Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rgaf20 Download by: [87.66.98.214] Date: 25 May 2016, At: 03:55 Global Affairs ISSN: 2334-0460 (Print) 2334-0479 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgaf20 Where to go from Paris? The European Union in climate geopolitics Sebastian Oberthür To cite this article: Sebastian Oberthür (2016): Where to go from Paris? The European Union in climate geopolitics, Global Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2016.1166332 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1166332 Published online: 23 May 2016. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1 View related articles View Crossmark data
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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rgaf20
Download by: [87.66.98.214] Date: 25 May 2016, At: 03:55
Where to go from Paris? The European Union inclimate geopolitics
Sebastian Oberthür
To cite this article: Sebastian Oberthür (2016): Where to go from Paris? The European Union inclimate geopolitics, Global Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2016.1166332
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1166332
Where to go from Paris? The European Union in climate geopolitics
Sebastian Oberthür*
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Institute for European Studies, Brussels, Belgium
(Received 8 January 2016; accepted 12 March 2016)
The EU’s strategic re-orientation to coalition and bridge building after the failed CopenhagenClimate Summit in 2009 paved the way for its success in securing the Paris Agreement onclimate change in December 2015. This orientation will largely remain relevant in climategeopolitics characterized by multipolarity and a diversification of interests away from aNorth–South divide, both headed towards growing support for decarbonization. Various forabeyond the multilateral UN negotiations deserve systematic attention as climate governancehas become “polycentric”, requiring careful prioritization as well as further enhancedcoordination of climate diplomacy across the EU. The EU’s position in climate geopoliticswill not least depend on the development of its internal climate and energy policyframework for 2030 and beyond. Advancing decarbonization and fostering low-carboninnovation towards the new climate economy in the EU will help enhance the EU’s powerbase and role in future climate geopolitics.
Keywords: climate change; climate policy; EU strategy; low-carbon economy; ParisAgreement
Introduction
In the twenty-first century, internationalclimate politics has become what I refer toin the following as “climate geopolitics”.While “geopolitics” is a loaded term andconcept in itself, I use the term “climate geo-politics” to denote three prominent features ofcontemporary international climate politics.First, international climate politics hasbecome firmly established as “high politics”and great power politics (Terhalle &Depledge, 2013). As climate change andclimate policy are understood to significantlyaffect the future world order, they will remainan integral element of world politics for theyears and decades to come. The secondfeature is closely connected to the first:while traditionally the “common-good/bad”
characteristics have dominated thinkingabout international climate governance, azero-sum logic has grown more prominentas climate change has become part ofcountries’ broader economic, technologicaland ideological competition, the geopolitical“struggles for political dominance” (Dalby,2013, p. 38). Finally, climate geopoliticsdraws attention to a number of more structuralfactors – prominently including the inter-national constellation of power and interests– that condition and drive internationalclimate politics and the position of individualactors in it. As countries’ domestic climateand energy policies have direct relevance, sig-nificant conditions are to be found at both theinternational and domestic levels. While rela-tively stable, these conditions can and do
change as a result of scientific, technological,socio-economic and political developments.
This article argues that the Paris Agree-ment adopted at the Paris Climate Summit inDecember 2015 significantly affects the pos-ition of the European Union (EU)1 in climategeopolitics. This position has shifted signifi-cantly: whereas the EU has traditionally beenconsidered an international leader on climatechange (e.g. Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008;Wurzel & Connelly, 2011), changes in inter-national conditions (US re-engagement, therise of China and other emerging powers)and domestic circumstances (post-2008crises, opposition to climate policy by Polandand other central and eastern Europeanmember states) have led to adaptations of EUstrategy over the past decade (e.g. Bäckstrand& Elgström, 2013; Groen & Niemann, 2013;Skovgaard, 2014). In adopting the ParisAgreement, the Paris Climate Summit inDecember 2015 advanced and re-framed thepolitical space for future global climatepolicy, especially by providing directionstowards worldwide decarbonization. FutureEU strategy on climate policy needs to graspthe emerging opportunities and, to this end,integrate the international with the domestic.
In the following I pursue the overall argu-ment and attempt to shed light on the impli-cations of Paris for the EU’s role in climategeopolitics by investigating key internal andexternal factors and their dynamics. In thenext section, I first place the Paris Agreementin the broader context of the evolving poly-centric framework of global climate govern-ance and discuss the EU’s performancetowards the Paris Summit. I then investigatethe underlying international constellation ofpower and interests, before exploring theEU’s evolving climate and energy policy fra-mework and domestic EU politics. The con-cluding section derives elements of a futureEU strategy in international climate politicstherefrom. To remain an influential drivingforce in international climate policy the EUmust take proper account of evolving internaland external conditions. In doing so, the EUfaces important choices in developing its
interlinked internal and external strategies onclimate change post Paris.
Evolving international climate policy:polycentric governance, the ParisAgreement and the EU
From centralized to polycentricgovernance
Traditionally, many considered the UN Frame-work Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) of 1992 and its Kyoto Protocolof 1997 as the centre of climate governance.While multilateral consensus decision-making precludes imposition of unwantedobligations, the multilateral UN frameworkwas considered as the place where the grandbargain should emerge that would enable andunlock climate action at the other governancelevels. While the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 hadsuch an effect in a part of the world, notablyin the EU (see below), it did not lead to thebroadened and deepened climate actionrequired. During much of the 2000s, the multi-lateral process was characterized by stalemateculminating in the failed CopenhagenSummit in 2009 (Groen & Niemann, 2013;Terhalle & Depledge, 2013).
In the 2000s, the traditional centralizedconceptualization has hence made room for amore polycentric, decentralized framing ofclimate governance. A wealth of governancelevels (local, regional, national, supranational,international), public and private actors andfora have become driving forces of climateaction in their own right. National climatelegislation has expanded tremendously andcountries have pushed forward with variousbilateral initiatives. Transnational climate gov-ernance has flourished, including variousinitiatives involving cooperation by publicand private actors, cities and regions. Compa-nies and other private actors have increasinglyengaged in climate measures. Grassrootsmovements have raised awareness and pro-vided impetus for a growing movement todivest from fossil fuels. As to intergovernmen-tal cooperation, fora beyond the UNFCCC
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have received increased attention, includingthe Montreal Protocol for the protection ofthe ozone layer, the International Civil Avia-tion Organization (ICAO), the InternationalMaritime Organization (IMO), the G20 andothers. Overall, global climate governancehas increasingly become recognized for itsmulti-level, multi-actor and multi-forumcharacteristics, providing for a dense “poly-centric” framework (e.g. Bulkeley et al.,2014; Jordan et al., 2015; Keohane & Victor,2011; Ostrom, 2010).
The Paris Agreement
Widely heralded as historic, the Paris Agree-ment under the UNFCCC adopted on 12December 2015 constitutes an attempt to reca-librate the role of the multilateral climateregime within the evolving polycentric gov-ernance framework that enabled it. The func-tion of the international regime mayincreasingly consist of aggregating lower-level developments and providing directionto and orchestrating the overall governanceframework (e.g. Hermwille et al., 2015).Hence, the Paris Agreement establishes (1)the global temperature goal of “holding theincrease in the global average temperature towell below 2°C above pre-industrial levelsand pursuing efforts to limit the temperatureincrease to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”(Article 2) and (2) the goal of phasing out netgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions “in thesecond half of this century” (Article 4.1). Toachieve these goals, emissions would need tobe phased out early in the second half of thiscentury (Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange [IPCC], 2014a). The Paris Agreementthus points to worldwide decarbonizationwithin the next few decades as the major direc-tion of travel for the overall governanceframework.
In addition, the Paris Agreement creates arenewed dynamic framework of internationalcooperation on climate change. For the firsttime, all countries, including developed anddeveloping countries, undertake “nationallydetermined” climate action plans. More than
180 countries covering around 98% of world-wide GHG emissions submitted such plansprior to the Paris Summit. Regular reports bycountries on implementation will be subjectto expert review. Developed countriescommit to providing financial resources toassist developing countries. Since the existingclimate action plans are insufficient for achiev-ing the global temperature goal of 2/1.5°C(United Nations Environment Programme[UNEP], 2015), progress is to be reviewedand strengthened commitments to be sub-mitted every five years. Most of the elementsof the Paris Agreement will require furtherelaboration in the years to come, at least untilit enters into force upon ratification by 55countries representing 55% of global GHGemissions. Overall, the Paris Agreementexceeded expectations and constitutes animportant achievement for multilateralism aswell as for climate governance (for fulleraccounts, see Clémençon, 2016; Obergasselet al., 2016).
The EU’s new role model as a “leadiator”
The Paris Agreement reflects the EU’s policyobjectives to a great extent. The EU in particu-lar was successful in securing an internationaltreaty, a five-year review cycle, mitigationcommitments for all countries and a rules-based system ensuring “transparency andaccountability” through reporting on andreview of countries’ climate action. Althoughthe EU had to lower its ambitions in somerespects – including guidelines for countries’mitigation and reporting commitments and abroadening of the group of countries contribut-ing to climate finance – especially the GHGmitigation package exceeded expectationsand constituted a significant success for theEU. In addition, the EU can claim credit forenabling the progress made in the processleading up to the Paris Summit. Thus, the EUwas a central driving force behind theDurban mandate of 2011, the growingsupport for the agreement taking the form ofan international treaty and the preparationand submission of climate action plans by
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nearly 190 countries prior to the Paris Summit(Oberthür & Groen, forthcoming; Obergasselet al., 2016).
The main thrust of the EU’s strategy wasproactive coalition and bridge building at themultilateral negotiations and beyond. On thebasis of policy objectives which it had signifi-cantly scaled down after Copenhagen (e.g.Bäckstrand & Elgström, 2013), the EU con-sistently pushed towards an ambitious Parisoutcome, including by submitting its own rela-tively high GHG emission reduction target ofat least 40% by 2030 from 1990 levels earlyon in the process. It invested in building acoalition for a progressive middle ground,while also building bridges between partieswith more extreme positions, including bymaking numerous textual bridging proposalsto the French Conference Presidency duringthe conference. To this end, the EU workedwith partners from North and South in the Car-tagena Dialogue for Progressive Action estab-lished in 2010 throughout the negotiatingprocess. In 2015, the European ExternalAction Service (EEAS) elaborated and, uponapproval by the Council, implemented aclimate diplomacy action plan streamliningthe external messages and coordinatingclimate diplomacy by the EU and its memberstates. Throughout 2015, EU member statesand the Commission actively engaged in bilat-eral climate diplomacy, with declarations ofBrazil and Germany as well as of France andChina marking important achievements. TheEU also helped galvanize the move towardsnational climate action plans on the waytowards Paris and reached out to the US toexplore common ground (for more details,see Oberthür & Groen, forthcoming).
These efforts culminated in the forming ofa “high-ambition coalition” at the ParisSummit that proved influential in assuring theParis Agreement’s relatively high level ofambition. This revival of the “Durbancoalition” that had been instrumental in secur-ing the Durban mandate in 2011 had been pre-pared with the Marshall Islands in 2015. Likethe Durban coalition, the Paris high-ambitioncoalition especially included poorer and more
vulnerable developing countries. It was even-tually also joined by Brazil and the USA atthe Paris Conference. It significantly widenedthe room for manoeuvre of the French Presi-dency of the Paris Summit in erring towardsambition in its final compromise proposal(Oberthür & Groen, forthcoming; Obergasselet al., 2016, pp. 9–10).
Overall, the EU thus appears to havefound a new role model as a “leadiator” (i.e.leader and mediator) in international climatepolicy characterized by growing multi-polarity with the USA and China as particularheavyweights. The ingredients of this leadia-tor role have remained in place throughout themultilateral negotiations after Copenhagen in2009 and became first clearly visible inDurban in 2011 (Bäckstrand & Elgström2013). In adapting to the evolving inter-national context, taking a moderately pro-gressive stance enabled coalition and bridgebuilding, both in Durban and in Paris. Whilepower politics between the USA and Chinashaped some of the underlying grand bargains(Obergassel et al., 2016, p. 10), the EUthereby managed to avert marginalization àla Copenhagen and to shape importantaspects of the Paris Agreement.
The evolving international constellationof power and interests
Shifts of power
Several key power indicators of relevance toclimate geopolitics point to an EU in declineover the past decades. The EU’s shares inworld population, GDP and GHG emissionsshow a solid downward trend (Figure 1). Inclimate politics, the declining emissionshare has received particular attention sinceit indicates how much other actors need theEU for addressing the climate problem.Expected to decline further, EU GHG emis-sions accounted for about 10% of the globaltotal in 2012, clearly behind China (around25%) and the USA (around 15%). As aresult, the EU has, with the move from theKyoto Protocol’s focus on industrializedcountries toward a global approach and
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framing, turned from one of the two biggestindustrialized country emitters to a second-row player (e.g. Oberthür, 2011).
Another key element of an actor’s weight inclimate geopolitics has, however, so farreceived scant attention: the capacity to contrib-ute to solving the problem in terms of expertise,knowledge, policies and technology. Not onlyare the biggest emitters needed for internationalcooperation, but also actors that have themeansto address the problem. In this perspective, thetrack record of the EU having reduced itsGHG emissions by more than 20% since 1990(see Figure 2) may not indicate decline, butsignal – against the backdrop of an elaboratepolicy framework (see below) – a leading“low-emission capacity”. With the worldaiming for decarbonization under the ParisAgreement and competition for a low-carboneconomy intensifying, this capacity is set togrow in importance for players’ power, attrac-tiveness and influence in climate geopolitics.
The EU seems to be in a relatively goodposition regarding “low-emission capacity”.There is no established lead indicator for this
capacity. The EU has acquired a world-leading position in terms of GHG/CO2 emis-sions intensity (World Resources Institute[WRI], 2016). One possible lead indicator con-cerns shares in high-value climate change miti-gation technologies inventions (EuropeanPatent Office and United Nations EnvironmentProgramme [EPO/UNEP], 2015). In this field,the EU has taken a leading role and maintaineda share of 30–40% throughout 1995–2011 (seeFigure 1). Two considerations suggest that therosier picture in this field is precarious andpossibly deceptive. First, the field is develop-ing dynamically, with global decarbonizationefforts still at an early stage, providing ampleroom for growth and competition. Second,investment in a key field, renewable energy,has dramatically declined in Europe in recentyears, so that the EU’s share in the globaltotal has plummeted from close to 50% in2010 to less than 20% in 2015 (REN21, 2015).
Overall, climate geopolitics is thus likelyto move further towards multipolarity. Overthe past years, the USA and China have beenthe two strong poles, with a number of
Figure 1. The EU’s power position in climate geopolitics: key indicators.Note: High-value CCMT means “high-value climate change mitigation technologies”; all data given asshares of global total; CCMT data for Europe as a whole. Sources: High-value CCMT data from EuropeanPatent Office (EPO/UNEP 2015); all other data from WRI (2016).
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second-row players behind them, amongwhich is the EU (but also other members ofthe G20). Changing economic dynamicscould result in a further strengthening of theposition of emerging powers such as India.The African continent also has considerablepotential both in terms of economic develop-ment and GHG emissions (WRI, 2016). Thefield of low-emission capacity is also evolving,with players such as Japan, Korea and Chinaholding significant shares already (EPO/UNEP, 2015). Mapping these indicators ontoeach other provides for a multi-facetedpicture, with dynamic multipolarity as themost likely structure for the foreseeable future.
Evolving interests
Climate interests are on the rise worldwide,both as a result of an increasing manifestationof climate change impacts and due to growingsocioeconomic interest in decarbonization. Asregards impacts, extreme weather events havefurther increased in intensity and frequencyand have led to increasing economic lossesboth in developed and developing countries.
Glaciers have continued to melt, exacerbatingproblems with freshwater supply. Increasingnumbers of people have experienced newrecords in temperatures, precipitation and/ordrought. Internationally, discussions on “lossand damage” have raised awareness of the irre-versible impacts of climate change that cannotbe adapted to (IPCC, 2014b). These climatechange impacts do not only strengthen interestby those affected, but also create incentives forcountries to behave as “responsible” powersby not advancing the destruction of others.
In parallel, socioeconomic interest in dec-arbonization has grown markedly, especiallyin the 2000s. By 2015, renewables dominatedinvestment in new power generation capacity,also due to drastic cost reductions that farexceeded expectations. Energy efficiency tech-nologies in appliances, buildings and transportand related policies have also advanced signifi-cantly, with considerable further potential.Reinforced by the aforementioned spread ofclimate initiatives in polycentric governance,increasing numbers of business actors havecome out in support of strong climate policies
Figure 2. EU progress towards 2020 climate and energy targets.Note: The EU’s target of improving energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 corresponds to an absolute reductionof energy consumption by 13% from 2005 levels. Source: Data from Eurostat and European EnvironmentAgency.
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and have engaged in developing, and reapingthe benefits of, the “low-carbon” or “newclimate economy” (see also above). The low-carbon economy is dynamically growing, asalso indicated by an increasing number ofinventions/patents granted for relevant low-emission products (EPO/UNEP, 2015).Overall, a positive narrative stressing theopportunities of the transition towards thenew climate economy has thus gained strength(Goldman Sachs, 2015; The New ClimateEconomy, 2014; 2015).
At the same time, significant barriersremain, especially as regards fossil fuels andenergy politics. Economic activity around theworld continues to depend to a large extent onfossil fuel use, supported by established infra-structure. Coal, oil and gas remain abundantlyavailable, especially after the shale gas revolu-tion in the USA and elsewhere, as also indicatedby falling prices in the 2010s. Accordingly,fossil fuel production and consumption has con-tinued to grow and related status-quo interestshave continued to carry significant weight inpolicy discussions. In some areas of economicactivity (for example, in energy-intensive indus-try), the market alone will not deliver alterna-tives to fossil fuels. The decarbonizedeconomy thus does not yet sell itself, butmeets sizeable resistance (Dupont & Oberthür,2015a; International Energy Agency [IEA],2015).
The strength and development of relevantinterests is not uniform across the globe. Inter-est in the “old” economy remains stronger incountries with abundant fossil-fuel resources,like Russia and the USA, than with energyimporters like the EU. Interest in the low-carbon economy, by contrast, grows moreeasily where it can build on significant innova-tive capacity, as exists in the USA, the EU andother countries. In some developing countries,particular opportunities exist, as energysystems are evolving dynamically. In manydeveloping countries, however, particular bar-riers related to technology, finance and generalcapacity remain. Combined with a widespreaddesire to prioritize economic development andensure climate justice, these barriers create
formidable challenges that require targetedpolicy intervention.
The Paris Agreement can be expected toprovide a further impetus for the growth ofsocioeconomic climate interests. While depend-ing on implementation for its full effect, it sendsa powerful signal to investors and societies thatthe world community is headed toward decarbo-nization and that related socioeconomic interestswill be privileged. It also strengthens the meansavailable for addressing barriers related tolimited capacity in developing countries in need.
Implications: coalition-building across theNorth–South divide
Three implications in particular arise from thisanalysis of the international constellation ofpower and interests in climate geopolitics.First, the North–South divide will further loseframing power. This process is already under-way, not least as a result of the economic diver-sification of “the” South. Developing countrygroupings with diverse interests have blos-somed, including progressive Latin-Americancountries, small-island developing states, leastdeveloped countries, oil-exporting countries,BASIC countries, like-minded developingcountries and others. And the Paris Agreementweakens the traditional distinction betweendeveloped and developing countries. Althoughthe persistence of the traditional North–Southnarrative must not be underestimated, currenttrends suggest that interest diversification willfurther deepen.
Second, the rationale and drive for coalitionbuilding will remain intact for the foreseeablefuture. Coalitions cutting across developingand developed countries have already becomemore common, as visible in the Durbancoalition in 2011 and the Paris high-ambitioncoalition. Multipolarity will remain a powerfulmotivation for countries to align in order toshape international climate policy and counter-balance greater powers. At the same time, thegrowth of common climate interests shouldfurther enhance the basis for coalition buildingamong countries.
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Third, climate protection will continue torequire targeted political action and carefulstrategic nurturing. While the Paris Agreementhas provided an impetus for moving to the newclimate economy, important barriers andweighty status-quo interests remain, with sig-nificant variance across countries. The key inthe political contest over making the momen-tum toward climate protection unstoppablewill likely be the main players with “mixedmotivations” (i.e. growing climate interestsbut also weighty fossil-fuel interests), includ-ing the USA, BASIC countries, Central andEastern Europe and others. In much of thedeveloping world, effective support for transi-tioning to the new climate economy will alsobe crucial.
The EU’s policy framework
The EU and its member states have arguablyestablished the most advanced climate policyframework worldwide. Starting with theimplementation of the Kyoto Protocol in theearly 2000s, they have developed an increas-ingly tight and comprehensive web of regu-lations and measures, including the EUemissions trading scheme, the promotion ofrenewable energy and energy efficiency, CO2
emission standards for new passenger cars, andothers (for a brief overview, see Dupont &Oberthür, 2015b). Overall, a relatively elaboratepolicy framework spanning the EU, national andsubnational levels has emerged in Europe.
EU climate policy has also increasinglybecome “climate and energy” policy –climate policy objectives have become pro-gressively integrated with energy policy(Dupont, 2016). In 2007, the EuropeanCouncil established three related 20% targetsfor 2020: for reducing GHG emissions from1990 levels, for increasing the share of renew-able energies and for improving energy effi-ciency. In October 2014, it agreed a “2030Climate and Energy Policy Framework” withagain three headline targets of, “at least”, abinding 40% emission reduction, a 27%share of renewable energy and a 27% energy
efficiency improvement by 2030 (EuropeanCouncil, 2014).
The established policies have driven sig-nificant reductions of GHG emissions, butalso important structural improvementsespecially regarding the power sector and thegrowth of renewable energies. With the EU’sclimate policy framework maturing, GHGemissions in the EU have entered a sustaineddownward trend in the 2000s. The EU’s 2020targets for renewable energy and energy effi-ciency are within reach – and its GHG emis-sion reduction target will be significantlyexceeded (Figure 2). As mentioned above,climate change mitigation technology ingeneral has seen a dynamic development(EPO/UNEP, 2015).
Despite the progress made, there is still along way to go towards decarbonization inline with the EU’s objective of reducingGHG emissions by 80–95% by 2050 and, asimplied by the Paris Agreement, achievingnet zero emissions as soon as possible there-after. Although the EU’s policy frameworkcontains the major elements, it will needfurther development to achieve full decarboni-zation in the relevant key sectors (includingpower, industry, transport, buildings) and con-sistently across the Union. Decarbonizationwill also require further progress in climatepolicy integration, for example in grid andenergy market development. The majority ofthe technological, economic and societal trans-formation is still ahead – the global racetowards the new climate economy andsociety is underway, but still in an earlyphase (Dupont & Oberthür, 2015a).
EU policy development is at a criticalmoment as the EU designs its concreteclimate and energy policies to 2030. By theend of 2016, the European Commission willtable a raft of legislative proposals to this endaddressing, among other things, the EU emis-sions trading scheme, the promotion of renew-able energy and energy efficiency, energymarket design and overarching EU climateand energy governance. This creates theunique opportunity to make a quantum leapin European decarbonization by advancing
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climate policy integration in the energy sectorand beyond, enabling and fostering low-carbon innovation across key sectors (industry,transport/mobility, power, buildings) includingby ensuring stable conditions of support forkey technological fields such as renewableenergy and energy efficiency. As arguedabove, the decision taken in the legislativeprocess over the next years will also have aprofound impact on the place of the EU inclimate geopolitics.
EU politics: ambivalent
Current EU politics provides for a mixed pro-spect for the decarbonization agenda. Itneither categorically excludes further advancesof climate policy nor makes such advances anobvious or even inevitable choice. Progress inEU climate policy toward decarbonizationremains a strong possibility, especially if build-ing on a robust positive agenda synergizingwith other key policy concerns (energy secur-ity, economic recovery, innovation, etc.).Eventually, however, it will be up to policy-makers in the EU to make that choice.
On the one hand, the advances so far havefostered support for climate (and energy)policy. Economic and societal interest in inno-vative renewable energy and energy efficiencytechnologies has been growing and climatepolicy can now rely on a stable basis ofsupport by local and regional initiatives thathave flourished over the years. Also, policy-makers and societies at large have learnedthat effective climate protection is possibleand generates important positive side effects.Overall, public support for climate policy hasremained remarkably strong in the EU (Euro-barometer, 2015).
On the other hand, important political bar-riers to effective climate policy remain. Coaland gas have remained prominent energy car-riers in many EU member states. Interest incoal has especially persisted in Poland andother central and eastern European memberstates. Growing right-wing Euro-scepticismthat frequently comes hand in hand withclimate scepticism has reinforced opposition
to effective climate policies. Regarding thepromotion of renewable energy, indispensablefor the required energy transition, nuclearinterests have constituted additional impedi-ments, including in the UK and France. Thescope for the EU to address national-levelimpediments is limited since energy policy ispolitically seen as crucial by EU memberstates. Hence, EU policy legally requiresunanimity in core areas in accordance withArticles 192.2(c) and 194.2 of the Treaty onthe Functioning of the European Union andsignificant divergence of national policiesacross the EU persists (European EnvironmentAgency [EEA], 2015).
Broader European politics are also undeter-mined. Climate and energy policy have com-peted for attention with a crowded list ofpolitical crises in Europe (Euro-crisis/Greece,migration, terrorism, European integration)and its external environment (Ebola inWestern Africa, Syria, Iraq). Partially fed bythese crises, the growing EU identity crisis,as evident from the growth of Euro-scepticismin many member states and the “Brexit” dis-cussions, does not bode well for further inte-gration, including of climate and energypolicy. In contrast, energy security and therelated Energy Union project support theclimate agenda. High dependence on energyimports continues to provide a strong rationalefor the promotion of renewable energies andenergy efficiency. The escalating conflictwith Russia over Ukraine from 2014 hasreinforced this rationale.
Synchronizing internal and external EUstrategy
An effective future international strategy onclimate change requires the EU to have aclear understanding of the evolving inter-national context and internal conditions (andtheir links). Internationally, the EU is set toremain a medium-sized power in dynamicmultipolar climate geopolitics. Given the sus-tained trend toward decarbonization as bol-stered by the 2015 Paris Agreement, thecapacity of actors for low-emission solutions
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and innovation acquires increasing promi-nence as a source of competitiveness and pol-itical influence. Given its potential in this area,the EU has the opportunity to balance its rela-tive decline in other respects (emissions,GDP) and possibly strengthen its internationalposition by developing its low-emissioncapacity.
To grasp this opportunity, the EU needs tofurther develop its domestic climate policies.With an undetermined balance of interests inthe new climate economy versus the “fossil”economy, policymakers face a choice in theupcoming discussions on the EU’s climateand energy policy framework for 2030 andbeyond. The EU’s domestic policy agendathus provides them with a unique opportunity:EU policy can orchestrate Europe’s multi-level governance system to further developclimate and energy policies so as to maximizefirst-mover advantages and foster low-emis-sion innovation in the global competition foropportunities. Advancing this agenda system-atically and consistently will enhance theEU’s power base and role in future climategeopolitics – giving way to status quo inter-ests would mean that Europe shoots itself inthe foot.
As to the EU’s future international strategyon climate change, the EU’s strategic re-orien-tation towards coalition building and “leadiat-ing” after the failed Copenhagen Summit of2009 is likely to remain valid also for theyears to come. This revised strategy pavedthe way to the EU’s success in Paris andremains valid in a world of continuing butevolving multipolarity. The direction of travelprovided by the Paris Agreement may in thefuture facilitate this task by promotingcommon climate interests globally. Enhancedcapacity of coordinated climate diplomacyacross the EU has a continuing role to playin supporting the implementation of thisstrategy.
Furthermore, the development of climatepolicy in other fora and at other levels of gov-ernance deserves systematic attention, reflect-ing the polycentric nature of global climategovernance. This includes: (1) the targeted
fostering of “international cooperative initiat-ives” involving various public and privateactors and possibly of other climate-protection“clubs” (Hermwille et al., 2015); (2) activeengagement in other multilateral fora andorganizations such as the G7, the G20,ICAO, IMO and others; and (3) activeshaping of inter-regional and bilateral relationsin a strategic long-term perspective, includinga further integration of climate policy objec-tives in EU development cooperation. Astrong initial focus logically falls on the effec-tive implementation of climate plans under theParis Agreement with key partners. Given thewealth of fora and relations, strategic prioriti-zation of initiatives with the highest potentialwill be required (including with a view todeveloping future technologies and markets).
Since climate change has grown to becomehigh politics, the future international climatestrategy of the EU and its member states willhave an important bearing on Europe’sgeneral standing in world politics. Theongoing process to elaborate an EU GlobalStrategy by the High Representative of theUnion for Foreign Affairs and SecurityPolicy, due in June 2016, may hence providean opportunity to create a solid basis for inte-grating the elements of an international EUclimate strategy and engaging in the strategicprioritization required. In this context, itdeserves repeating that basing internationalclimate strategy on sound and consistent dom-estic policy is crucial, requiring close inte-gration between the internal and externalpolicy domains. Apart from that, the dynamicsof the relevant economic, technological, socialand political developments call for regular re-assessments of domestic and international con-ditions so as to flexibly adapt the EU’s strategyover the years and decades to come.
AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Ilke Adam, Claire Dupont,Daniel Fiott, Lisanne Groen, Laura Iozzelli, EstherMarijnen, Christof Roos, Luis Simón, FlorianTrauner and Louise van Schaik for helpful com-ments on a previous version of this article andCarmen Mazijn for important research assistance.
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Disclosure statementThe author was a member of the German delegationat the Paris conference in December 2015.
Note1. For reasons of simplicity, in the following,
unless indicated otherwise, I use the term“EU” as referring to the EU and its memberstates.
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