Whitley 1992

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Prehistory and Post-Positivist Science: A Prolegomenon to Cognitive ArchaeologyAuthor(s): David S. WhitleySource: Archaeological Method and Theory, Vol. 4 (1992), pp. 57-100Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20170221.

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Prehistory

and

Post-Positivist Science

A

Prolegomenon

to

Cognitive

Archaeology

DAVID S.

WHITLEY

Science,

after

all,

is

a

branch

of

literature.

?Sir

Karl

Popper,

Objective

Knowledge,

p.

185

Archaeology

sits

at

an

interface.

Having

finally

evolved

through

(some

had

hoped

beyond)

the

growth

pangs

of

new

archaeol

ogy,

it

is

now

undergoing

a

second,

similar

period

of

debate,

with

issues

of

epistemology,

ontology,

and

metaphysics

once

again

in

the

fore.

That

is,

current

theoretical discourse

involves

a

reconsideration

of

the

"processualist"

positivism

of

new

archaeology

and the

evalua

tion of

"post-processual,"

"symbolic,"

or

"radical"

approaches (cf.

Hodder

1986;

Leone

1982;

Binford

1987;

Earle

and

Preucel

1987;

Shanks

and

Tilley

1987a;

Schiffer

1988).

Following

Huffman

(1986a;

cf.

Lewis-Williams

1989),

I

prefer

a

particular

brand

of

post-proces

sual

archaeology

labeled

"cognitive

archaeology,"

but the

appellative

is

not

so

important

as

the

substance.

Cognitive

archaeology

specifically

and

post-processual

archaeol

ogy

more

generally

are,

admittedly,

much

less

than

universally

or

even

widely

accepted

in

our

discipline.

Some

view

many

of the

con

tentions

raised

by

their

advocates

as

fundamentally inappropriate

to

science

(e.g.,

Binford

1987).

Others,

equally

strongly,

see

them

as

central

concerns

in

archaeology's

heuristic

(e.g.,

Hodder

1986),

even

while certain

critics

seem

to

question

the

ability

of

post-processual

approaches

to

contribute

to

our

understanding

of

the

prehistoric

past

(e.g., Earle

and

Preucel 1987). Yet

on

the empirical and practical

levels,

at

least,

there

are

two

substantive

areas

in

which

cognitive

archaeology,

that

is,

the

post-processual

approach

practiced

princi

2

57

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58 David

S.

Whitley

pally

by

archaeologists

associated

with

the

University

of the

Wit

water

srand,

specifically

is

making

great

inroads:

African

iron-age

studies

(e.g.,

Huffman

1981, 1982, 1984,

1986a,

1986b;

Thorp

1984a,

1984b;

Loubser

1985, 1988;

Evers

1989)

and

hunter-gatherer

research

(e.g.,

Lewis-Williams

1980,

1981,

1982,

1983, 1984,

etc.;

Lewis-Wil

liams and

Dowson

1988,

1989;

Lewis-Williams and

Loubser

1986;

Whitley

1982, 1988a, 1992;

Huffman

1983;

Wadley

1986,1987;

Camp

bell

1986, 1987;

Dowson

1988a,

1988b).

It is

the

purpose

of

this

essay

to

review these

cognitive archaeological

studies,

but

not

principally

in

terms

of

empirical

substance.

To do

so

without

attending

first

to

the theoretical

bases

of

cognitive

archaeology

would be

incautious.

Aside from

the

fact

that

many

processual

archaeologists

are

simply

unfamiliar

with this

literature,

it

is

apparent

that those that have

considered

it maintain certain

misconstrued

beliefs.

Further,

as

implied

above,

it is

also

true

that

there

is

more

than

one

brand of

post-processual

archaeology

and that distinctions be

tween

various strains

have been

little

explored

in

the

literature.

Thus,

a

consideration

of

cognitive archaeology's

substantive

ad

vances

can

only

be

predicated

on a

necessarily

antecedent

review

of

the

philosophical

and

methodological

issues

these entail.

I

begin

with

these,

before

turning

briefly

to two

case

studies of

the

approach

in

practice.

Intellectual

Bases

of

Cognitive

Archaeology

Critiques of the positivism (or,

more

correctly, logical

empiricism)

that

underpinned

new

archaeology

have

been

presented

by

a

number

of authors from

various

viewpoints

(e.g., Wylie

1981;

Flannery

1982;

Hodder

1986;

Shanks and

Tilley

1987b;

Kelley

and

Hanen

1988)

and need

not

be reiterated

here. Suffice

it

simply

to

note

that the

perception

of

a

scientific

archaeology

as

necessarily

part

of

Otto

Neurath's

"unified

science,"

following

a

formalized

(principally

Hempelian)

positivist

model,

is

now

widely

recognized

as

an

overly

narrow

characterization,

even

by

some

of the

original

proponents of the new archaeology program. Ironically, though, even

as

processual

archaeologists

are

reworking

their

philosophical

and

methodological

commitments

to

bring

them

in

line

with

recent

de

velopments

in

the

philosophy

of

science,

scientific

archaeology

is

being

caricatured

by

certain

post-processualists

(e.g.,

Hodder

1986;


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Prehistory

and

Post-Positivist

Science 59

Shanks and

Tilley

1987b)

in

exactly

the old-fashioned

positivist

mode that

many

new

archaeologists

are

moving beyond.

That

the

early

new

archaeological

treatises

and

some

of the

more

vocal

post-processualists

share

(or

shared)

the

same

flawed, positivist

perception

of

science

is,

however,

more

than

simply

anecdotal.

For

with this

misperception

on

the side of

certain

post-processualists,

there

is

an

equally

debilitating

and

parallel

misconstrual

on

the

part

of

most

processual

archaeologists,

which

is

that

any

opposition

to

their

processualist

goals

is,

somehow,

an

opposition

to

science and

necessarily

a

committment

to

relativism.

Just

as

narrow

positivism

has become

a

whipping

post

for

segments

of

the

post-processualist

persuasion,

in

other

words,

so too

has

an

extreme

relativism

been

taken

as

the hallmark of

post-processual archaeology.

But,

in

fact,

these

philosophical

and

methodological

commitments

do

not

necessarily

follow.

Anti-positivism

does

not

equate

with

anti

science,

or

at

least need

not

so,

and

neither

necessarily

does

an

anti

processualism imply

relativism.

Instead,

when

"post-positivist"

developments

in

the

philosophy

of

science

are

acknowledged,

an

archaeology

that

is

both scientific and

hermeneutic?cognitive

ar

chaeology?is

allowed.

Indeed,

it

suggests

that

archaeology

funda

mentally

is

an

interpretive endeavor,

but

one

in

which

scientific

method

and

heuristic

play

their

part.

In

order

to

understand this

intellectual

position

adopted by

cogni

tive

archaeologists,

and

implicitly

how this differs from other

post

processualist

as

well

as

processualist

positions,

I

outline

two

impor

tant

intellectual

developments

that

have been

fundamental

to

its

appearance: changes in culture theory in anthropology, and the rise

of

post-positivist

philosophy

of science.

Archaeology,

Culture

Theory,

and

the

Cognitive

Paradigm

Although

recently

there

appear

to

have

been

some

dissenting

voices,

for

over

three decades North

American

archaeologists

have

by

and

large adopted

the

catch-phrase

"archaeology

as

anthropology"

as a

rallying

cry,

if

not

an

ideological

precept.

This

is ironic

because

just

as archaeologists were emphasizing their intellectual ties and al

legiance

to

their

"mother-discipline,"

they apparently

turned their

backs

on

certain

major

intellectual

transitions

then

occurring

within

anthropology. Specifically,

shortly

after

Phillip

Phillips published

the

oft-quoted

remark

"archaeology

is

anthropology,

or

it

is

nothing"


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60

David

S.

Whitley

(1955:246-47),

and

following

earlier

intellectual trends

in

psychol

ogy

and

linguistics, anthropologists

such

as

Ward

Goodenough,

An

thony

F.

C.

Wallace,

David

Schneider

and

others

began

the

move

to

wards

a

"cognitive

revolution,"

resulting

in

what

is

now

generally

referred

to

as

cognitive

or

symbolic

anthropology

(cf.

D'Andrade

1984:88).

Whether

or

not

this constituted

an

anthropological

"para

digm

shift"

(Kuhn

1962),

or an

alteration

in

the "theoretical hard

core"

(Lakatos 1969),

is

arguable,

but

it

certainly

changed

in

funda

mental

ways

the

manner

in

which

most

anthropologists

viewed the

world,

and their

intellectual

task

in

understanding

it.

This

is

apparent

when

it is

recognized

that, prior

to

the

mid-1950s,

anthropology

was

dominated

by

the

belief that

most

things

human,

including

personality,

language,

and

culture,

could

be

best

under

stood

in

terms

of

stimulus-response

relationships

(D'Andrade

1984;

Le Vine

1984).

For

the

anthropologist,

and

by

derivation the

archaeol

ogist,

this

"behaviorism"

was

most

manifest

in

the

then-existing

defi

nition

of culture.

Simply

stated,

culture

was

defined

in

reference

to

patterns of behavior,

with

explanations

of culture

change

or

cultural

differences

most

frequently

framed

in

terms

of human-environment

relationships.

But,

starting

about

1957,

the behaviorist

paradigm

was

rejected by

many

in

anthropology

(and

other

human

sciences)

in

favor of

a

cognitive

formulation.1

Here,

rather than

emphasizing

nor

mative

patterns

of

action,

concern

shifted

to

a

definition

of

culture

as a

system

of

values and

beliefs

or,

in

a

word,

a

worldview.

Although

this

change

in

culture

theory

has

not

been

adopted

by

processualist

archaeologists,

including

many

who consider them

selves "anthropological archaeologists," cognitive

culture

theory

is

fundamental

to

cognitive archaeology,

and

a

few

summary

points

concerning

its

ramifications

need be made.

The

first

of

these

is

that

this

change

in

culture

theory

implies

a

shift

in

the

emphasis

of

social

inquiry

from

the

purely

behavioral

realm

to

better include

the

cogni

tive.

I

discuss

this

in

more

detail

below,

but

here

I

wish

to

emphasize

one

implication

and what

it

suggests concerning

the

explanatory

capability

of

one

strain

of

processual

archaeology,

"behavioral

ar

chaeology"

as

espoused

specifically

by

Earle and

Preucel

(1987).

This

is that archaeologists employ remnants of prehistoric behavior,

whether

expressed

in

artifacts,

monuments,

sites,

associations,

or

contexts,

as

their

evidence.

Since the

results

of

behavior

are

funda

mentally

our

evidence,

it is then

a

logical

inversion

to

argue

that

our

goal

is

to

seek laws

to

explain

our

evidence,

as

Earle and

Preucel


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Prehistory

and

Post-Positivist

Science

61

claim.

"One

uses

human behavior

as

evidence

for the

operation

of

the

mind,"

John

Searle

(1982:2)

noted

in

a

parallel

vein,

"but

to

sup

pose

that the

laws

must

be laws of behavior

is

to

suppose

that the

evidence

must

be

the

subject

matter."

Indeed,

it

is

only

if

the

subject

of

inquiry

is

extended

beyond

the level of

behavior,

to

what

causes

behavior,

that

any

hope

can

be raised

of

achieving

explanatory

laws

(cf.

Jarvie 1972:18;

Farr

1983:171).

For

this

reason,

cognitive archaeologists

have

adopted

an

approach

roughly

akin

to

Popper's

(e.g.,

1972,

1976)

"situational

analysis."

In

situational

analysis Popper distinguishes

what

he calls "world-one"

physical

objects (which

include

behavior)

from

"world-two"

subjec

tive

experiences,

and

both of these from "world-three"

objects.

These

latter

are

the

product

of the human mind

[not

to

be conflated

with

human

emotions

or

psychological

states,

which

are

world

two)

and

include

art,

myths,

institutions, statements,

arguments,

etc.;

that

is,

the

cognitive

(but

not

psychological)

realm. "The

innermost

nucleus

of

world

three,"

he

states,

"is

the

world of

problems,

theo

ries

and criticism"

(1976:194).

For

Popper

and other

proponents

of

situational

analysis (e.g.,

Jarvie 1972;

Farr

1983)

it

is

situational

analysis,

which

explicitly

considers

world-three

objects,

that under

lies law-like

generalizations

and makes

explanation

possible

in

so

cial

inquiry

(cf.

Farr

1983:171;

see

also Gibbon

1984:388-92).

Now

while

Popper

allows the

narrow

applicability

of

microeco

nomic

theories of

rationality

in

situational

analysis

(cf.

Popper

1961

:

141),

he

contends these

are

oversimplified,

overschematicized,

and

therefore

largely

false.

Correspondingly, they

are

inappropriate

to

the kinds of social contexts and problems that, for example, archaeol

ogists

confront

(cf.

Farr

1983:172).

In

other

words,

the

application

of

problematic

assumptions concerning industrialized,

Western

eco

nomic

behavior?economic

rationality,

maximization,

optimiza

tion,

minimization,

etc.?to

non-Western,

nonindustrialized

cul

tures

amounts

to

implicit analogical

reasoning

founded

on

vague

notions of

universalities

in

human

nature.

Thus,

although

I

recog

nize

that

many

processualists

set

their

sights

on

the

decision

making

behind

prehistoric

behavior,

my

contention is

that

the

way

they

con

ceptualize decision making is fundamentally faulty. That is, while

their

concern

with

decision

making

may

in

certain

cases

supersede

the

world-one

realm of

behavior,

at

best

it

leads

to

the

psychologisms

of

world-two

or,

in

other

cases

(e.g.,

optimal

foraging theory),

reduces

explanation

to

a

sociobiological

focus

on

the behavior of the

gene.


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62

David

S.

Whitley

Situational

analysis,

by

contrast,

is

"not

based

on

any

psychological

assumptions

concerning

the

rationality (or

otherwise)

of

'human

na

ture'"

(Popper

1966:97).

Therefore,

many

processualists'

recourse

to

immanent

psychological

motives

(e.g.,

maximization)

as

explana

tions

for

behavior

devolves

rapidly

to

a

kind of

hermeneutics

con

cerned with

psychologistic

world-two

objects.

And

such

simply

can

not

lead

to

satisfactory

explanation.

Second,

many

anthropologists

have chosen

to

ally

this

change

in

culture theory with the humanistically based, generally relativist in

tone,

idealist

critique.

Hodder

(e.g.,

1986)

has

apparently

adopted

a

similar relativist

stance

(cf.

1984:30),

although

without

any

explicit

consideration of culture

theory.

But,

in

fact,

the

cognitive

paradigm

does

not

imply

or

require

such

a

position.

That

is,

nowhere

does

interest

in

cognition,

symbolism,

or

belief

necessarily

imply

a

rela

tivist

or

nonscientific

approach

or

method

(cf.

Rudner

1966:74;

Huff

1981,

1982;

Farr

1983;

see

below);

instead,

such

is

simply

a

debatable

metaphysical

commitment.

Perhaps

most

importantly,

the

retention

of a scientific

approach

even within an

interpretive

program,

such as

is

suggested by

cognitive

culture

theory,

is

implied

by

a

number of

researchers

(cf.

Sch?lte

1986:8;

Alexander

1982:138).

Third,

it is

also

important

to

emphasize

that

new

archaeology

ef

fectively

enshrined

the

behaviorist definition

of

culture.

This

is

ironic

on

a

number

of

counts,

but

particularly

because

one

of

the

central

tenets

of

new

archaeology

was

a

rejection

of the "normative"

approach

of

traditional

archaeology.

Yet

the

behaviorist

paradigm

and

its

resulting

culture

theory

are

paramountly

normative.

By

con

trast,

as David Schneider has demonstrated a number of times

(e.g.,

1972:38),

it is

only

with

the

cognitive paradigm

that the

"normative

problem"

is

finally

overcome.

Here

the distinction

turns

on

the

con

ceptual

difference

between culture

as

"constitutive rules"

(i.e.,

guidelines)

in

the

cognitive

paradigm

and

as

"regulative

rules"

(or

norms)

in

behaviorism.

Post-processual

archaeology

and

the

cogni

tive

paradigm,

therefore,

do

not

necessarily

imply

a concern

with

"mental

templates,"

as

both

Binford

(1987)

and Earle and

Preucel

(1987)

seem

to

believe. Mental

templates,

instead,

simply

represent

an

aspect

of

the

normative

and one-dimensional

model

of

cognition

inherent

in behaviorism.

The

normative contradiction

of

new

archaeology,

of

course,

has

not

gone

unrecognized

by

processualists.

Culture

has

been

widely


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Prehistory

and Post-Positivist

Science 63

perceived

as

problematic,

because

the

concept

has

not

been

viewed

as

"operational."

But,

instead

of

coming

to terms

with the

concep

tual

contradiction,

new

archaeologists simply

eliminated the

con

cept

of

culture

from their

vocabulary

(e.g.,

Hill

1977:103;

Trigger

1984:283-84). This,

of

course,

was

no

new

strategy.

British

social

anthropologists

had

taken

the

same

tactic

in

downplaying

culture

and

favoring

social

structure

(cf.

Radcliffe-Brown

1952:192),

and

with the

same

result: "social

anthropologists

in

fact

had all

the

theoretical problems created for cultural anthropologists by the cul

ture

concept,

and also the

added

problem

of

not

realizing

that

they

had

the

problems"

(Sapire

n.d.).

For

a

number of

reasons,

consequently,

the

appearance

of

cogni

tive/symbolic anthropology

is

an

important

intellectual

develop

ment

in

understanding

the

post-processual

debate.

Arguably

it

repre

sents

a

larger "paradigmatic

shift"

from

a

behaviorist

to

a

cognitive

view

of

human culture and

society,

with

cognitive

archaeology

repre

senting

a

manifestation

of

this

change.

It

also

obviates the

normative

problem

which has

plagued archaeology

for

decades,

and does this

by

revitalizing

the central

concept

of

any

anthropological

(and

any

an

thropological archaeological)

research: culture.

Equally

importantly,

however,

it

implies

no

turn to

an

extreme

relativist,

anti-scientific

approach

to

research.

Post-Positivist

Philosophy

of

Science

In

addition

to

an

explicit

recognition

and

adoption

of

cognitive

cul

ture

theory

now current in

anthropology, specifically

of

culture

as

worldview,

cognitive

archaeologists

have

expressed

a

commitment

to

scientific method and

heuristic

(e.g.,

Lewis-Williams

1983;

Lewis

Williams

and Loubser

1986;

Lewis-Williams

and Dowson

1988;

Huff

man

1986a). This,

perhaps

more

than

anything

else,

sets

the

cognitive

archaeologists

apart

from

other

post-processualist

strains.

However,

this reflects

no

adoption

of

doctrinaire

positivist

scientific methodol

ogy,

toward

which other

post-processualists

and

even now some

pro

cessualists look

with disfavor.2

Instead,

it

represents

a

recognition

of

post-positivist

developments

in

the

philosophy

of

science,

and

it

is

to

these

that

I

now

turn.

Post-positivist

philosophy

of

science is

an

intellectual

movement

that

has

appeared

during

the

last

two

decades,-

that

is,

since

the

initial


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64

David

S.

Whitley

emergence

of

new

archaeology.

This

is

not

to

deny

that

it

has

earlier

intellectual

origins

but

simply

to

emphasize

that

it

has

experienced

a

sophisticated

development

in

the

recent

past.

Among

its

central

tenets

is

the

rejection

of

positivism's

narrow

emphasis

on

science

as

based

on

sense-data:

it

is

recognized

that there

are

many

phenomena

that

are

not

directly

observable

(e.g.,

neutrinos)

but

that,

nonethe

less,

have

a

material existence

that

is

indirectly

observable,

based

on

their influence

on

other

aspects

of

the material

realm.

That

is, post

positivist science has been marked by the rise of realism3 and its

linkage

with

a

rationalist

method

of

science

(discussed

below).

The fundamental

postulates

or

presuppositions

of

post-positivist

science

have been summarized

by

Toulmin

(1977:152)

and

Alexander

(1982:18-33;

1987:17-18;

cf.

Taylor

1971)

and

can

be

fruitfully

con

sidered

in

contrast

to

those

of

positivism:

1.

The

relationship

of

theory

and

fact

and

the

nature

of scientific

discourse.

Positivism

presupposed

a

radical break between fact and

theory,

with

empirical

observations held to be

specific

and concrete

and

nonempirical

statements

thought

to

be

general

and abstract.

In

contrast,

post-positivist

science

maintains

that

all data

are

theoreti

cally-informed.

That

is,

a

distinction

in

kind

between

theoretical

and

observational

terms?what

Nietzsche condemned

a

century ago

as

the

"dogma

of immaculate

perception"?is

now

widely

consid

ered

neither

ontologically

nor

epistemologically

supportable.

In

stead,

as

Lakatos

(1969:156)

has

argued,

to

call

some

things

"observa

tions"

and

others

"statements"

is

simply

an

analytical

convenience

based on a useful manner of

speech

(cf.

Hesse

1974;

Toulmin 1977:

152;

Newton-Smith

1981:19-27;

Kaplan

1984:34-35;

Giddens and

Turner

1987:2-3).

However,

that

we

recognize

that

these do

not

dif

fer

in

kind

does

not

imply

that

we

cannot

identify

a

distinction

in

degree

between

them;

simply

put,

they

are a

useful

manner

of

speech,

and

one

which

we

should

maintain.

This allows rational

con

fidence

(including,

in

some

low-level

cases,

inter

subjective

invari

ance)

in

scientific

observations.

Further,

this

postulate

implies

that scientific

formulations

have

implicit

or

explicit

commitments

to

metaphysical

and

empirical

concerns;

therefore

science

is

not

simply

an

activity

that

can

be

con

ceptualized

methodologically

or

empirically,

for

it

necessarily

incor

porates

the

general

and

presuppositional.

This

is

in

contradistinction


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Prehistory

and Post-Positivist

Science 65

to

hard-line

positivism,

which held that

more

general

and abstract

concerns

had little

significance

for

an

empirically

oriented disci

pline.

To

ignore

the

philosophical

side,

however,

runs

the

risk

of

implicit

and

unrecognized

theoretical

problems

or

misconstruals.

As

Alexander

notes,

"Reason

can

only

be

preserved

by making

presup

positions

explicit

and

subjecting

them

to

disciplined

debate"

(1987:

52),

and Reed

contends

that

"attempts

to'remove

all

philosophizing

from

a

domain

are

likely

to

remove

only explicit, potentially improv

able ideas at the expense of embedding tacit, potentially damaging,

ideas

into

the fabric of

a

field"

(1981:477).

This

fact

emphasizes

the

necessity

of

including

general,

theoretical

discourse

in

archaeology,

without

awaiting

the

final

resolution of

archaeology's

observation

language,

for

example,

as

some seem

wont to

do.

2.

The

nature

of scientific

method.

Scientific

commitments

are

no

longer

made

solely

on

empirical

evidence

or

crucial,

singular

tests

(cf.

Polanyi

1958:92),

as

positivism

maintained. That

is,

the

search

for some final

falsifying

or

verifying

evidence is considered inconclu

sive,

if

not

somewhat

simplistic.

Archaeology's

regular

controversies

over

the

acceptance

or

rejection

of

certain

key

radiocarbon

dates il

lustrate this

point

in

an

inductivist

way.

Further,

according

to

Lakatos

(1969),

it

is

often

not

clear what

even

constitutes

a

crucial

test

for

a

particular

theory

anyway,

save

in

hindsight.

Thus,

Salmon

(1982:37-38)

states,

"there

exists

both

confirming

and

disconfirm

ing

evidence for

many

important

hypotheses,"

while

Kelley

and

Hanen

(1988:241)

note

that

"acceptance

in

science is

always

tenta

tive. We

adopt

the

hypothesis

that has

best

survived

testing,

always

ready

to

abandon

it if

additional

research

shows that

another

is

more

probable."

This

implicates

a

scientific

method,

which

is

to

say

a

means

of

validation,

not

wedded

to

singular

criteria,

such

as

naive

falsification,

but instead

more

concerned with

"inference

to

the

best

hypothesis,"

to

employ Kelley

and

Hanen's

phrase.

3.

Theoretical

change.

Finally,

"paradigm

shifts"

or

transitions

in

a

"theoretical hard-core"

only

occur

when

a

match exists

between

em

pirical

evidence

and

convincing

theoretical

alternatives.

But,

be

cause

theoretical

disputes

are

often

implicit

(cf.

Holton

1973:26),

they

may

go

unrecognized

in

debates

perceived

as

principally

empir

ical

and

methodological

in nature.

Just

such

a

failure

to

recognize


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66

David

S.

Whitley

the

fundamental

theoretical

changes implied by

post-processual

ar

chaeology

is

illustrated

by

Earle

and

Preucel

(1987),

who

concluded

that

this

simply

represents

a

"critique"

of

new

archaeology.

These

postulates

are

important

for

a

number of

reasons.

First,

and

most

significantly,

they

effectively

undermine

the

foundation of

positivism.

As

Alexander has shown

in

great

detail

(

1982:18-33),

the

last

two

decades

in

the

philosophy

of

science

can

be said

to

have

unsettled

the

metaphysical, ontological,

and

epistemological

posi

tions

upon

which

positivism

was

based.

This,

of

course,

justifies

many

of

the

criticisms

of

new

archaeology

that

have been

raised

by

the

post-processualists,

but of

course

similar

criticisms

have been

raised

by

those

more

allied

with

processual

archaeology

as

well

(e.g.,

Kelley

and

Hanen

1988).

Further,

although

the

above

points

constitute

the

framework of

post-positivist

philosophy

of

science,

they

do

not

imply

only

a

single

approach

to

research;

for the

archaeologist,

they

do

not

entail

a

specific

method

for

the

study

of

the

past.

In

fact,

there

is

considerable

room

for

variation

in

how

these postulates

are

interpreted, particu

larly

the

first,

and these

interpretations

have had

a

great

influence

on

the manifestation of

post-processual

and

cognitive

archaeology.

That

is,

and

contrary

to

what

certain

post-processualists

would

lead

us

to

believe,

the

postulates

of

post-positivism

do

not

only

imply

a

relativist

position.

This

is

best understood if

we

consider

the basis

for

a

realist rationalism.

Temperate

Rationalism

That scientific method and

a

rationalist

approach

are

not

antithetical

to

an

interest

in

interpretation

and the

cognitive

paradigm

is

demon

strated

by

the

philosopher

of

science

William

Newton-Smith

(1981),

who has

outlined

what

he calls

a

"temperate

rationalism" that illus

trates

the

realist

position

adopted

by

the

cognitive

archaeologists.

It

consists

of

two

components

that,

together,

specify

its

program:

a

goal

of

science,

and

a

principle

or

set

of

principles

for

comparing

rival

theories,-

that

is,

a

scientific

heuristic and method.

In

consider

ing the scientific goal, the temperate rationalist accepts a realist

view of science.

This includes

an

ontological

position

that holds

that

theories

are

true

or

false

by

virtue

of how the world

actually

is,

inde

pendent

of

ourselves

(this,

of

course,

being

a

cleaned-up

version of

the

"correspondance

theory

of

truth";

cf.

Davidson

1969;

Elkana


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Prehistory

and

Post-Positivist

Science

67

1978:312-13).

It

also

includes

a

thesis of

verisimilitude,

in

which

it

is

held

that the

point

of

scientific

enterprise

is

to

discover

explana

tory

truths

about

the

world,

but

that

these

truths

are

verisimilar

and

inherently

corrigible

in

the

sense

of

only

progressively

approximat

ing

the

real

truth

per

se.

Indeed,

the

"pessimistic

induction"

sug

gests

that all

scientific

theories

will

be

disproven

within about

200

years'

time,

but that

they

will

be

replaced

by

better

theories,

achiev

ing increasing proximity

to

the

real

truth.

The

second

component

of

rationalism,

the

set

of

principles

by

which

theories

are

evaluated,

has

been elaborated

by

Newton-Smith

in

great

detail

(1981:226-30),

and similar

principles

have been

suggested

by

many

other

scholars

(e.g.,

Kuhn

1962;

Hempel

1966:33

46;

Popper

1966:268;

Lakatos

1969;

Copi

1982:470-75;

Farr

1983:

165;

Lewis-Williams

and Loubser

1986).

It

corresponds

in

its

com

mitments

and

essential

elements

to

Kelley

and

Hanen's

(1988)

con

tention that the validation

of

archaeological

hypotheses

should

be

based

on

inference

to

the best

hypothesis.

In

summary

form,

what

Newton-Smith calls

the

"good-making

features

of

theories"

are as

follows:

(1)

observational

nesting?the

ability

to

preserve,

while

increas

ing

and

improving

over,

the

observational

success

of

previous

theories,

(2)

fertility?the provision

of

a

scope

or

guidance

for future devel

opment;

(3)

track

record?the record of

success

that

an

existing theory

has

accumulated;

(4) inter-theory support?the ability to account for, or support,

other,

accepted

theories;

(5)

smoothness?the

ease

with

which

a

theory

accounts

for

obser

vational

anomalies

in

terms

of

auxiliary

hypotheses;

(6)

internal

consistency-,

(7)

compatability

with

well-grounded

metaphyscial

beliefs)

and

(8)

simplicity.

These

qualities

allow for

an

adjudication

between

competing

theo

ries

and

hypotheses.

Scientific

advancement,

therefore,

need

not

simply be a question of new theories triumphing only through the

death of

old

theoreticians,

as

Max

Planck

(1949)

once

argued,

nor

is

there

"no

external

objective

basis for

saying

that

any

one

theory,

well

argued

and

coherent

internally

and

'fitting'

the

data,

is

any

bet

ter

than

any

other"

(Hodder

1984:30).

Nor,

for

that

matter,

need

we


7/27/2019 Whitley 1992

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68 David

S.

Whitley

naively

assume

that confirmation

or

falsification

through

a

singular

critical

test

can

occur.

Instead,

there

are

multiple

criteria

upon

which

scientific

evaluation

can

be

based,

and these

allow for

a

rational and

objective

process

of

verification,

even

if

it is

ultimately

tentative

and

provisional

in

nature.

Cognitive

Archaeology

There

is,

correspondingly,

a

rational

approach

available

to

us

that

can

be called

upon

to

obviate the

many

problems

of

positiv

ism.

However,

this leaves

some

unresolved

issues.

As

might

be

clear

from the

few illustrations

I

have cited

concerning post-positivist

philosophy

of

science,

it is

apparent

that

many

processual

archaeolo

gists

have,

on

a

practical

level,

already adopted

certain

of

the

pos

tulates

of this

move

beyond positivism.

This

simply

underscores

Laudan's

(1981:2)

contention

that the

philosophy

of

science

is

more

closely

tied to what has

already happened

in the sciences than the

reverse.

But

what,

then,

are

the

distinctions

between

cognitive

ar

chaeology

and the

archaeology practiced

by

many

processual

archae

ologists,

if

these

archaeologists

already

share

some

of the

same

realist

rationalist

commitments?

In

summarizing

these

I

emphasize

a

distinctive

brand of

post-processual

archaeology?cognitive

ar

chaeology?most

evident

in

the research

of the

archaeologists

at

the

University

of the Witwatersrand.

Fundamentally,


take the

position

that

so

cial

inquiry

must

necessarily

consider the

cognitive

and

symbolic

aspects

of

past

societies.

That

is,

fully

aware

of the

shift

from

the

behavioral

to

the

cognitive

doctrine,

they

maintain that the

remains

of

prehistoric

actions

are

evidential,

and the

point

of

inquiry

is

to

study

the

cognitive

systems

behind

the behavior

creating

the archae

ological

record.

This

does

not

deny

that

humans

adapt

to

their

envi

ronment,

or

that man-land

relationships

may

impose

constraints

on

cultures.

Further,

it

does

not

imply

that such

are

unworthy

of

analy

sis.

And,

parting

company

with

post-processualists

such

as

Hodder

and Shanks

and

Tilly,

it

does

not

insist

that

archaeological

research

need

be

anti-scientific

or

that,

somehow,

concern

with

cognition

im

plies

interest

in emotions

or

psychological

states

(contrary

to

what

both

Sabloff

et

al.

[1987]

and

Hodder

[1986]

seem

to

believe).


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Prehistory

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Post-Positivist

Science

69

Instead,

while

maintaining

an

allegiance

to

scientific

method

per

se,

and

to

the

inherent

rationality

this

implies,

cognitive

archaeolo

gists

insist

that

explanation

and

interpretation

of

prehistoric

human

societies

and

culture

must

look

beyond

the evidential

level,

past

the

behavior

that

created

our

archaeological

record,

to

the

cognitive

sys

tems

that

underlie

it. In

this

avowedly anthropological

approach

to

archaeology,

three related

issues,

then,

require

clarification:

the

focus of social

inquiry;

the

inescapability

of

interpretation

in

social

research; and the means by which the cognitive systems of the past

may

be

accessed.

I

discuss these

in

turn.

The

Focus

of

Social

Inquiry

Adopting

a

committment

loosely

related

to

Popper's

"situational

analysis" (Popper

1961,

1966, 1972,

1976),4


maintain

that the

prehistoric

past

was

socially

and

culturally

consti

tuted, and,

therefore,

that

prehistoric

societies

and cultures

cannot

simply

be reduced to one-to-one

analogues

with

ecological

or

cyber

netic

metaphors.

Nor,

for that

matter,

do

they

think

that the

explana

tion of the

past

can

proceed

simply

with

a

consideration

of

the

overt,

behavioral

realm

or

the

relationship

of humankind

to

the

environ

ment.

Rather,

they

take the

concept

of culture

to

be central

to

ar

chaeological

analysis.

But

"culture"

here

is

not

what

is

meant

by

the

term

in

traditional

and

new

archaeology:

culture

as

regulative

rules,

governed

by

mental

templates,

evidenced

in

behavioral

patterns,

and

resulting

from

stimulus-response relationships

with the

environ

ment.

Instead,

culture

is

defined

as a

system

of

beliefs,

symbols,

and

values

or,

in

a

word,

as

worldview,

with these

"cognitive

objects"

comprising

constitutive

rules

within

which human

action

and

be

havior

unfold.

In

this

sense,

culture

is

determinative

for human

so

cial

behavior,

but this

does

not

imply

full

predictability

(Sapire

n.d.;

cf.

Weber

1975:122-23);

culture

provides

a

system

of beliefs

that

guides

behavior,

just

like the rules for

a

game

of

chess,

but culture

does

not

fully prescribe

behavior,

like the

algorithm

that

uniquely

specifies

the

course

of

a

computer

program

(cf. D'Agostino

1986).

At

this

point

a

few words

are

needed

in

reference

to

Popper's

situa

tional

analysis.

In

summary

form,

it

has

two

components:

a

situa

tional

model,

which

is

a

description

of what

Popper

terms

the

social

environment

within which human behavior

occurs;

and

a

rationality


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70

David

S.

Whitley

principle.

The

latter

(which

is

not

to

be

taken

as

a

law;

while

it is

a

major

premise

of the

thesis,

it

is

more

rightly

a

definition,

therefore

it is

not

nomological;

cf.

Farr

1983:169)

points

to

the

need

to

recon

struct

the

context

or

situation

within

which

action

occurs,

to

make

the

actions

that result

rationally

understandable

or

appropriate

to

the

context

within

which

they

unfold.

By

this

is

implied

a

ideologi

cal

analysis

that

begins

with

the

definition of

the

situation

and

pro

ceeds

to

the

rationality

of

subsequent

action,

as

specified

by

this

context.

Here

the

situational

environment

in

a

general

way

is

recon

cilable with the

cognitive

definition of

culture,

and

interpretation

therefore

must

consider the

cognitive

realm.

Culture, then,

is

a

central

concern,

but

it

is

not

simply

an

explana

tory

metaphor

for

the

cognitive

archaeologist

(such

as

"diffusion"

was

for the

traditional

archaeologist,

or

"evolution"

is in

certain

pro

cessual

studies).

That

is,

it is

the

purpose

of

cognitive

archaeological

research

to

elucidate the

system

of

beliefs that

constitute

a

culture,

thereby defining

the cultural

logic

or

situational

rationality

within

which decisions

were

made, institutions

were

constituted, and

ac

tions

performed.

In

reference

to

Popper's

situational

analysis, then,

cognitive

archaeology

aims

to

identify

the

realm

of

"cognitive

ob

jects" and,

through

the

exegesis

of

these,

explain,

interpret,

and

un

derstand the

prehistoric

past.

It is

important

to

emphasize

a

few

issues

here.

First,

as

noted

above,

concern

with

prehistoric cognition

does

not

imply

interest in

mental

states

or

other

psychologistic

concepts.

It

is,

therefore,

not

the realm of human

emotions,

which

has constituted the focus

of

"classical" hermeneutics and

now seems

the point of Hodder's con

textual

archaeology. Simply

stated,

understanding

the

past

cannot

be attained

by "getting

into"

the

psyche

of

our

ancestors,

or

by

con

cern

with

the

subjective

experiences

of

prehistoric

actors,

or

by

re

course

to

a

sensationalist

epistemology.

As

Farr

(1983:161)

notes,

"the limitations

of this

subjective

method overwhelm

its

utility

and

suggestiveness."

In

this

manner

cognitive

archaeology

parts

ways

with idealism and

its

recent

post-processual

manifestations.

Second,

explanation

of

the

past

(or

of

any

social

phenomena)

can

only be achieved by recourse to the cognitive realm. It cannot be

attained

simply

by

examination of

behavior

(Popper's

"world-one")

nor

through

consideration

of

human

psychological

motives

and

emo

tions

(Popper's "world-two").

Instead,

explanation

of

social

phenom

ena

requires

recourse

to

understanding

(cf.

Weber

1977:109)

and,


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72

David S.

Whitley

archaeology.

For

example,

as

Evans-Pritchard

noted

long

ago

in

com

menting

on

Radcliffe-Brown's social

anthropology,

social

structure

is

every

bit

as

abstract

as

culture,

or,

at

least,

one

is

no

more

concrete

than the other.

Kinship,

in

other

words?just

like

economic

and

sub

sistence

systems?is

as

much

in

people's

minds

as are

beliefs and

values

(Sapire

n.d.).

All of these

are

at

least

in

part

cognitive

con

structs,-

strictly,

none are

observable

on

the

ground;

therefore

there

is

no

logic

to

the

argument

that

one can

be

accessed

by prehistorians

while the others

cannot

(Lewis-Williams

1986a;

cf.

Wylie

1982a).

Nor,

for

that

matter,

is

there

reason

to

assume

that the

investigation

of

one

need

necessarily

be

methodologically

different from the

study

of the other.

Indeed,

to

presuppose

that

some

of these

phenomena

can

be

identified

and studied

archaeologically

while

others

cannot

is sim

ply

to

allow

perceived

inductive limits of the

archaeological

record

to

determine

our

research,

as

Wadley (1987)

has

rightly pointed

out.

But

this

is

only

part

of

the

problem

in

positing

a

distinction

in

kind

between

culture and

the

social,

economic,

and

subsistence

sys

tems

of

the

new

archaeologist.

As

Sapire (n.d.) contends,

the

analysis

of social

structure

simply

cannot

be

separated

from beliefs and

values:

the

relationships

that

constitute

distinctions

in

social

organi

zation

(like

commoner

and

elite)

lie

exactly

in

culturally-specific

values and beliefs. Therefore

it

cannot

be

presumed

that

one

can

be

considered

without the other.

Sapire

points

out

that

"the

prompts

for these social

roles

[constituting

social

structure]

are

not

in

the

genes;

they

are

in

the

conceptions

distilled

from

stories, theories,

jokes,

lies,

customs,

and other

educative

experiences

since

childhood

. . .

social

structure

presupposes culture" (Sapire n.d.; emphasis

added).

And,

as

Max

Weber has

argued

in

a

frequently

cited

passage

(1977:109),

the

same

holds for

economy

as

well.

Consequently,

con

tentions

that the

processual archaeologists'

focus

of social

inquiry

is

somehow

more

concrete,

less

abstract,

and

not

part

of the

cognitive

realm

but,

in

fact,

separable

from

it,

are

simply wrong-headed,

and

represent

a

logical

fallacy

of

the

gravest

order.

Archaeology

and

Interpretation

That

social

structure, economy,

and

subsistence

are

as

abstract

a

form

of

the

cognitive

realm

as

beliefs

and values

is

one

thing;

that

we

need

understanding

to

study

them

may

be

viewed

by

some

as a

slightly

different

matter.

Traditional

positivist

natural

science

denied


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Science

73

the need

for

Verstehen,

or

understanding,

based

on

the

argument

that

the

objects

that the

physical

sciences

study

("stars,"

for

example)

have

an

existence

independent

of

anything

we

make of them. With

new

archaeology's original

adoption

of

positivism

and

its

metaphysi

cal belief

in

a

unified

science,

moreover,

it

was

presumed

that archae

ology

could

fully

be

a

naturalistic

science

and

that

recourse to

Verste

hen

was

unnecessary.

Further,

it

appears

that

certain

archaeologists

continue

to

view

any

concern

with

understanding

or

interpretation

with

suspicion.

Therefore the

interpretive

nature

of

archaeology

re

quires

comment.

First,

to

allay

certain

initial

fears,

it

is

important

to

emphasize

that

there

is

nothing

about

interpretation

that

is

inherently

"less

objec

tive"

or

"more

subjective,"

or

"more

scientific"

or

"less

scientific,"

than there

is

about

"explanation."

To

presume

such

is

to

commit

a

fallacy

of

equivocation

in

which

the

concepts

"objective"

and "sub

jective"

are

conflated

respectively

with "unbiased" and

"biased,"

"cognitive"

and

"noncognitive,"

"observational"

and

"nonobserva

tional,"

"rational"

and

"irrational,"

and

ultimately,

"scientific" and

"nonscientific."

But this is

simply

an

epistemological doctrine,

yet

to

be

supported.

Processual

archaeologists,

for

example,

have

never

illustrated

that their

explanations

are

somehow

more

scientific

or

more

objective

than

cognitive

archaeologists'

interpretations

(cf.

Feleppa

1981:62-63;

Lewis-Williams

1983;

Lewis-Williams and

Loubser

1986).

In

a

parallel

vein,

similarly,

Rudner

has

noted that

"no

one

has

ever

demonstrated

that the

psychological,

per

se,

is

iden

tical

with the

biased;

nor

is

it

easy

to

imagine

how

a

cogent

demon

stration of this could possibly proceed. (The fact that metaphysical

positions

have assumed this

position

without demonstration

is

scarcely

recommendation

for its

adoption)"

(1966:74;

emphasis

in

original).

Indeed,

Max

Weber

(1975:125)

has

argued

that

it

is

exactly

because

interpretations

of

human

actions

can

situate

such

actions

within

their

own

frames

of

reference that

such

interpretations

are

inherently

more

rational

than scientific

explanations

of

individual

natural

events,

which

may

simply

constitute

statistical

predictions.

Thus,

at

the

outset

it is

clear

that

certain

archaeologists'

reactions

against interpretation and understanding are emotional reactions,

based

on

embedded

metaphysical

and

epistemological

beliefs that

have

been little

thought-through

or

critically

evaluated.

Fundamen

tally,

there

is

little

justification

for

the

argument

that

understanding

and

interpretation

are,

somehow,

less

objective

than

explanation.


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74

David

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But

this embedded

reactionary position

aside,

there

are

other

sub

stantial

arguments

against

the

notion

that

archaeology

can

ignore

understanding.

According

to

Max

Weber

(1975),

for

example,

the

dis

covery

of

"meaning"

and

"interpreting"

are

neither

logically

nor

epistemologically

different than

the

discovery

of laws

or

causes

in

the natural

world;

fundamentally

both

rely

on

the

use

of

hypotheses

and

"instruments

of

concept

formation"

(Huff

1981:469).

For

Weber,

in

fact, interpretation

and

understanding

are

necessary

activities

in

all

domains of scientific

inquiry (Huff 1982:91). Similarly, Popper

argues

that all

science

is

performed

within

a

"horizon of

expecta

tions"

and that this "confers

meaning

on our

experiences,

actions

and observations"

(1972:345).

By

this,

both

contend that

understand

ing

is

a

necessary,

indeed

unavoidable,

component

of research.

And,

on

an

empirical

level

at

least,

Knorr-Cetina

(1981)

has

demonstrated

that

the

situational

logic

of

the

physical

sciences

results

in

natural

and

technological

scientists

employing

understanding

and

interpre

tation

as

much

as,

and

in

the

same

manner

as,

social

scientists.

In

short,

not

only

is it

impossible

for the

archaeologist

to

avoid under

standing

in

studying

the

past,

it is

highly

unlikely

that the natural

scientist

is

any

more

privileged

in

this

regard

as

well.

Again,

however,

this

is

not to

imply

that

interpretation

or

under

standing

can

be

reduced

epistemologically

to

"experiencing

some

thing"

(Weber 1975:159).

Weber

was

careful

to

emphasize

the need

to

objectify

interpretation (cf.

Cooper

1981:82;

Huff

1981,

1982),

and

this

concern

has been

considered

in

detail

by Popper.

In

fact,

Popper's

"critical

rationality"

is

effectively

an

objective

theory

of understand

ing (cf. Popper 1972). With this Popper defines what he calls "scien

tific

understanding,"

which

is

a

"systematically

critical

version

of

the kind

of

understanding

we

have

in

everyday

life"

(Farr

1983:159).

It

is

through

situational

analysis,

in

fact,

that such

objective

under

standing

can

be achieved. That

is,

for the

archaeologist

it

can

be

through

the related

approach

termed

cognitive

archaeology

that

we

can

understand

and

interpret

the

past,

but

in

a

manner

that obviates

the relativism

of other

post-processualist

approaches.

But

there

is

one

final

subtlety

in

the

interpretation

of "understand

ing" itself that warrants mention. This pertains directly to many

processual

archaeologists'

apparent

fear of the

interpretive,

and

is

that,

since

Verstehen

is

not

a

method

of

acquiring

knowledge

(as

Binford

[1987]

seems to

imply),

it

cannot

be

a

suspicious

method

at

all.

Instead,

it

is

a

mode

of

knowledge

(Sapire

n.d.),

and

exactly

that


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Prehistory

and

Post-Positivist

Science

75

mode

of

knowledge

appropriate

when

concern

lies with

values,

be

liefs,

meanings,

and

so

on.

And

this,

of

course,

is

the

specific

kind of

knowledge

required

to

understand human

actions and

behavior.

Archaeology, consequently,

is

fundamentally

an

interpretive

exer

cise.

Simply

put,

we

interpret

the

past,

regardless

of

whether

or

not

we

do

so

with

explanatory

laws,

symbolic

interpretations,

or em

pathie

understanding.

This does

not

necessarily

relegate

it

to

non

science,

nor

does

it

implicate

relativism.

Instead,

as

Max

Weber,

Karl

Popper,

and others

have

taken

pains

to

show,

it

can

include

rational,

scientific

study.

Accessing

the

Cognitive

Systems

of

the

Past

"Well and

good,"

I'm

sure some

will

say,

"but how does he

figure

he

can

determine

what

they

were

thinking

in

the

past?"

This,

then,

is

the

next

order

of

business,

and,

although

my

concern

is

not

the

thought

patterns

of

prehistory,

it

ultimately

reduces

to

empirical

and technical

problems.

To

begin,

it is

necessary

to

identify

the

ar

chaeological

locus of

the

cognitive

realm.

Where,

in

short,

can we

look

within the

archaeological

record

to

find

evidence

of

prehistoric

cognitive

systems?

As

implied

above,

prehistoric

culture,

which

is

to

say

beliefs,

val

ues,

or

worldview,

is

inseparable

from other

cognitive

abstractions,

such

as

economy,

subsistence,

and social

organization.

Huffman

(1981,

1984,

1986a),

for

example,

has shown how

beliefs and world

view

were

expressed symbolically

in

the internal

arrangements

of

African Iron Age settlements, while Evers (1989) has illustrated the

expression

of

contrasting cognitive

systems

in

the

material

culture

of

a

variety

of

modern and

prehistoric

Bantu

groups.

It

follows,

then,

that

cognitive

systems

are

expressed

at some

level

in

effectively

all

aspects

of material

culture.

Thus,

beliefs

are

visible

archaeologically,

and

they

are even

commonly

and

regularly

expressed

in

everyday

material culture

(cf.

Welbourn

1984:23)

as

well

as

in

"ceremonial

objects."

That the

cognitive

side of

the

archaeological

record has

been

somewhat overlooked

in

favor

of

techno-environmental considera

tions, and that archaeologists may be unaccustomed to looking for

it,

then,

is

no

argument

in

support

of

the

putative

difficulty

of

access

ing prehistoric cognitive

systems

in

the

material record of the

past.

This

fact,

however,

is

bound

to

lead

to

other

objections.

For

exam

ple,

on

many

occassions I

have

heard

incredulity expressed

over

the


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76

David

S.

Whitley

idea that

beliefs and

values

can

be

ascertained

without

talking

to

informants.

But

this

simply

represents

misconceptions

concerning

the

nature

of

anthropological

research,

in

a

specific

sense,

and,

more

generally,

concerning

how

interpretations

are

made,

as

well

as

the

distinction

between

"signs"

and

"symbols"

(Whitley

n.d.a).

As far

back

as

his

writings

on

the Andaman

Islanders,

Radcliffe-Brown

(1922)

argued

that

"native

explanations"

are

not

explanations

at

all

in

the

sense

of final

exegesis

or

interpretation.

Instead,

as

has

been

emphasized

by

numerous

anthropologists (e.g., Sperber

1975;

Hugh

Jones

1979),

such

oral

accounts

themselves

are

simply

the

raw

data

from which the

anthropologist

develops

his

own

interpretation

of

a

particular

culture.

Ask

a

"native"

why

a

particular

ritual

is

per

formed,

or

what

bearing

his worldview has

on

his

architecture,

and

chances

are

quite

good

that the

response

will

be

on

the

order

of

"Be

cause we

have

always

done

it

this

way,"

or

"It is

our

tradition,"

or

simply

"I

don't know."

For

that

matter,

ask the

man on

the

street

similar

questions

about

the

symbols

and beliefs of

our

own

culture

and the average response will probably be equally unenlightening.

Beliefs

and

values,

as

expressed

in

symbols,

myths,

and

rituals,

often

not

only

are

not

widely

understood within

a

culture but

are

fre

quently

misunderstood

(Jung

1949:601;

Grimes

1976:45;

Elster

1982).

In

a

word,

then,

oral

informants

are not

the end-all and do-all

of

cognitive

research,

be

it in

anthropology

or

archaeology.

It is

exactly

for

this

reason

that

Clifford

Geertz

argues

that

"whatever,

or

wherever,

symbol

system

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