Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol

What should nations reveal about their spying from space?An examination of the US experience

James David

Smithsonian Institute, National Air & Space Museum (DSH e MRC 311), PO Box 37012, Washington, DC 20013-7012, USA

Available online 28 April 2009

Abstract

Revelation of the details of countries’ space-based reconnaissance programs was unusual until the end of the Cold War, despite debates on thesubject within the US government. Since then e and in contrast to Russia e the USA has been more open about its spying activities. This articlecharts the history of declassification in the USA from the Eisenhower Administration to that of G.W. Bush. It discusses issues such as the need toensure freedom of space for the operation of spy satellites, gaining public acceptance of space-based reconnaissance by demonstrating the civiluses of such photography, and tradeoffs between revealing one’s capabilities and letting others know how closely their actions can be observed.Published by Elsevier Ltd.

1. Introduction

The USA and the USSR began successfully deployingreconnaissance satellites in the early 1960s. China, France,Israel, and other nations have subsequently placed smallernumbers of these vehicles in orbit. As with every intelligenceprogram they conduct, these countries have had to decidewhether to reveal the existence and any details of these space-based operations to the public.

Numerous factors have influenced the decisions made e theopenness of the society, the need to bolster the reputations ofthe agencies conducting the programs, the requirement toreassure citizens and allies that the nation can identify andmonitor national security threats, the potential civilian appli-cations of the data acquired. Not surprisingly, the countriesinvolved have arrived at very different determinations. TheUSSR revealed virtually nothing and the Russian governmenthas largely continued this practice. While the USA disclosedvery little during the Cold War, there were some high-levelpolicy makers supporting greater openness during this period.Since the end of this conflict, however, the USA has been theleader in revealing information about its classified satelliteprograms. This article will detail the history of the debates

E-mail address: davidj@si.edu

0265-9646/$ - see front matter Published by Elsevier Ltd.

doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.02.009

within the US government and the actions taken by it in thisregard.

A key goal of the USA at the beginning of the Space Agewas to ensure freedom of space to permit the highly classifiedsatellites under development to operate without restrictions.Collecting imagery and electronic intelligence or providingearly warning of a missile attack, these spacecraft would beabsolutely essential in acquiring data on the growing threatfrom Soviet military forces. Even if arms control agreementswere reached with the USSR to limit the threat, the vehicleswould still be required to verify them, since the possibilityof the Soviets permitting on-site inspection was extremelyremote.

Attempts to reach an agreement with the USSR early in theSpace Age to guarantee freedom of space failed. Even beforethe USA launched its first successful reconnaissance space-craft in 1960, the USSR initiated a vigorous propagandacampaign against these platforms. There were a few StateDepartment officials who called for greater openness con-cerning at least the classified imaging programs. They arguedthat the fact of photoreconnaissance from space should beadmitted and perhaps some imagery released as well,believing that these steps would lead to increased internationalacceptance of this activity and that selected photography couldalso be used for civilian purposes. However, the intelligenceagencies and the Department of Defense (DoD) were stronglyagainst any disclosure, based on their long-standing opposition

1 Hall R. Cargill. The evolution of US national security space policy and its

legal foundations in the 20th century. Journal of Space Law Summer 2007;

33(1): 8e9, 12e13, 17e18.

118 J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

to revealing intelligence sources and methods and the beliefthat the release of any information would only cause theSoviets to intensify their campaign. These same argumentswere repeated many times in the coming years as policymakers debated what, if anything, should be revealed con-cerning reconnaissance satellites. Not surprisingly, the oppo-nents of greater openness prevailed for many years.

Shortly after President John Kennedy took office, whatlittle information then being released concerning military andintelligence space projects was drastically reduced. Althoughthe Soviets ceased their propaganda campaign in 1963 andtacitly accepted reconnaissance from space thereafter, thisactually undercut the argument that disclosure was needed tobuild international support for this activity. Opponents nowstated that it was no longer required in light of the tacitacceptance and that to admit to conducting reconnaissancefrom space or to reveal any details or product would onlyprovoke the Soviets to renew their campaign.

Challenges to the secrecy arose in the 1960s resulting fromthe National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s(NASA’s) plans to launch remote sensing satellites and theneed to prove to the American public, Congress, and allies thatstrategic arms control agreements with the Soviets could beverified by space-based reconnaissance systems. While theseefforts for greater openness failed, they led in part to the firststep taken in 1973 to eventual declassification. In that yearPresident Richard Nixon downgraded the fact that the USAconducted photoreconnaissance from space, and most of thephotography, from Top Secret/Codeword to Secret.

Pressure grew during the 1970s for declassification in orderto quell increasing concerns that the USA could notadequately verify the existing and proposed strategic armscontrol agreements with the Soviets. All the agencies favoredadmitting the fact that the nation operated photoreconnais-sance satellites. In October 1978, President Jimmy Carterdisclosed this to the world. However, a companion proposal torelease some imagery to further bolster confidence in theability to monitor was rejected.

The end of the Cold War caused many government officialsto push for greater openness concerning some classified activ-ities, including certain space-based programs. In 1992, theexistence of and limited information concerning the NationalReconnaissance Office (NRO) was disclosed. Three years later,President William Clinton signed Executive Order 12951 whichdeclassified the imagery from three photoreconnaissancesatellite programs that operated during all or part of the period1960e1972. All the hardware and many of their programrecords were released in whole or part under separate initia-tives. Most of the photography from two other long-terminatedprograms was released eight years later under the executiveorder, but not any documents or hardware. More recently, thegovernment confirmed its employment of Synthetic ApertureRadar (SAR) on space-based platforms and its initial use ofa digital return system in 1976. Notwithstanding the aboveactions, the existence, operational details, product, hardware,and program records of the majority of America’s obsoleteimagery intelligence satellites still remain classified in 2009.

The USA acknowledged for the first time publicly in 1996that it conducted signals intelligence and measurement andsignature intelligence from space. During 1998 and 2005, thegovernment voluntarily declassified the existence of andhardware from two first-generation electronics intelligencespacecraft that were launched in 1960e1962 and 1962e1971.Very few operational details were released, however, and thedocuments concerning them remain completely classified.Even more so than with imagery intelligence satellites, theexistence, operational details, hardware, and program recordsof the majority of America’s obsolete signals intelligencespacecraft are still classified in 2009.

The efforts to get anything declassified regarding thereconnaissance satellite programs are an important storybecause it is an excellent illustration of the frequent conflictbetween the need to protect vital intelligence sources andmethods and the public’s right to know of the measures beingtaken to protect national security and their effectiveness. Itdemonstrates the immense power of the intelligence agenciesand the DoD to defeat even the most modest attempts to revealdetails of covert programs. Moreover, it calls into questionwhether this influence always works to the nation’s bestinterest in the end. Because of the classification of virtually allthe relevant government records until recently, there has beenno comprehensive treatment of this history. In recent years, theNational Security Archive has posted on its website twoelectronic briefing books on the topic e Declassifying the‘‘Fact of’’ Satellite Reconnaissance and Secrecy and USSatellite Reconnaissance, 1958e1976. Each contains a numberof declassified records with brief descriptions of their originand importance. This article will expand on these works byreferencing additional documents, giving greater backgroundand context, and bringing the history up to the present time.

2. The Eisenhower administration

The USA had several critical objectives it wanted to ach-ieve at the outset of the Space Age. One was to ensure freedomof space so that the highly classified reconnaissance satellitesunder development could operate freely. The National SecurityCouncil in May 1955 adopted NSC 5520, Statement of Policyon US Scientific Satellite Program, which expressly estab-lished it as a basic goal of the US space program. Subsequenttop-level policy directives continued to emphasize thisobjective.1 While U-2 overflights of the USSR hadcommenced in 1956 and provided important photographic andelectronic intelligence, they were limited in coverage andextremely provocative. Officials recognized that the missionscould continue for only a short period. (The overflightsstopped, of course, after the Soviets shot down Gary Powers’plane in May 1960.) Much less vulnerable satellites would bethe key to obtaining vital intelligence on the growing military

119J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

threat from the USSR, especially its intercontinental ballisticmissiles (ICBMs) and other strategic nuclear forces. Further-more, officials realized that, even if strategic arms controlagreements were reached with the USSR, these vehicles wouldstill be required to verify them as it was very unlikely that theSoviets would permit on-site inspection.2

The US Air Force began developing reconnaissance satel-lites in 1956 under the WS-117L program. The spacecraft toprovide imagery (through both electronic readout and filmrecovery systems) and electronic intelligence was ultimatelydesignated SAMOS, while the platform to furnish earlywarning of Soviet ICBM launches was called the MissileDetection and Alarm System (MIDAS).3 Although WS-117Lwas a classified project, unofficial and official publicityrevealed some details. Several newspapers and periodicals inthe late 1950s described SAMOS as a space-based platform tophotograph the USSR and MIDAS as a means of giving earlywarning of a surprise attack. Senior Air Force officers alsomade statements along the same lines before Congress and inother forums. Dr. James Killian, Special Assistant to thePresident for Science and Technology from 1957 to 1959,warned that the publicity being given to the programs wasforcing the USSR to take action against them. Although therewas no way to completely stop this hostility, he stronglyrecommended that official statements concerning theseprograms cease. However, his warnings were not heeded andthe publicity continued.4

The more promising SAMOS film recovery system wassplit off in early 1958, given to the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) and Air Force to manage jointly, and wasdesignated CORONA. In December of that year, the project’sDISCOVERER cover story was announced. It was describedas a program to explore environmental conditions in space thatwould place biomedical specimens and other payloads in orbitand recover them. Although CORONA was a classified projectand knowledge of it was extremely restricted, at the outset itdoes not appear that it was protected under any special secu-rity control system (as it would be later).5

The Naval Research Laboratory began work on the GalacticRAdiation and Background (GRAB) electronic intelligencesatellite in 1958. It was to be a package covertly added toa spacecraft that carried an open solar radiation scientificexperiment. From the beginning, its existence, operatingdetails, and product were not only protected under regular

2 McDougall Walter A. The heavens and the earth: a political history of the

space age. New York: Basic Books; 1985. p. 113, 117; Pedlow Gregory W,

Welzenbach Donald E. The central intelligence agency and overhead

reconnaissance. Washington, D.C.: The Central Intelligence Agency; 1992.

p. 321e24.3 Peebles Curtis. High frontier, the United States air force and the mili-

tary space program. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; 1997.

p. 32e3.4 Steinberg Gerald M. Satellite reconnaissance: the role of informal bar-

gaining. New York: Praeger; 1983. p. 30e2, 40e42.5 Greer Kenneth E. CORONA. In: Ruffner Kevin C, editor. CORONA:

America’s first satellite program. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence

Agency; 1995. p. 4e6.

classification guidelines but under a special security controlsystem designated CANES. Fewer than 200 individuals in thegovernment had the CANES clearance.6 In contrast toSAMOS and MIDAS, there was no unofficial or officialpublicity concerning CORONA or GRAB.

Even before the launch of Sputnik 1 in October 1957, theUSA made several proposals to the Soviets to ensure freedom ofspace and to limit the arms race. In his State of the Unionaddress early that year, President Dwight D. Eisenhowerpledged that the nation would enter any ‘‘reliable agreement’’that, among other things, monitored and controlled the devel-opment of missiles and satellites. His administration quicklysubmitted a proposal to the United Nations that required allouter space development to be used only for peaceful andscientific purposes and place all missile and satellite testingunder international inspection. However, there was little reac-tion from the USSR. Soon after Sputnik 1, Eisenhower urged theSoviet leaders to agree that outer space would only be used forpeaceful purposes. They replied that a prohibition on themilitary uses of space was acceptable if combined with a ban onforeign bases and the creation of an international agency tolaunch rockets, conditions that were unacceptable to the USA.7

The two superpowers brought the issue of outer space usebefore the United Nations’ General Assembly in late 1958. Itquickly approved the US proposal to create the UN Ad HocCommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, but theSoviets initially boycotted the group and no progress wasmade in reaching any agreement regarding the uses of space ormonitoring activities therein.8

While these international diplomatic efforts were underway,the US Intelligence Community published a Special NationalIntelligence Estimate in July 1958 on the political implicationsof the nation’s reconnaissance satellite programs and the likelyreactions to varying degrees of disclosure concerning them. Itpredicted that if the USA did not acknowledge them, theywould probably become known anyway and the Soviets wouldtry to neutralize or destroy the spacecraft to the extent theycould and would also launch a propaganda campaign againstthem. In this case, many neutralist countries would bepersuaded by the Soviet charges. The assessment stated that theUSSR would still try to neutralize or destroy the satellites andconduct a propaganda campaign if the USA acknowledged theirexistence or even if it offered to share the data with the UnitedNations. Only if the USA offered to work with the USSR andother nations to use reconnaissance satellites as part ofa ‘‘multilateral inspection system on behalf of the UN’’ did itpredict that world reaction would be supportive. Nevertheless,the estimate stated that the USSR would probably still reject the

6 GRAB, galactic radiation and background, first reconnaissance satellite.

Washington, D.C.: Naval Research Laboratory; 1998. 1e2.7 The heavens and the earth: a political history of the space age, p. 127e28,

179e80.8 Ibid, pp. 184e85.

120 J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

proposal and work to delay the development of an independentUS program.9 What effect this document had on the internaldebates within the Eisenhower administration is unclear.The predictions of the Soviets neutralizing or destroying USsatellites fortunately proved to be wrong.

The next month Eisenhower signed NSC 5814/1, Prelimi-nary US Policy on Outer Space. It was the first comprehensivestatement of US outer space policy since Sputnik 1. Althoughthe document emphasized the critical importance of recon-naissance satellites, it did not recommend a specific disclosurepolicy but only stated that there must be ‘‘a political frame-work which will place the uses of US reconnaissance satellitesin a political and psychological context more favorable to theUnited States.’’10

During 1960, the USSR commenced its campaign againstreconnaissance from space in earnest. For example, in publi-cations and at international conferences Soviet jurists statedthat the activity was illegal on the basis that existing inter-national law which prohibited aerial photoreconnaissanceshould be applied to outer space and, in any event, espionagewas a hostile act and violated the UN Charter. The USgovernment closely monitored the campaign and top policymakers received regular reports on it.11

The USA also finally successfully launched its firstreconnaissance satellites that year. In June, it placed the firstGRAB in space. Fearful of the Soviets detecting GRAB’stransmissions to ground stations and publicizing the fact thatit was an intelligence satellite, Eisenhower ordered that theelectronic intelligence equipment could only be turned on withpresidential approval. This was done only 23 times duringGRAB’s 10-month operational life. Despite this limitedcoverage, the satellite provided a wealth of information on thelocation and technical characteristics of Soviet radars.12

After a string of failures, the first successful CORONAmission with cameras and film took place in August 1960.Known publicly as DISCOVERER XIV, it provided morephotographic coverage of the USSR than all 24 U-2 over-flights. As with prior launches in the program, the governmentoffered some details concerning the vehicle, the orbital

9 Special National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-58: Implications of Certain

US Earth Satellite Programs, 29 July 1958. National Intelligence Estimates

and Special National Intelligence Estimates were all-source publications

initially prepared by the CIA’s Board of Estimates. They were reviewed and

voted on by the US Intelligence Board, an interagency group chaired by the

Director of Central Intelligence and whose other members were the heads of

the other intelligence agencies and organizations. Their distribution was

limited to selected civilian and military officials in the executive branch.

(http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp?doc_noþ000028380&title_

IMPLICATI. [accessed 6.07.08]).10 The heavens and the earth: a political history of the space age, p. 180e83.11 See, e.g., ‘‘Comment on Outer Space Law in Soviet Propaganda Media’’, 3

April 1962; CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120038-0; and ‘‘US military space

requirements in the light of Soviet intentions evidenced during JuneeAugust,

1962’’, 5 September 1962; CIA-RDP66R00638R000100140005-3; CREST

(CIA Records Search Tool) database; National Archives, College Park,

Maryland (NARA).12 Day Dwayne A. Listening from above: the first signals intelligence

satellite. Spaceflight August 1999; 41: 338e46.

elements, and recovery. It did not, of course, mention the truepurpose of the mission. Instead, the announcements simplystated that the nose cone carried special instrument pack-ages.13 Before the end of the month, Eisenhower signeda directive creating the TALENT-KEYHOLE (T-KH) specialsecurity control system to protect the fact of photoreconnais-sance from space and its product. Only those with this clear-ance would be allowed to learn that the USA was obtainingimagery intelligence from space and have access to thephotography. A little over 1400 officials received the clearanceat the time. The directive also charged the Director of CentralIntelligence with implementing and overseeing the T-KHsystem.14 The separate BYEMAN special security controlsystem was apparently also created in same time period.Although the documents establishing it remain classified, itreportedly covers the technologies and operating details ofreconnaissance satellites.15

Another five CORONA satellites were launched by the endof 1960. The government offered information concerningthem in line with the earlier DISCOVERER missions.Although the resolution of the CORONA imagery was lessthan that from the U-2, it provided a huge amount of valuableintelligence and continued to do so until the program ended in1972.16

Beginning with the launch of MIDAS 1 in February 1960,various problems beset the program. In 1963, MIDAS 6 finallyoperated correctly and became the first satellite to detecta missile launch.17 The first attempt to place SAMOS in spacetook place in October 1960, but a second stage malfunctionprevented it from reaching orbit. (There were over 10 addi-tional SAMOS launches before the program was cancelled in1963. Neither the electronic readout nor film recovery systemsproduced any usable imagery. Whether the electronic intelli-gence system acquired any valuable data is not known.).18

Consistent with the prior practice, considerable publicityattended the MIDAS and SAMOS launches in 1960.19

Representatives of the DoD, CIA, and State Departmentmet several times in 1960 to discuss the use of SAMOS

13 CORONA, p. 22e24.14 Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, 26 August 1960, in

CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program, pp. 63e74. Memorandum for

the Secretary of State, et al., August 26, 1960; CIA-RDP76B00734R0002

00070002-1; CREST database; NARA.15 Richelson Jeffrey T. The US Intelligence Community. 5th ed. Boulder:

Westview Press; 2008. p. 514. The author’s declassification request for the

documents establishing the BYEMAN special security control system was

denied in its entirety.16 CORONA, p. 22e4, 37e9.17 High frontier, The United States air force and the military space program,

p. 32e7.18 Albert Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology to Director

of Central Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,

3 June 1965; CIA-RDP71B00508R000100060041-6; CREST database; NARA.

Day Dwayne A., Development and improvement of the satellite, in

Day Dwayne A., Logsdon John M., and Latell Brian, eds., Eye in the sky, the

story of the corona spy satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution

Press, 1998), pp. 70e4.19 Satellite reconnaissance: the role of informal bargaining. p. 40e1.

22 Richelson Jeffrey T. Undercover in outer space: the creation and evolution

of the NRO, 1960e1963. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-

intelligence 2000; 13: p. 308e20; Hall R. Cargill. The NRO in the 21st century e

121J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

imagery. The DoD and CIA believed that it should all beclassified. While the State Department certainly understoodthe goal of SAMOS to collect intelligence, some of its offi-cials also believed that the release of selected imagery wouldresult in political, legal, and propaganda benefits. (Thisposition of greater openness was one that the State Depart-ment would generally adhere to in subsequent years.) Theyargued that the release would help legitimize photorecon-naissance from space and help rebut Soviet criticism of thisactivity. Imagery that had direct use in such civilian appli-cations as forestry and urban planning would help gainacceptance for photography from space. Lastly, these officialssuggested that the USA seriously consider permitting theUnited Nations to use SAMOS to ensure compliance withinternational agreements.20 None of these suggestions wasadopted, however, and the DoD and CIA’s position becamepolicy.

3. The Kennedy administration

When John F. Kennedy became president there was stillno comprehensive, uniform policy on what, if any, informationshould be disclosed concerning the reconnaissance satelliteprograms. The SAMOS, MIDAS, and DISCOVERERprograms continued receiving substantial official and unoffi-cial publicity, while CORONA and GRAB still did not get any.Just before assuming office, Kennedy received a report fromhis Ad Hoc Committee on Space chaired by Jerome Wiesner(who became Kennedy’s science advisor). It stated thatpossibly ‘‘the most disturbing and dangerous part of the spaceprogram is the international aspect of the Samos and Midasprograms’’. Noting the growing Soviet criticism of USreconnaissance satellites, the report recommended that stepsbe taken ‘‘to salvage the Samos program from destruction byinternational political action on the part of the Soviets’’.Although not endorsing any particular course of action, itnoted that one possible solution was to announce SAMOSmissions and to make SAMOS data freely available to theUnited Nations.21

To better coordinate and run the nation’s strategicreconnaissance activities, the DoD and CIA agreed inSeptember 1961 to convert the Air Force office created theprevious year to operate the SAMOS program in to theNRO. It was to manage the newly designated NationalReconnaissance Program that included all ‘‘satellite andoverflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert’’.The initial directors were the Under Secretary of the Air

20 Farley Philip J. to Mr. Merchant, September 14, 1960. Satellites, recon-

naissance file, box #279; Records re AE matters, 1944e1962; Record group

59. General records of the Department of State: NARA.21 Report by the Ad Hoc committee on space to president-elect Kennedy,

January 10, 1961. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/6022pf.htm

[accessed 30.08.08].

Force and the CIA’s Deputy Director (Plans). Everythingconcerning the office was classified, even its existence andmission.22

The Kennedy administration soon moved to reduce thepublicity surrounding space-based reconnaissance programs.When the initial actions did not significantly decrease theinformation released, the DoD issued a directive in March1962 that ended the disclosure of virtually all informationconcerning unclassified and classified programs. Among otherthings, the order stated that military space projects would bereferred to solely by a numerical designator and that militaryspace vehicles would be identified only by an alphabeticalprefix followed by a number designator. Such names asSAMOS, MIDAS, and DISCOVERER could no longer beused publicly. All unclassified discussion of payloads andmissions was prohibited.23

The General Assembly in December 1961 approved a USresolution that called on nations to register with the UnitedNations all objects launched into Earth orbit or beyond. Theexact information to be supplied was not spelled out. Becausethe State Department had not coordinated the issue with theCIA and other intelligence agencies, the measure took them bysurprise and caused them great concern. A series of high-levelinteragency meetings took place in the spring of 1962 trying toformulate a policy to comply with it. Consistent with its often-stated position that considerable data should be released tolegitimize reconnaissance from space, the State Departmentadvocated that such information as payload and mission befurnished. The intelligence agencies strongly opposed this andargued that only minimal data be furnished. Their position wasadopted and only information on the launch date, orbitalelements, the launch vehicle, and the general satellite categorywould be provided to the United Nations.24

The confusion and lack of coordination on the launchregistration question illustrated the need for a permanent high-level committee to establish policy on such matters. Time wasof the essence as negotiations were pending with the Soviets atthe UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Theirpublic relations campaign against reconnaissance from spacehad intensified and indications were that it would proposethere that all spacecraft used for ‘‘military reconnaissancepurposes’’ be prohibited.25

ensuring global information supremacy. Quest: The History of Spaceflight

Quarterly Summer 2004;11(No. 3):5; Haines Gerald, The national recon-

naissance office, its origins, creation, and early years, Eye in the sky, the story

of the corona spy satellites, p. 148e50.23 Satellite reconnaissance: the role of informal bargaining, pp. 39e45.

Department of Defense Directive S-5200.13, March 23, 1962;

CIA-RDP75B00326R000200230012-6; CREST database; NARA.24 Chronology of Events Leading to UN Registration of Space Vehicles, n.d.;

CIA-RDP66R00638000100150016e0 and Development of Procedures for US

Reports for the U.N. Registration of Space Launches, n.d.; CIA-RDP66R00

638R000100150031-3.; CREST database; NARA.25 Satellite reconnaissance: the role of informal bargaining. p. 56e60.

29 Memorandum from Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to

Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, et al., January 21, 1964.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9015.htm [accessed 20.08.08].30

122 J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

President Kennedy signed National Security ActionMemorandum 156 in May 1962 to fill this gap. It directed thatan interagency group be formed by the State Department toexamine the pending negotiations with the Soviets on spaceand disarmament ‘‘with a view to formulating a position whichavoids the dangers of restricting ourselves, compromisinghighly classified programs, or providing assistance of signifi-cant military value to the USSR and which at the same timepermits us to continue to work for disarmament and interna-tional cooperation in space.’’26

Formally known as the Committee to Establish NationalPolicy on Satellite Reconnaissance, it was commonly referredto as the NSAM 156 Committee. The first chair was U. AlexisJohnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.Its other initial members were Dr. Robert Seamans, AssociateAdministrator of NASA; Dr. Joseph Charyk, Under Secretaryof the Air Force and (covertly) Director of the NRO; Dr.Herbert Scoville, Deputy Director (Research) at the CIA;Roger Hilsman, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence andResearch at the State Department; Paul Nitze, AssistantSecretary of Defense (International Security Affairs); AdrianFisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency; and Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to thePresident for National Security Affairs.27

The group’s July 1962 report contained 18 policy recom-mendations and all but one were approved by the NationalSecurity Council as NSC Action 2454 in July 1962. Amongthem were that the USA must maintain that outer space is freeand that reconnaissance activities are legitimate and are‘‘peaceful uses’’ of outer space. The report endorsed thepresent policy of not identifying individual launches bymission or purpose, but also stated there should be a ‘‘moreopen (but not more detailed) public reference to the generalover-all military program’’ and its objectives should bedescribed ‘‘in broad and general terms.’’ However, it cautionedthat there should be no disclosure of the ‘‘status, extent,effectiveness, or operational characteristics’’ of the recon-naissance programs at the current time. The report stronglyadvocated that studies be made on whether there is anyreleasable data, such as mapping information, which wouldhelp gain wider acceptance of photography from space. Withthe clearance of the NRO, it stated that the USA ‘‘shoulddiscreetly disclose to certain allies and neutrals selectedinformation with regard to the US space reconnaissanceprogram’’ and emphasize its importance to Free World secu-rity.28 As will be seen, the NSAM 156 Committee wouldcontinue to be intimately involved in the question of possibledeclassification of reconnaissance satellite programs for thenext decade.

26 National Security Action Memorandum 156, May 26, 1962;

CIA-RDP80B01676R002900230001e7; CREST database; NARA.27 Memorandum for the Record, 2 June 1962. CIA-RDP66R00638

R000100150037e7; CREST database; NARA.28 Record of Action at the Five Hundred and Second Meeting of the National

Security Council, July 10, 1962. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/

xxv/6022pf.htm [accessed 30.08.08].

The recommendation concerning informing allies andneutrals was soon carried out. US officials told the heads ofgovernment of all NATO nations, their Foreign Ministers, andtheir NATO Advisory Council Permanent Representatives thatthe USA had such programs, that they were developing well anddirectly benefiting the alliance, and that they must be maintainedat all costs. Officials of several unknown neutral nations alsoreceived similar briefings. Neither any photography nor detailson the quality or extent of coverage were revealed.29

President Kennedy signed National Security ActionMemorandum 216 in January 1963, which directed the CIA,DoD, and the State Department to study the possibility ofdisclosing US reconnaissance capabilities to the Soviet lead-ership or, alternatively, maintaining such materials at the USEmbassy in Moscow to be provided to them in times ofcrisis.30 Although the reason for the review is not known, itmay have resulted from the belief that not sharing criticalintelligence with the USSR in the recent Cuban Missile Crisismight have exacerbated tensions. No accessible recordsdocument the work of the NSAM 216 group but, as will beseen, the NSAM 156 Committee addressed the issue thefollowing year.

Carrying out its recommendation made the previous year,the NSAM 156 Committee in June 1963 examined the ques-tion of releasing some degraded ARGON mapping cameraphotography to foster wider acceptance of imaging fromspace. (Twelve ARGON cameras were launched between 1961and 1964.).31 Based on the increasing acceptance at the UNCommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of the USposition that observation from space was lawful and onthe fear of provoking the Soviets, the group unanimouslyrecommended against any disclosure.32

The strident Soviet campaign against reconnaissance fromspace ended in 1963 for reasons that were not entirely clear toUS officials. They surmised the change resulted from theUSSR’s successful operation of its own reconnaissance satel-lites and its realization that, because most countries outside theSino-Soviet bloc accepted space reconnaissance, its attemptsto limit or stop the US program would continue to fail.Although the USSR was now tacitly accepting space-basedreconnaissance, this did not alter the position of most USofficials against even admitting to conducting the activity.They now believed that to do so would probably force theSoviets to renew their campaign.33

National Security Action Memorandum 216, January 18, 1963. http://

www.jfklibrary.org/images/nsam216.jp [accessed 6.07.08].31 CORONA program history, volume V, system integration, 19 May 1976.

pp. 2e5, 2e9; CIA-RDP89B0098R000500110001-7; CREST database;

NARA.32 Memorandum for the Record, 26 June 1963; CIA-RDP63e00

313A000500090044-0; CREST database; NARA.33 Memorandum from Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, et al., January 21,

1964.

123J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

4. The Johnson administration

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave separate interviews inMay 1964 to journalist Drew Pearson and former Senator WilliamBenton indicating an acceptance of reconnaissance from space. Inhis conversations with Benton, for example, he stated that theUSSR took photographs of unspecified military bases from spaceand half-jokingly offered to exchange them with President Lyn-don Johnson. Khrushchev further asked that the USA stop aerialoverflights of Cuba because they were provocative; he impliedthat US reconnaissance satellites could replace them.34

Probably because of the Soviet leader’s comments, theNSAM 156 Committee met several times over the summer of1964. An Arms Control and Disarmament Agency proposal tohave an international organization receive US and Sovietsatellite imagery for storage and possible readout was defeated.Its subsequent suggestion to discuss reconnaissance from spacewith the USSR at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference wasalso rejected. In the end, almost every agency was againstrevealing even the existence of the programs, based on the beliefthat this might provoke the Soviets. The NSAM 156 Committeealso brought to a close the issue raised by NSAM 216 in theprevious year by opposing the private disclosure to the Soviets ofany information regarding the reconnaissance programs.35

The NSAM 156 Committee again addressed the subject in1966 in connection with its review of NASA’s plans to operateremote sensing spacecraft. Prompted by NASA’s requests tothe Bureau of the Budget for funding, the heads of the Bureauof the Budget and the White Office of Science and Technologyjointly requested the Secretary of State to convene the NSAM156 Committee to examine the issue.36

The Director of the NRO, Alexander Flax, led the opposition toNASA’s proposals to use cameras beginning in about 1971 thatwould achieve better than six foot resolution from low-Earthorbit. He argued that employing this equipment would entaila virtually complete declassification of sensors used in the covertprograms or ‘‘a parallel development of sensors of equalquality’’.37 (The highest resolution of the CORONA photore-connaissance satellite in 1966 was approaching six feet. The onlyother photoreconnaissance satellite in operation at the time, theKH-7, had a maximum resolution of about two feet.38) In either

34 Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to Acting Secretary of

State, June 1, 1964. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/9016.htm

[accessed 20.08.08]. Middleton Drew Khrushchev says soviets uses satellites

for spying. The New York Times, May 30, 1964, p. 1.35 Memorandum for the Record, 18 June 1964; CIA-RDP67B00558

R000100020021-5 and Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director for Intelli-

gence, 3 May 1966. CIA-RDP79B01709A002000050035-8; CREST database;

NARA.36 Schultze Charles L., Director, Bureau of the Budget and Hornig Donald F.,

Director, Office of Science and Technology, to Honorable Dean Rusk, April 4,

1966. NSAM 156 committee file, box #12; National Security File, Intelli-

gence; LBJ Library.37 Flax Alexander H, Director to Amb. Johnson, et al., May 24, 1966. NSAM

156 committee file, box #12. National Security File, Intelligence; LBJ Library.38 Eye in the sky, the story of the corona spy satellites. pp. 232e33. Amer-

ica’s eyes: what we were seeing. Washington, D.C.: National Imagery and

Mapping Agency; 2003. p. 3.

case, Flax stated that what NASA wanted to do would probablyprovoke the USSR and perhaps other nations to take steps toimpose restrictions on photography from space, could leadnations to adopt camouflage measures to hide their sensitiveinstallations, and could possibly force countries to develop anti-satellite weapons.39

The NSAM 156 Committee made a number of recommen-dations in its July 1966 report. It reaffirmed its recommendationfrom four years earlier to avoid causing challenges to satellitephotography and stated that there was no need for any disclosureinitiatives currently because the USSR tacitly accepted it. Thegroup strongly believed that for the time being NASA shouldcontinue to comply with the agreement with the NRO limiting its‘‘study, design, development, fabrication, or test of earth sensors’’to those with no higher resolution than 20 m from low-Earth orbit.To increase the use of covert satellite photography by NASA andthe other interested Federal civilian agencies for non-militarypurposes, it recommended that the US Intelligence Board shouldconsider downgrading the fact that the USA had such a programfrom Top Secret/T-KH to Top Secret or Secret, downgradingselected imagery from Top Secret/T-KH to Top Secret or Secret,or, alternatively, clearing more NASA and civilian agencypersonnel to access the imagery under the T-KH system.40

The US Intelligence Board considered the latter recom-mendations the following month. Only the State Departmentrepresentative was in favor of downgrading the ‘‘fact of’’ andsome photography. He argued that the main reason for creatingthe T-KH system in 1960 e preventing the Soviets from learningof the photoreconnaissance satellite program and from takingretaliatory action e was no longer valid. Additionally, thisofficial took the position that the existence of the program andmuch of its imagery no longer required special security controlsand could be protected under normal classification guidelines.The Director of Central Intelligence and the other membersstrongly opposed either action, based primarily on the belief thatrelease would force the Soviets to renew their propagandacampaign. In the end, the Board voted against any downgradingor disclosure and recommended that more NASA and civilianagency employees receive T-KH clearances.41

Confirmation of the existence and importance of the USsatellite reconnaissance program came from an unexpectedsource in March 1967. At a meeting of Southern educators and

39 Flax Alexander H, Director to Amb. Johnson, et al.40 Political and security aspects of non-military applications of satellite

earth-sensing, July 11, 1966. NSAM 156 committee file, box #12. National

Security File, Intelligence; LBJ Library.41 Richard Helms, Director to The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, 7 September

1966; CIA-RDP79B01709A002000050023e1. Memorandum to Holders of

USIB-D-41.12/23. 29 August 1966; CIA-RDP79B01709A002300010034-0;

CREST database; NARA. The National Security Council created the US Intelli-

gence Board in 1958. Chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, its other

members were initially the Director of the National Security Agency and heads of

the intelligence components of the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investi-

gation, Atomic Energy Commission, and the three military services. Among the

Board’s duties were to assist the Director of Central Intelligence in establishing

intelligence policy and program guidance, reporting to the National Security

Council on the foreign intelligence effort, and developing security standards.

47 Endgame. The inside story of SALT II, p. 19e21. Treaty between the

United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the

limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/

abmt/text/abm2.htm [accessed 5.09.08]. Interim agreement between the

United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with

respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. http://www/fas.org/nuke/

control/salt1/text/salt1.htm [accessed 5.09.08].48 Laird Melvin R, to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 8

June 1972. http//www.gwu.edu/wnsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/index.htm

[accessed 20.08.08].

124 J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

government officials in Nashville that month, President Lyn-don Johnson stated in off-the-record comments that because ofthem ‘‘I know how many missiles the enemy has’’.42 He addedthat the nation had spent from $35 to $40 billion dollars onmilitary and civilian space programs, but that the benefits ofsatellite photography alone would justify having spent10 times as much.43 The comments were reported briefly inthe New York Times and a few other publications, but they didnot affect the debates on greater openness.

Discussions began between the USA and USSR duringspring 1967 on initiating what eventually became known as theStrategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). US officials realizedlong before formal negotiations started in late 1969 that verifi-cation would by a key issue, the Soviets would not permit on-siteinspection, and both nations would have to rely on reconnais-sance satellites for verification. As a result, many believed thatgreater disclosure was necessary to prove to the Americanpublic, Congress, and allies that the nation could monitor anyagreement with the USSR. This would be a powerful argumentfor increased openness for another decade.44

Dr. Morton Halperin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefense (International Security Affairs), requested the NSAM156 Committee meet in late 1967 to consider whether theUSA should negotiate privately with the Soviets for a jointdisclosure of their satellite reconnaissance programs to helpthe upcoming arms control process. It is unclear whether thegroup formally met to review the proposal. However, the NROand CIA were extremely unhappy about it for the usual reasonsand it was rejected.45

The NSAM 156 Committee again examined the possibilityof acknowledging the existence of reconnaissance satellites inSeptember 1968. It is not known where the proposal origi-nated, but it was intended to increase public confidence in theability to verify any arms control agreement. It apparentlynever came up for a formal vote and was not adopted.46

5. The Nixon and Ford administrations

After more than two years of SALT negotiations, the USA andthe USSR signed two treaties in May 1972. One limited thenumber and location of anti-ballistic missiles each could deployand the other froze for five years the number of launchers forintercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Thetwo treaties had identical language stating that both countrieswould use ‘‘national technical means of verification’’ to ensurecompliance, would not interfere with the other’s ‘‘national tech-nical means of verification’’, and would not employ ‘‘deliberate

42 Clark Evert. Satellite spying cited by Johnson. The New York Times,

March 17, 1967: 13.43 Ibid.44 Talbott Strobe. Endgame, the inside story of SALT II. New York: Harper &

Row; 1979. p. 19e21.45 Worthman Paul E. Colonel, USAF to Dr. Flax, December 18, 1967. NRO

staff records collection on the NRO website at www.nro.gov.46 DDS & T staff meeting, 12 Sept 1968; CIA-RDP71B00185

A000100010006e8; DDS & T staff meeting, 19 Sept 1968. CIA-RDP71B

00185A000100010005-7. CREST database; NARA.

concealment measures which impede verification by nationaltechnical means’’.47

Before President Richard Nixon sent the two treaties to theSenate for ratification, all the relevant agencies agreed that the‘‘fact of’’ reconnaissance from space should be disclosed inone way or another to help dispel doubts about the ability toverify. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird recommended thatthe president’s transmittal letter to the Senate state ‘‘nationaltechnical means of verification’’ for both the USA and theUSSR includes reconnaissance satellites and that all types of‘‘national technical means’’ provide confidence ‘‘that we canverify compliance with the provisions of these agreementswithin satisfactory limits’’.48 The State Department and ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency supported an officialacknowledgement in any form. Director of Central Intelli-gence Richard Helms argued that any disclosure should onlybe made when necessary during the congressional hearings.The issue was forwarded to Henry Kissinger, Assistant to thePresident for National Security Affairs, who decided againstan acknowledgement for unknown reasons.49

William Colby, the new Director of Central Intelligence,proposed in autumn 1973 that the ‘‘fact of’’ photoreconnais-sance from space and certain imagery and information derivedtherefrom be downgraded to Top Secret or Secret. He arguedthat the ‘‘maximum benefit from the photography collectedby intelligence satellites is inhibited by the continuation ofcompartmented control over all aspects of the program’’.50

Both the US Intelligence Board and the Secretary of Defensesupported Colby. As a result, President Nixon quickly signeda directive downgrading the ‘‘fact of’’ to Secret and much ofthe photography and data from it to Secret.51

Colby went a step further in 1974 and proposed that theUSA reveal that it conducted photoreconnaissance from space.He argued that because the ‘‘fact of’’ was already widelyknown, acknowledging it ‘‘would also open the opportunity ofdeclassifying individual products of the program for publicrelease’’.52 Colby further stated that retaining its classification

49 Sonnenfeldt Helmut and Odeen Phil to Dr Kissinger, June 9, 1972 and

Odeen Phil and Sonnenfeldt Helmut to Dr. Kissinger, June 13, 1972. http://

www.gwu.edu/wnsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/index.htm [accessed 20.

08.08].50 Colby WE, Director to Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs, 21 September 1973. CIA-RDP76B00734R000200070002e1. CREST

database; NARA.51 George Bush to the President, 8 June 1976. CIA-RDP79M00467

A002400080008e0. CREST database NARA.52 Colby WE, to the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs, 21 August 1974. http://www.gwu.edu/wnsarchive/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/index.htm [accessed 20.08.08].

125J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

restricted what government officials could discuss and did notmeet the standards of Executive Order 11652 as to whatinformation must be classified.53 Secretary of Defense JamesSchlesinger led the opposition to it on the basis that therewould be little gain and potentially great risk.54 Colby’s effortdid not result in any declassification.

Several agencies advanced proposals in 1976 to downgrade ordeclassify the existence of or products from reconnaissancesatellites. Although the available documentation does not revealthe reasons behind these proposals, they were probably in largepart related to the current debate over the ability of the USA toverify the SALT I agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, forexample, recommended that the ‘‘fact of’’ collecting imagery andelectronic intelligence from space should be classified as Confi-dential (the lowest security classification) and the ‘‘fact of’’acquiring communications intelligence from space should bedecompartmented and classified Top Secret or Secret. Theyfurther proposed to remove from compartmented controls allimagery and electronic intelligence from satellites and classify itTop Secret or Secret.55 The NRO, Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency, and the National Security Agency opposeddisclosing even the existence of a reconnaissance satelliteprogram.56 After extensive interagency discussion, Director ofCentral Intelligence George Bush wrote to President Gerald Fordin November recommending only that the ‘‘fact of’’ reconnais-sance from space be downgraded from Secret to Confidential.57

However, President Ford did not take any action before leavingoffice in January 1977.

6. The Carter administration

President Jimmy Carter did act on the recommendation,directing in March 1977 that ‘‘The fact that the UnitedStates conducts satellite reconnaissance for intelligencepurposes, without disclosing the generic type of activity, will beclassified Confidential.’’.58 At the time, the USA and the USSRwere beginning SALT II, a second round of negotiations overstrategic arms. Some progress had been made in SALT II byspring 1978, although a final agreement was still not at hand.59

To help diffuse the growing criticism over the ability to verifyany agreement, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance raised the possi-bility in May that some aspects of the space-based reconnaissanceprogram be disclosed. With the agreement of other high-levelofficials, the Space Policy Review Committee chaired by

53 Ibid.54 James R. Schlesinger to The Honorable William E. Colby, 22 August

1974; CIA-RDP84B00506R000100090023e1; CREST database; NARA.55 Plummer W. to Deputy Secretary of Defense, 5 March 1976. Document

#156, NRO staff records collection.56 George Bush, Director to the Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, 10 November 1976. CIA-RDP79

M00467A002400080002e6. CREST database; NARA.57 George Bush to the President, 10 November 1976; CIA-RDP79

M00467A002400080002e6; CREST database; NARA.58 Presidential review memorandum/NSC 23, March 28, 1977 and presidential

directive/NSC-37, May 11, 1978. http//www.gwu.edu/wnsarchive/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB231/index.htm [accessed 30.08.08].59 Endgame, The inside story of SALT II. p. 38e77.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown soon examined declassifyingthe ‘‘fact of’’ and possibly releasing some imagery.60

The members made the usual arguments for and againstthese actions. The Secretary of State and the Director of theArms Control and Disarmament Agency favored immediatelyadmitting the ‘‘fact of’’, while the Director of Central Intel-ligence, the Secretary of Defense, the NASA Administrator,and the Director of the Office of Management and Budgetsupported doing so only after additional preparation. Only thelatter two supported releasing selected imagery, on thegrounds that such a step would be much more valuable inproving the ability to verify and that the photography also hada number of civilian applications. Opponents argued that sucha move might provoke the Sino-Soviet Bloc and some neutralnations to call for international controls on imaging fromspace and that it would provide information on the systems theUSA employed, their capabilities, and might possibly lead tosome countries taking countermeasures.61

After receiving the recommendations, President Carter agreedto declassify the ‘‘fact of’’ and directed that all preparations andconsultations required before doing so be completed by 1October. A major influence on the timing of the announcementwas the trial of William Kampiles, a CIA officer charged withselling a technical manual on the latest photoreconnaissancesatellite to the Soviets, which was set to begin in November 1978.Although the government was unsure of how much regarding theprogram it might have to reveal in court, at a minimum it believedthat it would have to admit to a photoreconnaissance satelliteprogram. Consequently, officials believed that the disclosureshould precede the trial so that it would not appear the governmentwas forced to make it.62 After notifying the Soviets, selectedallies, and Congressional leaders, Carter acknowledged that thenation had photoreconnaissance satellites and that they werecritical to monitoring arms control agreements in a 1 Octoberspeech at the Kennedy Space Center. As many predicted, theadmission did little to quiet the SALT critics.63

Ten days later, Carter ordered that an interagency task forcechaired by the Director of Central Intelligence be created to reportto the Space Policy Review Committee on possibly releasingselected imagery or information on the program. Although fewtask force documents are available, it is known that it recom-mended in March 1979 that no imagery be released.64

60 Meeting of the SPRC on declassification of the ‘‘fact of’’ US satellite

photoreconnaissance on 13 September 1978, 11 September 1978; CIA-RDP

81B004001R002000130002e7; CREST database; NARA.61 Memorandum for the Record, 21 September 1978; CIA-RDP81e0014R0

00600080002-9; CREST database; NARA.62 Arnold Kantner to OSTP, et al., September 25, 1978;

CIA-RDP83M00171R000500070005e1; CREST database; NARA.63 Walsh Edward. Carter vows US will continue leadership in space. The

New York Times October 2, 1978: A1. [Redacted] to Director of Central

Intelligence, 14 November 1978. CIA-RDP81e0014R000600080002-9.

CREST database; NARA.64 Presidential Directive/NSA-42. http//www.gwu.edu/wnsarchive/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB231/index.htm [accessed 20.8.08]. [redacted], Chairman, ‘‘Open

skies’’ Task Force to Dr. Victor H. Reis, Assistant Director, Office of Science and

Technology Policy, 1 April 1982; CIA-RDP83M00171R000300150002e7;

CREST database; NARA.

126 J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

7. The Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and GeorgeW. Bush administrations

During the Reagan administration the only further disclo-sure made was that the USA had photoreconnaissance satel-lites with near-real-time capability which provided defenserelated information for indications and warning. This was notdone publicly, but in a Top Secret National Security DecisionDirective.65 (It was not until several decades later, however,that the government confirmed that this was the KH-11satellite and that it was first launched in December 1976.66)

Senator Albert Gore’s interest in the release of older classifiedimagery for studying the environment and the growing supportwithin the Intelligence Community for increased openness withthe end of the Cold War were important factors that led to newdeclassification initiatives. Director of Central IntelligenceRobert Gates created the Task Force on the National Recon-naissance Office in March 1992 to examine the structure andprocedures of that office and also to review the possibility ofdeclassifying its existence and other limited information. Itsmembers included two senior executives from major IntelligenceCommunity contractors and six current or retired high-levelintelligence agency officials. With respect to the latter issue, theTask Force recommended the following month that the existence,mission statement, names of the three top officials, fact of jointDoD and Intelligence Community staffing, and the headquarterslocation be disclosed. Their arguments were that the ‘‘fact of’’ ofthe NRO was already an ‘‘open secret’’, that trying to maintain asclassified such ‘‘open secrets’’ without a strong reason wasinconsistent with the drive for greater openness and weakened theargument for keeping truly sensitive secrets, and that it ‘‘need-lessly angered congressional and other critics’’.67 The SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence strongly supported the TaskForce recommendations regarding declassification.68 InSeptember 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence signeda directive implementing them.69

Gates had formed the Classification Review Task Force in late1991 to examine the feasibility of declassifying photorecon-naissance satellite imagery. After extensive study, it recom-mended three years later that all the imagery from the CORONA,ARGON, and LANYARD missions that flew during all or some ofthe years from 1960 to 1972 be released.70 (LANYARD was

65 National security decision directive number 42, July 4, 1982. http://www.

gwu.edu/wnsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/index.htm [accessed 20.08.08].66 National reconnaissance office review and redaction guide. http://www/

nro.gov/foia/foia_req.html; 2006 [accessed 25.06.09] p. 21.67 DCI task force on the national reconnaissance office, final report, April 1992.

http://www.gwu.edu/wnsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB35/14-07.htm [accessed 7.

07.08] p. 13e4.68 Faga Martin C. to Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence,

July 30, 1992. http://www.gwu.edu/wnsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB35/14-07.

htm [accessed 7.07.08].69 Gates Robert M., Director of Central Intelligence to Secretary of Defense,

15 September 1992. http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp [accessed

7.07.08].70 Ruffner Kevin C. CORONA and the Intelligence Community: declas-

sification’s great leap forward. Studies in Intelligence 1996;39(No. 5): 62e70.

a program initiated in 1962 to develop a high-resolution camera.Three cameras flew in 1963, but the results were discouraging andthe program was cancelled later that year.71) However, imple-mentation was delayed over concerns about the possible negativereactions of some of the nations photographed and whether therelease might require disclosure of imagery from other still-classified systems under the Freedom of Information Act. Oncethese issues were resolved and with the critical support of nowVice President Gore, President Clinton signed Executive Order12951 in February 1995 that declassified all the photography (atotal of about 800,000 images) from the three programs. Thehardware was voluntarily declassified concurrently. The execu-tive order did not address the release of records, but a separateinteragency effort that continues to this day has released hundredsof thousands of pages in whole or part.72

Executive Order 12951 also mandated that the Director ofCentral Intelligence determine by February 2000 whether thephotography from other obsolete broad-area film returnsystems could be released. An interagency group recom-mended early that year declassification of the KH-7 imageryand the KH-9 mapping camera imagery.73 (The KH-7 was thefirst successful high-resolution photoreconnaissance satelliteand flew 38 missions from 1963 to 1967. The KH-9 mappingcamera was carried on 12 satellites from 1973 to 1980.) Thephotography was made available to the public in 2002.74 Forreasons that are unclear, however, the hardware from these twosystems and all the program records remain classified.

In the past several years the government acknowledged theexistence of the nation’s first digital return system (the KH-11which became operational in early 1977) and confirmed theuse of SAR.75 These actions did not result from any mandateof Executive Order 12951, but were entirely voluntary.

The NRO, whose own existence had been declassified in 1992,proposed in 1995 that the ‘‘fact of’’ signals intelligence collectionfrom space be declassified. Declassification occurred thefollowing year when the Clinton administration revealed that thenation conducted overhead signals intelligence and measurementand signature intelligence collection.76 Although there has neverbeen a mandate similar to Executive Order 12951 concerning

71 CORONA program history. vol. v, system integration; 19 May 1976,

p. 2e15, 2e16.72 CORONA and the Intelligence Community: declassification’s great leap

forward. The largest number of declassified CORONA, ARGON, and

LANYARD documents are on the CREST database at the National Archives in

College Park, Maryland.73 Dempsey Joan A. to the Director of Central Intelligence, 24 February

2000. http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp [accessed 6.07.08].74 America’s eyes: what we were seeing, p. 2e5.75 National reconnaissance office review and redaction guide (2006 edition),

p. 21; Clark Colin. Spy radar satellites declassified. DoD Buzz, Online

Defense and Acquisition Journal, 3 July 2008. http://www.dodbuzz.com/2008/

07/03/spy-radar-satellites-declassified/ [accessed 2.02.09].76 Kurtzer Daniel C., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and

Research to Vice Admiral McConnell JM, Director, National Security Agency/

Chief/CSS, September 6, 1995 and Fact sheet, national space policy,

September 19, 1996. http://www.gwu.edu/wnsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/

index.htm [accessed 6.06.08].

127J. David / Space Policy 25 (2009) 117e127

signals intelligence programs, the Naval Research Laboratory in1998 voluntarily declassified the existence of and the hardwarefrom the GRAB electronic intelligence satellite that was launchedfive times from 1960 to 1962.77 All the program records remainclassified. Seven years later, the NRO voluntarily declassified theexistence of and hardware from the follow-on POPPY electronicintelligence satellite that was placed in space seven times from1962 to 1971. Once again, all the program records are stillclassified.78

8. Conclusion

The debates within the US government over acknowledgingor releasing information concerning space-based reconnais-sance systems started almost 50 years ago. The StateDepartment and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency werethe most consistent supporters of greater openness during theCold War, while the DoD and intelligence agencies were thestrongest opponents. Until the end of this conflict, the fewdeclassification actions taken were modest and only occurredwhen fully supported by the latter two organizations.

The situation changed dramatically with the end ofthe Cold War. The US government in 1995 confirmed theexistence of and released the product, hardware, and recordsfrom three early imagery intelligence satellite programs eCORONA (1958e1972), ARGON (1959e1964), andLANYARD (1962e1963). It also subsequently confirmedthe existence of and declassified the product of two otherfilm return systems, the KH-7 high-resolution camera (1963e1967) and the KH-9 mapping camera (1973e1980). Lastly,the government has acknowledged in recent years the exis-tence of the nation’s first digital return system (the KH-11which was launched in late 1976) and confirmed the use ofSAR. Notwithstanding these releases, the vast majorityof imagery, hardware, and records from obsolete systems stillremain classified.

The lack of further disclosures is difficult to understand,especially considering the quality of commercially available

77 GRAB: galactic radiation and background. Washington, D.C.: Naval

Research Laboratory; 1998.78 Raising the periscope: grab and poppy, America’s early ELINT satellites.

Chantilly, VA: National Reconnaissance Office; 2005.

products which has advanced to the point where the GeoEye-1now provides 0.50-m resolution imagery.79 This is better thanthe highest resolution achieved by the KH-7, is probably aboutequal to that of its KH-8 film return successor, and is greaterthan the reported maximum of two feet of the KH-9’s otherfilm return cameras.80 It is also probably better than theimagery produced by the earliest KH-11 digital return system.Just as with CORONA, there is some information concerningthese obsolete systems that in all likelihood must remainclassified under current guidelines (e.g., budgets, certain tar-geting data, and programming data). However, this informa-tion can be protected by redacting it in the records released, ashas been done in the case of CORONA.

Moreover, there have to be more data that can be releasedconcerning the employment of SAR and perhaps otherimaging technologies. NASA first used space-based SAR onits SeaSat-1 launched in 1978. The Space Shuttle carried it onmissions in 1981, 1984, and 2000. The Canadian SpaceAgency, European Space Agency, Japan Aerospace Explora-tion Agency, and the German and Italian governments havealso launched SAR-equipped spacecraft. The highest resolu-tion achieved is the Canadian Radarsat-2’s 3 m.81 Because ofSAR’s long use in these overt programs, at the very least basicdata such as the dates and results of its early employment bythe Intelligence Community should be releasable.

There has never been any known mandate similar to ExecutiveOrder 12951 to review signals intelligence systems for possibledeclassification. What has been done in this regard e the admis-sion that the USA conducted signals intelligence in space and thepartial releases concerning the early GRAB and POPPYelectronicintelligence satellites e has been voluntary. There must be at theleast some limited additional information concerning long-terminated programs from the Cold War that can be disclosed. Forexample, it is difficult to envision how acknowledging thatspacecraft intercepted Soviet microwave transmissions or Soviettelemetry would damage national security. Similarly, revealing thecodenames of obsolete vehicles or programs and some minimaldata concerning their operations would seem to pose little threat.

79 The information concerning GeoEye-1 comes from the corporate website

http://www.geoeye.com/CorpSite/products/Default.aspx [accessed 4.02.09].80 Richelson Jeffrey T. America’s secret eyes in space, the US keyhole spy

satellite program. New York: Harper & Row; 1990. p. 107.81 Aronoff Stan. Remote sensing for GIS managers. Redlands: ESRI Press;

2005. p. 214, 221e7.