G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981BEATRIZ L. GONZALES,petitioner,vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA,respondents.AQUINO,J.:1wph1.tBeatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject toreserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following:1wph1.t(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and theManila Times.(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties heldproindivisoby her other six children.Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:1wph1.tA mis hijos :Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en GuipitLa case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races.1wph1.t(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA6 Marzo 1953During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals inLegarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties arereservableproperties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject toreserva troncalthat is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to conveymortis causawhat she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within thethird degreeand to bypass the reservees in thesecond degreeor should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved inFlorentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in theFlorentinocase and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature ofreserve troncal,also calledlineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature ofreserve troncalwhich together with thereserva viudalandreversion legal,was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.The Code Commission regarded thereservasas remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, thereserves,insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored thereserve troncal,a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.Reserva troncalis provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads:1wph1.tART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes procedenART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.Inreserve troncal(1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor orreservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).If there are only two transmissions there is noreserve.Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).The persons involved inreserve troncalare (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant orprepositus(prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from theprepositusand who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).The rationale ofreserve troncalis to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).An illustration ofreserve troncalis found inEdroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, theprepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half portion.Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil. 964).Other illustrations ofreserva troncalare found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang andGutierrez vs. Balcita46 Phil. 551;Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601;Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737;Centeno vs. Centeno52 Phil. 322;Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89;Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279;Fallorfina vs. Abille,CA 39 O.G. 1784.The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called theprepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).In theCabardocase, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.First cousins of theprepositusare in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from theprepositus(Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).Reserva troncalcontemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.Gratuitous title ortitulo lucrativorefers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).Thereservacreates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee aretroin apacta de retrosale or to afideicomiso conditional.The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia,111 Phil. 349, 353).1wph1.tThereservatarioreceives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during thereservista'slifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property. (J.J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)Even during thereservista'slifetime, thereservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent thereservistafrom doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).The latter, therefore, do not inherit from thereservistabut from the descendant (prepositus) of whom thereservatariosare the heirsmortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).Hence, upon thereservista'sdeath, thereservatarionearest to theprepositusbecomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of theprepositusFilomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will ormortis causato the reservees within thethird degree(her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in thesecond degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is alreadyres judicataorcosa juzgada.We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a dispositionmortis causaof the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.As repeatedly held in theCanoandPaduracases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from theprepositus,not from the reservor.Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from thepreposituswho in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in thethird degreeand, consequently, to ignore the reservees in thesecond degreewould be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine ofFlorentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled:1wph1.tReservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of areservatario(reserves).ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.Under the rule ofstare decisis et non quieta movere,we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of theFlorentinocase. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of theprepositusregardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be awarded.The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is noreserva troncalwhen the only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in theFlorentinocase.It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for thereserva troncalhas been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".That same contention was advanced in theFlorentinocase where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of theprepositusand ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of theprepositus.In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservorwas only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property(pp. 894-5).Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but fromthe reservor but from the prepositus,of whom the reservees are the heirsmortis causasubject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.SO ORDERED.Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.1wph1.tJustice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.Padura v. BaldovinoSV: Fortunato Padura without any heirs, hence the four parcels of land hereceived from his father were transmitted to her mother. After hermother died, Fortunatos nephews and nieces from hisfull sister and half-brother tookpossession ofthe property. The court ruled that these nephews and nieces will have equal shares over the property.SC: Rule on Reserva troncal should be applied, meaning the relatives ofFortunato up to the third degree willget the reservable property after his mother dies. The children of such relatives (the reservatarios) can receive theproperty by way ofright of representation. But after applying therule, the reservatarios and their relationship will be considered in determining their shares. The rules on ordinary intestate succession would befollowed after the reservatarios have beendetermined.1.AgustinPaduramarried twice. Hisfirst wife wasGervacio Landig with whom he had one child named Manuel Padura. His second wife was Benita Garing with whom he had 2children named Fortunato and CandelariaPadura2.He died leaving a last will and testament duly probated wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children, Manuel, CAndelaria andFortunato, and his surviving spouse Benita (2nd wife). Fortunato was adjudicated 4 parcels of landa. Fortunato died unmarried and without having executed a will; and not having any issue, the 4parcels of land were inherited exclusively by Benita. Benita applied for an later was issued aTorrens Certificate of Title in her name, BUT subject tothe condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the 3rd degree belonging to the line from which the property came(Fortunato) b.Candelaria(Fortunatosfull sister) died leaving asher heirs her4 legitimate children (the appellants) Melania, Anicia and Pabloall surnamed Baldovinoc.Manuel (Fortunatos half brother) also died. His heirs were his legitimate children (the appellees) Dionisia, Felisa,Flora, Cornelio,Francisco, Juana and Severino, all surnamed Padura 3.Benita Garing (the reservista) died.The children of Candelaria andFortunato took possession of the 4 parcels of land (the reservableproperties).a.CFI Laguna issued a resolution declaring the legitimate children ofManuel and Candelaria are the rightful reserves and as suchentitled to the 4parcels of land4.The Baldovinos filed thispresent petition wherein theyseek tohave theproperties partitioned suh that one-half of thesame be adjudicated tothem, the other half tothe Paduras on the basis that theyinherited byright of representation from their respective parents, theoriginal reserves.5.The Paduras opposed, arguing that theyshould all (all11 ofthem) bedeemed inheriting in their own right hence, they should have equalshares.6.TC renderedjudgmentdeclaringthem allreserveeswithoutdistinctionand have equal sharesover the properties asco-owners, pro indiviso.ISSUE: should the properties be apportioned among the nephews of the wholeblood and nephews of the hald-blood equally? Or should the nephews of thewholeblood take a share twice aslarge as that of thenephews of the half-blood? Thenephews of the whole blood get twice theshare.The Baldovinos contend thatnotwithstanding the rule on Reservablecharacter of the property under Art. 891, the reservatarios nephews of thewhole blood are entitled to ashare twice as large as that ofthe otherspursuant to Arts. 10063, 10084 on intestate succession.The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return ofthe reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the linefrom which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated intoand by theirrelatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista) Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant anyproperty which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title fromanother ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve suchproperty as he mayhave acquired by operation of law for thebenefitof relatives who are within the third degree andwho belong to the linefrom which said property came. (871)

o The motives for such rule were explained by D. Manuel Alonso Martinezin his book El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con Las LegislacionesForales5Summary of not so good translation: consider this sample case:father dies leaving his wife and lone son as heirs. Wife remarriesand had children with 2nd husband. Lone son dies and his mother(wife) inherits whatever he got from the father. In case the wifedies, the relatives of the lone son are prejudiced since the wifeschildren from the second marriage will inherit the properties of the lone son as opposed to his uncle (fathers brother) The code commission chose to give more importance to linealsuccession than the presumed affection of the deceased.The commission settled with the suggestion of Manresa, amongothers, to reserve the property in case the ascendants inherit infavor of relatives up to the third degree. No reason was givenwhy 3rd degree.Aside from the sample case, another reason why this rule wasadopted was to make it the law more democratic (Democracywas becoming a trend when the civil code was being made bythe Spaniards, so fetch).The purpose of the reserva is accomplishedonce the property hasdevolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin.After that, Art.891 has nothing to do with the relations between one reservatario andanother of the same degree. Their shares should be foverned by theordinary rules of intestate succession. Upon the death of the ascendantreservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all reservatarios as aclass, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus),excluding those reseravatarios more remote in degree.o The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claimingthe same as a reservatario of the property is not among those relativeswithin the third degree belonging to the line from which the propertycame. Relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never beconsidered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them assuchoBut there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who arewithin the third degree mentioned by law as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property cameProximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of intestate succession so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews areentitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.o In determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity ofdegree and the right of representation of nephews are made toapply,the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of thewhole bloodshould likewise be operative.Reserva Troncal merely determines the group pof relatives to whom theproperty should be returned. Within the group,the individual right to theproperty should be decided byapplicable rules of ordinary intestatesuccession (since art. 891 issilent on the matter).Reserva Troncal is an exceptional case and its application should be limitedto what is strictly needed toaccomplish the purpose of the lawEven during the lifetime of the reservista, the reservatarios could compel theannotation of their right (over the property) in the registry ofproperty. Thereservable property is no part of the estateof the reservista, who may notdispose them by will so long asthere are reservatarios existing. Thereservatarios are in factinheriting fromthe descendant prepositus fromwhom the reservista inherited theproperty.If the nephews of whole and half-blood inherited the prepositus directly, thewhole bloods would receive a double share compared to those of thehalf-blood. Why then should the half-bloods inherit equally just because of thedelay in the transmission of the property (when itwas with the reservista)?The hereditary portions should not changePhilippine (and Spanish Jurisprudence) agrees with this despite the contraryopinions of authors such as Sanchez Roman and Mucius Scaevola.Appealed order REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Whole blood nephews will get twice theshare of those who are nephews of Half-blood.

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA,petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre,respondents.Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.MARTIN,J.:Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled"Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. MilitaraliasSy Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15, 19311adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483)2dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complainta quo3(subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject toreserval troncalpursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners4On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.The pertinent provision ofreserva troncalunder the New Civil Code provides:ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came.Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.5In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit ofreserva troncal whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chuagratuitouslybut for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not subject tot areserva troncal,under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not subject to areserva troncalunder Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval inCabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator,6"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:14483La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso;por con la obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgadoBut the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject toreserva troncalunder Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua wasnever probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer.7There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua haseverbeenprobated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Mu;oz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19003 December 13, 1922ROSA CABARDO, assisted by her husband Apolinario Zalameda,plaintiff-appellee,vs.FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA, individually, and in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Lorenzo Abordo, deceased,defendant-appellant.O'Donovan, Muller and Tanner for appellant.Recto, Casal and Ozaeta for appellee.STREET,J.:This action was instituted on September 3, 1921, in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna, by Rosa Cabardo (with whom is joined her husband, Apolinario Zalameda) to establish her right as reservee, under article 811 of the Civil Code, to certain property of considerable value, chiefly real property, now in the possession of the defendant, Francisco Villanueva, executor of the estate of Lorenzo Abordo, deceased. The trial judge having determined the case favorably to the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.It appears that the last owner of the property in questionwho held by descentwas one Cornelia Abordo, resident of Pagsanjan, in the Province of Laguna, who died on October 30, 1918, intestate and without issue. Her mother, Basilia Cabardo, died as far back as in February, of the year 1899; and as Cornelia left no brothers or sister, the nearest living person qualified to take by inheritance from her was her own father, Lorenzo Abordo, who accordingly succeeded to all of Cornelia's property.The estate possessed by Cornelia at the time of her death, and which thus passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo, was derived by inheritance from two sources, that is, in part from her mother Basilia Cabardo, and in part from Isabel Macaraya, the mother of Basilia Cabardo (and therefore grandmother of Cornelia), who died in November, 1912. Lorenzo Abordo, the father, having thus succeeded to the property aforesaid by inheritance from his daughter, himself died in December, 1920. The present claimant and plaintiff in this case, Rosa Cabardo, was a sister to Basilia Cabardo in life, and therefore aunt to Cornelia Abordo. Rosa Cabardo had no brothers or sisters living at the time of the death of Cornelia Abordo, though formerly there were two, namely, Juan Cabardo and Guadalupe Cabardo, both of whom left children who are still alive.Upon the facts above stated, it is evident that the properties in question were, upon the decease of Cornelia Abordo, impressed with the reservable character in the hands of Lorenzo Abordo, and that upon his death the plaintiff was entitled to succeed thereto, she being the only living person within the limits of the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. The case therefore falls precisely under article 811 of the Civil Code, and the trial judge committed no error in applying that article to the case.The appellant's attorney in a lengthy brief have drawn in question several points which, in the light of former decisions of this court and of the supreme court of Spain, are clearly settled; and a few words of passing comment will suffice to dispose of these contentions.In the first place, it is evident that the property which Cornelia Abordo acquired from her mother, Basilia Cabardo, upon the death of the latter in 1899, became impressed with the character of reservable property in the hands of Lorenzo Abordo when he succeeded to those properties by inheritance from his daughter Cornelia; and the circumstance that said property originally pertained to the conjugal partnership composed of Basilia Cabardo and Lorenzo Abordo is immaterial. It is sufficient that Cornelia acquired it by inheritance from her mother, there being no difference in this respect between property owned by the ancestor as member of conjugal partnership and property owned by such ancestor in separate right.lawphil.netIn the second place, it is no less evident that the property acquired by Cornelia Abordo from her grandmother, Isabela Macaraya, upon the death of the latter in 1912 whether by testate or intestate succession is immaterial also pertains to the reservable estate, notwithstanding the fact that a division of Isabel Macaraya's estate was effected by a partition deed executed by the persons in interest. It is sufficient that the property descended to Cornelia Abordo from her grandmother by gratuitous title (por titulo lucrativo), the meaning of which expression is explained by the commentator Manresa as follows:The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return. It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property transmitted deliver, give or do nothing in return.The typical gratuitous titles, to which all imaginable sorts are reducible, are donation and testate and intestate succession, which are specified as such in article 968.In a case where the questions raised were as to the rights of a minor to the inheritance of his grandmother, and which questions were settled by a compromise, in a decision rendered November 8, 1894, the Supreme Court held that it was not the document of compromise that determined the character of the title by virtue of which the minor got the amounts awarded to him, but the thing which was the subject-matter of the compromise, namely the hereditary rights, which import a gratuitous title, and that, therefore, when said minor inherited the property from his father, he was under obligation to reserve such as was included in the document, in favor of the relatives of the line whence it came. (6 Manresa, 285, 3d ed.)The third point drawn in question by the attorneys for the appellant is whether the plaintiff is within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property was derived; and in this connection it is suggested that Lorenzo Abordo should be treated as thepropositusor person from whom the degrees are to be reckoned, with the consequence that the plaintiff would be in the fourth degree reckoning through Cornelia Abordo, Basilia Cabardo, and Isabel Macaraya, successively, to the plaintiff.This contention is in our opinion likewise untenable, as the person from whom the degrees should here be reckoned is clearly Cornelia Abordo herself, since she was at theendof the line from which the properly came and the person upon whom the property last devolved by descent. Lorenzo Abordo was a stranger to that line and not related by blood to those for whom the property is reserved. That the degrees are to be thus reckoned is understood by Manresa; and our own decisions, as well as those of the supreme court of Spain, are accordant. (Manresa, Civ. Code, 3d ed., vol. 6, p. 252; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil., 480.)Still another point urged against the appealed judgment is the error supposed to have been committed by the trial court in permitting this reivindicatory action to be maintained against the defendant Francisco Villanueva in his capacity as administrator; and it is insisted that an executor or administrator is not subject to be sued with respect to the property which pertains to the estate in his possession. The reply to this is, that, supposing the property in question to be of a reservable character, all interest on the part of Lorenzo Abordo and his heirs therein terminated with his death. Said property therefore does not pertain to his estate at all, and his administrator is wrongfully withholding possession from the plaintiff. In this connection the last clause of section 699 of the Code of Civil Procedure is pertinent, where it is expressly declared that actions to recover the seisin and possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be maintained against the executor or administrator. In other words, the property here in question is not, property speaking, a part of the estate in administration at all.Various other considerations impugning the appealed judgment are adduced in the appellant's brief, but apparently they are not such as to require refutation at our hands.Upon one additional point only will a few words be added, namely, with reference to the action of the trial judge in reserving to the plaintiff the future right to require the defendant to account for the rents and profits of the property during the time the same has been in his charge. As to this we note that the petitory part of the complaint contains no prayer either for an award of damages or for an accounting for rents and profits. It follows that the right to recover damages, or rents and profits, was never legitimately in issue in this action; and it was undoubtedly an act of supererogation on the part of his Honor to reserve to the plaintiff the right to require an accounting for rents and profits in another action. Whether such an accounting can be had is a question that must be determined by the proper tribunal when occasion arises, and no pronouncement thereon is here necessary except to say that, so far as concerns the appealed judgment, the reservation therein contained is mere surplusage.With this explanation the judgment is affirmed; and it is so ordered with costs against the appellant.Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

October 27, 1920G.R. No. 13386SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,vs.MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.JOHNSON,J.:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint, without any finding as to costs.Juliana Nieva, the allegednaturalmother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her,ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same,ab intestate, from his deceased father.On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to thereserva troncalunder the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes,29 Phil., 167.)The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to thereserva troncalprovided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only tolegitimaterelative. One of such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established by acknowledgement between the father or mother who acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth, thatin said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, - and as we will see also article 812, - continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly included in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846.Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants.And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalu?a concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may be raised just as the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says:Persons in whose favor the reservation is established.- This is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the parentswho are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.It also treats oflegitimaterelationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral law.And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)" (See Scvola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.Lacerna v. Corcino, 1 S 1226FACTS: Valentine Marbebe begot adaughter, JacobaMarbebe, before hismarriage with Bonifacia Lacerna.Valentine andBonificia had an only son, Juan.Valentine and Bonifacia died leavingthree parcels of land totheir only son Juan.Juan, then, executed a power ofattorney authorizing the sister of his mother or his aunt, Agatona Vda. de Corcino take care of the disputed land.Eventually, Juan died intestate and without any issue. The Court of First Instance declared that the land is property ofJacoba being the half sister of Juan.Agatona Vda. de Corcino and the nephews andnieces of Bonifacia questioned thedecision of the court.According to them, the case should bebased upon Article 891 of theCivil Code of the Philippines which establishes what is known as "reserva troncal." According to them, under this principle, the properties in disputeshould pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree, who belong to the line from which said properties came.Thus, since Juan Marbebe inherited the land from his mother, they should go to his nearest relative within the thirddegree on the maternal line or to his aunt and cousins and not to Jacoba Marbebe for she belongs to the paternal line.This, however, was protested by Jacoba Marbebe.She contends that pursuant to Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines, brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in the order of intestate succession, and that,as Juan Marbebe's half-sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit his properties.ISSUE: Who has the better right to succeed Juan?RULING: The provision on reservetroncal cannot be appliedin this case.In reserve troncal, the ascendant who inherits fromhis descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brotheror sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives whoare within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied.) This articleapplies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant from a descendant, and this isnot the scenario in the given case, for the lands in dispute were inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from anascendant, his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not applicable in this case.Furthermore, the Trial Judge, correctly awarded the land toJacoba Marbebe.The said decision is inaccordance withthe order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,pursuant to which a sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of children of brothersor sisters, excludes all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line from which theproperty of the deceased came.Based on the foregoing, Jacoba Marbebe has the better right to succeed Juan.

[G.R. No. 28265. November 5, 1928.]

NATIVIDAD CENTENO, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, v. MARTINA CENTENO, ET AL., defendants and appellees. NICOLAS CENTENO, ET AL.,Appellants.

Vicente Singson Pablo forAppellants.

Antonio Belmonte for intervenors.

Vicente de Vera, Julio Borbon and Maximino Mina forAppellees.

SYLLABUS1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; ACTION TO ANNUL PARTITION. More than six years having elapsed from the date the order of the court approving the extrajudicial agreement of partition among those interested in the inheritance became final until the filing of the first complaint praying for the annulment of said partition, there is absolutely no legal reason for setting aside said order, which must therefore be considered irrevocable, and the partition made in accordance with the agreement valid.

2. ID.; ACTION FOR PARTITION; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY. When the action is for the recovery of property based upon the annulment of a partition and at the same time for the partition of the property declared to be undivided common property, it is not improper to order the partition of the estate which has been declared to be undivided common property, since there is no incompatibility between the action for the recovery of property and for partition of an inheritance, once the court has held that the property, the recovery of which is sought, belongs to the parties in common and pro indiviso.

3. ID.; ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN; THEIR SHARE IN THEIR PARENTS HEREDITARY ESTATE. Articles 843 and 941 specifically provide that the portion corresponding to natural children in the hereditary estate of the parents who acknowledged them, is transmitted upon the death of these children to their legitimate or natural descendants. The latters right, however, to represent their natural father in the hereditary estate of their grandfather is not admitted, because they are not called by law to participate in their grandfathers estate. (Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, June 16, 1918.)

4. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; MOTION TO ADMIT ANSWER. Since the defendants made the motion for the admission of their answer to the second amended complaint in open court and in the presence of all the parties, the trial court did not err in granting it and admitting said answer and in not declaring them in default, in accordance with section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

D E C I S I O N

VILLA-REAL,J.:

This is an appeal taken by the plaintiffs Natividad Centeno in her own behalf and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased father, Valentin Centeno, Jesus Centeno First, Rosalia and Rosario Centeno, and by the intervenors Nicolas, Emilio, Isaac and Jesus Centeno Second, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, of which the following is the dispositive part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The agreement of partition in question is hereby upheld, with the adjudications to the parties thereto, and therefore the partition prayed for in this civil case by plaintiffs and intervenors respecting the realty described in the sixth paragraph of the original complaint is denied. The other petition that said partition be held void and of no effect in so far as it refers only to the said portion adjudicated to defendants, is also denied.

"It is held that parcels Nos. 70, 86, and 95, described in the aforementioned sixth paragraph of the original complaint, are held by defendants pro indiviso; and the others, Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, and 69, with the metes and bounds given in the said sixth paragraph, which are in possession of the plaintiff Jesus Centeno First, as well as the others, Nos. 82, 85, and 99, which are in the possession of the defendant Telesforo Centeno.

"The defendants" petition that the first 51 parcels of land described in the said sixth paragraph of the original complaint, reproduced in the last amendatory complaint, be partitioned in this case and parcel No. 116 described in the inventory Exhibit F of the plaintiffs, and 6 of the defendants, as well as the said parcels Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, and 69, and the credits is denied; all of which are considered and declared to be pro indiviso (Exhibit 7 of the defendants), without prejudice to said partition being made in such manner as they may agree upon.

"It is ordered that the plaintiffs deliver to defendants the two parcels of land described in the latters crosscomplaint in their second cause of action, and said two mares and harness cannot be ordered delivered, because they are not formally detailed and difficulties would arise in the execution of such an order.

"As Fabian Cabanilla and Simplicio Gaberto possessors of parcels Nos. 76, 77, 59, and 100 claimed by plaintiffs and intervenors, were not made defendants in this case, no pronouncement is here made against them, nor as to parcels Nos. 52, 66, 94, and 61, the possessors of which are unknown.

"Defendants are absolved from the claims with respect to parcels Nos. 105, 106, 107, 11, 57, 75, 93, 102, 112, 115, 56, 58, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 101, 103, 108, 109, 110, 113, and 114 (43) described in the complaint.

"The pious legacy of parcel No. 104 made by the testatrix Melchora Arroyo, is upheld.

"It is ordered that each of the parties, plaintiffs, intervenors, and defendants, pay a third part of the costs of the trial.

"It is so ordered."cralaw virtua1aw library

Plaintiffs support their appeal by assigning nineteen alleged errors, and the intervenors another nineteen, to the trial court in its judgment, which we shall discuss hereinafter:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In their second and last amended complaint, the plaintiffs pray for judgment on the causes of action therein set forth: (a) Ordering the partition between plaintiffs and intervenors in accordance with the law and the wills of Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo of all properties described in the sixth paragraph of the original complaint, together with the property constituting the portion then adjudicated to the defendants in the said partition; (b) holding the said partition to be void and of no effect, only insofar as it refers to the portion adjudicated to the defendants and ordering the latter to deliver the property in their possession numbered from 52 to 115, with all its fruits, and to return what they have unduly received in said erroneous partition; (c) ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the action; and (d) granting plaintiffs such further remedy not herein prayed for as may be just and equitable.

In their second amended complaint the intervenors pray for the causes of action therein set forth that the voluntary partition of the property left by the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo be declared null and void, in so far as it respects the portion adjudicated to the defendants, ordering the latter to return to said plaintiffs and intervenors what they have unduly received in said partition.

In their amended answer, the defendants generally and specifically deny each and every one of the allegations of the complaints of the plaintiffs and the intervenors, with a special defense and cross- complaint and pray the court: (a) To absolve the said defendants from the complaint entirely; (b) to order the partition of the property under Nos. 1 to 51,. 53, 54, 55, 60, 61, 62, 69, 116. 119 and 120, with their corresponding fruits or their equivalent in money, and that their respective portions be adjudicated and delivered to these defendants, and that the credits of the deceased so far collected be equally distributed among the heirs; (c) that the plaintiff Valentin Centeno be ordered to deliver to said defendants Martina Jose and Telesforo Centeno, the property specified in paragraph 3 of the crosscomplaint, with all the fruits they produced or should have produced from 1911 up to present date, or in default thereof, to pay the value of said fruits with the proper legal interest; (d) that the plaintiff Valentin Centeno be ordered to pay the costs of this action; and (e) grant said defendants all such further remedies with respect to their rights as may be just and equitable.

The case having passed through all the proper proceeding and after hearing the evidence presented by the parties in support of their respective claims, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which is quoted above.

The preponderance of the evidence establishes the following pertinent facts necessary to the solution of the questions of fact and of law raised in the present appeal.

Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were husband and wife who brought no property to the marriage but acquired much property during their married life.

Isaac Centeno died on October 7, 1905, and was survived by his wife Melchora Arroyo, and their three sons, Valentin, Faustino and Antonio Centeno. Before his death, that is, on June 30, 1904, Isaac Centeno executed a will, one of the clauses of which contained the following provision: "I hereby named and institute as my sole and universal heirs my three sons Antonio, Valentin and Faustino Centeno or their heirs, if any, to one-half of the above-named property, provided, that the same be divided equally among my three said sons." (Exhibit D of plaintiffs and Exhibit 4 of defendants.) The will having been admitted to probate and his widow Melchora Arroyo, appointed administratrix of the property left by him, said Melchora Arroyo, as such administrator, filed with the court a detailed inventory of all the property left by her deceased husband which had come into her possession. (Exhibit F of plaintiffs and Exhibit 6 of defendants.)

On October 30, 1907, Antonio Centeno died leaving a widow, Gabriela Fernandez, and a will executed on October 9, 1907, clauses 3 and 8 of which are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Third. I declare that I was married once, being still married to Da. Gabriela Fernandez y Bribiesca, and during our union we had not a single child; I also declare that although I said I have no child, the God of pity has given me eight, who are my children by another woman, three of whom are called natural, who are Martina, Jose (alias Pepe), and Telesforo Centeno, because they were born even before I married my aforesaid wife, Da. Gabriela; the five are Sisenando, Antonina, Gregorio, Jose (alias Peping), and Gabriel Centeno, and are called illegitimate, because they were born after my marriage; nevertheless I acknowledge them all for I have had them since their birth supporting and bringing all of them, up until now.

"Eighth. Of my portion from my deceased father Isaac Centeno Purugganan, and of my future portion from my mother Da. Melchora Arroyo, I institute as my universal heirs my three children called natural, to have and to hold in fee simple during their lives, under Gods blessing and my own." (Exhibit 9-b of defendants.)

This will was probated on petition of his mother Melchora Arroyo de Centeno, and his widow, Gabriela Fernandez de Centeno.

Melchora Arroyo de Centeno died on December 8, 1909, leaving one son named Valentin Centeno, and a will executed on November 3, 1909, clause 3 of which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(c) The third part shall be divided equally, neither more nor less, among my sons Antonio and Faustino Centeno, may they rest in peace, and Valentin Centeno." (Exhibit E of plaintiffs and Exhibit 5 of defendants.)

This will was probated upon petition of Valentin Centeno, one of the executors named therein.

While testamentary proceedings for the settlement of the estates of Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were being had, the heirs of both, desiring a just and lawful partition in accordance with the wills of both, submitted for its approval to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in November, 1910 an agreement of partition executed in October, 1910 wherein Valentin Centeno, Gabriela Fernandez de Centeno widow of Antonio Centeno, and the latters acknowledged natural children, Martina and Emilio A. Centeno, and Asuncion Arcebal, widow of Faustino Centeno, for herself and in behalf of her minor son Jesus Centeno, jr., intervened as parties. (Exhibit 7 of defendants.)

On March 10, 1911, the court, acting on the motion presented by said heirs, ordered the publication in newspaper of the largest circulation in the locality once a week for three consecutive weeks, of a notice of the filing in said court of the agreement of partition of the testate estate of the deceased spouses, Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, so that each and every person interested in said property and those who might have claims thereto may present themselves before the court on the day appointed and show cause if any, why said agreement of partition should not be approved or why said estates should not be declared closed. (Exhibit 8-b of defendants.) On March 8, 19119 in pursuance of said order, the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur set the 8th of April 1911 for the hearing of the approval of the said agreement of partition. On April 20, 1911, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur issued the following order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All the heirs in this case and in No. 264 having bound themselves to answer for all just claims against the estates the subject matter of the aforesaid two cases, and having complied with the order of March 10, 1911 issued in the present case with. respect to the publication in the newspapers of the proper notification to those interested in the estate or those holding any claim against said estate, for the approval of the scheme of partition filed by the heirs, the court, notwithstanding the opposition of Pedro Arroyo to such approval, hereby approves said scheme of partition declaring said two cases closed, without prejudice to the oppositor, Pedro Arroyo, claiming his rights and legal fees from said heirs.

"It is so ordered." (Exhibit FF of plaintiffs and Exhibit 8-c of defendants.)

On October 22, 1913 the said Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur issued also the following order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The present case being called for trial for the approval of the account presented by the administratrix Gabriela F. de Centeno, the latter appeared with the heirs named Telesforo and Sisenando Centeno, and the legatee Antonina Centeno, minor.

"Inasmuch as said administratrix declares that the aforesaid heirs Telesforo and Sisenando, as well as the other heirs not present, Martina and Jose Centeno, have already received their corresponding share of the inheritance; and as the said present heirs con