Wilson Catherine, Descartes' Meditations (an Introduction)

7/22/2019 Wilson Catherine, Descartes' Meditations (an Introduction)

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D E S C A R T E S S

MEDI TATI ONSAn Introduction

C A T H E R I N E W I L S O N

University of British Columbia


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Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Paulo

Cambridge University PressThe Edinburgh Building, Cambridge , United Kingdom

First published in print format

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Catherine Wilson 2003

2003

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D E S C A R T E S S MEDITATIONS

In this new introduction to a classic philosophical text, Cather-ine Wilson examines the arguments of Descartess famousMed-itations, the book which launched modern philosophy. Draw-ing on the reinterpretations of Descartess thought of the pasttwenty-five years, she shows how Descartes constructs a theoryof the mind, the body, nature, and God from a premise of rad-ical uncertainty. She discusses in detail the historical contextof Descartess writings, and their relationship to early modern

science, and at the same time she introduces concepts and prob-lems that define the philosophical enterprise as it is understoodtoday. Following closely the text of theMeditationsand meantto be read alongside them, this survey is accessible to readers

with no previous background in philosophy. It is well suited touniversity-level courses on Descartes, but can also be read withprofit by students in other disciplines.

c a t h e r i n e w i l s o n is Professor of Philosophy at the Uni-versity of British Columbia, Vancouver. She is the author ofLeibnizs Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study(1989)andThe Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Inven-tion of the Microscope, 16201720(1995).


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c a m b r i d g e i n t r o d u c t i o n s t o k e y p h i l o s o ph i c a l t e x t s

This new series offers introductory textbooks on what are considered tobe the most important texts of Western philosophy. Each book guides thereader through the main themes and arguments of the work in question,

while also paying attention to its historical context and its philosophicallegacy. No philosophical background knowledge is assumed, and the books

will be well suited to introductory university-level courses.

Titles published in the series:

d es c ar tes s m e d i t at i o n s by Catherine Wilson


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For my children, Eva and David


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Contents

List of figures page xi

Introduction: About theMeditations 1

1 The situation of the Meditator is described and hisdesire to demolish everything and begin again isexplored, while the Reader is introduced to some basic

philosophical concepts 101 The Meditator The building metaphor Knowledgeconditions Scientific and unscientific mentalities(ATvii:1718) 10

2 The aims of an ideal scientist Sorting-procedures Belief-sets Skepticism and credulity Conformity andauthority (ATvii:18) 21

2 Meditation One

The possibility of a malevolent Demon is raised andthe Meditator resolves to doubt everything he canpossibly doubt 321 The Withholding Policy Can the senses be trusted? The

dream argument The malevolent Demon argument(ATvii:1823) 32

2 Objections to Meditation One 45

3 Meditation TwoThe Meditator discovers an indubitable propositionand continues with an investigation into her ideas ofherself and her ideas of corporeal things 501 Hyperbolic Doubt An addition to the Meditators belief-set

Cogito, sum (ATvii:235) 50

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viii Contents

2 What am I? Former opinions doubted I must be amind Seeing1andSeeing2(ATvii:2530) 57

3 What are corporeal things? Knowledge of [ideas of ]

corporeal things The piece of wax Extension Intellectpriority Mind priority (ATvii:3034) 62

4 Objections toMeditation Two 68

4 Meditation Three (i)The Meditator discovers how to distinguish true fromfalse propositions by reference to the clarity anddistinctness of his ideas and considers whether God is

merely a subjective idea 781 Clear and distinct perception Truth (ATvii:346) 782 Is the Deity (malevolent or benevolent) merely an idea? Ideas

and their sources Substance, modes, accidents Degrees ofreality and degrees of perfection Materially false ideas(ATvii:3646) 86

3 Objections toMeditation Three(i) 94

5 Meditation Three (ii)The Meditator finds that he can reach a perfect Godin his thoughts and that this God cannot perpetratefraud and deception and cannot be a Demon 971 Is God more than the Meditators invented idea? Could the

Meditator be God ? Continuous creation (ATvii:4651) 972 God is veracious The malevolent Demon is an invented

idea The natural light The conversion ofb e l i e v e to

t r u e Attaining knowledge (ATvii:512) 1033 Objections toMeditation Three(ii) 106

6 Meditation Four (i)The Meditator broods on her epistemological andmoral errors and deficiencies and discovers the truepower of her will and its spontaneous attraction totruth and goodness 1201 True and false judgment Divine and human will The use of

free will (ATvii:528) 120

7 Meditation Four (ii)The Meditator diagnoses the cause of herepistemological and moral errors, adds an


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Contents ix

error-prevention rule to her knowledge-set, andconfirms that God is truly benevolent 133

1 Error The denial of final causes Divine goodness(ATvii:5862) 133

2 Objections toMeditation Four 139

8 Meditation FiveThe Meditator reflects on his experiences ofmathematical and abstract concepts and arrives at aproof of Gods existence 1521 The essential nature of corporeal substance Category1 and

Category2 properties Mathematical objects andmathematical truths Triangles, unicorns, and God Realism and Psychologism (ATvii:635) 152

2 The Ontological Argument Could God (still) be a fictionalentity? Necessary existence (ATvii:6571) 161

3 Objections toMeditation Five 167

9 Meditation Six (i)

The Meditator determines that he is apparentlyattached to a particular human body. His mind andthis putative body are nevertheless distinct andseparable, so that immortality is possible even ifbodies in general are perishable 1701 Visual imagination The Meditators putative body

(ATvii:728) 170

2 Mortalism Distinct existence Separability of mind andbody Perception and imagination are not essential to theMeditator (ATvii:78) 176

3 Objections toMeditation Six(i) 182

10 Meditation Six (ii)The Meditator establishes that extramental corporealthings definitely exist, confirms that she has a

personal body to which she is united, and learns thatneither her sensations nor her perceptions resembletheir causes in the external world 1951 The active cause of ideas Corporeal things exist

(ATvii:7880) 195


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x Contents

2 The resemblance theory of sensation refuted GodNatureas an orderly system The unity of mind and body Sensations are confused (ATvii:801) 198

3 The resemblance theory of perception questioned(ATvii:813) 204

4 The functional body-machine The semantic theory ofsensation and perception (ATvii:834) 209

5 Objections to Meditation Six(ii) 212

11 Meditation Six (iii)The Meditator learns how her body is organized, and

discovers why her illnesses, like her errors, suggestthat God is benevolent, and determines that she canproceed confidently in all the sciences 2151 Sensory error The sick body and its sensations The

nervous system (ATvii:849) 2152 The end of doubt (ATvii:8990) 2193 Objections to Meditation Six(iii) 224

12 Descartes in context 2301 The enigma of theMeditations 2302 Some reactions to Cartesianism 2383 Reception and repercussions of Cartesian doctrine in

seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy 2414 Descartes and the formation of modernity 250

Appendix: the Objectors 256Glossary 258Further reading 262Index 266


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Figures

1 The overall task of becoming an ideal scientist page252 The Method of Total Credulity 263 The Method of Total Skepticism 274 The Subjective Policy 285 The Authority Principle 296 The Conformity Policy 297 The Withholding Policy 35

8 The Meditators belief-set at the beginning ofMeditation One 36

9 How things stand if there is a malevolent Demon 4110 The Meditators belief-set at the end ofMeditation One 4211 The Meditators belief-set at the beginning ofMeditation

Two 5112 A possible revision to the Meditators belief-set (rejected) 53

13 Another possible revision to the Meditators belief-set(rejected) 54

14 The Meditators belief-set at the end of p.25,Meditation Two 57

15 The Meditators belief-set at the end of p.27,Meditation Two 59

16 The Meditators belief-set at the end ofMeditation Two 67

17 The Meditators belief-set at the beginning ofMeditation Three 7918 The Meditators overall task 8019 The conversion ofb e l i e v e tot r u e 10420 The Meditators knowledge-set at the end of

Meditation Three 10621 The Cartesian Circle 111

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xii List of figures

22 The Meditators knowledge-set at the end ofMeditation Four 137

23 The Meditators knowledge-set at the beginning ofMeditation Five 153

24 Category1and Category2 properties 15425 The Meditators knowledge-set at the end of

Meditation Five 16626 The set of propositions that are still doubtful at the

beginning ofMeditation Six 17627 The set of propositions that are still doubtful in

the middle ofMeditation Six 19828 The Meditators knowledge-set inMeditation Six, p.81 20429 The Meditators knowledge-set at the conclusion of

Meditation Six 220


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Introduction: About theMeditations

DescartessMeditations on First Philosophy, first published in1641, aredevoted to the following philosophical questions: What can we cometo know about the human mind and its powers? Is there a realitybehind appearances, and, if so, how can we have access to it? Do ourexperiences arise from our bodies and our brains, or could we think,feel, and perceive without them? How can we recognize truth anddistinguish it from false and confused opinion? Is there is a God, and,

if so, is this God benevolent, malevolent, or simply indifferent to us?If this God is benevolent, how should we understand illness, error,and morally wrong actions?

This book is intended as a first introduction to the Meditationsand, at the same time, as an introduction to some basic problems andterminology of analytic philosophy, including the theory of knowl-edge, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of perception,

and philosophy of language. No previous experience in philosophy ispresupposed. Chapter1is an introduction to the problem of knowl-edge in Cartesian terms and Chapters 211lead the reader throughthe arguments of theMeditations, explaining and commenting on theimportant points along the way. Chapter 12offers an explanation ofthe relationship of theMeditationsto Descartess other writings, anddiscusses the conflicting perceptions of Descartes in his own time. It

outlines the relationship between Cartesian problems and doctrinesand the evolution of modern philosophy. While theMeditationsareunusual amongst philosophical works, insofar as it is possible to re-construct and follow Descartess main arguments without knowinganything about the seventeenth-century background, a brief surveyof Descartess life, character, and aspirations will help to set the stagefor a detailed treatment of his text.

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2 DescartessMeditations

descartess life

Rene Descartes was born March 31, 1596, in Touraine, southeast ofParis, and educated at the Jesuit college of La Fleche, to which hewas sent as a boarder at the age of ten. His future role as the founderof modern philosophy was not foreshadowed in his early accom-plishments and interests. Somewhat sickly and fond of his sleep not unusual qualities in an adolescent the young Descartes showedno signs of iconoclasm or even of philosophical acumen. He stud-ied logic, grammar, poetry, and history, and although he was an avid

reader and much favored by the schoolmasters, the literary side of hiseducation interested him less than the mathematical. After leavingschool, he acquired a law degree but he never practiced. He wrote toa friend that he would have been happy as an artisan.

Returning home, Descartes learned such skills of the minor no-bility as how to ride a horse and handle weapons. He was, however,not satisfied with life on a country estate and his family sent him to

Paris, where he continued to study mathematics. In 1618, he signedon with Prince Maurice of Nassau who was fighting the Spanish,to experience, he said, the theatre of the world, to learn its man-ners and customs. He left the Netherlands in 1619 on a long tourthrough Eastern Europe. Wintering in southern Germany, he soughtout learned persons for discussion before moving to Prague, where heencountered Tycho Brahes new cosmological system, a compromise

between the earth-centered system of the universe still in great favorand Copernicuss heliocentric cosmology, which represented our sunas only one of a multitude of stars and our planet as an even smallerspeck on the cosmic scene. He studied geometry, optics, mechan-ics, music theory, and animal physiology. He began to wonder howthe mind fitted or did not fit into the world of physical objects andprocesses.

A series of dreams in 1619convinced Descartes that he had beenspecially favored by God and was destined to be a philosopher, which,in the terminology of the time, meant one devoted generally to thepursuit of knowledge of all things. The dreams stimulated nine yearsof work attempting to perfect a method of discovery, but in 1623Descartes was still searching for a profession. He had published noth-ing in philosophy, or in any other field, though his ambitions were


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Introduction 3

grand. He announced to his friends that mathematics, as it was taughtand applied in a haphazard and unsystematic way, was virtually use-less, and stated his plan to invent a method of formal reasoninggoverning proportion and quantity of which ordinary geometry andarithmetic would compose only a part. This mathesis universalisoruniversal analytical method would embrace physical questions and,by extension, moral questions, insofar as these depended on humannature and the nature of the world. Returning to Paris, Descartesenjoyed an agreeable and innocent life, working on his universalmethod, and studying the theory of lenses. HisRules for the Direction

of the Mind, formulated and partially written down in the early1620s,presented some methodological ideas, along with some ideas aboutvisual perception, but he was not sufficiently satisfied with them topublish them during his lifetime.

A popular image of Descartes represents him as a quiet and medita-tive person who enjoyed sitting still in his room and thinking. In fact,he was an unusually restless man who moved around and changed

his residence frequently. Within a few years, he had decided to leaveParis, to escape the heat of the city, he claimed, and the press ofcrowds.

Infact,hewasbeginningtofindtheParisianintellectualclimatetooconservative. The liberal atmosphere of Amsterdam enticed him backto the Netherlands, and, in 1628, Descartes settled there, to pursuehis thoughts on philosophy in the broad sense, considering especially

its claim to independence from theology. He was not interested, hedecided, in theological subtleties and the mysteries of eternal salvationbut in happiness in this life. It seemed to him that the union ofmedicine and mathematics through the formulation of a rationallyintelligible account of the human body was the key to happiness,since both physical and emotional suffering had their basis in thebody. He began to study the structure of animals, buying cadavers in

butchers shops to take home and dissect. He also sketched out a two-part treatise on natural philosophy. The first part would be concernedwith the constitution of matter and light, the laws of nature, and theorigins and structure of the cosmos, and the second part would beconcerned with animal and human bodies, considered as machines.

The treatise was never published, though the first part was am-plified and reworked and eventually published as the Principles of


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Philosophy. Then, in1637, at the age of forty-one, Descartes broughtout anonymously three scientificEssays, theOptics, theGeometry, andtheMeteorology, the last dealing primarily with celestial phenomena.He appended to them a personal essay, theDiscourse on Method, thatdetailed his frustrations with his own education, the uselessness of tra-ditional philosophy, his beliefs about the similarities and differencesbetween humans and animals, and his hope to be able to introduceinto other areas of science the analytical techniques he had employedsuccessfully in theEssays. He advanced the view that a proper under-standing of the functioning of the human body would contribute to

the improvement of medicine and morals and that a well-foundedtheory of the physical world would render us masters and possessorsof Nature.

The Essayswere followed four years later by the Meditations onFirst Philosophy. To the surprise of some of his followers, Descarteshad turned his attention away from anatomy and physiology and fromhis theories regarding terrestrial and celestial phenomena. Instead, the

Meditationstook up the traditional topics of metaphysics God andthe soul and the traditional topics of epistemology truth, error,and the role of the senses in the acquisition of knowledge. Readerscurious as to why Descartes set off in this new direction and whatits consequences were will find further information and explanation,some of it necessarily speculative, in Chapter 12.

Descartes moved to a pleasant chateau near Leyden in 1643, shortly

before releasing his complete system of the natural world as thePrinciples of Philosophyin 1644. Recalled to Paris, he objected to beingput on display like an elephant or a panther and instead acceptedthe invitation of Queen Christina of Sweden to move to Stockholmto serve as her instructor, though she made little use of his talents.His interests shifted once more, this time from the physical sciencesand metaphysics to what we would today call psychology and ethics.

He wanted to understand the function of the passions that we suf-fer through our encounters with persons, objects, and events in theworld, especially love, hatred, wonder, desire, joy, and sadness, andto determine how to overcome such psychological evils as anger, de-pression, and the fear of death. His last work, thePassions of the Soul,published after his death in 1650, developed out of an exchange of


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Introduction 5

letters with the lonely and intellectual Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia.The Passionsdescribe the physical symptoms attached to the emotionsand offer moral advice about their management.

Descartess personal life can be reconstructed from the five volumesoflettersheleftbehind.Theseconveytheimpressionofaproud,sensi-tive, somewhat emotionally volatile man, anxious as to his reputationand not always perfectly straightforward in his accounts of himself,but whose commitment to clarity and truth is beyond doubt. Hisirascible and jealous nature did not preclude warmth and tenderness.He had an illegitimate daughter who died in early childhood and for

whom he grieved for a long time. His letters touching on love andthe passions have recently begun to intrigue commentators, some ofwhom note the first intimations of a theory of the unconscious.

t h e m e d i t at i o n s

Many earlier philosophical books had purported to answer the ques-

tions of metaphysics and epistemology posed in the opening para-graph above. For all the precise and subtle reasoning employed bytheir authors, they were known to contradict one another. Worse, theplurality of opinions seemed to give rise to the following paradox: Ifwe do not know what is metaphysicallytrue about God, the mind, andthe world, and what is false and confused, how can we establish thata particular philosophers epistemologicalconception of how to dis-

tinguish truth from falsehood is not false and confused? At the sametime, if we cannot have confidence in a particular philosophers epis-temology, how can we trust the metaphysical conclusions presentedin the philosophers writings?

TheMeditationsaddress this paradox. Descartes makes no directreference in this text to past philosophers and their writings. He doesnot build on, or try to develop or refute the ideas of other philoso-

phers, at least not explicitly. Like a mathematician, he tries to for-mulate a self-contained proof. (Mathematically inclined readers willbe reminded of the method of indirect proof, in which we assumethat a proposition that we suspect is true is actually false.) Like anexperimentalist, he changes ordinary conditions to see what happens.(His contemporary Francis Bacon tried carrying a clock down to the


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bottom of a mine and stuffing the carcass of a chicken with snow;Galileo Galilei rolled a ball down a carefully constructed inclinedplane.) Whether one sees the Meditator as trying out a thought-experiment in which customary ways of thinking are controlled andconstrained like experimental objects, or as trying out the equiva-lent of an indirect proof in mathematics, the starting point of theMeditations is largely free of positive assumptions. The Meditatorsettles on a policy of radical and systematic doubt, uncertain at firstwhether anything is thereby to be gained. As it turns out, the policy issuccessful. It leads to significant discoveries in both metaphysics and

epistemology and to the discovery of some fundamental principlesof natural philosophy concerning the human body and the bodiessurrounding it. The Meditator even becomes convinced that, if fu-ture inquirers adopt his method, they will be able to make furtherdiscoveries about themselves and about the material world.

TheMeditationsare written from the first-person perspective of anarrator, the Meditator. Is the I of theMeditationsRene Descartes

himself, recounting what he experienced and thought, over a periodof precisely six days in 1640? Many introductions to theMeditationstreat the Meditator as Descartes and describe Descartes as entertain-ing certain propositions or as coming to accept certain conclusions.I have not followed this practice for several reasons. First, the as-sumption that the I of the Meditationsshould be identified withthe historical Descartes seemed methodologically unsound, insofar as

the Six Days of Meditation never occurred, at least as far as we know.A number of the insights that suddenly occur to the Meditator including the insight immortalized in the phrase cogito, ergo sum: Ithink, therefore I am had occurred to the historical Descartes yearsearlier. The historical Descartes had even long since worked out anentire system of the physical universe and the human body of whichhe was quite certain, which the Meditator gives no hint of having ever

done. The Meditator is better regarded as a fictional character (whocould have existed) in a story taking the form of a voyage of intel-lectual (rather than geographical) discovery. The historical Descartestells the story of the Meditator to a certain purpose, as is explained inChapter12.

Descartes believed that anyone who started at the Meditators start-ing point and who employed his reasoning powers appropriately


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Introduction 7

would arrive at precisely the same conclusions as his Meditator does.He was not merely expressing the views hehad arrived at by followinga particular train of thought that could well have gone in a numberof other directions. Everyone, according to Descartes, not only thosewith special aptitude and schooling, can be or become a philosopher.He wanted his audience to identify with his Meditator and to thinkalong with his Meditator and it is hard not to do so. While it mighthave seemed appropriate to refer to the Meditator as It, especiallysince, for more than five of the sixMeditations, the Meditator is un-persuaded of the existence of an external world and of the Meditators

own body, custom and clarity dictated the use of the anthropologicalpronouns, and I have accordingly alternated between he and she,for the most part on aMeditation-by-Meditationbasis.

Descartes believed that, while later investigators might add to theknowledge of nature indefinitely, the answers he had given in theMeditationsto the metaphysical and epistemological questions posedabove were authoritative and final. His arguments were sound and

his conclusions could not be overturned. Nor was there anythingsignificant to be added to them. Are Descartess claims about thenature of truth, God, the mind, and the world really authoritative andfinal?ManyofDescartesscontemporariesthemorefamousamongstthem as well as the more obscure strenuously denied that they were.Others became convinced Cartesians. Every reader of theMeditationshas to try to decide the question for him or herself, by following the

arguments and by applying to them the rigorous standards of criticalthinking on which Descartes himself insisted.

The question whether Descartess claims were all true and ade-quately demonstrated is of course different from the question of hisinfluence on the history of modern philosophy and modern science.This influence is profound, and Descartes can be said to have definedthe main problems of modern philosophy for his immediate succes-

sors, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Berkeley. The best reasonfor reading Descartes, however, is not that what he said is beyondcriticism, nor that his historical role as founder of modern philoso-phy makes him a worthy author. Rather, reading Descartes is a goodexperience, the philosophical equivalent of a journey to an interest-ing territory undertaken in the company of an agreeable stranger. Nomatter how many times one has read and annotated a copy of the


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Meditations, a fresh reading is virtually guaranteed to bring new ideasand insights.

Besides the sharp distinction preserved in this text between thehistorical Descartes the seventeenth-century intellectual combat-ant, friend and foe of numerous illustrious philosophers and hissolitary Meditator, two other departures from past convention areworth mentioning. First, the present commentary proceeds in strictchronological order, taking the arguments in exactly the sequencein which they come. Each section is geared to a set of quotationsfrom theMeditationsthat are identified by a reference to the standard

edition of Descartess writings. Second, discussion of theObjectionsto theMeditationsand DescartessRepliesto them has been relegatedto the end of the main chapters.

t h e o b j e c t i o n s a n d r e p l i e s

The seven sets ofObjectionsandRepliesthat Descartes appended to

his Meditations are indispensable to an understanding of his maintext. Recognizing their importance, past studies have moved backand forth between exposition and interpretation of Descartess doc-trine and analysis of the reactions to it by the more notable of hiscommentators. As well as forcing the reader to identify Descartes andthe Meditator, this treatment interrupts the flow of theMeditations.Descartes could have written a dialectical treatise, considering and an-

swering objections as he went along. He explains his reasons for notdoing so and, as they are entirely credible, I resolved to respect them,even when some explanatory digressions were required to explain themain text. Young persons of my acquaintance pointed out that somereaders would be tempted to skip the discussion of theObjectionsandRepliesat the end of each chapter. Well, an author is not after all apoliceman . . . I can only hope that readers will not succumb to this

temptation, even if it is only for self-interested reasons. The criticismsraised and parried not only clarify the meaning of the earlier text anddeepen the readers appreciation of the issues, but are an excellentsource of topics for examinations and term papers.

Though I have tried to represent Descartess arguments and inten-tions as objectively as possible, every commentary is at the same time


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Introduction 9

an interpretation and the present commentary is no exception. I havetakenthedoctrineofthegoodbodyofMeditation Sixto be Descartessintended contribution to natural philosophy and have laid more thanusual emphasis on the preoccupation of his critics with the possibil-ity that God is fictional and that corporeal substance can think. Myintellectual debts to the books and articles cited in the section onFurther Reading and to colleagues and students are at the same timesubstantial. Discussions with Husain Sarkar and Gabor Boros helpedespecially to shape my understanding of Descartess procedures onone hand and of the theodicy hidden in his metaphysics on the other.

I am also grateful to Tim Christie for assistance with the Index, and toHilary Gaskin for proposing the project and for sound advice alongthe way. The edition cited isThe Philosophical Writings of Descartes,3volumes, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, DugaldMurdoch and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 198491). References in the text (AT) are to the standard edi-tion,Oeuvres de Descartes, 11volumes, edited by Charles Adam and

Paul Tannery (Paris, Vrin/CNRS, 196476). Citations are by volumenumber and page, as these are given in the English translation.


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c h a p te r 1

The situation of the Meditator is described andhis desire to demolish everything and begin again

is explored, while the Reader is introduced tosome basic philosophical concepts

1 t h e m e d i tat o r t h e b u i l d i n gm e ta p h o r k n o w l e d g e - c o n d i t i o n s s c i e n t i f i c

a n d u n s c i e n t i f i c m e n ta l i t i e s ( at v i i : 1 7 1 8 )

Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had

accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature ofthe whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. I realized thatit was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everythingcompletely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted toestablish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last.

(vii:17)

Our first introduction to the Meditator finds him in a mood of dis-illusion but, at the same time, full of confident resolve.

The Meditators aim, it seems, is to establish something in thesciences that will be stable and likely to last. He has apparently justrealized that he is going to have to demolish everything completelyand start again right from the foundations in order to accomplish

this task.This announcement raises a number of questions. Who is theMeditator and why is he so disenchanted? How did the Meditatordiscover some years ago that the beliefs he had acquired in childhoodand built on subsequently were falsehoods? Why did he wait so longto do anything about this grievous state of affairs? What is the planto demolish everything completely and why does the Meditator

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The situation of the Meditator 11

think demolishing everything is the essential first step to establishingsomething firm in the sciences?

We know very little about the Meditator. He must be an adult, sincehe refers to his childhood as past. He seems to be at least temporarilyrelieved of the pressures of having to make a living, though he refers toworries that he has for the moment set aside. He has some leisure inwhich to reflect. Otherwise, we know nothing about the Meditator,not his age, his educational and family background, or his customaryoccupation, only that he is dissatisfied with the number of falsehoodshe has accepted and that he sees the need to remedy this situation.

The sudden emergence of a decision to change ones life completelyafter years of inaction is not beyond comprehension. One who haslived in the same city for twenty years might come to the realizationthat a large number of the friendships established in childhood andmaintained since are weighing him down. One who has lived all herlife in an apartment inherited from her deceased parents might comein time to appreciate the inadequacy of the roof, the faulty plumbing,

and the defects in the appliances. Regardless of feelings of familiarityand attachment, one might become convinced that these fixtures haveto go.

Of course, in order to build, it is not usually necessary to demolisheverything completely. Even if your circle of friends seems tiresome,there are usually one or two you would just as soon keep. Sometimesan old flat can be restored and refurbished. At other times, partial

measures do not seem to work. The old structure can get in the wayof the new structure. The old building may have to be dynamitedand carted away before new construction goes up.

The two vignettes capture something of the Meditators situation.Like familiar companions and familiar surroundings, his old beliefsserved him well enough for a time, but increasingly he sees them asunsatisfactory, in the same way that the people and surroundings of

ones childhood can come to seem limited. The Meditator even ex-presses his dissatisfactions through an analogy between what might becalled his knowledge-condition and an old building he inhabits. Anindividuals knowledge-condition can be thought of on analogy withhis or her health-status or financial condition. My knowledge-condition is the good, bad, or indifferent condition I am in with


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respect to possessing knowledge, as opposed to possessing health ormoney.

There are many respects in which possessing knowledge is notmuch like owning or living in a house. There are, however, sev-eral similarities that make the analogy work, beyond the fact thatboth knowledge and houses can be expensive to acquire. A house isconstructed:itisbuiltupoutofvariousmaterialswood,metal,sandcollected in the environment or acquired from others. These are notthrown into a pile together, but are given a structure. Knowledge,too, is built up out of observations collected in the environment or

acquired from others. The data of experience have to be assembledin a certain way or we will have nothing more than a chaos of sen-sations such as we suppose infants to have. A house is functional: itoffers a place to eat, rest, and store things. A mind well-stocked withknowledge-items provides psychological nourishment and recreation.Moreover, being well informed is a precondition of making sensibledecisions in practical matters. Finally, a house can be expandedand

improved: I can clean out musty corners, upgrade the plumbing orwiring, add rooms, terraces, balconies, or entire stories. My knowl-edge can be upgraded, expanded, and improved as well. I can ridmyself of misconceptions, refine my knowledge of particular topics,and master entirely new subject areas.

There are several further similarities. A house can be erected care-lessly, without a proper foundation, leaving it in danger of collapse. A

house, however elaborate and ornate, can also be only a dream-castlethat has no substantiality and that will vanish as soon as I wake up orcome out of my reverie. Analogously, my knowledge-condition canbe without good and proper foundations and accordingly shaky, oreven purely illusory.

When a sweet illusion vanishes say, the illusion that one was goingto capture some attractive prize with little trouble ones feeling is

often that the props that were holding up ones view of the worldhave been kicked out and that something has collapsed. Nevertheless,the Meditator has two distinct worries, one about the foundationsofhis knowledge, another about its possiblyillusorycharacter. A dream-edifice cannot collapse though it can be dreamed to collapse. Dreamcastles do not come with dream-foundations, or dream-plumbingand wiring, for that matter. An edifice without a foundation cannot,


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in the ordinary course of things, vanish into nothing. Still, what isgroundless or unfounded merges in our experience with whatis delusory. Both are threats to the stability and permanence of thehouse the Meditator imagines himself to possess.

The Meditator has not explained where his feelings of insecurityand doubt with respect to his knowledge-condition stem from. Whydoes he think that a complete overhaul of his existing beliefs is calledfor? This question is perhaps best approached by scrutinizing hiswish to establish something in the sciences that is stable and likelyto last, since this is the avowed purpose of the planned destructive

activity.Which sciences is the Meditator interested in, one might wonder?

After all, there are many sciences anatomy, chemistry, mathematics,physics, physiology, astronomy representing the various specialties.No one can seriously wish to contribute significantly to all of them.The Meditator does not say to which science he wishes to contribute.He does not present the familiar profile of the enthusiast for black

holes, sharks, prime numbers, or some other particular type of objector phenomenon that has produced total scientific dedication in thisperson. The Meditator may, for all we know, be fascinated by someparticular type of object, or some phenomenon, but he has not givenany clue so far. All we know is that he has general scientific ambitions.So it is appropriate to ask: What differentiates the general orientationof the scientist from the nonscientists? What is it to want, in a general

way, to establish something in the sciences without being an enthusiastfor a particular subject?

Here is a provisional, doubtless somewhat controversial, charac-terization: Both the scientist and the nonscientist are interested inthings natural things, manufactured things, social things, expe-rienced things. The nonscientist (more precisely, the person whoseattitude towards things at the moment is not scientific) thinks about,

looks at, interacts with, describes, imagines, dreams of, tries to obtain,hopes for, ignores, or fears things. The scientist (more precisely, theperson adopting at the moment the scientific stance towards things)is in pursuit of nonobvious truths about things truths that can onlybe discovered by long observation, or by observation under controlledcircumstances, by experimentation, by precise measurement. One canhave either a scientific or a nonscientific attitude towards any and all


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of the following: dreams, tropical birds, hairstyles, soil . . . dependingon whether one is trying to find out some nonobvious truth aboutthem, or just thinking about them, or liking, or not liking, some ofthem.

Often, scientists voice the opinion that knowing nonobvious truthsabout things is useful, claiming that possession of the truth enableshumanbeingstochangetheworldforthebetter.Advancesinscientificknowledge, it is often said, can be applied to the relief of physical andpsychological suffering and deprivation, prolonging life and healthand making us less susceptible to misfortune. Scientists may even

explain why they wanted to become or are gratified to be scientists byreference to their altruistic motives. Yet think on what happenedto Pandora with her Box, or the development of the atomic bomb the pursuit of nonobvious truths about what things are really like,or what is inside them, can be dangerous. Scientists can be deludedabout the benefits to humanity that will flow from the pursuit ofsome nonobvious truth, or about the appropriateness of some kinds

of science for someone with genuinely altruistic motives. Just as often,however, scientists express their opinion that the successful pursuitof nonobvious truth provides them with a unique kind of personalsatisfaction that cannot be obtained in any other way. To have ascientific orientation is not necessarily to be interested in power andcontrol, or even in providing benefits to humanity. One can wantto be a scientist because one finds knowledge of nonobvious truths

worth having for its own sake.The scientist whether practically inclined and altruistically mo-

tivated or disinterested (we can ignore the rare malevolent scientistwho truly wishes to worsen the condition of the world) has a fur-ther, important, goal in addition to that of getting to know manynonobvious truths. He or she does not want to believe anything thatis false. It is just as important not to accept as true many nonobvious

errors and superstitions as not to be ignorant of the truth. Skepticismis an important feature of the scientific attitude.The provisional characterization of the scientific attitude just given

does not permit us decisively to classify all orientations towards a thingas scientific or nonscientific. Is my study of the prices, heights, andcolors of tulips for sale over the Internet scientific? Yes, but onlyweakly so; for the knowledge I am seeking, though not obvious to


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everybody, is relatively superficial. Are the detailed investigations ofa jealous lover into the beloveds behavior scientific? They are cer-tainly intended to get at some nonobvious truths that will changethe condition of the world for the better in the eyes of the in-vestigator, anyway. However, the distanced, skeptical attitude maybe conspicuously lacking. There is a continuum between scientificand nonscientific interests, with some kinds of investigation resem-bling more closely our stereotype of scientific activity as laboratorywork carried out in a white coat with a microscope. The definitiongiven should, however, be enough to start with. As an aspiring scien-

tist, the Meditator is oriented to the discovery of some nonobvioustruths about things, and likely believes both that practical benefitswill flow from their discovery and that their discovery is intrinsicallysatisfying.

There are two ways to address the question of the Meditatorsdissatisfaction with his knowledge-condition, keeping in mind theanalogy between knowledge and houses. One can take ahistorical

perspective and ask why someone of a certain background, livinglike the author of the Meditations in Amsterdam in the middle ofthe seventeenth-century, might have come to doubt whether his orher knowledge was in good condition. One can also take atimelessperspective and ask why anyone, in any historical era for example,in the early twenty-first century might come to doubt whether hisor her knowledge was in good condition. Let us take up the historical

question first.Today, we are accustomed to the idea that scientific discovery builds

on previous discovery, that scientific knowledge is cumulative. FromCopernicuss astronomy, the modern theory of the universe was born.From the theory of elements discovered in the eighteenth century,modern chemistry was born. Furthermore, our latest methods andtechniques seem to build on our experience with previous meth-

ods and techniques. Scientific method, as we know it, comprisescertain tests and procedures. For example, it is often said that scien-tific hypotheses must be verifiable or falsifiable by experiment, thatexperimental results must be reproducible, and that quantitative re-lationships should be sought corresponding to all qualitative differ-ences. Science also comprises certain techniques the employmentof statistical inference based on the laws of probability, methods for


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determining causal relationships such as regression analysis, and theuse of instruments for visualization and measurement.

Ifanaspiringscientisttodaydeclaredthatitwasnecessarytodemol-ish all existing knowledge in the sciences and to reject all the canonsof experimental practice and the interpretation of data in order to es-tablish stable and lasting results, we could hardly regard him or her asa serious aspirant to the scientific life. Only a crank would make sucha proposal. The Meditator, however, is a fictional character createdby Rene Descartes in 1640and the Meditators situation reflects hiscreators historical context. In1640, the fundamentals of modern sci-

ence have not been established. An omnipotent and benevolent Godis widely believed in Christian countries to have created the cosmosfrom nothing in seven days, as reported in the Book of Genesis, andthen to have created each type of animal, vegetable, and mineral inmore or less the way it now appears on earth. Heaven and hell areconsidered to be real places, to which God will assign us after death.The Ptolemaic system, with the earth at the center of the universe,

with or without certain modifications, is still taught in the universi-ties. The laws of mechanics and the inverse-square law of gravitationhave not yet been stated. The nature of light is unknown. It is still amystery why living creatures need to breathe air and what warms theirblood. The chemical elements, their attributes, and their principles ofcombination have not been identified. Doctors can do little except setbroken bones, lance abscesses, and induce sleep. The microscope and

the telescope, however, have just come into use. Galileo, followingCopernicus, has insisted that the earth orbits a stationary sun, which,he somewhat implausibly claims, is another star.

Meanwhile, the moral and philosophical treatises of ancient au-thors, long lost or forgotten in Europe, have been recovered andtranslated, published, and reread. Many of these texts contradictChristian theology and Christian ethics. Among the recovered works

are the systems of the ancient Stoics, with their world soul, andtheir ethics based on personal virtue and the ideal of self-sufficiency.The ancient Epicureans are discovered to have denied the existenceof a providential God who created and supervises the universe. Theypropound the doctrine that the world and all its creatures, includ-ing human beings, came into existence by chance from clusters ofatoms moving aimlessly in a void and will dissolve into atoms again.


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Who, amongst all these speculators, self-proclaimed authorities, an-cient eminences, and powerful dispensers of official knowledge, is tobe believed?

The printing press, invented almost 200years earlier is, by1640,pouring out essays, treatises, polemical works, astronomical tables,strange descriptions of distant lands, people, and wild beasts, andbooks of recipes and cures for every manner of illness. A few hereti-cal treatises and dialogues cast doubt openly on the existence ofthe Christian God. It is not clear what anyone should believe, forthe books contradict one another. Can salamanders live in fire?

Do all diseases come from the stars? Are there witches? This is theMeditators time-bound predicament: He doesnt know what to thinkabout himself, the world around him, or God. He is like someone whohas come into a room in which many noisy arguments are going on.People with raised and sometimes barely intelligible voices aremaking competing claims, credible and incredible. It is no wonderthat he has a strong compulsion to put his hands over his ears and

block out all the noise.Nor is there much in 1640 by way of knowledge of scientific

method. Although mathematics employs certain standard methods ofanalysis for the solution of problems and although Francis Bacon hasproposed a novel method of classifying observations in order to arriveat a knowledge of nonobvious truths in his New Organonof1620,there are no established canons of experimental practice, laboratory

manuals, or statistics textbooks. The Meditator is a would-be scientistwho is convinced that the question of method is as fundamental toinquiry in the natural sciences as it is to mathematics, but who has noproven techniques and instruments and who has no trustworthy bodyof scientific data to ground his inquiries. His impulse to demolish isnot, taken in its proper context, the whim of a crank. We could putthe point as follows. If in our time it would be counterproductive

to demolish everything in order to become a scientist, this is chieflybecause creatures like the Meditator succeeded inbecomingscientistswhen there were none before.

The problem of knowledge can also be considered from a time-less perspective. Think of my knowledge-condition as a model, orrepresentation, of the world existing in my mind that enables me tothink certain thoughts, to write or speak certain sentences, and to


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pronounce certain opinions and beliefs true and others false. If, forexample, I am asked to describe the room in which I am sitting, Ican report that the walls are a biscuit color, that there are sofas andcarpets, pictures and ornaments, a piano, a view to the west, and soon. I can explain how some of the mechanisms in the room work;for example, how to turn on the lights and heating, and how certainobjects came to be as they are, such as the cushion whose edges werenibbled by mice. Going beyond my own room, I can describe my city,explain how some of its institutions work, and give some account ofits history and evolution.

My knowledge-condition with respect to my room and even mycity is, I might think, not too bad. A little reflection, however, willshow that confidence in the adequacy of my representation with re-spect to descriptive, explanatory, and historical accuracy is unjustified.I do not know the name of the species of palm in the window, orhow the heating system actually works, or in what year the pictureof a small boat tied to its dock was painted. There are corresponding

deficits in my knowledge of Vancouver, Canada. The more detail Itry to provide about my surroundings, the more mis-statements willcreep into my account and the more evident my ignorance of featuresof even my immediate environment will become. When it comes tomy overall representation of the world outside my room and my city,my knowledge-condition is even poorer.

One might suppose that I at least have considerable knowledge of

myself. However, reflection again suggests that my representation ormodel of myself is not as good as I am inclined at first to think. It istrue that I remember many events of years past, but these constituteafter all only a fraction of my past experiences. I imagine that I knowthings about myself that no one else knows, but introspection doesnot teach me as much about myself as I might at first suppose. Whatam I really like? Am I courageous? Generous? Do I like Brahms? In

some circumstances, yes, in others, no.Imagine being asked to write a descriptive essay that contains every-thing you know. For this experiment, you are given piles of paper andpencils, as much time as you need, and proper rest and nourishment.You are not, however, permitted to consult any books, newspapers,websites, or other media, or to ask questions of anyone else. What-ever you know about the fundamental particles of physics, geography


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and the world-economy, astronomy and cosmology, the behavior ofanimals, snow, sleet and hail, aerodynamics, human physiology andpsychology, and what you are like as an individual, has to comeout of your own head and will therefore represent your knowledge-condition, more or less as it is.

If I were required to write such an essay, it would be, even un-der the most favorable writing-conditions, rather short at most, afew hundred pages. It would also be somewhat ridiculous, to the eyeof the expert at least. This is not because I am an ignorant person.My explanation for why it snows might even employ such special-

ized concepts as water molecules, freezing points, crystallization, andthe stability of the hexagonal form. To a meteorologist, however, itwould probably appear hilariously garbled. My account of povertyand wealth, though I fancy I have some insight into these matters,would be considered hopelessly nave by each of: an economist, asociologist, a social worker, and an entrepreneur. My interpretationof my own personality and past behavior might seem self-serving to

a psychologist or any more objective observer.The situation is the same for all of us. Our individual representa-

tions of the world in which we are situated, no matter how insightfulor well-read we consider ourselves to be, are like the Meditatorshouse, without solid foundations. We know that there are protons,molecules, labor-markets, weight, neurotransmitters, horses, genes,rituals, speed, feathers, asteroids, gravitational and electromagnetic

forces. We have the vague idea that some of these terms are morebasic than others molecules, for example, and forces. None ofus, however, can claim to be certain what the foundations of theworld actually look like, what concepts are truly fundamental. Weknow as well that our so-called explanations for why things happenand our historical reconstructions of the past are largely fantastic. Sowe know on reflection that our personal knowledge-edifices are not

built on very solid foundations and that we spend much of our timein dream-houses.Nevertheless one might think there are people who know

about protons, and the economy, and genes, and all these matters,including the physicist, the meteorologist, the paleontologist, thebiologist, and so on. They are experts, and if you want your houseto have better foundations and to have fewer imaginary features, you


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need only consult them. Think of the millions of volumes in thegreat public libraries of the world. No single mind could embracethe knowledge they contain. It is unreasonable for an individual toaspire to a knowledge-condition that represents everything fully andaccurately. Collectively, though, our representation of the world hasgood foundations and is solid. On this view, the Meditators timelessconcerns about the foundations, solidity, and reality of his house areneedless. There is no particular reason for any individual to be tooworried about his or her own knowledge-condition. Each of us hasas much knowledge as we need to get through the day and to earn

a living, and it is only rarely that we feel we lack some key piece ofinformation. Moreover, we all make up a part of humanity, which,taken as a whole, is very well informed indeed.

Well, that is an optimistic view. But it is problematic. Confidencein the collective knowledge of humanity is hard to sustain. Surelythe contents of the great libraries of the world contain, if not morefalsehoods altogether than truths, at least plenty of falsehoods? Why

else do textbooks have to be revised year after year? Further, the expertsdisagree about many things, starting with such simple matters as whata person ought to eat to remain healthy, which you might think hadbeen settled long ago, and going on to such matters as whether theuniversewillcometoanendinahugeexplosionorwillendureforever.We can refer in a vague way to the wisdom of the human race atthe dawn of the twenty-first century. However, while it makes sense

to speak ofmyrepresentation of the world,myknowledge-condition,there is no representation of the world thought or written that wecould designate as ourrepresentation of the world, the knowledge-condition of the collective mind, for there is no collective mind. Thereare only many books, many experts (and frauds), many opinions. Itis perhaps fair to say that we humans know a good deal and seemto be in a reasonably good knowledge-condition, relative to gorillas

or birds. Nevertheless, wherever we can point to a material artifactthat contains vast quantities of knowledge, such as an encyclopedia,we can be certain that no mind contains it. Any actual collectionof minds contains much that is mere illusion and that lacks goodfoundations. So there is little comfort to be had in the thought thatthere is a collective representation of the world that is adequate.


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Suppose it is up to me and I want to improve my representation ofthe world. I shall try to identify and learn from those persons whoseexpertise I have reason to credit. Trying to improve my knowledge isan active process, not passive reception. Ihave to decide whereto lookandwhenI have looked long and hard enough and this implies that Ihave to make some decisions about where notto look. Ihave to decidewhom to trust and how far and this means decidingnotto trust someself-proclaimed authorities: maybe all PR spokespersons, some sales-people working on commission, and most members of ideologicallyconstituted think tanks. I have to ignoresomeclaims for my atten-

tion and credence if I am to make any headway. I even have to rule outas unworthy of further consideration some explanations about howthings happen without making a full investigation. The Meditatorsdecision to demolish everything and to begin laying his own newfoundations for science still needs some explanation, however.

2 t h e a im s o f a n i de a l s c ie n t i s t s o r t i n g - p r o c e d u r e s b e l i e f - s e t s s k e p t i c i s m a n dc r e d u l i t y c o n f o r m i t y a n d a u t h o r i t y ( at v i i : 1 8 )

To see more clearly what is involved in upgrading ones knowledge-edifice and why a general demolition of ones existing opinions mightbe conducive to that end, the notion of asorting-procedurewill behelpful. A small investment of time at this stage with respect to some

further basic concepts of epistemology will pay large dividends laterwith respect to understanding the complex philosophical architectureof theMeditations.

Suppose my ambition, like the Meditators, is to become a scientist.Not only do I want to become a scientist, I want to approach as closelyas I can to the condition of an ideal scientist. The opinions I accept my beliefs must reflect the nonobvious truth about things. I also

want my representation of the world to be not just accurate, butample. My knowledge-edifice should not only have good foundations,it should be large and elaborately detailed.

An opinion, for the purposes of the present discussion, is anyclaim expressible as a declarative statement in a meaningful sentenceof English. It is a proposition that could bebelieved by someone,


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whether or not anyone actually believes it or has ever believed it. It iscustomary in ordinary language to separate facts from opinions,to refer to mere opinions, or to what is only an opinion. Thiscommon usage, however, should be ignored in all that follows. Thestatements below can all be considered to express opinions:

Cows eat grassCows climb treesThe normal lifespan of a cow is less than ten yearsThe number of stars is evenThe number of stars is odd

2 + 2 =5Snow is whiteCows are large animals

Imagine a computer program that generates English sentences likethese and then presents me with a list of them. In principle, I cansort any such sentence I am confronted with into one of three classes:b e l i e v e ,d i s b e l i e v e , andu n d e c i d e d . I can do the same with

most sentences encountered in a book, or a newspaper article, orvocalized by an acquaintance, or thought up by me:

b e l i e v e : OpinionsIagree with and accept.d i s b e l i e v e : OpinionsIdisagree with and reject.u n d e c i d e d : OpinionsIam not convinced of either way.

For example, if I am presented with the sentencesCows eat grassandSnow is white, I will put them into the b e l i e v e category. I agree

that cows eat grass and that snow is white. The opinion that Cowsclimb treeswill go into the d i s b e l i e v e category, along with 2 +2 =5. Finally the sentence The normal lifespan of a cow is less thanten yearswill go into theu n d e c i d e d category; for I do not knowenough about the normal lifespan of cows to agree or disagree. Thenumber of stars is evenand thatThe number of stars is oddwill go intou n d e c i d e d as well. I suppose one or the other must be true, but I

do not know which.I can perform this sorting procedure for as long as I like, providedI have the leisure in which to do so and a source of new sentences. Ithas never until now occurred to me deliberately to wonder whether Iam actually mortal; and no one has formally presented the claimCWis mortalto me for my assessment. Yet if I now present the opinion tomyself, I have no hesitation in placing it into theb e l i e v e category.


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The procedure just described sounds simple enough, but there isa complication. A single English sentence can correspond to morethan one opinion. Many sentences areambiguousand susceptible ofmultiple interpretations, e.g.,This drill is boring. Other sentences arevague. In ordinary life, the context in which a sentence is uttered orwritten helps to pin down the meaning we should attach to it. Theproposition asserted by a speaker or writer, using a particular Englishsentence, is the opinion he or she is actually expressing. And until Ihave decided what a sentence means, what opinion I should take thesentence as expressing, I cannot assign it to the category ofb e l i e v e ,

d i s b e l i e v e , oru n d e c i d e d .TakeShooting stars can be entertaining.It is susceptible of at least

three interpretations, corresponding to three different thoughts oropinions that might be expressed by the sentence and that can beparaphrased as follows:

a) Shooting firearms at the stars can be a fine sport.b) A show of meteors at night can be pleasurable to watch.

c) Taking photos of celebrities is good fun.If I am presented with the sentence Shooting stars can be entertain-ing, I have not been presented with an opinion, for I do not knowwhich opinion (a) or (b) or (c) is being expressed. I mightbelieve the opinion expressed in (b) but not that expressed in (a)and (c).

Or, take the vague sentenceCows eat grass. I know that cows eat

other food besides grass maize, for example, and hay, as well as pro-cessed feed. Probably there are some cows that have never eaten grassin their lives, only synthetic cattlefeed. Does the sentence Cows eatgrassexpress the opinion that Cows eat onlygrass and thatAllcows eatgrass? If so, I should place the sentence in thed i s b e l i e v ecategory.If, however the meaning of the sentence is,With some exceptions, cowseat grass given the opportunity; grass is the usual and preferred food of a

cow, I should place it inb e l i e v e .Cows are large animalsis another vague sentence. When presentedwith it, I can not tell whether to disagree or agree, for cows are largerthan some animals but smaller than many others. Reflecting on thesematters, I might put each ofCows eat grass,Cows are large animals,andCows climb treesinto the u n d e c i d e d category. (I have neverseen a cow climb a tree, but perhaps they can get a little way up into


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the branches of low-spreading trees; it depends on exactly how theword climb is to be understood.)

When I am asked to classify sentences generated by a computerthat have not been uttered or written by a speaker or writer in ameaning-fixing context, then I am likely to experience some difficul-ties. Even when I am classifying sentences produced on some occasionby another human being, I may experience difficulties on account ofvagueness and ambiguity. On a little reflection, it is apparent thatdeciding what I should place into the categoryb e l i e v e what Ishould believe is no simple matter. Nevertheless, each of us can be

said unproblematically to hold many opinions (our own) for true andto hold many other opinions (those of irritating newspaper colum-nists) for false.

Call the set of opinions that are believed by Person X, Xs belief-set. We can ask about anyones belief-set: How good is it? Is everyopinion Person X holds for true really true? Is every opinion PersonX holds for falsereally false? Arealltrue opinions contained within

Person Xs belief-set? Arenofalse opinions contained within Xs beliefset? In other words, is Person X omniscient? I can ask the correspond-ing questions about myself, too. Is every opinion I hold for truereallytrue? Is every opinion I hold for false really false? Arealltrue opin-ions contained within my belief-set? Arenofalse opinions containedwithin my belief-set? In other words, am I omniscient?

The hypothesis that any other living or dead person is or was om-

niscient seems clearly untenable. It is therefore exceedingly unlikelythatIam omniscient. I can figure this out by reasoning as follows.It is quite apparent that other people harbor numerous false beliefsabout geography, medical matters, etc., and fail to believe certain truethings. It would be strange, however, if I were one of the few humanbeings in the world who had no false beliefs along the same lines.Moreover, I often discover that I waswrong about something that I

firmly believed. I have frequently believed that the road I was drivingalong would take me to my destination, when this was untrue, asI discovered on pulling over and consulting a map. I have also of-ten failed to believe certain true things, such as the fact that I had adentists appointment on some particular day. Relativists sometimesinsist that whatever a person believes is true for that person. If so,many things that are true for some person or other are, at the sametime, false and can be discovered to be false by that same person.


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It seems that we are an error-prone species. I have good evidencethat I am not exempt from the tendency to err and that no one elseis either. My belief-set is constantly undergoing revision as I discoverthat I was wrong about certain things and as I expunge false beliefsfrom my belief-set, and learn new facts.

To make my belief-set correspond to reality, I must find a way toaccomplish the following three subtasks. Perhaps I cannot accomplisheach of them perfectly. But the better I am at accomplishing each ofthem, the more closely I will approach to the knowledge-conditionof an ideal scientist:

Subtask (1) Decide which opinions currently believed or disbelievedare actuallyt r u e .

Subtask (2) Decide which opinions currently believed or disbe-lieved are actuallyf a l s e .

Subtask (3) For all opinions that are currently undecided, decidewhether they aret r u e orf a l s e .

SORT

Opinions that I currently

believe

Opinions that I currently

disbelieve

Opinions that I am

currently undecided about

??

TRUEFALSE

Figure1 The overall task of becoming an ideal scientist

But how should I go about the overall task?

Suppose I have the opportunity to choose one fundamental sorting-procedureinthehopethatitwillenablemetocompletetheoveralltaskappropriately. I should first consider the array of sorting-proceduresthat I could use and pick the best, the one that looks as though it ismost likely to produce the best results in terms of getting my beliefsinto the right boxes,t r u e&f a l s e . How, though, can I choose anyprocedure? For, if I do not yet knowwhat is true and what is false,how can Iknowthat one procedure gives better results than another?


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All I can do, it seems, is pick a method that looks promising and,once I have tried it out for a while, make a decision as to whether itis working. I can tell if it is working if I am satisfied with the results.One might compare this process to that of friend-selection. SupposeI want to sort persons of my acquaintance into two boxes: GoodMates and Bad Mates. Unfortunately, I do not know in advance whatthe characteristics of Good and Bad Mates are. If I already knewwhat the characteristics of Good Mates and Bad Mates were, I couldassess each candidate against the criteria. I need, however, to developthese criteria on the basis of my experience with the candidates. The

experience of socializing with a humorless person might, for example,encourage me to introduce the criterion of having a sense of humorinto my set of criteria for a Good Mate. When I reach the point whereall the candidates I encounter either fulfill the criteria I have built upor fail to fulfill themandno experience with new candidates inducesme to change my criteria, I can be confident that my criteria are good,and that my sorting procedure for Good and Bad Mates is reliable.

In looking for a fundamental rule for inquiry, I have to follow thesame procedure. I have to consider various criteria for classifying opin-ions as true or false, on the basis of my experience with the opinionsthemselves. Just as experience with different sorts of people can dis-close to me that humor is important in a friend, but a knowledgeof fine wines is irrelevant, experience with different sorts of opinionscan disclose to me that some characteristics are important for truth,

others are not.Consider several sorting-procedures for opinions that can be

quickly rejected as inappropriate to the overall task. First, there isa method that might be designated the Method of Total Credulity:

Method of Total Credulity: Whenever an opinion is presented tome, I shall deem itt r u e . I shall further review all my previousopinions and deem them all t r u e , no matter how I regarded

them before.

SORT

All opinionsOpinions

TRUE FALSE

Figure2 The Method of Total Credulity


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A person who is able successfully to employ the Method of TotalCredulity will hold all opinions for true. She will believe that Thenumber of stars is evenand that The number of stars is oddand thatCows climb treesand thatSnow is black. She will even hold for truethe opinion, All my opinions are false, while holding all opinionssimultaneously for true.

Is it possible seriously to imagine someone employing the Methodof Total Credulity? It is hard to understand what could be involved inholding all the above propositions for true and being happy to believecontradictions. And even if we can imagine someone successfully

deciding to believe everything, mechanically accepting all opinionsdoes not fit with our intuitive idea of what a scientific method shouldlook like: the Method of Total Credulity can hardly help anyone toimprove his belief-set. By employing it, the inquirer will come toaccept as true many new falsehoods. Equally unfortunately, he willnot expunge from his belief-set any existing falsehoods that, in hiscurrent state of partial ignorance, he accepts.

Another method, Total Skepticism, will purify my belief-set verywell down to nothing:

Method of Total Skepticism: Whenever an opinion is presentedto me, I shall deem it f a l s e . I shall further review all my pre-vious opinions and deem them allfalse .

SORT

All opinionsOpinions

TRUE FALSE

Figure3 The Method of Total Skepticism

By employing Total Skepticism, an inquirer can purify her existingbelief-set of all errors. She will also have a method for dealing with allcurrently undecided propositions reject them all. However, in lightof the fact thatsome opinions are true, she will end up with an emptybelief-set that fails to reflect reality.

Perhaps, then, an inquirer should trust his instincts and follow aSubjective Policy?


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Subjective Policy: Whenever I b e l i e v e a proposition, I shalldeem itt r u e . Whenever Id i s b e l i e v e a proposition, I shalldeem itf a l s e . If I amu n d e c i d e d , I shall simply ignore theproposition.

SORT TRUE FALSE

IGNORE

Opinions

Propositions that I

currently believe

Propositions that I

currently disbelieve

Propositions I am undecided about

Figure4

The Subjective Policy

It is hard to see how the Subjective Policy can help me make anyprogress towards the goal of becoming an ideal scientist. For thereason I decided to try to sort my existing beliefs was that I hadreason to suspect that many of them were false. As well, deciding toignore all opinions I am currently undecided about can hardly extend

my knowledge of nonobvious truths.The three Methods considered Credulity, Skepticism, and the

Subjective Policy all supply criteria for truth. A criterion can bethought of as a filter that selectively lets something through, as a coffeefilter lets coffee through but holds back grounds, or as a criterionfor friendship excludes some people from the role of friend. Whatcollects beyond the filter is clear coffee or acceptable friends, and

what is left in the filter can be discarded or ignored for purposesof drinking or friendship. The Methods of Total Credulity and TotalSkepticism are not effective filters, for one lets everything through andthe other lets nothing through. They are nonselective. The SubjectivePolicy is selective, but it is evident that it is not selective in quite theright way.


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If I can choose the right filter for opinions, what collects beyondthe filter will be what ist r u e . A good selective filter can be used onpropositions I already believe or disbelieve, and it can also be usedon undecided propositions. Consider some other selective filters thatmight be useful for deciding what is true: the Authority Principle andthe Conformity Policy.

Authority Principle: Everything a particular designated Author-ity (for example: elders, technical journals, religious authorities)says is true I shall deem to be t r u e . Everything that the Au-

thority says is false or that it does not explicitly state to be true,I shall deem to bef a l s e .

SORT TRUE FALSE

Opinions Opinions

endorsed by

the Authority

Opinions rejected by

the Authority

Opinions not endorsed

by the Authority

Figure5 The Authority Principle

Conformity Policy: Everything most other people believe I shalldeem to be t r u e . Everything most other people reject or failto believe I shall deem to bef a l s e .

FALSE

Opinions Opinions

believed by

most other

people

Opinions rejected by

most other people

Opinions not believed

by most other people

SORT TRUE

Figure6 The Conformity Policy


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Both the Authority Principle and the Conformity Policy can changemy belief-set. In case I have been using the Subjective Policy up tonow, introducing the Authority Principle or the Conformity Policywill make a difference to what I hold for true. If I learn that 75 percentof the population believes that UFOs have visited Earth, I will holdthis for true if I am employing the Conformity Policy, regardless ofmy previous disagreement with the opinion. We now need to ask,however, whether either of these filters is any good if my aim is toacquire new beliefs about what is nonobviously true. A criterion testsbeliefs, but we also have to test criteria, or filters, to see if they do

what they are supposed to do.I can check whether my paper filter really performs as ad-

vertised to filter cryptosporidium cysts by examining the filteredwater with a microscope for the presence of cryptosporidium cysts.If I am very worried about the condition of my water, I had betterhave this assurance. At least, I should be assured that the fine printon the filter box that says that the filter has been tested by some

expert is not a forgery. How, though, can I check whether the Au-thority Principle or the Conformity Policy performs as advertisedto separate true from false propositions? Well, since there is no fineprint to look at, it seems that all I can do is scrutinize propositionsthat made it through the filter and see whether they really are true.The reason I need a filter, though, is that I do not know what ist r u e !

Suppose I look at the opinions that made it through one or theother of these two filters and compare them with the opinions thatwere held back. Suppose that, when I see what the outcome is, I amtempted to believe thatSome things the Authority has certified are justnott r u e or that Some things that most people think are true are just nott r u e .How can I decide whether I should (a) change my conceptionof what is true, or (b) simply reject the Authority Principle or the

Conformity Policy?Truth is a philosophically perturbing subject. It seems that if I tryout a proposed filter for a while and see what propositions come outast r u e andf a l s e , I will think the filter is good if and only if allthe propositions I now believe come through and all the propositionsI now disbelieve are trapped. This implies, however, that with a good


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filter, I will not refine my belief-set. A good filter is supposed to helpme refine my belief-set! What is the way out of this dilemma? Thenext chapter shows how the Meditator manages to extricate himself byignoring (temporarily) the question what a truth-filter looks like andhow it is to be certified. Instead, the Meditator begins to experimentwith his existing belief-set.


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c h a p te r 2

Meditation OneThe possibility of a malevolent Demon is raisedand the Meditator resolves to doubt everything

he can possibly doubt

1 t h e w i th h o l d i n g po l i c y c a n t h e se n s e s bet r u s t e d ? t h e d r e a m a r g u m e n t t h e m a l e v o l e n t

d e m o n a r g u m e n t ( a t v i i : 1 8 2 3 )

I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself sincerely and without

reservation to the general demolition of my opinions.. . . Once the foundations of a building are undermined, anything builton them collapses of its own accord; so I will go straight for the basicprinciples on which all my former beliefs rested.

(vii:18)

The Meditators overall ambition is to establish something in the sci-ences that is stable and likely to last. The previous chapter suggestedthat we should understand his aim to be the discovery of nonobvioustruths about the world and that he needs especially to add significanttrue opinions to and eject significant false opinions from his belief-set, while shrinking his set of undecided opinions. We can take himas having realized that all the sorting-procedures described in Ch. 1

Sec. 2, including the Methods of Total Credulity and Total Skep-ticism, the Subjective and Conformity Policies, and the AuthorityPrinciple, are inadequate for this purpose. To be sure, the Meditatorhas not explicitly reviewed each of the five methods and found eachwanting. Yet the Authority Principle and the Conformity Policy, theonly two that showed any real promise, are alluded to in the text.Most beliefs acquired in childhood are either inculcated in us by

32


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Meditation One 33

certain authorities, or they are the consensus beliefs of the peoplearound us.

The Meditator reiterates his intention to demolish the entireedifice representing his knowledge-condition. He will bring it downby knocking out the foundations of his existing beliefs:

Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent fromopinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefullyas I do from those which are patently false . . . And to do this I will not

need to run through them all individually, which would be an endlesstask.

(vii:18)

Note that the Meditator has not decided to adopt the method ofTotal Skepticism, holding all propositions for false. In fact, he isnot even trying to sort his opinions into the categories t r u e andf a l s e . Instead, he has decided simply to sort his opinions into twocategories, b e l i e v eand d o u b t , ignoring the problem of truth. Wecan assume that his aim is ultimately to come to know what is trueand what is false. He has no way, however, to get out of the trap thatthe problem of stating and justifying a criterion for truth has justbeen shown to lead us into. Perhaps he senses that he can only make

headway by backing away for the moment from the large, mysterious,problematic conceptst r u e andfalse .

The Meditator has decided that he should hold back . . . as-sent from any opinion held by himself, or anyone else, that is notcompletely certain and indubitable. He will employ the followingpolicy:

Withholding Policy: If an opinion appears to be at all uncertain,or if it is possible to doubt it, I will withhold assent from it, i.e.I will notb e l i e v e it.

The Withholding Policy is a departure in two respects from theordinary way of filling in and sometimes kicking beliefs out of ourbelief-sets.


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First, I normally distinguish between propositions I actively disbe-lieveand hold for absurd and propositions that I merely doubt or havenot decided about. Iactively disbelievethe proposition that our Earthhas two different suns that appear on odd and even numbered daysof the month, whereas I have merelynot decided aboutthe proposi-tion that there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe. Iactivelydisbelievethat I shall live to be200years old, whereas I merelydoubtthat I shall live to be100years old. The Withholding Policy instructsme to ignore this distinction. It tells me to withhold assent fromany proposition that is either absurd in my view, or plainly wrong,

or probably not right, or unproved, or dubious, or questionable, ormaybe false, or simply possible to doubt. All such propositions areto be treated in the same way and relegated to a single category, thecategory of propositions I do not believe.

But what about the propositions the Meditator currently believes?What will happen to them as a result of the Withholding Policy?

This brings us to a second interesting feature of the Withhold-

ing Policy. There are many propositions that I believe to be truewithout beingcompletely certainthat they are true. For example, Ibelieve that I locked my office door when I left it, and I believe thatThere are fewer than eleven planets. I believe that I shall live to beat least seventy years old. But I am not completely certainof any ofthese propositions. I would perhaps bet $100 on not being shownto be wrong where the planets are concerned. I would not, however,

bet $100,000that I locked my office door when I left it, or on theplanetary proposition either. I do not consider those propositions im-possible to doubt, and, by dwelling on my hereditary and acquiredweaknesses, it is possible for me to feel uncertain that I will live pastthe age of sixty-nine, though I do not actually believe that I will not.The Withholding Policy instructs me to refuse to believe any opinionof which I am not completely certain, any opinion that it is possible to

doubt.But will the Withholding Policy really help with the completionof subtasks (1)(3)? It is unclear at this stage whether it will help verymuch. If the Meditator is currently undecided about an opinion, heshould withhold assent, according to the Policy. H

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Wilson Catherine, Descartes' Meditations (an Introduction)

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