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WHAT SORT OF FACT IS K ANT’S FACT OF R EASON?

Tatiana Patrone

tpatrone@ithaca.edu

Introduction

The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant says, aims to show “that  there is pure practical reason”

(5:3).  !urthermore, i" it succeeds in this, then “transcendental freedom is also esta#lished”.$  %n

order to accomplish #oth tas&s, Kant's nalytic shows, "irst, that all and only those wills that are

su#ect to the cate*orical imperati+e o" morality are transcendentally "ree. econd, it ar*ues that

human +olition #elon*s to the set o" wills that are su#ect to the moral law (and thus are "ree in

this “a#solute sense”). This second tas& in+ol+es an appeal to what Kant calls the fact of reason:

throu*h this “"act” Kant is a#le to *round his claim that humans ha+e the "aculty o" pure

 practical reason and thus are also transcendentally "ree.3

Kant's appeal to the "act o" reason in the second Critique has not won o+er many

supporters. The ar*ument "rom the "act o" reason has #een called a “moralistic #luster” (#y llen

-ood) and one o" the “most spectacular train wrec&s” (#y Paul /uyer 5). 0ne o" the common

concerns a#out Kant's appeal to the “consciousness o" the "undamental moral law” is that it #e*s

the 1uestion o" the second Critique, the tas& o" which is to show (and not to assume) that our

 practical reason is in "act pure. nother concern (which is somewhat related to the 1uestion2

 #e**in* issue) is that Kant intends the "act o" reason to do too much hea+y li"tin* in his system

 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (in Kant: Practical Philosophy, translated and edited #y ary 4. /re*or (am#rid*e6ni+ersity Press, 778).$ %#id.3 % should say that this way o" readin* the second Critique has #een de+eloped #y 0nora 0'9eil and Pa+el u&;w

(see especially his “The !act o" <eason: Kant's Passa*e to 0rdinary oral Knowled*e”, Kant-Studien = (773),

 pp. $>2$$.) nd in this #asic approach to the structure o" the second Critique % a*ree with these readin*s that ta&e

the "act o" reason to #e a part o" Kant's ar*ument to the conclusion that humans ha+e pure practical reason, etc. llen -ood, Kantian Ethics (am#rid*e 6ni+ersity Press, $>>=), 35.5 Paul /uyer, “9aturalistic and Transcendental oments in Kant's oral Philosophy”, (5) in  Inquiry 5> ($>>?):

28.

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and that the whole critical corpus stands or "alls with the success o" this central ar*ument in the

Critique of Practical Reason.

%n what "ollows, % will loo& into one aspect o" Kant's ar*ument "rom the "act o" reason,

namely into the 1uestion whether the "act o" reason is empirical or a priori. 9ow, Kant claims 

that the "act o" reason is a priori (a"ter all, it is a "act o" reason). ut the nalytic does not *i+e

us a direct ar*ument to this claim. %t seems to me, howe+er, that it is important "or Kant to ha+e

an ar*ument such as this at least a+aila#le (i" not eAplicitly presented). nd here is why. The

"act o" reason is supposed to show une1ui+ocally that humans are su#ect to the moral lawB and it

does this #y appealin* to our consciousness o" #ein* #ound #y the moral law. The status o" the

claim that we are conscious o" the #indin* nature o" morality would ha+e important implications

"or the status o" the claim that we are #ound #y the moral law. %" our consciousness o" the moral

ou*ht is an empirical "act a#out us, then C since a posteriori ud*ments do not deli+er necessity C 

the claim that we are #ound #y the moral law would itsel" #e a contin*ent claim. %", on the other

hand, the "act o" reason itsel" is a priori (and thus necessary), then the claim that we are #ound

 #y the moral law also #ecomes unconditional. nd so % thin& it is worth discussin* what

ar*uments to the conclusion that the "act o" reason is not an empirical "act a#out our

 psycholo*ical ma&eup are a+aila#le to Kant.

y plan "or this paper is the "ollowin*. "ter #rie" preliminary remar&s on the

compleAity o" the term Faktum and a"ter eAplainin* what % ta&e Kant to mean #y it, % will *o o+er 

the eAamples o" our common ethical ud*ments that Kant cites in support o" his claim that we are

aware o" the #indin* nature o" the moral law. Then, % eAplain what is at sta&e in ar*uin* that the

"act o" reason is a priori (and not empirical). e"ore addressin* the main 1uestion o" the paper, %

*o o+er some prominent issues in Kant's theoretical philosophy (the status o" his Dtranscendental

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 psycholo*y') with the hope o" learnin* some methodolo*ical lessons "rom the literature on this

topic. !inally, % pro+ide an ar*ument (on #ehal" o" Kant) to the conclusion that the "act o" reason

is a synthetic a priori proposition and "or this ar*ument % draw on what Kant actually says a#out

the "eatures o" our +olition.

Preliminary remark

e"ore turnin* to the main 1uestion o" this paper C whether Kant's "act o" reason is empirical or

not C it is worth notin* that there is a set o" am#i*uities associated with the term D"act o" reason'.

0ne am#i*uity (which % will not address, #ut will only mention) is that D"act o" reason' is used #y

Kant to re"er to at least two thin*s. 0n the one hand, D"act o" reason' re"ers to our consciousness

o" the #indin* nature o" the moral law, #ut on the other hand, Kant uses it to re"er to the moral

law itself . (ompare, "or instance, 5:3 and 5:?, which say, respecti+ely: “consciousness o"

this "undamental law Ethe moral lawF may #e called a "act o" reason”, and “the moral law is

*i+en Eto usF, as it were, as a "act o" reason”, etc.8)

The second eAe*etical 1uestion concernin* the phrase D"act o" reason' has to do with the

term Faktum. The term is commonly translated into Gn*lish as fact B indeed, e+en in

contemporary /erman its synonym would #e the word atsache (and in that Gn*lish translations

are no more misleadin* than the connotations o" Kant's teAt would ha+e today e+en in his nati+e

lan*ua*e). ut the second Critique does not contain a sin*le re"erence to atsache (althou*h

Kant uses this term later, in the Critique of !ud"ment ). ince the term Faktum is deri+ati+e "rom

the Hatin facere (to do, which has a connotation o" acti#ity) and since (in Kant's time) it would

8 % should note that arcus -illasche& ar*ues that in 5:? “as a "act o" reason” re"ers not to Dthe moral law' #utrather to its "i#enness to us. That is, accordin* to -illasche&, the moral law is "i#en to us as a fact , and the moral

law itsel" is not a "act o" reason. (ee his Praktische $ernunft: %andlun"stheorie und &oral'e"r(ndun" 'ei Kant  

(Ierla* 4.. etJler, 77$), p. =.)

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not ha+e #een synonymous with atsache (a later term?), it is reasona#le to dou#t whether

 Faktum is a term that descri#es a state of affairs rather than a certain act o" reason.

-ithin the *rowin* literature on Kant's notion o" "act o" reason, at this point % thin& that

arcus -illasche&'s analysis stands out.=  This is not the place to *et into details o" his wor&,

and so % will only pro+ide a couple o" hi*hli*hts and will also say what % ta&e to #e its essential

lessons "or the purposes o" this paper. !irst, % thin& that -illasche& con+incin*ly shows that

Kant's term Faktum is rich and that it cannot #e reduced either to at (deed) or atsache ("act),

and althou*h it is closer to the "ormer, the term really com#ines #oth meanin*s. lthou*h

 Faktum is a noun (and althou*h now its etymolo*y is less tellin* that it would #e in Kant's time),

the term has a stron* connotation o" acti#ity, in particular C reason)s acti+ity. Pure practical

reason, -illasche& ar*ues, re+eals that we are #ound #y the moral law since it produces or

deli#ers this moral law "rom itsel" and since it determines our will to moral action.7  %n this, pure

 practical reason mani"ests itsel" throu"h an act ( Faktum) o" deli+erin* the moral law and o"

determinin* the will to action. %n addition to ar*uin* that Faktum is more appropriately rendered

as act (or deed ) (and thus is synonymous to at rather than atsache), -illasche& *oes o+er the

 passa*es containin* the term and shows that this rendition would clear up many con"usions

associated with the term, includin* the "irst am#i*uity that % mentioned (i.e., that Kant uses

 Faktum to re"er 'oth to our consciousness o" the moral law and to the moral law itsel").

? lthou*h the term atsache was coined in ?58 (to re"er to “matters o" "act” and speci"ically to an e+ent, the

occurrence o" which was to #e esta#lished thou*h testimony), it was not widely used till later in ?7>s. Kant doesnot use the term in the second Critique, althou*h in his later Critique of !ud"ment , 7 (0n -hat Kind o" ssent

<esults "rom a Practical !aith) Kant uses it to re"er to res facti C “o#ects o" concepts whose o#ecti+e reality can #e pro+ed are matters of fact EatsachenF (res facti), etc.” (0n the history o" the term DTatsache' and on its rele+ance to

Kant's (and then /erman %dealists') term Faktum, see e.*., Paul !ran&s“!reedom, atsache and athandlun"  in theLe+elopment o" !ichte's 4ena *issenschaftslehre” in +rchi# f(r ,eschichte der Philosophie, ?7 (77?): 3>23$3,

and also his “Transcendental r*ument, <eason, and &epticism: ontemporary Le#ates and the 0ri*ins o" Post2

Kantianism” in ranscendental +r"uments: Pro'lems and Perspecti#es, edited #y <. tern (larendon Press,

0A"ord, 777).= arcus -illasche&, Praktische $ernunft: %andlun"stheorie und &oral'e"r(ndun" 'ei Kant  (Ierla* 4.. etJler,

77$), chapter > (pp. ?273).7 G.*., -illasche&, =.

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-hat % ta&e to #e si*ni"icant in this analysis is -illasche&'s emphasis on the distinction

 #etween factum 'rutum (as he puts it) and Faktum o" reason. Pure reason, he points out, does

not “disco+er” the moral law as we disco+er, e.*., the laws o" nature. The moral law is not *i+en

to us as an independently eAistin* "act (in which case atsache would #e a more appropriate term

"or it). <ather, pure practical reason produces the moral law, and the moral law is not

antecedently *i+en to it #ut sprin*s "orth "rom its acti+ity.

ut essentially whether Faktum is #etter rendered as act or as fact o" reason is not what's

at issue here. %ndeed, "or the purposes o" this paper this am#i*uity is not all that important. % ust

mentioned that -illasche&'s analysis shows that the primary conteAt o" the term fact of reason is

Kant's claim that throu"h the "act o" reason (i.e., throu"h its acti+ity), reason attests to the "act

that we are conscious o" the "undamental law o" morality. That is, reason's acti+ity deli+ers to us

(the philosophers) e+idence that humans are conscious o" the moral law. The "ocus o" this paper

is this latter claim, i.e., the claim that humans are aware of the 'indin" nature of morality, and

the main 1uestion with respect to this claim is this: %s this an empirical (psycholo*ical) or an a

 priori (philosophical) claim a#out usM

e"ore we turn to the passa*es that will #e essential "or answerin* this 1uestion, let me

clari"y what it is that % am proposin* to in1uire into. % ta&e it that we can distin*uish #etween at

least three sorts o" claims that could #e rele+ant to a normati+e ethical theory, and that these

claims would ha+e di""erent status in it. onsider the "ollowin* propositions:

()-hen ha+in* done somethin* wron*, we usually "eel *uilty.

() Numans tend to #e deterred "rom wron*doin* #y the threat o" punishment.

() Numans are aware o" the #indin* nature o" the moral law.

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%n what "ollows, % will speci"ically as& whether () is crucially di""erent "rom () and (). Het

me eAplain. % ta&e it that () and () are empirical claims a#out us, althou*h the ways to +eri"y

() and () would di""er. !or Kant, as we will see, our awareness o" the #indin* nature o"

morality (or ()) is "undamentally di""erent in that it is not an empirical claim. o, the tas& that %

will pursue is to #rin* out the "eatures o" () that empirical claims such as () and () do not

ha+e.

nother way that this 1uestion can #e set up is #y re"errin* directly to Kant's "irst len*thy

 passa*e that contains the term D"act o" reason'. lthou*h he #rie"ly uses the term already in 5:8,

the "irst su#stanti+e re"erence to it can #e "ound only in 5:3. Nere is the passa*e in "ull:

onsciousness o" this "undamental law may #e called a "act o" reason #ecause one

cannot reason it out "rom antecedent data o" reason, "or eAample, "rom consciousness

o" "reedom (since it is not antecedently *i+en to us) and #ecause it instead "orces itsel"

upon us o" itsel" as a synthetic a priori proposition that is not #ased on any intuition,

either pure or empirical, althou*h it would #e analytic i" the "reedom o" the will were

 presupposedB #ut "or this, as a positi+e concept, an intellectual intuition would #e

re1uired, which certainly cannot #e assumed here. Nowe+er, in order to a+oid

misinterpretation in re*ardin* this law as *i+en, it mut !e noted care"ully t#at it i

not an em$irical "act !ut t#e ole "act o" $ure reaon which, #y it, announces itsel"

as ori*inally law*i+in* ( sic #olo sic .u'eo).>

Het me put into "ocus what will interest us in this passa*e. ince Kant is tal&in* a#out the "act o" 

reason as a “synthetic a priori proposition” (Sat/ ), and that the clear re"erent o" the D"act o"

reason' is consciousness o" EtheF "undamental EmoralF law, we can ta&e him to re"er, rou*hly, to

(), i.e., to the proposition: %umans ha#e consciousness of the fundamental moral law. Ne then

> 5:3 (emphasis added)

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*oes on to say that “it is not an empirical "act #ut the sole "act o" pure reason”. This seems to *o

well with the claim that this "act is a “synthetic a priori proposition”: proposition (), Kant

adds, is not an empirical claim (it is not synthetic a posteriori). <ather, it is a "act o" “pure

reason”, namely, it has a priori ori*in (or else it would not #e pure), and it is synthetic since it is

not merely analytically deduced "rom the claim that humans are free (in the positi+e sense).

E%am$le in u$$ort o" t#e "act o" reaon

 9ow, #e"ore we turn to the 1uestion itsel" C *hy is the "act o" reason not empirical, a"ter allM C

let me trace Kant's claim that we are conscious o" the moral law to the e+idence that he pro+ides

"or it. The claim itsel", he points out, “cannot #e reasoned out "rom antecedent data o" reason”

(5:3). y this Kant speci"ically means that the claim that we are conscious o" the moral law

cannot #e analytically deduced "rom another claim C the claim that we are "ree in the positi+e

sense o" D"reedom.' 9onetheless, the claim that we are conscious o" the moral law needs to #e

conteAtually situated. (%n this, it reminds us o" Lescartes co"ito C the in"erence that, althou*h it

is usti"icatorily "oundational, nonetheless is thorou*hly eAplained #y Lescartes.) -e are, Kant

says, “immediately conscious o" the moral law” (#y which, % thin&, he means that we are

immediately conscious o" its 'indin" nature), #ut, he adds, we are conscious o" it “as soon as we

draw up maAims o" the will "or oursel+es” (5:$7). Thus, #y “immediate” % thin& Kant

speci"ically means that our consciousness o" the moral law is not mediated (or 'ased on) our

consciousness o" freedom. ut notice that "or the consciousness o" the moral law to re+eal itsel",

we nonetheless "irst need to “draw up maAims o" the will "or oursel+es”. nd so 5:3 that

introduces the claim that Kant calls Dthe "act o" reason' is preceded #y Kant's "amous "allows

eAample in 5:3> (which does ust that C “draws up maAims o" the will”.) The eAample has two

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 parts (the "irst o" which is the *allows 1uestion), and it is the second part that will interest us

here. Kant writes:

s& EsomeoneF whether, i" his prince demanded, on pain o" EanF immediate eAecution,

that he *i+e "alse testimony a*ainst an honora#le man whom the prince would li&e to

destroy under a plausi#le preteAt, he would consider it possi#le to o+ercome his lo+e

o" li"e, howe+er *reat it may #e. Ne would perhaps not +enture to assert whether he

would do it or not, #ut he must admit without hesitation that it would #e possi#le "or

him. Ne ud*es, there"ore, that he can do somethin* #ecause #e i a&are t#at #e

ou'#t to do it and co*niJes "reedom within him, which, without the moral law, would

ha+e remained un&nown to him.

Kant's immediate concern here is to show what he calls “the order o" concepts” in us, i.e., to

*round the claim that moral law is ratio co"noscendi o" "reedom and not the other way around.

This point (concernin* how "reedom is related to morality) does not interest us here. -hat is

rele+ant, howe+er, is Kant's claim that the case o" #earin* "alse witness (or rather our awareness

that it would #e wron" to do so) attests to the "act that we are conscious o" the #indin* nature o"

the moral law. 9otice, o" course, that our a'ility or e+en our willin"ness to o#ey the moral law is

not what's at issue hereB rather, it is our awareness that it would #e wron* to #ear "alse witness.

This awareness o" our duty not to #ear "alse witness mi*ht seem to #e too content speci"ic, and

so it is. ut what Kant has in mind, % thin&, is the "eneral "act that in cases where morality

sharply contrasts with other, non2moral concerns (such as one's wish to preser+e one's li"e), our

conscience is a moral “compass” (Compasse) (as he says in the ,roundwork $) that allows us to

discern what actin* out o" duty re1uires. The case where an a*ent is con"licted #etween a moral

 5:3> (emphasis added).$ ee e.*., :>.

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o#li*ation (not to #ear "alse witness) and a non2moral inclination (to sa+e his li"e), 'ecause o"

this con"lict, attests to the "act we are conscious o" the “moral law within” us (as Kant puts it in

5:8). nd this C Kant says C is not an empirical "act a#out our +olition, #ut a “sole "act o" pure

reason” instead.

-hat % thin& ma&es Kant's claim e+en more interestin* (and more puJJlin*) is that he

also re"ers to li&e thou*ht2eAperiments as e0periments. onsider what he says in 5:7$. Nere,

Kant comments on the importance o" separatin* doctrine of happiness "rom doctrine of morals,

and says that, unli&e *eometers, philosophers ha+e to rest content with “co*nition throu*h mere

concepts” since it is impossi#le to *round this co*nition in “constructions” (the way *eometers

do). ut he adds that here, philosophy can distin*uish #etween di""erent *rounds o" willin* #y

“settin* up an eAperiment”. Ne says:

EFlmost li&e a chemist, Ea philosopherF can at any time set up an eAperiment with

e+ery human practical reason EOF namely, #y addin* the moral law (as a determinin*

*round) to the empirically a""ected will (e.*., that o" someone who would *ladly lie

 #ecause he can *ain somethin* #y it). EOF %" a man who is otherwise honest (or who

 ust this once puts himsel" only in thou*ht in the place o" an honest man) is con"ronted

with the moral law in which he co*niJes the worthlessness o" a liar, his practical

reason (in its ud*ment o" what he ou*ht to do) at once a#andons the ad+anta*e EandF

unites with what maintains in him respect "or his own person (truth"ulness).3

Nere we ha+e another clear eAample o" what one morally ou*ht to do C tellin* a lie is contrasted

with truth"ulness, and e+en in a liar, practical reason “unites” itsel" with the latter. %t is worth

notin* that Kant says this eAperiment to #e possi#le with “e+ery human practical reason” (mit

 .edes &enschen praktishen $ernunft ). *ain, the thou*h here is not that e+eryone acts morallyB

3 5:7$23.

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rather, it is that e+eryone reco"ni/es that there is such thin* as actin* morally. %n this case

speci"ically, Dactin* morally' means #ein* truth"ul, #ut Kant presuma#ly wants to ma&e a more

*eneral claim to the point that humans reco*niJe the #indin* nature o" morality. *ain, this

claim C althou*h it is mani"ested in an e0periment (a&in to li&e eAperiments in chemistry) C is not

empirical B rather, it is a synthetic a priori proposition. rmed now with Kant's statement "rom

5:3 alon* with his two cases C (i) o" #earin* "alse witness, and (ii) o" truth"ulness C we are in

the position to unra+el Kant's claim that his "act o" reason is a synthetic a priori proposition.

W#at’ at take?

r*ua#ly, it must #e rather important "or Kant to show that the "act o" reason is not empirical.

"ter all, i" the claim that we are aware o" the #indin* nature o" the moral law were empirical,

then its status in Kant's theory would ha+e #een 1uite di""erent. s it stands, the "act o" reason

(Kant claims) attests to the "act that we are #ound #y the moral law. This, in turn, attests to the

"act that we are "ree in the positi+e sense o" D"reedom.' e"ore the introduction o" the "act o"

reason in section ? o" the second Critique (in 5:3) Kant's aim was to show the reciprocal

entailment #etween transcendental "reedom and #ein* su#ect to the “"ormal practical principle”.

ections 5 and 8 respecti+ely ar*ue that:

() %" a will is to #e “determina#le” #y purely "ormal practical principles, then it must #e

“transcendentally "ree” (Pro#lem %, 5:$7).

() %" a will is transcendentally "ree, then only a "ormal practical principle can “determine

it necessarily” (Pro#lem %%, 5:$7).

"ter Kant esta#lishes that “"reedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each

other” (5:$7), he turns to the neAt 1uestion concernin* which one has primacy in our “co*nition”.

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-e are, he claims, “immediately conscious o" the moral law”, and thus only secondarily

(throu"h our consciousness o" the moral law) we are conscious o" "reedom as well.

 9ow, i" this consciousness o" the moral law were an empirical "act a#out us, then (in

Kant's ar*on) it would pro+ide us with quid facti, i.e., with &nowled*e o" what is the case. ut

answerin* the 1uestion o" quid facti is not su""icient "or answerin* the 1uestion concernin*

whether the proposition is also o'.ecti#ely +alid, or the 1uestion o" quid .uri. Gssentially, i"

Kant's "act o" reason is empirical, a further ar*ument would #e needed to show that our

consciousness o" the moral law is Dle*itimate' or, in other words, that this empirically con"irmed

consciousness cannot #e eAplained away or dismissed as a contin*ent "eature o" ours. Kant's

ar*ument, howe+er, has no second le* C no in1uiry into the 1uestion whether the "act o" reason is

warranted. This means, % thin&, that he considered it to #e "airly clear that the "act o" reason is

not empirical, #ut rather a synthetic a priori proposition.

(eon "rom trancendental $yc#olo'y

ince the status o" the "act o" reason has not yet #een discussed in the literature, what % will draw

on is the discussion o" a parallel issue in his theoretical philosophy. There, Kant's

“transcendental psycholo*y” has #een lon* re*arded as a topic worth considerin*. Nis

ar*uments in the "irst Critique appear to ha+e a peculiar status since they "all in2#etween

empirical studies o" the phenomenal sel" (which Kant would want to distance himsel" "rom) and

the noumenal realm (o" which we cannot ha+e &nowled*e). nd since Kant ne+er tires to insist

on the distinction #etween quid facti and quid .uri, it is essential ("or him and "or proponents o"

his theory) to show that the normati+e conclusions o" the "irst Critique, i.e., conclusions

concernin* the o#ecti+e +alidity o" e.*., the cate*ories o" understandin*, are not deri+ed "rom

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empirical premises concernin* our psycholo*ical ma&eup. -hat % propose to learn "rom the

discussion o" Kant's transcendental psycholo*y and o" issues related to it, are the criteria "or

delineatin* #etween empirical and non2empirical, transcendental accounts. Het me point out that

there are +ast disa*reements within this literature, and that % will not #e concerned with

discrepancies #etween +arious interpretations of Kant . -hat will interest me here is a possi#le

 position that can #e put to*ether #ased on these discussions, a position that deals with a more

*eneral 1uestion a#out the di""erence #etween the "eatures o" empirical and o" transcendental  

accounts o" the co*niJin* sel". %n particular, % hope that the lessons that we learn here will allow

us to "ocus on the status o" Kant's "act o" reason.

onsider, "or instance, the analysis that Paul /uyer de+elops in his “Psycholo*y and the

Transcendental Leduction”. The 1uestion that /uyer sets to answer is “whether Kant's

transcendental deduction o" the pure concepts o" the understandin* is a psycholo*ical ar*ument”

and, more precisely, “whether it is dama*in*ly psycholo*ical”.  Kant would o#+iously want to

a+oid psycholo*ism in his transcendental deductions C his ar*ument is supposed to #e

 philosophical and not psycholo*ical, and the new method he de+ises "or answerin* the quid .uri

1uestion is the transcendental method. ut the transcendental method C a in"erence "rom

"eatures o" our co*nition to the necessary conditions "or them C needs to starts with an accepta#le

account o" the e0plananda, i.e., o" the features o" our co*nition. The 1uestion a#out the status o"

the e0plananda #ecomes crucial since they themsel+es need to #e more than empirical "acts

a#out our co*niti+e ma&eup.

/uyer then ar*ues that there are three "eatures (or criteria) that an empirical account o"

co*nition would ha+e to ha+e. nd, he *oes on to claim, since none o" the three "eatures are

 Paul /uyer, “Psycholo*y and the Transcendental Leduction”, p. ? (in Kant)s ranscendental 1eductions, edited

 #y Gc&art !rster (tan"ord 6ni+ersity Press, 7=7)).

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applica#le to Kant's account o" our co*niti+e ma&eup, Kant's theory must not #e empirical in the

dama*in* sense o" Dempiricism'. The three criteria that /uyer identi"ies are the "ollowin*:

() “The premises o" a psycholo*ical ar*ument O must postulate the actual occurrence,

indeed at moments that are at least in principle determina#le, o" speci"ic "orms o"

eAperience or inputs to the mind as well as o" speci"ic acts o" mental processin* o" or

reaction to these inputs” and “the character o" the output o" the psycholo*ical

mechanism will #e correlated to such "eatures as the actual num#er o" inputs or

"re1uency o" operation”.5

($) “The assertions a#out the nature o" the mental acts o" input and processin* that

constitute the premises o" psycholo*ical ar*uments are contin"ent  rather than

necessary truths”.8  Put sli*htly di""erently, “psycholo*ical premises are ones to which

there are concei#a'le alternati#es. They cannot #e truths entailed directly #y the

concept o" human nature, nor e+en #y any more *eneral concept, such as that o" a

“co*niti+e system”, #ut must, li&e the more particular propositions they support or

eAplain, #e “matters o" "act””.?

(3) “Psycholo*ical premises are ordinarily assumed to #e disco+era#le only #y some

empirical  method , e+en i" that method #e as easy as introspection o" oursel+es and

o'ser#ation o" the manners o" others”.=

6sin* this set as a startin* point, we can say that an empirical account is methodolo"ically

di""erent "rom a philosophical one. % ta&e it, () and (3) can #e reduced to the same idea: an

empirical account is #ased on inducti+e *eneraliJation "rom a set o" occurrences a, ', c, etc.,

where a, ', c, etc., are particular e#ents (% thin& that this is what /uyer means #y “actual

occurrence”, etc. in ()). The last point is important since eAperience in "eneral is essential "or

5 /uyer, 5.8 /uyer, 5 (emphasis added).? /uyer, 55.= /uyer, 55 (emphasis added).

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any account o" co*nition C psycholo*ical and philosophical ali&e. n a priori account o"

co*nition would not #e independent "rom all eAperienceB a"ter all, as Kant puts it in : “all our

co*nition commences &it# eAperience, yet it does not on that account arise "rom eAperience”.7 

Gmpirical account (#orrowin* this distinction) would not only “commence with eAperience” #ut

also would “arise "rom eAperience”. philosophical account C althou*h it would start with

eAperience as its e0planandum C  would not “arise "rom it”.

<eturnin* to the 1uestion concernin* the method o" an empirical account, then, we can

say that it is essentially inducti+e, since it starts with particular cases a, ', c, etc., which are the

data o" either introspection or o#ser+ation (or #oth), and it would *round a conclusion #ased on

what is learnt "rom this sample. nd, as /uyer points out, “the character o" the output o" the

 psycholo*ical mechanism will #e correlated to such "eatures as the actual num#er o" inputs or

"re1uency o" operation”. %n other words, an inducti+e in"erence would #e all the stron*er, the

more cases we would consider and the more representati+e our sample would #e. This method,

as /uyer says in ($), is a method o" ac1uirin* &nowled*e o" “matters o" "act” rather than o" e.*.,

deductin* our &nowled*e "rom the concept o" a human #ein*. That is to say (as he puts it), “the

 premises o" psycholo*ical ar*uments are contin*ent rather than necessary truths”.$>  (This latter

way to put it, thou*h, seems to me to #e parasitic on the statement concernin* the methodolo*y

7 %n $, Kant *oes on to say: “#y a priori co*nitions Ewe will understandF not those that occur independently o" thisor that eAperience, #ut rather those that occur a'solutely independently o" all eAperience” (and he then *oes on to

add that there is a di""erence #etween a priori and pure, e.*., DG+ery alteration has a cause' is a priori #ut not pure,

since Dalteration' itsel" is an empirical concept and a pure co*nition has nothin" empirical with it). % thin& that $ isconsistent with what % ha+e to say, thou*h, since my point is only that the 1uestion concernin* a priori +s. empirical 

co*nitions arises inso"ar as we ha+e co*nitions at all, i.e., we start "rom the fact of e0perience in "eneral and as&what the necessary conditions "or the possi#ility o" eAperience are.$> % ha+e reser+ations with the way that /uyer puts this last pointB or at least, % would ma&e a wea&er claim that this.-hile "or Kant and "or his predecessors necessity is a “mar& #y means o" which we can securely distin*uish a pure

co*nition "rom an empirical one”, % am not sure that the in+erse holds. That is, "rom the "act that a co*nition C is

not necessary we cannot conclude that it is empirical. nd since an empirical method (induction) would "ail to

 produce a co*nition with a mar& o" necessity, it would not "ollow that the truth is contin*ent in the sense that it could #e otherwise (or, as /uyer puts it, that C has “concei+a#le alternati+es”). t #est, "rom the "act that C results "rom

an empirical in+esti*ation, we can conclude that further proof is re1uired (and mi*ht #e possi#le) to show that C is a

 priori. (This is, a*ain, the quid facti +s. quid .uri distinction at wor&.)

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o" an empirical in1uiry. %n other words, the test o" concei#a'ility, % thin&, is actually a poor *uide

to settlin* the issue. more relia#le way to *et to the idea o" necessity as opposed to

contin"ency o" our results would #e to loo& at the methods o" in1uiry and not to the 1uestion

whether a "eature o" ours could 'e other than what it is.)

ut i" not throu*h o#ser+ation, introspection, and *eneraliJation "rom *i+en occurrences,

in what way are we to *ather Ddata' concernin* the "eatures o" our co*niti+e ma&eupM lthou*h

eAperience is still the startin* point o" a philosophical in1uiry, we are &eepin* in mind that (i) it

is eAperience in "eneral we are tal&in* a#out when we do philosophy rather than psycholo*y and

that (ii) we are reflectin" on the "eatures o" this eAperience. %n his “Gmpirical, <ational, and

Transcendental Psycholo*y: Psycholo*y as cience and as Philosophy”, /ary Nat"ield echoes

the point made #y /uyer.$  Nat"ield aims to spell out the "eatures o" transcendental psycholo*y

and, more speci"ically, to show that it is not empirical (and so his discussion is related to /uyer's

analysis that we ust loo&ed into). Nat"ield's considered +iew on the status o" Kant's proect is

the "ollowin*:

G+en in ar*uin* "or his transcendental philosophy Kant surely must appeal to

eAperience to *round some #asic claims, "or eAample, that we eAperience in space and

time, that we are "inite intelli*ences, that we ha+e some sensations and "eelin*s. ut

this sort o" “empirical” data was accepted e+en #y rusius, the most a+owedly

aprioristic metaphysician o" Kant's time. nd reasona#ly so. %" it were otherwise, any

sort o" reflection on human e0perience whatsoe+er would count as “empirical”,

e""ecti+ely renderin* all philosophy empirical #y stipulation. !or the purpose o"

readin* and interpretin* Kant, and "or many other purposes, we are well ad+ised to

$ /ary Nat"ield, “Gmpirical, <ational, and Transcendental Psycholo*y: Psycholo*y as cience and as Philosophy”

in Cam'rid"e Companion to Kant , edited #y Paul /uyer (am#rid*e 6ni+ersity Press, 77$).

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distin*uish #etween treatin* reflection on ordinary e0perience as a minimal startin"

 point for philosophy and adoptin* an empirical approach when "ormulatin* and

con"irmin* eAplanatory theses in philosophy.$$

Nere, what % ta&e to #e si*ni"icant is the emphasis on “re"lection on ordinary human eAperience”.

philosophical ar*ument o" the +ariety that interests us here starts with a "airly non2

contro+ersial set o" cases, ud*ments, or propositions a#out the world that we ma&e all the time.

Now o"ten or how relia#ly we come up with these is not really what's at issue (as it would #e

with an empirical in+esti*ation). <ater, our cases or samples will #e representati+e enou*h in

that any set o" cases, etc. o" a certain type would do. Thus, in Kant's speculati+e realm, any

co*nition would do since all co*nition has the same "undamental "eatures. imilarly, common

moral ud*ments that we ma&e would allow us to conclude that humans are aware o" the #indin*

nature o" morality. (0r so Kant #elie+es it to #e the case.)

W#y t#e "act o" reaon i ynt#etic a priori 

%" we now loo& at the passa*es surroundin* Kant's discussion o" the "act o" reason, we can notice

 ust that: Kant claims that the "act o" reason (i.e., that we are aware o" the #indin* nature o" the

moral law) is e+ident "rom re"lection on our common ud*ments when it comes to ethical issues.

Het me *i+e a couple o" eAamples where Kant adopts this approach. onsider what he says e.*.,

in 5:3$, 5:38, and 5:72$ (althou*h in *eneral, % would claim, consultin* our common ud*ments

is one o" the leitmoti"s o" the second Critique). <i*ht a"ter Kant "irst introduces the "act o"

reason (in 5:3), he comments on it in the "ollowin* way:

The "act Eo" reasonF mentioned a#o+e is undenia#le. 0ne need only analy/e the

 .ud"ment that people pass on the lawfulness of their actions in order to "ind that,

$$ Nat"ield, $8 (emphasis added).

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whate+er inclination may say to the contrary, their reason, incorrupti#le and sel"2

constrained, always holds the maAim o" the will in an action up to the pure will, that

is, to itsel" inasmuch as it re*ards itsel" as a priori practical.$3

-e see that Kant is here introducin* the method o" “analyJin* ud*ments that people pass” C the

tool that will pro+e #oth use"ul and (as we will soon see) indispensi#le "or the ar*ument in the

nalytic. Nere (in 5:3$), the "act o" reason is said to #e *rounded on an analysis such as this.

%n particular, % thin&, what #ecomes e+ident "rom this analysis is that people without "ault

distin*uish #etween morality and self-lo#e. nd so in 5:38 (a*ain, appealin* to the data o"

common moral co*nition), Kant will hi*hli*ht this aspect o" our moral ud*ments. "ter

introducin* the cate*orical imperati+e o" morality into the second Critique (in 5:3), and a"ter

claimin* that we can also see that humans re*ard themsel+es to #e #ound #y it (in 5:32$), Kant

*oes on to emphasiJe that there is a sharp #oundary #etween morality and self-lo#e. Ne *oes

o+er se+eral "eatures that show that moral principles are 1uite hetero*eneous "rom counsels o"

 prudence, and he reiterates that the di""erence #etween morality and sel"2lo+e is apparent “e+en

to the most common human #ein*s” E f(r den "emeinsten &enschen #ernehmlichF. nd so, "or

instance, in 5:38 Kant says: “o distinctly and sharply drawn are the #oundaries o" morality and

sel"2lo+e that e+en the most common eye Edas "emeinste +u"eF cannot "ail to distin*uish whether 

somethin* #elon*s to the one or the other”. (The details o" Kant's series o" claims in this section

do not interest us hereB what is important is the appeal to our common ethical ud*ments as the

stratum that i" not *rounds, then surely anchors our moral theory.)

!inally, in 5:72$, Kant eAplicitly points out that a proect such as his second Critique can

 #e “usti"ied” #y appeal to our common ethical ud*ments. The principles are the "irst “data” o"

a pure theory: an empirical ethical theory that starts with the sensi#ly determined notion o" the

$3 5:3$ (emphasis added).

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 "ood has a less sophisticated structure, #ut a pure doctrine o" morals that cannot help itsel" to a

sensi#ly determined startin* point has no other way to *et o"" the *round #ut throu*h considerin*

reason's principles. -hen it then comes to answerin* the 1uestion whether these principles are

applica#le to our actual +olition, the usti"icational strate*y, Kant says, is to consider our

common understandin* o" morality. Thus, in 5:72$ he writes: “the usti"ication o" moral

 principles as principles o" a pure reason could also #e carried out +ery well and with su""icient

certainty #y a mere appeal to the ud*ments o" common human understandin" ”. !urthermore,

the "eelin* o" respect "or the law that ser+es as a clear indication o" moral principle rather than a

 principle o" sel"2lo+e, “is made &nown so saliently and so prominently that no one, not e#en the

most common human understandin" Eder "emeinste &enschen#erstand F, can "ail to see at once in

an eAample presented to him, that he can indeed #e ad+ised #y empirical *rounds o" +olition to

"ollow their charms #ut that he can ne+er #e eApected to o'ey anythin* #ut the pure practical law

o" reason alone” (5:7$). (9otice the appeal to the “most common understandin*” here.)

*ain, settin* aside the details o" the ar*uments in 5:3$, 5:38 and 5:7$, let me point out

Kant's characteristic appeal to what we can now call common moral .ud"ments in "eneral , i.e., to

the *eneral "eatures o" how we en*a*e the world practically. This appeal, % thin&, is a&in to the

appeal to e0perience in "eneral made #y transcendental philosophy in the theoretical realm. nd

much li&e Nat"ield stresses, the tone o" this appeal is not empirical in any meanin*"ul sense o"

“empiricism”. nd althou*h the startin* point (in some sense) is e0perience, the way that we

deal with eAperience is methodolo*ically not empirical.  Reflection on our common moral

 ud*ments has to do with discernin* the structure o" our "aculties in +irtue o" which our

eAperience is what it is.

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 9ow, in the second Critique Kant does not complete the ar*ument in this way. That is, he

does not trace the "eatures o" our eAperience eAplicitly to the structure o" our "aculties. Perhaps,

he holds the "eatures o" our common ud*ments to #e sel"2e+ident and re1uirin* no "urther

eAplanation.$  Nere, in particular, % am tal&in* a#out our capacity to see the distinction #etween

moral principles and non2moral counsels o" prudence (or self-lo#e, as Kant puts it). The

eAamples that he pro+ides ha+e to do with our capacity to draw the contrast #etween the moral

ou*ht and the concerns "or one's happiness. ut a"ter introducin* the "act o" reason in 5:3, in

5:3$ we "ind a discussion that, % thin&, comes +ery close to an eAplanation o" why it is that

humans see so clearly the distinction #etween morality and self-lo#e. 5:3$ contains a Remark to

a Corollary (to ?): ? introduces the “"undamental law o" pure practical reason” (in a

"ormulation that closely resem#les F23), and its Corollary says that “pure reason is practical o"

itsel" alone and *i+es (to the human #ein*) a uni+ersal law which we call the moral law” (5:3).

nd so the transition "rom ? to its Corollary has to do with mo+in* "rom the law o"  pure

 practical reason in "eneral to its speci"ically human mani"estation as an imperati+e. The

 Remark to the Corollary is dedicated to the distinction #etween our (at #est pure) will and what

Kant calls the “holy will”, i.e., “such a will as would not #e capa#le o" any maAim con"lictin*

with the moral law” (5:3$). Kant eAplains that only "or the human will (as an imper"ect will) the

moral law is an imperati#e (not merely a law) o" reason. Ne says o" human #ein*s:

$ %n some sense, % thin& that this is eAactly the reason "or the lac& o" eAplicit usti"ication o" the "act o" reason. %

thin& that Kant was certain that humans are aware of the 'indin" nature of morality , and that (more speci"ically) #yDmorality' he understood the necessary, uni+ersal, etc. principles that command us to 45 (unconditionally). Karl

meri&s in his “The Practical !oundation o" Philosophy in Kant, !ichte, and "ter” puts the more *eneral claimconcernin* Kant's presuppositions this way: “Kant would o"ten appeal to common claims that he (nai+ely, we

would now say) assumed no sane person o" his time would put in real dou#t. uch claims included the "undamentalso" mathematics and lo*ic, the *eneral "act that there is “eAperience”, that is, a warranted determination o" empirical

o#ects, and also the "act that we ac&nowled*e cate*orical demands o" morality. Kant understood transcendental

 philosophy to #e an a priori account o" these assumptions, an account that would appreciate the metaphysical

compleAities o" alternati+e +iews, and that would o""er its own "ramewor& as the #est way “to sa+e the phenomena”and to &eep people "rom a#andonin* common sense in the "ace o" modern philosophical perpleAities”. (ee

meri&s's “The Practical !oundation o" Philosophy in Kant, !ichte, and "ter” in he Reception of Kant6s Critical

 Philosophy: Fichte Schellin" and %e"el , ed. #y ally ed*wic&  (am#rid*e 6ni+ersity Press, $>>>).)

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The moral law is "or them an imperati+e that commands cate*orically #ecause the law

is unconditionalB the relation o" such a will to this law is dependence under the name

o" o#li*ation, which si*ni"ies a necessitation, thou*h only #y reason and its o#ecti+e

law, to an action which is called duty #ecause a c#oice t#at i $at#olo'ically a""ected

)t#ou'# not t#ere!y determined* #ence till "ree+ #rin*s with it a wish arisin* "rom

su#ecti+e causes, #ecause o" which it can o"ten #e opposed to the pure o#ecti+e

determinin* *round and thus needs a resistance o" practical reason. EOF %n the

supremely sel"2su""icient intelli*ence, choice is ri*htly represented as incapa#le o" any

maAim that could not at the same time #e o#ecti+ely a law.

$5

The contrast that Kant is drawin* now is #etween human +olition and holy +olition. !or our

 purposes, we need to "ocus on the clause that descri#es our capacity to choose as “patholo*ically

a""ected” #ut at the same time not necessarily “determined” in this way. 0ur will there"ore is

 pulled into two directions: on the one hand, there are “su#ecti+e causes” (inclinations) at wor&

here, and on the other hand, our will reco*niJes the #indin* nature o" the o#ecti+e moral law.$8 

Perhaps it merits a mention that on the other side o" the spectrum, Kant puts what he calls the

“animal choice” (ar'itrium 'rutum) C the capacity to choose that “can #e determined only #y

inclination (sensi#le impulse, stimulus)”.$?  nd so there are three types o" +olition (or choosin*)

 possi#le:

$5 5:3$ (emphasis added).$8 -e "ind similar analysis o" our patholo*ically a""ected and yet "ree choice in he &etaphysics of &orals. Nere,Kant says: “The +ery concept o" duty is already the concept o" a necessitation (constraint) o" "ree choice throu*h the

law. EOF uch constraint does not apply to rational #ein*s as such (there could also #e holy ones) #ut rather tohuman #ein*s, rational natural 'ein"s, who are unholy enou"h that pleasure can induce them to #rea& the moral law,

e+en thou*h they reco*niJe its authorityB and e+en when they do o#ey the law, they do it reluctantly (in the "ace o"opposition "rom their inclinations), and it is in this that such constraint properly consists”. Ne then adds (in a

"ootnote): “Qet i" a human #ein* loo&s at himsel" o#ecti+ely EOF he "inds that as a moral #ein* he is also holy

enou"h to #rea& the inner EmoralF law reluctantlyB "or there is no human #ein* so depra+ed as not to "eel an

opposition to #rea&in* it and an a#horrence o" himsel" in the "ace o" which he has to constrain himsel" Eto #rea& thelawF” (8:3?72=>B emphasis added). % am usin* ary 4. /re*or's translation here (in Kant: Practical Philosophy 

(am#rid*e 6ni+ersity Press, 778).$? he &etaphysics of &orals, 8:$3.

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() %n a holy #ein*, the choice is determined only #y the moral law.

($) %n a human #ein*, the choice is determined either  #y the moral law or #y inclination.

(3) %n non2rational #ein*, the choice is determined only #y inclination.

-ith this distinction in place, we can see that humans are the only #ein*s who are capa#le o"

"eelin* the pull o" 'oth morality and  sensi#le causes. nd the eAamples that Kant pro+ides in

order to show that we are conscious o" the #indin* nature o" morality are the cases where we are

at a crossroads and where the distinction #etween morality and sel"2lo+e is mani"ested especially

clearly. Thus, "aced with the choice o" “*i+in* "alse testimony” and “immediate eAecution”, one

acutely "eels the duality o" practical principles: one understands that it is wron" to *i+e "alse

testimony, #ut one also "eels a stron* inclination to preser+e one's li"e. nd so any case where

the a*ent percei+es this duality will re+eal to us (the philosophers) that the a*ent considers

hersel" to #e su#ect to the moral law.

%" this is the way ultimately to reconstruct Kant's ar*ument, then it can #e shown that the

 phenomenolo*y o" our eAperience, i.e., the "act that we are aware o" the #indin* nature o" the

moral law, is *rounded on the structure o" our "aculties.$=  %n particular, it is #ased on the "act that

we are 'oth “unholy enou*h” and “holy enou*h” (as Kant puts it in his “Loctrine o" Iirtue”)

since we are su#ect to 'oth the commands o" morality and the demands o" our sensi#le nature.

<ecall, that % said earlier that this rout o" usti"ication C the rout that traces the "eatures o"

our eAperience (in this case, our moral ud*ments) to the structure o" our "aculties C would a+oid

the pro#lem o" empiricism. %" this rout is what Kant has in mind, then his claim that humans are

$= %n “The !act o" <eason: Kant's Passa*e to 0rdinary oral Knowled*e”, Pa+el u&;w ma&es a similar point. Ne

says that humans ha+e “dual citiJenship” C one in the empirical and one in the noumenal worlds, and that the "act o"

reason is a “phenomenolo*ical conse1uence o" ha+in* to ta&e #oth standpoints Ethe empirical and the moralF” ($).

(ee Pa+el u&;w, “The !act o" <eason: Kant's Passa*e to 0rdinary oral Knowled*e”, Kant-Studien = (773),

 pp. $>2$$.) %n my paper, % am reluctant to put the point in this way, since % do not want to claim (yet) that themoral law has its seat in the noumenal realm (althou*h, o" course, it does). ll Kant needs to show at this le* o" the

ar*ument is that we are conscious o" the #indin* nature o" a moral lawB the rest o" the second Critique ar*ues what

the nature o" this moral law must #e, etc.

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aware o" the #indin* nature o" morality would ac1uire a status o" an a priori claim. That is, Kant

is not appealin* to our introspection and then *eneraliJin* the results o" what such introspection

would re+eal to a common understandin*. <ather, his "alse testimony eAample is a case2study in

the structure o" our common moral co*nitionB and this case2study can #e part o" the

transcendental ar*ument concernin* the necessary conditions "or the possi#ility o" the "act o"

reason. *ain, this possi#ility has to do with the structure o" our "aculties (in this case our will ).

r*ua#ly, at this point Kant's o+erall ar*ument to the conclusion that morality rests on

the cate*orical imperati+e o" reason tra+els a "ull circle. -hat % ha+e in mind (#ut what % cannot

ade1uately co+er at present) is that Kant's ,roundwork supplies the ar*ument to the conclusion

that our common rational moral co*nition attests to the "act that the moral law is none other than

the cate*orical imperati+e. The second Critique does not pro+ide the analysis o" our common

moral ud*ments, althou*h it does point to them in support o" the claim that we are aware o" the

 #indin* nature o" morality. ection % o" the ,roundwork , on the other hand, does ust that: it

 pro+ides a detailed analysis o" our common rational moral co*nition that culminates (at the end

o" the section) in the pronouncement that the Dsupreme principle o" morality' is the "ollowin*: “%

ou*ht ne+er to conduct mysel" eAcept so that % could also will that my maAim #ecome a uni+ersal

law” (:>$).

Concluion

-e started with Kant's claim that the "act o" reason is a synthetic a priori proposition and his

warnin* not to ta&e this Faktum to #e empiricalB the "act o" reason, he says, is “the sole "act o"

 pure reason” (5:3). % ar*ued that, *i+en the structure o" the second Critique, Kant is 1uite ri*ht

in issues this warnin*, and that it is un"ortunate that he does not spell out an ar*ument that would

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su""iciently *round his claim. % said that there eAists a similar eAe*etical worry with respect to

his transcendental psycholo*y C part o" his corpus that must #elon* to philosophy and yet that is

dan*erously close to psycholo*y. y hope was to learn "rom what % consider to #e success"ul

de"enses o" Kant on that "ront C "rom the accounts that spell out the di""erences in methodolo*y

 #etween psycholo*y and transcendental philosophy. The &ey di""erence (% thin&) is the contrast

 #etween psycholo*y's inducti#e method and philosophy's method o" reflection on e0perience. %

then ar*ued that Kant seems to #e Dre"lectin*' on the "eatures o" our common moral co*nition

throu*hout the second Critique in that he "re1uently appeals to the ethical ud*ments that we

ma&e (Dwe' here is Dmost common human understandin*', not philosophers, o" course). nd the

&ey salient "eature o" these ud*ments is the sharp distinction #etween morality and self-lo#e. 

!inally, % made an attempt to eAplain (on #ehal" o" Kant) in +irtue o" what we acutely percei+e

this distinction: % ar*ued that, in comparison to holy and animal +olition, human capacity to

choose is uni1uely pulled into two directions (toward li+in* up to the moral ou*ht and toward

satis"yin* the demands o" our sensi#le nature). This duality, then, as a condition sine qua non, 

*rounds our consciousness o" the moral law, and since this duality is a necessary "eature o" our

+olition, the phenomenolo*ical conse1uence o" it must #e an a priori "act as well.

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