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WookieeStatements,Semanticism,andReasonableAssertion†

EduardoGarcíaRamírezInstitutodeInvestigacionesFilosóficas

UniversidadNacionalAutónomadeMéxico

espurea@gmail.com

Abstract

It is assumed that the content of an assertion is determinedeitherbythesemanticallydefinedcontentorbytheinteractionofthelatterwiththecontext.HereIpresentacounterexamplebymeansoftheWookieeproblem.AfterconsideringseveraloptionsIofferwhatappearstobeitsmostsatisfactorysolution.Thisrequiresthatwegiveuptheassumptionin favor of a view according to which it may be that semanticinformationdoesnot at all determine the content of an assertion, notevenpartlyso.

Keywords:assertion,semanticcontent,context,presupposition.

1Assertion

Allconversations takeplace inacontextandconveysomethingbyutteringsomeor

other sentence.On the receivedview (see Stalnaker1978and1987) the goal of an

assertion is to communicatewhat is said. The context and content of an assertion

interactinordertodeterminewhatissaid.

In order to properly describe this interaction Stalnaker 1978 proposes a two‐

dimensional model. One dimension is determined by the contextually relevant

information:e.g.,whoisthespeaker,whicharethesalientobjects,andwhatdoesthe

world look like. The other dimension is determined by semantic information: the

meaningofthewordsusedbytheparticipants.

†TheauthorwouldliketothankAndyEgan,Shen‐YiLiao,andJoshDeverforveryhelpfulcomments.

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Thismodelhasbeenusedandinterpretedindifferentways.Stalnaker2004claims

heintendedtousehismodelwitha“metasemantic”interpretationaccordingtowhich

the model offers a mere description of the context‐content interaction within

conversations.Others(seeChalmersandJackson2001andChalmers2002)intendto

usethemodelwitha“semantic”interpretacionaccordingtowhichthemodeloffersa

descriptionofthesemanticandconceptualknowledgethatcompetentspeakershave.

Both interpretations,however, agreeonwhat I call “the semanticist assumption”or

SAforshort:

SemanticistAssumption(SA):thecontentofanassertionisdeterminedeitherby

the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the

interactionbetweenthelatterandthecontext.

It is easy to see howSAworkswithin two‐dimensional semantics. According to

Chalmers2002,forexample,everylinguistictermhastwodifferentkindsofmeaning

or content. On the one hand, A‐intensions track epistemic dependence. Epistemic

dependencetellsushowthesentence’struth‐valuedependsonthespeaker’sapriori

(i.e.,semantic)knowledge.Forexample,forallIknowaprioriapurelyindexicaluse1

of theEnglishsentence ‘Iamhere’ is true ifandonly if thespeaker is locatedat the

place of the utterance. On the other hand, C‐intensions track factual dependence.

Factualdependencetellsushowthesentence'struth‐valuedependsonthefacts.For

example,ifMuses`Iamhere'indexicallywhilebeinginCambridge,whatMsayswill

betrueifandonlyifMisinCambridge.

1Imean“purelyindexical”inKaplan’swayinordertoexcludedemonstrativeusesof‘here’wherethespeakerispointingataparticularlocationdistinctfromhers;e.g.,whensomeoneistryingtogiveherlocationbypointingatamapandsaying‘Ilivehere’.

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Two‐dimensionalsemantics(seeStalnaker1978,Chalmers2002,2004,and2006)

canbeunderstoodasclaimingthatforeverydeclarativeassertionorthoughtthereis

atwo‐dimensionalintensionthatmapspairsofworlds(oneconsideredasactualand

theotherascounterfactual)intotruth‐values.Theresultisatwo‐dimensionalmatrix

where the horizontal lines describe propositions that are determined by the

interactionbetweencontentandthecontext.Stalnaker1978famouslyarguesthatthe

corresponding two‐dimensional matrix includes a second distinguishable kind of

proposition:thatwhichisdescribedbythediagonalofthematrix.2

Thecentralclaimoftwo‐dimensionalsemanticsisthatthecontentofanassertion

willbeeitherahorizontalpropositionor thediagonalone.There isnothirdoption.

Now, given that both, horizontals and diagonal, are determined either by the

semanticallydefinedcontentorby the interactionof the latterwith thecontext, the

two‐dimensionalviewiscommittedtoSA.

SemanticistAssumption(SA):thecontentofanassertionisdeterminedeitherby

the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the

interactionbetweenthelatterandthecontext.

Whether two‐dimensionalist or not, almost everyone seems to agree with

Stalnaker’s 1978 claim that the content of an assertion is determined in the way

describedbySA.Somesuchassumptionseemstounderlie, forexample, thecurrent

debateconcerningrelativism(seeEgan2005andCappelenandHawthorne2009).

2For several reasons, Chalmers 2004 and Stalnaker (see Block and Stalnaker, 1999, and Stalnaker,2004) distinguish this from Chalmers’ A‐proposition. The distinction, however, is irrelevant for thepurposeofthisdiscussion.

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Some reject the idea that all truth‐conditionally relevant information is

semanticallyencodedinfavorofwhatisknownastruth‐conditionalpragmatics(see

Chomsky1996,Travis1997,Bezuidenhout2002andAsherandLascarides2003).On

this view, there is truth‐conditionally relevant contextual information that is not

semanticallyencoded.Still,itisassumedthecontentofanassertionisatleastpartly

determinedbythesemanticallyencodedinformation.SomethinglikeSAistakentobe

trueevenwithintruth‐conditionalpragmatics.

The case is clearer for Neo‐Rusellians like Soames 2007 who reject the two‐

dimensional approach just described. On this view, the content of an assertion is

always the semantically defined proposition. This suggests an even stronger

endorsementofSA.

Soitseemsfairtosayphilosophersoflanguagehaveadoptedasemanticistattitude

by assuming that something like SA is true. As I will show, this assumption is

mistaken.Thereare informativeassertions the contentofwhich isnot semantically

determinedatall,notevenpartlyso.

2Theoreticconstraints

Speakers seem to utter sentence tokens, more often than not, for communicative

purposes. It is plausible to think that utterances of declarative sentences count as

assertions. And it is plausible to think that what the assertion expresses for the

speakerisidentifiedwithwhatthespeakerwantstocommunicatewithherassertion.

Ifthisisaccepted,thentheremustbeawayinwhichatheorythatassumesSAhelps

usunderstandthisphenomenon.

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Atfirstglanceitseemslikeitcanreadilydoso.Allitneedstodoisfindoutwhich

content, either the horizontal or the diagonal, gets to play the role of the asserted

content.But,whenitcomestocommunication,therearesomeconstraints.Itakeitfor

granted that any account—for sure, any two‐dimensional account— of

communicationmustobservethefollowingprinciplesowedtoStalnaker(1978).

Informative:Apropositionasserted(orthought)isalwaystrueinsomebutnotallof

thepossibleworldsinthecontext.

Nogaps:Anyassertiveutterance(orthought)shouldexpressaproposition,relative

toeachworld in thecontext,and thatpropositionshouldhavea truth‐

valueineachworldinthecontext.

No ambiguities: The same proposition is expressed (or thought) relative to each

worldinthecontext.

These principles work under the assumption that the goal of an assertion is to

reducethesetofpossibilitiesinthecontextset.Thiscannotbeachievediftherelevant

propositioniseithernecessarilytrueornecessarilyfalse,that’swhatweneedthefirst

principlefor.Thesamehappenswiththesecondprinciple.Ifthereisaworldwhere

theproposition in questionhasno truth‐value thenwewill not knowwhether that

possibility shouldbe carvedoutof the spaceofpossibilities; that’swhat the second

principleisfor.Similarconsiderationsapplytothethirdprinciple.Propositionscanbe

understoodasrecipesforlogicalcarving.Ifthematrixoffersmanyofthemwewillnot

knowwhichrecipetofollow.3

3Thethirdprinciplecomeswithawrinkle.Ontheepistemicinterpretation,theassertion(orassertive

thought)willcorrespondto twopropositionsatonce. Ifpresent,anambiguitywillberepresented in

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It shouldbeclear thatany theory thatacceptsSAmustembrace theseprinciples.

Theydeterminewhatagivenspeakerexpressesbymeansofherassertiveutterance.

So here comes the challenge, can a theory that accepts SA account for the way in

whichspeakersuttersentencestocommunicateinformationwhilebeingconstrained

bythethreeprinciplesabove?Theanswer,Ibelieve,isnegative.

3TheWookieeproblem

Therearesuccessful(i.e., informative)assertionswhereneitherahorizontalnorthe

diagonalproposition–i.e., neither theC‐intensionnor theA‐intension, onChalmers’

view–canbesaidtodeterminethecontentoftheassertionin lightoftheprinciples

above.

Considerthefollowingsituation.IamlookingforTom.Weagreedtomeetatthe

departmentatnoon, either in the commons roomor inhisoffice. It’snoonandas I

walkthroughthehallwayIcalloutp:“Tom,whereareyou?”Tomrepliesbyuttering

q:“Iamhere”fromwithinhisoffice.Tom’sspeechactobservestheprinciples.Itlets

meknowwhereheis(i.e.,notambiguous),itiscontingent(i.e.,informative),anddoes

notseemtobeincomplete(i.e.,hasnotruth‐valueormeaninggaps).Thequestionis,

then,howshouldwerepresentthissituation?

thehorizontallines,whichcorrespondtotheexternalcontent.Followersoftheviewcouldsimplyreply

that there is no ambiguity since, in those cases, there is still a single proposition, the diagonal or A

proposition, represented by the matrix. If this is so, then so be it. The point is irrelevant for the

purposesofthepresentdiscussion.

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Thereare twoworlds in the setofpossibilities:worldw1 inwhichTom is in the

commons room and world w2 in which Tom is in his office. The purpose of the

conversation is to let me knowwhich of these worlds is the actual one. Matrix A1

representsthetwo‐dimensionalpropositionofTom’sutteranceq.

A1 w1 w2

w1 T F

w2 F T

So,whichpropositiondidTomjustassert?Therearetwocandidates:thediagonal

andahorizontal.Butnoneof themobservetheprinciples.Thediagonalproposition

fails tomeet Informative because the sentenceTomuttered isbound tobe true in

everypossibleworldinwhichheuttersit.Inshort,ithasanecessarydiagonal,which

istrivial.Thehorizontalpropositions,determinedbytheC‐intensions,goagainstNo

ambiguities because Tom’s utterance expresses different propositions relative to

differentworlds.Sotherearedifferenthorizontalpropositions.Hence,neitherofthe

twocandidatesexplainshowTom’sutteranceobservestheprinciples.

Matrix‐levelupdate?

Ifyouareatwo‐dimensionalistyoumightbethinking:“butwhyshouldwebeforced

to pick one, either a horizontal or a diagonal proposition. Why not update on the

wholematrix?”

Theonlykindof“matrix‐level”updatethatIknowofisStalnaker’sdiagonalization

bymeansofthedaggeroperator.Stalnaker1978introducesthedaggerasapragmatic

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tool, but there is no problem ifwewant to interpret it semantically (see Chalmers

2002).Thedagger†worksinaverystraightforwardfashion: ittakesamatrixasan

input and gives a matrix as its output by taking the diagonal of the former and

projectingitonthehorizontallinesofthelatter.Toillustrate,theresultofapplying†

toTom’soriginalproblematicMatrixA1isgivenbyMatrix†A1.

†A1 w1 w2

w1 T T

w2 T T

Asyoumay see, the result isnogood. Idonot seem tohave learnedanything in

virtue of the semantics of Tom’s utterance. Matrix †A1 does not offer any update

recipeforTom.Ofcourse,theremightbeothermoreinteresting,perhapsevenmore

semantic,kindsof“matrix‐level”update.Sofar,thereseemstobenoalternativeone.

Furthermore, it’sunlikely thatanynon‐arbitrarymatrix‐level strategywill solve the

problem.

It goes without saying that the pragmatic use of † is in no better standing (see

Stalnaker1978).Sofar,Tom’sfelicitousassertionisproblematicforbothsortsoftwo‐

dimensionalism.

Amorenaturalresponse

It is commonly agreed (see Stalnaker 1978 and 2002) that there are at least two

processes by means of which one can be informative. Accommodation, on the one

hand,takesplacepriortotheacceptanceofthecontentandaftertheutterancetakes

place. It simply adds on one more presupposition to the context, namely, that the

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speechacttookplace.Reduction,ontheotherhand,takesplaceaftertheacceptance

of the asserted content by eliminating incompatible worlds. This gives the two‐

dimensionalista response:weare in troublebecausewe leftoutan importantstep:

wehavenotyetaccommodatedthespeechactintothecontext.

The speech act is an observable fact. The fact that we communicate verbally

presupposesthatwebothareabletohearthesoundsproducedbyoneanother.More

specifically, Tom presupposes that I presuppose that he presupposes that I can

identify the sound of his speech act and where it comes from. Tom is correct. I

presupposethis.Furthermore,fromtheobservablefactthatTomhasutteredasound

Icaninferthattheutterancecomesfromhisoffice.

Thisgivesusaderivedsetofpossibilities: the resultof accommodation from the

observedfactthattheutterancetookplace.ThisisthecontextinwhichIamsupposed

tointerpretTom’sutteranceanddetermineitscontent.Itincludesthepresupposition

(Φ),fromwhichwecanderive(Υ).

(Φ)thatTomisspeakingfromwithinhisoffice.

(Υ)thatTomisinhisoffice.

But(Υ)isincompatiblewithw1,theworldinwhichTomisinthecommonsroom.SoI

must get rid of it. The accommodated context includes onlyw2, theworld inwhich

Tomis inhisoffice.This,apparently, solvestheproblem.Theaccommodatedmatrix

representsasinglecontingentproposition:i.e.,(Υ).Suchpropositioncanexplainhow

Tom’sspeechactobservestheprinciplesofcommunication.

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Anothertroublingfact

Unfortunately, the problem is still standing. For now that we have updated by

accommodatingthefactoftheutterancethesemanticallydeterminedcontentofTom’s

utterance doesn’t have any communicativework to do. Any utterance—indeed any

productionofnoises—wouldhavethesamecommunicativeeffect.Sonowweareleft

wondering why would Tom—and for that matter, anyone—would ever make that

utterancetoconveythatinformation.

What we learn from accommodation, by definition, has nothing to do with the

contentoftheutteredsentence.Thus,itisnotsomethingthatcanbeexplainedbyany

semantically determined proposition. However, we get too much from

accommodating these presuppositions. So much that prior to the acceptance of

content I already know that the actualworld isw2. This preempts the semantically

determinedcontentfrombeinginformative.

Itfollowsthat,accordingtothetheory,thesemanticallydeterminedcontentofany

appropriateuse4of theEnglishsentence ‘Iamhere’ isuninformative.Giventhat the

assertion is informative, it followsthatthecontentoftheassertionisnot inanyway

semanticallydetermined.

4Itwouldbeterriblyinappropriate(uncooperative)ofTomtosay,“Iamhere”,whenIaskhim,“Where

areyou?”bythephone.Amongotherreasons,becausesomecentralpresuppositionsarenotsatisfied:

e.g., thepresupposition that I be able to infer the locationof theutterance from the fact that it took

place.

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TheWookieeproblem

Let memake this more dramatic. Suppose that Tom replies, instead, by uttering a

sentence‐token from a different language, say, r: “Ich bin hier”. Is this a successful

communicative act? Tompresupposes that I presuppose that he presupposes that I

can identify the soundshe isutteringand,hence, that I can infer the locationofhis

utterance from the observable fact that it took place. This presupposition is easily

satisfied.

Thistimethingslookabitworse.Notonlyisthecontentinformativelyirrelevant.It

isnotevenrelevantwhethertheparticipantsarecompetentintheuseofthelanguage

ofwhichasentence‐tokenhasbeenuttered.Howisitthenthatspeakersalwaystryto

conveythesemanticallydeterminedcontent?

Why not twist this a little bitmore? Tom is a StarWars fan. In particular, he is

pretty knowledgeable about Chewbacca and the Wookiee species. He knows, for

example,thattheyspeakShyriiwook.Likemanyotherfans,heknowsprettywellhow

to utter a sentence‐token of Shyriiwook. You only have to utter two vocal sounds

withoutusingyourvocalchords.Iwalkthroughthehallwayandask,p:“Tom,where

areyou?”CouldTomnotreplywithhisfavoriteShyriiwooksentence?IfhedoesIcan

dothesamesortofaccommodationdescribedaboveandfindoutwherehe is.Heis

not even speaking a human language (Yes, Tom is amazing). Yet, his utterance is

informativeandsuccessfulinmeetingthegoaloftheconversation.

WhatistheWookieproblemabout?Theproblemisnotthatthetheoryisunableto

explainthosecaseswhereTomdecidestospeaklikeChewbacca.Theproblem,rather,

isthatthemeaningof‘Iamhere’isnotplayinganyinterestingroleinthestoryabout

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howTomusesittocommunicate.AssumingthetruthofSA,onewouldhavethought

that ‘I amhere’ is, in virtueof its semantics, uniquelywell suited for conveying the

sortofinformationthatTomistryingtoconvey.Butitseemsthatitisnot.

That is the Wookiee Problem. Thus far, the theory cannot tell us howWookiee

utterances–e.g,Tom’sq:“Iamhere”–managetobeinformativeinvirtueofasserting

anysortofsemanticallydeterminedcontent.

4Areasonablesolution

Speakers usually observe certain principles when communicating. It is good

communicativepractice, forexample,toberelevant,clear,notambiguous,brief,and

orderly. So, when I ask p: “Tom, where are you?” Tom should not reply with “No

worries!”unlesshewantstochangethetopic;orwith“Ichbinhier”,unlesshewants

tobeobscure.Similarly,Tomshouldnotreply inShyriiwookbecausethatwouldbe

obscure,unclear,andirrelevant.

Thisgivesusasimplesolution.Whyisq,anutteranceoftheEnglishsentence‘Iam

here’,uniquelywellsuitedforTomtoconveythesortofinformationthathewantsto

communicate? The answer is: because q is uniquely well‐suited, in virtue of its

semantics,forTomtosaysomethingrelevant,clear,brief,etc.

The example we are concerned with involves a context in which by simply

accommodating the fact of the utterance we manage to update all the relevant

information.Yet,itwillbebest,forcommunicativeconsiderations,ifthespeakerpicks

an utterance the semantically determined content of which coincides with the

informationwe have contextually inferred. That way wewill avoid confusions and

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misunderstandings.Forexample,anutteranceofq semanticallyexpresses thesame

propositionthatgetscommunicated,therebyallowingTomtoberelevant.

Wookieeutterancesseemtocarrytoomanypresuppositionswiththem;somany

thatthesemanticallydeterminedcontentbecomes irrelevant,butonlypartlyso.The

informativepurposeofthespeechact issatisfiedpriortotheacceptanceofcontent.

But being informative is not the only goal of a conversation. By uttering q Tom

managestobewellbehaved.

Thisisnotthegoodoldtwo‐dimensionalpicture,clearly.However,itmightstillbe

acceptable for two‐dimensionalists. It would be surprising otherwise. They simply

needtoaddsomethinglike:whentheprinciplesofassertionarenotobserved,itmust

bethattheyarebeingexploitedformanners’sake.

Thesolutionis,however,clearlyincompatiblewiththegenerallyacceptedtruthof

SA.

SemanticistAssumption(SA):thecontentofanassertionisdeterminedeitherby

the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the

interactionbetweenthelatterandthecontext.

IfthereasonableaccountoftheWookieeproblemIjustgaveiscorrect,andIseeno

reasontothinkitisnot,thenthecontentoftheassertionisnotdeterminedeitherby

thesemanticallydefinedcontentoftheexpression‘Iamhere’orbytheinteractionof

thelatterwiththecontext.Theonlyrelevantrolethatthesemanticfeaturesof ‘Iam

here’playinthiscaseispurelydiplomatic,toputitsomehow.Semanticinformationis

relevantonlyformanner’ssake,notforcontent’ssake.

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5Wookieestatementsandstipulations

AppropriateutterancesoftheEnglishsentence‘Iamhere’are,ofcourse,nottheonly

onesthatcanhelpmakethecaseagainstSA.Therearemanyothercases,withinand

across languages,ofWookieestatements.Consider, forexample,appropriateusesof

sentencessuchas‘Iamspeakingnow’, ‘Iamherenow’,and‘Iexist’.5Allappropriate

utterances of these sentences are such that the presuppositions are enough to

determine thecontentof theassertion.Evenbeforedetermining themeaningof the

relevantsentences,assoonasthespeechacttakesplacetheaudienceknowsthatthe

speakerisspeaking,thatthespeakerislocatedattheplaceandtimeoftheutterance,

andthatthespeakerinfactexists.Idubthese“Wookieestatements.”

Wookiee statements have one further feature in common: their associated two‐

dimensionalmatrix ismadeupofdifferentcontingenthorizontalpropositionsanda

necessary diagonal. As such, they are similar to another kind of problematic

statements: stipulations. This is not the place to offer a theory of stipulations. But

reflectingonsomeplausibleconsiderationswillhelpusseethat theyconstituteone

morecaseofWookieestatements.

Awell‐knownexampleisthatofthestandardmeter.Consideracompetentspeaker

making the following stipulation s: “This length is one meter”, while point at a

particularmetalrod.Weknowthat,whatevertheactuallengthoftherelevantmetal

rod is, itwillbeonemeter long.Thus, regardlessof contextualvariations, including

5 Another, yet controversial, example is given by `Honey, I’m home!’. If one considers it to beinappropriatewhenutteredataplacedifferentfromhome,thensuchutterancedoespresentuswiththesameWookieeproblem.Othercontroversialexamplesare‘Iamthinking’and‘Iamthinkingnow’.The latterarecontroversial insofaras it is controversial to claim that it isa commonpresupposition(i.e.,commonground)inordinaryconversationsthatparticipantsarethinking.

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variationsinlengthoftherelevantmetalrod,thespeakermakingthestipulationswill

assert something true. This gets described in the two‐dimensional matrix as a

necessarydiagonal (seeMatrixB). Suppose the stipulation takesplace in a context

wheretheparticipantsignorewhattheactuallengthofthemetalrodis,andconsider

the following possibilities:worldw1where the length of themetal rod the speaker

referstoisinfactl1,andworldw2whereitisl2,andl1≠l2.

B w1 w2

w1 T F

w2 F T

Not surprisingly, the same Wookiee problem arises. Whoever makes the

stipulation s will be asserting nontrivial information. Which proposition is she

asserting?Itwillnotbethediagonal,foritistrivial;andwecannotpickahorizontal

propositionbecause there isnotenough information, including thesemanticone, to

determinewhetherweare inw1orw2. It isalsonotviable todiagonalize, since the

resultingpropositionwillstillbetrivial.Furthermore,ifwepaycloseattentiontothe

processofaccommodation,bymeansofwhichthefactthatthespeechacthastaken

placeisincludedinthecontext,werealizethatthereisenoughinformationamongthe

presuppositions to preclude the semantic information from being informative and,

thus,fromdeterminingthecontentoftheassertion.

Itseemsatleastintuitivelycorrecttointerpretthespeakerissuingthestipulation

sasassertingsomethinglike(Β):

(Β):Fromnowon‘onemeter’willbecorreferentialwiththisuse‘thislength’.

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There are at least two reasons to think that the information has to be so

underdetermined. On the one hand, stipulations are ways of “coining” new terms.

Ludlow2006and2008forcefullyarguesforadynamicviewofthelexiconaccording

to which “discourse participants routinelymint new linguistic items” and also that

what seem to be “common coins […] are typically “thin” – in the sense that their

meanings are underdetermined and fleshed out on a case‐by‐case basis.” [Ludlow,

2008, p. 115] If, as Ludlow suggests, commonly used terms have a very

underdeterminedmeaning, one should expect that new, not previously used, terms

have a radically underdetermined meaning, if any at all, at the moment of their

issuing.Thisclaimisratheruncontroversial:ifwewanttointroducetheterm‘T’into

our linguistic practice we cannot do this by presupposing that ‘T’ meansm, for in

ordertobeunderstoodwewouldhavetopresupposethatouraudiencepresupposes

that ‘T’ means m. That is tantamount to presupposing that ‘T’ has already been

introduced.

Ontheotherhand,andpartly invirtueofthepreviousconsideration,thereisno

way to further determine the information conveyed by s. One might think, for

example,thatwhatthespeakerconveysis,atleast,alittlebitmoredeterminedthan

(B),somethingperhapslike(Δ):

(Δ)Fromnowon‘onemeter’willrefertothislength.

However, the context inwhich s appears offers noway to determinewhat ‘this

length’refersto.All theparticipantscanlearnfromthespeaker’s issuingofs isthat

‘onemeter’referstowhatever it is that the lengthof therelevantmetalrod is.So it

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seems that the only way of taking (Δ) as appropriately describing the information

conveyedbythespeaker’sissuingofsistotakeittomeansomethinglike(Β).

(Β):Fromnowon‘onemeter’willbecorreferentialwiththisuseof‘thislength’.

Ifso, then itseemsthat thecontentof thespeaker’sstipulations: “This length is

one meter” is in fact determined by sheer accommodation. As it happens with

Wookieestatements,oncetheparticipantsaccommodatethefactthatthespeakerhas

utteredthesentence‘Thislengthisonemeter’,theycaninfer(B)withoutbotheringto

considerthemeaningofthetermsused.Alltheyneedtoknowtodrawthatinference

isthattherelevantspeechactisastipulation,butthatpieceofknowledgeiscertainly

notsemanticbutmerelycontextual.

It seems, then, that stipulations, such as the one described, constitute another

counterexampleagainstthesemanticistassumption.

SemanticistAssumption (SA): the content of an assertion is determined either by

the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the

interactionbetweenthelatterandthecontext.

Foritseemsthattheinformationassertedbythespeaker’sissuingofs:“Thislengthis

onemeter”issomethinglike(B),whichisfullydeterminedbymerelyaccommodating

the fact that thespeechacthas takenplace,prior to theacceptanceofanysemantic

information. Furthermore, it seems that (B) simply does not express any of the

information that the English sentence ‘This length is one meter’ may semantically

encode.

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6Objectionsandreplies

Could the semanticist philosopher of language not claim that the English sentence

‘Thislengthisonemeter’semanticallyencodestheinformationthat“‘thislength’and

‘one meter’ are correferential”? If so, could she not claim, furthermore, that the

contentofthespeaker’sissuingofsisinfactsemanticallydefined?

Thereisinfactarathersimplemovethatthesemanticistcouldmake:toclaimthat

partof the lexicalmeaningof eachword is theword itself.Basedonevidence from

linguisticpractices,Geurts1998claimsthat“ALLexpressionsfromanylanguageare

equivocal in a way: besides their ordinary meaning(s) they can also be used to

designate themselves.”[Geurts, 1998, p.291] Semanticist philosophers may want to

followGeurtsandclaim,forexample,thateveryreferentialexpressionhasatleasttwo

referents:theobjectitisordinarilyusedtoreferandtheexpressionitself.

Fromthisitwouldfollow,againstwhatIsaidtowardtheendoflastsection,that

the information conveyed by the issuing of the stipulation s: “This length is one

meter”, namely, that ‘this length’ and ‘one meter’ are correferential, can be

semantically determined. In other words, if the semanticist makes the “equivocal”

move described by Geurts 1998, she could claim that the proposition asserted by

issuing s could be either one of the semantically defined contents of the relevant

Englishsentenceortheresulttheinteractionofthelatterwiththecontext.

Furthermore,thesemanticistcouldmakeasimilarclaimaboutthecasesofwhatI

have called “Wookiee” statements. After all, the information conveyed by Tom’s

assertion of p: “I am here”, namely, that Tom is in his office, coincides with the

propositiondeterminedbytheinteractionofthesemanticallydefinedcontentofthe

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English sentence ‘I am here’ and the relevant context. So, it seems that even with

Wookiee statements the content of the assertion couldbe semantically determined,

eitherbythesemanticcontentorbytheinteractionofthelatterwiththecontext.

TheseobjectionswillhelpclarifythepointIamtryingtomake.Iamnotclaiming

that the content of Wookiee assertions or statements cannot or could not be

semanticallydeterminedeitherbythesemanticcontentorbyitsinteractionwiththe

context.WhatIamclaimingisthatthecontentofthesepeculiarassertionsisnot,asa

matteroffact,semanticallydeterminedatall,notevenpartlyso.

Similarly,theargumentformycentralthesisdoesnotconsistinshowingthatthe

assertedcontentcannotbysemanticallydetermined.Rather,theargumentconsistsin

showing that the relevant information is contextually conveyed in a purely non‐

semanticmanner.TodothisIhaveshownthatpriortotheacceptanceofthesemantic

contentof thesentenceuttered, i.e.,evenbeforeanyassignmentofsemanticvalues,

theaudiencehasalreadyinferredtherelevantassertedinformation.Thus,evenifthat

sameinformationcanbesemanticallydetermined,thesemanticcontentisredundant

and, hence, useless for truth‐conditional orcontent purposes.As the solution to the

Wookieeproblemshows, theonly role that semantic contentplays in thesecases is

ratherperipheral:ithelpsthespeakerobserveberespectful,clear,etc.

ThatmuchisclearforthecaseofTom’sassertionp,andingeneralforappropriate

assertionsofsentencessuchas‘Iamspeakingnow’,‘Iamherenow’,and‘Iexist’.But

somethingsimilarcanbesaidaboutstipulationssuchastheissuingofs:“Thislength

isonemeter.”Themetalinguisticinformationconveyedbysuchastipulation,namely,

that ‘this length’ is correferential with ‘one meter’, gets conveyed prior to the

20

assignmentofsemanticvaluesto‘Thislengthisonemeter’.Thesemanticinformation

encodedby thisEnglish sentencedoesnotdetermine the contentof the stipulation.

Thatjobhasalreadybeendone.Still,thesentence’ssemanticinformationisusefulfor

manner’s sake: since themetalinguistic information associatedwith itwill coincide

withthealreadydeterminedcontent,itwillhelpthespeakerbeclear,respectful,etc.

7Theinclusiveview

Ihavearguedallalongforamoreinclusiveviewofassertivecontent.Onthisview,the

semantically defined content of the sentence(s) usedmay not at all determine the

content of an assertion, not even partly so. This goes against what I called the

SemanticistAssumption.

SemanticistAssumption (SA): the content of an assertion is determined either by

the semantically defined content of the expression used or by the

interactionbetweenthelatterandthecontext.

OnthismoreinclusiveviewwhatwegetissomethinglikeReasonableAssertion

(RA).

Reasonable Assertion (RA): the content of an assertion may be determined by

differentmeans,onacasebycasebasis,andbywhatappearstobethe

most reasonable manner. It is sometimes determined by the

semantically defined content of the expression used or by the

interaction between the latter and the context, but purely contextual

non‐semanticfeaturesmayalsodetermineit.

ThereareverygoodreasonstoendorseRAinsteadofthetraditionalSA.Firstand

foremost,RAwillallowustohandlewhatwouldotherwisebeproblematicWookiee

21

assertions.Thiswillpotentiallyhave further ramifications.UnlikeSA,RA isopen to

assertionsbeingamoreflexibleactasit,intuitively,appearstobe.Suchaflexibleand

inclusivepositionseems, inprinciple,moreattractive than thestringentsemanticist

one.

Second,RAwillhelpusavoidcertainphilosophicalpuzzles.At leastsinceKripke

1980,somehavethoughtthatcertainspecialassertionsprovidespeakerswithwhat

would otherwise by a rather doubtful kind of knowledge: that of contingent yet a

priori truths. Such knowledge seems philosophically suspect for it purports to be

abouttheworldofourexperienceeventhoughtheaccesstoitisindependentofour

experience.

Kripke1980arguesthatissuingstipulations,suchass:“Thislengthisonemeter”,

providethespeakerwithsuchcontingentaprioriknowledge.Furtherdiscussion(see

Stalnaker1978andChalmers2002)hasportrayedsuchcontingentaprioritruthsas

describing a two‐dimensional matrix with contingent horizontals and a necessary

diagonal.6 If we accept RA and, with it, the reasonable account of the Wookiee

problem (see section 4), we can explainwhy such assertions seem special without

accepting that they provide speakers with anything like contingent a priori

knowledge. These assertions are special because their content is not determined

semantically,notevenpartlyso.Theircontentis,rather,contextuallydetermined.And

itisuncontroversialthatthereisnoaprioriaccesstocontextualinformation:itmust

be acquired through experience. Thus, such assertions may provide speakers with

6Stalnakerappears tono longerendorse thisdiagnosis (seeBlockandStalnaker1999andStalnaker2004).ItisunclearwhetherChalmersstilldoes(seeChalmers2010).

22

contingent truths about the world of their experience, but there is no experience‐

independentaccesstosuchtruths.

I hope this is enough to convince the reader that we need to give up our

semanticist assumption in favor of a more reasonable account of assertion. Those

that are not convinced will at least have to face a substantial challenge: to give a

semanticist‐friendlysolutiontotheWookieeproblem.

23

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