WMD Nonproliferation Regimes: Current Threats and Challenges
Dr. Vladimir OrlovSpecial Advisor
PIR Center
MGIMO UniversityGovernance and Global Affairs M.A.
MA in Nonproliferation StudiesMoscow, 2017
Lecture 10
Current Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Regime
Key Problems for the Nuclear Nonproliferation
1. Nuclear disarmament process is too slow;
2. DPRK continues its nuclear tests being outside the regime
3. India, Pakistan and Israel decline to joint the NPT
4. JCPOA with Iran is under threat of failure
5. No progress with the Zone Free of Nuclear and Other WMDin the Middle East
6. Multilateral diplomacy fails to address key nucleardisarmament and proliferation concerns
7. Nuclear and missile technology proliferation networksbecame a part of reality;
8. Non-state actors seek access to nuclear weapons andnuclear materials
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Decreasing of effectiveness of the mechanisms of multilateral diplomacy
Difficulties with the implementation and universalization of the NPT
Lack of progress towards establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East
Disturbance of strategic stability
MEASURES ON STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME IN 2017-2020
KEY
CHALLENGES
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and nuclear test
(opened for signature in 1996)
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
radionuclid hydroacoustic infrasoundseismic
CTBT Annex 2 States(States whose signature and ratification are required
for the Treaty to enter into force)
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Democratic People's
Republic of KoreaDemocratic Republic
of Congo
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Islamic Republic of Iran
Israel
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Poland
Republic of
Korea
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovakia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States of
America
Viet Nam
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
«[To] achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, myadministration will immediately and aggressively pursueU.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.After more than five decades of talks, it is time for thetesting of nuclear weapons to finally be banned»
Barack ObamaPrague Speech (April 9, 2009)
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FCMT)
«A necessary condition for the success of FMCT negotiations is carrying them out within the Conference on Disarmament, and not anywhere else. That is the only way to ensure the participations of all key actors»Sergey Lavrov
Russian Foreign Minister
March 1, 2011
«If efforts to start negotiationsin the CD continue to stall, thenthose governments that wishto negotiate an FMCT will haveto consider other options formoving this process forward»Rose GottemoellerUS Deputy State SecretaryOctober 5, 2010
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Nuclear proliferation in the world: 1945 - 2017
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Nuclear-Weapons States
Not members to the NPT
States renounced their nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons
on their territories
States renounced their nuclear weapon programs
Non-Compliance
States of Concern Nation NPT
memberCTBTstatus
Number of nuclear tests
IAEA membership
Transfer of nuclear technology to other countries
Physical security of military nuclear infrastructure facilities
Israel No Signed, not ratified
n/a* Yes n/a n/a
India No Not signed
9 Yes No Satisfactory
Pakistan No Not signed
2*** Yes Yes Unsatisfactory
North Korea
Since 1985**
Notsigned
6 No n/a n/a
* Probably did not conduct any nuclear tests, though Israel’s complicity in the mysterious 1979 "flash” in the South Atlanticcannot be ruled out** North Korea initiated its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993 and announced the resumption of NPT withdrawal procedure onJanuary 10, 2003*** Pakistan has conducted two underground nuclear tests, detonating a total of six nuclear devicesSource: "NPT-2010: strengthening the regime". Moscow, PIR Center, 2010.
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
States non-parties to the NPT (1)
CNN/Brian Rokus
www.lenta.ru
www.barc.ernet.inDr. Vladimir Orlov
IsraelDimona nuclear facility that is
the key element of Israel’s
Nuclear Weapon Program
DPRKYongbyon
Nuclear Complex
PakistanUranium enrichment facility at Kahuta
which has being developing actively
since the beginning 1990.
IndiaBhabha Atomic Research
Centre (BARC), the premier
Indian research center carries
out research in areas of
nuclear research and
development.
South Sudan
• Ratification of the CTBT as soon as possible;
• Providing the access for IAEA inspectors to theDimona nuclear facility;
• Early start of negotiations on WMD-free zonein the Middle East creation;
• Step by step NPT accession as a non-nuclearstate.
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
States non-parties to the NPT (2)
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
• Ratification of the CTBT as soon as possible;
• Renounce the blocking of FCMT negotiationsstart on the Conference on Disarmament;
• Providing IAEA with comprehensiveinformation on nuclear materials proliferationtaken place;
• Step by step NPT accession as a non-nuclearstate.
States non-parties to the NPT (3)
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
• Ratification of the CTBT as soon as possible;
• Implementation of the obligations under US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement from October10, 2008 (123 agreement);
• Peaceful nuclear activity under NuclearSuppliers Group 6 September 2008 decisions.
States non-parties to the NPT (4)
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
• Moratorium on nuclear test and further CTBTaccession
• The implementation of the agreements in thesix-nation talks framework with focus onregaining NPT membership of DPRK as a non-nuclear state
• Participation, along with South Korea, in aKorean Peninsula denuclearization process
States non-parties to the NPT (5)
States Non-Parties to the NPT (6)
В.А. Орлов
North Korea talks are deadlocked
DPRK expands nuclear weapon and missile programmes
Goal - denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, DPRK's return to the NPT, restoration of the IAEA safeguards
P5 to initiate consultations on this issue
South Korea and Japan to avoid pressures for further proliferation in the region
Steps to encourage cooperation:humanitarian assistance and economic aid, easing of sanctions security assurances помощь
Responses: Use of Force
An Israeli F-16 pilot's view ashe lines up on Iraq's Osiraknuclear reactor in 1981.
June 7, 1981Israel's air strike against the Osiraq reactor
September 6, 2007Israel's air attack against Syria
Syrian reactor was not yet operationaland no nuclear material had beenintroduced into it.
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Responses: Sticks (sanctions)
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
Responses: Carrots
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
ABDUL QADEER KHAN is a Pakistaninuclear scientist and metallurgical engineer. The Head of the Network.
FRIEDRICH TINNER and his sons, mechanical engineer, alleged to have had dealings with the nuclear arms expert since 1980s,was reported to have prepared certain centrifuge components, including safety valves.
PETER GRIFFIN, a citizen of
UK who has business interests
in DUBAI and currently
residing in FRANCE. Alleged
to have supplied the lay-out
plan for the Machine Shop
1001 as a workshop to enable
LIBYA to produce centrifuge
GOTTHARD LERCH, a German citizen residing in Switzerland, worked for LEYBOLD HERAEUS, a German company that is alleged to have produced vacuum technology
equipment.
German citizen GERHARDVISSER was the managingdirector of Randburg companyKrish Engineering
Swiss citizen DANIEL GEIGES worked for Randburg company Krish Engineering as a project manager
JOHAN ANDRIES MULLER MEYER, the citizen of South Africa Republic, the director of Tradefin EngineeringThe main witness in the South African process
The Netherlands
Germany
Turkey
Libya
Pakistan
North Korea
U A E
South Africa
Iran
Countries furnished know -how & materials
Countries received nuclear technologies
Khan’s network
BUHARY SAYED ABU TAHIR (Sri Lanka)
Abdul Qadeer Khan International Network Supplied Nuclear Technologies to the Following
Countries:
• Iran (first transfer in about 1987)
• Libya (first transfer approximately in about 1997)
• North Korea (cooperation began in 1993)
• Iraq (nuclear technologies offers in 1990)
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Nuclear Security and Nuclear Terrorism
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
UN Security Council Resolution#1540 (2004) of April 28, 2004
• all states shall take and enforce effective measures to establishdomestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
• develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures toaccount for and secure such items in production, use, storageand transport;
• develop and maintain appropriate and effective border controlsto detect, deter, prevent and combat, including throughinternational cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking insuch items;
• establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate andeffective national export and trans-shipment of such items.
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
• Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 April 2005• Opened for signature in September 2005• Signatories: 115, Parties: 99• Provides for a definition of acts of nuclear terrorism and
covers a broad range of possible targets, including thoseagainst nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors
• Encourages States to cooperate in preventing terroristattacks by sharing information and assisting each otherin connection with criminal investigations and extraditionproceedings.
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
There is a need to reach an interim agreement on DPRK's nuclear program: lifting of sanctions, international aid, and security assurances, should be exchanged for DPRK freezing its nuclear and missile programs
In the case of withdrawal from the NPT, any nuclear materials and/or equipment received must be returned or placed under life-long unconditional IAEA safeguards
All parties must implement the JCPOA in a spirit of good will, using all available mechanisms contained in the agreement to resolve any differences in the framework of Iran agreement
Example of Pakistan should be used for involving India as an observer in CTBTO Preparatory Commission and continue the dialog with both countries concerning signing and ratifying the CTBT
Difficulties with the implementation and
universalization of the NPT
6 Steps towards further Nuclear Disarmament:
1. Nuclear-weapon states accept the commitments not to increase theirnuclear stockpiles
2. Nuclear-weapon states renounce the onshore deployment of nuclearweapons beyond their national borders
3. Nuclear-weapon states renounce the development of new types ofnuclear weapons
4. All nuclear-weapon states together must start to work on a Treaty fornon-orbiting and non-deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space
5. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty must be universalized
6. Nuclear disarmament should become a part of global military budgetcuts
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
The first step for preventing hypersonic arms race could be an international conference with participation of all the key actors in this area
The United States and NATO should resume negotiations with Russia about their missile defense system in Europe and introduce transparency measures
In the framework of the Conference on Disarmament all nuclear weapons states should unilaterally release official reports on their nuclear arsenals
Establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe could accelerate removal of the US nuclear weapons back to the national territory
Disturbance of strategic stability
Facilitating the ratifications and entry into force of the CTBT should be an important priority for the international community.
New treaty could include limitations on deployed strategic systems (warheads and delivery vehicles), deployed and non-deployed launchers, and non-deployed nuclear warheads; negotiations could also include other arms control issues (such as sea-based and air-based cruise missiles with conventional warheads, and missile defense systems).
Further nuclear arms reductions in the near time frame (2018-2020) are hardly realistic
It is essential that both Russia and US continue to implement the New START treaty until it expires in 2021
Disturbance of strategic stability
Russia and China could initiate an international conference for a broad discussion of the Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space
The NWS should continue to reiterate their commitment to Article VI of the NPT
Elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles by all NWS would lay the foundations for a multilateral nuclear disarmament process
It is necessary to restart the work of the Conference on Disarmament and by temporarily removing FMCT from the CD agenda
Decreasing of effectiveness of the mechanisms of
multilateral diplomacy
Submitting to the UN the reports on disarmament and non-proliferation education would demonstrate states compliance with their commitments in this area
Students from the states that are newcomers in peaceful development of nuclear energy should be specifically involved in relevant educational programs
The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters under the UN Secretary General could conduct a review of the implementation of the recommendations made by the UN study on disarmament and nonproliferation education, and, if necessary, arrange a revision of the study
Decreasing of effectiveness of the mechanisms of
multilateral diplomacy
«Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters»
Report of the UN Secretary-General
The relationship between sustainable development, security and arms control
The challenges facing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its review process, with a particular focus on the Middle East
The emerging nexus between chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, cybersecurity and terrorism
«Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters»
Report of the UN Secretary-General
Key issues
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
?
NPT 2020
Dr. Vladimir Orlov
