Will India Be a Better Strategic Partner Than China?
Presentation for Non-proliferation Education Center
Dan Blumenthal
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
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Topics
• U.S. China partnership 1972 Strategic Justification
• Evolution
• Dissenting Arguments
• Take Aways
• U.S.-India Strategic Justification 2005
• Policy Implications
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U.S. China Partnership
• U.S. 1972 Strategic Justification
Vietnam War
Triangulating Against Soviets
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Vietnam
• What Did We Want?– Pressure North Vietnam to keep South
Vietnam in tact, join coalition government. • Unsuccessful
– Assurances that China would not intervene if we escalated in Vietnam. • Successful
– Bottom Line: Minimal assistance/Minimal influence in Vietnam
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Soviet Union
• Give America stronger hand in dealing with Moscow– Uneven success
• Intelligence Sharing: Make up for lost listening posts in Iran
• Impact on Soviet behavior?– Greatest tactical success: Afghanistan
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End Chinese Expansion
• Stop support of Communist Revolutions in Asia such as Malaysia and Indonesia.– Successful
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Integrating China
• Change and shape China into responsible global actor– Still open question
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What Did China Want?
• Taiwan issue– Mostly Successful. Taiwan loses recognition; mutual
defense treaty abrogated; assurances that Taiwan is part of China. Taiwan slowly marginalized
• International legitimacy for CCP. – Successful. UN Seat; Recognition from Japan,
Europe
• Pressure on Soviets who were considering attack on China– Successful. In 1978 ¼ of Soviet ground troops, 1/5 of
tactical air-force deployed against China
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What Did China Want?
• 1979 Support for attack on Vietnam– Successful
• Access to Western technology– Successful Opened spigot over time that is
difficult to close
– 1980 DoC authorized sale of dual use items
– DoC designates China a “friendly state” for tech-transfer licenses
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Evolution: China Card
• 1979 -1989 Triangulation becomes anti-Soviet partnership– Intelligence Sharing, technology transfer,
military cooperation dominate
– Open the door for China to acquire Western technology
– Detailed briefings on Soviet Military situation
– China gets MFN, other economic benefits, Soviets do not
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China Card cont…
• Turns into arms sales and high-tech transfer relationship– By 1985 China buying $5 billion dollars worth
– Eligible for FMS, bought radars, torpedoes, upgrades for jet fighters, “Peace Pearl”program
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Dissenters
• Shultz/Wolfowitz: China needed U.S. far more than reverse.
– Needless concessions on Taiwan when Chinese afraid of Soviet Invasion
– China defined “obstacles” that U.S. needed to overcome – Taiwan; tech transfer – in order to make relationship better
• Luttwak/Doak Barnett/Ambassador Toon/Perry:– Are we building up a power that will be hostile to us?
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China Take Aways• Strategic Competition punctuated by tactical cooperation
– China now only country with capabilities and intent to challenge U.S. primacy
– Taiwan more difficult/potential for armed conflict. U.S. negotiated away opportunities to clarify (e.g. 79 and 82 communiqués)
• Gave up too much (technology/Taiwan) as the “price of admission.”
• Justification/rational changed from “triangulation” to anti-Soviet to “engagement”
– Military and intelligence bureacracies took over/commercial interests grew in influence
• Despite U.S. give aways China did not become strategic parner.– Ideological differences = worldview differences– Clashing national interests
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U.S.-India Strategic PartnershipWhat Does U.S. Want?
Broad Goals in Asia• Prevent hegemon on Eurasian continent• Maintain pre-eminence/regain unipolarity
– Create Asian security architecture: Japan, Singapore, Australia and India
– Enduring strategy of military pre-dominance – U.S. strategy creates conditions for liberal
political and trading order.• Growth and democratization of Japan, Taiwan,
South Korea, Indonesia etc.
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U.S.-India Strategic PartnershipWhat Does U.S. Want?
• Support with War on Terror/Counter-proliferation
• Counterweight to China
• Preferential treatment for U.S defense industry
• More steps on nuclear nonproliferation
• Joint Action with U.S. Military outside UN
• Access and Basing
• Understanding on “Pakistan contingency”
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July 18 Joint StatementIndian Commitments
• “Combat Terrorism Relentlessly”
• Continued implementation of New Framework for Defense relationship
• Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities.– Place civilian facilities under IAEA safeguard
• Continued moratorium on testing
• Working with U.S. on Fissile Cut-Off Treaty
• Strengthen Export Control in Line with MTCR, NSG
• Bottom Line: Not many new commitments
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India’s Aspirations
• Great power status– Recognition as nuclear power
• Maintain independent foreign policy– A “South Asian France”
• Triangulate China and United States
• Military technology for modernization
• Economic growth of 6-8%
• Power to stop Pakistan-supported incursions
• Primacy in South Asia
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Indian Aspirations
• Diverse energy supplies– Oil and pipeline from Iran
– Cooperative ventures with China and Russia in Central Asia
– Nuclear energy?
• Energy security– SLOC in Indian Ocean
– “Look East” Straits of Malacca
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U.S. Commitments
• U.S. will treat and urge others to treat India as a NWS– Not deny most civil nuclear technology.
– Military nuclear facilities will not be subject to IAEA safeguards
• Help India be “great power”
• Defense cooperation and technology
• Energy Security/cooperation
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Will India Be A Better Partner than China?
Positives• Democracy, rule of law.
– More transparency, shared values, ideological divergence not strong
• Shared Interest in minimizing Chinese influence in South Asia
• Shared interest in securing sea lanes
• Broader counter-terror goals/spread of Democracy?– Not supportive of Greater Middle East Initiative
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Will India Be Better Partner?
Positives
• Mitigate Indian suspicions of U.S.-Pakistan cooperation– Muted response to F-16 sale, but still “tit-for-
tat” mentality (e.g. will not buy P3s)
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Will India Be a Better Partner?
Negatives• Ideological
– Great power status in service of multi-polarity– Strategic Independence – legacy, political
culture
• Power gap: How much can India do?– $3.678 trillion GDP; $3,400 GDP per capita– Power shortages– 433 million living below poverty
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Will India Be a Better Partner?
Power Gap cont…
• Military – Forces can defend against conventional war
with China
– Cannot attain quick decisive victory over Pakistan
– Limited power projection capabilities around Indian Ocean littoral
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Will India Be a Better Partner?
Power Gap cont…
– Ambitious modernization goals • Navy: sea denial with submarine fleet, perhaps two carriers,
cruise missiles by 2015• Air Force has 40 Su 30s intends to buy 126 aircraft. Force
multipliers: Phalcon, air to air tankers• Army increasing firepower and mobility• Strategic forces: medium range missile program (~3000 km)
building Agni III (~3,500 km) plus missile defense; estimated 40-50 warheads
• Underfunded: defense budget has risen from 15.5 billion to 19.1 billion (around 2.75% of GDP) but for replacement and introduction of new systems not enough
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Will India Be a Better Partner?
Negatives
• Strong interests in/with Iran– India imports 60% of oil needs and growing
– Pipeline project for natural gas worth $7 billion. Oil-field stake/development ~ $40 billion
– Large Indian Shia population
– Convergence on Afghanistan
– Routine defense/intelligence exchanges: 2003 joint naval exercises
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Will India Be a Better Partner?
• India and rogue states energy cooperation (Burma, Sudan)
• Commitment to broader nonproliferation goals?– PSI
– Fissile moratorium
• Nuclear arms rivalry? – Watch carefully SLVs, ICBMs
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Will India Be a Better Partner?Take Aways
• Asymmetry in means: India needs maximum U.S. assistance
• In reality U.S. policy is to shape, engage, accommodate a rising power– Contrast with China first tried engagement,
now soft containment
• India will most likely not be strategic competitor; More likely an “Asian France”
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Will India Be a Better Partner?Take Aways
• Ideological similarities will help overcome some obstacles
• But similar to China deal in process: lack of consultation; giving up much up front without reciprocal commitments
• Inverted strategic priorities– Assistance with economic development/real energy
solutions should come first• American trade with India still less than 1% of total trade • FTA could force reforms in India, make U.S. and India more
interdependent
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Will India Be a Better Partner?Policy Implications/Suggestions
• Economic cooperation/assistance– FTA
• Energy cooperation– Diverse: clean coal, renewables – Nuclear energy – India plan of going from 2,700
megawatts to 10,000 by 2010 unrealistic. U.S. and others can provide low enriched uranium for existing reactors and possible LWRs
• Pressure China on adding to its arsenal– Strategic missiles are 120 and growing– Could have 75-100 warheads by 2015– No fissile moratorium
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Will India Be a Better Partner?Policy Implications/Suggestions
• Focus cooperation on maritime/sea lane• Negotiate for air access points in India in case of
conflict with China: Air to air exercises has “shaping affect” on Chinese military
• Defense Industrial – get India addicted• Monitor carefully SLV/ICBM program
– U.S. committed to assist with Polar SLV and Geo-synchronous SLV
• Don’t let India off the hook on Iran • Watch SCO statements/activities
– Work against anti-U.S. triangulation