Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for STATE UNIV OF NE
Date/Time of Request: Friday, November 29, 2013 06:24 CentralClient Identifier: CAMPUS RESEARCHDatabase: SCTFINDCitation Text: 103 S.Ct. 1684Lines: 1292Documents: 1Images: 0
The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson Reuters,West and their affiliates.
Supreme Court of the United StatesHarry CONNICK, Individually and in His Capacity
as District Attorney, etc., Petitioner,v.
Sheila MYERS.
No. 81-1251.Argued Nov. 8, 1982.
Decided April 20, 1983.
Former assistant district attorney brought civilrights action in which she contended that her em-ployment was terminated because she exercised herconstitutionally guaranteed right of free speech.The United States District Court for the EasternDistrict of Louisiana, Jack M. Gordon, J., 507F.Supp. 752, held that attorney was entitled to rein-statement, back pay, and compensatory damages,and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, in anunpublished opinion, 654 F.2d 719, affirmed, andcertiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, JusticeWhite, held that discharge of former assistant dis-trict attorney did not violate attorney's constitution-ally protected right of free speech.
Reversed.
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion inwhich Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevensjoined.
West Headnotes
[1] Constitutional Law 92 1934
92 Constitutional Law92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press92XVIII(P) Public Employees and Officials
92k1934 k. Efficiency of public services.Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2), 92k90.1(1))In determining a public employee's rights of
free speech, task of the Supreme Court is to arriveat a balance between interests of the employee as acitizen, in commenting upon matters of public con-cern and the interest of the state, as an employer, inpromoting the efficiency of the public services itperforms through its employees. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 1, 14.
[2] Officers and Public Employees 28372.41(1)
283 Officers and Public Employees283I Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure
283I(H) Proceedings for Removal, Suspen-sion, or Other Discipline
283I(H)3 Judicial Review283k72.41 Decisions Reviewable; For-
um for Review283k72.41(1) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases(Formerly 283k72.41, 283k72(2))Ordinary dismissals from government service
which violate no fixed tenure or applicable statuteor regulation are not subject to judicial review evenif reasons for dismissal are alleged to be mistakenor unreasonable.
[3] Officers and Public Employees 28372.41(1)
283 Officers and Public Employees283I Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure
283I(H) Proceedings for Removal, Suspen-sion, or Other Discipline
283I(H)3 Judicial Review283k72.41 Decisions Reviewable; For-
um for Review283k72.41(1) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases(Formerly 283k72.41, 283k72(2))When a public employee speaks not as a citizen
upon matters of public concern, but instead as anemployee upon matters only of personal interest,absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 1461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
court is not appropriate forum in which to reviewwisdom of personnel decision taken by a publicagency allegedly in reaction to employee's behavi-or.
[4] Constitutional Law 92 1947
92 Constitutional Law92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press92XVIII(P) Public Employees and Officials
92k1947 k. Discharge. Most Cited Cases(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2), 92k90.1(1))Whether a public employee's speech addresses
a matter of public concern so as to shield employeefrom discharge for expressing those views must bedetermined by content, form and context of givenstatement, as revealed by whole record. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 1, 14.
[5] Constitutional Law 92 1958
92 Constitutional Law92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press92XVIII(P) Public Employees and Officials
92k1958 k. Attorneys, prosecutors, andAttorney General's office. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2), 92k90.1(1))
District and Prosecuting Attorneys 131 3(1)
131 District and Prosecuting Attorneys131k3 Deputies, Assistants, and Substitutes
131k3(1) k. Appointment. Most Cited Cases(Formerly 92k90.1(7.2), 92k90.1(1))Discharge of former assistant district attorney
did not violate her constitutionally protected rightof free speech where when district attorney pro-posed to transfer attorney she strongly opposedtransfer, expressing her views to several of her su-pervisors, she thereafter prepared a questionnairewhich she distributed to other attorneys concerningoffice transfer policy, office morale, need for agrievance committee, level of confidence in super-visors and whether employees felt pressure to work
in political campaigns, and except for the questionregarding pressure upon employees to work inpolitical campaigns, questions posed in question-naire did not fall under rubric of matters of “publicconcern.” U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14.
[6] Civil Rights 78 1405
78 Civil Rights78III Federal Remedies in General
78k1400 Presumptions, Inferences, and Bur-dens of Proof
78k1405 k. Employment practices. MostCited Cases
(Formerly 78k240(2), 78k13.13(1))In civil rights action in which former assistant
district attorney contended that her employmentwas terminated because she exercised her constitu-tionally guaranteed right of free speech, districtcourt erred in imposing unduly onerous burden onthe state to justify attorney's discharge by requiringit to “clearly demonstrate” that speech involved“substantially interfered” with operation of office;state's burden in justifying a particular dischargevaries depending upon nature of employee's expres-sion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14.
**1685 Syllabus FN*
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of theopinion of the Court but has been preparedby the Reporter of Decisions for the con-venience of the reader. See United States v.Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed.2d 499.
*138 Respondent was employed as an AssistantDistrict Attorney in New Orleans with the respons-ibility of trying criminal cases. When petitionerDistrict Attorney proposed to transfer respondent toprosecute cases in a different section of the criminalcourt, she strongly opposed the transfer, expressingher view to several of her supervisors, including pe-titioner. Shortly thereafter, she prepared a question-naire that she distributed to the other Assistant Dis-trict Attorneys in the office concerning office trans-
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 2461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
fer policy, office morale, the need for a grievancecommittee, the level of confidence in supervisors,and whether employees felt pressured to work inpolitical campaigns. Petitioner then informed re-spondent that she was being terminated for refusalto accept the transfer, and also told her that her dis-tribution of the questionnaire was considered an actof insubordination. Respondent filed suit in FederalDistrict Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed.,Supp. IV), alleging that she was wrongfully dis-charged because she had exercised her constitution-ally protected right of free speech. The DistrictCourt agreed, ordered her reinstated, and awardedbackpay, damages, and attorney's fees. Finding thatthe questionnaire, not the refusal to accept thetransfer, was the real reason for respondent's ter-mination, the court held that the questionnaire in-volved matters of public concern and that the Statehad not “clearly demonstrated” that the question-naire interfered with the operation of the DistrictAttorney's office. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Respondent's discharge did not offendthe First Amendment. Pp. 1687-1693.
(a) In determining a public employee's rights offree speech, the problem is to arrive “at a balancebetween the interests of the [employee], as a cit-izen, in commenting on matters of public concernand the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro-moting the efficiency of the public services it per-forms through its employees.” Pickering v. Boardof Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731,1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811. P. 1687.
(b) When a public employee speaks not as acitizen upon matters of public concern, but insteadas an employee upon matters only of personal in-terest, absent the most unusual circumstances, afederal court is not *139 the appropriate forum inwhich to review the wisdom of a personnel decisiontaken by a public agency allegedly in reaction**1686 to the employee's behavior. Here, exceptfor the question in respondent's questionnaire re-garding pressure upon employees to work in polit-ical campaigns, the questions posed do not fall un-
der the rubric of matters of “public concern.” Pp.1687-1691.
(c) The District Court erred in imposing an un-duly onerous burden on the State to justify respond-ent's discharge by requiring it to “clearly demon-strate” that the speech involved “substantially in-terfered” with the operation of the office. TheState's burden in justifying a particular dischargevaries depending upon the nature of the employee'sexpression. P. 1691.
(d) The limited First Amendment interest in-volved here did not require petitioner to tolerate ac-tion that he reasonably believed would disrupt theoffice, undermine his authority, and destroy theclose working relationships within the office. Thequestion on the questionnaire regarding the level ofconfidence in supervisors was a statement that car-ried the clear potential for undermining office rela-tions. Also, the fact that respondent exercised herrights to speech at the office supports petitioner'sfears that the function of his office was endangered.And the fact that the questionnaire emerged imme-diately after a dispute between respondent and peti-tioner and his deputies, requires that additionalweight be given to petitioner's view that respondentthreatened his authority to run the office. Pp.1691-1693.
654 F.2d 719 (CA5 1981), reversed.William F. Wessel argued the cause for petitioner.With him on the brief was Victoria Lennox Bartels.
George M. Strickler, Jr., argued the cause for re-spondent. With him on the brief were Ann Wool-handler and Michael G. Collins.*
* Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance werefiled by Mark C. Rosenblum, Nadine Strossen, andCharles S. Sims for the American Civil LibertiesUnion et al.; and by Robert H. Chanin, LaurenceGold, and Marsha S. Berzon for the National Edu-cation Association et al.
*140 Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 3461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Court.In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S.
563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), westated that a public employee does not relinquishFirst Amendment rights to comment on matters ofpublic interest by virtue of government employ-ment. We also recognized that the State's interestsas an employer in regulating the speech of its em-ployees “differ significantly from those it possessesin connection with regulation of the speech of thecitizenry in general.” Id., at 568, 88 S.Ct., at 1734.The problem, we thought, was arriving “at a bal-ance between the interests of the [employee], as acitizen, in commenting upon matters of public con-cern and the interest of the State, as an employer, inpromoting the efficiency of the public services itperforms through its employees.” Ibid. We return tothis problem today and consider whether the Firstand Fourteenth Amendments prevent the dischargeof a state employee for circulating a questionnaireconcerning internal office affairs.
IThe respondent, Sheila Myers, was employed
as an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleansfor five and a half years. She served at the pleasureof petitioner Harry Connick, the District Attorneyfor Orleans Parish. During this period Myers com-petently performed her responsibilities of tryingcriminal cases.
In the early part of October, 1980, Myers wasinformed that she would be transferred to prosecutecases in a different section of the criminal court.Myers was strongly opposed to the proposed trans-fer FN1 and expressed her view to several of hersupervisors, including Connick. Despite her objec-tions, on October 6 Myers was notified that she wasbeing transferred.*141 Myers again spoke withDennis Waldron, one of the first assistant districtattorneys, expressing her reluctance to accept thetransfer. A number of other office matters were**1687 discussed and Myers later testified that, inresponse to Waldron's suggestion that her concernswere not shared by others in the office, she in-
formed him that she would do some research on thematter.
FN1. Myers' opposition was at least par-tially attributable to her concern that a con-flict of interest would have been created bythe transfer because of her participation ina counseling program for convicted de-fendants released on probation in the sec-tion of the criminal court to which she wasto be assigned.
That night Myers prepared a questionnaire soli-citing the views of her fellow staff members con-cerning office transfer policy, office morale, theneed for a grievance committee, the level of confid-ence in supervisors, and whether employees feltpressured to work in political campaigns.FN2 Earlythe following morning, Myers typed and copied thequestionnaire. She also met with Connick whourged her to accept the transfer. She said she would“consider” it. Connick then left the office. Myersthen distributed the questionnaire to 15 assistantdistrict attorneys. Shortly after noon, DennisWaldron learned that Myers was distributing thesurvey. He immediately phoned Connick and in-formed him that Myers was creating a“mini-insurrection” within the office. Connick re-turned to the office and told Myers that she was be-ing terminated because of her refusal to accept thetransfer. She was also told that her distribution ofthe questionnaire was considered an act of insubor-dination. Connick particularly objected to the ques-tion which inquired whether employees “had con-fidence in and would rely on the word” of varioussuperiors in the office, and to a question concerningpressure to work in political campaigns which hefelt would be damaging if discovered by the press.
FN2. The questionnaire is reproduced asAppendix A.
Myers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, con-tending that her employment was wrongfully ter-minated because she had exercised her constitution-ally-protected right of free speech. The District
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 4461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Court agreed, ordered Myers reinstated, and awar-ded backpay, damages, and *142 attorney's fees.507 F.Supp. 752 (E.D.La.1981).FN3 The DistrictCourt found that although Connick informed Myersthat she was being fired because of her refusal toaccept a transfer, the facts showed that the ques-tionnaire was the real reason for her termination.The court then proceeded to hold that Myers' ques-tionnaire involved matters of public concern andthat the state had not “clearly demonstrated” thatthe survey “substantially interfered” with the opera-tions of the District Attorney's office.
FN3. Petitioner has also objected to the as-sessment of damages as being in violationof the Eleventh Amendment and to theaward of attorney's fees. Because of ourdisposition of the case, we do not reachthese questions.
Connick appealed to the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed on thebasis of the District Court's opinion. 654 F.2d 719(1981). Connick then sought review in this Courtby way of certiorari, which we granted. 455 U.S.999, 102 S.Ct. 1629, 71 L.Ed.2d 865 (1982).
II[1] For at least 15 years, it has been settled that
a state cannot condition public employment on abasis that infringes the employee's constitutionallyprotected interest in freedom of expression. Key-ishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-606,87 S.Ct. 675, 684-685, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967);Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Perry v. Sinder-mann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,515-516, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1293, 63 L.Ed.2d 574(1980). Our task, as we defined it in Pickering, is toseek “a balance between the interests of the[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon mat-ters of public concern and the interest of the State,as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of thepublic services it performs through its employees.”391 U.S., at 568, 88 S.Ct., at 1734. The District
Court, and thus the Court of Appeals as well, mis-applied our decision in Pickering and consequently,in our view, erred in striking the balance for re-spondent.
*143 **1688 AThe District Court got off on the wrong foot in
this case by initially finding that, “[t]aken as awhole, the issues presented in the questionnaire re-late to the effective functioning of the District At-torney's Office and are matters of public import-ance and concern.” 507 F.Supp., at 758. Connickcontends at the outset that no balancing of interestsis required in this case because Myers' question-naire concerned only internal office matters andthat such speech is not upon a matter of “publicconcern,” as the term was used in Pickering. Al-though we do not agree that Myers' communicationin this case was wholly without First Amendmentprotection, there is much force to Connick's sub-mission. The repeated emphasis in Pickering on theright of a public employee “as a citizen, in com-menting upon matters of public concern,” was notaccidental. This language, reiterated in all of Pick-ering's progeny, FN4 reflects both the historicalevolvement of the rights of public employees, andthe common sense realization that government of-fices could not function if every employment de-cision became a constitutional matter.FN5
FN4. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.593, 598, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 L.Ed.2d570 (1972); Mt. Healthy City School Dist.Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284,97 S.Ct. 568, 574, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977);Givhan v. Western Line ConsolidatedSchool District, 439 U.S. 410, 414, 99S.Ct. 693, 695, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979).
FN5. The question of whether expressionis of a kind that is of legitimate concern tothe public is also the standard in determin-ing whether a common-law action for inva-sion of privacy is present. See Restatement(Second) of Torts, § 652D. See also CoxBroadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 5461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975)(action for invasion of privacy cannot bemaintained when the subject-matter of thepublicity is matter of public record); Time,Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-388, 87S.Ct. 534, 541-542, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967).
For most of this century, the unchallengeddogma was that a public employee had no right toobject to conditions placed upon the terms of em-ployment-including those which restricted the exer-cise of constitutional rights. The classic formulationof this position was Justice Holmes', who, when sit-ting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-setts, observed: “A policeman may have a constitu-tional *144 right to talk politics, but he has no con-stitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v.Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29N.E. 517, 517 (1892). For many years, Holmes' epi-gram expressed this Court's law. Adler v. Board ofEducation, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.Ed.517 (1952); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317 (1951);United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947); United States v.Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 50 S.Ct. 167, 74 L.Ed.508 (1930); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 1 S.Ct.381, 27 L.Ed. 232 (1882).
The Court cast new light on the matter in aseries of cases arising from the widespread effortsin the 1950s and early 1960s to require public em-ployees, particularly teachers, to swear oaths ofloyalty to the state and reveal the groups withwhich they associated. In Wieman v. Updegraff,344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952),the Court held that a State could not require its em-ployees to establish their loyalty by extracting anoath denying past affiliation with Communists. InCafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961), the Court re-cognized that the government could not deny em-ployment because of previous membership in a par-ticular party. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 490, 81 S.Ct. 247, 253, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960);Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6L.Ed.2d 982 (1961); Cramp v. Board of Public In-struction, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S.Ct. 275, 7 L.Ed.2d285 (1961). By the time Sherbert v. Verner, 374U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963),was decided, it was already “too late in the day todoubt that the liberties of religion and expressionmay be infringed by the denial of or placing of con-ditions upon a benefit or privilege.” **1689 Id., at404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794. It was therefore no surprisewhen in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967), theCourt invalidated New York statutes barring em-ployment on the basis of membership in“subversive” organizations, observing that the the-ory that public employment which may be deniedaltogether may be subjected to any conditions, re-gardless of how unreasonable, had been uniformlyrejected. Id., at 605-606, 87 S.Ct., at 684-685.
In all of these cases, the precedents in whichPickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes and ac-tions sought to suppress the rights of public em-ployees to participate in public *145 affairs. The is-sue was whether government employees could beprevented or “chilled” by the fear of discharge fromjoining political parties and other associations thatcertain public officials might find “subversive.”The explanation for the Constitution's special con-cern with threats to the right of citizens to particip-ate in political affairs is no mystery. The FirstAmendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered in-terchange of ideas for the bringing about of politic-al and social changes desired by the people.” Rothv. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304,1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498; New York Times Co. v. Sulli-van, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). “[S]peech concerning publicaffairs is more than self-expression; it is the es-sence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana,379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 215-216, 13L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Accordingly, the Court hasfrequently reaffirmed that speech on public issuesoccupies the “highest rung of the heirarchy of First
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 6461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Amendment values,” and is entitled to special pro-tection. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., ---U.S. ----, ----, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3426, 73 L.Ed.2d1215 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467,100 S.Ct. 2286, 2293, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980).
Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, fol-lowed from this understanding of the First Amend-ment. In Pickering, the Court held impermissibleunder the First Amendment the dismissal of a highschool teacher for openly criticizing the Board ofEducation on its allocation of school funds betweenathletics and education and its methods of inform-ing taxpayers about the need for additional revenue.Pickering's subject was “a matter of legitimate pub-lic concern” upon which “free and open debate isvital to informed decision-making by the elector-ate.” 391 U.S., at 571-572, 88 S.Ct., at 1736.
Our cases following Pickering also involvedsafeguarding speech on matters of public concern.The controversy in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), arosefrom the failure to rehire a teacher in the state col-lege system who had testified before committees ofthe Texas legislature and had become involved inpublic disagreement over whether the collegeshould be elevated to four-year status-a change op-posed by the Regents. In *146Mt. Healthy CityBoard of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568,50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), a public school teacher wasnot rehired because, allegedly, he had relayed to aradio station the substance of a memorandum relat-ing to teacher dress and appearance that the schoolprincipal had circulated to various teachers. Thememorandum was apparently prompted by the viewof some in the administration that there was a rela-tionship between teacher appearance and publicsupport for bond issues, and indeed, the radio sta-tion promptly announced the adoption of the dresscode as a news item. Most recently, in Givhan v.Western Line Consolidated School District, 439U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979), weheld that First Amendment protection applies whena public employee arranges to communicate
privately with his employer rather than to expresshis views publicly. Although the subject-matter ofMrs. Givhan's statements were not the issue beforethe Court, it is clear that her statements concerningthe school district's allegedly racially discriminat-ory policies involved a matter of public concern.
**1690 [2] Pickering, its antecedents and pro-geny, lead us to conclude that if Myers' question-naire cannot be fairly characterized as constitutingspeech on a matter of public concern, it is unneces-sary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her dis-charge.FN6 When employee expression cannot befairly considered as relating to any matter of polit-ical, social, or other concern to the community,government officials should enjoy wide latitude inmanaging their offices, without intrusive oversightby the judiciary in the name of the First Amend-ment. Perhaps the government employer's dismissalof the worker may not be fair, but ordinary dis-missals from government service which violate nofixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation arenot subject to judicial review even if the reasons forthe dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreas-onable.*147 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Perryv. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,349-350, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079-2080, 48 L.Ed.2d 684(1976).
FN6. See, Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928(CA7 1972) cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972, 93S.Ct. 2148, 36 L.Ed.2d 695 (1973);Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist.,558 F.2d 982, 984 (CA10 1977).
[3] We do not suggest, however, that Myers'speech, even if not touching upon a matter of publicconcern, is totally beyond the protection of the FirstAmendment. “The First Amendment does not pro-tect speech and assembly only to the extent it canbe characterized as political. ‘Great secular causes,with smaller ones, are guarded.’ ” United MineWorkers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S.217, 223, 88 S.Ct. 353, 356, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967)
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 7461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531, 65S.Ct. 315, 323, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945). We in nosense suggest that speech on private matters fallsinto one of the narrow and well-defined classes ofexpression which carries so little social value, suchas obscenity, that the State can prohibit and punishsuch expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); Roth v. UnitedStates, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d1498 (1957); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). For ex-ample, an employee's false criticism of his employ-er on grounds not of public concern may be causefor his discharge but would be entitled to the sameprotection in a libel action accorded an identicalstatement made by a man on the street. We holdonly that when a public employee speaks not as acitizen upon matters of public concern, but insteadas an employee upon matters only of personal in-terest, absent the most unusual circumstances, afederal court is not the appropriate forum in whichto review the wisdom of a personnel decision takenby a public agency allegedly in reaction to the em-ployee's behavior. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.341, 349-350, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079-2080, 48L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). Our responsibility is to ensurethat citizens are not deprived of fundamental rightsby virtue of working for the government; this doesnot require a grant of immunity for employee griev-ances not afforded by the First Amendment to thosewho do not work for the state.
[4][5] Whether an employee's speech addressesa matter of public concern must be determined bythe content, form, and context*148 of a given state-ment, as revealed by the whole record.FN7 In thiscase, with but one exception, the questions posedby Myers to her coworkers do not fall under therubric of matters of “public concern.” We view thequestions pertaining to the confidence and trust thatMyers' coworkers possess in various supervisors,the level of office morale, and the need for a griev-ance committee as mere extensions of Myers' dis-pute over her transfer to another section of the
criminal court. Unlike the dissent, post, at 1698, wedo not believe these questions are of public importin evaluating the performance of the District Attor-ney as an elected official. Myers did not seek to in-form the public that the District Attorney's officewas not discharging **1691 its governmental re-sponsibilities in the investigation and prosecutionof criminal cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring tolight actual or potential wrongdoing or breach ofpublic trust on the part of Connick and others. In-deed, the questionnaire, if released to the public,would convey no information at all other than thefact that a single employee is upset with the statusquo. While discipline and morale in the workplaceare related to an agency's efficient performance ofits duties, the focus of Myers' questions is not toevaluate the performance of the office but rather togather ammunition for another round of controversywith her superiors. These questions reflect one em-ployee's dissatisfaction with a transfer and an at-tempt to turn that displeasure into a cause celèbre.FN8
FN7. The inquiry into the protected statusof speech is one of law, not fact. See n. 10,infra.
FN8. This is not a case like Givhan, supra,where an employee speaks out as a citizenon a matter of general concern, not tied toa personal employment dispute, but ar-ranges to do so privately. Mrs. Givhan'sright to protest racial discrimination-a mat-ter inherently of public concern-is not for-feited by her choice of a private forum.439 U.S., at 415-416, 99 S.Ct., at 696-697.Here, however, a questionnaire not other-wise of public concern does not attain thatstatus because its subject matter could, indifferent circumstances, have been the top-ic of a communication to the public thatmight be of general interest. The dissent'sanalysis of whether discussions of officemorale and discipline could be matters ofpublic concern is beside the point-it does
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 8461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
not answer whether this questionnaire issuch speech.
*149 To presume that all matters which tran-spire within a government office are of public con-cern would mean that virtually every remark-andcertainly every criticism directed at a public offi-cial-would plant the seed of a constitutional case.While as a matter of good judgment, public offi-cials should be receptive to constructive criticismoffered by their employees, the First Amendmentdoes not require a public office to be run as aroundtable for employee complaints over internaloffice affairs.
One question in Myers' questionnaire, however,does touch upon a matter of public concern. Ques-tion 11 inquires if assistant district attorneys “everfeel pressured to work in political campaigns on be-half of office supported candidates.” We have re-cently noted that official pressure upon employeesto work for political candidates not of the worker'sown choice constitutes a coercion of belief in viola-tion of fundamental constitutional rights. Branti v.Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-516, 100 S.Ct. 1287,1293, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Inaddition, there is a demonstrated interest in thiscountry that government service should dependupon meritorious performance rather than politicalservice. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); United PublicWorkers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91L.Ed. 754 (1947). Given this history, we believe itapparent that the issue of whether assistant districtattorneys are pressured to work in political cam-paigns is a matter of interest to the community uponwhich it is essential that public employees be ableto speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dis-missal.
B[6] Because one of the questions in Myers' sur-
vey touched upon a matter of public concern, andcontributed to her discharge we must determinewhether Connick was justified in discharging My-
ers. Here the District Court again erred in imposingan unduly onerous burden on the state to justify*150 Myers' discharge. The District Court viewedthe issue of whether Myers' speech was upon a mat-ter of “public concern” as a threshold inquiry, afterwhich it became the government's burden to“clearly demonstrate” that the speech involved“substantially interfered” with official responsibilit-ies. Yet Pickering unmistakably states, and re-spondent agrees FN9, **1692 that the state's burdenin justifying a particular discharge varies dependingupon the nature of the employee's expression. Al-though such particularized balancing is difficult,the courts must reach the most appropriate possiblebalance of the competing interests.FN10
FN9. See Brief for Respondent 9 (“Thesefactors, including the degree of the‘importance’ of plaintiff's speech, wereproper considerations to be weighed in thePickering balance.”); Tr. of Oral Arg. 30(Counsel for Respondent) (“I certainlywould not disagree that the content of thequestionnaire, whether it affects a matterof great public concern or only a very nar-row internal matter, is a relevant circum-stance to be weighed in the Pickering ana-lysis.”)
FN10. “The Constitution has imposedupon this Court final authority to determ-ine the meaning and application of thosewords of that instrument which require in-terpretation to resolve judicial issues. Withthat responsibility, we are compelled to ex-amine for ourselves the statements in issueand the circumstances under which theyare made to see whether or not they ... areof a character which the principles of theFirst Amendment, as adopted by the DueProcess Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-ment, protect.” Pennekamp v. Florida, 328U.S. 331, 335, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 1031, 90L.Ed. 1295 (1946) (footnote omitted).
Because of this obligation, we cannot
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 9461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
“avoid making an independent constitu-tional judgment on the facts of the case.”Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190,84 S.Ct. 1676, 1679, 12 L.Ed.2d 793(1964) (Opinion of BRENNAN, J.). SeeEdwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.229, 235, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683, 9 L.Ed.2d697 (1963); New York Times v. Sullivan,376 U.S. 254, 285, 84 S.Ct. 710, 728, 11L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); NAACP v.Claiborne Hardware Co., --- U.S. ----, ----, n. 50, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3427, n. 50,73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982).
CThe Pickering balance requires full considera-
tion of the government's interest in the effectiveand efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to thepublic. One hundred years ago, the Court noted thegovernment's legitimate purpose in “promot[ing]*151 efficiency and integrity in the discharge of of-ficial duties, and to maintain proper discipline inthe public service.” Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371,373, 1 S.Ct. 381, 384, 27 L.Ed. 232 (1882). AsJustice POWELL explained in his separate opinionin Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168, 94 S.Ct.1633, 1651, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974):
“To this end, the Government, as an employer,must have wide discretion and control over themanagement of its personnel and internal affairs.This includes the prerogative to remove employ-ees whose conduct hinders efficient operation andto do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of adisruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employeecan adversely affect discipline and morale in thework place, foster disharmony, and ultimatelyimpair the efficiency of an office or agency.”
We agree with the District Court that there isno demonstration here that the questionnaire im-peded Myers' ability to perform her responsibilities.The District Court was also correct to recognizethat “it is important to the efficient and successfuloperation of the District Attorney's office for As-sistants to maintain close working relationships
with their superiors.” 507 F.Supp., at 759. Con-nick's judgment, and apparently also that of his firstassistant Dennis Waldron, who characterized My-ers' actions as causing a “mini-insurrection”, wasthat Myers' questionnaire was an act of insubordin-ation which interfered with working relationships.FN11 When close working relationships are essen-tial to fulfilling public *152 responsibilities, a widedegree of deference to the employer's judgment isappropriate. Furthermore, we do not see the neces-sity for an employer to allow events to unfold to theextent that the disruption of the office and the de-struction of working relationships is manifest be-fore taking action. FN12 We caution that a stronger**1693 showing may be necessary if the employ-ee's speech more substantially involved matters ofpublic concern.
FN11. Waldron testified that from what hehad learned of the events on October 7,Myers “was trying to stir up other peoplenot to accept the changes [transfers] thathad been made on the memorandum andthat were to be implemented.” App. 167. Inhis view, the questionnaire was a “final actof defiance” and that, as a result of Myers'action, “there were going to be somesevere problems about the changes.” Ibid.Connick testified that he reached a similarconclusion after conducting his own in-vestigation. “After I satisfied myself thatnot only wasn't she accepting the transferbut that she was affirmatively opposing itand disrupting the routine of the office bythis questionnaire, I called her in ... [anddismissed her].” App. 130.
FN12. Cf. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry LocalEd. Assn., ---U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 948,957, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (proof of fu-ture disruption not necessary to justifydenial of access to non-public forum ongrounds that the proposed use may disruptthe property's intended function.); Greer v.Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 10461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (same).
The District Court rejected Connick's positionbecause “unlike a statement of fact which might bedeemed critical of one's superiors, [Myers'] ques-tionnaire was not a statement of fact, but thepresentation and solicitation of ideas and opinions,”which are entitled to greater constitutional protec-tion because “under the First Amendment there isno such thing as a false idea.” 507 F.Supp., at 759.This approach, while perhaps relevant in weighingthe value of Myers' speech, bears no logical rela-tionship to the issue of whether the questionnaireundermined office relationships. Questions, no lessthan forcefully stated opinions and facts, carry mes-sages and it requires no unusual insight to concludethat the purpose, if not the likely result, of the ques-tionnaire is to seek to precipitate a vote of no con-fidence in Connick and his supervisors. Thus,Question 10, which asked whether or not the As-sistants had confidence in and relied on the word offive named supervisors, is a statement that carriesthe clear potential for undermining office relations.
Also relevant is the manner, time, and place inwhich the questionnaire was distributed. As notedin Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated SchoolDist., supra at 415, n. 4, 99 S.Ct., at 696, n. 4,“Private expression ... may in some situations bringadditional*153 factors to the Pickering calculus.When a government employee personally confrontshis immediate superior, the employing agency's in-stitutional efficiency may be threatened not only bythe content of the employee's message but also bythe manner, time, and place in which it is de-livered.” Here the questionnaire was prepared, anddistributed at the office; the manner of distributionrequired not only Myers to leave her work but forothers to do the same in order that the questionnairebe completed.FN13 Although some latitude inwhen official work is performed is to be allowedwhen professional employees are involved, andMyers did not violate announced office policyFN14, the fact that Myers, unlike Pickering, exer-cised her rights to speech at the office supports
Connick's fears that the functioning of his officewas endangered.
FN13. The record indicates that some,though not all, of the questionnaires weredistributed during lunch. Employee speechwhich transpires entirely on the employee'sown time, and in non-work areas of the of-fice, bring different factors into the Picker-ing calculus, and might lead to a differentconclusion. Cf. NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,415 U.S. 322, 94 S.Ct. 1099, 39 L.Ed.2d358 (1974).
FN14. The violation of such a rule wouldstrengthen Connick's position. See Mt.Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429U.S., at 284, 97 S.Ct., at 574.
Finally, the context in which the dispute aroseis also significant. This is not a case where an em-ployee, out of purely academic interest, circulated aquestionnaire so as to obtain useful research. Myersacknowledges that it is no coincidence that thequestionnaire followed upon the heels of the trans-fer notice. When employee speech concerning of-fice policy arises from an employment dispute con-cerning the very application of that policy to thespeaker, additional weight must be given to the su-pervisor's view that the employee has threatenedthe authority of the employer to run the office. Al-though we accept the District Court's factual find-ing that Myers' reluctance to accede to the transferorder was not a sufficient cause in itself for her dis-missal, and thus does not constitute a sufficient de-fense under *154Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471(1977), this does not render irrelevant the fact thatthe questionnaire emerged after a persistent disputebetween Myers and Connick and his deputies overoffice transfer policy.
IIIMyers' questionnaire touched upon matters of
public concern in only a most limited**1694 sense;her survey, in our view, is most accurately charac-
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 11461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
terized as an employee grievance concerning in-ternal office policy. The limited First Amendmentinterest involved here does not require that Connicktolerate action which he reasonably believed woulddisrupt the office, undermine his authority, and des-troy close working relationships. Myers' dischargetherefore did not offend the First Amendment. Wereiterate, however, the caveat we expressed in Pick-ering, supra, at 569, 88 S.Ct., at 1735: “Because ofthe enormous variety of fact situations in whichcritical statements by ... public employees may bethought by their superiors ... to furnish grounds fordismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate orfeasible to lay down a general standard againstwhich all such statements may be judged.”
Our holding today is grounded in our long-standing recognition that the First Amendment'sprimary aim is the full protection of speech upon is-sues of public concern, as well as the practical real-ities involved in the administration of a governmentoffice. Although today the balance is struck for thegovernment, this is no defeat for the First Amend-ment. For it would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory forthe great principles of free expression if theAmendment's safeguarding of a public employee'sright, as a citizen, to participate in discussions con-cerning public affairs were confused with the at-tempt to constitutionalize the employee grievancethat we see presented here. The judgment of theCourt of Appeals is
Reversed.
*155 APPENDIX AQuestionnaire distributed by respondent on Oc-
tober 7, 1980
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2, App. 191Please take the few minutes it will require to
fill this out. You can freely express your opinionWITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED.
1. How long have you been in the Office? _____
2. Were you moved as a result of the recent trans-
fers? _____
3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] youdiscussed with you by any superior prior to thenotice of them being posted? _____
4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they shouldhave been? _____
5. From your experience, do you feel office pro-cedure regarding transfers has been fair? _____
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active inthe office? _____
7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overallworking performance of A.D.A. personnel?_____
8. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] officemorale? _____
9. Do you generally first learn of office changesand developments through rumor? _____
10. Do you have confidence in and would yourely on the word of:
Bridget Bane _____
Fred Harper _____
Lindsay Larson _____
Joe Meyer _____
Dennis Waldron _____
11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in politic-al campaigns on behalf of office supported can-didates? _____
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would bea worthwhile addition to the office structure?_____
*156 13. How would you rate office morale?_____
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 12461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
14. Please feel free to express any comments orfeelings you have. _____
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATIONIN THIS SURVEY.
**1695 Justice BRENNAN, with whom JusticeMARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and JusticeSTEVENS join, dissenting.
Sheila Myers was discharged for circulating aquestionnaire to her fellow Assistant District Attor-neys seeking information about the effect of peti-tioner's personnel policies on employee morale andthe overall work performance of the District Attor-ney's Office. The Court concludes that her dis-missal does not violate the First Amendment,primarily because the questionnaire addresses mat-ters that, in the Court's view, are not of public con-cern. It is hornbook law, however, that speechabout “the manner in which government is operatedor should be operated” is an essential part of thecommunications necessary for self-governance theprotection of which was a central purpose of theFirst Amendment. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966).Because the questionnaire addressed such mattersand its distribution did not adversely affect the op-erations of the District Attorney's Office or inter-fere with Myers' working relationship with her fel-low employees, I dissent.
IThe Court correctly reaffirms the long estab-
lished principle that the government may not con-stitutionally compel persons to relinquish their FirstAmendment rights as a condition of public employ-ment. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.589, 605-606, 87 S.Ct. 675, 684-685, 17 L.Ed.2d629 (1967); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811(1968); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Pickeringheld that the First Amendment protects the rights ofpublic employees “as citizens to comment on mat-ters of public interest” in connection with the oper-ation of the government agencies for which they
work. 391 U.S., at 568, 88 S.Ct., at 1734. We re-cognized, however, that the *157 government haslegitimate interests in regulating the speech of itsemployees that differ significantly from its interestsin regulating the speech of people generally. Ibid.We therefore held that the scope of public employ-ees' First Amendment rights must be determined bybalancing “the interests of the [employee], as a cit-izen, in commenting upon matters of public concernand the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro-moting the efficiency of the public services it per-forms through its employees.” Ibid.
The balancing test articulated in Pickeringcomes into play only when a public employee'sspeech implicates the government's interests as anemployer. When public employees engage in ex-pression unrelated to their employment while awayfrom the work place, their First Amendment rightsare, of course, no different from those of the gener-al public. See id., at 574, 88 S.Ct., at 1737. Thus,whether a public employee's speech addresses amatter of public concern is relevant to the constitu-tional inquiry only when the statements at issue-byvirtue of their content or the context in which theywere made-may have an adverse impact on the gov-ernment's ability to perform its duties efficiently.FN1
FN1. Although the Court's opinion statesthat “if Myers' questionnaire cannot befairly characterized as constituting speechon a matter of public concern, it is unne-cessary for us to scrutinize the reasons forher discharge,” ante, at 1689-1690(footnote omitted), I do not understand itto imply that a governmental employee'sFirst Amendment rights outside the em-ployment context are limited to speech onmatters of public concern. To the extentthat the Court's opinion may be read tosuggest that the dismissal of a public em-ployee for speech unrelated to a subject ofpublic interest does not implicate FirstAmendment interests, I disagree, because
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 13461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
our cases establish that public employeesenjoy the full range of First Amendmentrights guaranteed to members of the gener-al public. Under the balancing test articu-lated in Pickering, however, the govern-ment's burden to justify such a dismissalmay be lighter. See infra, at 1699, n. 4.
The Court's decision today is flawed in threerespects. First, the Court distorts the balancing ana-lysis required under Pickering by suggesting thatone factor, the **1696 context in which a statementis made, is to be weighed twice-first in *158 de-termining whether an employee's speech addressesa matter of public concern and then in decidingwhether the statement adversely affected the gov-ernment's interest as an employer. See ante, at1690, 1693. Second, in concluding that the effect ofrespondent's personnel policies on employee moraleand the work performance of the District Attorney'sOffice is not a matter of public concern, the Courtimpermissibly narrows the class of subjects onwhich public employees may speak out without fearof retaliatory dismissal. See ante, at 1690-1691.Third, the Court misapplies the Pickering balancingtest in holding that Myers could constitutionally bedismissed for circulating a questionnaire addressedto at least one subject that was “a matter of interestto the community,” ante, at 1691, in the absence ofevidence that her conduct disrupted the efficientfunctioning of the District Attorney's Office.
IIThe District Court summarized the contents of
respondent's questionnaire as follows:
“Plaintiff solicited the views of her fellow Assist-ant District Attorneys on a number of issues, in-cluding office transfer policies and the manner inwhich information of that nature was communic-ated within the office. The questionnaire alsosought to determine the views of the Assistantsregarding office morale, the need for a grievancecommittee, and the level of confidence felt by theAssistants for their supervisors. Finally, the ques-tionnaire inquired as to whether the Assistants
felt pressured to work in political campaigns onbehalf of office-supported candidates.” 507F.Supp., at 758.
After reviewing the evidence, the DistrictCourt found that “[t]aken as a whole, the issuespresented in the questionnaire relate to the effectivefunctioning of the District Attorney's Office and arematters of public importance and concern.” Ibid.The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of *159the District Court's findings and conclusions. App.to Pet. for Cert. A-23. The Court nonetheless con-cludes that Myers' questions about the effect of pe-titioner's personnel policies on employee moraleand overall work performance are not “of publicimport in evaluating the performance of the DistrictAttorney as an elected official.” Ante, at 1690. In sodoing, it announces the following standard:“Whether an employee's statement addresses a mat-ter of public concern must be determined by thecontent, form and context of a given statement....”Ibid.
The standard announced by the Court suggeststhat the manner and context in which a statement ismade must be weighed on both sides of the Picker-ing balance. It is beyond dispute that how andwhere a public employee expresses his views arerelevant in the second half of the Pickering inquiry-determining whether the employee's speech ad-versely affects the government's interests as an em-ployer. The Court explicitly acknowledged this inGivhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis-trict, 439 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619(1979), where we stated that when a public employ-ee speaks privately to a supervisor, “the employingagency's institutional efficiency may be threatenednot only by the content of the ... message but alsoby the manner, time, and place in which it is de-livered.” Id., at 415, n. 4, 99 S.Ct., at 696, n. 4. Butthe fact that a public employee has chosen to ex-press his views in private has nothing whatsoever todo with the first half of the Pickering calculus-whether those views relate to a matter of publicconcern. This conclusion is implicit in Givhan's
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 14461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
holding that the freedom of speech guaranteed bythe First Amendment is not “lost to the public em-ployee who arranges to communicate privately withhis employer rather than to spread his views beforethe public.” Id., at 415-416, 99 S.Ct., at 696-697.
The Court seeks to distinguish Givhan on theground that speech protesting racial **1697 dis-crimination is “inherently of public concern.” Ante,at 1691, n. 8. In so doing, it suggests that there aretwo classes of speech of public concern: statements“of public import” because of their content, formand context,*160 and statements that, by virtue oftheir subject matter, are “inherently of public con-cern.” In my view, however, whether a particularstatement by a public employee is addressed to asubject of public concern does not depend on whereit was said or why. The First Amendment affordsspecial protection to speech that may inform publicdebate about how our society is to be governed-re-gardless of whether it actually becomes the subjectof a public controversy.FN2
FN2. Although the parties offered no evid-ence on whether the subjects addressed bythe questionnaire were, in fact, matters ofpublic concern, extensive local press cov-erage shows that the issues involved are ofinterest to the people of Orleans Parish.Shortly after the District Court took thecase under advisement, a major dailynewspaper in New Orleans carried a seven-paragraph story describing the question-naire, the events leading to Myers' dis-missal, and the filing of this action. TheTimes Picayune/The States Item, Dec. 6,1980, section 1, p. 21, col. 1. The samenewspaper also carried a sixteen-paragraphstory when the District Court ruled in My-ers' favor, Feb. 11, 1981, section 1, p. 15,col. 2; a nine-paragraph story when theCourt of Appeals affirmed the DistrictCourt's decision, July 28, 1981, section 1,p. 11, col. 1; a twelve-paragraph storywhen this Court granted Connick's petition
for certiorari, March 9, 1982, section 1, p.15, col. 5.; and a seventeen-paragraphstory when we heard oral argument, Nov.9, 1982, section 1, p. 13, col. 5.
In addition, matters affecting the internaloperations of the Orleans Parish DistrictAttorney's Office often receive extensivecoverage in the same newspaper. For ex-ample, The Times Picayune/The StatesItem carried a lengthy story reportingthat the agency moved to “plush new of-fices,” and describing in detail the“privacy problem” faced by AssistantDistrict Attorneys because the Officewas unable to obtain modular furniturewith which to partition its new space.January 25, 1981, section 8, p. 13, col. 1.It also carried a sixteen-paragraph storywhen a committee of the Louisiana StateSenate voted to prohibit petitioner fromretaining a public relations specialist. Ju-ly 9, 1982, section 1, p. 14, col. 1.
In light of the public's interest in the op-erations of the District Attorney's Officein general, and in the dispute betweenthe parties in particular, it is quite pos-sible that, contrary to Court's view, ante,at 1690-1691, Myers' comments con-cerning morale and working conditionsin the Office would actually have en-gaged the public's attention had shestated them publicly. Moreover, as ageneral matter, the media frequentlycarry news stories reporting that person-nel policies in effect at a governmentagency have resulted in declining em-ployee morale and deteriorating agencyperformance.
“[S]peech concerning public affairs is morethan self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” *161Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 215-216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125(1965). “The maintenance of the opportunity for
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 15461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
free political discussion to the end that the govern-ment may be responsive to the will of the peopleand that changes may be obtained by lawful means,an opportunity essential to the security of the Re-public, is a fundamental principle of our constitu-tional system.” Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 536, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931).
We have long recognized that one of the cent-ral purposes of the First Amendment's guarantee offreedom of expression is to protect the dissemina-tion of information on the basis of which membersof our society may make reasoned decisions aboutthe government. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S., at218-219, 86 S.Ct., at 1436-1437; New York TimesCo. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-270, 84 S.Ct.710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). See A. Miekle-john, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 22-27 (1948). “No aspect of that con-stitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured thanits protection of the ability of our people throughfree and open debate to consider and resolve theirown destiny.” Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417U.S. 843, 862, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 2821, 41 L.Ed.2d 514(1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting).
Unconstrained discussion concerning the man-ner in which the government performs its duties isan essential element of the public discourse neces-sary to informed self-government.
“Whatever differences may exist about inter-pretations of the First Amendment, **1698 thereis practically universal agreement that a majorpurpose of that Amendment was the free discus-sion of governmental affairs. This of course in-cludes discussions of candidates, structures andforms of government, the manner in which gov-ernment is operated or should be operated, andall such matters relating to political processes.”Mills v. Alabama, supra, at 218-219, 86 S.Ct., at1436-1437 (emphasis added).
*162 The constitutionally protected right tospeak out on governmental affairs would be mean-ingless if it did not extend to statements expressing
criticism of governmental officials. In New YorkTimes Co. v. Sullivan, supra, we held that the Con-stitution prohibits an award of damages in a libelaction brought by a public official for criticism ofhis official conduct absent a showing that the falsestatements at issue were made with “actual malice.”384 U.S., at 279-280, 84 S.Ct., at 725-726. Westated there that the First Amendment expresses “aprofound national commitment to the principle thatdebate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-bust, and wide-open, and that it may well includevehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantlysharp attacks on government and public officials.”Id., at 270, 84 S.Ct., at 720. See Garrison v. Louisi-ana, 379 U.S., at 76, 85 S.Ct., at 216.
In Pickering we held that the First Amendmentaffords similar protection to critical statements by apublic school teacher directed at the Board of Edu-cation for whom he worked. 391 U.S., at 574, 88S.Ct., at 1737. In so doing, we recognized that “freeand open debate” about the operation of publicschools “is vital to informed decision-making bythe electorate.” Id., at 571-572, 88 S.Ct., at 1736.We also acknowledged the importance of allowingteachers to speak out on school matters.
“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a com-munity most likely to have informed and definiteopinions as to how funds allocated to the opera-tion of the schools should be spent. Accordingly,it is essential that they be able to speak out freelyon such matters without fear of retaliatory dis-missal.” Id., at 572, 88 S.Ct., at 1736.
See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 228,94 S.Ct. 1633, 1680, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974)(MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (describing “[t]he im-portance of Government employees being assuredof their right to freely comment on the conduct ofGovernment, to inform the public of abuses ofpower and of the misconduct of their superiors ...”).
*163 Applying these principles, I would holdthat Myers' questionnaire addressed matters of pub-lic concern because it discussed subjects that could
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 16461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
reasonably be expected to be of interest to personsseeking to develop informed opinions about themanner in which the Orleans Parish District Attor-ney, an elected official charged with managing a vi-tal governmental agency, discharges his responsib-ilities. The questionnaire sought primarily to obtaininformation about the impact of the recent transferson morale in the District Attorney's Office. It isbeyond doubt that personnel decisions that ad-versely affect discipline and morale may ultimatelyimpair an agency's efficient performance of its du-ties. See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 168, 94 S.Ct.,at 1651 (Opinion of POWELL, J.). Because I be-lieve the First Amendment protects the right ofpublic employees to discuss such matters so that thepublic may be better informed about how their elec-ted officials fulfill their responsibilities, I would af-firm the District Court's conclusion that the ques-tionnaire related to matters of public importanceand concern.
The Court's adoption of a far narrower concep-tion of what subjects are of public concern seemsprompted by its fears that a broader view “wouldmean that virtually every remark-and certainlyevery criticism directed at a public official-wouldplant the seed of a constitutional case.” Ante, at1691. Obviously, not every remark directed at apublic official by a public employee is protected bythe First **1699 Amendment FN3. But decidingwhether a particular matter is of public concern isan inquiry that, by its very nature, is a sensitive onefor judges charged with interpreting a constitutionalprovision intended to put “the decision as to whatviews shall be *164 voiced largely into the hands ofeach of us....” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24,91 S.Ct. 1780, 1788, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). FN4
The Court recognized the sensitive nature of thisdetermination in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974),which held that the scope of the constitutional priv-ilege in defamation cases turns on whether or notthe plaintiff is a public figure, not on whether thestatements at issue address a subject of public con-cern. In so doing, the Court referred to the
“difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to de-cide on an ad hoc basis which publications addressissues of ‘general or public interest’ and which donot,” and expressed “doubt [about] the wisdom ofcommitting this task to the conscience of judges.”Id., at 346, 94 S.Ct., at 3010. See also Rosenbloomv. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79, 91 S.Ct.1811, 1837, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (MARSHALL,J., dissenting). In making such a delicate inquiry,we must bear in mind that “the citizenry is the finaljudge of the proper conduct of public business.”Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,495, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1046, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975).
FN3. Perhaps the simplest example of astatement by a public employee that wouldnot be protected by the First Amendmentwould be answering “No” to a request thatthe employee perform a lawful task withinthe scope of his duties. Although such a re-fusal is “speech,” which implicates FirstAmendment interests, it is also insubordin-ation, and as such it may serve as the basisfor a lawful dismissal.
FN4. Indeed, it has been suggested that “aclassification that bases the right to FirstAmendment protection on some estimateof how much general interest there is in thecommunication is surely in conflict withthe whole idea of the First Amendment.”T. Emerson, The System of Freedom ofExpression 554 (1970). The degree towhich speech is of interest to the publicmay be relevant in determining whether apublic employer may constitutionally berequired to tolerate some degree of disrup-tion resulting from its utterance. See ante,at 1692-1693. In general, however, wheth-er a government employee's speech is of“public concern” must be determined byreference to the broad conception of theFirst Amendment's guarantee of freedomof speech found necessary by the Framers
“to supply the public need for informa-
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 17461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
tion and education with respect to thesignificant issues of the times.... Free-dom of discussion, if it would fill its his-toric function in this nation, must em-brace all issues about which informationis needed or appropriate to enable themembers of society to cope with the exi-gencies of their period.” Thornhill v.Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct.736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940)(footnote omitted).
See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,388, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1371, 8 L.Ed.2d 569(1962).
The Court's decision ignores these precepts.Based on its own narrow conception of which mat-ters are of public concern, the Court implicitly de-termines that information concerning*165 employ-ee morale at an important government office willnot inform public debate. To the contrary, the FirstAmendment protects the dissemination of such in-formation so that the people, not the courts, mayevaluate its usefulness. The proper means to ensurethat the courts are not swamped with routine em-ployee grievances mischaracterized as FirstAmendment cases is not to restrict artificially theconcept of “public concern,” but to require that ad-equate weight be given to the public's important in-terests in the efficient performance of governmentalfunctions and in preserving employee disciplineand harmony sufficient to achieve that end. See partIII, infra.FN5
FN5. The Court's narrow conception ofwhich matters are of public interest is alsoinconsistent with the broad view of thatconcept articulated in our cases dealingwith the constitutional limits on liabilityfor invasion of privacy. In Time, Inc. v.Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17L.Ed.2d 456 (1967), we held that a defend-ant may not constitutionally be held liablefor an invasion of privacy resulting fromthe publication of a false or misleading re-
port of “matters of public interest” in theabsence of proof that the report was pub-lished with knowledge of its falsity orreckless disregard for its truth. Id., at389-391, 87 S.Ct., at 542-543. In that ac-tion, Hill had sought damages resultingfrom the publication of an allegedly falsereport that a new play portrayed the experi-ence of him and his family when they wereheld hostage in their home in a publicizedincident years earlier. We entertained “nodoubt that ... the opening of a new playlinked to an actual incident is a matter ofpublic interest.” Id., at 388, 87 S.Ct., at542. See also Cox Broadcasting Co. v.Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43L.Ed.2d 328 (1975) (holding that a radiostation could not constitutionally be heldliable for broadcasting the name of a rapevictim, because the victim's name was con-tained in public records). Our discussion inTime, Inc. v. Hill of the breadth of the FirstAmendment's protections is directly relev-ant here:
“The guarantees of speech and press arenot the preserve of political expressionor comment upon public affairs, essen-tial as those are to healthy government.One need only pick up any newspaper tocomprehend the vast range of publishedmatter which exposes persons to publicview, both private citizens and public of-ficials.... ‘Freedom of discussion, if itwould fulfill its historic function in thisnation, must embrace all issues aboutwhich information is needed to copewith the exigencies of their period.’Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102[60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093]. ‘Nosuggestion can be found in the Constitu-tion that the freedom there guaranteedfor speech and the press bears an inverseratio to the timeliness and the import-ance of the ideas seeking expression.’
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 18461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269[62 S.Ct. 190, 196, 86 L.Ed. 192].” 385U.S., at 388, 87 S.Ct., at 542.
The quoted passage makes clear that,contrary to the Court's view, ante, at1688, n. 5, the subjects touched upon inrespondent's questionnaire fall within thebroad conception of “matters of publicinterest” that defines the scope of theconstitutional privilege in invasion ofprivacy cases. See Restatement (Second)of Torts § 652D, comment j (1977):
“The scope of a matter of legitimate con-cern to the public is not limited to‘news,’ in the sense of reports of currentevents or activities. It extends also to theuse of names, likenesses or facts in giv-ing information to the public for pur-poses of education, amusement or en-lightenment, when the public may reas-onably be expected to have a legitimateinterest in what is published.”
*166 **1700 IIIAlthough the Court finds most of Myers' ques-
tionnaire unrelated to matters of public interest, itdoes hold that one question-asking whether Assist-ants felt pressured to work in political campaignson behalf of office-supported candidates-addresseda matter of public importance and concern. TheCourt also recognizes that this determination ofpublic interest must weigh heavily in the balancingof competing interests required by Pickering. Hav-ing gone that far however, the Court misapplies thePickering test and holds-against our previous au-thorities-that a public employer's mere apprehen-sion that speech will be disruptive justifies suppres-sion of that speech when all the objective evidencesuggests that those fears are essentially unfounded.
Pickering recognized the difficulty of articulat-ing “a general standard against which all ... state-ments may be judged,” 391 U.S., at 569, 88 S.Ct.,at 1735; it did, however, identify a number of
factors that may affect the balance in particularcases. Those relevant here are whether the state-ments are directed to persons with whom the speak-er “would normally be in contact in the course ofhis daily work”; whether they had an adverse effecton “discipline by intermediate supervisors or har-mony among coworkers”; whether the employmentrelationship in question is “the kind ... for which itcan persuasively*167 be claimed that personal loy-alty and confidence are necessary to their properfunctioning”; and whether the statements “have inany way impeded [the employee's] proper perform-ance of his daily duties ... or ... interfered with theregular operations of the [office].” Id., at 568-573,88 S.Ct., at 1734-1737. In addition, in Givhan, werecognized that when the statements in question aremade in private to an employee's immediate super-visor, “the employing agency's institutional effi-ciency may be threatened not only by the content ofthe ... message but also by the manner, time, andplace in which it is delivered.” 439 U.S., at 415, n.4, 99 S.Ct., at 696, n. 4. See ante, at 1687-2688.
The District Court weighed all of the relevantfactors identified by our cases. It found that peti-tioner failed to establish that Myers violated eithera duty of confidentiality or an office policy. 507F.Supp., at 758-759. Noting that most of the ques-tionnaires were distributed during lunch, it rejectedthe contention that the distribution of the question-naire impeded**1701 Myers' performance of herduties, and it concluded that “Connick has notshown any evidence to indicate that the plaintiff'swork performance was adversely affected by herexpression.” Id., at 754-755, 759 (emphasis sup-plied).
The Court accepts all of these findings. Seeante, at 1692. It concludes, however, that the Dis-trict Court failed to give adequate weight to thecontext in which the questionnaires were distrib-uted and to the need to maintain close working rela-tionships in the District Attorney's Office. In partic-ular, the Court suggests the District Court failed togive sufficient weight to the disruptive potential of
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 19461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Question 10, which asked whether the Assistantshad confidence in the word of five named super-visors. Ante, at 1693. The District Court, however,explicitly recognized that this was petitioner's“most forceful argument”; but after hearing thetestimony of four of the five supervisors named inthe question, it found that the question had no ad-verse effect on Myers' relationship with her superi-ors. 507 F.Supp., at 759.
*168 To this the Court responds that an em-ployer need not wait until the destruction of work-ing relationships is manifest before taking action. Inthe face of the District Court's finding that the cir-culation of the questionnaire had no disruptive ef-fect, the Court holds that respondent may be dis-missed because petitioner “reasonably believed [theaction] would disrupt the office, undermine his au-thority and destroy close working relationships.”Ante, at 1694. Even though the District Court foundthat the distribution of the questionnaire did not im-pair Myers' working relationship with her super-visors, the Court bows to petitioner's judgment be-cause “[w]hen close working relationships are es-sential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a widedegree of deference to the employer's judgment isappropriate.” Ante, at 1692.
Such extreme deference to the employer's judg-ment is not appropriate when public employeesvoice critical views concerning the operations ofthe agency for which they work. Although an em-ployer's determination that an employee's state-ments have undermined essential working relation-ships must be carefully weighed in the Pickeringbalance, we must bear in mind that “the threat ofdismissal from public employment is ... a potentmeans of inhibiting speech.” Pickering, supra, at574, 88 S.Ct., at 1737. See Keyishian v. Board ofRegents, supra, 385 U.S., at 604, 87 S.Ct., at 684. Ifthe employer's judgment is to be controlling, publicemployees will not speak out when what they haveto say is critical of their supervisors. In order toprotect public employees' First Amendment right tovoice critical views on issues of public importance,
the courts must make their own appraisal of the ef-fects of the speech in question.
In this regard, our decision in Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Community School District,393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969),is controlling. Tinker arose in a public school, acontext similar to the one in which the present casearose in that the determination of the scope of theConstitution's guarantee of freedom of speech re-quired consideration of the “special *169 character-istics of the ... environment” in which the expres-sion took place. See id., at 506, 89 S.Ct., at 736. Atissue was whether public high school studentscould constitutionally be prohibited from wearingblack armbands in school to express their opposi-tion to the Vietnam conflict. The District Court hadruled that such a ban “was reasonable because itwas based on [school officials'] fear of a disturb-ance from the wearing of armbands.” Id., at 508, 89S.Ct., at 737. We found that justification inad-equate, because “in our system, undifferentiatedfear or apprehension of a disturbance is not enoughto overcome the right to freedom of expression.”Ibid. We concluded:
“In order for the State ... to justify prohibitionof a particular expression of opinion, it must beable to show that its action was caused bysomething more than a mere desire to avoid thediscomfort and unpleasantness that always ac-company**1702 an unpopular viewpoint. Cer-tainly where there is no finding and no showingthat engaging in the forbidden conduct would“materially and substantially interfere with therequirements of appropriate discipline in the op-eration of the school,” the prohibition cannot besustained.” Id., at 509, 89 S.Ct., at 738 (emphasissupplied) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d744, 749 (CA5 1966)).
Because the speech at issue addressed mattersof public importance, a similar standard should beapplied here. After reviewing the evidence, the Dis-trict Court found that “it cannot be said that the de-fendant's interest in promoting the efficiency of the
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 20461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
public services performed through his employeeswas either adversely affected or substantially im-peded by plaintiff's distribution of the question-naire.” 507 F.Supp., at 759. Based on these findingsthe District Court concluded that the circulation ofthe questionnaire was protected by the FirstAmendment. The District Court applied the properlegal standard and reached an acceptable accom-modation between the competing interests. I wouldaffirm its decision and the judgment of the Court ofAppeals.
*170 IVThe Court's decision today inevitably will deter
public employees from making critical statementsabout the manner in which government agencies areoperated for fear that doing so will provoke theirdismissal. As a result, the public will be deprived ofvaluable information with which to evaluate theperformance of elected officials. Because protect-ing the dissemination of such information is an es-sential function of the First Amendment, I dissent.
U.S.,1983.Connick v. Myers461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1IER Cases 178
END OF DOCUMENT
103 S.Ct. 1684 Page 21461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 1 IER Cases 178(Cite as: 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684)
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
