabi and Colin Powel
s u m m a r yReport of the Select Committee on Intelligence on The Use by the Intelligence Community of InformationProvided by the Iraqi National Congress. September 8, 2006 - Ordered to be printed. Committee membersinclude: Pat Roberts, Kansas, Chairman; John D. Rocefeller IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman; Orrin G. Hatch,Utah; Mike DeWine, Ohio; Christopher S. Bond, Missouri; Trent Lott, Mississippi; Olympia Snowe, Maine; ChucHagel, Nebraska; Saxby Chambliss, Georgia; Carl Levin, Michigan; Deanne Feinstein, California; Ron Wyden,Oregon; Evan BAyh, Indianna; Barbara A. Mikulski, Maryland; Russell D. Feingold, Wisconsin. see Cooperative
Research
Conclusions: (from original report) summarized) by Steve Francis, author of NewsFollowUp.com
Conclusion 1. "False information from the Iraqi National Congress (INC)-affiliated sources was used tosupport key Intelligence Community assessments on Iraq and was widely distributed in intelligence produc
prior to the war." Information provided by INC-affiliated sources resulted in the production and distribution of large body of intelligence reports and assessments on Iraq prior to the war (250 from Source One alone), and wasused to support key judgments about Iraq's WMD (and alleged Iraq / Al Queda links) programs in the October 20 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).Conclusion 2. "The Iraqi National Congress (INC) attempted to influence United States policy on Iraq byproviding false information through defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq possessedweapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists." The INC had an aggressive 'publicity campaign' an brought six defectors to the attention of the Congress, media and other U.S. government agencies. In July 2004 thCIA concluded that Source One (AntiPolygraph blog) reporting was 'questionable' 'demonstrably incorrect'. Source O(AntiPolygraph blog) appeared deceptive about whether the INC provided him information to give to the U.S.government on suspect facilities. Source Two fabricated information, which included a claim that in 1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile biological weapons labs to evade UN inspections. A DIA debriefer said Source Two w
being coached by INC. In May 2002, the DIA issued a fabrication notice on Source Two. A foreign intelligence
service also believed Source Two information was unreliable. James Woolsey? MORE Where dohe fit in? see below. Source Three said that he observed non-Iraqi Arabs training (for hijackings) in an abandonaircraft shell at he Salman Pak training facility in Iraq in 1994-1995. In December of 2001, CIA said that SourceThree "is under the influence/control of the INC and is not considered to be very credible." In February 2002, the
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CIA's Iraq Operations Group concluded that: "Although we can verify a few elements of his story, we havedetermined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably wester policy on Iraq)." Source Four said Iraqi intelligence trained Iraqi soldiers and 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs in hijackingtechniques. In October 2001 Source Four complained that his earlier accouts to the press about terrorist trainingcamps had been distorted and mistranslated by the INC translator. The CIA Iraqi Operations Group lost interest iSource Four, citing, in a February 2003 cable, Source Four's past exposure in the media and his employment withINC. In the fall of 2002 INC-affiliated defector Source Five claimed to have seen Saddam Hussein meet withOsama bin Laden in the early 1990's and SH's son, Uday, told Source Five that bin Ladin was in Iraq to discusstraining some of his people in Iraq. The DIA would neither confirm or deny his access to SH and his inner circle.
DIA said Source Five's information "may be intended to disinform." The CIA evaluation of Source Five in Octob2002 said the bin Ladin story was perhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications. DIA terminated itsrelationship with Source Five and said his information may have been intended to influence as well as inform U.Sgovernment decision makers.Conclusion 3. "The Intelligence Community's use in intelligence assessments of information provided by IrNational Congress (INC)-affiliated defector Source Two was a serious error. The use of the Source Twoinformation came after three Intelligence Community assessments raised questions about his reliability as asource and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued a fabrication notice." Despite all the warnings thatSource Two may have been coached by the INC and fabricated information to his debriefers, the Source Tworeporting was cited specifically in three subsequent CIA intelligence assessments issued from July 2002 to Novem2002 and the October 2002 NIE, as corroborating other source reporting about Iraq's mobile biological weapons program. Source Two also was one of the four human intelligence sources specifically referred to in the part of
Secretary of State Powell's February 2003 UN Security Council speech. Issuing a fabrication notice instead of
recalling the information left it available for use. Reforms by ODNI were instituted. Ahmad Chalabi an
Colin Powell
Conclusion 4. (redacted) by Steve Francis, author of NewsFollowUp.com
Conclusion 5. "The July 2002 decision by the National Security Council Deputies Committee directing therenewed funding of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) Intelligence Collection Program under DefenseIntelligence Agency (DIA) management was ill-advised given the counterintelligence concerns of the CentraIntelligence Agency (CIA) and warnings of financial mismanagement from the Department of State. At the
time it assumed responsibility for funding and managing the INC's collection effort in October 2002, the DIcautioned that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence services and would use the relationship topromote its own agenda." Beginning in March 2000, the Department of State entered into an agreement with theINC, amended over time, to fund the Intelligence Collection Program (ICP) to collect evidence on SH regime. Anaudit found financial management and internal control weaknesses and a potential for fraud. The State Departmen began to doubt the value on INC information, and ceased funding the program in May 2002. On July 25, 2002, th NSC refunded it through the Department of Defense and on Oct 25, 2002 the DIA assumed formal responsibility funding and managing the INC's collection effort despite warnings from both the CIA, which terminated itsrelationship with the INC in December 1996, and the DIA that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligenceservices, including the Iranians, and that the INC would use the relationship with the Intelligence Community to promote its own agenda.Conclusion 6 (redacted)
Conclusion 7 "The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency were inconsistent inidentifying their reporting from INC-affiliated defectors and INC members as opposition-affiliatedreporting." Information sources affiliations and motivations of defectors were carelessly handled in the reports.Conclusion 8 "There is insufficient basis to determine whether or not CURVE BALL (Cooperative Research), thIntelligence Community's primary source of intelligence about Iraq's alleged biological weapons program,provided his information at the behest of the Iraqi National Congress (INC)" Beginning in 2000, CURVEBALL provided information to a foreign liaison intelligence service alleging that Iraq had a mobile biologicalweapons program. And this led to the October NIE that "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial antoxin BW agents." CURVE BALL provided false information to the Intelligence Community and had a closerelative who had worked for the INC since 1992. A high-ranking official's statements led to initial suspicion in thCIA that CURVE BALL may have provided false information at the INC's behest. The CIA has since concluded
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the relative's connection to INC was coincidental. All this open to question and debate. The CIA also assessed thCURVE BALL's defection did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the IC and did not put him in front of the media. The IC did not formally collect on theINC so has no information on the INC's processes and procedures for disseminating information, a key element toasses potential deception programs or tactics. The IC does not understand why CURVE BALL provided falseinformation and only has a superficial understanding of CURVE BALL's contacts with his close relative and otheINC officials. Its an open question whether he provided his information at the behest of the INC.Committee ActionsOn August 2, 2006, The Committee inserted text on page 61 concerning the production by CIA analysts of a
Memorandum or PDB (Presidential Daily Brief) for the Vice President (Cheney) using an INC-affiliated source'sinformation to support the mobile BW (bio-weapons) program judgment. As modified, the amendment clarified tthe PDB did not include caveats related to the source's reporting.On August 2, 2006, the Committee agreed (by party lines) to an amendment by Senator Wyden that struck from threport a press statement by Brigadier General Brooks, of the U.S. Central Command, regarding information purportedly discovered in April 2003 at the Salman Pak facility.Additional views of Chairman Roberts: included strong objections to the conclusions of the report ... notsupported by the facts and contain numerous errors and omissions. But also said it should be approved and declassified.Additional Views of Chairman Roberts Joined by Senators Hatch, Dewine, Lott, Chambliss, and Warner:Includes referrals to 'systematic failures in prewar intelligence on Iraq", reforms...etc. and that the INC only playeminor role in prewar intelligence. And referred to HUMINT role, signals intelligence. They blame the 'media' an
media embellishments and misguided attention to the INC as issues. Only about 20 intelligence products out of 40,000 had INC related material. The ISG found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M14, used the Salman Pak facility to train Iraqi, Palestinian, Syrian, Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives. The Republican
pick apart minutia detail of the report and try to cast doubt wherever they can. But the bottom line is that the repowas approved including the conclusions by the committee. It is completely predictable that the Republicans wouldnot like this report. For more details on Republican rebuttal, see the report.
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heney: "I didn't know the man"
Israel
Middle EastPalestinians
Rosen, Weissman: Condi was o
informant
Summarization of original Report The use by the Intelligence Community (IC) of information provided by
the Iraqi National Congress (summarization by Steve Francis, author of NewsFollowUp.com)I. IntroductionFeb 12, 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence places 'the use by the Intelligence Community (IC) of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in "phase II" of the Iraq Inquiry. see first phase: Repoof the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar IntelligenceAssessments on Iraq, July 9, 2004.The report to focus on "prewar INC intelligence with regard to Iraq" prior to March 19, 2003, start of Operation Ir
Freedom.INC was funded for over a year after the war started, and the report does not include a review of the quality or utility of INC information after the war started.The report does not focus on INC information in the early and mid 90's. CIA had a tumultuous relationship withINC and Ahmed Chalabi. Ultimately the relationship ended.INC information was widely distributed, this also was not a focus of the report.A general history of the use of INC information is included, and the transition of information from the CIA to theState Dept to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ... and how it was used in analysis of 'WMD'The report distinguishes between INC info and INC-affiliated info. Iran and other sources may have been feedinginfo to IC.II. Background1991, Bush encouraged efforts towards Iraq regime change. Violence was deemed a possibility.
May 1991, CIA approached Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim, to rally opposition.June 1992, more than 200 opposition leaders met in Vienna. INC then created, Wikipedia, Rendon Group
Oct 1992, another conference held in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Chalabi elected INC chairman. Goals:overthrow Sadam Hussein, establish Iraq democracy, Sadam trial.CIA had problems with Chalabi, say he didn't provide useful info, and didn't deliver on assurances that disaffectedIraqi military officers wanted to defect to opposition. Chalabi lobbied Congress which caused friction with the CIand he said he was not under control of CIA,Oct 1994, the INC provided a steady stream of low-ranking walk-ins from various Iraqi army and Republican Guaunits ... but described as a spartan operation. A lot of squabbling between different opposition groups. Chalabiawarded for his efforts.1994 see Cooperative Research, 'forgery shop' and Huffington Post "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us All" search
James Woolsey.
Jan 1995, a KDP / PUK cease fire negotiated, U.S. offered INC funding for INC mediation efforts, U.S. said woulcease no-fly zone efforts if KDP / PUK didn't accept cease-fire.Feb 1995, CIA learned of new opposition plan to remove Saddam Hussein (SH) from power. An assault on SH Uresidence Mar 4 or Mar 5 was planned.Mid Feb, KDP / PUK a fragile cease-fire holds, INC mediation and separation forces were funded by U.S.Mid Feb, SH assassination plan ongoing, but U.S. not a participant, U.S. wants Iraqis to do it.Mid Feb, Feb 17, 1995, overt U.S. diplomatic initiative with Department of State, Chalabi was focusing on detainiSH in Ujah, then wait for Iraqi people to rise up. The plan needed diversions in Mosul and Kirkuk and uprisings the Shi'a south. But KDP / PUK was still fighting,Mar 1995, CIA met with SCIRI's (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) Badr Corps and others saithey would support early March coup attempt.
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CIA accompanied Chalabi to meetings to support a coup,Mar 3, 1995 Chalabi made contact with Iranian intelligence to discuss coup support in southern Iraq, and signaledthat U.S. supported the plan.Early Mar 1995, 'a foreign government' provided U.S. info on Iran's view of this meeting. It was indicated that Irathought that the US was seeking Iranian support for the Iraqi oppositionist uprising against Saddam Hussein plannfor early March 1995. Iranian officials also believed that the U.S. person involved in the matter was a CIA officerIndications were that Chalabi "handed" the Iranians a message at the meeting, purportedly from the U.S., that saidAmerica would welcome the involvement of Islamic forces in the operation against Saddam Hussein, on thecondition that the independence and unity of Iraq are preserved, ant the Iraqi borders are not changed.
By now there was a NSC firestorm and calls to the CIA to find out what was happening and why a CIA agent was posing as a member of the NSC and allegedly planning an assassination of SH.Further intelligence about the same meeting indicated that Chalabi told the SCIRI representatives that Americas ha promised to prevent any action by the Iraqi army and to target them; to impede Iraqi any tank movements in thecities, not in the marshes, via aerial bombardment, and to prevent Saddam's army from suppressing this initiative,through exploitation of resolutions 688 and 949.In early March, and on the day that the operation was to go forward, messages were sent to all opposition memberthat the operation had been totally compromised, there was a high risk of failure, and that the U.S. government didnot use Chalabi to pass any message to Iran.Chalabi believed it was too late to stop the operation, so proceeded to initiate it, and called other opposition figureand informed them that U.S. no longer supported the operation. And concern about perception of US support, blaRegrouping was necessary, maintain sanctions, erosion of SH power.
The coup plan never made it to the White House according to ICG. NSC was surprised by the plan.The plan was a complete failure. Animosity grew between Chalabi and the CIA, and differing opinions aboutwhether Chalabi consulted the CIA before initiating the coup arose and at the same time claiming that the U.S.supported the uprising.But other reports said he did not enter the plan unilaterally and he did consult the CIA from the beginning.Chalabi meetings with the Iranians also fueled CIA resentment. They accused Chalabi of fraudulently acting on behalf of the U.S. when he alleged to Iranian intelligence that Washington was interested in enlisting Tehran'ssupport for operations against SH.Chalabi did work openly with the Iranians, because much of the Iraqi opposition lived in Iran.The CIA reduced contact and support for INC after the failed uprising.August 1996 incursion of Iraqi army into Northern Iraq stopped most INC operations.Chalabi denied fabricating a written communication from the White House (about U.S. support of SH uprising
efforts), or any other part of the U.S. government. He did work with the Iranians as part of his efforts to establishand maintain the INC.In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which led to the 1999 INC authorization for federal assistance.The Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) was created and granted $33 million (2000) to fund Ira propaganda and research on SH war crimes. Conflicts with INCSF wanting offices inside Iraq delayed funding unMar 2001 clearing the way for funding the Information Collection Program (ICP) from countries surrounding IraqOffices were in Tehran, Damascus, and Cairo.
Huffington Post "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us All" search James Woolsey. 2003 Ahmad Chalabi
Colin PowellIn an October 2001 report the INCSF provided information on ICP activities and included: "Collect sensitiveinformation that reveal Iraq's link with September 11th aftermath and anthrax exposures in the USA,"The State Department still uncomfortable with ICP, and an April 2004 saw INC fraud as a PR threat and stilldoubted value of ICP information and again cut off funding in May 2002. But in July 2002, DOD gave it back toDIA. In October of 2002 DIA took over and forbid ICP from publicizing their efforts or work in Iraq.From August of 2002 until early 2004 the CIA voiced concerns about the reliability of the INC information, that ihad been penetrated by Iranian and other intelligence services, and that it had its own agenda.In the fall of 2003 the DIA began making plans to terminate its relationship with the INC assuming that it would become a political party in Iraq.On May 12, 2004, and Iraqi Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for a senior INC official on allegations of frau
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and other offenses. On May 24th the DIA terminated it relationship with the INC and the DOD terminated itsrelationship with the ICP.Information Provided by the INC In August 2002, the NIC published a memorandum, Iraq: Evaluation of DocumProvided by the Iraqi National Congress. (an evaluation of approximately 300 pages of INC materials). Was deemof little value.Source One: (AntiPolygraph blog) an Iraqi who lived and worked in Baghdad, defected to Syria.Source One met with INC representatives who facilitated his travel to Asia and his introduction to the internationa
media. James Woolsey wouldn't rule out involvement with Source One. Woolsey met Chalabi in tlate 90's and represented as co-council to eight INC members detained in California on immigration charges.CIA preliminary analysis of Source One: (AntiPolygraph blog) "does not have access to specific programs at variousfacilities, his knowledge of (facility) details, individual engineers, and personalities could permit subject matter experts t analyze the data and extrapolate broader program information." He passed a polygraph. This report created by S
Francis, the author of NewsFollowUp.com
January 10, 2002. The DIA produced and disseminated over 250 intelligence information reports from Source Ondebriefings, and all sent to the CIA. Source One worked as a contractor at several Iraqi WMD sites of which he
reported extensively on including SSO. Two reports discussed suspect terrorist training sites in Iraq. The first, daJanuary 2002, said that from 1997-1998, Afghan, Pakistani, and Palestinian nationals were trained by the FedayeeSaddam at an Iraqi special forces training facility in Salman Pak, Iraq. The report said the camp is "rumored to provide al-Qa'ida terrorist teams with training" and added, "many Iraqis believe that Saddam Hussein had made aagreement with Usama bin Ladin in order to support his terrorist movement against the U.S. The second report,dated March 2002, provided the general locations of suspected Iraqi terrorist training camps, including one at SalmPak. ....In early 2002, WMD facilities reports appeared in the media drawing attention to other foreign intelligence servicIn March 2002, the information was corroborated and vetted. On March 6 2002 the INR had access to the reports said they were useful. And in July 2002, in a NIC memo, Source One was described as "the most successful INCreferral" ... he had access to as many as 150 conventional or WMD facilities. ...but he did not have access to morspecific information regarding WMD programs. INR said his claims about WMD work at various facilities are no
adequately substantiated.Source One's (AntiPolygraph blog) descriptions of a specific suspect site were wrong on many points. Despite thisSource One's reporting was included in two finished intelligence assessments, the October NIE Iraq's Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a DIA assessment Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program
Much of the reporting on a uranium enrichment facility was sexed-up to somewhat match what Source One said.Postwar findingsAccording to the DIA, the U.S. 75th Exploitation Task Force and Iraq Survey Group (ISG) visited the suspectfacility in the spring and summer of 2003 respectively. Soil samples were normal and no enriched uranium wasfound. No evidence was found to support intelligence assessments that the site may have been involved in nuclearelated work.In early February 2004, in order to resolve credibility issues with Source One, the IC elements brought Source Onto Iraq. Source One failed to prove any credibility about the suspect facility, but was able to identify a second
facility but the information may have been coached and his WMD knowledge remained highly questionable. DIAofficers may have indeed created (extrapolated) the image that Source One knew more than he did. The CIA studthis possibility in comparing Iraqi opposition deception efforts to reports prepared by DIA officials.Ultimately, the IC has never deemed Source One (AntiPolygraph blog) to be a fabricator and has not recalled hisreporting.
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See references to Judith Miller and the 75th Exploitation Task Force in NewsFollowUp Plamegateimeline and search her story "White House Lists Iraq Steps to Build Banned Weapons". and ZMag or New
York Times and Huffington Post "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us All" search James Woolse003
Source Two, a former Iraqi major, was referred to DIA on February 8, 2002. James Woolseyinvolved in the referral. The DIA questioned his credibility on Iraqi chemical weapons information. He may havehad some limited knowledge of Iraqi mobile R&D labs in its bio weapons program and VX. He told debriefers hwas involved in procuring dual-use technology in support of Iraq's WMD program. He was asked not to talk to thmedia. And again, his credibility was questioned, and he may have been coached, but passed polygraph tests.In March of 2002, disseminated two intelligence reports based on Source Two's information. The reports includedinfo on the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and mobile bio research labs (the word weapons not included). March the CIA told DIA that Source Two was unreliable and fabricated information. March 20th all contact ceased. InApril, the DIA said that they thought he was being coached by the INC. In May the DIA issued a fabrication notiand said that he was coached by INC and said he was a fabricator/provocateur.The DIA did not recall the original reports or reissue them with a warning that Source Two was believed to be afabricator.Despite all the above actions, Source Two was cited specifically in five CIA intelligence assessments and theOctober NIE, as corroborating other source reporting about a mobile biological weapons program.The five assessments included: WMD Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections, Ira
Iraq's Past Efforts to Mask Its BW Program, and the NIE. These reports used almost identical descriptions of
Source Two's information. The language in the papers said that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobilelaboratories for BW agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections...according to Source Two, an Iraqi defector associated with the INC.Source Two was slso one of the four HUMINT sources specifically referred to in the par of Secretary Powell'sFebruary 2003 speech before the UN Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production units. The DIADivision Chief who attended Powell's speech never connected the fabrication notice and the source mentioned in tspeech so didn't raise concerns about it. The Iraq BW analysts from the CIA, DIA, and State INR all acknowledgthat the fabrication notice was available in their message handling systems, but they all said they did not see thenotice. Other analysts involved in Powell's speech said Source Two's reporting on the labs remained plausible andwas never cancelled. As long is it wasn't canceled and was used with appropriate caveats, it could continue to beused in finished intelligence reporting. Powell's speech contained no caveats.The fabrication notice was issued on the basis that Source Two was coached, he was talking to the media and fore
intelligence concerns. Source Two has disappeared.Source Three Ultimately, Source Three, according to a response from the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, stated under the influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very credible." Despthis, many reports were disseminated from his reporting and he was described as a "high ranking Iraqi public officwith direct access to reported information."
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In late September 2001, James Woolsey and INC presented another defector who had served as aliaison between Iraqi intelligence and the Fedayeen Saddam from 1998 to 2000 and had information on terroristtraining in Iraq.
Haydr al Bandor, an INC employee, said Source Three was a former Iraqi lieutenant colonel who conducted traini(aircraft hijackings, underwater explosives and booby traps) of 70 Arab terrorists at a special Iraqi training facilitySalman Pak. The DIA wanted a CIA opinion on debriefings of Source Three. (Jihaz Mukhabarat al Amma)Using the information from al Bandar, the DIA disseminated two reports. They described the information fromBandar as from "a former Iraqi citizen, who received this information from a subsource. Source and subsource'scredibility have not been determined." The reports did not indicate that the source was a member of the INC or ththe subsource was Source Three.The second report from Bandar provided only one paragraph of text identifying an Egytian businessman whomaintained a relationship with the Iraqi intelligence service. DIA used the first report in which Source Three wassubsource in a Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM) on September 30, 2001, titled Terrorists
Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps. The DITSUM said Salman Pak was used for hijacking training and LakeTharthar was used for underwater operations training. Source Three was instructed by INC to go to the U.S.
embassy for an interview. They thought he had information on an Iraqi officer who had worked as Salman Pak.Source Three only had info on a subsource that could broker a meeting with this officer. The CIA and DIAcontinued to debrief Source Three about INC coaching.In mid October three more reports were disseminated based on Source Three reporting and described Source Threas a "high ranking Iraqi public official with direct access to reported information." None of the reports discussed WMD. The reports discussed Kuwait prisoners, a special unit of the Fedayeen Saddam al-Qarai'a Force and its Udeployment plans, training at the Salman Pak location.In November 2001, the CIA published an assessment of the Salman Pak facility titled Iraq: Salman Pak
Unconventional Warfare Training Facility. Despite reliability warnings said the reports cannot be discounted.On December 6, 2001 a foreign intelligence service told the CIA that their Iraqi contacts in (Israel?) said that theCIA was working with Source Three.Source Three, according to a response from the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, stated "is under the influence/cont
of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very credible."Following debriefings, Source Three's story began to appear in the press that were said to have discrepancies withCIA reports. This report created by Steve Francis, the author of NewsFollowUp.com
see New American article and search on "Iraq and al-Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship" and Uhler ,IraqNewsOn February 6, 2002, CIA's Iraq Operations Group (IOG) disseminated a cable attempting to summarize the ICvarious interactions with Source Three. Conclusions: Although they could verify a few elements of his story, wehave determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. policy on Iraq.Mistaken IdentityOn June 7, 2002, another CIA station requested a name trace on former Iraqi military officer. Confusion seems toexist between the identity of Source Two and Source Three stemming from Source Three fleeing Iraq to Europe a being sought by stations in Europe. Contact was not advised.Intelligence AssessmentsCIA analysts included Source Three's information in three extensive assessments about Iraq's links to al-Qa'ida, aJune 2002 paper, Iraq and al-Qa'ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, and September 2002 and January 2003versions of Iraqi Support for Terrorism. All three assessments noted that reporting surged after September 11, 20from Iraqi defectors claiming that al-Qa'ida and other non-Iraqi Arabs engaged in special operations training atSalman Pak. Again the defectors information was suspect and all were associated with INC. Despite the assertion Iraqi Support to Terrorism that the "defectors claimed that al-Qa'ida and other non0iraqis" trained at Salman Pak,Committee staff found no reports from these defectors claiming that it was member of al-Qa'ida who received thetraining. The IC has no information on the location of Source Three.Source Four Ultimately....CIA Headquaters responded that given several concerns referenced in a separate cable,including Source Four's past exposure in the media and his emplyment with th INC, "we do not have any operatio
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interest in further pursuing (the suspected Iraqi intelligence officer) at this time.In October 2001, Source Four, a former Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam captain, living in the U.S., was referred to the IC Source Three as someone who could confirm Source Three's story. A meeting was arranged between him and a U journalist. INC was involved and provided an INC interpreter. The CIA received an advance copy of the mediaarticle, it said Source Four was a terror school instructor and said that the methods used at the training school wersimilar to those used by September 11 hijackers.It was determined that Source Four did not have first-hand access to the information he was giving and the other sources embellished or exaggerated their stories on training camps and may have been coached.Postwar Information on Salman Pak Steve Francis
A November 2003 assessment from DIA noted that postwar exploitation of the Salman Pak facility found it devoiof valuable intelligence. DIA concluded that "we don't know whether the ex-regime trained terrorists on the aircrat Salman Pak. The plane was sold for scrap. In June 2006 DIA said it has "no credible reports that non-Iraqis wetrained to conduct or support transnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak after 1991. It was a well-knownfacility and a large volume of heresay evidence could be collected. The Iraqi Survey Group found that an Iraqiintelligence directorate, M14 used Salman Pak for terrorist training.Source FiveUltimately ...An assessment of Source Five after his media appearance in 2002 noted that his reports of a meeting between Sadam Hussen and bin Ladin were not corroborated and other reports of meetings between senior Iraqiofficials and al-Qa'ida members provide no indication that SH and bin Ladin met.Source Five was referred to the DIA by the INC through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International SecuAffairs. He did not recall making this referral. According to the DIA, Source Five had been smuggled out of Iraq
by the INC. The DIA debriefed the source in the fall of 2002 and produced sixteen intelligence reports based.Source Five claimed publicly that Osama bin Ladin came to Baghdad. He passed polygraph tests. In October 200his story appeard to be more or less cogent, but was perhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications. TDIA said that his comments may have been intended to influence as well as inform decision makers. The bin Ladmeeting report was the only terrorism related report from the source. None other related to WMD. NewsFollowUp.com
The Would-Be Defector No reporting resulted from this referral.In July 2001, Ahmed Chalabi told an individual in the Department of Defense he had information from anintermediary that a senior Iraqi diplomat in Europe wanted to defect to the U.S. DIA met with Chalabi to discussdiplomat's possible defection. He never defected and neither CIA or DIA officers met with him. No reportingresulted from this referral.INC Reporting During DIA's Management of the ICP.DIA officially took over management of the ICP (Iraqi Collection Program) from the State Department in late
October 2002. From that time until the beginning of OIF, the DIA disemminated reporting from fourteen other sources (and four others) who were either members of or were associated with the INC. DIA is unable to attributthe reporting to any single source within the INC's ICP. The reports covered a myriad of information, with mixedvalue similar to HUMINT sources. One report stated that Iraq possessed several thousand chemical weapons shellfilled with ebola and anthrax. DIA thought this was credible and was included in threat briefings. It was not citedany written assessments.Other reports of which the vast majority were from Iraqi opposition sources. The reports provided information abSH genealogy, SH key personnel, a report about SH poisoning water supplies with Anthrax, palaces, tribe loyaltiemilitary plans, locations of suspect WMD facilities, medical facilities, leadership residences, regime biographies,smuggling of prohibited materials, SCUD missiles, information on targeting Turkey if U.S. invaded, conventionalweapons production facilities, chemical and biological weapons smuggled to Syria, al Qa'ida travel plans outside oIraq, dual-use materials from Jordan, T-72 tank parts, anti-tank missiles, helicopter engines, and night-vision
goggles, rumors of nuclear activity at Tuwaitha and Ameriyah where radiation levels were above acceptable safetstandards, daily routine of Uday Hussein, Hussein family residences, Republican Palace, Republican Guard Corp, Special Security Organization, the Gneeral Security Directorate, Military Intelligence Directorate, business activitof Uday Hussein, oil for food program kickbacks, a subsource report on moving chemical and biological weaponstruck into Samawa, Iraqi Intelligence officers id's, 1989 production of chemical masks, information on Kurdishwillingness to support U.S. effors to topple SH in return for money and weapons, a report that Saddam had someunits which were dressed as U.S. and British troops and were prepared to "execute chemical-biological warfare" oIraqi citizens so the world would blame President Bush.CIA Debrief of INC walk-in (Source Eighteen) was judged a coached fabricator and IC had no further contactwith himAlleged INC-Linked Sources (CURVE BALL)
8/12/2019 Were the Bush Neo-cons Duped by Chalabi Into Invading Iraq Ledeen, Fascism, Chalabi ... NewsFollowup.com
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In the IC's judgment, CURVE BALL was the crucial source that led the IC to judge in the 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMcapabilities that "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents." There were threeother (insignificant) sources who the IC believed corroborated CURVE BALL's reporting. He provided more than100 reports.Uncertainties noted in 2004 of his reliability had been raised but were not disseminated to analysts outside the CIADespite these warnings CURVE BALL was judged to be "credible" or "very credible" in its reporting. The
committee said concerns should have been passed to policymakers. Ahmad Chalabi and Colin Powell
In the summer and fall of 2003, the Iraq Survey Group investigated whether Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program. It was to investigate sites identified by CURVE BALL and later, CURVE BALL himself. None of thesixty individuals debriefed provided evidence to substantiate the claim of a mobile BW program. The CIAassessment on May 26, 2004 states he lied about the program and issued a congressional notification in June 2004and that his reporting had been recalled.CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for the INC since 1992, for at least some time in a senior position. They believed he was also coached by the INC. The CIA believes that CURVE BALL's close relative'sconnection to the INC is coincidental, and is not an explanation for his fabrications. In 2003, a CIA analyst told tCommittee that CURVE BALL was located when he sought asylum in a European country, when officials
reviewed his asylum paperwork, noticed that he was an Iraqi chemical engineer, and approached him to beinterviewed.Source Nineteen Ultimately....he was unable to provide basic organizational information on the IIS that would shfamiliarity with the organization.On February 27, 2002 Source Nineteen and Iraqi defector walked in to a third country embassy in the Middle EasOfficers from both the CIA and the third country's intelligence serve debriefed him four times. Source Nineteenclaimed to have worked as a civilian employee in the IIS from 1988 to 2001, initially as a driver. He claimed thawas aware of four trucks in Iraq that carried biological and nuclear materal and that in 1995 al-Qa'ida sent some oits members to receive training at a Baghdad intelligence school. He also provided the names of individuals he sawere Iraq intelligence agents posted abroad. ....he was unable to provide basic organizational information on the Ithat would show familiarity with the organization. Other details about Source Nineteen reveal trivial details and lsupport to his just being another fabricator/provacateur. Some of his reports were included in one official IC
product.go to Conclusions
See NewsFollowUp.com pages on Judith
Miller, CURVE BALL. also the New Yorker
New Yorker "the defector's name is Adnan Ihsan Saheedal-Haideri."
search internet: Woolsey, Chalabi, Miller
Aljazeera Neo-cons role in amassing dubious Iraq intel 4/10/2005 9:00:00 AM GMTn an interview with the former CIA head of counterterrorism operations and intelligence director at the National Security Council under Ronald
eagan, Vincent Cannistaro, he was asked if the documents on Iraq's purchase of uranium from Niger came from Italian intelligence to which he
nswered in the affirmative.
owever according to Cannistaro "…When we're talking about acquiring information on Iraq. It isn't that anyone had a good source on Iraq - there
eren't any good sources. The Italian intelligence service, the military intelligence service, was acquiring information that was really being hand-fed
them by very dubious sources. The Niger documents, for example, which apparently were produced in the United States, yet were funneled
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When the former CIA head of counter-terrorism was asked if a Michael Ledeen had been the one who produced the Iraq documents he said "You'd b
ery close." This is consistent with the theory that the documents are the work of Iraqi dissidents associated with Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National
ongress. The documents would have flowed from Chalabi to Ledeen to SISME, and thus would have been laundered to make them appear as
gitimate products discovered by a legitimate intelligence agency.
his sophistication in the use of foreign intelligence agencies appears to be part of the modus operandi of the neocons, and may derive from the
articular expertise of Ledeen and Richard Perle, developed in various shenanigans going back to the 1970's in particular the Iran-Contra affair.
ntelligence agencies in Britain, France, and Germany were also used in the same campaigns of lies which led to the attack on Iraq. One of the
rategies was to feed some nonsense to one intelligence agency, and then have that nonsense distributed to other intelligence agencies. Then the
aim would be that the information must be true, as it came from multiple sources.
n an interview with the former CIA head of counterterrorism operations and intelligence director at the National Security Council under Ronald
eagan, Vincent Cannistaro, he was asked if the documents on Iraq's purchase of uranium from Niger came from Italian intelligence to which he
nswered in the affirmative. However according to Cannistaro "…When we're talking about acquiring information on Iraq. It isn't that anyone had a
ood source on Iraq - there weren't any good sources. The Italian intelligence service, the military intelligence service, was acquiring information tha
as really being hand-fed to them by very dubious sources. The Niger documents, for example, which apparently were produced in the United
tates, yet were funneled through the Italians."
When the former CIA head of counter-terrorism was asked if a Michael Ledeen had been the one who produced the Iraq documents he said "You'd b
ery close." This is consistent with the theory that the documents are the work of Iraqi dissidents associated with Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National
ongress. The documents would have flowed from Chalabi to Ledeen to SISME, and thus would have been laundered to make them appear as
gitimate products discovered by a legitimate intelligence agency.
his sophistication in the use of foreign intelligence agencies appears to be part of the modus operandi of the neocons, and may derive from the
articular expertise of Ledeen and Richard Perle, developed in various shenanigans going back to the 1970's in particular the Iran-Contra affair.
ntelligence agencies in Britain, France, and Germany were also used in the same campaigns of lies which led to the attack on Iraq. One of the
rategies was to feed some nonsense to one intelligence agency, and then have that nonsense distributed to other intelligence agencies. Then the
aim would be that the information must be true, as it came from multiple sources.
he handling of the source of the main lies used to justify the attack, the aptly named 'Curveball', also displays the same sophistication in technique.
urveball was too obviously undependable to be sent directly to the CIA. As Joseph Cannon writes:
. . the Office of Special Plans] could feed lies directly into the Oval Office - but they needed more. They needed to find a way to make the CIA
estow its imprimatur onto this silliness. Thus, the neo-cons somehow arranged for Curveball to be routed through German intelligence - we don't
et know how it happened, but it happened. Why give this alky German minders? If the CIA had dealt with Curveball directly, they would have seen
rough his deceptions rather easily.
ut since the information came by way of the BND, the CIA tended to trust it. By the time the agency decided to take a closer look at the sourcing,
ar was already a done deal. Furthermore, this little scheme offered a bonus: Since Tenet and McLaughlin had bought into the BND's information i
all went haywire responsibility could be laid to rest at the feet of the CIA. Not the OSP, not the INC, not the BND, not Mossad, not the neocon
eologues.
nce again, we see use of a bold tactic: The use of a foreign spy shop as a go-between, in order to legitimise and circulate bogus (but ideologically
seful) data within the U.S. intelligence community." If you feed Curveball's shoddy information through German intelligence, with no CIA experts
lowed to see him, and ignore the German protestations that he could not be trusted, you can have the lies fed into the American system without any
aveats about reliability. The added bonus is that by using the CIA to convey the information, you can then blame the CIA when trouble erupts.
he common thread in the forged Niger documents, the use of Curveball, and the British intelligence manipulations which ended up getting David
elly killed, is a very clever use of multiple intelligence agencies to disguise the source of a collection of rather obvious lies which were used to
stify the attack on Iraq.
Whoever was behind this had to have had a long history of involvement in American government and involvement with multiple foreign intelligence
gencies. There aren't that many people with that kind of experience. Who was: 1) a neocon in favor of an attack on Iraq; with 2) connections to
eith's Office of Special Plans; and with 3) ties to Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress; and with 4) long-standing documented relationships with
reign intelligence agencies, particularly SISME?
Huffington Post "That Awful Power: How Judith Miller Screwed Us All" search JamesWoolsey.
ummary in reference to Chalabi and White House: search terms related to Senate Intelligence Report: Miller's New York
imes front page story: "AFTEREFFECTS: PROHIBITED WEAPONS; Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, An Iraqi
cientist Is Said to Assert." MET Alpha, proof of WMD, buried evidence south of Baghdad, Miller quoted commanding
