What is the meta-history?

What is Meta-History?

Jörn Rüsen:

What is the Meta-History?

Approaching a Comprehensive Theory

of Historical Studies

The title of my paper already gives an

answer to the question what meta-history

is: meta-history is the theory of historical

studies. But what does theory mean and

what historical studies? Theory is a form of

cognition and knowledge, characterized by

generalizing statements, and therefore it is

an abstraction from concrete, single and

unique phenomena. We find it in the

knowledge of everyday-life and in all

academic disciplines.

Here, in the academic disciplines, it is a

matter of controversy, whether all

disciplines really have theoretical elements

and use theories. The dominant philosophy

of history in the second half of the 19th

century e.g. (Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey)

made a sharp distinction between

individualizing and generalizing modes of

thought and used this distinction to

illuminate the specific nature of the

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humanities, mainly all disciplines which are

dealing with history.

I think that the difference between

theoretical and a- or non-theoretical

disciplines or sciences (in the broader

meaning of the word science) is completely

misleading. Why? Even in those disciplines

like historical studies, where abstract

theories are not the main purpose of their

cognitive work, we will find generalizing

statements as necessary elements for

describing and explaining the events of the

past and their temporal order. Max Weber

illuminated these theoretical elements as

ideal types, which are necessary to

conceptualize the individuality of historical

phenomena by means of a certain kind of

theorizing.

But the theoretical status of meta-history is

different. It has a reflective nature; it is a

theory about the cognitive forms and

procedures of historical thinking. If one

concedes that historical thinking uses

theoretical elements, meta-history even is a

theory about theory. That exactly is

indicated by the formulation "meta".

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Thus meta-history reflects history, - history

not as something which happened in the

past, but as a way of dealing with the past,

of making sense of experiencing it for the

purpose of orienting the people of the

present in the temporal dimension of their

lives.

Meta-history reflects the mental procedures

and structures of making sense of the

experience of the past. It draws a mental or

intellectual map of historical consciousness.

This reflection and mapping does not refer

to all dimensions and activities of historical

consciousness, but concentrates on its

specific manifestation in historical studies

as an institutionalized form of historical

thinking. In the non-English speaking world

this institutionalized form is called 'science'.

So meta-history is a space for the discourse

on the question whether history is a science

or not. If it is a science, what then is its

distinctive nature when comparing it with

other academic disciplines, mainly the

natural sciences?

With this concentration on the ' scientific'

character of historical thinking meta-history

has got a place in the work of the

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professional historians, mainly when

explaining the rules of historical method.

This has led to a narrowing of the scope of

understanding what historical thinking is

about. Without a more general and

fundamental insight into the mental and

intellectual work of historical consciousness

there is no clear idea of what its activities

in the professional form of an academic

discipline actually are. This argument

indicates my way of conceptualizing meta-

history. It reflects all those mental elements

and principles which constitute historical

thinking. So it only considers 'thinking' (or

to be more precise: it inquires into sense-

making, since this includes the work of a

literary forming, which indeed refers less to

cognitive elements than to esthetic ones). It

addresses its context in the social life of the

people and all social, political and economic

conditions, under which history is

performed in human life; but this applies

only to a performance in respect to its

importance for thinking, cognition, and

sense-formation. Meta-history starts its

reflective work with the fundamental and

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general question: "what makes sense in

historical thinking?"

In order to find an answer to this question

for the basic category of historical sense, it

is useful to distinguish single elements of

sense generation in general and applying

them to the special field of historical

consciousness.

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Sense making is a dynamic procedure of

the human mind, which can be described in

an abstract way as a process which leads

from perception and experience to

interpretation, which produces knowledge,

and from interpretation to orientation,

which uses knowledge for understanding

the problems of human life, and, finally,

from orientation to motivation, which gives

the human will a direction, a purpose and

an aim.

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This complex interrelationship of basic

principles of human sense generation can

be picked up and transformed into a similar

abstract scheme of basic principles and

activities of historical consciousness. This

scheme refers to the special form of

historical thinking, which is typical for its

modern academic character. It should

express the idea of historical thinking as a

process of cognition, which starts from a

question and ends in an answer. Question

and answer can be related to the social and

cultural context, within which the process of

cognition takes place and which has an

impact on it. At the same time the step

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from this context to the specific procedures

of historical research and of history writing

could be marked.

So the beginning of meta-history should be

a reflection on the beginning of the

activities of the human mind in respect to

the challenge of specific mental operations:

I mean the operations which can only find

an answer by referring to the perception

and experience of the human past in a

cognitive manner.

This challenge can be identified as needs

for orientation in the temporal dimension of

human life. In every human life form these

needs are permanently produced by the

experiences of temporal changes, to which

the affected people have to adjust their

lives. In the specific view on historical

studies they acquire the form of interests,

which demand cognition

(Erkenntnisinteressen). History as 'science'

is the result of a fundamental

transformation of needs for orientation into

interests for cognition.

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These needs and interests give the human

mind the direction towards the past, which

brings the past into a perspective, within

which it receives meaning and becomes a

matter of understanding. The past in itself

is not history; it acquires this character

within a perspective, which relates it to the

present and to the future perspective of

human life. Here is the place where

fundamental questions, what history in

general is about, have to be discussed.

Philosophy of history becomes visible as an

integral part of the work of the professional

historians. That does not mean they have to

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turn into a philosophers as such; but that

their work can't be understood without an

impact of philosophical presuppositions

concerning the meaning of the past as

history. General periodizations covering the

whole realm of historical experience are

here at stake as well.

But not only general philosophical questions

or comprehensive periodizations fall into

this realm of meta-history. In the specific

work of professional historians concepts of

interpretation play an enormous role. They

stem from the leading questions they want

to answer. A well known example is the

theory of modernization or –to say it in a

more updated way– modernizations in

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modern history. These concepts have their

own logical form, namely that of a more or

less articulated hypothesis. 'Science'

endows concepts of interpretation with a

theoretical form, in which they function by

opening the realm of historical experience

according to the research guiding

questions. It is them which define what

constitutes a historical source. Many history

teachers in school and university tell their

students that proper historical thinking

starts with the sources. But what is a

source? In general: all relicts from the past,

everything which can give information of

what, when, where, and why happened in

the past. But historical thinking has to

select the relevant sources for the required

information; for this selection a filter is

necessary and a criterion, which may

decide upon what is relevant and important

and what is not. This filter and this criterion

have a theoretical status in relation to the

information furnished by the sources.

Concepts of interpretation and more or less

theoretically explicated perspectives are

only insofar useful as they disclose relevant

source material, which can be used to get

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the information about the past to answer

the question at the beginning of the

cognition-process. Historical perspectives

are only meaningful, if they become - so to

speak -filled with evidence. Historical

thinking without evidence of what

happened in the past is senseless.

Historical sense and meaning demand

evidence as a necessary condition for the

possibility of any form of historical

knowledge. Therefore the approach to

evidence and its content of information

about the past is a necessary principle and

procedure of historical thinking. It has its

own logic. It is the logic of making

statements plausible by referring to so-

called facts. These facts are not simply

given, they don´t lie around in the open,

but they have to be brought about by

dealing with all the materials in which the

past is still present.

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Here is the place in the mental map of

historical thinking where the essence of its

modern ' scientific' character is located: the

methodical rules of historical research.

From their very beginning as an academic

discipline till today historical studies are

characterized as an academic discipline and

distinguished as professional. From all other

ways of doing history it differs by its ability

to gain solid historical knowledge by

research. Research is a way of dealing with

the evidence of the past. It brings about

new knowledge of what happened, and

when and where and why it did so.

Research endows this knowledge with a

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certain reliability, namely that of being

based on evidence.

This knowledge always has its specific –

namely historical – form. It can only be

sufficiently analyzed when it is shaped

according to this specific form usually

called historiography. This form has its

specific logic as well, which is

fundamentally different from the logic of

theoretical conceptualization and empirical

research. It is the narrative logic of telling a

story.

The difference and the interrelationship

between gaining knowledge by research

and presenting it in a historiographical form

is a highly controversial issue of meta-

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history. Nobody can deny that two

principles exist -method and representation

- but since both govern clearly different

logics, it is anything but clear how they are

synthesized on the logical basis of historical

thinking. Many theoretists today think that

interpretation is nothing but re-

presentation. Thus they radically deny the

'scientific' character of historical studies

and position historical thinking only in a

place in literature. On the other hand

professional historians insist on rational

procedures of gaining solid knowledge out

of the sources and deny any logical

supremacy of narration over all single

procedures.

It is the task of meta-history today to

recognize these contradictions and to show

that the narrative structure of historical

knowledge does not oppose the rationality

of methodical research. Neither does it

exclude elements of rational argumentation

from historical presentation.

The reconstruction of the main principles of

historical sense generation would be

incomplete if the function of

historiographically presented historical

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knowledge were omitted. It is the function

which decides whether the thought-

provoking needs for orientation - or more

specifically: interests in historical

knowledge - are fulfilled or not. Then the

results of the process of generating

meaning out of the experience of the past

may come to an end (and immediately start

again with new questions). As all other

constitutive principles that one of the

function of historical knowledge in practical

life has its own specific logic. It is the logic

of serving practical life by cultural

orientation. It makes historical knowledge

effective. Regarding the rational status of

historical studies, this logic furnishes

historical knowledge with elements of

'practical truth'. This truth criterion can be

clearly (in respect to its logic) distinguished

from the empirical and theoretical truth of

research as well as from the criteria of a

convincing re-presentation.

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Here the issue of identity plays an

important role. Without a historical

reference to the past the question who we

are, to whom we belong and who the others

are, with whom we have to live together

cannot be answered. Every piece of

historical knowledge contributes to this

answer. Very often this does not occur

directly, but only mediated, and more or

less disconnected from identity politics.

Looking at the function of historical thinking

in its cultural context and realizing the close

connection between functions and needs,

we become aware that the cognitive

dimension of historical thinking is

fundamentally related to non-cognitive

ones, - mainly (but not exclusively) to a

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political one (an esthetic dimension is

already apparent in the principle of

historiographical forming). The motivational

forces of the human mind can't be

overlooked when focussing on the roots of

historical thinking and its role in practical

life. This makes politics constitutive for

historical cognition (but only as one factor

besides others)..

What now is the specific role of academic or

' scientific' argumentation in this field of

practical life? It is not at all separated from

it, but is rooted in it and needed by it. Its

necessity is based on a fundamental need

for the reliability of historical knowledge in

human life. Historical studies with its

emphasis on evidence and its explanatory

interpretation plays an important role in

giving reasons and in criticizing the claim

for plausibility in historical presentations. -

It is the advantage of this concept of meta-

history to emphasize the interrelationship

between the cognitive work of the

professional historians and the role history

plays in practical life. We can't understand

the specific logic of historical cognition

without knowing how it is rooted in and

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refers to cultural life. The usual distinction

between serving life purposes

(Lebensdienlichkeit) and claims for

rationality and even objectivity is

completely misleading. We come much

closer to the reality of doing history when

we consider their mutual dependence, and

at the same time those areas of historical

thinking where not primarily practical

purposes are pursued. Here the

commitment to empirical and theoretical

evidence may play the foremost role.

Till now my argumentation has emphasized

different logics as necessary factors of

historical thinking. Each of the five

enumerated principles have a different

logic: each is necessary, and all five

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together are sufficient for reconstructing

and explaining what constitutes historical

thinking as a mental activity with special

respect to historical studies. Therefore I

think that my concept of meta-history is

comprehensive indeed. It can claim for a

systemic order covering the issue of

historical thinking in all its relevant

dimensions.

The sequence of these logics might give a

misleading impression, since from the very

beginning they are interrelated, but without

giving them this sequential order, the

internal (even logical) dynamics in historical

thinking would not have become visible.

But how are these logics interrelated? This

question cannot be answered without a

systematic reconstruction of the discursive

form of historical thinking and their specific

logic of communication. In a very schematic

way these forms of communication can be

described as dominating a section in the

space where the different principles of

historical sense generation are mediated.:

1. Needs for orientation and concept of

historical understanding are systematically

interrelated in a discourse of symbolization,

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where ' history' is defined as a cultural unit

in human life orientation.

2. Concepts of historical understanding and

rules for treating the sources are

systematically mediated by a strategy of

cognition. Here the approach to evidence in

historical perspective is the dominating

issue.

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3. Rules for treating the sources in a

historical perspective and forms of

representation are mediated by a strategy

of esthetics. It is this strategy which

enables empirical knowledge about the

human past to the historiographical

representation of the past.

4. Forms of representation and functions of

orientation are mediated by a strategy of

rhetoric. With this strategy the

historiographically represented past can

play a role in the historical culture of the

present.

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5. Functions of orientation and needs for

orientation are mediated by a discourse of

memory politics and identity formation in

practical life. Here the role of historical

knowledge in practical life is at stake.

In these five views at the discursive and

communicative dynamics of historical

thinking become visible. But the proper

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understanding of this dynamics would be

impossible if the role of human subjectivity

in making sense of history did not undergo

some differentiation concerning its

dimensions. Today everybody is convinced

that it is the human mind which brings

about the meaning of history. Sense

generation is mainly, if not exclusively,

seen as a cultural issue of the presence

referring to the past. Thus by the mental

creativity of historically minded people

history is completely determined. This

determination can be called constructivism.

Its essence holds that history is nothing but

a construction of the past brought about in

the present. The past has no voice of its

own in the sense generating process of

historical thinking. It is nothing but a

soundboard for the tunes that people of

today want to hear in order to place

themselves into the course of time.

Is this true? Is the past really voiceless?

Using the scheme of historical sense

generation we can easily show that matters

are much more complicated. At least three

different dimensions of pursuing the

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process of historical sense generation can

be distinguished.

1. The first one is the level where the

dominance of human subjectivity is evident.

It is the level of (re-)construction. The whole

process of conceptualizing historical

perspectives, of working with the sources

and of forming historical knowledge

historiographically is governed by the

intellectual capacities of the historians.

2. But what about the influence of the

context, within which these capacities were

used? What about important criteria and

modes of discourse and even the whole

culture of their terms of doing history?

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Arent´t they already pregiven in the

cultural life, of which the historians

themselves are a part of? And is the past

not already present in these circumstances

and conditions of the historical thinking of

the present? In order to make this evident it

is useful to distinguish a level of historical

sense generation where the effectivity of its

conditions and circumstances is

dominating. I would like to call it the level of

practical life or of functioning historical

sense generation. Here the historians as

constructors of historical meaning

themselves are constructed; they are

offspring 'children of their time'.

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3. Both levels are interrelated, and it is

useful to distinguish another level of its

own, artificially separated from the two

others, where this interrelationship takes

place. It is the level of pragmatism where

the constructors interfere in those

processes where the constructing of the

constructors takes place. The historians are

activists of historical culture on the level of

theoretical reflection; yet, on the level of

pragmatic reconstruction they are still

actors, but no longer the masters of what

takes place here in the public and private

life. They are the actors who rewrite their

pregiven roles on the stage of history

without being able to rewrite the whole

screenplay. And they have no chance or

possibility of changing or stepping out of it.

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This brings me to the last point of my

concept of meta-history. When we look at

the three different dimensions in which

historical sense generation takes place, we

know that their distinction is artificial, that

they are three angles of one comprehensive

process. How can we characterize their

systemic interrelatedness and internal

unity? It is the unity of the creative process

of historical sense generation, that is when

historians do their work in the context of

the historical culture of their time. Sense

takes place before and beyond it is noticed

and reflected and handled by the historians.

They execute it in their practical work, and

by doing so it becomes a matter of their

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creativity, but, nevertheless, at the same

time they remain but performers

(executors) of sense.

Doing and be done coincide in the absolute

presence of sense during the actual

performance and practise of historical

thinking. Doing history in the human mind

is a part of history as the temporal

execution of human life. This very history is

different from the history the historians

address, research and re-present. It is so–

to-speak history in and as presence. Only

afterwards it can be reflected in its

complicated temporal dimension. As such

this can't be thought because thinking

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already raises it to the status of the subject

matter of thinking. It is no longer left in the

status of its actualperformance and action,

of its doing and being done. It is un-pre-

thinkable. In this fascinating ontological

status of unpre-thinkability it is a real basis,

the ground for any historical sense-

generating by historical thinking.

This is an epistemological argument, which

transgresses the cognition process, and

even the traditional philosophy of history

(in both forms: concerning what happened

in the past and what afterwards is said

about and understood by it). Nevertheless,

here we have the logical consequence of an

analysis of the the historians´ intellectual

work of when they want to come to terms

with the past in order to serve the cultural

orientation of the presence for the sake of

the future. Of course, I am full aware that

by speaking about this unprethinkability I

am, at the same time, approaching the end

of thinking about historical thinking, of

meta-history. Nonetheless, I have tried my

best to cope with what has been left to us.

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What is the meta-history?

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