Work for Everyone

WORK FOR EVERYONE What Elected Officials Can Do To Help Build a Middle Class

in Miami

Prepared By:

www.onemiaminow.org -‐ 305.672.7021 -‐ [email protected]

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WORK FOR EVERYONE

REPORT ABSTRACT

Too many Miami residents lack access to a good job, decent housing, education, and health care. The 2008 financial collapse has only made matters worse. This year’s unemployment rate in Miami-‐Dade is higher than ever recorded, while more than a third of working people do not earn a living wage. To better understand this situation, the community organization, 1Miami surveyed 887 residents from Little Havana to North Miami asking how they have been affected by the jobs crisis and what needs to change for their communities to prosper. The results published here show that the vast majority of Miami residents—working, unemployed, and retired—have not recovered from the economic recession. They also feel their elected officials are not responding adequately to their concerns.

Drawing on the findings of the survey, the second part of this report argues that elected officials have a responsibility to do what is in their power to build a broad middle class in Miami. This includes investing in public services and public works projects that Miami communities say they need, financing these investments by asking the wealthiest individuals and corporations to pay their share, calling on Miami's employers to raise standards in dozens of low-‐wage occupations, and helping locally owned, responsible businesses grow. As community leaders, faith leaders, workers, and all who believe government ought to work for everyone, it is our job to challenge elected officials to be champions of this new way forward.

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WORK FOR EVERYONE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FINDINGS FROM THE 1MIAMI SURVEY ....................................................................... 4

WHAT ELECTED LEADERS CAN DO

INTRODUCTION: WHY WE CANNOT WAIT .................................................................. 4

1. INVEST IN PUBLIC SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE ..................................... 13

2. ASK THE WEALTHIEST INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS TO PAY THEIR SHARE ........................................................................................................................... 17

3. TURN BAD JOBS INTO GOOD JOBS ...................................................................... 20

4. ENCOURAGE A DIVERSE ECONOMY BY HELPING LOCALLY OWNED BUSINESSES GROW .................................................................................................... 25

APPENDIX – SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND ADDITIONAL TABLES ..................... 27

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INTRODUCTION: WHY WE CANNOT WAIT

One of the most important issues facing Miami-‐Dade County is the growing economic hardship that residents have endured since the 2008 financial collapse. In order to better understand this situation and identify potential solutions, 1Miami surveyed nearly 900 residents from Little Havana to North Miami about how their lives have been impacted by the crisis and what needs to change for their communities to recover. The findings suggest the urgent need for elected officials to take greater responsibility for addressing the conditions that have kept far too many of their constituents from accessing a good job, decent housing, education, and health care. Just 41 survey respondents (less than 5%) say their economic situation has improved at all in the last three years, while the vast majority feel their elected leaders are not responding adequately to their concerns.

Miami is experiencing what economists call a jobless recovery. Large corporations like Florida Power and Light and Wells Fargo have achieved record profits at the same time that most people continue to suffer from unemployment, bad jobs, and cuts to public services.1 As residents recognize, Miami’s jobless recovery is a consequence of the choices local, state, and federal leaders have made, and the priorities they have adopted in the wake of the financial collapse. County leaders, for example, chose to build a $619 million sports stadium,2 then laid off more than 300 social workers, home care aides, library assistants, and other public servants.3 State leaders chose to uphold $850 million in tax cuts for the wealthiest Floridians,4 then raised college tuition by 15% three years in a row.5 Federal leaders chose to bailout many of the corporations responsible for the financial collapse,6 and now contemplate deep cuts to Medicare, Medicaid, and Unemployment Insurance.7

Miami residents do not expect government to solve all their problems, but they do expect elected leaders to be accountable to their concerns. Today, the stakes are simply too high to put the interests of the wealthy few ahead of hundreds of thousands of workers, unemployed people, small business owners, seniors, and students. This year’s unemployment rate in Miami Dade is higher than ever recorded.8 Unemployment dramatically worsens the budget deficit, strains public services, and hurts small businesses. To bring unemployment back to what it was before the recession, Miami needs to create, at a minimum, 100,000, jobs.9 If our leaders fail to act, it will take at least five years to reach this goal at the rate we are currently creating jobs.10 And if they proceed with business as usual, Miami will be tethered to the same economic model that brought on the crisis.

Unemployed workers—half of whom have already been out of work six months or more11—do not have another five years to wait for their jobs to return. According to 1Miami’s survey, most have at least two other family members who depend on them for financial support. Nearly all say they are under greater stress now than when they held a job. Seventy percent have applied

INTRODUCTION – WHY WE CANNOT WAIT

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to six or more jobs in the last two months, and close to half have applied to 10 or more jobs. Unemployed workers are doing their part. They are counting on elected officials to do theirs.

This report reviews the key findings of the survey and outlines what elected leaders can do to address the issues raised by Miami residents:

1. Elected officials can return thousands of unemployed people to work providing the public services that support Miami’s future and building the infrastructure Miami communities say they need. Solid public services are the foundation of a competitive local economy, yet whether it is health clinics or higher education, elected officials continue to focus on where to cut, instead of how to rebuild. According to county capital plans, Miami is also due for $33 billion in repairs to roads, water pipes, and schools over the next decade.12 It is not just illogical, it is unjust to withhold essential investments in healthcare and public works when thousands are out of work. 1Miami’s survey shows that unemployed people are ready and willing to fill these jobs. Strong goals for local hiring and funding for targeted training can help ensure that they do.

2. Elected officials can finance needed investments in healthcare, education, and public works by asking the wealthiest 1% of Floridians to pay the same or greater share of their income in state and local taxes as the middle 60% of Floridians and by closing corporate tax loopholes that allow some of the largest, most profitable corporations in the state to pay no income taxes. Florida’s tax system is the second most regressive in the nation. The top 1% pay just 2.6% of their income in state and local taxes, while the poorest 20% pay 14% of their income.13 Some of Miami’s largest corporations, like Carnival Cruise Lines, pay little or no state income tax due to loopholes and incentives.14 Before we ask business owners in Little Haiti to wait another year for their customers to return, before we ask construction workers in Liberty City to wait for work to resume, or ask students in Hialeah to wait for their schools to be repaired, we ought to ask the wealthiest individuals and corporations to pay a greater share of the cost to put Miami back to work.

3. Elected officials can call on Miami’s tourism, international trade, health care, retail, higher education, and downtown business sectors to improve job standards for the tens of thousands of workers who support those sectors day in and day out. The vast majority of working people surveyed say their economic situation is worse today than it was three years ago, and the primary reason is a bad job. Elected officials can play a significant role, particularly with corporations who receive public funding or other support, in encouraging employers to take the high road and provide the good jobs that Miami needs. Raising wages in 20 of Miami’s largest low-‐wage occupations to national averages would inject an additional $470 million annually into the local economy.15 In the hands of those who would be likely to spend it, this alone would create and sustain 6,600 jobs.16

INTRODUCTION – WHY WE CANNOT WAIT

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4. Elected officials can open up new opportunities for locally owned, responsible businesses to grow. As the financial crisis illustrated all too well, Miami’s economy is structured to promote short-‐term, speculative investment over long-‐term growth. This shortsighted economic model changes Miami’s skyline but does not change the poverty rate. Locally owned businesses can be an important countervailing force to Miami’s “boom/bust” economy. The owners of small businesses often have a strong affinity with their community and are likely to remain here even when the economy sours. Small business owners also help build wealth in Miami’s neighborhoods by allowing money to keep circulating within the local economy (creating more jobs) and by reinvesting their earnings back into their neighborhoods.17 Miami’s high rate of entrepreneurship is not matched by business sustainability and growth. Despite the importance of small, local firms, much of our government’s economic development capacity has gone toward attracting large corporations from outside Miami to relocate here, as opposed to providing the financial and strategic support that small businesses need to grow. More focus on growing our own will yield better results than the continuous use of incentives for business relocation that seldom bears long-‐term benefits.

Elected officials at all levels of government have a great deal of power to put people back to work, protect vital services, and build a middle class in Miami. They just have to exercise it! Even in cases where elected officials do not have direct jurisdiction over the issues raised in this report, they still have a role to play. County leaders may not have the authority to close corporate tax loopholes, for example, but they certainly have the power to raise their voice. As representatives of the state’s largest economic engine, local officials can lobby Tallahassee for permission to create new revenue sources to support street repair and health services jobs in Miami. Likewise, the federal government may not have a direct say in Miami’s economic development agenda, but they can still grant funding for local governments to assist small businesses or train local workers to access good jobs.

At this moment in history, Miami is facing a moral crisis, not just an economic one. The basic principle that government should work in the interests of all, rich or poor, is under attack. As workers, community leaders, faith leaders, and all who believe our government should do what is in its power to build a broad middle class in Miami, we need to come together and fight for this principle. We need to show support for those who stand with us, oppose those who do not, and give new life to the call, sounded long ago, “Do not withhold good from those who deserve it, when it is in your power to act” (Proverbs 3:27).

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FINDINGS FROM THE 1MIAMI SURVEY

1Miami’s survey asked residents how they have been impacted by the jobs crisis, which public services and public works projects are most needed in their neighborhoods, and who they hold responsible for helping to create good jobs in Miami. Participation was limited to residents of North Dade neighborhoods with a median household income below $35,000, with most responses coming from Hialeah, North Miami, Little Havana, Liberty City, Brownsville, Little Haiti, Wynwood, Allapattah, and Miami Gardens. Of 887 total respondents, 40% are employed, 32% are unemployed or discouraged workers, and 27% are out of the labor force for some other reason (retired, disabled, or in school). Appendix A presents additional tables of people’s responses and notes on methodology. The following are the key findings guiding this report’s recommendations:

§ The vast majority of respondents, regardless of their employment status, have not recovered from the financial collapse. Asked to describe how their economic situation has changed over the last three years, 93% of unemployed workers, 72% of those not in the labor force, and 68% of employed workers said their situation had gotten worse. In total, just 41 respondents (less than 5%) said their economic situation had improved. The rest said their situation was about the same.

Figure 1 – Change in economic situation over the past three years

§ Unemployed people are doing everything they can to find work, but the jobs simply are not available. Seventy percent say they have applied to 6 or more jobs in the last two months, 46% have applied to more than 10 jobs, and 27% have applied to more than 20 jobs in the last two months. Almost half (42%) of unemployed workers have applied to 10 or more jobs in a single month. While they are open to new training

33% 34%

67%

44%

35% 38%

26%

33%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

Employed Out of labor force

Unemployed Grand Total

Bejer

Same

A lijle worse

A lot worse

FINDINGS FROM 1MIAMI’S SURVEY

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opportunities, the vast majority recognize that it is the lack of job openings—more so than any personal deficit—that explains why it has been so difficult to find a job.

Figure 2 – Number of jobs unemployed workers applied to in the last two months

Figure 3 – Most important reason why it been difficult to find a job

19% 24% 30%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

% of Unemployed Workers

More than 20

11-‐20 jobs

6-‐10 jobs

1-‐5 jobs

68%

10%

7%

5% 3%

3% 2%

1% Too few Job Openings

Lack of Experience /Training, Educamon, or language requirements

Discriminamon

Lack of Transportamon

Lack of Childcare

Personal problems


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§ Working people need better jobs, too. Most full-‐time workers have not received health benefits, paid sick days, job training, or a job promotion from their employer in the last year. Ninety-‐two percent of workers say they are earning the same or less than they earned last year. Since costs keep rising even when wages do not, a quarter of working people say they have gone into debt or taken on more debt just to pay for basic living expenses.

Figure 4 – Share of workers who received the following benefits from their job

Figure 5 -‐ Worker earnings, this year versus last year

42% 48%

60%

17%

5%

13% 13%

23%

13%

3%

Health benefits Paid sick days Paid vacamon days Job training Job promomon

Full Time Part Time / Other

47%

45%

9%

Less than before

The same

More than before


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§ Respondents ranked affordable housing and health care as the two services most in need of expansion in their neighborhood. Street improvements and public transit were chosen as the most needed public works projects. These priorities were relatively consistent across neighborhoods. Furthermore, many unemployed workers feel capable of filling jobs that would be created by new investments in these public goods. Given a list of occupations, more unemployed workers felt they could access construction work than any other occupation. While women were less likely to show an affinity with construction work than men, many of the occupations that women felt most strongly suited to are needed to support new investments in health care.

Figure 6 -‐ Services ranked as first or second priority by Miami residents

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

#2 priority

#1 priority


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Figure 7 -‐ Public works projects ranked as first or second priority

§ Respondents hold their government responsible for creating jobs, but believe government is currently “not doing enough” to help Miami recover. Nearly all respondents said they believe government has a responsibility to help create good jobs. When asked to grade the government’s current performance in creating good jobs, however, just 74 respondents (or 9%) felt the government is doing its part.

Figure 8 – Share of residents who believe government has a responsibility to help create good jobs

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

#2 priority

#1 priority

96%

3%

Yes

No

Unsure


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Figure 9 – Residents’ perceptions of their government's current performance in helping to create jobs

16% 67% 9%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

4. Cupng/Prevenmng good jobs

3. Not Doing Enough

2. Helping to Create Good Jobs

1. Creamng good jobs

Unsure

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WHAT ELECTED OFFICIALS CAN DO

1. INVEST IN PUBLIC SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

At a time when thousands are out of work, Miami has no shortage of work that needs to be done. Unmet demand for health care, education, and other critical services has never been greater. Miami has also run up a $33 billion backlog of public works projects that must be undertaken over the next decade.1 We have the need, we have the workforce, and as the following section will show, we have the resources to begin this work now. What we lack is commitment from elected leaders to take on these priorities as their own.

Investments in education, health, public safety, and infrastructure are what make us economically competitive. These public services provide businesses real advantages over competitors in other markets.2 Low wages, low taxes, and lax regulations can be replicated any place in the world willing to accept the consequences. An outstanding quality of life, and the infrastructure to support it, cannot. In the words of former president of the Florida Senate, Ken Pruitt, “if the state invested more in higher education,” there would be no need for “corporate welfare.”3 Solid public services are the foundation of a competitive local economy—yet our leaders continue to focus on where to cut, instead of how to rebuild. Over the last three years, the county has helped close or cut staff at local health clinics,4 the state has rejected federal transit funding,5 and federal leaders are promising deep cuts to the safety net this December.6

When people cannot cover their basic needs, small businesses ultimately suffer from weaker consumer demand. Weak consumer spending is a consequence of unemployment and low wages, but also our government’s choice to shift the cost of public goods onto everyday residents. National student loan debt, for example, will soon exceed $1 trillion!7 Investments in public transit, affordable housing, and education free up people’s income to patronize local businesses as opposed to spending money on gas, insurance or paying off any debt. Community health clinics have the same effect, plus the added benefits of boosting local business procurement and avoiding emergency room visits down the road.8

Our leaders are supposed to represent everyone, not just those with the greatest means. They can start by investing in the services and infrastructure projects that Miami residents say they value most. 1Miami’s survey asked residents which services and infrastructure projects were most important to them. More than half of residents said health clinics and affordable housing were the most needed services in their neighborhood. Street improvements and building public transit ranked at the top of public works projects in demand.

In addition to the priorities residents identified, Miami is due for $33 billion in backlogged public works projects over the next decade.9 This includes at least $2 billion to modernize public

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schools like Norland High School,10 which are reaching the end of their useful life, and $7 billion to repair our water and sewer system, which is as old as many of our cities.11 Most of these projects are on hold indefinitely as a consequence of budget cuts and lack of funds.12 But cuts to public works do not erase the need for public works. A third of Miami-‐Dade public school facilities are over 40 years old,13 with pealing paint and the smell of mold to prove it.14 Twenty-‐five hundred miles, or half the county’s water pipes, and 160 miles of sewage pipes need replacement.15 With interest rates and construction costs near historic lows, we can solve these problems today at a far lower cost than what the next generation will be forced to pay if we do not do our part. What’s more, accelerating projects like these will put thousands back to work. School and water system repairs alone will require 94,000 job years to complete.16 Spread over five years, these jobs could reduce the unemployment rate by 1.5 percent.17

The unemployed workers 1Miami surveyed are ready and willing to take on the work our communities need. More unemployed workers felt capable of filling construction jobs than any other occupation and a majority said they would participate in a three-‐month training program if it resulted in a good job. Women were less likely to express interest in construction work than men, but many of the jobs they felt capable of filling (medical assistant, cook, desk clerk) are essential to new investments in health services.

All this said, it will still take an intentional effort to make sure local people in need of work are able to access the jobs created by new public investment. African Americans are underrepresented in Miami’s construction industry, 18 yet face the highest unemployment rate in the county.19 To ensure fair access for all, our leaders need to set and monitor goals for local worker, apprentice, and minority business participation, as well as funding targeted training and outreach. When the Los Angeles Unified School District embarked on a multi-‐billion dollar school renovation initiative, they partnered with unions and community organizations to create the “We Build” pre-‐apprenticeship program which trained local residents, mostly people of color, for careers in the building trades. Best value contracting gave bid incentives for hiring district residents beyond the baseline goals that contractors were expected to meet. Weekly electronic reporting of payroll data held contractors accountable to these goals. As a result of the “We Build” training program, 723 trainees have secured apprenticeships, meaning they are on their way to becoming certified in a trade. Two-‐thirds of school renovation workers have been local residents and one-‐third have been apprentices.20

Elected leaders at all levels of government have withheld new infrastructure and public service jobs by arguing that these investments will grow the deficit. What they fail to acknowledge is that unemployment is the primary cause of the budget deficit, as higher unemployment means less people paying taxes and more relying on unemployment, Medicaid, and other safety net programs. Withholding new jobs or eliminating existing public sector jobs simply adds to the

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underlying problem. The 5% cut to Medicaid contemplated by the federal deficit committee would eliminate 11,320 Florida jobs.21 This would wipe out a majority of the health care jobs added in Florida this year.22 Private sector job growth will not be able to absorb additional unemployed workers for another five years.23 Budget cuts are not a solution to our real problems; they are an extension of them!

Contrary to what our leaders tell us, we do not have to cut our standard of living to cut the deficit. We can put thousands back to work and meet the needs of our communities in a fiscally responsible way. Our capacity to invest in real solutions is purely and simply a function of how much revenue we take in and, if we are borrowing, the terms by which we borrow. When effective tax rates for the 1% and large corporations are at their lowest in decades,24 it is clear that our leaders have not asked enough of the wealthiest individuals and corporations to help support our economic recovery. The following section will cover what our leaders ought to ask of the 1%. First, the box on the following page reviews the role that banks have played in inflating the cost of municipal borrowing and challenges our leaders to stand up for fairer borrowing terms.

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TELL THE BANKS: “SWAP” FAST PROFITS FOR GOOD JOBS Big banks have made it more difficult for local governments to fund the work our communities need. UBS, Bank of America, and Chase Bank have all recently settled cases with the US Securities and Exchange Commission for their role in a conspiracy to rig bids on municipal bond contracts in order to increase their profits.1 Higher profits for the banks means less money going to support the underlying project; in other words, less money to renovate schools and bridges and actually create jobs. Banks have also raised the cost of borrowing by selling local governments complicated financial products known as interest rate swaps. Originally marketed as a way to reduce risk when issuing variable rate bonds, swaps have turned into a huge liability for local governments, including Miami-‐Dade. Interest rate swaps obligate the county to pay a fixed interest rate to a bank in exchange for a variable rate tied to current rates. Since current rates are very low and are expected to remain low for some time, these deals cost Miami-‐Dade millions every year, and even more to terminate. The Water and Sewer Department had to pay $77 million in termination fees to end a swap with AIG,2 one of the corporations most responsible for the financial collapse.3 Our school district continues to make $6 million annual swap payments to RBC Capital and Bank of America.4 The full cost of these payments is projected to total $79 million,5 enough to renovate Norland High School two times over.6 Since the financial collapse, the federal government has handed out $2.5 trillion in interest-‐free funds to banks and other large corporations.7 The Federal Reserve has kept interest rates low to encourage investment and lending8—not for banks to cash in on bets against the school board. The jobs crisis is far too serious to allow these banks to stand in the way of economic recovery. Our leaders should refuse to do business with banks that keep us from getting started on the work our communities need. They should call on banks to provide the same favorable interest terms to Miami that they have received from taxpayers—or face removal from county contracts. The school district, for one, ought to cancel its depository relationship with Bank of America if the bank refuses to cancel the toxic swap deal that is costing the district millions.9

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2. ASK THE WEALTHIEST INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS TO PAY THEIR FAIR SHARE

As Miami faces the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression, we are counting on our elected officials to do their best to help put people back to work and protect the services Miami residents say they need. We also recognize, in this time of crisis, that elected leaders will have to make difficult choices. Miami residents do not expect their leaders to make the right choice all the time, nor solve all their problems. But when the choice is between the interests of a small group of wealthy and powerful individuals and the lives of thousands of workers, unemployed people, small businesses, seniors, and students, people expect their leaders to be accountable to their concerns.

Far too often, elected leaders’ decisions have not lived up to this basic expectation. For example, in 2007, state leaders completed their phase-‐out of a tax on stocks and bonds that almost exclusively impacted corporations and millionaires, at a loss of $850 million per year.1 Two years later, state leaders raised taxes and fees on low-‐income individuals by $2 billion to help close the budget gap.2 It is choices like these that have made Florida’s fiscal policy the second most regressive in the nation. The poorest 20% pay 13.5% percent of their income in state and local taxes, the middle 60% pay 7.8% of their income, while the top 1% pay just 2.6% of their income in state and local taxes.3 Even when federal taxes are included, we estimate that the top 1% (with average incomes over $2 million) pay just 1% more of their income in taxes than middle income families (with average incomes of $37,000).4 If elected officials asked millionaires to pay the same share of their income in state and local taxes as the middle 60%, this would generate $5.2 billion in state revenue to put residents back to work repairing streets and building affordable housing and health clinics—$620 million in Miami alone.5

Figure 10 – In Florida, low-‐income people have a higher tax burden than the 1%

0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00%

Lowest 20% Middle 60% Next 15% Next 4% Top 1%

State & Local Tax Burde

n

Income Level

WHAT ELECTED OFFICIALS CAN DO – FAIR SHARE

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Florida’s corporations frequently pay even less in income taxes than the wealthiest 1%. The corporate income tax as a percentage of state revenue is about half what it was 30 years ago.6 Just 2% of active businesses pay any income taxes at all.7 There are three principal ways corporations avoid income taxes: loopholes that allow corporations to shift their profits overseas or to other states, tax breaks that allow corporations to reduce their tax burden, and exemptions for businesses incorporated as LLCs, S-‐Corporations (with up to 100 shareholders), and other partnerships.8 Thanks to these strategies, many of Florida’s biggest corporations pay little or no income taxes. This includes Miami’s three largest public corporations9—Carnival Cruise Lines, Royal Caribbean, and World Fuel Corporation—which posted profits of $2.7 billion last year. Carnival pays a combined global (federal, state and international) tax rate of less than 1%, Royal Caribbean pays a combined global tax rate of less than 4%, and World Fuel Corporation pays less than 1% of its pretax profits in state taxes.10 It has been reported that the region’s largest privately held companies11 like JM Family Enterprises, Southern Wine and Spirits, and Oxbow Energy Corporation also avoid paying taxes on the profits of a combined $20 billion in revenue.12 Even corporations that do pay slightly more in state income taxes, like Florida Power and Light, still pay less than the statutory rate.13

Our leaders must find a way to close corporate tax loopholes so all large corporations pay their fair share. Corporate profits have grown by 41% since the recession while wages have stayed flat.14 Because wages are flat and unemployment remains near record highs, taxable sales and property values—our largest sources of state and local revenue—have not recovered from the recession, leaving all levels of government with substantial budget gaps.15 Corporate profits, higher today than ever before,16 have not been impacted by the jobs crisis in the same way. By 2009 Wells Fargo had grown its profits by 50% over what they were before the recession, yet still paid no state or federal income taxes in 2009.17 When tens of thousands are out of work, elected officials should not be “phasing out” one of the state’s only growing tax bases, as Governor Scott has vowed to do.18 Elected officials should be strengthening it to make sure all large corporations help support public services and public works projects that create jobs and make Florida more competitive.

It is the combination of no personal income tax and a weak corporate income tax that allows billionaires like William Koch, the president of Oxbow Energy, and Micky Arison, the CEO of Carnival Cruise Lines, to pay so little of their income in taxes. Koch, whose estimated personal wealth has grown by $2 billion since 2007,19 complains that he still has to pay $470,000 in property taxes on his $25 million mansion.20 But the billionaire has shelled out more than that for four bottles of rare wine,21 and four times as much for a photograph of Billy the Kid.22 Corporate executives like Koch and Arison depend on well-‐maintained roads, ports and bridges, an educated, healthy workforce, and reliable emergency services as much or more than everyone else. These public goods, the foundation of our economy, are worth more than a

WHAT ELECTED OFFICIALS CAN DO – FAIR SHARE

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couple bottles of wine. The current tax code, called “unfair and outdated” by former president of the Florida Senate John McKay,23 clearly fails to reflect most people’s priorities.

Our leaders need to take a stand. Before we ask business owners in Little Haiti to wait another year for their customers to return, before we ask construction workers in Liberty City to wait for work to pick up, or students in Hialeah to wait for their schools to be repaired, we ought to ask the wealthiest individuals and corporations to pay their share of the cost to rebuild our economy. It will not be easy for our leaders to stand with us. Billionaires like Koch may believe paying taxes to our government is “money down a rat hole,”24 but they are perfectly willing to direct hundreds of thousands of dollars to politicians who support their views.25 That is why faith leaders, community residents, social service providers, and workers need to come together to show support for those elected officials willing to do what is necessary to put Miami back to work.

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3. TURN BAD JOBS INTO GOOD JOBS

As the people of Miami encourage their leaders to do what is necessary to put people back to work, we must not stop there. Miami ranked high in poverty and inequality even when unemployment was low.1 It is not just more jobs we need—it is more good jobs. By definition, jobs with no benefits and poverty wages cannot support families and build a middle class. For Miami, with an economy that principally creates jobs in the service sector, elected officials should call on tourism, international trade, health care, retail, higher education, and downtown business sectors to improve standards for the tens of thousands of workers who support those sectors day-‐to-‐day, often invisibly.

The vast majority of working people who 1Miami surveyed said their economic situation is worse today than it was three years ago, and the primary reason is a bad job. Ninety-‐two percent of those 1Miami surveyed say they are earning less than or the same as last year. Half are not receiving health insurance from their employer, and many who do receive employer-‐based coverage find it unaffordable. At the same time, housing, food, transportation and other costs keep going up. It is no wonder that more than a quarter say they have gone into debt or taken on more debt just paying basic living expenses.

The Center for Women’s Welfare studied what it costs for individuals and families to pay for their basic needs in Miami. They found that for a four-‐person family with two wage earners, each adult needs to earn at least $25,000, or $12 per hour, to make ends meet.2 More than one third of full-‐time workers over the age of 25 in Miami fall below this threshold.3 Among African American and Hispanic full-‐time workers, more than half are not earning a self-‐sufficiency wage.4 For these workers, the typical rent of an affordable housing unit is still out of reach;5 add transportation and health expenses, and making a living becomes nearly impossible.

Out of the nation’s 100 largest counties, only in Hidalgo and El Paso, Texas do full time workers earn less than workers in Miami Dade County, while workers in the cities of Hialeah and Miami fare worse than in any of the nation’s 100 other large cities.6 Health coverage follows the same pattern. Miami Dade’s rate of insured, full-‐time workers is 20 points below the national average and the second-‐lowest among large counties.7 The size of Miami’s service sector helps explain why earnings and benefits fall behind the rest of the nation, but this is not the whole story. Even within low-‐wage service jobs, Miami workers receive substantially less than their peers doing the same work in other metropolitan areas.

There is not a rational or moral explanation why workers in Miami should earn a lower hourly rate than what they would receive doing the exact same work almost anywhere else. Yet for

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Miami workers in virtually every large low-‐wage occupation, from office clerks to landscapers, this is the case.8 As the tables below show, janitors in Miami earn $1.50 per hour less than the US median and as much as $4 less than other large metropolitan areas with a cost of living most similar to Miami. In other words, over the course of a year, the typical Miami janitor is making $3,000 less than janitors across the US and as much as $8,000 less than janitors in similar metropolitan areas. This is also true for nursing aides—whose median hourly wage is up to $5 less than what nursing aides in similar areas make—and workers from dozens of other major service occupations. 9

Figure 11 – Median hourly wage of janitors by metropolitan area (2010)

$7.25

$8.25

$9.25

$10.25

$11.25

$12.25

$13.25

$14.25

Med

ian Ho

urly W

age

Metropolitan areas arranged by cost of living (lowest to highest)

Median Wage (Janitors), US = $10.68


22

Figure 12 -‐ Median hourly wage of nursing aides by metropolitan area (2010)

If Miami employers paid fairer wages to these workers, the effect on our economy would be dramatic. Simply raising the wages of Miami’s twenty largest underpaid occupations to US averages would inject an additional $470 million into the local economy annually.10 In the hands of those who would be likely to spend it, this alone would create 6,600 permanent jobs11 —more jobs than Miami’s entire cruise industry.12 Likewise, if Miami employers offered health benefits to workers and their families at the same rates they do nationally, the number of uninsured adults between the ages of 25 and 64 in the county, working or not, would drop by almost half.13 That’s news to county leaders who think governance is the only way to fix Jackson Hospital!

Service sector wages and benefits are higher in other cities because standards are higher, meaning employers are under greater pressure to pay fair wages than they are here. As the gatekeepers to zoning permits, county land, county contracts, job training funds, and a bank chest of other economic development subsidies, elected leaders possess a considerable amount of influence over how much employers in Miami pay and what kind of benefits they offer. They have, however, generally avoided making use of this influence to turn bad jobs into

$7.25 $8.25 $9.25

$10.25 $11.25 $12.25 $13.25 $14.25 $15.25 $16.25 $17.25

Hourly W

age

Metropolitan areas arranged by cost of living (lowest to highest)

Median Wage (Nursing Aides), US = $11.54


23

good jobs under the misguided belief that setting higher expectations will somehow discourage development. This laissez faire approach has to end. Miami’s service sector is not going anywhere. The jobs of the janitors who clean downtown office buildings or nursing aides who care for those who are disabled will never be outsourced. If our leaders fail to do everything in their power to turn some 300,000 low-‐wage jobs14 into better jobs, we will never build a middle class in Miami.

As we argued before, Miami does not have to pursue the “low road” of minimum wages and no taxes to be competitive. We do not have to choose between good jobs and economic growth. We can build a better economy than the one we have now by competing on the strengths of our public services, infrastructure, and workforce. San Diego’s Market Creek Plaza is one example of how a “high road” economic development strategy can be mutually beneficial to developers and local communities. When the Food4Less supermarket chain opted to be the anchor tenant of a new shopping complex known as Market Creek in the predominantly low-‐income Diamond neighborhood of San Diego, local residents and a non-‐profit partner negotiated an agreement with the grocery chain to ensure that all the jobs, from stock clerks to managers, paid a living, union wage with benefits.

The people of the Diamond neighborhood did not come to Food4Less with a tax break or a promise to loosen wage standards. They presented a market opportunity. Residents had already mobilized around the need for a supermarket in their community. When it came time to negotiate, community leaders were able to show that residents controlled millions in untapped spending power that they would direct to a retailer whose hiring practices aligned with their values.15 Since opening, this Food4Less is one of the retailer’s highest-‐grossing stores, which has helped spur the revitalization of the Diamond neighborhood.16 Sixty-‐nine percent of construction contracts were awarded to local enterprises, 91% of permanent employees live in the Diamond neighborhood, and thanks to a unique ownership structure, a portion of lease revenues are reinvested into community organizing and cultural activities.17

Miami has many strengths, which should not be sold away to the lowest bidder. The times are too serious for timid requests and development agreements without teeth. We need leaders who recognize that when a developer like Genting purchases 14 acres of land to build a resort casino, they did not pick Miami because wages here are cheap or standards are low. They picked Miami because we are one of the biggest tourist destinations in the country and we have a workforce capable of filling those jobs. If elected officials can make that cognitive leap, if they can show the resolve to ensure all developers pay a living wage with benefits, Miami will have a tremendous opportunity to transform its bad jobs into good jobs. The benefits of higher standards will ripple through the entire economy, as low-‐wage workers are far more likely than millionaires to direct new earnings toward local goods.18 As community leaders,


24

faith leaders, workers, and their allies, it is our job to give elected officials the courage to be champions of this new way forward.

As with jobs created by public investment in services and infrastructure, our leaders must be vigilant in ensuring that when good jobs are created by way of higher standards or any other means, those jobs are accessible to all Miami residents, particularly people from communities that have been most impacted by the lack of good jobs. This can be accomplished through a combination of negotiated, neighborhood-‐specific hiring agreements with employers, as the Market Creek case illustrates, and investments in workforce training. Targeted training that relies on the input of employers, community organizations, and educational institutions, like the Culinary and Hospitality Academy in Las Vegas19 and Project QUEST Texas,20 has had success preparing those with less work experience or education to gain access to careers in growing industries and advance along a career ladder. Training also helps reduce turnover and retraining costs for employers, which amount to $2,000 to $6,000 per employee in Miami’s hotel industry.21 With this in mind, elected officials should always leverage effective training in pressing for higher wages or seeking wholesale commitments from employers to hire local or disadvantaged candidates.

25

WHAT ELECTED LEADERS CAN DO

4. ENCOURAGE A DIVERSE ECONOMY BY HELPING LOCALLY OWNED BUSINESSES GROW

As our financial crisis illustrates all too well, Miami’s economy is structured to promote short-‐term, speculative investment over long-‐term growth. This shortsighted economic model changes Miami’s skyline but does not change the poverty rate. Furthermore, because Miami’s “boom” times depend so much on export industries like tourism, real estate, and international trade, problems outside of Miami can quickly make our economy go “bust.” Big banks like Wells Fargo still come out richer,1 while everyday residents are out of luck.

Miami leaders can protect against these external shocks and promote an economy that works for everyone by turning their attention to locally owned, small and mid-‐sized businesses. If aided to supply goods and services that Miami’s customers—particularly large institutions—currently purchase from outside our local economy, these businesses could play a critical role in building a stable, diversified economy that meets Miami’s long-‐term needs. Toward this end, elected leaders should mobilize the government’s planning capacity and political influence to create opportunities for small businesses to grow. This could include influencing major institutions and corporations to redirect their purchasing toward small local businesses and bringing together a variety of stakeholders to provide technical support and financing for small businesses to take advantage of these opportunities.

Small and midsized businesses are already important to Miami’s economy. Firms with twenty or fewer employees account for nearly a quarter of total employment in the Miami metro area, higher than any other large metropolitan area in the nation.2 The owners of small businesses often have a strong affinity with their local community, and are likely to remain here even when our economy sours. Local business owners also help build wealth in Miami neighborhoods by allowing money to keep circulating within the local economy, (creating more jobs) and reinvesting their earnings back into their neighborhoods.3 This is especially important in communities of color, where median net wealth has declined to just $4,633 in African American households and $6,375 in Hispanic households—lower than it was in 1984!4

Despite the importance of local firms, much of our government’s economic development capacity has gone toward attracting large corporations from outside Miami to relocate here, as opposed to providing the financing and strategic support that small businesses need to grow. We spent more money giving Burger King a tax incentive to bring 60 jobs to Miami than the entire budget of Miami’s Small Business Development Office, and twice as much on yearly tax credits to the film industry.5 Very few of the participants in incentive programs have even produced the jobs that were promised.6 Furthermore, where goals for small or disadvantaged

WHAT ELECTED OFFICIALS CAN DO – ENCOURAGE A DIVERSE ECONOMY

26

business participation on county-‐funded projects exist, the expectations are generally modest (roughly 12% of contract dollars).7

Other urban areas are showing that much more can be done to support small business growth. In Cleveland, the mayor recently joined with a foundation and a non-‐profit to develop local businesses that will supply goods and services to major hospitals and universities in the city’s “University Circle.” These anchor institutions collectively make $3 billion in purchases every year, mostly, as it turns out, from businesses outside Cleveland. The mayor used the power of his office to call on these institutions to redirect their purchasing toward a network of new local enterprises called the “Evergreen Cooperatives.”8 With buy-‐in from the anchor institutions, the mayor’s non-‐profit partner was able to secure financing from a community bank and a federal loan program to launch a solar installation company, a large hydroponic greenhouse, and a commercial laundry. At scale, the businesses will employ nearly 200 workers, all residents from nearby communities with high-‐unemployment. Workers receive shares in the business that allow them to collect annual dividends and build equity, which is projected to reach $65,000 per worker in the first eight years. Workers also receive training in business management to eventually take full control of these enterprises.9

We all want a diverse, stable economy where wealth accumulates in every Miami neighborhood, not only among the 1%. The Cleveland case is just one example of what our government can do to help support equitable, long-‐term growth. In Miami, the strategies may differ, but the goal should remain the same. To get there, our leaders will need to be proactive, inclusive, and accountable. In other words, leaders should facilitate new opportunities for responsible businesses to grow as opposed to simply staying out of the way. They should call on a variety of stakeholders, including small businesses, community groups, and anchor institutions to take part in setting Miami’s economic agenda. Finally, they should be able to show how their policy decisions, from awarding county contracts to deciding on the budget, will help create a broad, inclusive middle class in Miami.

27

APPENDIX – SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND ADDITIONAL TABLES

Survey Methodology

Staff organizers and volunteers from 1Miami solicited survey participation through door-‐to-‐door outreach and several large community meetings. As participants filled out written surveys, staff and volunteers clarified questions and later reviewed surveys with participants to screen for errors.

Though we did not follow rigorous randomization techniques, survey administrators did their best to interview a broad spectrum of neighborhood residents. Participation was limited to one person per household in North Dade neighborhoods with a median income below $35,000. Participants were not screened for political affiliation or any other characteristic besides neighborhood. We cannot claim our results are statistically valid, but we maintain they still offer a reasonably solid representation of the views and experiences shared by residents from participating neighborhoods.

Demographics

Figure 13 -‐ Age of participants (n = 887)

8% 16% 59% 16%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

18-‐25

26-‐35

36-‐65

66+

No response

APPENDIX

28

Figure 14 -‐ Neighborhood of participants

Figure 15 -‐ Race/ethnicity of participants

25% 24%

17% 13% 11%

7% 3%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

North Miami, North Miami Beach

Hialeah and Vicinity

Lijle Haim, Lijle River, Miami Shores

Lijle Havana and Vicinity

Liberty City, Brownsville

Allapajah, Wynwood, Overtown

Miami Gardens, Opa-‐Locka

46%

36%

17%

1%

Lamno

Haiman, Haiman American

African American/Black

All other races/ethnicimes

APPENDIX

29

Figure 16 -‐ Gender of participants

Figure 17 -‐ Employment status of participants

Employed 40% Full Time 71%

Involuntary Part Time 19% Part Time Voluntary 5% Varied Hours 5%

Total Self-‐Employed 10%

Full Time Self-‐Employed 5%

Unemployed 32% Discouraged 21% Officially Unemployed 79%

Not Working or Seeking Work 28% Disabled and not seeking work 10% Full-‐time Student 8% Other Not Working 9% Retired 58% Stay-‐at-‐home parent 13%

57%

43% Female

Male

APPENDIX

30

Figure 18 – Number of other people who depend on respondents for financial support

Additional survey responses

Figure 19 -‐ Unemployed workers feel under greater stress now than when they held a job (n = 285)

43%

43%

19%

27%

20%

12%

18%

21%

45%

12%

16%

24%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

Employed

Unemployed

Out of labor force

3 or more people

2 people

1 person

0

5%

95%

No

Yes

APPENDIX

31

Figure 21 -‐ Nearly 2/3 unemployed workers would participate in a 3-‐month training program that resulted in a job

58%

42% Yes

No

Figure 20 -‐ 43% of unemployed workers have applied to 10 or more jobs in a single month

21% 22% 18% 40%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

20 or more

10 to 19

6 to 9

1 to 5

APPENDIX

32

Figure 22 -‐ Unemployed workers felt most capable of filling construction jobs

Given the list of occupations, below, almost 60% of men said they felt capable of accessing construction-‐related jobs. Women felt less strongly about the list of options, but a sizable share said they felt capable of filling jobs that could support new investments in health care.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

% who

felt they cou

ld access the

job

Potenmal jobs

Female

Male

APPENDIX

33

Figure 23 -‐ Detailed explanation for why economic situation worsened

1Miami asked those who said their economic situation was worse today than three years ago which factors explain why their economic situation has changed. Bolded categories show the percentage of employed, unemployed and not working respondents who said that particular category of issues helps explain the changes in their economic situation. Subcategories show which particular issues within the category were cited most commonly by employed, unemployed, and not working respondents, respectively. Job issues were the top explanation for why employed and unemployed people said their situation had gotten worse, with employed people experiencing cuts to wages/hours and unemployed people experiencing job loss. Government benefits were most explanatory for individuals out of the labor force, with frozen benefits being the predominant issue for these respondents.

Employed Unemployed

Out of labor force

Job Issues 56% 85%

17%

Lost job, found worse job 31% 0% 0% Wages / hours cut 64% 2% 0%

Lost job, unemployed or not working 0% 94% 90% Slow or closed business 4% 2% 0%

Other 5% 2% 10% Housing 44% 28% 35%

Higher rent or owner costs 89% 70% 92% Lost home due to foreclosure or

eviction 11% 30% 8% Health Care 33% 33% 29%

Health insurance / fees became more expensive 73% 41% 78%

Lost insurance / access to a source of care 27% 59% 22%

Government Benefits

9%

22%

39%

Lost / reduced benefits 91% 77% 37% Frozen benefits, higher costs 9% 23% 63%

Credit and Debt Issues 37% 20% 15%

Went into debt to pay living expenses 53% 45% 58% Existing debt payments increased 47% 55% 42%

Savings Issues 37% 25% 19% Home worth less than what I owe bank 27% 11% 30%

APPENDIX

34

I lost all my savings 57% 69% 70% Value of savings / home has decreased 23% 23% 48% Education 11% 11% 10%

Cost of education increased 78% 47% 76% Dropped out, could not afford 22% 53% 24%

Other 15% 4% 12%

Note: Respondents could pick more than one bolded category. Subtotals for each category should add up to 100%, except in the savings category, where individuals could pick “home is worth less than what I owe the bank” and one additional category.

35

NOTES

Introduction – Why We Cannot Wait 1 Florida Power and Light recorded its “highest earnings ever” in 2010. Wells Fargo’s pretax profits increased 60% between 2007 and 2010, also a “record.” In general, corporate profits have increased 41% since 2009. (A) Next Era Energy. Definitive Proxy Statement. p. 31. May 20, 2011. < http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/753308/000119312511088341/ddef14a.htm> (B) Wells Fargo. Form 10-‐K. Exhibit 12(a). February 25, 2011. < http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000095012311018541/f56816exv12wa.htm > (C) Campbell, Dakin. “Wells Fargo Advances on Record Profit, Cost-‐Cutting Plans.” Bloomberg News. June 19, 2011. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-‐07-‐19/wells-‐fargo-‐profit-‐revenue-‐increase.html> (D) Sum, Andrew and Joseph McLaughlin. Who Has Benefitted from the Post-‐Great Recession Recovery? A New Look at the Growth Performance of Jobs, Wages, Corporate Profits, and Stock Price Indices During the First Two Years of Recovery. Northeastern University Center for Labor Market Studies. p. 6. July 2011. < http://www.northeastern.edu/clms/wp-‐content/uploads/Who-‐Had-‐Benefitted-‐from-‐the-‐Post.pdf> 2 Talalay, Sarah. “Commission OK's Marlins stadium.” Sun Sentinel, March 24, 2009, http://articles.sun-‐sentinel.com/2009-‐03-‐24/news/0903230628_1_hotel-‐bed-‐miami-‐dade-‐county-‐commissioners-‐bed-‐tax. 3 Brannigan, Martha."300 Miami-‐Dade workers losing jobs." The Miami Herald, October 4, 2011. http://www.sun-‐sentinel.com/news/local/florida/mh-‐miami-‐dade-‐layoffs-‐20111004,0,5944309.story Specific positions cut identified in Miami-‐Dade County FY2011-‐2012 Layoff Report. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/68700974/Layoff-‐Report-‐10-‐12-‐11-‐Public-‐Record-‐Req.> 4 The intangibles tax was completely eliminated in FY2007-‐2008. Today it would generate $850 million based on average collections from 1994 to 1998. Florida Center for Fiscal and Economic Policy. Unbalancing Florida’s Tax System: Eliminating Taxes on Wealth Has Shifted the Burden to Other Floridians. pp. 3-‐4. November 2010. < http://www.fcfep.org/attachments/20101108-‐-‐Eliminating%20Taxes%20on%20Wealth.pdf> 5 Rockwell, Lilly. "15 percent tuition increase locked in for Florida's state universities." Miami Herald. June 23. 2011. <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/06/23/2281803/15-‐percent-‐tuition-‐increase-‐locked.html> 6 Through July 2011, the federal government has spent $2.5 trillion bailing out companies including A.I.G. and Bear Stearns. New York Times. "Adding Up the Government's Total Bailout Tab." July 24, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-‐bailout-‐totals-‐graphic.html> 7 Carey, Mary Agnes, and Phil Galewitz. “FAQ: 'Super Committee' Could Have Big Impact On Medicare, Medicaid Spending.” Kaiser Health News. August 11, 2011. http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/August/03/debt-‐deal-‐FAQ.aspx 8 Average annual unemployment rate, January to August 2011, compared to Local Annual Unemployment Statistics since 1983, the earliest year in the data series. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, Miami-‐Kendall-‐Miami Beach Metropolitan Division, 1983-‐2011. 9 We take the number of unemployed workers in July 2011 and net out the number who would be unemployed if the unemployment rate was 5.1% (the January 2008 rate). Bureau of Labor Statistics, Seasonally Adjusted Local Area Unemployment Statistics for Miami-‐Dade County, July 2011 and January 2008. 10 Employment growth from July 2010 to July 2011 was 1.77%. Using this as the Annual Compound Growth rate, Miami does not create reach 100,000 new jobs until mid-‐year 2016. This projection makes the conservative assumption that the labor force does not grow in five years. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Seasonally Adjusted Local Area Unemployment Statistics for Miami-‐Dade County, July 2010-‐July 2011. 11 Eisenhauer, Emily, and Carlos A. Sanchez. The State of Working Florida 2011. Center for Labor Research and Studies, Florida International University. p. 2. September 5, 2011. < http://www.risep-‐fiu.org/2010/09/state-‐of-‐working-‐florida-‐2010/> 12 From FY2011-‐FY2016, Miami has $29 billion in capital needs, including $4.3 billion in funded "future" projects (to be completed after FY2016) and $17.8 billion in unfunded projects, which are on hold indefinitely. The school district has $2 billion in (mostly unfunded) capital needs over the next five years, and $1.6 billion over the

NOTES

36

following five years. Together with county projects, Miami has at least $33 billion in capital needs over the next decade. (A) Miami Dade County. FY2011-‐FY2012 Proposed Budget and Multi-‐Year Capital Plan -‐ Capital Schedules Addendum, p. 438-‐440. August 2011. < http://www.miamidade.gov/budget/FY2011-‐12/pdf/Capital11-‐12.pdf> (B) Dade County School District. FY2011-‐FY2012 Five-‐Year Work Plan. p. 17, 33 and 86. September 2011. <facilities.dadeschools.net/capital/pdf/11-‐12_work_plan.pdf.> 13 Davis, Carl, et al. Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax System in All Fifty States. Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy. p. 34. November 2009. <www.itepnet.org/whopays3.pdf> 14 Carnival, according to its 10-‐K filing, is “exempt from US federal income taxes.” Florida tax code “piggybacks” the federal code, meaning Carnival’s cruise profits are also exempt from state taxation, unless profits were made through on-‐land subsidiaries. Carnival reported an effective global tax rate of less than 1% in 2010. Given the exemptions stated here, it is likely that little or none of these income tax payments went to Florida. Carnival Cruise Lines. Form 10-‐K., p. 23, G-‐1. January 31, 2011, < http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/815097/000119312511018320/d10k.htm>. See also, Florida Department of Revenue. Tax Information Publication. p. 1. 2011. <http://dor.myflorida.com/dor/tips/pdf/tip11c01-‐01.pdf> 15 Using Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates (OEWE), we select the 20 largest low-‐wage occupations in Miami (defined as occupations with mean wages below 2/3 of Miami’s mean wage), which also have a median wage below the occupation’s national median wage. Using mean wage data from OEWE and data on hours worked from the Current Population Survey, we imply average annualized earnings for Miami workers and workers nationally, by occupation. Using OEWE data on total employment by occupation, we then calculate the total annual earnings gain Miami workers would receive if they earned the national mean wages for their occupation. (A) Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, National and Metropolitan Cross-‐Industry Estimates. May 2010. (B) Current Population Survey. Average Hours At Work By Occupation. 2010. 16 We take the earnings gain of $669.5 million and apply it to the typical Miami household budget shown in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditures Survey. Because this is a marginal increase in spending power, we reduce transit and housing shares by 75% (since these costs are more or less fixed) and raise the shares of other expenditures proportionately (with the exception of utilities, insurance and food at home, whose share of expenditures we hold flat, for the same reason as above). We assign these household expenditures to the corresponding industry that would benefit from the spending increase. Finally, we use RIMS II multipliers for Miami-‐Dade County from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to imply the annual effect on employment. It is worth noting that our estimate of one new job for every $70,727 in new earnings is more conservative than a similar estimate by Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett-‐Peltier, which assumed a ratio of $67,568 per new job in projecting the employment effect of tax relief for middle class Americans nationally. (A) Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditures for the Miami Area 2008-‐2009, October 2010. (B) Bureau of Economic Analysis, RIMS II Multipliers, Miami-‐Dade County, 2008-‐2009. (C) Pollin, Robert and Heidi Garrett-‐Peltier. U.S. Employment Effects of Military and Domestic Spending Priorities: An Updated Analysis. Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. p. 5. Oct 2009. 17 Christiansen, Gayle, Amy Stitely, and Lorlene Hoyt. Strengthening Local Economies and Civic Life: The Untapped Power of Small Businesses. MIT Community Innovators Lab. p. 6. September 2010. <web.mit.edu/colab/resources/SmallBusinesses-‐CoLabSept2010.pdf> 1. Invest in the Public Services and Infrastructure Communities Say They Need

1 See Introduction, reference 12, for how we computed this figure. (A) Miami Dade County. FY2011-‐FY2012 Proposed Budget and Multi-‐Year Capital Plan -‐ Capital Schedules Addendum. p. 438-‐440. August 2011. < http://www.miamidade.gov/budget/FY2011-‐12/pdf/Capital11-‐12.pdf> (B) Dade County School District. FY2011-‐FY2012 Five-‐Year Work Plan, p. 17, 33 and 86. September 2011. < facilities.dadeschools.net/capital/pdf/11-‐12_work_plan.pdf>

NOTES

37

2 “A business needs a successful community, not only to create demand for its products but also to provide critical public assets and a supportive environment.” Porter, Michael E., and Mark R. Kramer. “Creating Shared Value.” Harvard Business Review. p. 6. January -‐ February 2011. 3 Hirth, Diane. “On the road to ‘Brighter Futures,’ Senator is making bus stops to boost state scholarship.” The Tallahassee Democrat. September 30, 2003. 4 Dorschner, John. “Critics: Jackson Health System cuts hurt primary care for poor.” Miami Herald. August 14, 2011. < http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/08/14/2359448/are-‐poor-‐suffering-‐because-‐of.html> 5 Williams, Timothy. “Florida's Governor rejects high-‐speed rail line, fears cost to taxpayers.” New York Times. February 16, 2011. < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/us/17rail.html?_r=1> 6 Carey, Mary Agnes, and Phil Galewitz. “FAQ: 'Super Committee' Could Have Big Impact On Medicare, Medicaid Spending.” Kaiser Health News. August 11, 2011. <http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/August/03/debt-‐deal-‐FAQ.aspx> 7 Cauchon, Dennis. “Student loans outstanding will exceed $1 trillion this year.” USA Today, October 19, 2011. 8 NACHC, the Robert Graham Center, and Capital Link. Access granted: The primary care payoff. August 2007. p. 8. < http://www.graham-‐center.org/online/graham/home/publications/monographs-‐books/2007/rgcmo-‐access-‐granted.html> 9 See reference Introduction, reference 12 for how we computed the county’s total capital needs. 10 Dade County School District, FY2011-‐FY2012 Five-‐Year Work Plan, September 2011, p. 33. 11 Miami Water and Sewer Department, Five-‐Year Outlook of Water and Sewer Department. Miami Dade County First Budget Hearing, Attachment E. p. 7 of 24. September 8, 2011. < http://www.miamidade.gov/budget/FY2011-‐12/pdf/first-‐hearing/attachment-‐e.pdf> 12 Analysis of FY2011-‐FY2012 Proposed Budget and Multi-‐Year Capital Plan and Dade County School District FY2011-‐FY2012 Five-‐Year Work Plan. 13 Florida Industry of School Houses (FISH) Report. Summary Data. July 2011. <http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/planningsurvey/excel/Summary.xls> 14 State of Florida Department of Health, County Health Department. Public/Private School Inspection Report: Norland High School. February 16, 2011. < http://mnorland.dadeschools.net/healthreport.html > See also, Osirus, Darnell. "Faulty building." Thor student newspaper. p. 5. January 2011. <http://onemiaminow.org/files/2011/09/school-‐paper-‐thor.pdf> 15 Miami Water and Sewer Department, Five-‐Year Outlook of Water and Sewer Department. Miami Dade County First Budget Hearing, Attachment E. p. 7 of 24. September 8, 2011. < http://www.miamidade.gov/budget/FY2011-‐12/pdf/first-‐hearing/attachment-‐e.pdf> 16 School maintenance jobs projected using a ratio of $77,126 per job from White House analysis of the American Jobs Act. Water infrastructure jobs projected using a ratio of $102,851 per job from Green For All water infrastructure impact analysis. (A) White House Press Office. “American Jobs Act: Impact For Florida.” September 2011. < http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/THE_AMERICAN_JOBS_ACT_Impact_FL.pdf >. (B) Gordon, Emily et al. Water Works: Rebuilding Infrastructure, Creating Jobs, Greening the Environment. Green For All. p. 24. September 2011. < www.greenforall.org/waterworks> 17 Analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics, Seasonally Adjusted Local Area Unemployment data – Miami-‐Miami Beach-‐Kendall MSA, September 2011. 18 Census 2000 EEO Data Tool. Employment by Census Occupation Codes and Industry. Worksite Data -‐ Miami Dade. Accessed October 25, 2011. 19 Austin, Algernon. High black unemployment widespread across nation’s metropolitan areas. Economic Policy Institute. p. 6. October 3, 2011. < http://www.epi.org/publication/high-‐black-‐unemployment-‐widespread-‐metropolitan-‐areas/> 20 Chimienti, Elizabeth Ann. Breaking down barriers, building up communities: Implementing project labor agreements with targeted hiring goals (Unpublished master’s thesis). Massachusetts Institute of Technology. p. 50, 69, and 77. 2010. < http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/59718> 21 Families USA. Federal Medicaid Cuts Would Harm State Economies. p. 4. June 2011. < http://familiesusa2.org/assets/pdfs/Medicaid-‐Cuts-‐Hurt-‐State-‐Economies.pdf>

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22 Eisenhauer, Emily, and Carlos A. Sanchez. The State of Working Florida 2011. Center for Labor Research and Studies, Florida International University. p. 3. September 5, 2011. < http://www.risep-‐fiu.org/2011/09/state-‐of-‐working-‐florida-‐2011/> 23 See Introduction, reference 10, for how we project the time it will take the private sector to recover. 24 (A) The White House. 2010 Economic Report of the President. p. 154. 2010. < http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/economic-‐report-‐of-‐the-‐President > (B) Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez."How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(1). p. 7. 2007. < <elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/piketty-‐saezJEP07taxprog.pdf> Interest Rate Swaps 1 Selway, William, and Martin Z. Braun. “JPMorgan Will Pay $228 Million to Settle Municipal Bond Bid-‐Rigging Claims.” Bloomberg News. July 7, 2011. < http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-‐07-‐07/jpmorgan-‐will-‐pay-‐228-‐million-‐to-‐settle-‐municipal-‐bond-‐bid-‐rigging-‐claims.html> 2 Sigo, S. “Miami-‐Dade Prices Bonds to Aid Swap Exit.” The Bond Buyer. Jul 11, 2008. <http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_131/-‐291306-‐1.html> See also, Business Week. “Paying For Bad Bets.” November 11, 2010. <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_47/b4204053230937.htm> 3 Baumann, Nick. “Why AIG Went Down.” Mother Jones. October 7, 2008. < http://motherjones.com/mojo/2008/10/why-‐aig-‐went-‐down> 4 (A) Sigo, S. “Miami-‐Dade Inks School Swaps with RBC, Merrill.” The Bond Buyer. April 24, 2006. (B) The School Board of Miami-‐Dade County. FY2011 CAFR. p. 65. September 2011. <http://financialaffairs.dadeschools.net/pdfs/AFR_11.pdf> 5 The School Board of Miami-‐Dade County. FY2011 CAFR. p. 65. September 2011. <http://financialaffairs.dadeschools.net/pdfs/AFR_11.pdf> 6 Norland High School renovation costs are projected to total $33 million. Dade School District. FY2011 Work Plan. p. 14. 7 The New York Times. "Adding Up the Government's Total Bailout Tab." July 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-‐bailout-‐totals-‐graphic.html> 8 The Federal Reserve. "Current FAQs: Why are interest rates being kept at a low level?" August 9, 2011. <http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12849.htm> 9 School Board of Miami-‐Dade County Schools. "E-‐144: A contractual services agreement between The School Board of Miami-‐Dade County, Florida, and Bank of America, N.A.; The Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon); J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.; SunTrust Bank; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and All County ATM, Inc., pursuant to Request For Proposals No. 033-‐LL10." Meeting minutes, May 11, 2011. <pdfs.dadeschools.net/Bdarch/2011/Bd051111/agenda/e144.pdf> 2. Ask the Wealthiest Individuals and Corporations To Pay Their Fair Share

1 It would generate $850 million based on average collections from 1994 to 1998. Florida Center for Fiscal and Economic Policy. Unbalancing Florida’s Tax System: Eliminating Taxes on Wealth Has Shifted the Burden to Other Floridians. p. 3-‐4. November 2010. < http://www.fcfep.org/attachments/20101108-‐-‐Eliminating%20Taxes%20on%20Wealth.pdf> 2 Florida Center for Fiscal and Economic Policy. Paying More for Less: More Cuts Will Hurt Floridians Who Rely on State Services While Florida’s Tax System Remains Unfair and Unbalanced. p. 3. January 2011. < http://www.fcfep.org/attachments/20110104-‐-‐Paying%20More%20for%20Less.pdf> 3 Davis, Carl, et al. Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax System in All Fifty States. Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy. p. 34. November 2009. < www.itepnet.org/whopays3.pdf> 4 We combine state tax data from Davis et al. (above) with federal tax data from CTJ report: Citizens for Tax Justice. America's Tax System is Not as Progressive as You Think. p. 1. April 15, 2011. < www.ctj.org/pdf/taxday2011.pdf> 5 Davis et al. (2009, p. 34) establishes that the top 1% pay 5.2% less of their income in state and local taxes than the middle 60% of income earners. We apply the share of adjusted gross income (AGI) controlled by the top 1% in

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2006 to the total AGI for Florida and Miami in 2009. We then multiply 5.2% by the implied income of the top 1% for Miami and Florida, respectively, to estimate the tax revenue gain from asking millionaires to pay their share. (A) Internal Revenue Service. Individual Income Tax Returns with Positive Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). Number of Returns, Shares of AGI and Total Income Tax, and Average Tax Rates, by State. 2006. < http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=96679,00.html#_grp1 > (B) Internal Revenue Service. Individual Income Tax Returns: Selected Income Items by State and County – Florida. Tax Year 2009. < http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=217542,00.html> 6 Florida Senate Committee on Finance and Taxation. Why Did Florida’s Corporate Income Tax Revenue Fall While Corporate Profits Rose? Report Number 2004-‐137. p. 4. November 2003. < http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2004/Senate/reports/interim_reports/pdf/2004-‐137ftlong.pdf> 7 Florida House Finance and Tax Committee. Presentation on Florida Corporate Income Tax. p. 6. January 27, 2010. <http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?PublicationType=Committees&CommitteeId=2592&Session=2011&DocumentType=Meeting%20Packets&FileName=FT_Mtg_1-‐27-‐11_Online.pdf> 8 Florida Center for Fiscal and Economic Policy. Keeping and Modernizing the Corporate Income Tax Will Best Serve Florida. Corporate Tax Cut Would Force More Service Cuts While Doing Little to Create Jobs. pp. 6-‐7. February 2011. < http://www.fcfep.org/attachments/20110228-‐-‐Keeping%20and%20Modernizing%20the%20Corporate%20Income%20Tax.pdf> 9 South Florida Business Journal. "Largest Public Companies." Book of Lists. p. 47. 2011. 10 (1) Carnival Cruise Corporation. 10-‐K, p. F-‐1. January 31, 2011. < http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/815097/000119312511018320/dex13.htm> (2) Royal Caribbean. Form 10-‐K, p. 34 and F-‐19. January 32, 2011. < http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/884887/000119312511045435/d10k.htm > (3) World Fuel Services Corp. Form 10-‐K, p. 22 and 78. January 31, 2011. < http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789460/000119312511045452/d10k.htm> See also, Freedberg, Sydney P. "A special report on Florida's corporate income tax." St. Petersburg Times. October 26, 2003. < http://www.sptimes.com/2003/10/26/State/A_special_report_on_F.shtml> 11 South Florida Business Journal. "Largest Private Companies." Book of Lists. p. 40. 2011. 12 Freedberg, Sydney P., and Kitty Bennett. "Big boys profit on mom-‐and-‐pop tax break." St. Petersburg Times. December 28, 2003. < http://www.sptimes.com/2003/12/28/State/Big_boys_profit_on_mo.shtml> 13 In 2010, FPL reported $49 million in current-‐year state income tax expenses for 2010, indicating an effective state tax rate of 3.2%, compared to Florida’s corporate income tax rate of 5.5%. NextEra/FPL 10-‐K, 2/28/2011, p.91. < http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37634/000075330811000025/form10k123110.htm> 14 (A) Sum, Andrew and Joseph McLaughlin. Who Has Benefitted from the Post-‐Great Recession Recovery? A New Look at the Growth Performance of Jobs, Wages, Corporate Profits, and Stock Price Indices During the First Two Years of Recovery. Northeastern University Center for Labor Market Studies. p. 6. July 2011. (B) Bureau of Labor Statistics. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. Annual NAICS Files, Miami-‐Dade County, “Total Wages.” 2007-‐2010. 15 (1) Analysis of Florida Department of Revenue. Taxable Sales Data for Miami Dade County. CY 2006-‐2011. <http://dor.myflorida.com/dor/taxes/colls_from_7_2003.html> (2) Analysis of Miami-‐Dade County. Office of the Property Appraiser. Estimate of Taxable Value. FY2006-‐2011. <http://www.miamidade.gov/pa/reports.asp> 16 Bureau of Economic Analysis. Corporate Profits: Second Quarter 2011 (Revised Estimates). Table 11. Corporate Profits: Level and Percent Change. September 29, 2011. 17 Wells Fargo. Annual report 2010, p. 90 and 174. February 26, 2010. <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000095012310017877/f54129exv13.htm> 18 Dunkelberger, Lloyd. "Scott to push corporate income tax cut." Sarasota Herald-‐Tribune. October 10, 2011. <http://htpolitics.com/2011/10/10/scott-‐to-‐push-‐corporate-‐income-‐tax-‐cut/> 19 Forbes 400 profile of William Koch. “Net Worth Over Time.” Accessed October 28, 2011. <http://www.forbes.com/profile/william-‐koch/> 20 Freedberg, Sydney P., and Kitty Bennett. "Big boys profit on mom-‐and-‐pop tax break." St. Petersburg Times. December 28, 2003. Home value and taxes paid updated according to Palm Beach County Property Appraiser's Office. Assessment Data for Parcel Control No. 50-‐43-‐43-‐35-‐00-‐001-‐0420. Accessed October 28, 2011.

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21 Keefe, Patrick Radden. "The Jefferson Bottles." The New Yorker. September 3, 2007. <http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/09/03/070903fa_fact_keefe> 22 Forbes 400 profile of William Koch. Accessed October 25, 2011. <http://www.forbes.com/profile/william-‐koch/> 23 McKay, John. "A Taxing Situation." Tampa Tribune. January 20, 2002. 24 Freedberg, Sydney P., and Kitty Bennett. "Big boys profit on mom-‐and-‐pop tax break." St. Petersburg Times. December 28, 2003 25 OpenSecrets.org search query. "William Koch." Accessed October 28, 2011. 3. Turn Bad Jobs Into Good Jobs

1 South Florida Business Journal. “Census highlights Miami poverty, lower Palm Beach wages.” August 31, 2005. 2 Center for Women's Welfare. "Self-‐Sufficiency Standard Tables by County, All Family types." 2007. < http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/docs/FL%202007%20All%20Families.xls> Note: we adjusted standard to 2009 dollars to match Census data. 3 US Census. 2007-‐2009 American Community Survey. Custom data tables. Percentage of full-‐time workers ages 25 and over who earn under $25,000. 4 US Census. 2007-‐2009 American Community Survey. Custom data tables. Percentage of full-‐time workers ages 25 and over who earn under $25,000 by race. 5 The county-‐funded 7th Avenue Transit Village asks that rents for affordable housing be set at 60% of Area Median Income. This implies, in FY2011, a monthly rent of $776 for a one-‐bedroom unit. Workers earning less than $25,000 would have to spend 37% or more of their income to rent a one-‐bedroom unit, above the threshold of housing affordability as defined by the US Census. (A) Miami Dade County. Resolution R-‐138-‐11: "Approving Carlisle as Developer...", p. 1. March 1, 2011. < http://www.miamidade.gov/govaction/matter.asp?matter=110083&file=true&yearFolder=Y2011 > (B) Miami-‐Dade County Department of Public Housing and Community Development. Income Limits, 2011. <http://www.miamidade.gov/housing/income-‐limits.asp> 6 US Census. 2007-‐2009 American Community Survey. Custom data tables. Percentage of full-‐time workers ages 25 and over who earn under $25,000. 7 US Census. 2007-‐2009 American Community Survey. Custom data tables. Insurance coverage of working-‐age adults ages 16 to 64 by employment status. 8 Sixteen of Miami’s twenty largest low-‐wage occupations (defined as occupations with a mean wage 2/3 of Miami’s mean wage) have median wages below the national median wage for the same occupation. None of the four with median wages exceeding the national median do so by more than $1. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, National and Metropolitan Cross-‐Industry Estimates. May 2010. 9 Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, National and Metropolitan Cross-‐Industry Estimates. May 2010. The twelve large metropolitan areas (populations above 800,000) with a cost of living most similar to Miami were chosen using data from The Council for Community and Economic Research. ACCRA Cost of Living Index: Comparative Data for 314 Urban Areas. October 2010. 10 For an explanation of how we arrived at this projection, please see Introduction, reference 15. 11 For an explanation of the jobs projection, please see Introduction, reference 16. 12 Bureau of Labor Statistics. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. Total Employment -‐ NAICS 483112 Deep Sea Passengers -‐ Miami-‐Miami Beach-‐Kendall. 2010. 13 US Census. American Community Survey -‐ United States and Miami-‐Dade County. Health Insurance Coverage by Employment Status for Adults Ages 16 to 64. 2010. We assigned average national rates of employer-‐based health coverage to full-‐time, part-‐time and not working people in Miami and compared to current coverage data. The difference is the health coverage gain, a 45% decrease in the number of uninsured working-‐age adults. 14 Bureau of Labor Statistics. Occupational Employment and Wages – Miami-‐Miami Beach-‐Kendall MSA. 2010. 15 Robinson, Lisa. Market Creek Plaza: Toward Resident Ownership of Neighborhood Change. PolicyLink. p. 7, 13, and 20. 2005. 16 Allen, Mike. “Diamond's Emergence a Boon to Neighborhood.” San Diego Business Journal. March 13, 2006. < http://www.jacobscenter.org/news/na/03-‐13-‐06.htm>

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17 PolicyLink. “Achieving Policy Impact: San Diego’s Market Creek Plaza.” 2010. <http://www.policylink.org/site/c.lkIXLbMNJrE/b.5160109/k.BE43/San_Diego_Market_Creek_Plaza.htm> 18 Dynan, Karen E., Jonathan Skinner, Stephen P. Zeldes. “Do the Rich Save More?” Journal of Political Economy 112(1). p. 437. 2004. <www.dartmouth.edu/~jskinner/documents/DynanKEDotheRich.pdf> 19 Auerhahn, Louise, Bob Brownstein and Sarah Zimmerman. Jobs with a future: regional growth strategies and strong career ladders for the hospitality industry. Working Partnerships USA. p. 30. 2004. <http://www.wpusa.org/Focus-‐Areas/eco_Jobs%20with%20a%20Future%20hospitality%202%20color.pdf> 20 Osterman, Paul, and Brenda A. Lautsch. Project QUEST: A report to the Ford Foundation. 1996. < www.questsa.org/images/Data/Sloan(MIT)ReporttoFordFound.pdf> 21 Hinkin, Timothy R., and J. Bruce Tracey. The Cost of Turnover: Putting a Price on the Learning Curve. Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly. p. 18. June 2000. 4. Encourage A Diverse Economy By Helping Locally Owned Businesses Grow 1 See commentary on Wells Fargo’s profits in Introduction, reference 1. 2 U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy. Employer Firms, Employment, and Estimated Receipts by Firm Size and Metropolitan Statistical Area. 2007. 3 Christiansen, Gayle, Amy Stitely, and Lorlene Hoyt. Strengthening Local Economies and Civic Life: The Untapped Power of Small Businesses. MIT Community Innovators Lab. p. 6. September 2010. 4 Pew Research Center. Twenty-‐to-‐One: Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics. p. 27. July 26, 2011. < http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-‐gaps-‐rise-‐to-‐record-‐highs-‐between-‐whites-‐blacks-‐hispanics/> 5 (1) Nissen, Bruce and Marcos Feldman. Subsidized Economic Development in Miami. Research Institute on Social and Economic Policy. p. 22. July 2007. <http://www.risep-‐fiu.org/2007/07/subsidized-‐economic-‐development-‐in-‐miami/ > (2) Miami Dade County. Proposed Budget -‐ Small Business Development Office. p. 210. September 2011. < http://www.miamidade.gov/budget/ > (3) Governor’s Office of Film & Entertainment. FY 2010-‐2011 Annual Entertainment Industry Incentive Program Report. p. 13. 2011. < http://www.filminflorida.com/ifi/PDFs/annualReports/FY2010-‐2011_Report.pdf> 6 Bender, Michael. “Florida tax incentive programs creating 1 out of every 3 jobs promised.” Miami Herald. October 22, 2011. <http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2011/10/florida-‐tax-‐incentive-‐programs-‐creating-‐1-‐out-‐of-‐every-‐3-‐jobs-‐promised.html> 7 Small business participation goal for construction of the Marlins stadium was 12%. This was after strong mobilization for community benefits. Miami Dade County. “Small Business and Local Worker Participation -‐ Marlins Stadium.” Accessed October 25, 2011. <http://www.miamidade.gov/ballpark/small_business.asp> 8 Loh, Penn. "Reflections on Evergreen Cooperatives in Cleveland." CoLab Radio. August 11, 2010. < http://colabradio.mit.edu/reflections-‐on-‐evergreen-‐cooperatives-‐in-‐cleveland/> 9 Capital Institute. Field Study -‐ The Evergreen Cooperatives of Cleveland. p. 7-‐13. May 2011. < http://www.capitalinstitute.org/capital-‐lab/field-‐guide-‐investing-‐resilient-‐economy/evergreen>

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