WikiLeaks US Embassy Cables 15 Files for Burma

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/burma

15 file on 8/9 December 2010

US embassy cables: Revealed - what Chinareally thinks about Burma

guardian.co.uk, Thursday 9 December 2010 21.30 GMT

Article history

Friday, 11 January 2008, 11:28C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000125SIPDISSIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/MLS, P, DRLNSC FOR DENNIS WILDEREO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2028TAGS PREL, PHUM, CH, BMSUBJECT: MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA'S EFFORTS ON BURMAREF: 07 BEIJING 7197Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

1. (C) Summary: China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching theboundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and

SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current

"standstill" in Burma,but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will

draw China's attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage directtalks between the United States and the Burmese regime. End summary.

2. (SBU) MFA Asia Department Counselor Yang Jian and Ministry of State Security-affiliated ChinaInstitutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Asia scholars Zhai Kun and ZhangXuegang met HFAC professional staff members Eric Richardson and Dennis Halpin and SFRCprofessional staff member Frank Januzzi on January 10-11.

"Bold Measures" Necessary to Prevent Further Turmoil

--------------------------------------------- -------

3. (C) Counselor Yang Jian told the HFAC and SFRC staff members January 11 that China would like

to see the Burmese Government take "bold measures" to improve the livelihood of the Burmese peopleand achieve national reconciliation through dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy

supporters as well as ethnic minority groups. Counselor Yang stated that the Chinese accept theBurmese regime's so-called "roadmap" to democracy as the best route to democracy and national

reconciliation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said the Burmese government exerts control over societyonly on the surface and the potential for "lots of trouble" persists. Zhai said the regime's inept handlingof the economy costs it legitimacy. Even if the Burmese generals and Aung San Suu Kyi undertook ahealthy dialogue, economic problems could throw the country into turmoil.

Encouraging Signs but Current Standstill
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----------------------------------------

4. (C) Yang said despite the potential for further trouble, the Chinese government is encouraged by anumber of developments since the disturbances in August and September, including the visits of UNSpecial Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, the appointment of Labor Minister Aung Kyi (who Yang believes is"close to the core" of the Burmese regime) as a liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, and the release ofdetainees. Yang said that during VFM Wang Yi's November 2007 visit to Burma (reftel), Wang shared

with senior Burmese leaders China's analysis, again suggesting more attention to the livelihood of theBurmese people, dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, and more interaction with ASEAN. Yang said that,based on the regime's positive language about the dialogue, China had been optimistic it wouldsucceed. In light of the current "standstill" in Burma, however, China is thinking about what other stepsnow to take with the regime.

China's "Extraordinary" Efforts

-------------------------------

5. (C) Yang recounted China's efforts to improve the situation in Burma. She said that after China andRussia in January 2007 vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma, State CouncilorTang Jiaxuan traveled to Burma in February to hold "extraordinary" discussions with the regime's

senior leaders. Tang suggested that Senior General Than Shwe and other Burmese leaders improveBurma's domestic and international situation. Yang said lower level Burmese officials, hesitant toapproach senior leaders with critical advice, were pleased with China's approach to Than Shwe.

6. (C) Scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang January 10 separately echoed the view that China ismaking great efforts to influence Burma positively while adhering to its policy of non-interference.Zhai said China has delivered indirect but clear signals to Asian countries and the United States on theneed for greater openness in Burma. Zhai highlighted Premier Wen Jiabao's November 19 speech at theNational University of Singapore. (Note: Wen's speech included the following: "Only an open andinclusive nation can be strong and

BEIJING 00000125 002 OF 003

prosperous; cutting off contacts with the outside world can make a country backward.")

Direct U.S.-Burma Dialogue

--------------------------

7. (C) During the Wang Yi visit, Burmese leaders expressed interest in more discussions with theUnited States. Noting that USG officials have suggested Burmese officials contact our Embassy inRangoon, Yang said Burma preferred the format of the June 2007 talks in Beijing. China views the Junemeetings between the Burmese delegation and State Department officials as a "bilateral confidencebuilding measure," Yang said.

Continued Support for Gambari

-----------------------------

8. (C) Yang said China will continue to support UN Special Advisor Gambari's mission, though shenoted that the Burmese Government is unhappy with Gambari because Burmese leaders believe theyfollowed Gambari's suggestions during his first visit but then received only further opprobrium. Yangsaid Burmese leaders are unhappy about the UN "Group of Friends" on Burma. While China is open tomultilateral means to address the situation in Burma, China believes Burma's acceptance of thesemeans is the key to success. For example, China would like ASEAN to play a more constructive role,Yang said, but ASEAN is divided over how to address Burma. Older ASEAN member countries, such


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as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, favor a hard-line approach. Newer ASEAN members,such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, support a more moderate stance towards Burma.

No Sanctions

------------

9. (C) MFA's Yang reiterated that China remains opposed to additional sanctions, which she said will

not spur further dialogue, but instead make the regime look further inward and give it an excuse forhard-line polices. Despite China's opposition to sanctions, Yang stressed that the United States andChina have similar goals for Burma, including stability, democracy and development. Therefore, Chinaand the United States should show unity, particularly in the UN, in addressing the situation in Burma.CICIR scholar Zhai said that because China foremost values stability in Burma, China does not wish tosee a sudden change in the Burmese regime. In that light, China fears the pressure of more sanctionsmay only bring further civil unrest.

China's attention drawn away from Burma

---------------------------------------

10. (C) CICIR's Zhai said China would like to see ASEAN play a larger role on Burma partly because

domestic events in China, including the National People's Congress in March and the Olympics inAugust, are increasingly consuming China's attention. Zhai said recent protests in Vietnam over theSouth China Sea and the turmoil in Pakistan have also drawn China's and international attention awayfrom Burma.

Including democracy supporters slows down roadmap

--------------------------------------------- ----

11. (C) Zhai said that including the democratic opposition and ethnic groups in the so-called roadmapto democracy at this stage would slow down the process, yet Zhai asserted that "if Senior General ThanShwe is rational," he will include the democratic opposition to increase the legitimacy of the currentregime.

USG should assure safe future for Burmese generals

--------------------------------------------- -----

12. (C) CICIR's Zhang said that the United States should "play two hands" with the BurmeseGovernment. Zhang said the United States has been sufficiently critical of the regime and now shouldsend messages, via China if necessary, to reassure Burmese military leaders that their personal securitywould not be imperiled in a democratic transition. Zhang said that guaranteeing the safe future of thecurrent military leadership is the key to "unlocking the deadlock."

13. (U) HFAC and SFRC staff members did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.

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RANDT


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US embassy cables: US seeks replacement of UN

special envoy to Burma


Article history

Tuesday, 07 October 2008, 19:48C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 107438SIPDISUSUN FOR JEFF DELAURENTISEO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2018TAGS PREL, KPAO, PHUM, BMSUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: REPLACEMENT OF SRSG GAMBARI FOR

BURMA MISSIONClassified By: IO">IO">IO PDAS James Warlick. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (U) This is an action request. See para. 4.

2. (C) Department views the "good offices" mission of the UN Secretary General's SpecialRepresentative (SRSG) to Burma as an important vehicle for encouraging democratic progress inBurma. Consequently, Department has viewed with growing concern the lack of progress on corepolitical steps that the UNSC called on Burma to take such as the immediate release of politicalprisoners and the opening of a meaningful, time-bound political dialogue with democratic and ethnicminority leaders, in particular, with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), over the course of SRSG Gambari'sfour missions to Rangoon. Indeed, it appears that Gambari's access to regime officials and ability tosecure results has only contracted over the course of these missions. His access to democratic leadershas been constrained by both the regime and more recently a loss of confidence in Gambari amongleaders of the democracy movement.

3. (C) Gambari appears unrealistically upbeat, pursuing and reporting progress on peripheral matters(e.g., a possible economic forum, the possible placement of a UN staff member in Rangoon) that are adistraction from what the Security Council has articulated as critical goals and identified as Gambari'smandate.

4. (C) Considering the key role of the good offices mission and Gambari's inability to secure significantprogress from the Burmese regime, USUN is asked to demarche SYG Ban or Ambassador Kim to seek

Gambari's dismissal as SRSG for Burma. This demarche should occur as soon as practical.

5. (C) Taking into account Gambari's usefulness in his concurrent role as UN advisor on theInternational Compact with Iraq, as well as SYG Ban's likely sensitivities in regard to a possible

dismissal, Department provides the following talking points (not/not to be left as a non- paper) for useby USUN in this demarche:

6. (C/rel to UN) Begin points:

-- Over time, the United States has become increasingly concerned that the UN good offices mission inregard to Burma is in dire jeopardy.

-- Special Representative Gambari's fourth and latest trip to Burma continued a disturbing pattern ofregime-managed itineraries; restricted access to key regime officials and activists; and complete lack ofprogress on the critical issues that form the core of Mr. Gambari's mandate: the opening of a
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meaningful and time-bound dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority leaders, including Aung SanSuu Kyi, toward democratization and national reconciliation, and the immediate and unconditionalrelease of all political prisoners.

-- While the main responsibility for this lack of progress should be attributed to regime intransigence,Mr. Gambari has not been willing to acknowledge it. This lack of progress, Mr. Gambari's

inappropriate claims of success regarding peripheral issues, and his unwillingness to press the regime

more forcefully for progress have caused us to conclude that his continued involvement undermines thegood offices mission and should therefore be ended.

-- We have no wish to embarrass Mr. Gambari and have no intent to link any removal with a lack of

progress in Burma, but we would ask that you find a way to terminate gracefully his participation inthis particular mission. In particular, we cannot support further travel to Burma for discussions with

regime leadership by Mr. Gambari as part of the good offices mission.

-- We urge you not to rush to name a replacement. There have been a series of Special Representatives,none of whom have succeeded due to regime intransigence. Absent some sign that the regime is willingto engage seriously, we fear appointment of a new envoy could actually encourage the regime andsome of its friends to continue to emphasize process over substance. As you requested, however, we are

willing to share ideas of possible candidates as you consider next steps.-- There is talk of your ramping up your personal involvement on Burma, or perhaps even visiting. Wethink you could play an important role but understand you will have to consider carefully how youwould engage. Although a trip by you could be useful, we believe it's critical that the groundwork belaid so you can be confident that your visit will result in tangible progress.

-- We understand that the Burmese are unlikely to make major concessions as a condition for your visit.However, we do not believe you should go without a strong indication ahead of time that your visitwould coincide with some tangible, positive steps. Steps that we recommend you insist upon are: therelease of high-profile political prisoners; the release of Aung San Suu Kyi or at least the easing of herhouse arrest; insistence that you and any subsequent Special Representative will be able to determine

your own schedules, including meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, political prisoners, activists, andwhomever else you wish; and that you will have access to the senior most leadership of the Burmeseregime; agreement on specific steps to begin a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democraticand ethnic leaders; and a guarantee that any Special Representative will be granted a multiple entryvisa.

End points. RICE

US embassy cables: Burmese official reports

Burma and North Korea's 'peaceful nuclear

cooperation'


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Article history

Friday, 07 August 2009, 10:51S E C R E T RANGOON 000502SIPDISSTATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP,

PACOM FOR FPAEO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2019TAGS KNNP, PARM, PREL, NPT, PGOV, PINR, KN, BMSUBJECT: (S) BURMESE OFFICIAL CONFIRMS BURMA-DPRK

"PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR COOPERATIONClassified By: CDA Larry Dinger for for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

1. (S) Australian Ambassador to Burma Michelle Chan informed CDA that XXXXXXXXXXXX toldher the Burma-DPRK connection is not just about conventional weapons. There is a peaceful nuclearcomponent intended to address Burma's chronic lack of electrical power generation. When Chan citedreports of a Burma-Russia agreement for development of a peaceful nuclear reactor,XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that the agreement with Russia is currently just for "software,training." The DPRK agreement is for "hardware." XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed reports Burma'sArmy Chief of Staff (third highest ranking) General Thura Shwe Mann visited the DPRK lastNovember. Asked why Thura Shwe Mann, XXXXXXXXXXXX responded, "Because he is in chargeof all military activities." XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly seemed surprised that the West might beconcerned by a Burma-DPRK "peaceful" nuclear relationship. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that,after all, given sanctions, Burma really has "no other options" but to develop the relationship wi thNorth Korea.

Comment

-------

2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX DINGER

US embassy cables: China losing patience with

Burma


Article history

Friday, 18 January 2008, 10:34C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000044SIPDISSIPDIS
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DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS AND IO">IO">IOPACOM FOR FPAEO 12958 DECL: 01/16/2018TAGS PGOV, PREL, BMSUBJECT: CHINESE LOSING PATIENCE WITHBURMA

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

1. (C) Summary: Charge hosted the Chinese Ambassador for lunch on January 17. We discussed thelack of political dialogue and the need for all countries to speak with one voice to persuade the generalsto start talking and quit dragging their feet. The Chinese Ambassador no longer tried to defend theregime, and acknowledged that the generals had made a bad situation worse. The Chinese have usedtheir access to the generals to push for change, without much observable result, but remain interested

in working with us to promote change. The Ambassador indicated that fear of losing power and

economic interests may be the key obstacles keeping the generals away from the negotiating table. EndSummary.

Chinese Fed Up

--------------

2. (C) Ambassador Guan Mu no longer tries to defend the regime as making any progress on politicaldialogue. He admitted that he did not know why the dialogue apparently stopped last November,although he added that some in the senior leadership understand that they must open up to the outsideworld. He acknowledged that accurate information about the current situation does not get passed up tothe senior levels. Although claiming that it was un-Buddhist for monks to become involved in politics,Guan agreed that the monks' involvement indicated how bad the situation had become in Burma. Hepointed out the designated liaison officer met with Aung San Suu Kyi last week after a two-monthhiatus, but quickly admitted that this gap was "too long." Charge pointed to Senior General Than Shweas the main obstacle to moving forward. The Ambassador responded that he believed that Than Shwewould be ready to open up in a few more years. The Burmese people can't wait that long, the Chargewarned, stressing that further delays would only increase the possibility of further turmoil.

3. (C) Ambassador Guan stated the various Chinese officials traveling to Burma have counseled thesenior generals to speed up the political dialogue and warned them that the international communitywould not accept any backtracking. He agreed that the various parties just needed to start talking, andurged us to offer positive, constructive comments. Charge said "start talking now" was veryconstructive advice, and real dialogue would be welcomed by the whole world. If the generals wereserious about a dialogue, they should be meeting everyday, not just with Aung San Suu Kyi, but withethnic leaders, and other interested citizens as well. A one hour meeting with one person after twomonths was just for show, claimed the Charge, not serious. In addition, she continued, the regime hasnot permitted ASSK to meet with anyone else. The regime should be easing the restrictions on her, soshe can get advice and counsel from a wide variety of people.

Control vs. Turmoil

-------------------

4. (C) Guan cited two concerns that might be hindering the political dialogue from getting started:losing power and economic interests. Guan suggested, if the senior leaders could be offered assurancesthat they would not "lose their lives" and could keep their economic interests, they might be moreamenable to ceding power gradually. He implied that the economic interests were of higher priority forthe generals and their families. Charge replied that this could all be negotiated, reiterating the need toget started now. If turmoil breaks out as people's frustration continues to grow, there might be nothing
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left to negotiate, she added.

5. (C) The generals want to stick to their roadmap, stated Guan. Charge suggested that they could stillcall it a roadmap while increasing participation at each of the remaining steps, including the currentconstitution drafting. Even though this might slow the roadmap process, she said it could produce morebroadly accepted results in the end, which would be better for all. The roadmap process as it is will

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not deliver the stability that everyone wants to see, the Charge said, because it does not incorporateprovisions the pro-democracy supporters and ethnic minorities want to see. Instead of taking credit forspeeding up the roadmap as he has in previous meetings, Guan nodded in agreement. He repeated theChinese interest in stability. Charge said more demonstrations were likely in the coming months if thepeople saw no signs a genuine dialogue was underway. She expressed confidence that many issuescould be easily resolved, if the various parties just started talking and kept talking.

6. (C) Guan acknowledged that the regime has done nothing to improve the lives of the Burmesepeople, even though they recieved increased oil and gas revenues. He recognized that the huge increasein satellite fees will further turn the public against the military. Charge characterized the latter as anattempt to keep people from the news, but also effectively blocking them from some of their few

escapes--soccer and Korean soap operas. Guan mentioned thatChinahad learned that when thegovernment tried to press down too hard, it increased the likelihood of an eruption; he understood therisks of more turmoil in Burma.

7. (C) Guan questioned whether democracy could work in Burma citing the experience of their firstdecade of independence and Ne Win's efforts to promote a democratic transition in 1988. Chargeexplained that many nations went through the same struggles after independence, and reminded Guanthat it was the current generals who blocked a transition in 1988. The Burmese have learned from thepast, according to the Charge, if they have a voice in deciding their political future then they will havean interest in maintaining stability. Guan said there were some issues that were inappropriate foroutsiders to decide, like sexual problems in a family. Charge agreed saying the role of the outsiders

should be in persuading the parties to talk; what they talked about and the decisions they came to wasup to them. Charge urged China to join with the U.S. in urging genuine talks get started now and keepgoing until a more broadly acceptable way forward can be agreed upon by all the relevant parties ofBurma.

Meet the USDA, not the NLD

US embassy cables: Are Burma and North

Korea cooperating on nuclear weapons?

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Article history

Tuesday, 10 November 2009, 09:35S E C R E T RANGOON 000732SIPDISDEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAPPACOM FOR FPA

EO 12958 DECL: 11/10/2019TAGS KNNP, PARM, PREL, NPT, PGOV, PINR, KN, BMSUBJECT: BURMA: ANOTHER CONVERSATION ABOUT BURMA-DPRK

NUCLEAR ISSUEREF: RANGOON 502Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

1. (S) [NAME REMOVED] , who on [DETAILS REMOVED] informed Australian Ambassador Chan inRangoon that Burma and the DPRK were engaged in "peaceful nuclear cooperation" (reftel), has

changed [DETAILS REMOVED] story. In a November 9 conversation with Ambassador Chan, [NAME

REMOVED] said there had been a "misunderstanding." After Chan's "blunt" response to the Augustrevelation (Chan had responded with incredulity to the thought that the GOB might consider nuclear

cooperation of any sort with the DPRK to be acceptable), [NAME REMOVED] had checked around

Nay Pyi Taw. [DETAILS REMOVED] now says GOB-DPRK conversations were merely "exploratory."

[NAME REMOVED] cannot confirm any direct nuclear cooperation. [DETAILS REMOVED] addedthat, in any case, the Kang Nam 1 affair and Secretary Clinton's remarks in Phuket in July "puteverything on hold."

2. (S)[NAME REMOVED] observed that Russia is the key GOB partner for a nuclear reactor, but[DETAILS REMOVED] said there has been no progress. Russia has proposed a commercial deal, andthe GOB cannot afford it. [NAME REMOVED] added that many countries have relations with theDPRK, including Australia, "so why worry?!"

Comment

-------

3. (S) As with many issues in Burma, the truth behind and possible motivations for [NAMEREMOVED] first version and the recent revision are difficult to ascertain. Ambassador Chan nowbelieves [DETAILS REMOVED] was simply speculating in August and has corrected the record. Wewere not in the actual conversations, but to us [DETAILS REMOVED] revision sounds more like aneffort to cover a lapse in judgment than to deny the earlier story outright. The comment about the KangNam 1 and the Secretary's remarks having "put everything on hold" leave room for concern. Thatnoted, other of [NAME REMOVED] comments have caused us to question just how well plugged in[NAME REMOVED] is on the "nuclear" issue.Bottom line: GOB-DPRK cooperation remains opaque.Something is certainly happening; whether that something includes "nukes" is a very open question

which remains a very high priority for Embassy reporting. DINGER
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US embassy cables: Burma's democracy

movement being held back by 'uncles'


Article history

Monday, 14 July 2008, 06:56C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000557SIPDISDEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO">IO">IOPACOM FOR FPAEO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2018TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BMSUBJECT: CONTINUING THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY INBURMA

RANGOON 00000557 001.2 OF 004Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

1. (SBU) Embassy Rangoon pol/econ chief departs Post this week after ending a two-year tour that sawthe largest political uprising in Burma in twenty years, the arrest and imprisonment of the pro-democracy opposition's most talented leaders, and the worst natural disaster in Burma's recordedhistory. We asked her to share her candid observations on the current political situation, and herrecommendations on how best to advance our democratic goals.

-------------------

The Senior Generals

-------------------

2. (C) The Burma army remains firmly in control throughout most of the country, with Senior GeneralThan Shwe retaining almost absolute power. He has the final word on all significant political andeconomic decisions. While outsiders may portray him as an uneducated, crass, and blundering man, hehas successfully consolidated and held onto power for several years, while at the same time buildinglucrative relationships with his energy hungry neighbors that undermine Western efforts to cripple hisregime.

3. (C) The generals keep their power through a vast system of economic patronage, not unlike aWestern style Mafia. Military-owned enterprises control every profit-making natural resource andindustry in the country. Economic prosperity can only be enjoyed by rising thorough the ranks of theArmy, or having extremely close ties to the senior generals. This is why China's urging to the generalsto begin reforming Burma's economy falls on deaf ears. Economic liberalization and reform would

require the generals to dismantle the very system that ensures their power. Dismantling this system willbe one of the biggest challenges for any future democratic leader of Burma.

4. (C) Rumors of splits at the top of the regime are the result of uninformed analysis and wishfulthinking of the exiles and outside observers. While the senior generals may disagree from time-to-timeamongst themselves (as witnessed after Nargis), they follow the orders of Than Shwe. The seniorgenerals are keenly aware that if they do not stand together, they will fall together. True democraticchange will not likely happen until the top two generals, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, are off the scene.Both are extremely concerned for the safety and financial security of themselves and their families.Third-ranking general Thura Shwe Mann is rumored to be Than Shwe's pick for Burma's President in
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2010, but if Than Shwe and Maung Aye are still alive, they will likely pull his strings from behind thescenes. Sources close to Thura Shwe Mann tell us he is smart, sophisticated, and well-aware of Burma'sproblems. Some talented Burmese intellectuals and political dissidents tell us they pass him policypapers that are reportedly solicited on his behalf. However, he is intimately involved in Burma'scorruption, primarily through his sons' business interests.

5. (C) Several of our sources close to high and mid-ranking military officers tell us that some of the

regional commanders are reform-minded and aware of the need for political and economic reform.However, most of the military believe that working within Burma's current military system is the onlyway to bring about this change while maintaining stability. While some officers begrudgingly respectAung San Suu Kyi, they do not sympathize with the pro-democracy opposition in general. We shouldnot expect an imminent coup to save us from the hard-line senior generals.

--------------------------------------------- --

Aung San Suu Kyi and the Pro-Democracy Movement

--------------------------------------------- --

6. (C) Since the September protests, the most dynamic and talented leaders of Burma's pro-democracy

movement have been jailed, left the country, or remain in hiding. Tellingly, the NLD remain free. Whilemany outside Burma perpetuate the

RANGOON 00000557 002.2 OF 004

impression of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party as a large movement

with massive support waiting to take the Parliamentary seats they won in the 1990 election, the realityis quite different. Without a doubt, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a popular and beloved figure of the

Burman majority, but this status is not enjoyed by her party. Already frustrated with the sclerotic

leadership of the elderly NLD "Uncles", the party lost even more credibility within the pro-democracy

movement when its leaders refused to support the demonstrators last September, and even publiclycriticized them.

7. (C) Many of the younger political activists are turning away from the NLD and preparing to run inthe 2010 parliamentary elections, to effect political change any way they can. This includes members of88 Generation. There is reportedly an ongoing, heated debate among the 88 Generation leaders inInsein prison on whether or not the groups' members should contest the election, with Ko Ko Gyiadvocating members do so, and Min Ko Naing opting for a boycott. Those who want to run tell us theydo not agree with the new constitution and despise the regime's roadmap to democracy. However, withthe absence of any alternative, they see the new Parliament as a possible mechanism for dialoguebetween the military, the pro-democracy opposition, and the ethnic cease-fire groups.

8. (C) The way the Uncles run the NLD indicates the party is not the last great hope for democracy andBurma. The Party is strictly hierarchical, new ideas are not solicited or encouraged from youngermembers, and the Uncles regularly expel members they believe are "too active." NLD youth repeatedly

complain to us they are frustrated with the party leaders. Repeated overtures from and "summits" withthe leaders of the 88 Generation in 2007 failed to result in any significant cooperation between thefactions. Indeed, lack of unity among the pro-democracy opposition remains one of the biggest

obstacles to democratic change in Burma.

9. (C) The "Uncles" have repeatedly rebuffed the most dynamic and creative members of the pro-democracy opposition, who reinvigorated the pro-democracy movement throughout 2006 and 2007 bystrategically working to promote change through grass-roots human rights and political awareness andhighlighting the regime's economic mismanagement.Nor has the party made any effort to join forces
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with the technically sophisticated bloggers and young, internet-savvy activists, who have been so

clever at getting out the images which repeatedly damaged the regime and undermined itsinternational credibility. Instead, the Uncles spend endless hours discussing their entitlements from the

1990 elections and abstract policy which they are in no position to enact. XXXXXXXXXXXX

Additionally, most MPs-elect show little concern for the social and economic plight of most Burmese,

and therefore, most Burmese regard them as irrelevant.

----------------------------

The Ethnic Cease-Fire Groups

----------------------------

10. (C) The cease-fire groups remain an important component of Burma's future political stability and itis noteworthy that none have chosen to support Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. Instead, they haveentered dialogue with the regime, at the same time cutting lucrative concession deals for many ofgroups' leaders. However, many leaders of the cease-fire groups have told us they would cast their lotwith whomever best looked out for their interests. However badly the regime does this, the NLD hasrepeatedly missed opportunities to reach out to the cease-fire groups to demonstrate that they would.Instead, it has consistently issued statements calling for a dialogue between the NLD and regime first,

before the ethnic cease-fire groups are brought into the mix. They have also continually feuded withethnic MPs-elect on the Committee to Represent the People's Parliament (CRPP).

RANGOON 00000557 003.2 OF 004

11. (C) It is these long-held ethnic tensions that has kept the cease-fire groups from defecting from theirdialogue with the regime to form an alliance with the NLD. Many of Burma's neighbors, includingChina, are aware of the tension between the NLD and the ethnic nationalities. The NLD's continuingalienation of the ethnic minority groups gives credence to the regime's most effective argument with itsneighbors and ASEAN: that the military is the only force capable of guaranteeing stability in Burma.

12. (C) The recent statement Aung San Suu Kyi released through UN Special Envoy Gambari indicatedshe is aware of this problem and wants to rectify it. The overture she offered to the ethnic nationalitieswas welcomed by the cease-fire group leaders with whom we spoke. But her party failed to follow upon her initiative and issued only a half-hearted invitation for the ethnic leaders to visit them at NLDheadquarters in Rangoon. Once again, they reduced the role of the ethnics to second-class supplicants.The timing of ASSK's statement was strategic: just before the referendum on a constitution, whichmany of the cease-fire groups were unhappy with because the regime had failed to include keycompromises promised by former PM Khin Nyunt before his ouster. A genuine overture from the NLDoffered the best chance yet to split the cease-fire groups from the regime and undermine its credibilitywith its regional supporters. The Uncles failed to use this opportunity, so the cease-fire groups continuetheir relationship with the regime.

-------------------------

Where do We Go From Here?

-------------------------

13. (C) Throughout the country, there is still widespread and growing frustration with the regime for itsbrutal and incompetent rule. Though most Burmese do not believe the NLD will be able to bring aboutdemocratic change, at least while ASSK is under house arrest, they have not given up on working fordemocracy. Instead, they are taking matters into their own hands and creatively working in what spaceis available to improve the lives of their communities.


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14. (C) Like the many community-based organizations (CBOs), religious organizations, and civilsociety groups that responded to Cyclone Nargis while the international community was shut out, manydissidents and ordinary Burmese are creatively trying to incorporate democratic principles into theircivil society programs, including private-tuition schools, environmental programs, health education,and religious organizations. Through this process, change will come about more slowly than most want,but it is a channel that functions where most other options were shut down by the regime after the

September 2007 demonstrations. It is also a method that promotes change from the grass roots,teaching community responsibility at the local level, rather than a top-down movement by the urban,intellectual elite. A strong civil society is something we should seek and encourage in Burma. It willmake any democratic transition in Burma more likely to succeed.

15. (C) Ending Burma's isolation will also be integral to any successful long-term change in thecountry. No matter how democratic transition comes about in Burma, the military will be involvedgiven its vast control over the political and economic structures of the country. We should make aneffort to seek out and speak with the more progressive military officers and to those who have access tothe senior generals. Their hostility to democratic change is motivated by paranoia and distrust of theWest, and a belief that we seek to punish them and obliterate a significant role for them in Burma'sfuture. If we want to counter this, we should pursue dialogue directly with them rather than through

intermediaries who can sometimes garble messages.16. (C) If we do decide to speak with the generals again, we should do it strategically. Dialogue couldbe used as a tool to bring the generals into the twenty-first century.

RANGOON 00000557 004.2 OF 004

Discussions could take place on the margins of international fora, exposing them to the outside worldand its diplomatic norms, juxtaposing Burma's backwardness against the modern world, which couldcause greater realization among the generals about their country's lack of development. Carefulpreparation could be made before such events to make sure Burma's neighbors send the same messagesto the generals during their bilateral meetings. Such unity of message was extremely effective inpersuading the regime to open up to international assistance after Cyclone Nargis.

---------------------------

Give a Little, Get a Little

---------------------------

17. (C) While our economic sanctions give us the moral high-ground, they are largely ineffectivebecause they are not comprehensive. Burma's biggest client states refuse to participate in them.However, the generals despise the sanctions and want them removed because they challenge theregime's legitimacy. If we really want to see the generals make progress, we need to show them whatthey will get in return. This means being willing to gradually remove sanctions in exchange for truesteps toward dialogue and political change.

18. (C) We should start small and hold them to real action (unlike the sham dialogue they purported toinitiate with Aung San Suu Kyi last November). If they do make concrete progress, we should be readyto offer them something. For instance, removing them from Tier 3 on the Trafficking in Personsrankings, or taking them off the Narcotics Majors list, areas where the regime has actually made someprogress. This should be a gradual process that would be based only on the condition of concreteresults. Large rewards should come only with large compromises, such as lifting the visa ban if theyrelease Aung San Suu Kyi. We may also want to consider putting security guarantees on the table forthe most senior generals and their families if we are serious about removing them from the scene. Aswe move toward the 2010 parliamentary elections, it may be a strategic time to begin talks with them


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about such an agreement. Allowing international election monitors, lifting laws that restrict free andfair debate, and freeing key political prisoners could be tied to lifting specific sanctions.

19. (C) While talking to the generals may be unpalatable, their firm control over Burma and theweakness of the pro-democracy opposition are a reality we must consider when working to promotechange in Burma. The prospect for democratic change in the near future is low, but despite the setbacksafter the September demonstrations, there is hope change may eventually come. After many years of

waiting for the outside world to help free them from the generals' despotic rule, many Burmese arefinding creative ways to take control of their country through community-based organizations andbuilding the capacity of civil society. Through these organizations, leaders may emerge who will run inthe 2010 elections and work for democratic change.

20. (C) We should seek every opportunity to support and increase the capacity of Burma's nascent civilsociety by expanding humanitarian assistance inside the country that promotes self-reliance, conflictresolution, and respect for human rights. Such a policy will have the added benefit of expanding ourinfluence and increasing our access throughout the country. Not only will this approach increase ourknowledge of the subtle changes occurring inside Burma, but it will strengthen our position andinfluence inside when change does come, so we can assist the Burmese to reform their political andeconomic systems in a manner that best promotes U.S. economic and strategic interests. Above all, ourBurma policy should be focused on helping those Burmese who are working to bring about democraticchange themselves, for that is the only way it can realistically come. VILLAROSA

WikiLeaks cables: China 'fed up' with Burma's

footdragging on reformsCables show that China's stance on Burma echoes that on North Korea: publicly supportive whileprivately despairing

Ewen MacAskill in Washington


Article history
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WikiLeaks cables reveal that while Aung San Suu Kyi remains popular, there is frustration in thecountry with the 'sclerotic leadership' of her National League for Democracy. Photograph: Nyein Chan

Naing/EPAThe Chinese government,Burma's closest ally, is losing patience with the military regime over itsfailure to implement political and other reforms, according to leaked US diplomatic cables.

A Beijing diplomat complained Chinais "fed up with the footdragging" of Burma's strongman, GeneralThan Shwe, and his inner circle, one of the cables, released by WikiLeaks, reported.

China, in spite of its closeness to the Burmese dictatorship, shares the same concerns as the US aboutthe country's instability and is keen to work with Washington in promoting change, according toAmerican diplomats.

The Chinese stance on Burma echoes that towards North Korea revealed in other cables: publicly

supportive while privately despairing.Burma has for decades been treated by the US and others in the west as an international pariah, amilitary dictatorship castigated for brutal crackdowns on pro-democracy activists. Although theBurmese government held elections on 7 November, these were denounced by the west as a fraud andwere boycotted by the National League for Democracy (NLD), the biggest opposition party, headed bythe recently-released Aung San Suu Kyi.

In a 2008 cable marked "China Losing Patience With Burma", the senior US diplomat in Burma at thetime, Shari Villarosa, described a lunch with the Chinese ambassador, Guan Mu, and said the Chinesewere worried about political turmoil that could affect their business interests.

Villarosa said: "The Chinese ambassador no longer tried to defend the regime, and acknowledged that

the generals had made a bad situation worse. The Chinese have used their access to the generals to pushfor change, without much observable result, but remain interested in working with us to promotechange."

She added: "The Chinese can no longer rely on the generals to protect their interests here, andrecognise the need to broker some solution that keeps the peace, including bringing in the pro-democracy supporters."

Guan said that if senior leaders in Burma could be offered assurances they would not lose their livesand keep their economic interests, they might be more amenable to ceding power gradually.
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US diplomats in Beijing in 2008 found similar sentiments expressed by the Chinese foreign affairsministry.

Although the US champions the Burmese opposition, its diplomats in Burma are scathing of the leadinggroup, the NLD, fronted by Aung San Suu Kyi. A US cable said that while she remains popular, there isfrustration in the country with "the sclerotic leadershipof elderly NLD 'uncles'."

The cable adds that the way the leadership runs the NLD "indicates the party is not the last great hopefor democracy and Burma. The party is strictly hierarchical, new ideas are not solicited or encouragedfrom younger members, and the 'uncles' regularly expel members they believe are 'too active'."

The cable adds that lack of unity among the pro-democracy opposition is one of the biggest obstacles tochange in Burma.

The party has not made any effort "to join forces with the technically sophisticated bloggers and young,internet-savvy activists, who have been so clever at getting out the images which repeatedly damagedthe regime and undermined its international credibility."

The US was also disappointed with the UN special envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari and the cablesreveal how the then US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, ordered the US mission at the UN to work

for his removal. In a 2008 cable that reflects the way the US seeks to exert control over the UN, Ricewrote: "Considering the key role of the good offices mission and Gambari's inability to securesignificant progress from the Burmese regime, USUN (the US mission at the UN) is asked to demarcheSYG (UN secretary general) Ban or Ambassador Kim (Ban's chief of staff) to seek Gambari's dismissalas SRSG (special representatives of the secretary general) for Burma. This demarche should occur assoon as practical."

Rice, noting Ban's "likely sensitivities in regard to a possible dismissal", suggested several talkingpoints, among them that Gambari was failing to acknowledge the intransigence of the Burmesegovernment.

"We have no wish to embarrass Mr Gambari and have no intent to link any removal with a lack ofprogress in Burma, but we would ask that you find a way to terminate gracefully his participation inthis particular mission," Rice wrote.

Gambari was moved by Ban last year.

The Obama administrationapproach to Burma is not markedly different from that of the Bushadministration, basically trying to nudge the regime towards reform through a mixture of sanctions andoffers of sweeteners.

The present US charge d'affaires, Larry Dinger, in a cable in April last year, proposed various ways ofimproving ties with Burma, including aid, which he cynically suggested could undermine the regime.

"If properly designed, such assistance builds the basic capacity of people at the grassroots to surviveand to think beyond mere subsistence to political goals. Such aid is subversive more directly as well:

recipients understand who helps them (international donors) and who doesn't (the regime)," Dingersaid.
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WikiLeaks cables suggest Burma is building

secret nuclear sites

Fears of bomb plan as witnesses tell US embassy that North Koreans are involved with undergroundfacility in jungle

Ewen MacAskill in Washington


Article history

Burma's military regime has said it wants a nuclear power plant but denied any plans for atomicweapons. Photograph: Khin Maung Win/AFP/Getty Images

Witnesses in Burma claim to have seen evidence of secret nuclear and missile sites being built inremote jungle, according to secret US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, heightening concernsthat the military regime is seeking to develop nuclear weapons.

A Burmese officer quoted in a cable from the US embassy in Burma said he had witnessed NorthKorean technicians helping to construct an underground facility in foothills more than 300 miles(480km) north-west of Rangoon.

"The North Koreans, aided by Burmese workers, are constructing a concrete-reinforced undergroundfacility that is '500ft from the top of the cave to the top of the hill above'," according to the cable. Theman is quoted as saying the North Koreans were "blowing concrete" into the excavation.

An expatriate businessman told the embassy in Rangoon he had seen alarge barge carrying reinforcedsteel barof a diameter that suggested a project larger than a factory. Other informants includeddockworkers, who reported suspicious cargo.

The reports add rare detail to rumours that have circulated since 2002, most recently from a militarydefector this year, that Burma is covertly seeking a nuclear bomb with the help ofNorth Korea. Bothcountries have strenuously denied this in the past and Burma insists there are no North Koreans in thecountry.
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The cables will compound existing international concern over Iranian and North Korean nuclearprogrammes, and show why Barack Obama has made nuclear non-proliferation one of the centralplanks of his foreign policy.

According to the witness accounts, pieced together by US embassy staff, thework is at an early stageand haphazard. But they regard it as a troubling development, with the risk that Burma could joinPakistan, North Korea and possibly Iran in having a nuclear bomb.

In a cable dated August 2004 titled "Alleged North Korean involvement in missile assembly andunderground facility construction in Burma", one of the embassy staffwheedled information from anofficer during a visit to Rangoon. The officer was in an engineering unit working at the site, wheresurface-to-air missiles were allegedly being assembled. The site is the Irrawaddy river town of Minbuin Magwe division, west-central Burma.

The officer said 300 North Koreans were working at the site, though the embassy, in its cable back toWashington, described this as improbably high. The officer "claims he has personally seen some ofthem, although he also reported they are forbidden from leaving the construction site and that he andother 'outsiders' are prohibited from entering".

Burma has made no secret of wanting a civilian nuclear reactor, in part because of severe electricity

shortages, and has signed a deal with Russia to build one. The project has so far failed to start becauseof lack of funds. A secret deal with North Korea would be in breach of international rules on nuclearproliferation.

According to a 2009 cable, a well-placed source within the Burmese government last year made anapparentlyindiscreet remarkto the Australian ambassador that the agreement with Russia was just for"software, training" and the North Korea agreement was for "hardware".

The source said General Thura Shwe Mann, who had overall command of military activity, visitedNorth Korea in 2008. The source backtracked six months later, insisting that the talks with North Koreawere only exploratory.

In February 2009 the Burmese deputy foreign minister, Khin Maung Win, called a US diplomat to denythere was collusion between his country and North Korea over missiles, missile technology or nucleartechnology.

Alarmingly, there is a report of a businessman offering uranium to the US embassy in Rangoon. Theembassy bought it.

"The individualprovided a small bottle half-filled with metallic powderand a photocopied certificateof testing from a Chinese university dated 1992 as verification of the radioactive nature of the powder."He said that "if the US was not interested in purchasing the uranium, he and his associates would try tosell it to other countries, beginning with Thailand".
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US embassy cables: Burmese civilian offers to

sell uranium to US diplomats


Article history

Tuesday, 23 September 2008, 08:59S E C R E T RANGOON 000749SIPDISFOR STATE ISN/CTR AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7)DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPT OF ENERGYEO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2018TAGS KNNP, MNUC, PARM, KCRM, PTER, ASEC, KCOR, BMSUBJECT: BURMESE CIVILIAN OFFERS TO SELL PURPORTED URANIUM

238 TO U.S. EMBASSY RANGOON, BURMAREF: A. 2007 STATE 162091 B. USDAO RANGOON IIR 6 812 0131 08Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

1. Summary Burmese civilian provides US embassy in Rangoon with a half-bottle alleged tocontain radioactive material, and says he has access to large quantities. Cable highlights dangersof nuclear proliferation. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Per Ref A, Post is alerting the Department and Washington agencies thaton XXXXXXXXXXXX after USDAO Rangoon received guidance from DIA, a Burmese civilian metwith members of USDAO Rangoon and offered to sell Uranium-238. The individual had initiallycontacted the USDAO eight days prior with the offer. The individual provided a small bottle half-filled

with metallic powder and a photocopied certificate of testing from a Chinese university dated 1992 asverification of the radioactive nature of the powder.During XXXXXXXXXXXX interview, the individualclaimed to be able to provide up to 2000 kg of uranium-bearing rock from a location in Kayah State

XXXXXXXXXXXX , and further stated if the U.S. was not interested in purchasing the uranium, he andhis associates would try to sell it to other countries, beginning with Thailand. See Ref B for furtherinformation.

2. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Details of the incident follow, keyed to questions in Ref A:

A) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Current location of the material: Sample bottle is in transit via classifiedDiplomatic Pouch to Aberdeen Proving Grounds via DIA.

B) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Transportation status of material: sample bottle in transit throughdiplomatic courier service. The sample was wrapped in several layers and placed inside multiplecontainers, including glass, lead, and wooden boxes/crates. Following instructions from DIAheadquarters, USDAO has sent the package via Diplomatic Pouch to Aberdeen Proving Grounds,through DIA, 3100 Clarendon, Arlington, VA. The box is marked "Secret." Dimensions are 16 X 16 X8 inches. Embassy Rangoon assesses that the host nation is currently unaware of USDAO receipt andshipment of the material. However, the possibility cannot be dismissed that rather than a sale for profit,the seller is attempting to assist in executing a government entrapment scheme.

C) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) As noted, Post assesses that the Burmese government is currently unaware


20/46

of USDAO receipt and shipment of the sample. Burmese authorities would likely seize any additionalsamples or stocks of the material if aware of their existence.

D) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Sample is in transit by commercial air via Diplomatic Pouch.

E) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Intended destination of material: The subject indicated his first choice fora possible buyer of the alleged uranium is the United States, via the Embassy in Rangoon. Other statedoptions include the Thai and Chinese Embassies. His intent appears to be to sell the material inRangoon. Subject made no mention of intent to move material across borders.

F) Unknown.

G - J) (S//NF) Subject identified himself as XXXXXXXXXXXX .

(S//REL TO USA, ACGU) The subject brought with him a small bottle weighing 1.8 ounces andmeasuring 70 mm long by 26 mm in diameter, which was half-filled with a grey metallic powder. Heclaimed the material in question was Uranium-238 in powder form. The subject claims to represent asmall group that wants to sell uranium to the U.S. Embassy. According to the subject, he has 50kilograms of uranium-containing rock or ore at an undisclosed location in Rangoon, which is stored ina barrel that prevents the radioactivity from being toxic XXXXXXXXXXXX . He estimates there are

at least 2000 more kilograms that could be dug up from thesite in Kayah State. The uranium was only recently brought to Rangoon (subject would not give aspecific time frame). The subject claimed the uranium was discovered in Kayah state in 1992.XXXXXXXXXXXX

(S//REL TO USA, ACGU) The subject claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX know about the uranium.XXXXXXXXXXXX

K) N/A.

L) N/A.

M) (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Interview occurred in a consular interview room (used for walk-ins) at

the U.S. Embassy Rangoon.N) Additional details: Ref B contains all other available information related to this incident.

3. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX

DINGER

US embassy cables: Businessman fuels

suspicions over secret Burmese nuclear

reactor


21/46


Article history

Tuesday, 20 January 2004, 09:44S E C R E T RANGOON 000088SIPDISNOFORN

EO 12958 DECL: 01/09/2014TAGS PGOV, PARM, PREL, BM, RS">RS, KS, KNPPSUBJECT: BURMA: RUMORS OF CONSTRUCTION OF A NUCLEAR REACTOR

NEAR MINBUREF: STATE 297614 AND PREVIOUS 03 RANGOON 1427Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)

1. Summary Expatriate businessman reports large-scale construction work in Minbu, location ofrecurring rumours of secret nuclear reactor being built by Burma with North Korean help. Keypassage highlighted in yellow.

1. (S/NF) An expatriate businessmanXXXXXXXXXXXX recently volunteered to an Embassy Officer

that he had heard rumors that a nuclear reactor was being built near Minbu, in central Magway Divisionon the Irawaddy River. The businessman added that he personally had seen a "massive" bargecontaining large-sized rebar being unloaded on a trip to the area. After asking local residents about therebar's purpose, he was told that similar size barge shipments were arriving almost weekly and that therebar was to be used in the construction of unnamed/unidentified factories. In the opinion of thebusinessman, the quantities involved as well as the diameter of the rebar suggested a project larger than"factories." Along these lines, the businessman noted that there was a new airport near Minbu with alanding strip that, based on its length and thickness, seemed excessive, adding that "you could land thespace shuttle on it."

2. (S/NF) Comment: Rumors of construction of a nuclear facility in/near Magway Division date back to2002 and generally refer to alleged Goverment of Burma (GOB) and Russian cooperation on a nuclear

research reactor project. Similar rumors, sans the "Russia" angle, have been circulating with greaterfrequency within diplomatic and expatriate circles since a November 2003 Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) article which described signs of growing military ties between North Korea andBurma. While we have no direct evidence of this alleged cooperation, rumors of ongoing constructionof a nuclear reactor are surprisingly consistent and observations of activity such as that described

above appear to be increasing, as are alleged sightings of North Korean "technicians" inside Burma.

Martinez

US embassy cables: Suspicion at Burmese docks

over shipment


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Article history

Tuesday, 30 January 2007, 10:23S E C R E T RANGOON 000105SIPDIS

SIPDISSTATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSPEO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2017TAGS PARM, PREL, ETTC, MNUC, BM, CHSUBJECT: BURMAXXXXXXXXXXXX REPORT SENSITIVE SHIPMENTClassified By: Econoff TLManlowe for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. Summary Burmese sources help US embassy monitor shipments from Rangoon. Althoughthere is no evidence the shipment is anything other than what is on the manifest, it shows bothhow the US gathers intelligence and its concerns about possible uranium shipments. Keypassage highlighted in yellow.

1. (S) Summary: Embassy contacts XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with us on XXXXXXXXXXXXdocuments for 112 metric tons of "mixed ore" shipped on January 25 from Burma to China viaSingapore. XXXXXXXXXXXX noticed that authorities treated the shipment as highly sensitive, andsuspect it may have included uranium. Our contact had no direct evidence to support this claim. Endsummary.

2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told emboffs that XXXXXXXXXXXX informed him they weresuspicious about the behavior of authorities when handling a January 25 shipment of mixed ore fromRangoon. According XXXXXXXXXXXX, security was tighter than usual, surveillance was heavier,and officials paid closer attention to the movement of the shipment and activity at the port.XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that metals are usually exported in blocks, whereas the bags in thisshipment were filled with loose earth and mud. The source of the mixed ore, Maw Chi, is also a sourcefor uranium, they claimed. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the destination in China, Fang Chen, and theshipping line, Advance Container Lines, were unusual for routine ore shipments. Shipments normallygo to other ports in China via Myanmar Five Star Line, the government-owned shipping line, accordingto them. The shipper, Myanmar Ruby Enterprise, is a joint venture, 30% owned by the Ministry ofMines. XXXXXXXXXXXX

3. (S) Key information contained in the documents we have seen includes: Carrier: Advance ContainerLines Co., Ltd. Shipper: Myanmar Ruby Enterprise Address: No. 24/26 Sule Pagoda Road, KyauktadaTownship, Rangoon Shipped from Rangoon: January 25, 2007 Vessel: Kota Teraju to SingaporeDestination: Fang Chen, China Port of Discharge: Fang Chen, Guang Xi, China Consignee: YunnanMinmetals Trading Co., Ltd. Address: F/8 No. (408) Beijing Road, Kuming, PR China Shipment: Six

containers holding 3080 bags, 112.0049 net metric tons of Mawchi Mixed Ore: (tin, tungsten, scheelitemixed concentrate) Value: 534,263.37 euros.

4. (S) We have no further information about the shipment or the reliability of the documents. We wouldbe pleased to forward copies of the documents received to anyone interested. VILLAROSA


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US embassy cables: North Koreans alleged to be

building secret underground missile site in

Burma


Article history

Friday, 27 August 2004, 08:08S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001100SIPDISEO 12958 DECL: 08/26/2014TAGS PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, BM, KNSUBJECT: ALLEGED NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE

ASSEMBLY AND UNDERGROUND FACILITY CONSTRUCTION IN BURMAClassified By: CDA, A.I. RON MCMULLEN FOR REASON 1.5 (A/C).

1. Summary The report is one of many about alleged covert North Korean co-operation withBurma, which has repeatedly denied there are any North Koreans in the country. Key passagehighlighted in yellow.

1. (S) SUMMARY:North Korean workers are reportedly assembling "SAM missiles" and constructingan underground facility at a Burmese military site in Magway Division, about 315 miles NNW ofRangoon, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX . This unsolicited account should not be taken asauthoritative, but it tracks with other information garnered and reported via XXXXXXXXXXXX. End

Summary.

2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX

3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX some 300 North Koreans are working at a secret construction site west ofMimbu, Magway Division, in the foothills of the Arakan Yoma mountains. (Comment: the number ofNorth Koreans supposedly working at this site strikes us as improbably high. End comment.) TheXXXXXXXXXXXX claims he has personally seen some of them, although he also reported they areforbidden from leaving the construction site and that he and other "outsiders" are prohibited fromentering. The XXXXXXXXXXXX was confident that XXXXXXXXXXXX had the ability todistinguish North Koreans from others, such as Chinese, who might be working in the area. The exactcoordinates of the camouflaged site are not known, but it is reportedly in the vicinity of 20,00 N, 94,25

E.

4. (S) The North Koreans are said to be assembling "SAM missiles" of unknown origin.XXXXXXXXXXXX the North Koreans, aided by Burmese workers, are constructing a concrete-reinforced underground facility that is "500 feet from the top of the cave to the top of the hill above."He added that the North Koreans are "blowing concrete" into the excavated underground facility.

5. (S) The XXXXXXXXXXXX is supposedly engaged in constructing buildings for 20 Burmese armybattalions that will be posted near the site. Of these, two battalions are to be infantry; the other 18 willbe "artillery," according to this account.


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6. (S) [XXXXXXXXXXXX

7. (S) COMMENT: The [XXXXXXXXXXXX second-hand account of North Korean involvementwith missile assembly and military construction in Magway Division generally tracks with otherinformation Embassy Rangoon and others have reported in various channels. Again, the number 300 ismuch higher than our best estimates of North Koreans in Burma, and exactly how theXXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly came to see some of them personally remains unclear. Many details

provided XXXXXXXXXXXX match those provided by other, seemingly unrelated, sources.

8. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: We cannot, and readers should not, consider this report alone to bedefinitive proof or evidence of sizable North Korean military involvement with the Burmese regime.The XXXXXXXXXXXX description made no reference at all to nuclear weapons or technology, or tosurface-to-surface missiles, ballistic or otherwise. XXXXXXXXXXXX This account is perhaps bestconsidered alongside other information of various origins indicating the Burmese and North Koreansare up to something ) something of a covert military or military-industrial nature. Exactly what, and onwhat scale, remains to be determined. Post will continue to monitor these developments and report aswarranted. McMullen

WikiLeaks cables: Burma general considered

Manchester United buyoutJunta leader Than Shwe thought about spending $1bn on football club despite country being devastatedby cyclone Nargis

Robert Booth

guardian.co.uk, Monday 6 December 2010 14.31 GMT

Article history
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/nuclear-weaponshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/robertboothhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/06/wikileaks-burma-manchester-united-takeover#history-link-boxhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/nuclear-weaponshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/robertboothhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/06/wikileaks-burma-manchester-united-takeover#history-link-box


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Burmese ruler Than Shwe was urged to make a takeover bid for Manchester United by his grandson,according to the US embassy in Rangoon Photograph: David Longstreath/AP

The leader ofBurma's military junta considered making a $1bn (634m) bid to buyManchester Unitedfootball club around the time it was facing rising anger from the United Nations over its "unacceptablyslow" response tocyclone Nargis.Than Shwe, commander in chief of the armed forces and a fan ofUnited, was urged to mount a takeover bid by his grandson, according to a cable from the US embassyin Rangoon. It details how the regime was thought to be using football to distract its population fromongoing political and economic problems.

The proposal was made prior to January 2009; only months earlier, in May 2008, the Burmese juntahad been accused of blocking vital international aid supplies after Nargis struck, killing 140,000people.

Than Shwe reportedly concluded that making a bid for United might "look bad" at the time, but the

revelation that the proposal was even considered is likely to fuel criticism of the regime's cruelty. Thesenior general instead ordered the creation of a new multimillion dollar national football league at thesame time as aid agencies were reporting that one year on, many survivors of the cyclone still lackedpermanent housing, access to clean water, and tools for fishing and agriculture.

The mooted price tag for Manchester United was exactly the same as the aid bill to cover the mosturgent food, agriculture and housing for the three years after the cyclone, as estimated by internationalagencies including the UN. The proposal revealed that the regime, which is increasingly exploiting itsoil and gas reserves, felt confident of finding such a sum. According to Forbes magazine's valuation ofthe club at the time, $1bn would have been enough to acquire a 56% controlling stake.

"One well-connected source reports that the grandson wanted Than Shwe to offer $1bn for Manchester

United," said the June 2009 cable to Washington. "The senior general thought that sort of expenditurecould look bad, so he opted to create for Burma a league of its own."

Than Shwe then reportedly coerced and bribed eight leadingbusinessand political figures to establishteams and ordered them to spend large sums on imported players and new stadiums.

The cable revealed that in January 2009, selected Burmese business people were told "that Than Shwehad 'chosen' them to be the owners of the new professional soccer teams. [The informant, a topexecutive at one of the sponsor companies] said the owners are responsible for paying all costs,including team salaries, housing and transportation, uniform costs, and advertising for the new league.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/burmahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/burmahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/football/manchester-unitedhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/football/manchester-unitedhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/211733http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/211733http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/cyclonenargishttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/cyclonenargishttp://www.guardian.co.uk/football/businesshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/football/businesshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/football/businesshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/burmahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/football/manchester-unitedhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/211733http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/211733http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/cyclonenargishttp://www.guardian.co.uk/football/business


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In addition, owners must build new stadiums in their respective regions by 2011, at an estimated cost of$1m per stadium."

The Magway team was spending $155,000 a month on salaries while the Kanbawza team, linked to abank, had budgeted $2m for the 2009 season. Rangoon United hired five players from Africa and DeltaUnited recruited several Argentinians.

"When asked why the owners would participate in such an expensive endeavour, [an executive withone company sponsor] observed that they had little choice," the embassy reported. "'When the seniorgeneral asks someone to do something, you do it with no complaints,' he stated."

He added that several of the business people expected to receive incentives from the regime, such asconstruction contracts, new gem and jade mines, and import permits, which would more than offsettheir costs. The owners of the clubs in the Burma national football league, which launched on 16 May2009, include "regime crony" Zaw Zaw, who also chairs Burma's football federation and drew up plansfor the league with the senior general's grandson.

"Zaw Zaw hired Senior General Than Shwe's grandson to play on the team," a separate cable adds.

But according to the dispatch, "many Burmese businessmen speculate the regime is using it as a way to

distract the populace from ongoing political and economic problems or to divert their attention fromcriticism of the upcoming 2010 elections".

Political football

From Sierra Leone to Iran, football is more than a sport for many governments.

Cables in June 2009 reveal Iran's fear that public unrest over a national football team loss "could addfire to the increasingly volatile political demonstrations" during the presidential election.

Such was President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's political investment in Team Melli that spies were said tokeep tabs on key players. He loaned the squad his presidential plane to travel to North Korea for a

match after personally firing the coach Ali Daei when they lost to regional rivals, Saudi Arabia. Butfans have rebelled, chanting "we don't want political soccer" at one game.

In Jordan, hooliganism at a match in July 2009 between Al-Wahdat (Palestinian fans) and Al-Faysali(Jordanian fans) revealed the "ugly side of Jordanian ultranationalism" as the Palestinian origins ofboth the queen and the crown prince were denigrated. One contact warned US diplomats that suchextremism "would be difficult to contain now that it was publicly expressed".

Even in Azerbaijan, football clubs mean status for regime figures. The son of Kamaladdin Heydarov,the oil-rich nation's minister for emergency situations, owns Gabala football club: "a small-scale effortto replicate the Chelsea antics of Russia's Roman Abramovich".

"The Gabala squad is a virtual United Nations team, with players from across Europe, Latin America

and Africa the best team money can buy, at least for central Azerbaijan."

Meanwhile the US embassy in Sierra Leone believes the country's football manager, Mohamed AhmedSesay, may have used the job "to facilitate narcotics trafficking", after he was arrested during a cocainetrafficking investigation.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/212931http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/211004http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/211004http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/218464http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/250614http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/250614http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/165082http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/212931http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/211004http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/211004http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/218464http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/250614http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/250614http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/165082


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US embassy cables: Burma regime crony picks

general's grandson for football team

guardian.co.uk, Monday 6 December 2010 14.29 GMT

Article history

Friday, 19 June 2009, 05:24C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000378SIPDISSTATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, EEB/TFSPACOM FOR FPATREASURY FOR OASIA, OFACEO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2019TAGS ECON, EFIN, ETRD, PREL, PINR, BMSUBJECT: BURMA: UPDATE ON CRONY ZAW ZAW'S ACTIVITIES

REF: A. 07 RANGOON 1107 B. RANGOON 298 C. RANGOON 355 D. RANGOON 330RANGOON 00000378 001.4 OF 004Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).

Summary

1. Zaw Zaw, a businessman and "up and coming crony", picked General Than Shwe's grandson toplay for Delta United in the 2009-established national league. He is attempting to curry favorwith the regime and to use his government ties to expand his commercial enterprises. Key

passage highlighted in yellow.

2. Read related article

Summary

-------

1. (C) Regime crony Zaw Zaw continues to expand his businesses in Burma. In addition to MaxMyanmar Group of Companies, Zaw Zaw owns a beverage bottling company, a cement plant, a tradingcompany, a jade mine in Phakhant, a rubber plantation in Mon State, and a professional soccer team.Embassy Rangoon recommends OFAC add Zaw Zaw's additional companies and key managementpersonnel (listed in paragraph 5) to the targeted sanctions list. End Summary.

Additional Business Ventures

----------------------------

2. (C) Zaw Zaw, one of Burma's up-and-coming cronies, continues to expand his businesses. His MaxMyanmar Group of Companies, which overseas his construction and tourism operations, is alreadydesignated on the Department of the Treasury's sanctions list (Ref A). We have confirmed Zaw Zawalso owns Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd., which produces beverages including Max Cola for the localmarket. Pinya Manufacturing began operating in 1998 with an initial investment of 12.5 million kyat(approximately USD 41,000 in 1998) and currently employs more than 70 workers. Pinya


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Manufacturing Co. Ltd. has 13 distribution branches throughout Burma.

3. (C) Embassy business contact XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that Zaw Zaw is expanding hisbusiness ventures under the Max Myanmar umbrella, including construction of a cement factory in NayPyi Taw, which allegedly will provide cement to Steven Law for Asia World's airport project (Ref B), aconcrete block factory in Nay Pyi Taw, a jade mine in Phakhant, and a rubber plantation in Mon State.According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , Zaw Zaw operates the Lone Khin jade mine in conjunction with

the Ministry of Mines and recently received an additional 50 acres of land in Phakhant for jade minedevelopment. Zaw Zaw allegedly sold several lots of jade at the March 2009 government jade and gemauction, [name removed] noted.

4. (C) Zaw Zaw is currently Chairman of the Myanmar Football Federation, and he owns Delta United,one of the professional soccer teams in the new Myanmar Football National League (Ref C). Contactsconfirm that Zaw Zaw hired Senior General Than Shwe's grandson to play on the team (Ref D). ZawZaw has also begun to develop plans for the construction of a new soccer stadium in Pathein,Irrawaddy Division, the future home of the Delta United team,XXXXXXXXXXXX .XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated the stadium construction cost will be more than USD 1 million, andshould be completed by 2011.

5. (SBU) Below is information on additional companies owned by Zaw Zaw.RANGOON 00000378 002.8 OF 004

-- Delta United Football Club; Pathein, Irrawaddy Division. Listed owner and partner: U Zaw WinShaine, owner of Ayeyar Hinta Co., Ltd.

-- Lone Khin Jade Mine; Phakhant, Kachin State.

-- Max Myanmar Cement Factory; near Taung Phila Limestone Deposit, Leiway Township, Nay PyiTaw.

-- Max Myanmar Concrete Block Factory; Nay Pyi Taw.

-- Max Myanmar Rubber Plantation, Belin, Mon State.

-- Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd.; 37/38 Baw Maw An Twin Wun Street, Industrial Zone 3, Hlainthaya,Rangoon; phone: 95-1-681-745, 95-1-685-75, 95-1-685-15; fax: 95-1-680-669. Managing Director: UKyi Lwin, a.k.a. U Kyan Khinn.

Embassy Recommendation

----------------------

6. (C)Zaw Zaw is one of several mid-level cronies actively attempting to curry favor with the regimeand to use his government ties to expand his commercial enterprises. He, his family, and many of hiscompanies are already listed on OFAC's targeted sanctions list. Embassy Rangoon recommends OFACalso designate the above-mentioned companies and senior management under the JADE Act.

DINGER

RANGOON 00000378 003.2 OF 004

6. (SBU

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WikiLeaks US Embassy Cables 15 Files for Burma

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