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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at West Point Teaching Counterterrorism in the 21 st Century James JF Forest, Ph.D. Director of Terrorism Studies
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Page 1: WM College July 17 2005.ppt

COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Teaching Counterterrorism

in the 21st Century

James JF Forest, Ph.D.Director of Terrorism Studies

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Agenda

1. Advice from Sun Tzu2. MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach3. U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy4. Conclusion & Recommendations for Teaching

Notes: - This presentation is entirely at the unclassified level. - The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

1. Understanding the Terrorist Threat• NATO definition of terrorism:

The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives

• Sun Tzu– Know yourself– Know your allies– Know your enemy

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Sun Tzu: Know Your Enemy

Understanding the Terrorist Threat

• What motivates terrorists?• How do they get to a willingness to be a suicide bomber?• What do they want? • What are they capable of?• How do they view this struggle?

“You have to be lucky everyday – We only have to be lucky once” - IRA Bomber

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The Terrorists’ Perspective• For one thing, al Qaeda’s leaders believes that they have

been tested by two superpowers (Soviets and Americans); they defeated the first, and survived the second despite overwhelming military force – thus, both are considered victories

• Globally, members of this global religious-inspired insurgency believe this is an epic struggle that will likely take place beyond the current generation of fighters

• In Iraq, terrorists are developing a new “cult of the insurgent” by demonstrating how they, not the once-feared Saddam Hussein’s military, can inflict pain and suffering on the mighty U.S. (and coalition) forces

• Rationale for terrorism: perceived as only available means by which to achieve strategic goal

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Terrorism as Strategy• Terrorism is not new

• Terrorism is not merely religious: 1980 Bologna, Munich attacks; LTTE (Sri Lanka)

• Terrorism as weapon in a strategy

• Terrorist attacks as a formof strategic communication

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Terrorism as Strategic Communication

• What audiences are they attempting to communicate with?

• What message for each audience?• How are they communicating (beyond acts of violence)?• What are your actions, foreign policies, etc.

communicating, and to whom?• How can you determine the effectiveness of your own

communications?

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Some Strategic Acts of Terrorism

The terrorist act is generally a symbolic gesture against a group or national government. Tactics include:– armed attacks – arson– assassination – bombing– hijacking – hostage-taking – kidnapping, etc.

Suicide bombings

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Terrorism as Strategy• Terrorism as means to achieve goals and objectives

• Strategic goals include:– Political change (e.g., overthrow govt.)– Social change (e.g., France headscarf ban)– Economic change (e.g., stop resource export)– Religious change (e.g., fundamentalism)

• Overall goal: create a “better” world

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Some Strategic Objectives of Terrorism

• Recognition: Gaining national or international recognition for their cause; recruiting new personnel; raising funds; demonstrating their strength

• Coercion: Force a desired behavior of an individual or government

• Intimidation: Prevent individuals, groups, or governments from acting

• Provocation: Provoking overreaction by a government to the attack on symbolic targets or personnel, thereby gaining sympathy for their cause.

• Insurgency support: Forcing the government to overextend itself in dealing with the threat, thereby allowing the insurgency to gain support and commit further attacks against the government.

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Marine Barracks Beirut, Lebanon23 October 1983

• 241 Dead• 105 Injured

“We couldn’t stay there and run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines.”

-- Ronald Reagan, An American Life

“We couldn’t stay there and run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines.”

-- Ronald Reagan, An American Life

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Khobar Towers - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 25 June 1996

• 19 Dead

• 240 Injured

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New York, World Trade Center12 October 1993

6 Dead1,042 Injured

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Murrah Federal BuildingOklahoma City 19 April 1995

• 168 Dead• 490 Injured

• Some religious motivation, but different religion

• Same tactics (ammonium nitrate truck bomb) as 1993 WTC attack

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American Embassy Bombings, Kenya and TanzaniaAugust 1998 224 Americans, Kenyans, and Tanzanians deadOver 4,025 injured

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1999 LAX Attack Plan

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USS Cole, Aden, YemenOctober 12, 2000

17 Dead39 Injured

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Terrorism as Strategy

• Increasing interest in “soft targets” (economically strategic impact, and less protected) such as:

– pubs in Northern Ireland & London UK– open markets & cafes in Israel– international airport, Sri Lanka– bus in Manila, the Philippines– shopping mall in southern Philippines– nightclub in Bali, Indonesia– banks in Istanbul, Turkey– hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia– nightclub in Berlin, Germany

– and, of course . . .

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New York City & Washington, DCSeptember 11, 2001

2,973 Dead10,000+ Injured

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Karachi, PakistanMay 8, 2002 June 14, 2002

12 Dead50 Injured

14 Dead, including11 French engineers

Bus attackAttack on U.S. Consulate

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Bali, IndonesiaOctober 12, 2002 202 Dead

350 Injured

Citizens from 21 countries, mostly Western tourists, were killed in the blasts

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Casablanca, MoroccoMay 17, 2003

44 Dead107 Injured

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Jakarta, IndonesiaAugust 5, 2003

12 Dead60 Injured

J.W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta

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Riyadh, Saudi ArabiaNovember 8, 2003 April 21, 2004

4 Dead148 Injured

3 simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on Al-Muhaya apartment complex

Attack on Security Services Headquarters

17 Dead122 Injured

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Istanbul, TurkeyNovember 20, 2003

27 Dead400 Injured

Primary Targets: British consulate and the HSBC bank headquarters

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Madrid, SpainMarch 11, 2004

191 Dead1,035 Injured

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Jakarta, IndonesiaSeptember 9, 2004

9 Dead173 Injured

Australian Embassy was primary target

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London, UKJuly 7, 2005

54 Dead716 Injured

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Strategy and Recruitment• Terrorism is an individual’s strategic choice most often

driven by a combination of:– Intense grievances– Sense of crisis– Address a power imbalance - empower the disenfranchised

• The ties that bind: training camps, extended family, social networks; trusted networks = key

• Combination of ideology and psychology

• No constraints re: geography, organizational affiliation, etc.

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Strategy and Recruitment

• Recruit individuals with differing talents or attributes to offer– Locals with knowledge of customs, culture– Foreigners with passports, language skills– Sleepers or operationalists who can “fit in”– Individuals who can serve as critical functionaries

• Sleeper cells were key for the 9/11, Madrid and London attacks

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Terrorists as Strategic ActorsEven though it’s a decentralized network, there are still critical

functions that enable the network to operate

• Critical functionary roles – can become a hub of multiple networks – weapons procurement– financier (funder or banker) (particularly in Halawa system)– document forgerer– human traffickers

• Support individuals (trusted contacts) can and sometimes do support multiple networks; can provide supplies/facilitate trafficking of weapons & funds to multiple networks

• Example: 60% of day spent moving legitimate charity money around; 20% of day on Hamas transactions, other activity on side

• Some may get profit for doing these support/function roles

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Different members of the network play support and action roles

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Strategy and Training

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Strategy and Training

• Afghanistan• Algeria• Bosnia• Chechnya• Colombia• Egypt• Indonesia• Japan• Kashmir• Lebanon• Libya

Establish training camps – developing the will to kill and the skill to kill

• Operational space: Geographic isolation • Teachers: Experts in relevant knowledge, e.g., military combat experience• Committed learners• Time, money, and basic necessities

• Northern Ireland

• Peru• The Philippines• Somalia• Spain• Sri Lanka• Sudan• Syria• Turkey• United States• Uzbekistan

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Strategy and Training• Psychological dimensions

• Moral disengagement– Displacement of responsibility– Disregard for/distortion of consequences– Dehumanization– Moral justification

• Group power over behavior, personal decisions

• Preparation for martyrdom

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Strategy and Training

• education in explosives and detonators: how to assemble bombs (e.g., TNT, C4), mines and grenades, pressure and trip wire booby traps, and the basic knowledge of electrical engineering

• how to mount rocket launchers in the beds of pickup trucks

• how and where to launder money

• how to successfully conduct a kidnapping

• how to conduct target identification, surveillance and reconnaissance

• how and where to build camouflage-covered trenches

• how to covertly communicate with other members of a group or network

• how to fire handguns, machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers

Lessons for new recruits include:

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Strategy and Training

• the rudiments of chemical and biological warfare

• field command and escape tactics

• marksmanship and camouflage

• the use and employment of Soviet rocket-propelled grenades and shoulder borne STRELA missiles

• sniper rifle skills; how to fine-tune a rifle sight at short range to ensure accuracy at longer distances

• how to direct weapon fire at targets on the ground and in the air

• training in four-man unit deployments and formations—including wedges, columns, echelons and lines—techniques similar to those used by U.S. Marines and Army Rangers

Lessons for new recruits include:

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Strategy and TrainingIncreasing use of the Internet• Provide free tactical advice (print or online dissemination of information on

bomb making, computer hacking, etc.)• Advise sleepers on how to adapt to local surroundings (e.g., dress, friendly

relationships with locals, etc.)• Examples of online resources include:

– The Terrorists’ Handbook – How to Make Bombs, Book Two – 13 volume Encyclopedia of Jihad– Manual of Jihad– The Green Book (IRA)– The Turner Diaries (US extremists)– Mu’askar al-Battar (The Al Battar Training Camp, an Al Qaeda magazine)– The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook – The Anarchist Cookbook – Field Manual for Free Militia – Sabotage Handbook – Special Force – first-person shooter game, developed by Hizballah– Cyber-attack tools and instructions

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Example of Tactics: Ammonium Nitrate

• Millions of tons produced each year for use as fertilizer • Mining companies mix small amounts of explosive grade ammonium nitrate

with fuel oil to create explosives

• Used in several IRA bombings • Used in World Trade Center bombing, 1993 (1,200 lbs in truck bomb)• Used in the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995• Used in the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 1998• Used in the Bali bombing, 2002

• March 30, 2004: More than half a ton of ammonium nitrate fertilizer is found in a lock-up in West London. Eight British citizens, one American and one Canadian were arrested on suspicion of being involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Strategy and Training• These are Learning Organizations = committed to capturing

knowledge, analyzing it, forming new doctrine and tactics which are informed by lessons from the past– Learn from each other– Learn from trial and error (IRA example)– Media showcasing ‘best practices’ to others– Managing public image (PR)

(becoming more sophisticated)

• Terrorists are learning many things in Iraq, like:– Manufacturing and concealing IEDs– Urban warfare– Sniper and ambush techniques– Hostage taking– Media manipulation

• OVERALL: How to recruit, fund, and execute assymetric warfare

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Suicide Terrorism as Logical StrategySuicide Terrorism as Logical Strategy

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Suicide Terrorism: Who?Suicide Terrorism: Who?

Perception: • Generalized profile of suicide

terrorists, including:

– Young– Single– Male– Uneducated– Religious fanatics

Reality• The “profile” is wrong• Terrorists are:

– Preteen - mid-sixties

– Both single and married with families

– Both male and female

– Both educated and uneducated

– Not motivated by religious fanaticism

– World’s leader in suicide terror are Hindu; Tamil Tigers who are conducting insurgency against Sri Lanka

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Suicide Terrorism: Why?Suicide Terrorism: Why?

Perception: • Seemingly irrational act

Reality• Part of a strategy that is:

– Well planned

– Logical

– Designed to achieve specific political

objectives

• Does two things:– Inflicts immediate punishment

against target society

– Threatens more punishment in the future

• Suicide attacks have increased

over the past two decades

• Why?

• Suicide attacks have increased

over the past two decades

• Why?

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Suicide Terror Attacks are . . . • inexpensive and effective; extremely favorable per-casualty cost

benefits for the terrorists

• less complicated and compromising – no escape plan needed, and success means no assailant to capture and interrogate

• perhaps the ultimate “smart bomb” – this “weapon” can cleverly disguise itself, use various modes of deception, and effect last minute changes in timing, access, and target

• a strategic communication device – successful attacks are virtually assured media coverage

• effective because the weaker opponent acts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target

• Key difference from other attacks: The target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage

• inexpensive and effective; extremely favorable per-casualty cost benefits for the terrorists

• less complicated and compromising – no escape plan needed, and success means no assailant to capture and interrogate

• perhaps the ultimate “smart bomb” – this “weapon” can cleverly disguise itself, use various modes of deception, and effect last minute changes in timing, access, and target

• a strategic communication device – successful attacks are virtually assured media coverage

• effective because the weaker opponent acts as coercer and the stronger actor is the target

• Key difference from other attacks: The target of suicide campaign cannot easily adjust to minimize future damage

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Suicide Terrorism: Where?Suicide Terrorism: Where?

Three types of attacks are most likely to occur:

• High value, symbolic targets involving mass casualties– Important government buildings, installations, or landmarks– Major means of personal or commercial transportation

• High value, symbolic targets against specific persons– Political assassinations (e.g., head of state, regional governor,

etc.)

• Deliberately lethal attacks targeting the public– Bus, train, subway bombings; attacks on shopping malls, cinemas,

sports stadiums, public gathering spaces

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Understanding Counterterrorism

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2. MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) CT Approach

Question: Once we understand the threat, how do we address it?

Answer: We employ all the instruments of national power available to us.

• Military• Intelligence• Diplomacy• Legal• Information• Financial• Economic

Question: Once we understand the threat, how do we address it?

Answer: We employ all the instruments of national power available to us.

• Military• Intelligence• Diplomacy• Legal• Information• Financial• Economic

• Case studies of groups and

events help us learn about

each of these dimensions

• Case studies of groups and

events help us learn about

each of these dimensions

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

Example of the Financial/Economic Dimensions:

How does the LTTE Sustain its Operation Financially?

Taxes from local Population

Taxes from Business

Taxes from Fishermen

Taxes from Visitors

Tax on Liquor

Taxes on Goods

Robbery

Blackmail & Ransom

Drug s/ Crime

Investing/ running LocalBusiness Ventures

LOCAL

Local Enterprises

Fund raising Projects Playing the Stock Market

In Areas heavily dominated by Tamils

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Propaganda/ Fund raising projects

Donations from Supporters(Tamil Diaspora)

Foreign residence Tax

International

Asylum Seekers tax

Foreign Investments/Business

Drug SmugglingHuman Trafficking

Funding from state Parties

Shipping/Gunrunning

Money laundering/ Forgery

Credit card Fraud

Terrorist training

Aiding International Criminals

INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTERat West Point

US Counterterrorism Strategy

• Helped Sri Lankan military develop 4 key capabilities– Operate behind enemy lines– Engage in night fighting– SEAL, special boat operations– Psyops capabilities

• Helped Sri Lankan banking and commerce tracking systems locate & disrupt money laundering networks

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The “L” in MIDLIFE

• Legal/Law Enforcement• Rule of law is vital, both domestically and

internationally• The primary intelligence gatherers and first

responders are local law enforcement officers• Help countries develop their law enforcement

capabilities and legal institutions• Must conduct CT within ethical and legal

frameworks, to avoid exacerbating existing grievances

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Intelligence: Learn from our own mistakes• We assumed simultaneous 9/11 attacks in U.S. were

beyond the capabilities of terrorists• Overestimated the significance of past successes & the

terrorists’ own incompetence• Attention was focused exclusively on opposite ends of

the terrorist technological spectrum• Believed terrorists were still

interested in publicity and not killing

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3. U.S. Strategy for Combating TerrorismNational Strategy for Combating Terrorism

(released in February 2003)

Four main objectives:• defeating terrorist organizations with global

reach• denying sponsorship, support and

sanctuary to terrorists• diminishing the underlying conditions

that terrorists seek to exploit• defending U.S. citizens and interests

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Elements of the National CT Strategy4 D’s:• Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach• Deny terrorists the sponsorship, support, and

sanctuary they need to survive• Diminish the underlying conditions that promote

the despair and destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace terrorism

• Defend against terrorist attacks on the U.S., our citizens and our interests around the world

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Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach

Objectives:• Identify the terrorists

(DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information)

• Locate the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information)

• Destroy the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Military, Financial, Legal)

Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation

Particular importance given to organizations with combination of high motivation and significant capabilities

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Deny terrorists sponsorship, support, & sanctuaryObjectives:• End state sponsorship

(DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal, and in the most extreme cases, Military)

• Establish & maintain international accountability (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal)

• Strengthen international will to combat terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Military, Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Legal)

• Interdict & disrupt material support for terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial, Legal)

• Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Military, Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial, Legal)

Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation

In particular, we must work with willing and able states, enable weak states, persuade reluctant states, and compel unwilling states

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Diminish the underlying conditions

Objectives:• Strengthen international capacity to combat terrorism

(DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomacy, Intelligence, Military, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal)

• Win the war of ideas (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Legal)

Requires considerable interagency coordination and multinational cooperation

Special attention is already being given to developing SOF capabilities in places like the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel Region (e.g., TSCTI)

We need to focus on strengthening law enforcement/rule of law; intelligence gathering & sharing; public diplomacy

Local communities must de-legitimize terrorism

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Defend against terrorist attacks

Objectives:• Implement National Strategy for Homeland Security

(DIMEFIL dimensions: Intelligence, Economic, Financial, Information, Legal)

• Attain domain awareness (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal)

• Enhance measures to protect critical infrastructure (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal)

• Integrate measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal)

• Ensure an integrated response capability (DIMEFIL dimensions: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial, Legal)

Based on the mindset that “the best defense is a good offense”

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Table of Contents

IntroductionI. Overview of America's International Strategy II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work

to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends IV. Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our

Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade

VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy

VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power

IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century

U.S. National Security Strategy,September 2002 (Replaces 2000 Clinton Edition)

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National Strategic Framework for the GWOT

Overall Goal: Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to that way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists.

Ends

Means National, partner and international instruments of power

Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

Protect the Homeland

Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks

Ways

EnemyFoot soldiers

LeadershipIdeological support

Safe havens

WeaponsFunds

Comms & Movement Access to Targets

Help create and lead a broad international effort to deny terrorist networks the resources they need to

operate and survive.

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Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT

Strategic Goal: Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to our way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists.

Termination Objectives from the Contingency Planning Guidance

Ends

Means Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies

Mili

tary

Str

ateg

ic O

bje

ctiv

es

Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism

Protect the Homeland

Disrupt and Attack Terrorist Networks

Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.

Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence mgmt. Ways

Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive.

Establish conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.

Defeat terrorists and their organizations.

Persuade, coerce, and when necessary, compel states and non-states to cease support for terrorists.

EnemyFoot soldiers

LeadershipIdeological support

Safe havens

WeaponsFunds

Comms & Movement Access to Targets

END-STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

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• Our strategy must involve denying terrorists sanctuary; separating terrorists from the population

• Must isolate them, take away their support, force them to continually be on the run

• Organizing for force protection based on battle line mentality won’t work

• UAV’s aren’t as useful as you might think; over-reliance on technical wizardry has been a problem in the field

• Attrition – we must keep after them, never give up, while making sure they don’t recruit new members

Counterterrorism Strategy

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• Human intelligence networks are critical (although non-efficient use of manpower)

• Must have continual presence – cannot go into a village “looking for the terrorists”

• Focus on the enemy’s ideology, in addition to their tactics

• This is a War of Ideas: We need to convince them (potential supporters and recruits) that we (liberal democracies) offer a better way than separatist Islamic Jihad (but without attempting to convert them to our way of life)

• We must work to bolster the image of American morals and values being compatible with those of the Arab and Islamic world, where we are too often portrayed as greedy, selfish hedonists

Counterterrorism Strategy

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Counterterrorism Strategy

• Evaluate trends and potentials, capabilities and intentions, and provide an operational net assessment

• The contemporary terrorist threat involves a series of adversaries linked in networks. Combating networks requires an understanding of networked threats

• Must not over-react; terrorist strategy may be to provoke over-reaction, leading to further alienation and possible supporters among populace

• Tactical level: thwart an attack, pursue and bring to justice attack perpetrators

• Strategic level: build resilient communities

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Information warfare - We must develop an effective counter-ideological message- Manage perceptions/be more proactive in the information battlespace- Undermine the perceived legitimacy among supporters

• How well do we invest in and support the “extremists whom we like” (a.k.a., “moderates”) and support ways to amplify their voices?

• We must invest in educational & social institutions; media organizations

• Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism can only be achieved through

– Multinational partnerships– Interagency coordination

Counterterrorism Strategy

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Coordination Levels

ALLIESALLIES Coalition

Interagency

Joint

ArmyCombined

Arms

Army Navy Air Force Marines

OTHERAGENCIES

DOD DOS CIA

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Interagency Coordination Process

CounterterrorismSecurity Group (CSG)

DeputiesCommittee

PrincipalsCommittee

President

Core Group: NSC, DOS, DOJ/FBI, DOD, CIA, Treasury (Secret Service), and Department of Homeland Security

Deputy Secretary Level

Secretary Level

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POTUS

SE

CD

EF

SE

CS

TATE

Sec ofHome. Sec.

Nat’l SecurityAdvisor

CJC

S D

CI W

HC

OS

VP

NSC

DOS DOD

DOHS

NSC Staff

JCS

INTELCommunity

The National Security Council

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Interagency Coordination: Lead Federal Agency Concept

• Terrorist Incident Overseas: Department of State• Terrorist Incident in United States: FBI• Consequence Management in United States:

Department of Homeland Security (FEMA)• Terrorist Financing: Department of the Treasury• Military Action*: Department of Defense

• *and support lead agency

Intelligence Community Support:•Identifying, locating and tracking terrorists and organizations

•CIA, FBI, DIA and DoD Intel Orgs, State INR (plus Allies and Partners)

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National Counterterrorism CenterAddressing the first “I” in MIDLIFE

• NCTC currently has assignees (USG staff) from: • Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Department of Defense• Central Intelligence Agency• Department of Homeland Security• Department of State • Others – DOE, NRC, HHS, USDA, USCHP

• Assignees to NCTC retain authorities of parent entities

• In NCTC, key organizations involved in the fight against terrorism are collectively fulfilling shared responsibilities

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• Many U.S. Government networks are available in NCTC • Integrated architecture will enable a simultaneous, federated search capability against the terabytes of dataavailable to the U.S. government• Advanced analytic tools are facilitating the automated sourcing and tailoring multi-use products; enhancing data exploitation and integration

• “Terrorism information” covers an exceptionally broad array of data

• Active information acquisition effort underway• Seeking awareness and integration of non-obvious terrorism information

Terrorism Information Access and Integration

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• What do we know? What do we need to know?

• Providing daily terrorism analysis for the President, senior policymakers, and the U.S. Government

• NCTC produces integrated and coordinated analysis – if there are analytic differences on the nature or seriousness of a particular threator issue, they are incorporated into the analysis• Producing special analysis and other in-depth, strategic, and alternative analyses

• Counterterrorism Requirements - Identifying gaps in knowledge; prioritizing transnational terrorism information needs

Terrorism Analysis and CT Requirements

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• Beyond implementing Center responsibilities, the greater goal is facilitating a counterterrorism “system” as part of a greater U.S. Government (USG) system-of-systems

• All USG elements need not be centralized; however, a distributed but integrated framework must be consciously agreed upon and orchestrated• Roles and responsibilities of USG CT elements must be as unambiguous and straightforward as possible; intentional rather than haphazard redundancy

Toward a Counterterrorism “System”

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Conclusion• You must thoroughly know your enemy before you can

successfully defeat him

• You cannot address terrorism in isolation– Root causes (socioeconomic, religious extremism, etc.)– Facilitators (criminal networks, arms trafficking)– Finances are key– Ideology, other motivators– Information/public diplomacy is vital– All must be done in the context of moral, ethical & legal principles

• Bottom line: CT goes way beyond strategy and tactics; we must focus on environmental factors that facilitate terrorism

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Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism

• Use case studies to frame the key issues/challenges (particularly the moral, legal, tactical dimensions)

• Assign National Security Strategy and other White House documents as required reading

• Have students analyze National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from MIDLIFE perspective, noting that effective CT requires integration of all dimensions

• Assessment (papers, presentations, quizzes) – students should demonstrate - understanding of threat- the strategy behind the threat- dimensions of DIMEFIL model, and - the integration of DIMEFIL dimensions into holistic CT strategy

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Suggestions for Teaching Counterterrorism

Integrative Exercise/Capstone Experience:

• Complex terrorism scenario

• Assign different readings to different groups of students;integrative exercise should focus on the complex requirements for information and force collective strategic thinking and action

• Questions for groups to answer can include:– What will you recommend?– What are the moral, legal implications of your actions?– Who (what national assets) will you involve?

• Overall goal is to integrate lessons learned throughout the course, and to learn while engaged in the exercise

• Outcome should give you a sense of what they’ve learned, whether or not they “get it”

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Questions?


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