An Institutionalist Approach to Security in East Asia: From the Perspective of Neoliberalism

Tsuneo Akaha, Monterey Institute of International Studies

1. Introduction

This paper will analyze the evolution and current status of security cooperation in East Asia from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism. More specifically, it will present case studies of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia and the ASEAN-centered regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia. By using Neoliberalism as a mirror on which the neorealist realities of the East Asian region are reflected, the paper will demonstrate the need to build neoliberal international relations in the region.

Before presenting the analysis, we need to define “East Asia” and “security”. The discussion will be brief because there are many discussions on both concepts.1

(1) “East Asia” defined

There are geographic, historical, political-diplomatic, economic, and social-cultural aspects to “region” and the definition of the concept varies depending on which aspect is emphasized. Moreover, the definition also varies depending on the purpose and the rationale for which it is discussed, as well as the theoretical framework in which it is discussed. For example, in discussing the possibility of an “Asian union,” Amako (2007: 16-18) introduces “Asia” as a “geographic concept,” a “value system,” a “set of characteristics,” a “goal to aspire to,” and a “methodology.” As Amako mentions, Mori (Mori 2007: 18) organizes the idea of “Asia” in terms of a “myth”, a “symbol”, a “dynamic space,” an “identity”, and a “construct”.

The present study first views “East Asia” as primarily a geographic concept and then, from an institutionalist perspective, observes it as a “dynamic space” in which nation-states establish and maintain organized, regularized, and intense relations, exchanges, and linkages. Furthermore, the study defines “East Asia” as being composed of two subregions, “Northeast Asia” and “Southeast Asia,” both as well-established concepts in the discourse on regional integration in Asia. Here, we will analyze the various attempts at institutionalizing security cooperation separately in the two subregions according to the dynamic of international relations in each area, as well as the role and limits of those efforts.

(2) “Security” defined

Recent years have seen the development of the concept of “security” as a diversified concept beyond its traditional meaning. The traditional concept of security refers to the totality of the physical – especially military – threats to the political independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of states in the international system and the various means to counter the threats.

1 For example, on Northeast Asia, see Akaha 1999, Calder and Ye 2010, Dent and Huang 2002, Kim 2004, and Rozman 2000; on Southeast Asia, see Ciorciari 2010 and Dayley and Neher 2009.

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The state is understood both as the source and the target of threats. In recent years, however, we have seen the growing influence of non-state agents in the international system, such as international organizations, multinational corporations, and international nonprofit organizations. Also, there are phenomena that cannot be appropriately captured by the traditional concept of security. For example, we see the threat that environmental destruction poses to people’s living and health, the threat that energy and food shortages present to people, as well as growing gaps in economic development and financial crisis leading to social instability and riots. We also recognize that many states cannot adequately deal with the threats their citizens face. These phenomena are collectively referred to as “nontraditional security” (Akaha 2007: 185-188). Furthermore, we also see the concept of “human security” that focuses on the preservation and protection of the life, living, and basic human rights of people, in contrast to the protection of the state’s independence, territory and sovereignty (Akaha 2009: 11-34).

This paper will examine mainly international relations in the realm of traditional security. This is because state-centric international security dominates security discourse in East Asia and even response to nontraditional security and human security problems in the region ultimately centers on the policies of states, the capacity of state organizations, and cooperation between states (Akaha 2009: 11-34). However, the paper will point out that in Southeast Asia there is an emphasis on nontraditional security problems. Also, “Conclusion” will suggest that the construction of a system for security cooperation that links Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia requires the organization of cooperation that transcends states and this in turns calls for the development of civil society and the incorporation of nontraditional security issues into national policy and international cooperation.

2. Security Theories: Realism, Liberalism, and Neoliberal Institutionalism

(1) Classical Realism and Neorealism

The origins of modern traditional security theory are found in Classical Realism. Classical Realism views the international system as anarchy and considers the supreme priority of states within it to be self-preservation and the various resources and capabilities to be instruments of self-preservation. States sometimes form alliances and other cooperative systems but their ultimate purpose, according to Classical Realism, is self-preservation. Security theory based on Classical Realism is naturally national security theory and sees the state as the main agent of international relations and its self-help capability as central to its survival. As a consequence, “security dilemma” emerges.2

“Structural Realism” is based on Classical Realism but additionally incorporates into its theory the impact of the structure of the international system on states within it.3 Structural Realism is one of the strains in Neorealism (Lamy 2001: 185-186).4 The main questions for the states whose most important purpose is self-preservation are how many major powers there are in

2 For a classic work on Realism, see Morgenthau and Thompson 1985．

3 For a class work on Structural Realism, see Waltz 1979．

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the international system, how their power is distributed, and which powers are allies and friends and which are enemies. The stability of the international system requires a balance between the major powers, which can be accomplished through self-help, international cooperation, and alliances.

Another strain within Neorealism is “Hegemonic Stability Theory.” This theory focuses on the role of an hegemonic power or an hegemonic coalition of nations in the international system. “Hegemony” is variously defined, but in terms of security theory, a state that is so dominant that it can provide security for its allies and friends is called a “hegemon” or an “hegemonic power” and its status in the system and its relations with other states is called “hegemony”. According to Hegemonic Stability Theory, the hegemonic state stabilizes the international system with its overwhelming power. When the relative power or influence of the hegemonic state declines, other states that are benefiting from the existing system will cooperate to preserve the status quo. However, if the power of a state or states that want to change the existing system grows and those powers try to establish a new system, the existing system becomes unstable and a transition to a new system may ensue (Gilpin 1981; Organski 1968; Goldstein 1988; Modelski 1978: 214-235; Thompson 1988; Kennedy 1987; Kupchan 1994). We see today that East Asia, with the relative decline in the hegemonic power of the United States, the rise of China, and the long-stagnant Japanese economy, is in a transition period.

(2) Classical Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Neoliberal Institutionalism

There are several kinds of Classical Liberalism (Lamy 2001: 188-191). “Commercial Liberalism” is a theory that promotes peace and prosperity through the development of free trade and market economy. “Republican Liberalism” states that democratic countries respect citizens’ rights and try to maintain good relations with other democracies. “Sociological Liberalism” focuses on the two concepts of community and interdependence and argues that states deepen interdependence and friendly relations through commerce and exchange and expand international cooperation that transcends national borders and as a result contribute to the formation of a peaceful international community/society.

Neoliberalism has applied the above kinds of Liberalism to the analysis of the institutionalization of international relations and its role. The basic logic of Neoliberalism runs as follows (Keohane 1984; Martin 2007: 111). The international system has no authority or governmental organization that controls it from the center. Therefore, the states that make up the system must cooperate with each other to overcome the so-called “collective action problem.” The “collective action problem” refers to the situation in which some members of a group behave in a way that benefits the group as a whole (for example, to contribute to environmental conservation or peace maintenance), while other members fail to do so and, as a consequence, all members suffer the negative consequences of noncompliance. In order to overcome this problem, it is necessary for the members to share information about each other’s action and their goals, as well as the consequences of noncompliance, and to coordinate their action. It is necessary to establish joint decision-making rules, regulate the

4 For Neorealism, see Keohane 1986．

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behavior of members, and achieve the goals of the organization as a whole. In other words, the organization needs to build an institution.

Because Neoliberalism contributes to the advancement of theory of international relations by focusing on the formation and the role of international institutions, it is called “Neoliberal Institutionalism.” This theory is based on the following assumptions (Lamy 2001: 189-190):

The state is the main actor in international relations and it is a rational actor and attempts to maximize its interests in every field. Even though there are non-state actors, such as international organizations and transnational corporations, their global or regional impact does not compare with that of the state actors. (Hereafter “Assumption 1”)

In the environment of competition, states attempt to obtain absolute gain through cooperation. States see value in cooperation, and are not concerned how much other states benefit from cooperation. This contrasts sharply with the neorealist assumption about the importance of relative gain. (“Assumption 2”)

The biggest obstacle to successful cooperation is noncompliance with agreements and cheating. Since effective implementation or enforcement of agreements reached through international cooperation depends heavily on the willingness and capacity of key state actors, noncompliance and cheating remain important obstacles to successful coopertion. (“Assumption 3”)

Cooperation is not perfect and problems remain, but if the institution is recognized as mutually beneficial and as maximizing opportunities to ensure their interests, states hold their expectations for and contribute their resources to the system of cooperation they create. (“Assumption 4”)

(3) Security from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neoliberal Institutionalism has been applied mainly to institutions for international trade and environmental protection. This is because the theory is readily applicable to issue-areas in which many states share interests. That is, all states expect to obtain benefits from international trade and environmental protection institutions by behaving in an expected manner. In game theory, “positive-sum games” take place in such issue-areas. On the other hand, international security cooperation has been the most important subject of discussion in Realist and Neorealist theories because the assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism outlined above do not apply in zero-sum games, which are the central preoccupation of Realists and Neorealists (Lamy 2001: 190).

Why is it then that this paper analyzes security institutions in East Asia from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism? There are three reasons. First, it is possible to use Neoliberal Institutionalism as a mirror onto which the current state of international cooperation in security issues in East Asia can be reflected and obstacles to cooperation identified. Second, there are important differences in the organization/institutionalization of multilateral security

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cooperation in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia and the assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism can be used as criteria to delineate those differences. Finally, the neoliberal analysis can normatively suggest that the construction of peaceful and stable international relations in East Asia requires a change from the current neorealist world in the region toward a neoliberal world.

3. Case Study 1: Northeast Asia and the Six-Party Talks

(1) The U.S. hegemonic security strategy in Northeast Asia during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.

The end of the Second World saw the emergence of a global Cold War bipolarity, including in East Asia, where an East-West conflict structure took hold. The United States initially wanted to establish in East Asia a multilateral alliance similar to NATO, but this was not to be because it was impossible to bring into the same alliance Korea and Japan, the former of which suffered much damage and humiliation under the colonialism of the latter. Instead, Japan and South Korea were separately allied with the United States in what has come to be called a “hub-and-spokes” system. The United States and South Korea fought as allies in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, and the alliance deepened thereafter as the North-South tension on the peninsula continued. The U.S.-Japan alliance was established and maintained for the dual purpose of defending Japan and preventing its rearmament. As the United States and China reached rapprochement in the 1970s, Japan and China established diplomatic relations in 1972. However, the U.S.-Soviet conflict continued, and both the Japan-U.S. alliance and the ROK-U.S. alliance were maintained.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, the ideological rationale for the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea diminished. However, the Cold War structure, symbolized by the divided countries of Korea and China, remained in East Asia. Also, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and military provocations since the 1990s have heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. As far as the “Taiwan issue” is concerned, China considers it an internal issue and rejects any interference by others; it vehemently opposes the independence movement in Taiwan and does not rule out the use of force for national reunification. As long as China considers it a domestic issue, the “Taiwan issue” cannot be subject to multilateral negotiation. Northeast Asia is also home to territorial disputes: between Japan and ROK over the Takeshima/Dokto Island; between Japan, China, and Taiwan over Senkaku/Tiaoyu Island; between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories/southern Kuriles; and between China and Korea over territories in northeast China. These are bilateral conflicts that relate directly to each party’s sovereignty and are not amenable to a solution in a multilateral framework.

(2) North Korean nuclear and missile development

North Korea has maintained its socialist system under the hereditary dictatorship and juche ideology handed down from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-il has maintained his control of power and dictatorship through the military-first policy. He has also maintained national unity and people’s patriotism by heightening international tension through provocative actions.

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On the other hand, he has sometimes shown a conciliatory posture to obtain benefits from others, such as economic investment from South Korea.

North Korea views the U.S. military power as the greatest threat to its survival and has placed the highest priority on the termination of the hostile policy of the United States. In order to bring the United States to the negotiating table, North Korea has resorted to provocative actions such as missile launches and nuclear tests but also displayed a conciliatory posture by putting nuclear development on hold. For its part, the United States considers North Korea’s nuclear development as a threat to the global nonproliferation regime and also as a threat to the security of its allies Japan and South Korea. Since the death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, some in the United States have hoped for or expected the collapse of North Korea, which obviously has not taken place. The United States has also paid attention to the human rights problem in North Korea and adopted the North Korean Human Rights Act in January 2004.

In January 1992, North Korea signed the safeguards inspection treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but withdrew from the NPT in March 1993 and also withdrew from the IAEA in March 1994 and rejected international inspections. The North Korean nuclear crisis came to an end with the conclusion of the “Agreed Framework” in October. North Korea froze its nuclear program and in return the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established with the United States, ROK, Japan, and many other countries as its members, to built light-water reactors. Also, heavy oil was provided to the North under international cooperation. However, soon after the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, the Republican Party, which has many members opposed to the Agreed Framework as soft, became the majority party in U.S. Congress. Moreover, in January 2001, the Administration changed from Democratic Clinton to Republican Bush and the U.S. North Korea policy took a hard turn. The construction of light-water reactors was significantly delayed and began in February 2002, but heavy oil delivery was suspended in December after suspicions grew in October that North Korea had a highly enriched uranium program and was building a centrifuge plant. The construction of light-water reactors was also suspended indefinitely. In January 2003, North Korea declared it was withdrawing from the NPT and in February KEDO halted the light-water reactor construction plan. In February 2005, North Korea announced that it had built a nuclear weapon for defensive purposes. In May 2006, KEDO decided to terminate the light-water reactor construction plan.

Thus came the end of the first-ever attempt at multilateral security institution building in Northeast Asia that had begun under international cooperation based on the Agreed Framework.

North Korea had successfully built the intermediate-range ballistic missile Nodong in the middle of the 1990s and launched Nodon-1 toward the middle of the Sea of Japan/East Sea in March 1993. In August 1998, North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile Taepodong-1 over the Japanese archipelago toward the Pacific Ocean. This was followed by the launching of a Taepodong-2 toward the Sea of Japan/East Sea in May 2005. North Korea followed this up with the launching of a Taepodong-2 and six other missiles toward the Sea of Japan/East Sea in July 2006. The United Nations Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1695 calling for

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international sanctions. When North Korea tested a plutonium nuclear bomb in October 2006, the United Nations Security Council, where Japan was serving as President, unanimously approved Resolution 1718, including sanctions against North Korea. North Korea immediately rejected it.

(3) The Six-Party Talks

Following the trilateral talks between China, the United States, and North Korea in April 2003, South Korea, Russia, and Japan agreed to participate in the multilateral forum, now known as the “Six-Party Talks.” The multilateral talks have undergone much turbulence since its first session in August2003.

The first session failed to produce a joint document but China, serving as chair of the talks, issued an oral summary of the discussions. The participating nations could not even agree on when to meet next. At the second session in February 2004 North Korea insisted on limiting the discussion to the nuclear weapons program and excluding peaceful uses of nuclear technology. At the third session in June the North stated it was willing to give up its nuclear weapons program if Washington would abandon its hostile policy toward Pyongyang. The six parties agreed to consider a nuclear freeze as a first step toward denuclearization. However, when National Security Advisor Rice called North Korea “a despotism” in January 2005, the North retaliated by announcing it would indefinitely suspend its participation in the Six-Party Talks. It also announced officially that it had been making nuclear weapons and that it already possessed some nuclear weapons.

The fourth session took two rounds, in July-August and in September 2005. The talks resulted in the first joint statement, in which the North agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons. However, when the North Korean money laundering through Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao became known, the United States ordered a ban on all dealings with the bank by American financial institutions and the Macao administration froze the North Korean assets worth about $2,400 million. North Korea hardened its position in retaliation and the fifth session of the Six-Party Talks in November went into recess after only three days. In July the North launched a ballistic missile toward the Sea of Japan/East Sea and the UN Security Council adopted a resolution criticizing this action and calling for international sanctions. Moreover, when the North announced it was getting ready for a nuclear test, the President of the Security Council issued a statement criticizing the action on October 6. However, three days later North Korea went ahead with the nuclear test. On October 15, the UN Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1718 mentioned earlier.

It was against the backdrop of this deteriorating situation that the Six-Party Talks were resumed in December 2006. There were exchanges of criticisms around the table and the talks went into recess again. Finally, in February 2007, the talks resumed and produced a Joint Statement with the following elements (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007):

North Korea would discuss with the other five parties about the list of items related to its nuclear development program that would be subject to abandonment. This would be called the “initial phase.”

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The other five parties would reciprocate by providing 50,000 tons of heavy oil as emergency energy aid, economic assistance equivalent to a maximum of 960,000 tons of heavy oil, energy, as well as humanitarian aid.

The United States and North Korea would commence talks toward diplomatic normalization, and the United States would remove North Korea from the list of terrorism-supporting states and take steps to end the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to North Korea.

Japan and North Korea would commence discussion toward diplomatic normalization.

The parties would establish five task forces: on “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” (to be chaired by China); on “economic and energy assistance” (ROK); on “Japan-North Korea normalization” (Japan and North Korea); on “US-North Korea normalization” (the U.S. and North Korea); and on “security in Northeast Asia” (Russia).

Upon completion of the measures in the “initial phase,” the six parties would hold a foreign minister-level meeting.

The six parties held the sixth session in March 2007, but they failed to hold any substantive discussions and recessed after four days. The situation has since deteriorated and the parties have not returned to the multilateral table.

In April 2009, North Korea launched what it called a “rocket”, but the U.S. and Japan believed it was a ballistic missile and sought a UN Security Council resolution but China objected and the Security Council President issued a statement criticizing the North Korean action. The statement also called on the North not to repeat the action, to abandon completely the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and to return to the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible. The North rejected the statement and announced it would resume nuclear weapons development and that it would also withdraw from the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test in May. This prompted the United Nations Security Council to approve Resolution 1874 including a call for economic sanctions. Even China, which had been reluctant to support such sanctions, agreed to the resolution.

North Korea’s provocative actions did not stop; on the contrary, they escalated. In March 2010, according to South Korea and an international team of investigators, a North Korean torpedo hit the South Korean corvette Cheonan causing an explosion and sinking it. In November, North Korea launched a barrage of artillery shells on the South Korean island of Yeongpyeong in the West Sea, killing four South Koreans and wounding 19. The prospect of the Six-Party Talks being resumed has since been slim to none.

(4) The Six-Party Talks from the Perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism

The Six-Party Talks are clearly a multilateral institution dealing with security in Northeast Asia. By applying the four assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism outlined above, we can see the characteristics of this forum.

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We can see that the first assumption holds in the Six-Party Talks. That is, it is the states that participate in the talks and there is no room for non-state actors to participate or even exercise significant influence in the negotiating process. Also, as long as these multilateral talks are narrowly focused on the traditional security issue of North Korea’s nuclear development, they are likely to remain an inter-state forum.

How about the ssumption regarding the state’s rational decision-making? North Korea’s military-first policy is maintained at the cost of human suffering in the country. In view of the resultant economic crisis and large-scale famine, we cannot see the North’s policy as rational. However, if we see it as an instrument of dictatorship and national defense policy, we cannot necessarily say it is irrational. Moreover, from the standpoint of the North Korean leader, it is tactically rational to switch between provocative actions and accommodating postures in order to win concessions from relevant powers.

China needs a stable international environment to promote its long-term economic growth and to maintain the dictatorship by the Communist Party as well as social stability. The collapse of North Korea or the outbreak of a conflict on the peninsula must be prevented. For these reasons, China is reluctant to support sanctions against North Korea even though it criticizes North Korea’s provocative actions. It is in China’s interest to promote active diplomacy for the success of the Six-Party Talks (Kim 2006: 172-175). Also, as evident in Kim Jong-il’s visit to China in May 2011 and the high-ranking Chinese Communist Party officials’ visit to North Korea in June, China is conducting flexible diplomacy to prevent North Korea’s collapse by propping up the latter’s economy.

Russia’s North Korea policy is quite rational. Post-Soviet Russia established diplomatic relations with South Korea and deepened its economic ties with the latter. For a while domestic political and economic woes prevented Moscow from pursuing active diplomacy, but in recent years Russia has been making efforts to improve its relations with North Korea. Russia stands to gain economically if the North-South tension eases and the construction of railroads and other infrastructure on the peninsula proceeds. Russia is making efforts to expand Asian markets for the energy resources in the Russian Far East and, therefore, stability in the Korean peninsula is clearly in Russia’s interest. Russia’s approach to the Six-Party Talks reflects this fact (Blank 2008: 212).

The United States, South Korea, and Japan share a common interest in securing the denuclearization and ending the dictatorship of North Korea. All three countries also want a peaceful resolution to the North Korean problem. However, domestic political changes have caused major changes in their approaches to North Korea.

Changes in the US and South Korean governments have led to major changes in their respective policies towards North Korea (Armstrong 2011: 166), as well as inconsistencies. The Bush Administration that began in 2001 rejected the Clinton Administration’s “carrot and stick” policy and pursued a policy known as “anything but Clinton”, in favor of a hostile policy toward Pyongyang. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Bush Administration declared “war on terrorism” and President Bush, in his State of the Union

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Address in January 2001, referred to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil,” terrorist states harboring weapons of mass destruction. Since rational behavior in strategic interaction between states requires consistency, the inconsistency in the U.S. policy reduces rationality.

In South Korea, the Kim Dae-jung Administration’s engagement policy, known as the “Sunshine Policy,” was succeeded by the Roh Moo-hyun government in 2003 and South Korea’s economic presence in North Korea expanded during these two administrations. However, the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak government in February 2008 brought about a major shift in Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang. The new government began a policy of “selective engagement,” whereby Seoul would reduce its economic exchange with Pyongyang unless there were clear concessions from the latter. This has led to a significant deterioration in North-South relations.

Lacking in effective ways to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and provocative actions, Japan has emphasized coordination with the United States and South Korea (Austin 2008: 203). Diplomatic normalization is Japan’s important diplomatic agenda toward North Korea, but there has been virtually no progress on this front. Japan has been insisting on progress on the abduction issue as a condition for engaging in normalization talks with North Korea. Although Japan demanded inclusion of this issue in the agenda of the Six-Party Talks, it was not to be due to opposition by other parties. Japan managed to have the abduction issue included in the agenda of the task force on Japan-North Korea normalization established on the basis of the “Joint Statement” of 2007. However, the abduction issue is fundamentally a bilateral issue between Japan and North Korea and can be resolved only through bilateral negotiations. Moreover, even if the issue were resolved, it is hard to believe it would have much of an impact on denuclearizing North Korea (Akaha 2006). In short, there are contradictions in Japan’s behavior vis-à-vis the Six-Party Talks.

What about Assumption 2 of Neoliberal Institutionalism? Among the participants in the Six-Party Talks, North Korea attaches the least value to this multilateral framework. North Korea wants to win concessions from the United States through bilateral talks; therefore the multilateral process is both wasteful and ineffective. Moreover, the Six-Party Talks represent greater international pressure on North Korea than bilateral negotiations. Therefore, it is not surprising that North Korea has been the most reluctant participant in the multilateral talks, using them more as an occasion for criticizing others and insisting on its own demands than as a process for genuine negotiations requiring give-and-take on all sides. The United States wants to put diplomatic pressure on North Korea and therefore prefers the multilateral process to bilateral talks with North Korea. Moreover, the United States wants to prevent the evolution of North Korea and of the Korean peninsula that favors China over the United States; therefore the Six-Party Talks offers one of the venues for pursuing its interests and possible constrain China’s unilateral gains. Therefore, even though Washington is very dissatisfied with Pyongyang’s behavior at the Six-Party Talks, it will continue to participate in the talks as long as the possibility of North Korean concessions remains. China probably sees more value in the Six-Party Talks than any other participant. As a process that offers some chance of denuclearizing North Korea, the multilateral forum is valuable to China. Moreover, China, as the host country for the forum, has found it useful for displaying its diplomatic skills. China’s active diplomacy in

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this venue is in line with the nation’s increasingly active diplomacy, including multilateral diplomacy, since the 1990s, whose purpose is to ensure a stable international environment supportive with its domestic developmental priorities. Furthermore, just as the United States sees the Six-Party Talks as possibly limiting China’s unilateral gains, China also sees the multilateral process as constraining possible unilateral actions, including military intervention, on the part of the United States. South Korea wants to pursue its interests vis-à-vis North Korea through both bilateral dealings with North Korea and the Six-Party process. So, as long as the latter process does not jeopardize its bilateral approach, it finds value in the Six-Party framework. Russia does not possess effective carrots or sticks to induce North Korea’s denuclearization. As noted above, improvement of the North-South relations on the peninsula is in Russia’s interest, politically as well as economically. So, Moscow wants to see the Six-Party Talks to succeed in achieving its purpose. Moreover, Moscow values the multilateral venue as an opportunity to make its presence felt, particularly when it sides with Beijing as against Washington. Japan, as observed above, as long as bilateral diplomatic normalization is not proceeding, it has no other diplomatic forum to press its demands against North Korea. For this passive reason, Japan finds some value in the Six-Party Talks.

How about the assumption of Neoliberal Institutionalism that the state does not care much about the relative gains by others? As just noted, both the United States and China sees value in the Six-Party Talks as a means of constraining unilateral gains by the other. To both sides, relative gains matter a lot. Under whose leadership the denuclearization of North Korea is achieved is an important question for both. So is the distribution of burden for bringing about this desirable, commonly shared outcome. That is, neorealist logic pertains to their assessment of the value of the multilateral process. Moreover, how the balance of power will be affected by North Korea’s denuclearization and the future of the Korean peninsula is of great strategic interest to the United States and China, as well as to South Korea, Russia, and Japan. The 2007 Joint Statement, proposed the formation of multiple task forces, clearly reflects this reality. In short, the neoliberal assumption about absolute vs. relative gains fails to apply to this case.

Concerning Assumption 3, there was noncompliance and violation of the Agreed Framework from the perspectives of both North Korea and the United States. The most important document coming out of the Six-Party Talks is the “Joint Statement” of 2007. It took four long years for the multilateral discussions to produce this document. Even after the adoption of the document, the Six-Party Talks have been suspended and no progress has been seen on any of the agreed items in the Joint Statement.

Finally, with regard to Assumption 4, it is evident that the Six-Party Talks are imperfect. However, the fact that the multilateral talks have been maintained despite the fact that they have been delayed and suspended numerous times indicates that the participants in the talks see value in the talks and expect some results from them. We can at least say that the parties have found no alternative venue or forum for addressing the North Korean nuclear problem (Thompson and Matthews 2008: 181). What is also clear in both the Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks is that even though the core issue may be limited to the nuclear development in North Korea, it cannot be resolved by the participants in the Six-Party Talks alone. It requires coordination with the NPT and IAEA (Kikuchi 2008: 204-224).

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4. Case Study 2: Southeast Asia and ASEAN

(1) Establishment and Evolution of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has its origin in the 1967 “Bangkok Declaration.” The document calls for cooperation for economic growth, social progress, and cultural development but makes no reference to security cooperation. However, when ASEAN was established, its original purpose was confidence-building among the five original members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and the establishment of the organization was made possible by important changes in the security situation of the region, such as the cessation of the Malaysia-Philippines conflict over Saba and the end of Indonesia’s policy of Konfrontasi toward Malaysia. Also, in the Cold War context, the ASEAN members found it necessary to make it clear to the socialist countries in the region and others outside of the region that their organization was not a pro-U.S., anti-Communist alliance (Shoji 2008: 18-19). There were also some important differences in the security concerns among the ASEAN member states. Indonesia wanted security cooperation as a way to balance China, but Singapore relied on the British Commonwealth for its security. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand saw security cooperation as a future possibility and knew they would have to rely on the United States (Shoji 2008: 19).

The concept that has become the common denominator undergirding the formation of regional security cooperation within the ASEAN region is the concept of “collective political defense,” which was first introduced by former Thai foreign minister Thanat Khoman. The idea was that confidence building was necessary to achieve two purposes, avoidance of intraregional conflicts and prevention of intervention by extraregional powers into regional conflicts (Yamakage 1991: 107). As discussed below, these two purposes have contributed greatly to the subsequent development of ASEAN.

Changes in the international environment surrounding Southeast Asia and international relations within the region since the end of the 1960s contributed to the deepening of political relations among the ASEAN member states. The British withdrawal from Malaya, the U.S. troop reduction in Southeast Asia, and the growing presence of China and the Soviet Union in the region led to initiatives within ASEAN. Malaysia’s proposal for the establishment of a neutral zone in Southeast Asia led to the ASEAN declaration of the “Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality” (ZOPFAN) in 1971. When the Vietnam War ended in 1975, ASEAN faced the new socialist countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The first ASEAN Summit in 1976 adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (“Bali Declaration”), calling for the strengthening of political cooperation for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the ASEAN leaders concluded the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which called for peaceful resolution of conflicts within the region. It also called for regional cooperation based on the principles of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national identity of all countries, as well as self-determination and noninterference in the internal affairs of member countries. It also called for the eventual establishment of an “ASEAN

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Community.” The treaty also stated other Southeast Asian countries could join ASEAN (Shoji 2008: 19-21).

From the 1970s to the 1980s ASEAN countries deepened their political dialogue to prevent conflicts within Southeast Asia from affecting the entire region and appealed to parties to conflicts to resolve their disputes peacefully. As seen in ASEAN’s policy toward the Cambodian conflict, the ASEAN members reaffirmed the basic principles stated in TAC and especially stressed noninterference and conflict prevention. These efforts resulted in stability and economic development within the ASEAN region. The ASEAN membership also grew, Brunei joining the group in 1983, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999.

(2) Institutionalization of ASEAN security cooperation and ASEAN-centered regional security cooperation

In 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established to promote political and security dialogue among Southeast Asian nations and confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. The earliest major accomplishment of the new forum was the conclusion of the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1995 (Yamakage 1997: 181).

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 sent Southeast Asian economies into turmoil. When economic growth stopped, the regional governments were forced to cut their defense spending substantially. The Suharto government fell and Indonesia suffered a loss to its leadership within ASEAN. Moreover, the ASEAN countries could not take an effective collective response to the financial crisis (Shoji 2008: 22-23). The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 also affected Southeast Asia. There are terrorist groups with ties to al-Qaeda, there have been terrorist attacks in Indonesia since 2002, and the Thai government has suspected the involvement of terrorist organizations in the series of explosions that have happened in the south of the country since 2004.

The ASEAN countries began discussing the formation of an “ASEAN Security Community.” The discussion that began with an Indonesian proposal in 2003 reflected the ASEAN countries’ shared understanding that “security” needed to be “comprehensive security,” including both traditional and nontraditional security (Shoji 2008: 24; Sukma 2003). The ASEAN Summit in 2003 adopted the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II” (“Bali Declaration II”), envisaging the formation of an “ASEAN Community” composed of three pillars, an “ASEAN Security Community,” an “ASEAN Economic Community,” and an “ASEAN Social-Cultural Community.” The declaration outlined the framework of the proposed ASEAN Security Community as follows (Shoji 2008: 26):

The goal of the ASEAN Security Community is the peaceful co-existence among the member states in an environment of justice, democracy, and harmony.

The ASEAN members should resolve conflicts within the region peacefully.

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The ASEAN Security Community is not defense cooperation or an alliance, nor does it rely on joint foreign policy; instead it aims at building comprehensive security that includes political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions.

The ultimate goal of the ASEAN Security Community is to establish methods for norm setting, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding.

At the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007, agreement was reached on establishing the ASEAN Community, including the ASEAN Security Community, in 2015, five years earlier than originally planned.

As the multilateral dialogue expanded in scope and became more ambitious, disagreements among the member states surfaced. For example, the 2004 proposal by Indonesia to establish an ASEAN peacekeeping force by 2012 was opposed by Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos. Also, all member states other than Indonesia remained reluctant about the idea of an ASEAN Security Community (Shoji 2008: 27-28). At the 10 th ASEAN Summit in November 2008, the ASEAN leaders adopted the “ASEAN Vision” and the “Vientiane Action Programme” (VAP) to achieve the goals of the Bali Declaration II, but these documents simply reaffirmed the basic principles for cooperation outlined above. Moreover, in 2005, when the ASEAN members agreed to draft an “ASEAN Charter,” there was disagreement on whether the group should maintain the principle of noninterference. The issue came up in the context of the international community’s criticism of the military junta in Myanmar and the need for ASEAN to respond to the criticism. The member states failed to reach agreement and adopted in November 2007 the “ASEAN Charter” which included the principle of noninterference.

In 2006, ASEAN established the “ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting” (ADMM) as the highest framework in ASEAN for dialogue and cooperation concerning defense and security issues. At the first meeting in May 2006, the ASEAN defense ministers exchanged views on the future of the ASEAN Regional Forum, maritime security issues, terrorism, and the situation on the Korean peninsula. At the second defense ministers’ meeting in November 2007, it was decided that an “ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus” (ADMM Plus) should be established to deepen relations with the dialogue partners (Shoji 2008: 32-33). This was followed by the decision by the ASEAN leaders in April 2010 to establish an “ASEAN+8 Defense Ministers’ Meeting,” which was to include the ASEAN+3 members (i.e., the ASEAN countries plus Japan, China, and South Korea) and, additionally, India, Australia, and New Zealand). The defense ministers of these 18 nations met in Hanoi in October 2010. They agreed on the central role of ASEAN (“ASEAN centrality”) in the ASEAN+8 Defense Ministers’ Meeting. They also confirmed the principles of equality, nondiscrimination, and mutual benefit as provided for in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as well as the basic principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference, consensus, and unity in diversity.5

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia、Joint Declaration on the First ADMM Plus, Hanoi Joint Declaration on the First ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting – Plus, Hanoi, 12 October 2010,” http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/InformationSheet.aspx?IDP=12&l=en

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(3) ASEAN-centered regional security cooperation from the perspective of Neoliberal Institutionalism

Now, let us look at the ASEAN-centered regional security cooperation in terms of the assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism.

First, it is evident that the assumption about the state as the main actor in international relations applies here. We also see that the assumption regarding the state as a rational actor generally applies. We need to qualify this observation, however. As we have noted above, ASEAN’s decision-making is based on consensus and, therefore, issues that are unlikely to result in consensus are not apt to be brought up in the multilateral dialogue. If reaching consensus on common issues is the group’s goal, then precluding controversial issues from the discussion can be considered “rational”. However, if full transparency of the member states’ interests and concerns is a requisite for rational decision-making by ASEAN as a whole, then the consensus norm is incompatible with such requirement. Indeed, the consensus rule is an obstacle to the resolution of substantive political and security problems between ASEAN members. The disputes between China and ASEAN members (particularly Vietnam and the Philippines) over island territories in the South China Sea are a case in point.

The territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands are serious problems in the relations between China and Southeast Asian nations. From the late 1970s to the 1980s China made efforts to improve relations with the neighboring countries and keep territorial rows from disrupting those efforts. For example, China announced in 1986 that it would put aside territorial disputes in the South China Sea in favor of joint development of the related areas of the sea (Iida 2008: 6). Also, in normalizing relations with Vietnam in 1991, China vowed to resolve territorial disputes peacefully through negotiation (Iida 2008: 6-7). However, these actions were not meant to indicate China’s territorial concessions but rather to develop an environment in which the neighboring countries would recognize Chinese sovereignty as they went through the joint development of the areas concerned. In 1995, China forcibly occupied the Mischief Reef and has since occupied the territory over the objections of ASEAN countries, including the Philippines, which also claims it. Since the late 1990s, however, China has joined ASEAN countries in multilateral dialogues on territorial issues in the South China Sea (Iida 2008: 7-15). In 2002, China and the ASEAN countries issued the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” declaring the following:

The parties are committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law;

They are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect;

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They respect and are committed to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;

They will undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;

They will undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.

China and the ASEAN countries also declared to intensify efforts to seek ways to build trust and confidence between and among them, and to undertake cooperative activities in marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operation, and combating transnational crime.

However, China has been expanding its naval capabilities, strengthening its naval presence in the South China Sea, and seeking effective control of both the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. At the same time, China is continuing multilateral dialogues to expand and improve its relations with ASEAN countries. In July 2011, senior officials from China and the ASEAN countries agreed on guidelines for implementing the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,6 and the guidelines were approved by the foreign ministers of the relevant countries. While virtually all countries welcomed the adoption of the guidelines, there was no mention of the sovereignty issue. The guidelines were technical in nature, relating to cooperation in functional areas, such as marine technological research, rescue, and anti-pirate efforts.7 Although ASEAN nations want to develop a legally binding code of conduct based on the approved guidelines, China remains reluctant.

Concerning Assumption 2, it is clear that the ASEAN member states see value in the multilateral dialogue. Also, China, South Korea, and Japan also see value in the multilateral framework, and this is evident in their participation as dialog-partners and in the ASEAN+3 framework. However, Japan prefers to limit China’s influence by expanding the framework further, to ASEAN+6, with the addition of Australia, New Zealand, and India. China wants to block U.S. participation in regional security talks in Southeast Asia. The United States wants to maintain and if possible expand its political and security presence in the region and, therefore, does not

6 “Update 1-China, ASEAN Set “Guidelines” on Sea Row, but No Deal Expected,” Reuters, July 20, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/20/asean-southchinasea-idUSL3E7IK1B620110720.

7 “China Avert Collision in South China Sea,” Asia Times, July 29, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MG29Ad01.html.

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desire a multilateral framework that excludes it. At least, the United States want to prevent regional security cooperation that is unfavorable to its interests in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the United States will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation with its allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, outside of the ASEAN-anchored framework if the United States cannot join it.

Moreover, the expansion of the ASEAN-centered institutionalization of regional security cooperation helps maintain the relevance of ASEAN. However, it will invite big-power rivalries, such as between China and the United States, into the process. Because the big-power relations in the region tend toward neorealist character, concerns about relative gain will enter the picture. It will not be reasonable to expect an expanded ASEAN-centered institution to be able to contain or restrict big-power rivalries.

Next, as noted above, the ASEAN members have avoided issues that directly relate to national sovereignty or the survival of particular governments and, as the South China Sea conflicts indicate, they are far from being able to resolve sovereignty disputes over island territories. Therefore, we must qualify the applicability of Assumption 3. The most concrete results of the multilateral security dialogue among the ASEAN countries and between them and ASEAN dialogue partners are declaratory statements about principles and aspirations rather than binding agreements.

Finally, Assumption 4 is evident in the multilateral dialogue within ASEAN and between ASEAN nations and their dialogue partners. It is also safe to say that the dialogues have achieved one of their main goals, confidence-building. However, it remains to be seen whether the dialogues will lead to a resolution of substantive disagreements, such as territorial or jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea.

5. Conclusion: A Unified Security Framework in East Asia?

In Northeast Asia, the U.S.-centered bilateral alliance system that dates back to the Cold War period has continued to this day. Although the Six-Party Talks exist as a multilateral framework, it is focused on the specific issue of North Korean nuclear and missile development. Therefore, if the denuclearization of North Korea should prove impossible and if the countries concerned should come to see North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state, the framework’s raison d’être would have been dashed. Would it be possible to replace the Six-Party Talks with some other cooperative framework? The incompatibility of the major powers’ strategic interests regarding the future of the Korean peninsula makes it very difficult to transform the Six-Party Talks into a framework for sustained multilateral cooperation to resolve broader regional security issues.

In contrast, ASEAN as a multilateral framework for cooperation has helped Southeast Asian countries in stabilizing their region. ASEAN has also successfully limited extraregional powers’ political intervention in the region. In recent years, ASEAN has also been endeavoring to establish an ASEAN-centered security institution that can address security issues of concern not only to its members but also to the major powers outside of the region. Although Indonesia has played a leading role in this process, ASEAN owes much of its success to its adherence to the consensus-based process and gradualism. Also essential has been the members’

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commitment to the principles of equality, nondiscrimination, and mutual interest, as well as sovereignty, equality, and noninterference. However, it remains to be seen whether ASEAN will be able to maintain these principles and resolve the territorial disputes between China and ASEAN member countries in the South China Sea. While it may be possible to maintain the consensus that disputes should be resolved through peaceful means, territorial disputes are zero-sum problems, and the noninterference principle limits the effectiveness of the ASEAN-centered multilateral dialogue in resolving those disputes.

In sum, we see that some assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism pertain to both the Six-Party Talks and the ASEAN-centered process of regional security dialogue, but they are both limited in their ability to resolve issues that directly relate to national sovereignty. This is the reality that we see in East Asia.

East Asia remains a neorealist world. Although the hegemonic power of the United States may be experiencing a relative decline, its military power is by far the most powerful of any country in the region. Moreover, the influence of the United States in maintaining the existing global system far exceeds that of any other regional power. Although China’s rapid economic growth is increasing its national power, its military capabilities are several decades behind those of the United States. Moreover, China’s influence in the management of the global system is still limited. China is pursing active diplomacy as the host nation for the Six-Party Talks, but the multilateral framework has been unsuccessful in attaining its single most important goal, the denuclearization of North Korea, due to the substantial disagreements among the parties on how to achieve that goal. Moreover, China is a major party to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and its position on those conflicts is exposing the limitations of the ASEAN-centered security dialogue.

While the U.S.-centered hub and spokes alliance system will likely continue in the foreseeable future, over the medium to long term, East Asia needs to transition to a multilateral security system. For this to happen, we need to promote the establishment of a system of international relations that infuse neoliberal elements with the present international relations that are highly neorealist in character. The eventual multilateral regional security system for the region must also reflect this shift. In short, we need a multi-layered security system that combines the elements of Neorealism with elements of Neoliberalism.

Theoretically there are two scenarios. The first scenario would be centered on the construction of a Kantian international society, where national policies focused on narrowly defined national interests would be gradually replaced by policies that fostered common international aspirations. This would require national leaders who shared common values and common perspectives on regional issues. However, in view of the centralized state systems and the nationalism-heavy international relations that exist in East Asia today, we cannot expect this scenario to unfold in the foreseeable future.

The second scenario would be one in which civil society and transnational networks were highly developed, such that civil society institutions and organizations would make sustained contributions to the resolution of common problems among the countries of East Asia.

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Ordinary citizens would come to believe in international cooperation that did not depend on state institutions. This would require the democratization of each country in the region. Civil society organizations in democratic political systems would freely extend cooperation across national borders, share their resources and abilities with each other, and cooperate to address common problems. They would build mutual confidence and trust, develop common values, and share a sense of community. That is, this scenario would eventuate in the construction of international relations along the lines of Sociological Liberalism.

Finally, in the heavily neorealist East Asian region, we are likely to see continued reliance on the state-centric system for addressing traditional security issues. However, we can hope that civil society-led transnational cooperation will complement the state-centric system.

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