WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT AEGOSPOTAMI ?

L’Antiquité Classique

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT AEGOSPOTAMI ?Author(s): Graham WylieSource: L’Antiquité Classique, T. 55 (1986), pp. 125-141Published by: L’Antiquité ClassiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41656345 .

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WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT AEGOSPOTAMI ? *

In 408 B.C. the outcome of the Peloponnesian War still hung in the balance. The Athenians had rallied amazingly after the terrible disaster in Sicily, but their empire in the Aegean was now under challenge, and many of their Ionian allies were in revolt. But the defector Alkibiades, having embroiled himself with the Spartans, had managed to make his peace with the Athenian leaders on Samos in 411 ; and after being elected general and winning some spectacular successes in the Hellespont - including the destruction of a Spartan fleet - was given a tumultuous welcome by his native city. His popularity did not last long. In Lysander, the new Spartan admiral, he found an opponent as cunning and unscrupulous as himself, and with more money behind him. His failure to retake the Ionian cities, and the defeat of an Athenian fleet at Notion, near Ephesus, led to his denunciation in the Athenian assembly. He did not dare to return to Athens but set up as a local chieftain among the wild Thracians, in a fortress on the Hellespont.

Lysander, based on Ephesus and well supplied with Persian gold, in a few months doubled his navy and attracted many rowers from Athenian ships and territories. Konon, the able and energetic admiral of the Athenian fleet, tried to tempt him into a sea battle, but in vain. His strategy was to avoid naval action 1 and attack the Athenian empire at its most vulnerable points, taking care that if driven to port it should be where he could get supplies 2. He stormed and sacked an Athenian allied city, Kedreiai on the Ceramic Gulf, and enslaved the inhabitants, many of them Greeks. After returning to Rhodes he is even alleged to have made a dash across the Aegean to meet king Agis in Attica 3. In Miletus and other cities, his oligarchic friends seized power. Finally he headed north along

* Acknowledgement. I am grateful to Dr. P. J. Bicknell for suggesting the subject of this paper, and for many valuable suggestions.

Xenophon, Hellenika, II, 1, 14. W. S. Ferguson, Aegospotami , in Cambridge Ancient History , V, pp. 358-362. 3 Diodorus, XIII, 104, 8 ; Plutarch, Lysander , 9 ; but not Xenophon.



126 G. WYLIE

the Ionian coast to the Hellespont, with the objectives of intercepting the merchant ships proceeding to Athens from the Euxine, and dealing with cities in the regions which were still loyal to Athens 4.

The temporary Athenian ascendancy in the eastern Aegean after Arginousai (406) had now disappeared. The generals who won the victory had been put to death ; and apart from Konon their successors were almost without naval experience. The Athenian fleet, based on Samos, had been relatively inactive during the year after Arginousai, probably from lack of funds. A fleet had to be maintained and used, and sailors had to be paid regularly, if it were not to deteriorate 5 ; and one relying largely on foreign mercenary rowers could fall apart very quickly if money ran short6. In wage levels Athens could not compete with the Persian treasury ; and the Athenian assembly, according to Xenophon

7 but not Diodorus, had in desperation passed a decree that captured enemy rowers should have their right hands (or thumbs 8) struck off. Moreover, there were rumours that some of the Athenian generals were in Lysander's pay.

Lysander seems to have retained the initiative throughout. On reaching the Hellespont he collected the land forces assembled at Abydos under Thorax, and went on to besiege Lampsakos further up the strait. The Athenians, following him, were at Elaios at the mouth of the Hellespont when the news came through that Lampsakos had fallen. They set out at once, and after provisioning at Sestos camped that same night at Aegospo- tami, directly across the strait from the captured city. The Spartan ships must be brought to battle and destroyed, and meanwhile kept under ceaseless observation, for their new base lay on the route of the Pontic corn vessels which was the lifeline of Athens.

Thus far, Xenophon and Diodorus (from Ephorus) are in substantial agreement. But in the events leading up to the Aegospotami disaster and after, they diverge in important respects : and most modern historians 9, as well as subsequent ancient authors such as Plutarch, Pausanias, Nepos and Polyaenus, have followed the only "contemporary" account, that of

4 Xenophon, Hellenìka, II, 1, 17. J. D. Smart, in J. Hellenic Studies , 92 (1972), pp. 128-146. Compare Thucydides, I, 121,3 and VIII, 83, 3. Xenophon, Helle nika, II, 1,31. Plutarch, Lysander , 9. E.g. G. Grote, History of Greece , Everyman, 1942 ed., VIII, ch. 65, pp. 192-198 ;

N. G. L. Hammond, History of Greece to 322 B.C., pp. 416-417 ; J. B. Bury, History of Greece , pp. 503-504 ; Ferguson, see note 2.



WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT AEGOSPOTAMI ? 127

Xenophon, despite its inbuilt improbabilities. Ephorus' account is certainly not contemporary, and could have been written up to 50 years later ; but Xenophon's account, while contemporary in that he was living at the time, was probably not written until many years later 10, and may not have been based on first-hand knowledge.

Little is known of Xenophon's early life. He served in the cavalry during the war, and thereafter spent most of his life away from Athens, hence he probably had little time or opportunity to gather first-hand data from the survivors of Aegospotami. If he used Thucydides' material for books I and II of the Hellenika, as could be inferred from its chronological continuity with and general similarity to the History the information would still not have been first-hand, as Thucydides himself was in exile from 424 to his death c. 400. Personal contact between the two seems unlikely, so books I and II would have been pieced together from possibly fragmentary notes. Xenophon was apparently not familiar with the Hellespont region, for he puts Sestos at 2 miles from Aegospotami, whereas maps show it as at least 10 miles distant - an important point, as will appear. He did not fully appreciate the strategic position. And his impartiality is suspect. Xeno- phon appears objective in that he reports facts, with little moralizing or comment on motives, but this reticence in itself distorts his account.

( 1 ) One example is his treatment of Alkibiades, with whom he may have felt some sympathy as an aristocrat like himself with oligarchic leanings, and a fellow intimate of the Sokratic circle. Did he really believe that Alkibiades was disinterested in his approach to the Athenian generals ? At least he nowhere suggests, as Diodorus does, that he had any ulterior motive. But silence is not good enough, for a historian dealing with a man of Alkibiades' murky past. He was either being naive, or did not want to commit himself.

10 The date of writing of Books I and II of the Hellenika hinges on whether (a) the entire work was composed at one time, or (b) a "break" occurred after II, 3, 9 - on which there is much scholarly controversy and little consensus. For examples of opposing views see W. E. Higgins. Xenophon the Athenian, Albany N.Y., 1977, pp. 100-101, 168, n. 1 1, who accepts the "unified" view and dates the whole work at 361-c. 358/7, after Mantineia ; and C. H. Grayson, Did Xenophon intend to write history ?, in The Ancient Historian and his Materials, Farnborough U.K., 1975, p. 33, who dates the first part in the early 380s or late 390s and the remainder in the 350s.

Xenophon's relation to Thucydides, and his historical intent, are again vexed questions. See Grayson, pp. 33 ff„ and Higgins, ch. 6.



128 G. WYLIE

(2) He no doubt shared the suspicion and dislike of the Spartan upper class for Lysander, as he was a close friend of king Agesilaus, who discarded Lysander as untrustworthy because of his ambition and his prestige among the Ionian Greeks l2. Moreover, Lysander at the time of his death was plotting to overthrow the Spartan royal houses and have himself elected king l3. In Xenophon's view, Lysander would do anything for popularity and power. So why would he not execute several thousand prisoners, if it pleased his Ionian friends ? Xenophon did not bother to comment on the morality, or even the expedience, of the deed. Lysander had done much the same at Kedreiai 14. That was the sort of man he was.

But Xenophon recognized that Lysander was a good general. Sparta did produce good generals. Hence he was not surprised at his lightning capture of Lampsakos, his bloodless victory over the Athenians, or his efficient rounding up of the Athenian crews. Xenophon did not concern himself with ways and means, or feasibility. If a thing had to be done, he assumed that Lysander would have got it done somehow. No explanation or elaboration was needed.

(3) Conversely, he had a very low opinion of the Athenian democracy compared with the disciplined Spartans. In his view, it was only to be expected that generals elected by the Athenian popular party would be reckless, feckless and inefficient : would choose an unsuitable anchorage, let their men stray everywhere, and allow themselves to be taken by surprise. Their actions would never be based on sound reasoning, so why waste time trying to explain them ?

It was just this simplistic, uncritical approach which led Xenophon to misinterpret the situation at Aegospotami, and fail to provide, or perhaps even seek, explanations where they were needed.

To begin with, Xenophon failed to realize that the Athenians could not "fight when they pleased" - otherwise they would have forced a battle on the first day ! Lysander had them in a cleft stick. With a firm base in Lampsakos, he was in no hurry to move. Why should he ? He had a well-stocked city behind him, and strong forces to repel any landward

12 Plutarch, Agesilaus , 7-8. For Xenophon's prejudice against Lysander see W. E. Westlake, Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History, Manchester, 1969, pp. 217-225.

Plutarch, Lysander , 24. Diodorus, XIII, 104, 3-4. Probably, however, a calculated act of "frig ht fulness",

meant to intimidate the Athenian allies.



WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT AEGOSPOTAMI ? 1 29

attack ; his ships were riding in a safe harbour. No enemy squadron could enter without running the risk of being cut in two, with the leading ships being surrounded and annihilated. And simply by being there, he was immobilizing the Athenian fleet like a "pinned" piece at chess.

The Athenians could not just go away and leave him there. What if he broke out and wreaked havoc among the corn ships in the Euxine, or even blockaded their home ports ? What if he proceeded to recapture other Athenian allied cities in the region ? They could not even move dpwn to Sestos ( 10 miles away !), without losing sight of him. (As the story of the brazen shield shows, a mile was about the limiting distance for one ship to signal another : hence a trireme left at Aegospotami to watch the Spartans would have had to sail right back to Sestos to report any movement.) They were stuck on an open beach with no anchorage, so that the ships had to be dragged ashore every night ; and they were running out of supplies 15. Xenophon is unclear about supplies : first he says that they provisioned at Sestos before going on to Aegospotami ; later that they were procuring supplies from Sestos every day. At any rate, they were in an unhappy position, with no end in sight. No doubt Konon was finding it harder and harder to restrain his inexperienced and impatient colleagues - and cope with discontented and probably mutinous crews.

In the midst of this mélange, Alkibiades popped up, like a demon in a pantomime. According to Xenophon, he simply delivered a warning, Kassandra-like, but neither offered to help, nor persisted when his advice was rejected. This does not sound like Alkibiades, who was a man of action if nothing else. Nor did he tell the generals anything they did not already know l6. Of course Sestos would have been a more suitable anchorage. But they may have feared treachery, as with the Eretrians in 411 ,7. Or that in a sudden emergency, they would never have time to round up all the crews (and trierarchs) if they were billeted in the town. Or even that the crews would desert, especially if their pay was in arrears. And whatever Xenophon thought about Alkibiades' motives, the generals would hardly be expected to credit him with simple "love for his coun- try" 18 - given his past history.

15 Diodorus, XIII, 104, 5 ; NEPOS, VII, 8, 1. See J. Hatzfeld, Alcibiade , Paris, 1951, p. 335. Thucydides, VIII, 95. NEPOS, VII, 8, 1.



130 G. WYLIE

Diodorus says 19 that Alkibiades asked for a share in the command,

wishing to regain the favour of the Athenians by achieving "some great success". This does give him a credible motive. But the generals dismissed him, reasoning that he would get all the credit for any success and they would be blamed for a failure. They might also reasonably have asked how he proposed to "force a naval battle" (he had failed to do so at Ephesus) ; or what use could be made of his friend king Seuthes' army, which would be on the wrong side of the strait 20, needing to be ferried over and put ashore in the face of strong enemy land forces. Nor would the local Persian satrap be likely to sit idly by while a horde of barbarous Thracians poured into Phrygia. Nepos

21 gives a similar account to Diodorus, except

that he makes Alkibiades address his remarks specifically to Philokles, "in the presence of the common soldiers" - not a tactful thing to do ! It is noteworthy that while Xenophon has the whole affair over, with the Athenian fleet and its crews captured, five days after they arrived at Aegospotami, Diodorus and Nepos imply that they were there much longer, long enough to have "nothing left but their arms and their ships" 22.

All accounts, however, leave us with a problem. Why should Alkibiades have expected his proposals to be accepted by that particular group of generals - most of whom were his political opponents, if not his personal enemies ?

The senior general, Konon 23, was a competent and experienced sea- man, who had commanded an Athenian squadron as early as 413, at Naupactus. His political sympathies lay with the popular party ; he had been elected general in 41 1/10 after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, and was summoned to Kerkyra by the populares in 410 to contain the power of the oligarchs 24. He would have had little in common with Alkibiades, who had urged the setting up of an oligarchy in Athens in 412/11 (though he changed sides later) ; nor would he have relished being told his business by a man of less naval experience than himself.

" Diodorus, XIII, 105, 3-4. Grote, History , p. 194, n. 1 ; also Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, p. 336. " Nepos, VII, 8, 2. 22 Ibid., 8, 1. J. Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica. See entries 8707 (Konon), 14517 (Philokles),

9857 (Menander), 13884 (Tydeus), 8312 (Kephisodotos), 202 (Adeimantos), 600 (Alkibiades).

Diodorus, XIII, 48, 6.




Philokles (see note 23), first elected general as Konon's associate in 406/5 25, can have had little naval experience, if any. He is described as "demagogue, disreputable, sharp only at the inglorious point of tongue"

26 - presumably a man of the people, and a member of the popular party which included some of Alkibiades' deadliest enemies 27 (Antiphon, Anytos, Androides).

Menander (n. 23) was associated in command with Nikias at Syracuse in winter 414, and is described as ambitious and jealous 28. With Euthy- demos, he had engaged in a reckless sea battle with a Corinthian fleet and was defeated with heavy losses. He also took part in an unsuccessful attempt to break out of the harbour at Syracuse in Sept. 413. Again, not a type to take kindly to criticism.

Tydeus (n. 23) was a man of the people, and a son of the general Lamachus who lost his life in Sicily. He is especially noted by Xenophon as gibing at Alkibiades. He had reason for personal enmity towards him, for he probably regarded his father's death as resulting from Alkibiades' defection.

Nothing is known of Kephisodotos (n. 23). Thus of these six generals, the only one likely to give Alkibiades a

sympathetic hearing was his friend and fellow demesman Adeimantos (n. 23), who like him had been a member of the Sokratic circle 29 and probably owed to him his election as general in 408/7 30.

A certain Eryximachos is stated in a speech of Lysias 31 to have served at Aegospotami, apparently as a general since he speaks of ransoming "one of my own trierarchs". Rankin 32, but not Roberts (n. 31), identifies him with the doctor of Plato's Symposium, son of Akumenos 33, and exiled with his father in 4 1 5 for profaning the Mysteries 34. If so, he would have been a member of the Sokratic circle, an intimate of Alkibiades and perhaps Adeimantos, and a promising target for overtures. The charge of

25 Xenophon, Hellenika, I, 7, 1 ; Diodorus, XIII, 104, 1. Plutarch, Comp. Lysander and Sulla, 4. Plutarch, Alkibiades , 3 ; 4 ; 19. Plutarch, Nikias, 20. Plato, Protagoras, 315e. JU Diodorus, XIII, 69, 3. Lysias, in Rylands Papyri , 3 (Manchester, 1938), no. 489, edited by C. H. Roberts. D. I. Rankin, Prosopographical Studies of the Oligarchic Movement in Late Fifth

Century Athens, Ph. D. Thesis, Monash University, 1978. Plato, Protagoras, 3 1 5c ; Phaedrus, 268a. Andokides, 1, 18 ; 1, 35.



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"staying in the city", i.e. failing to withdraw to Peiraios in 403, was often levelled at persons suspected of anti-democratic leanings, though here not indictable, as the speech is dated in 399, after the amnesty.

We know that Alkibiades was a past master at diplomacy, and that his whole life was "about winning". Would such a man approach political enemies, knowing that he would almost certainly meet with scornful rejection, unless he had some other end in view ? It is at least possible that he did not intend his overtures to succeed. I suggest that he had been bought by Lysander.

Lysander had the Athenians at a disadvantage : he could afford to wait and they could not. But the situation was a stalemate, for he did not want them to move. He could not go on with his schemes for further conquest unless the Athenian fleet was destroyed or immobilized. A set battle on equal terms was chancy, even though Athenian naval superiority was now questionable 35. If the Athenian fleet remained idle long enough, it might fall apart through sheer inanition ; better still, it might be trapped into fighting at a disadvantage. How could it be kept there ?

Lysander had used money freely in gaining control of the Ionian cities - the first Spartan, says Pausanias disapprovingly 36, "to make victory in war a matter of purchase". Lysias 37 and Pausanias 38 state that he sub- verted several of the Athenian generals at Aegospotami ; Alkibiades could even have acted as go-between. Lysias says that he was implicated in the betrayal of the fleet - although he was not a general. Lysander would be aware that he was a fugitive from Athens and living in the vicinity. Here was just the job for him. He had a bitter tongue and his insolence was notorious. "You're in a stupid spot, and your discipline is lousy, etc., etc." 39. It is not surprising that the loyal generals were provoked into staying on, whatever their private qualms. The traitors would sit quietly by or, like Tydeus, throw in a hostile remark or two, to keep the pot boiling.

Who were the traitors, if any ? Konon and Philokles are out - the one because of his character, the other because of his ultimate fate. There is nothing against Menander or Kephisodotos. Adeimantos is the most

35 Compare Thucydides, II, 88-90 and VIII, passim. Pausanias, Description of Greece , IV, 17, 3. 37 Lysias, 14, 38-39. Pausanias, Description of Greece , IV, 17, 3 ; X, 9, 10. Plutarch, Alkibiades , 36.




obvious suspect. He is named by Pausanias 40, and by Lysias as actually involved with Alkibiades 4I. He was spared by Lysander 42, and is said to have been denounced later by Konon 43. Another likely one is Eryxima- chos, if his reputed background is to be believed. Tydeus is named by Pausanias 44, but one cannot see him entering into a conspiracy with Alkibiades. However, like his father he was probably a poor man, and may have been approached separately. The main task of the conspirators, after all, was not to listen to Alkibiades but to sabotage any concerted action by their own squadrons if an emergency arose.

How did Lysander pay them off? In cash, no doubt - and for Alkibiades immunity, for he must have grown tired of hiding among barbarians. It appears that Lysander ignored the urging of the Thirty to have him done away with until he received a direct order from Sparta. Even that is doubtful : some say that he was killed by the family of a girl he had seduced 45.

How did Lysander eventually trap the Athenians ? Xenophon's version is plausible enough, except his assertion that almost the entire Athenian fleet was captured on the beach without ever being launched : that is, there was no sea battle. But the speeches of Lysias, who was actually in Athens at the time, contain 12 references to Aegospotami, of which no less than six mention a "sea-fight" ( naumachia ) in which the Athenian ships were lost 46 ; Isokrates 47 also refers to a "naval engagement". Diodorus says 48

that Philokles advanced with 30 ships, after ordering the other ships to follow. He was put to flight and pursued to the western shore by Lysander, who captured the remainder of the fleet on the beach ; Konon escaped with 1 0 ships. He does not explain how Philokles was tempted out to fight at a disadvantage with only a small part of the fleet.

The question of whether there was actually a battle or not is not of great importance. Undoubtedly most of the ships (at least 140) were captured

40 See note 36 above. 41 See note 37 above. 42 Xenophon, Hellenika, II, 1, 32. 43 Demosthenes, De Falsa Legatione, 2, 191. Pausanias, Description of Greece, X, 9, 10. Plutarch, Alkibiades , 38-39. For discussion of Alkibiades' death, see Hatzfeld,

Alcibiade, pp. 341-349. ,0 Lysias, 12,36; 12,43; 14,39; 18,4; 19, 16; 21,9. Isokrates, vol. V, 1, 283. 48 Diodorus, XIII, 106.



134 G. WYLIE

on the beach. The "sea-fight" may have been just a story invented by the Athenians, rather than admit that the whole fleet had been lost without a blow by generals of the popular party, through sheer incompetence and lack of discipline. But the testimony of Eryximachos

49 is against this. He says "I inflicted much damage on the enemy, then sailed home, bringing my own trireme safe out of the battle", which he would hardly say if his hearers knew there had been no battle. It is probable that there was some sort of naval engagement, but there are puzzling features about Diodorus' narrative. If Philokles had time to muster his whole squadron, and ordered the other generals to follow, why were virtually no ships launched ? Even the competent Konon only managed to get his own ship and eight others 50, about a third of his contingent, into the water, and then turned and fled, together with the State trireme Paralus. Why did he not join in the battle ? What time of day was this ?

Ehrhardt 51 suggests that Philokles was trying to provoke Lysander into battle by repeating Antiochos' tactics at Notion in 408 - by offering a pawn en prise, as it were - but failed because his colleagues were too slow and Lysander was forewarned 52. But surely some ships would have been launched ? Were all the generals traitors except Philokles ? Would he not have waited to make sure they were ready to follow - for his own safety ? He was in command for the whole day, and could start when he liked. At Notion ", Lysander had sent out a few ships to chase a cheeky raider who ventured into the harbour of Ephesus, then emerged with his whole fleet in line of battle, and overwhelmed the Athenian ships piecemeal as they came up to support the fugitive. I suggest that the present battle was largely a replay of Notion, but with Lysander "trailing his coat", not Philokles.

What would be the reaction of Philokles if the sun rose to reveal a dozen Spartan ships impudently sailing across the strait ? He would be down on the beach screaming for action, and sending off triremes as fast

49 Lysias, in Rylands Papyri , 3, n° 489, lines 100-104. Athenian Naval Catalogue IG, II , 195 1 has been thoroughly discussed by D. Laing,

A New Interpretation of the Athenian Naval Catalogue IG If 195 1 (Diss. Cincinatti, 1964), who concluded that it originally listed the officers and crews of eight triremes, very probably those which went with Konon to Cyprus and, presumably, returned with him in 393 to Athens. See C. Ehrhardt, in Phoenix, 24 (1970), pp. 225-228. Lysias, 21, 10 then creates a "dilemma" (Ehrhardt, p. 226). But see note 66 below.

Ehrhardt, p. 227. Diodorus, XIII, 106, 2. Xenophon, Hellenika, I, 5, 22 f. ; Diodorus, XIII, 71, 2-4.




as they could be launched. It is improbable that he held them back until all his 30 ships were launched, much less went to see what the other generals were doing ; perhaps he roared an order or two over his shoulder as he left. The wary Konon began launching his ships, but did not send them off. If this was a trap, he was not going to throw away his men's lives and his own in a suicidal rescue attempt, and judging from the confusion on shore, the rest of the fleet would not be ready for half an hour. A few moments later, his suspicions were confirmed. Out of the morning mist appeared the whole Spartan fleet in order of battle. Leaving part of their forces to deal with Philokles, the main body were making straight for the western shore and coming fast.

The Hellespont is only two miles wide at this point 54. It has been calculated 55 that a trireme had a top speed of 21.3 km/h (13.4 mph), reached from rest in about 30 sec., hence could cross the strait in about 10 minutes. The sailors struggling to launch their ships must have realized that the Spartan soldiers would be upon them before they could become water-borne. They were paid to row, not fight ; most of them were not even Athenians. They would have bolted - probably joined by most of the marines. A few, perhaps, put up a fight, or were slow getting away, and were cut down. The traitorous generals, if any, sat quietly in their tents and waited for the Spartans. They would of course have made no move to get their ships launched. Konon and his ships got safely away - one valiant soul with a good pilot and crew saved another trierarch's ship as well as his own 56 - and even risked a hasty landing on the enemy coast to carry away the sails of the Spartan fleet and prevent any pursuit.

It is in Xenophon's sketchy account of the ensuing events that we enter the region of stark impossibility. He says simply that Lysander "rounded up nearly all the crews ... and brought prisoners, ships and all his other prizes into Lampsakos" ". But he does not explain when and how Lysander did all this. The logistical difficulties would be immense.

It was already "late in the day", with perhaps two or three hours of daylight left. The remark about "other prizes" would indicate that the Spartans looted the Athenian camp ; no doubt they would do this first,

54 Xenophon, Hellenika, II, 1,21. V. Foley and W. Soedel, Scientific American, 244 (Apr. 1981), pp. 1 16-129. See

p. 122. 56 Lysias, 21, 9 ; 21, 11. Xenophon, Hellenika , II, 1, 30.



136 G. WYLIE

before bothering to chase after prisoners. But then it would be too late : within half an hour or so, the Athenian crews would have scattered all over the peninsula.

Grote 58 estimates that 36,000 men were serving in the Athenian ships : 180 ships, each with 200 of a crew, including about 20 officers and marines. Of these, 6000 men of Philokles' squadron would have been drowned or captured, and perhaps 2000 escaped with Konon. The remaining 28,000 would have to be rounded up by the few thousand troops put ashore with Eteonikos to storm the camp 59, for hired rowers could not be used for combatant duties - even if they were, the operation would take a long time. Some days at least ; it certainly could not be done before nightfall. There were not many ways to stop a fleeing man. You could throw something at him - a spear or an arrow. If you did not want to kill him, you could chase him with a sword and persuade him to come back with you - a tiring job for a heavily armed hoplite ! Or you could run him down on horseback, if you had a horse. We are not told that the Spartans brought any with them, and it would need a stable as large as Alexander's to round up so large a body of men. One hoplite could escort only one man back to the camp, a horseman two or three. In the meantime the invading force would have to beach their ships (with probable parking congestion) and camp in the open without supplies, and guard their prisoners night and day until all were rounded up. It is hard to believe that any general would undertake such a pointless and time-consuming exercise.

The exercise anyway would almost certainly end in failure (like the "black drive" undertaken in 1830 by Governor Arthur in Tasmania to pen up all the aborigines in one corner of the island - they all slipped through the net, except one man and a boy). It can be assumed that anyone who eluded capture on the first day got clean away. Nobody was likely to go back and give himself up - and risk having his throat cut. We may therefore safely accept Diodorus' statement 60 that most of the fugitives found their way to Sestos - no more than three hours' walk for a healthy man. Lysander did not want them anyway : only the ships, without which Athens was doomed.

58 Grote, History, p. 195. " Diodorus, XIII, 1U6, 14. 60 Diodorus, XIII, 106, 6.




But even if Xenophon was right, and Lysander was able to round up all the crews, and they obediently formed up in ranks on the beach to await his commands - what did he do then ? Sort out the Athenians then and there ? If so, how - with any certainty ? It tickles the imagination to think of Lysander standing before that giant mass of men, and barking : "Parade, 'shun ! Athenians, six paces forward, march ! Other ranks, dismiss !". (The Athenians, of course, were not to know he would have them killed, but one might guess that the more timorous, or suspicious, would hide in the rear ranks !) Or did he ship the lot over to Lampsakos and sort them out there ? Whatever he did, he was faced with a huge transportation problem.

The Spartan fleet was about the same size as the Athenian fleet, so that Lysander would have a total of more than 70,000 men to carry back to Lampsakos, plus some thousands of land troops. About half of the 70,000 had to row, the other half had to be guarded ; and all had to be distributed over the 320 available ships in such a way that the prisoners had no opportunity to seize control of any vessel and make off with it. If it was decided to man the Spartan vessels only, and tow the captured ships empty, the risk of mutiny was lessened ; but there would be heavy work for the rowers, and the upper decks of the Spartan triremes would be packed solid. The captured ships could, of course, be left to be fetched later. But it is hard to imagine Lysander doing that, when he had risked everything to capture them.

It could all be arranged somehow, perhaps - Lysander was an able general. But the amount of organization and staff work would be appalling. Embarkation alone would take many hours, by the time the men were all told off for each vessel and put aboard. Fuller 61 states that it took William the Conqueror a whole day (12 hours) to embark his army of 7000 or 8000 men on 340 small ships of the Viking type at St. Valéry in Normandy, and another day to disembark them at Pevensey. He also quotes Ramsay as saying that Henry V required three August days to land 8000-10,000 men at Harfleur in 1415. It is incredible that Lysander should have taken so much time and trouble to ferry over this mass of men to Lampsakos (probably equal to the whole population of the city), most of whom would be at once set free and would then become an intolerable nuisance to him.

61 J. F. C. Fuller, Decisive Battles of the Western World , Granada, 1970 ed., I, p. 265.



138 G. WYLIE

We must then prefer Diodorus' account 62, despite Grote's stricture 63

that it is "far less clear and trustworthy". Faced with disciplined land troops, the Athenians did not put up much resistance. Seized with panic, they fled in all directions. Significantly, Lysander's first act was to make sure of the ships : "throwing iron hands on (them) ... he began dragging them off ... only ten escaped". Diodorus tells us no more, but it is most likely that Lysander simply sailed back to Lampsakos with what prisoners had been caught, plus the loot, towing the captured ships behind him and abandoning the fugitives. An interesting question is what became of the Athenian ships. With Athenian naval power shattered, Lysander would have little use for them, but he could not risk their recapture. It is most probable that they were destroyed, as Lysias states 64.

We come now to the most gruesome and least credible part of Xenophon's account, unquestioningly reproduced by many modern historians 65 - the massacre of the Athenian prisoners. Such a loss of fighting men would have been a national disaster, equivalent to nearly a fifth of Athenian citizens of military age - more perhaps than were lost in the whole Sicilian campaign. Half the households in Attika would have been in mourning. Yet Xenophon records it quite casually. Lysias in his references to Aegospotami says nothing at all of any massacre, though he names one citizen, Kritodemos of Alopeke, who was "killed by the Lakedaimonians after the sea-fight"

66 ; his main concern is for the loss of the ships

67 . Diodorus does not record any executions except that of Philokles 68 , which is likely enough if it was true that he had ordered the crews of two captured triremes to be thrown overboard. It is to be noted that Xenophon nowhere specifies the number of men executed. The figure of 3000 first appears in Plutarch 69 , and is inflated to 4000 by Pausanias 70,

62 Diodorus, XIII, 106. See note 58 above. 64 Lysias, 2, 58 ; 13, 5. 65 See note 9 above. Lysias, 19, 16. However, the "obvious dilemma" of Ehrhardt, that Lysias (21, 10)

"expects that there will be survivors from Aegospotami in any body of Athenians drawn for jury service", is by no means obvious. Statistically, Lysias' expectation would be justified even if only the 200 men on the Paralus had returned to Athens. Assuming c. 30,000 citizen voters, there would be a 96% chance that one or more of the 200 survivors would be chosen in any jury, and an 81% chance even if 100 of them had since died. 67 Lysias, 2, 58 ; 14, 38 ; 30, 10. 68 Diodorus, XIII, 106, 7.

Plutarch, Alkibiades, 37 ; Lysander, 13. 70 Pausanias, Description of Greece, IX, 32, 9.




both writing in the second century A.D. If these writers assumed that most of the officers and marines ( c. 20 per crew of 200) of the 1 80 triremes were Athenians and most of the rowers non-Athenian hirelings, this would give a figure of the right order 71 . But why seek a mathematical basis for what is more likely to be a pure "guesstimate" ?

Xenophon 72 tells us that before executing the prisoners Lysander conferred with the allies, who were very bitter about the past "crimes" of the Athenians, and about the decree for cutting off the hands of prisoners. The drowning of the crews of the captured triremes was brought up, and "many other such stories were told". This is rather vague, and would hardly justify butchering several thousand men. The decree is not stated to have been put into practice, and Grote 73 doubts that it was ever passed. The drowned crews were Philokles' responsibility alone ; and we have only Xenophon's word that the incident ever occurred - Diodorus does not mention it. But more important, this was not a decision Lysander could have left to the vote of emotional and vindictive men. It could shock the whole Greek world. He was already under suspicion by the Spartan authorities, who might not approve such an act. At just such an assembly, after the surrender of Athens in 404, the ephors curtly vetoed the proposal of Corinth and Thebes that Athens be destroyed ; they would not, they said, enslave the city that saved Greece from the Medes 74. Probably Lysander would have taken the risk if he had seen it as good policy. But why should it be ?

Parallel cases can no doubt be cited : the execution of the Plataeans by the Spartans

75 , of the Melians by the Athenians 76 , and the slaughter of Athenian troops by Syracusans at the river Assinaras 11 . But these were all on a much smaller scale, and in semi-hot blood, as it were. Not so long before, those killed had themselves been engaged in killing. Here it was a matter of putting to death, in cold blood, some thousands of men

" Examination of the extant fragments of IG, II2, 1951 indicates that the proportion of Athenian citizens in the crews, at least for these eight triremes, was much higher than the postulated figure of c. 10%. The officers and marines were nearly all Athenians, and numerous Athenian names appear under the heading "citizen sailors" ( nautai astoi). 11 Xenophon, Hellenika, II, 1, 31-32.

Grote, History , p. 196. 14 Xenophon, Hellenika , II, 2, 20. 75 Thucydides, III, 68. Thucydides, V, 116. Thucydides, VII, 84 f.



140 G. WYLIE

captured almost without a blow, and guilty of no particular offence except that of being Athenians. Who was to carry out this grisly task ? The civilians, the oligarchs, who voted for it could not be expected to sully their hands with bloodshed. The job would presumably fall to reluctant Spartan troops. And it would go on for hours and hours. One detachment, armed with swords, would be busy stabbing a line of men in the throat, pausing from time to time to resharpen their swords - or throw up ! Another detachment would be dragging off the bodies and piling them up in heaps. A third group, the largest, would be closely guarding the masses of doomed men drawn up in squads awaiting their turn. But where did all this take place - in the market place at Lampsakos, or on the local oval ? Were the townsfolk allowed to watch - knitting women and all ? More work for the troops - "Get back there ! Keep that space clear !" - and watching the prisoners for the inevitable break away. At least the wearied and nauseated 78 soldiery were saved one fatigue if, as Pausanias asserts 79, Lysander did not allow the bodies to be buried. One wonders how the townsfolk liked that - in summer weather too !

The whole story is so wildly improbable that one can only suppose Xenophon is retailing a yarn he heard afterwards in Sparta - anything could be said about the discredited Lysander ; or else he misinterpreted a note of Thucydides. Thus, if Thucydides had said "it was decided to put to death all the Athenian generals except Adeimantos", it would make better sense. Diodorus agrees that Philokles at least was executed. Xenophon himself says 80 that Lysander sent all Athenian garrisons and any other Athenians he found back to Athens, knowing that "the more people there were in the city and in Peiraios, the sooner the food supplies would run out !". It is only reasonable to conclude that he did the same with the Athenians from Aegospotami. According to Diodorus 81 he picked them up later when he captured Sestos, and released them under a truce.

But the strongest reason for believing that no massacre occurred is the complete absence of any reaction in Athens. Xenophon says that "they mourned for the lost" (which could mean ships or men), "but more for

78 A case of : "The young recruits are shaking, and they'll want their beer to-day, After hanging Danny Deever in the morning" !

Pausanias, Description of Greece, IX, 32, 9. Xenophon, Hellenika, II, 2, 2. Diodorus, XIII, 106, 7.




themselves" 82. Diodorus says nothing, except that they prepared for a siege 83. When Athens surrendered some months later, and Lysander sailed into Peiraios, "the walls were pulled down among scenes of great enthusiasm and to the music of flute girls" 84. This does not sound like a city mourning the loss of thousands of its young men, and confronted for the first time by their murderer. Nor was their spirit broken, for Plutarch 85

says that they showed bitter resentment and opposition when Lysander changed their form of government. Yet we have no evidence that he was personally unpopular in Athens. One would have expected him to be hissed in the streets, and remembered with hatred for generations, especially if he had refused burial to the bodies of the executed men. But even Lysias, a man of strongly democratic sympathies, does not say a word against him ; nor do Isokrates and Demosthenes. We can only conclude that the whole story is chimerical.

Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3168, Australia.

Graham Wylie.

82 Xenophon, Hellenika, II, 2, 3. Diodorus, XIII, 107, 1. 84 Xenophon, Hellenika, II, 2, 23. Plutarch, Lysander, 15.



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WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT AEGOSPOTAMI ?

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