Who Speaks for Hinduism? A Perspective from Advaita Vedānta

American Academy of Religion

Who Speaks for Hinduism? A Perspective from Advaita VedāntaAuthor(s): Arvind SharmaSource: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 751-759Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1465855 .

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Who Speaks for Hinduism? A Perspective from

Advaita Vedinta Arvind Sharma

THIS ARTICLE CONSISTS of three parts. In the first part the question "Who speaks for Hinduism?" will be provided with a sharper focus. In the second part the question will be examined in the light of Advaitic ontology. In the third part it will be reexamined in the light of Advaitic epistemology.

A question of credibility needs to be addressed, however, before one proceeds with the exercise: what possible relevance could material drawn from a system of classical Hindu philosophy such as Advaita Vedanta (which belongs to the premodern intellectual tradition of India) conceiv- ably possess for a debate so modern, or even postmodern, in nature and texture as the one at hand, namely, who speaks for Hinduism?

When Sarah Caldwell invited me to contribute to this discussion, she asked me to consider the possibility of harnessing the intellectual resources of the Hindu philosophical tradition for the topic at hand (should that be at all possible). In other words, she encouraged me to ask the question, Could Hinduism itself possibly have something to say on the issue of who speaks for Hinduism? and to provide, if possible, a voice from the tradition on the issue, as distinguished from a voice ofthe tradition on the issue. Issues pertaining to the "same" and the "other" (Larson and Deutsch: 3- 18) and to the status of the "other" in relation to "identity" are so central to a nondualistic system that I turned to Advaita Vedanta for that seren- dipitous connection, in the homeomorphic hope of discovering which scholars have been known to haunt the corridors of comparative philosophy and religion. There is also the more substantial point that philosophi-

Arvind Sharma is Birks Professor of Comparative Religion in the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill University, Montreal, Canada H3A 2A7.

Journal of the American Academy of Religion December 2000, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 751-759

? 2000 The American Academy of Religion



752 Journal of the American Academy of Religion

cal issues of identity and representation are stubbornly cross-cultural in nature and reincarnate themselves across vast dimensions of time and space in different guises, an insight playfully reflected in the saying that "all philosophy is philosophy 101." But whether this generalized confi- dence about the relevance of human thinking anywhere to human thinking everywhere is justified on my part is for the reader to decide.

I

The question of who speaks for Hinduism is a specific formulation of a more general question: Who speaks for any religious tradition? It might, then, be useful to determine how this question is faring in the discourse on religious studies in general (Oxtoby: 3-5) prior to attempting an an- swer in the context of Hinduism.

It turns out that the history of method in the study of religion pro- vides some useful hints here (Pye: 17; Sharpe: 228-229). An important division of opinion has emerged in the field around the question of the role to be assigned to the believer or the insider in the study of religion (Kristensen: 1-23; Pals; Segal; W. C. Smith: 31-58). This division emerges in sharp relief when two (extreme) formulations of the respective positions are placed alongside one another.

It is the controlling assumption of one school within the study of religion that the role of the believer must be accepted as paradigmatic for the study of religion. This position has been famously articulated by W. Brede Kristensen as follows:

No believer considers his own faith to be somewhat primitive, and the moment we begin so to think of it, we have actually lost touch with it. We are then dealing only with our own ideas of religion, and we must not delude ourselves that we have also learned to know the ideas of others. The historian and the student of Phenomenology must therefore be able to forget themselves, to be able to surrender themselves to others. Only after that will they discover that others surrender themselves to them. If they bring their own idea with them, others shut themselves off from them. No justice is then done to the values which are alien to us, because they are not allowed to speak in their own language. If the historian tries to understand the religious data from a different viewpoint than that of the believers, he negates the religious reality. For there is no religious reality other than the faith of the believers. (13)

He goes on to say, The concepts, "primitive" and "highly developed" forms of religion,

are therefore fatal for historical research. Religious ideas and sacred rites are degraded to a series of relative values, whereas in reality they have



Sharma: Who Speaks for Hinduism? 753

functioned as absolute values. We must understand the others as autono- mous and spiritual individuals; we must not let our appraisal be deter- mined by the degree of agreement or difference between them and ourselves. For the historian only one evaluation is possible: "the believers were completely right." Only after we have grasped this can we understand these people and their religion. (13-14)

Another school of opinion takes an opposite view. It regards the believer's role as minimal or even of no consequence. This position has been recently articulated by Brian K. Smith, in concluding a treatise on the caste system in Hinduism, as follows:

Claude Levi-Strauss unhesitatingly stated, "No common analysis of religion can be given by a believer and a non-believer, and from this point of view, the type of approach known as 'religious phenomenology' would be dismissed." Liberal-minded students of comparative religion have long been concerned with being properly empathetic toward and tolerant of the claims of religion in general and those of other peoples' religions especially. There was a time-and for some of us it is surely not yet passed- when such an emphasis served as a necessary corrective to crude ethno- centrism and jingoistic sectarianism and denominationalism. However, perhaps the time has now come also to begin to reflect more deeply about the ways in which being religious and being a scholar within that larger tradition called the humanities or the human sciences are often, and perhaps inevitably, fundamentally opposed enterprises. (324-325)

These two positions have a clear implication for how the question "Who speaks for a religious tradition?" may be understood in the present context. It is the clear implication of the first school of opinion that only the insider may speak for the tradition. It is an equally clear implication of the second school of opinion that the outsider alone may properly speak for the tradition. In the light of this controversy, therefore, the question at hand may be reformulated with greater precision as follows: "Who speaks for the tradition-the insider or the outsider?' The current climate of opinion in the field helps us reformulate the general question more clearly and thereby the specific question as well, which now becomes "Who speaks for Hinduism-the insider or the outsider?"

If one now examines this specific question again, in the light of the two positions discussed earlier, it also becomes clear that two competing answers may be given to this question. According to one view, in the light of the opinion expressed by W. B. Kristensen, it is the insider alone who may properly speak for Hinduism. According to the other view, presented by Brian K. Smith, it is the outsider alone who may properly speak for it. What we have here then is a gridlock or a deadlock. However, we might wish to use the word incommensurability to characterize this situation, if




only because it makes the situation more amenable to philosophical discourse. One can now ask the following question: How does Advaitic thought address issues of incommensurability, and is the way it addresses this issue capable of shedding light on the matter at hand, namely, who speaks for Hinduism-the insider or the outsider?

II

I would now like to claim that while Advaitic ontology tends to confirm the model of incommensurability, a similar discussion along the lines of Advaitic epistemology holds out hope of communicability between the two positions. In order to appreciate Advaitic ontology one must first identify the issue at stake. That issue is existential and general in nature: both material objects and immaterial consciousness are givens of human experience, yet they are radically distinct in nature. Matter is, well, "material" in nature, but consciousness (sometimes referred to as spirit) is immaterial in nature. How then is their apparent incommensurability to be accounted for?

I will now cite a statement that may be considered representative of Advaitic ontology. The reader might especially wish to note how the I-element and Thou-element echo the issue of the insider (I) and the outsider (Thou) at the metaphysical level in the following summation by M. Hiriyanna:

The Advaita definitely denies that there can be any relation at all between two such disparate entities as spirit and matter. But at the same time, it cannot be forgotten that our investigation of experience leads us to the conclusion that they are not only together but are often identified with each other as implied, for example, when a person says "I am walking." Here the act of walking is obviously a feature characterizing the physical body; and yet it is predicated of the person's self which is spiritual; The only explanation conceivable is that their association must be a mere ap- pearance or, in other words, that the relation between them is ultimately false. (1949: 160-161)

He goes on to say,

Sarhkara treats of this point in his celebrated preamble to the commen- tary on the Vedanta Sfitra, which is very brief and is written in what may be described as his "shorthand style." "The self or the 'I-element,'" he says there, "is so opposed to the not-self or the 'Thou-element' that they can never be predicated of each other." A necessary corollary to this conclusion is that one of the relata is unreal. Both, of course, cannot be regarded as unreal, for in that case, since all the three elements-the two relata and the relation-become false, and since the idea of falsehood necessarily




points to a standard of truth, we shall have to postulate another reality from the viewpoint of which we declare them to be false. The advaitin therefore takes for granted that it is matter which is false. (1949: 161)

Reality is thus reduced to the Spirit in Advaita Vedanta. Interestingly, such reductionism is not without its parallel in religious studies. Those who insist on the religious reality of religion reduce other manifestations of religion to it, while those who insist that the ultimate reality underlying religion may not be religious similarly reduce religion to whatever is considered the underlying reality (Paden: 18-22, 109).

Advaitic ontology thus only reflects the impasse we are dealing with. It tries to resolve the impasse by eliminating one party to it in favor of the other, just as the two schools of opinion try virtually to do away with outsiders' and insiders' positions respectively, as it were.

As we now turn to Advaitic epistemology from Advaitic ontology, two preliminary observations seem to be in order. The first is that, in the opinion of most scholars, Advaita Vedanta makes its great philosophical and religious contribution in terms of its ontology, which is considered origi- nal and even revolutionary, rather than in terms of its epistemology, which is considered derivative (Mahadevan: 144) and some aspects of which have been unflatteringly described as "rather crude on the scien- tific side" (Hiriyanna 1932: 346). In other words, its ontology is considered philosophically superior to its epistemology. In the context of the present discussion, however, these roles, as we will soon discover, are re- versed. I shall argue that, in terms of throwing light on the issue at hand, its epistemology is more helpful than its ontology. I think it only fair that the reader be alerted to this role reversal, as it is counterintuitive in terms of received wisdom.

The second observation is that although Advaita Vedanta is generally considered an "idealistic" school of philosophy ontologically, its epistemology is "realistic." Advaita Vedanta insists that objects in the world are "not mental but an object of the mind ... [which illustrates] how mis- taken is the common belief that

Samhkara views the objects of everyday

world as false or unreal ... far from doing so, he claims some kind of reality even for objects of illusion. To be perceived is for him to be, and his theory may therefore be described as an inversion of the one associated in western philosophy with the name of Berkeley" (Hiriyanna 1932: 351).

I will not deny that the juxtaposition of an idealistic ontology and a realistic epistemology has the power to surprise. However, how this re- markable philosophical feat is pulled off need not detain us. Pulled off it is, although a recapitulation of its complexities will defy the brief exposi- tion required here. The point to remember is that the way the duality of




the knower and the known is overcome soteriologically in Advaitic ontology is distinct from the way it is overcome empirically in the Advaitic epistemology as we are about to describe it.

III

In order to appreciate the argument as it is developed in Advaitic epistemology, some familiarity with a few technical aspects of Advaitic epistemology is required (see Sundaram). The explanations provided below, however, should suffice for our purposes.

Almost all epistemologies are based on a standard division between the subject and the object. This division is fundamental to all conventional epistemologies. It also accords with common sense. According to such an epistemology, the subject-the individual as a psychosomatic identity- is to be clearly distinguished from what he or she perceives-namely, the object, whether it be an inanimate object or another living being. In such a conventional and commonsensical epistemology, the subject and the object are observably distinct and separate entities that stand apart from and independent of each other.

The Advaitic concept of the subject and the way it acquires knowledge of the object departs from this model. According to Advaita Vedanta we are not pure subjects, inasmuch as we are capable of objectifying ourselves in our minds. Thus, Advaitic epistemology substitutes the subject (pramatd) and object (prameya) of conventional epistemology with the terms drk, or seer, for pramata and drsya, or what is seen, for prameya. It is true that by and large the two categories of "subject" and "seer" over- lap, but they do not coincide, and this is crucial. Hiriyanna explains:

The cognitive situation is usually taken to involve a subject and an object. The advaitin substitutes for them drk and drsya, the former meaning the self or what reveals and the latter, what is revealed. The reason for this substitution is that the other division is not logically quite satisfac- tory. The subject includes not only drk but also drsya. It is really a complex of the self and the not-self. This is clear from statements like "I know myself," where "myself' refers to some thought or feeling or, as Hume said, "some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure." These perceptions, being observable, are

dr.ya and necessarily point to some centre of consciousness beyond

them. (1957: 135)

This epistemological turn is significant for our study because it en- ables the member of a tradition to objectify his or her own tradition, to the extent that one can think of it, reflect on it, and assess it. This epistemic




distancing is comparable to the distance from the tradition the outsider naturally enjoys. Thus, the insider, in terms of this epistemology, is able to perform the mental function of the outsider on his or her own tradition. At the very least, in this way the insider approximates the outsider.

Another aspect of Advaitic epistemology must now be considered. This has to do with the act of perception. According to the conventional view, the senses perceive an object directly, as it impinges on them. Advaitic epistemology takes a different view of the situation. According to it, we are able to see an object not because the object impinges on the eye but, rather, because the "mind-stuff' goes out through the eyes, assumes the form of the object seen, and conveys it back to the mind (Gupta: especially 49). This epistemology may seem unusual in terms of our normal experience, but it is curiously relevant to our topic because, according to Advaita

Vedanta, this process also holds true for mental perception. What it means in terms of our context is that when we acquire knowledge of another tradition we do so by molding our minds to conform to its configuration. This is a much more intimate way of knowing than ordinary knowing. Hiriyanna pointedly notes, "Perception as conceived here is accordingly the result of a communion between the knower and the known [through the vrtti or psychic medium]; and it would therefore be more appropriate to describe the object as 'felt' rather than known" (1932: 346). The operation of this process is also recognized in mental knowing when "it remains internal" (1932: 346). It is obvious that in terms of such an epistemology the outsider to another tradition comes closer to sharing an insider's interiority than might be possible in other models of perception.

CONCLUSION

It is the clear implication of this analysis that, according the Advaita Vedanta, our very understanding of the insider and the outsider needs to be revised before the question of whether one or the other speaks for Hinduism can be adequately answered. It is clear that in Advaitic epistemology the two no longer stand in radical opposition and, therefore, in mutually exclusive isolation. The insider is capable of assuming the role of the outsider, and the outsider is similarly capable of understanding the insider in a way we could not consider possible at the beginning of this argument. The earlier polarization is now replaced by an epistemic porous- ness in the light of which it may not be too much to claim that both the insider and the outsider can speak for Hinduism.

The reader may have already sensed that this conclusion possesses far- reaching implications. Although the conclusion has been reached in the




context of the question "Who speaks for Hinduism?" it can be applied generally to the whole issue of who speaks for any tradition and, further, to the insider-outsider dichotomy as a whole.

The main point of this article is that there is a key element of isomorphism involved in how we perceive objects or ideas according to Advaitic epistemology and how we perceive our own tradition and other traditions in the study of religion, and such isomorphism has interesting conse- quences for the question "Who speaks for a religious tradition-the insider or the outsider?"

The great advantage of the outsider is that the outsider can be ob- jective. However, to the extent' that an insider from a tradition can objectify his or her own tradition, the insider can also perceptually distance him- or herself from his or her tradition, and, to that extent, the outsider's claim to perceptual objectivity no longer remains unique. Similarly, if the outsider's mind can reach out and assume the forms of the tradition he or she is studying, to that extent, similarly, the insider's special claim to perceptual interiority in relation to the tradition no longer remains unique.

Does it then mean that one can dispense with the distinction between the insider and the outsider? I do not think this follows because, speaking philosophically, what is really happening is that the contents of the insider's and the outsider's knowledge have been shown to be capable of being similar, or even identical, to a much greater extent than might be obvious at first sight. But that does not mean that the knowledges themselves-as the insider's knowledge and the outsider's knowledge-cease to remain distinct. What, however, does follow is that this more acute understanding of human knowing, as offered by Advaita, may render the whole prob- lem of insider-outsider somewhat irrelevant.

REFERENCES

Gupta, Bina Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell 1991 University Press.

Hiriyanna, M. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. London: George Allen 1932 and Unwin.

1949 The Essentials of Indian Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin.

1957 Indian Philosophical Studies. Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers.




Kristensen, W. Brede The Meaning ofReligion: Lectures in the Phenomenology 1960 of Religion. Trans. by John B. Carman. The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff.

Larson, Gerald James, Interpreting across Boundaries: New Essays in Compara- and Eliot Deutsch, eds. tive Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

1988

Mahadevan, T. M. P. Outlines of Hinduism. Bombay: Chetana Limited. 1971

Oxtoby, Willard G. World Religions: Western Traditions. Toronto: Oxford 1996 University Press.

Paden, William E. Interpreting the Sacred. Boston: Beacon Press. 1992

Pals, Daniel "Is Religion a Sui Generis Phenomenon?" Journal of the 1987 American Academy of Religion 55/2: 259-282.

Pye, Michael Comparative Religion. New York: Harper and Row. 1972

Segal, Robert "In Defense of Reductionism." Journal of the American 1983 Academy of Religion 51/1: 97-123.

Sharpe, Eric J. Comparative Religion: A History. London: Duckworth. 1986

Smith, Brian K. Classifying the Universe. New York: Oxford University 1994 Press.

Smith, W. Cantwell "Comparative Religion: Whither-and Why." In The 1959 History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, 31-58. Ed.

by Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Sundaram, P. K. Advaita Epistemology, with Special Reference to Istasiddhi. 1968 Madras: University of Madras.



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Who Speaks for Hinduism? A Perspective from Advaita Vedānta

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