Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIUL USE ONLY

Report No. 4931

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

COLOMBIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT(Loan 920-C)

February 10, 1984

Projects DepartmentLatin Ablerica and the Caribbean Regional Office

This document has a restricted dstibution nd may be ued by recipients only in the perfornmance ortheir official duties. Its c"tents m o ohrwise be dWosed withot World Bank anthori2tin.

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FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY

Glossary

ACPO - Popular Cultural Action (Accion Cultural Popular)CASD = Amdliary Centers for Educational Services (Centros Auxiliares

de Servicios Docentes)FONADE = National Fund for Development Projects (Fondo Nacional de

Proyectos de Desarrollo)ICA = Colombian Agrarian Institute (Instituto Colombiano Agrario)ICB = International Competitive BiddingICCE. = Colombian Institute for School Construction (Instituto

Colombiano de Construcciones Escolares)ICFES = Colombian Institute for the Development of Higher Education

(Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de la Educaci6n Superior)INCORA = Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (Instituto Colombiano

de la Reforma Agraria)IZIEM = National Institute of Secondary Education (Instituto Nacional

de Educacion Media)MOE = Ministry of EducationSENA = National Apprenticeship Service (Servicio Naclonal de

Aprendizaje)UINDP = United Nations Development Program

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of |I their official duties Its contents may not otherwise be disdosed without World Bank authorization.

COLOMBIA

LOAN 920-CO

THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

PREFACE . . ..................................... i)

PROJECT DATA SHEET ... ................ . (ii-v)

HIGHLIGHTS ............... ... (vi-vii)

I. INTRODUCTION ...................- ... ... 1

II. PROJECT- BACKGROUND ....... ....................... 1.......

Educational Development Strategy . . 1Project Generation ............................ . .... 1Project Objectives and Content ..................... 3Modification of Project Content ........... ... 5

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .... ......... .................... 7

Overview ......................................... 7Project Management ................................. 8Sites .............................................. 10Design and Supervision of Schools . ............... .. 10Supervision (Civil Works) ..... ..................... 11Civil1 Works ....... ................................. 11Contractors ..... ... 12Furniture and Equipment ..... ................... 12Maintenance ....... ................................. 13Technical Assistance ...... ......................... 14Special Covenants ...... ............................ 16Bank Performance ...... ............................. 17

IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCES ............................. 18

Project Costs ...................................... 18Use of Loan Proceeds ............................... 20

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page No.

V. OPERATION OF PROJECr INSTITUTIONS .................... .. 21

Overview ........................................... 21Attainment of Educational Objectives .............. . 21The Common Facilities Centers Program .... .......... 23

The Purpose of the Common Facilities Centers .. 24Administration of the Common Facilities Centers 24Curriculum of the Common Facilities Centers ... 25The Common Facilities Centers Students ........ 26The Teachers of the Common Facilities Centers.. 26

The Program of The Rural Development Centers ....... 27The Purpose of the Rural Development Centers ....... 27Operating Costs .......... ... ....................... 28

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ................... 29

ANNEX 1 - Implementation Schedule ..... ..................... 35

ANNEX 2 - Actual and Estimated Disbursements ............... 36

ANNEX 3 - Estimated and Actual Project Costs .............. 37

ANNEX 4 - Compliance with Loan Conditions .............. ... 38

AINEX 5 - Means on Selected Achievement Scores and Socio-demographic Variables for Common FacilitiesCenter Students and for Non Common FacilitiesCenter Students Enrolled in Four Courses of Study. 43

ATTACEMENT I - Comments from the Borrower .... ................ 45

This report is based on the findings of a completion mission that visitedColombia in July, 1982. The mission consisted of Messrs. R. Ruiz-Esparza(General Educator), E. Vergara (Architect), M. Botti (Economist, UNESCO) andH. Baritsch (Technical Educator, UNESCO)).

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

COLOMBIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT(LOAN 920-CO)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) of the Third EducationProject in Colombia, for which Loan 920-CO was approved in the amount ofUS$21.2 million on July 19, 1973. The original Closing Date was June 30,1977; the last disbursement was made on August 16, 1982. The remainingbalance in the Loan Account in the amount of US$2,143,786 was cancelled onAugust 13, 1982.

The Completion Report was prepared by the Latin American and Carib-bean Regional Office following a mission to Colombia. The PCR is based on thefindings of the completion mission; reports and other documents in theBank's files that relate to this project including the Appraisal Report (No.1292a-CO) dated July 5, 1973; the record of the Board discussion of thisproject on July 17,1973; and the Loan Agreement (920-CO) dated July 19,1973. The project experience has been discussed with Bank staff associatedwith the Project.

The Operations Evaluation Department decided not to audit theproject and sent copies of the draft PCR to the Government in July 1983. AnEnglish translation of the comments received from the Government is reproducedas Attachment I.

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COLOMBIA

THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 920-CO)

Project Data

A. The Loan

AppralsalEstiwate Actual

Total Project Cost(US$ million) 33.5 29.3

Overrun - -12%

Loan Amount (US$ million) 21.2 19.05

Amount Disbursed(US$ million) 21.2 19.05

Amount Cancelled(US$ million) n.a. 2.14

Date Physical ComponentCompleted 12/76 6/82

Proportion Completed byOriginal CompletionDate 105% 30%

Interest Rate 7.25% 7.25%

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements(US$ million)

Fiscal Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Estimated 0.86 10.0 19.4 21.2 - - - - -

Actual 0.10 3.6 6.5 8.0 8.8 9.5 10.8 13.6 19.0

Actual/Estimated (X) 12 36 33 37 41 45 51 64 90*

* Includes US$1.7 million charged as interest.

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B. Chronology of Events

LoanAgreement Revisions Actual

First Mention in File 1/14/72Government Application 3/21/72Negotiations 5/18/73Board Approval 7/17/73Loan Agreement Date 7/19/73 7/19/73Effective Date 1/20/74 1/20/74Closing Date 6/30/77 12/31/79

12/31/813/31/82 3/31/82

Borrower Republic of ColombiaExecuting Agency Ministry of EducationFollow-on Project Education IV

(US$15 million)

C. Currency Exchange Rate

Name of Currency: Peso (Col)Appraisal Year US$1.00 = Col$ 22.50Intervening Years (Average) US$1.00 = Col$ 40.00Completion Year US$1.00 = Col$ 63.30Fiscal Year = January 1 - December 31

D. Mission Data

Month No. of No. of Staff ReportType of Mission Sent by Year Days a/ Persons b/ Weeks Date

Reconnaissance Bank 1/72 13 3(A,B,C) 7.8 4/28/72Preparation

Reconnaissance Bank 7/72 5 2(B,C) 2.0 9/29/72Pre-Appraisal

Appraisal Bank 11/72 30 5(A,B,C,D,E) 30.0 6/11/72

TOTAL 39.8

a/ Actual work in the field

b/ A - Architect, B - Educator, C - Economist, D - Technical Educator,E - Agricultural Educator.

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Month/ No. of No. of Staff- ReportMission Data Sent by Year Days a/ Persons b/ Weeks DateType of Mission

Total

Supervision I Bank 2/74 2 1(C) 0.4 3/29/742 Bank 10/74 3 1(A) 0.6 1/24/753 Bank 10/75 c/ 2 3(A,B,C) 1.2 12/16/754 Bank 3/76 3 1(A) 0.6 4/08/765 Bank 3/76 d/ 6 2(B,C) 2.4 4/30/766 Bank 9/76 5 2(B,B) 2.0 10/18/767 Bank 11/76 24 2(A,B) 9.6 12/16/768 Bank 2/77 4 2(A) 1.6 2/25/779 Bank 4/77 4 1(B) 0.8 5/31/7710 Bank 3/78 3 1(B) 0.6 5/15/7811 Bank 11/78 4 2(A,B) 1.6 12/18/7812 Bank 2/79 2 2(A) 0.4 3/15/7913 Bank 3/79 4 1(B) 0.8 4/17/7914 Bank 2/79 5 1(A) 1.0 4/27/8215 Bank 7/79 12 2(B,B) 4.8 9/04/7916 Bank 11/79 3 1(A) 0.6 2/08/8017 Bank 5/80 6 1(B) 1.2 6/30/8018 Bank 11/80 1 1(B) 0.2 12/11/8019 Bank 9/81 9 1(A) 1.8 11/6/8120 Bank 3/82 5 1(B) 1.0 3/26/82

Sub-Total: 33.2

Completion Bank 6/82 15 4(A,B,C,D) 12.0

TOTAL 45.2

a/ Actual work in the field.b/ A - Architect, B - Educator, C- Economist, D - Technical Educator,

E - Agricultural Educator.c/ One year gap due to reluctance of Government to receive Bank missions.

During that year, the Government was planning educational reformmeasures and contemplating modifications in the project.

d/ This was a speciai mission to discuss the Government's proposal tomodify the project.

1~~~~~~~~~~~~

E. Allocation of Loan Proceeds

(US$)

Original Revision Revision ActualCategory Allocation (4-6-77) (12-7-81) Disbursement

I. Furniture and 9,800,000 10,500,000 10,695,285 10,314,664.90Equipment

II. Project Adminis- 4,400,000 5,000,000 7,725,513 5,975,635.79tration, Profes-sional Services(other than underCategory IV) andCivil Works (otherthan under CategoryIII)

III. Civil Works for 350,000 350,000 320,000 309,291.58Rural DevelopmentServices' Centers

IV. Technical Assis- 1,050,000 632,000 632,000 631,999.21tance ACPO Contract

V. Preparation of Proj- 30,000 27,421.25ect CompletionReport (Added(12/7/81)

VI. Interest and other 1,600,000 2,000,000 1,797,202 1,797,201.23Charges

VII. Unallocated 4,000,000 2,718,000 - 0 - - 0 -

Amount disbursed 19,056,213.96

Cancelled 2,143,786.04

TOTAL 21,200,000 21,200,000 21,200,000 21,200,000.00

COLOMBIA

THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 920-CO)

Highlights

A Loan of US$21.1 million equivalent to assist in financing theThird Education Project in Colombia was approved and signed on July 19,1973. Total project costs were estimated at US$33.5 million. The projectincluded the building and equipping of 20 Common Facilities Centers, 13 RuralDevelopment Centers, the expansion of one rural Development Services Centerat Las Gaviotas, technical assistance and a teacher training program. Itsmain objective concentrated on the improvement and expansion of diversifiedsecondary education in medium-sized cities and rural areas. Other objectivesincluded the improvement of training for technical education teachers,preparing education sector studies to strengthen the capacity for educationalplanning and strengthening rural development capability by improving thefacilities of the Las Gaviotas Rural Development Services Center.

The project has been completed after undergoing significant changesduring the implementation process in 1977 and less significant modificationsin 1981. Completion was delayed by almost five years. The Loan was notcompletely disbursed, and a remaining loan balance of US$2.1 million wascancelled. Total project costs amounted to US$29.3 million which is 12Xbelow the appraisal estimate of US$33.5 million owing to reductions inproject scope.

implementation was delayed by:

(a) significant policy changes enacted into law by a new governmentthat assumed power within eight months after the date ofeffectiveness and which suspended implementation for almost twoyears while the policy changes were being processed;

(b) periodic shortages of counterpart funds; and

(c) weak project management.

In 1977 the government proposed modification in project scope whichthe Bank eventually accepted. As a result of these modifications thestructures of the Common Facilities Centers and Rural Development Centerswere altered, the sector studies were deleted, and the teacher trainingprogram was reduced. These changes did not result in obtaining a greaterdegree of support for the project on the part of the government, and in 1978the government proposed to cancel a significant portion of tne project.Before the proposal was resolved a new government assumed office andcommitted itself to implement the project. The changes that were effected in1981 reduced the number of Common Facilities Centers from 23 to 20 anddeleted the rural satellite schools that were associated with the 13 RuralDevelopment Centers.

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The experience of implementing this project points out theimportance of the following matters:

(a) The risk of implementation delays when a government'seducational priorities change (paras. 6.01 and 6.04).

(b) The need for flexibility in project content and objectives so thatchanges can be accommodated during implementation (para. 6.06).

Cc) The need to synchronize technical assistance, teacher training andequipment procurement with construction; when construction isdelayed, they should be rescheduled (paras. 6.06, 6.08 and 6.16).

(d) The difficulty in giving proper attention (either by the Governmentor the Bank) to the implementation of components outside the mainfocus of the project (paras. 6.07 and 6.09).

The main finding is that the project has succeeded in establishingthe Common Facilities Centers as a viable alternative for extendingdiversified education in urban areas. It appears that the centralizedworkshops and science laboratories do provide a less costly way to supplydiversified secondary education in areas where large new secondary schoolsare not feasible.

The Rural Development Centers have not met with success because ofpolicy changes that have been made during the implementation period and weakmanagement of this component.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.01 This Project Completion Report (PCR) is based on the findings of acompletion mission that visited Colombia from June 29 to July 17, 1982. Themission consisted of four members who together used a total of 52 staff/daysin the field.

1.02 A PCR was prepared by a private consultant contracted for thatpurpose by the Borrower between March and June, 1982. However, that PCR wasfound unacceptable by the Borrower on the grounds that it was too critical ofthe project implementation process. The Bank's PCR was, therefore, preparedwithout the benefit of ;4 Borrower prepared PCR.

II. PROJECT BACKGROUND

Educational Development Strategy

2.01 The Government's strategy for educational development in the late1960s ascribed a high priority to reforming secondary education through theIntroduction and extension of a diversified curriculum. 1/ That priority ledthe Government to seek, and obtain, the Bank's financial7 assistance for theFirst and Second Education Projects. Those two projects produced 19diversified secondary schools (INEMs, Institutos Nacionales de EducacionMedia) between 1970-1975. Since those schools were located in the largercities, the Government saw the need to take the next step in fulfillment ofits policy by extending diversified secondary education to existing schoolsin medium-sized cities and, through new schools, to rural areas.

2.02 This educational strategy also sought to bring about a greaterintegration of the five-year primary cycle with the lower four-year cycle ofdiversified secondary education. 2/ By effecting such an integration theCovernment sought to increase the length of basic education for all childrenfrom five to nine years.

Project Generation

2.03 Project development progressed from the first reconnaissancemission to Board approval in 18 months. In January 1972, a Bankreconnaissance mission visited Colombia in response to the Government's

1/ Diversified secondary education, which is synonymous with comprehensivesecondary education, integrates practical and academic subjects into abalanced general education program that prepares students for a broadrange of possibilities in employment and further training.

2/ The Colombian pre-university system of education consisted of 5 years ofprimary (grades 1-5) and 6 years of the secondary education which wasdivided into 4 years of a basic cycle and 2 years of an upper cycle.

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expressed interest in a Third Education Project. 3/ The Government's initialrequest for Bank assistance included:

(a) fifty Common Facilities Centers (Centros Auxiliares de ServiciosDocentes, CASDs) to extend diversified secondary education to urbancenters;

(b) thirty rural comprehensive schools to extend diversified educationto rural areas;

(c) improvement of the quality and supply of technical educationteachers; and

(d) faculty training and other needs in post-secondary and highereducation.

2.04 Through the first reconnaissance mission the Bank and the Borroweragreed to:

(a) continue supporting the reform of secondary education through thethird project; and

(b) prepare a project consisting of 50 Common Facilities Centers, 10comprehensive rural schools, expansion of technical teachertrailing, and technical assistance.

The Bank decided to limit itself to secondary education because that was theonly level of education where the Government was actively implementingreform, and the third project was seen as a follow-up to the previous twoBank-financed projects.

2.05 Project preparation was to be accomplished between January and Juneof 1972 by a task force of the Ministry of Education (MOE), but that work wanot completed until the arrival of the appraisal mission in November 1972.The delay in preparation was caused by changes in high level personnel of theMOE including the Minister, and ineffective coordination among the variousagencies that would participate in the project. During preparation the MDEreduced the number of Common Facilities Centers from 50 to 25 and increasedthe number of rural schools from 10 to 13. This overall reduction was madeto keep the project within available financial resources.

2.06 When the project was appraised in November, the number of CommonFacilities Centers was reduced from 25 to 24 because one of the proposedCenters (Arauca) was of uneconomic size and could not be justified. Also,two new components were added:

(a) the extension of the Rural Development Services Center of LasGaviotas; and

3/ At that time Colombia was implementing two consecutive Bank-financedsecondary education projects under Loans 552-CO-and 679-CO with the aim ofimplementing the first phase of a reform of secondary education.

(b) assistance to conduct a sector survey and a series of sectorstudies.

The appraisal also established that, as a condition of effectiveness, theBorrower would submit to the Bank a detailed plan for implementing thetechnical teachers training program.

2.07 Negotiations were held in May 1973, followed by Board approval inJuly. However, it was not until January 9, 1974, that the loan becameeffective because the Colombian institute responsible for preparing theteacher training implementation plan had difficulty in getting technicalassistance for the task. The institute also had difficulty in organizing thetask force that ultimately developed the plan.

Project Objectives and Content

2.08 The project started with five general objectives that were toassist the Government to:

(a) implement its pollcy of extending diversified secondaryeducation by constructing, equipping and furnishing:

Wi) 24 common facilities centers (grades 6-11);

(ii) 13 rural :omprehensive schools (grades 6-9); and

(b) establish a training program at four regional centers for2,000 technical teachers;

Cc) improve the provision of services for rural development byextending the Rural Development Services' Center of LasGaviotas and linking Las Gaviotas with three satellite centersthat would be established in the Las Gaviotas area;

(d) assist in conducting an educational sector survey and specificsector studies to help the MOE with future educationalplanning; and

(e) provide technical assistance to carry out those projectcomponents listed under (b) and (c) above.

2.09 Xlrhile the main thrust of the project was on the improvement ofeducational quality and opportunity, the new facilities also providedadditional enrollment capacity as shown in the table that follows:

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Project School Enrollment Capacity

Additional BoardingGrades Number Enrollment Places

Common Facilities Centers 6-11 24 108,900 a/ I0-Rural Comprehensive Schools 6-9 13 7,000 1,700Rural Development Services'

Center 1-5 1 500 300Technical Teacher Training

Centers Post- 4 900 -0-Secondary

42 117,280 2,000

a/ This figure represented the total number of students that the centerswould serve, but 69,500 of those students were already enrolled insatellite schools. The remaining 39,400 were supposed to be new placesmade available at the satellite schools by the part-time attendance ofstudents at the Common Facilities Centers.

2 .10 The 24 Common Facilities Centers were to provide workshops,laboratories and student counseling services on a part-time basis to studentsfrom surrounding satellite schools that lacked such services. Each Centerwas to serve from two to six satellite secondary schools and the enrollmentswould be from 2,100 to 5,700 students. This was aimed at increasing thenational preparation of secondary students in diversified education from 4%to 15% by 1980.

2.11 The 13 Rural Comprehensive Schools were to be part of 39 suchschools that the Government intended to create throughout the country inorder to extend diversified secondary education to the rural areas. Theseschools were to cover only the first four years (grades 6-9) of the regularsix-year secondary program because the relatively small number of secondarystudents in the rural areas did not justify establishing schools with thediversified upper cycle (grades 10-11). The vocational orientation at theseschools were to be in agriculture, and serve as focal points for ruraldevelopment by offering a variety of services and training programs in adulteducation, community leadership, adult agricultural production, health andsanitation. In addition, the schools were intended to promote theimprovement of primary education in their respective zones of influence byproviding satellite schools with supervision, material assistance andin-service teacher training.

2.12 Since the Common Facilities Centers and the rural comprehensiveschools would require vocational teachers when the supply of such teacherswas practically non-existent, the project provided supplementary equipment tocarry out a training program for 2,000 teachers of industrial and othervocational subjects. The program was to be planned and coordinated by theColombian Institute for the Development of Higher Education (ICFES) andimplemented through a coordinated effort involving four regionaluniversities, technical schools, polytechnical institutes, and the NationalApprenticeship Service (SENA). This program was to serve various types ofdiversified secondary schools, not just the project schools.

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2.13 The project provided for the extension of facilities at the RuralDevelopment Center of Las Gaviotas and the establishment of three satellitecenters in that area. Las Gaviotas and its three satellites were to provideagricultural, educational, health, general supply and communication servicesto an estimated 1,100 to 2,000 families that were settling in an area ofabout 50,000 Km. Las Gaviotas was also meant to conduct research andexperimentation in various aspects of rural development with an emphasis onappropriate technology.

2.14 The sector survey that was included in the project was designed toassist the Government to evaluate the status of its educational system andformulate policies and priorities for its future development. Sector studieswere included in the project with the aim of helping to identify areas thatwould merit future Bank lending. Those areas included manpower needs,assessment of the INEM programs, and production of simple equipment and otherlearning materials.

2.15 Technical assistance for the project provided for 40 staff-years ofspecialists which were to be provided through the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) at an estimated cost of US$1.5 million. This assistance wasto be directed at strengthening educational administration, educationalplanning, vorational supervision, industrial and agricultural instruction,and developing programs for rural comprehensive schools and technical teachertraining. A non--governmental Colombian agency, Accion Cultural Popular(ACPO), was designated to organize and supervise the educational extensionservice of the rural comprehensive schools and to train its personnel.Lastly, an evaluation of the project was to be based in part on a tracersystem that would involve the students of the project schools and arepresentative group of students from traditional secondary schools.

Modification of Project Content

2.16 Project content underwent significant modification duringimplementation due to changes in educational policies and priorities andfinancial constraints. These modifications took place in 1977 and 1981 andare outlined in the table that follows:

Changes in Project Content

Content at First Second andAppraisal Revision 1977 Final Revision 1981

(No change in (No change inLoan Amount) Loan Amount)

(a) 24 Common Facilities 23 Centers 20 Centers (gradesCenters (grades 6-11) (grades 10-11) 10-11) for 11,970for 20,000 student for 14,250 student places toplaces to serve student places serve 130 existing91 existing schools. to serve 150 schools. (The

existing schools. Government statedits intention tobuild the 3 remain-ing Centers withits own resources.

(b) 13 Rural Comprehensive 13 Rural Development 13 Rural Devel-School (grades 6-9) Centers for 2,600 opment Centersfor 7,000 student places. student places (grades converted to

1-5 with conversion grades 6-9 under-to 6-9 to be done way with mostgradually), satellite schools already atsystem of 96 new 6-8. Satelliteprimary schools, 462 system was de-extension units for leted.348 existing primaryschools, 117 teachers'houses.

(c) Training for 2,000 Training for 2,000 No change.technical teachers technical teachersthrough ICFES in 4 through trainingregional centers. agency of MOE.

(d) Expansion of existing No change in Loan Expansion of LasRural Development Agreement but by 1979 Gaviotas, satel-Services Center of Las Borrower expressed lite centersGaviotas and establis- intention to discard deleted.ment of three satellite two of the satellitecenters (para. 2.13). centers.

(e) Preparation of a sector Deleted. No change.survey and three sectorstudies under ICFES andMOE.

(f) Technical assistance No change with regard No change.provided by ACPO to to ACPO.organize and super-vise an educationextension service andtrain personnel ofthat service. Sector survey and No change.Although not men- studies were deletedtioned in Loan Agree- from the technicalment UNDP was to pro- assistance plan.vide 40 staff-years oftechnical assistance.

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2.17 The project content revisions made in 1977 were mDtivated byeducational reform legislation enacted in December 1975 and January 1976.That legislation (Law 43, and Decree-Laws 102, 088 and 089) restructured theMOE and several autonomous educational entities, decentralized educationaladministration, revised the system of educational finance, restructuredprimary and secondary educational levels and revised their curricula. Thenew structure for pre-university education became:

Pre-School - for children under six years of ageBasic - Grades 1-9Middle Vocational - Grades 10-11Intermediate Professional - Grades 12-13 (post-secondary)

2.18 The size of each of the 13 Rural Comprehensive Schools was reducedand the Centers were converted to Rural Develoment Centers serving as primaryschools centers, because in those areas primary education opportunities wereconsidered so limited that they would not provide sufficient graduates forthe originally proposed secondary schools. It was agreed, however, that whenprimary demands were met, the schools cou'! be converted or extended for useas lower secondary schools. At the time of appraisal it was foreseen thatthe student catchment area would have to be large for each school, anddormitory and transportation facilities were planned accordingly. By 1977,however, the Government had changed its position on this matter and wantedsmaller primary schools to serve smaller catchment areas without dormitoryand transportation facilities.

2.19 As regards the revision of the teacher training program, ICFESwithdrew from its commitment to the project because of financialconstraints. The MOE agreed to absorb this part of the program. ICFES alsowithdrew from its commitment to the sector survey and sector studies andthese were deleted from the project. The reasons for this included: thenew Government did not think the studies merited a high priority andfinancial constraints.

2.20 All of the changes made in project content in 1981 were based onfinancial constraints affecting the Borrower.

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Overview

3.01 The project required 8.75 years for completion instead of theoriginal estimate of 4 years. Implementation delays were primarily causedby:

(a) significant policy changes enacted into law by a new govenment thatsuspended project implementation for almost two years on thegrounds that project content was not consistent with newlydetermined priorities;

(b) periodic shortages of counterpart funds; and

(c) weak project.

3.02 Within eight months after the loan had become effective a newlyelected Government assumed power and implementation, which had been slow fromthe start, slowed dowa even more due to changes in the top level personnel inagencies associated with the project. During its first 18 months in officethe Government enacted educational reform measures (para. 2.17) which alteredpreviously established priorities. This led the Government to suspendimplementation in mid-1975 until the project could be modified. Agreement onproject revision was reached between the Bank and the Government in 1977. Bythat time (1977) only 36% of the Loan had been disbursed.

3.03 Implementation continued at a slow pace and in May 1978 (threemonths before its term was to expire) the Government requested the Bank toagree to a sharp reduction in the scope of the project (deleting all but 8 ofthe Common Facilities Centers) and the cancellation of the balance of theLoan (estimated at US$12.3 million) on the grounds that the project was notconsistent with priorities and development strategies of the Government.This matter went unresolved until December 1978, four months after a newGovernment came into office, when the Government withdrew its request forcancellation and agreed to proceed with implementation but asked for, andreceived, an extension of the Closing Date to December 31, 1981. Between1978 and 1981 project implementation improved significantly, but delays wereencountered periodically due to shortages of counterpart funds and weakmanagement. However, by 1980 it became clear that financial constraintswould keep the Government from completing all components by the Closing Date,but a formal request to reduce project scope was not submitted to the Bankuntil July 1981. Agreement on the requested reduction of the project wasreached, and the closing date was extended a third time to March 31, 1982, bywhich time project completion was accomplished.

Project Management

3.04 The Instituto Colombiano de Construcciones Escolares (ICCE) is asemi-autonomous agency of the MOE. It has a staff of 917 employees andmaintains 26 regional offices located throughout the country. Its mission isto plan and manage the national programs for school construction and theprocurement of school furniture and equipment. In 1969 the agency was chosento implement the First Education Project financed by the Bank and later italso served as the PIU for the Second Education Project. ICCE's overallimplementation performance for the two projects was generally good.

3.05 In recognition of its past project implementation experience, theGovernment, in agreement with the Bank, designated ICCE as the executingagency for most of the project. Bowever, contrary to the appraisal mission'srecommendation that ICCE be the only agency responsible for theadministration, coordination and supervision of the entire project (SARpara. 6.01), the Loan Agreement placed under ACPO the component related tothe education extension service (to be guided and supervised by the MOE), anddesignated the Fondo Nacional de Proyectos de Desarrollo (FONADE) tosupervise the preparation of the sector studies.

3.06 During the first year of project implementation (1973/74), ICCE andthe MOE were effective in getting the project started, but for the rest ofthe project's life (1974-1982) management was weak for the following reasons:

(a) Implementation responsibility and authority was concentrated in theoffice of ICCE's Director General, but he and his top levelmanagers were unable to concentrate properly on the Bank's projectwhich represented only about 15% of ICCE's total budget for capitalinvestment in the period 1976-82. In short, throughout mDst of theimplementation period the project did not receive the high priorityattention from ICCE that had been expected by the Bank. The Bank'sefforts to improve this situation were successful for short periodsof time, but a lasting resolution of this issue was not achieved.

(b) Staff turnover during the nine-year implementation period resultedin changing the director general four times, and caused instabilityamong key staff members.

(c) In 1976, ICCE's pedagogical group was disbanded and tne MOE tookalmost a year to establish separate units to guide theimplementation of the educational programs for the Common FacilityCenters and Rural Development Centers. Those units were finallygiven legal status in 1979 but their coordination with ICCE wasconsistently weak.

(d) Financial constraints of the Borrower made it difficult for theMinistry of Finance to provide counterpart funds on time. 4/Since this was a matter of priorities, the Government wasill-advised in not giving the project the financial support thathad been promised because it jeopardized the success of the projectand the investment that it represented.

3.07 Project coordination between ICCE and the other agencies thatshared implementation responsibilites was consistently weak throughout thelife of the project. 5/ The Bank's recommendations to ICCE and the MOE forstrengthening coordination were not followed. Those recommendations includedalternatives such as creating a coordinating committee or assigning specificcoordination functions to key staff members. In 1976, when the MOE wasreorganized and ICCE's pedagogical group was abolished, project coordinationbetween ICCE and the MOE became even weaker as ICCE's management insistedthat it had no authority over the staff of the MOE that was eventuallyassigned to work on the educational components. In addition to hinderingimplementation, this lack of effective project coordination also createdproblems in the process of reporting project progress to the Bank. Progressreports to the Bank were consistently late and incomplete from 1975 onward.

3.08 Most managerial problems could have been substantially reduced byconcentrating project implementation under a small coordinating office,working exclusively for the project, and being responsible for theadministration of project funds independently of ICCE's experience inimplementing the previous two projets. In retrospect, it is evident that theexperience factors was offset by such things as changes in top levelpersonnel, a project that required more coordination than the previous twoprojects, and organizational changes within the MOE and ICCE. To this mustbe added the lack of solid support for the project manifested by theGovernment during most of the period 1975-78, which led to a Governmentrequest for project cancellation. That request was eventually withdrawnafter a new Government came to office and presided over the implementation of

4/ The Borrower agreed with this (see Attachment I, para. 2).

5/ The Borrower acknowledged that coordination was faulty (see Attachment I,para. 3).

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most of the project from 1978 to 1982, but even during that period ICCE'smanagement of the project showed the weakness already cited.

Sites

3.09 By July 1973 practically all sites for Common Facilities Centers andRural Development Centers had been selected; however, the 1976 revision ofthe project required the selection of four new sites for Common FacilitiesCenters that replaced original locations included in the SAR. Selection oftowns and neighborhoods included in the project was accomplished at an earlystage because a substantial number of poor urban areas lacking secondaryschool services had been identified during project preparation. However,good sites within those urban areas were difficult to find due to:

(a) legal limitations which preclude ICCE from buying land; and

(b) financial constraints of donors (departmental or municipalgovernments) that provided poor sites that generally createdproblems; for example:

(i) the poor quality of soils in Cartagena and Sincelejo requiredunusual and costly reinforcement to foundations and structuralsupport of floors at ground level;

(ii) suburbs poorly served by public transport and access roads inbad condition (Fanja, Pasto, Quibd'o); and

(iii) suburbs with public security risks (Medellin, Ibague andVillavicencio).

3.10 Although in future projects, site-related problems would beminimized owing to the current Bank policy which requires readiness forproject Implementation at the time of appraisal, the quality of sites shouldbe assured by including site acquisition in the cost of the project, so theGovernment would be prepared to meet all necessary expenditures.

Design and Supervision of Schools

3.11 During implementation of the First and Second Education ProjectsICCE strengthened its architectural office by 1972 and enough manpower forundertaking the preparation of the third project, including the design of all24 Common Facilities Centers and 13 Rural Development Centers. Designs fullyprepared in 1973/74 were discarded in 1976 following the project revision,and a second set of designs was prepared in 1978-80. Designs met theeducational purposes for which they were envisaged; pre-vocational occupationorientation for the Common Facilities Centers and secondary education for theRural Development Centers.

3.12 Schedules of accommodation for the Rural Centers were drasticallyreduced in the 1976 revision. The reduction was beneficial because designswhich are based on a modular system became more simple and coherent with thecurrent educational structure. This modest approach has proven to be good.There are two large and complex non-project Rural Development Centers(similar to those originally included in the project) that have been plaguedwith problems, including critical levels of underutilization. Most project

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Rural Centers would require to be expanded soon, but size of expansionsshould be regulated by school mapping (para. 3.11).

3.13 In regard to the Common Facilities Centers, designs reflect littleor no improvement on what was prepared for INEMs under projects I and II.The reasons for this situation are mainly:

(a) most benefits from direct experience of previous projects have beenlost due to staff turnover (para. 3.06); and

(b) poor client/architect communication between the MOE and ICCE,particularly after the elimination of ICCE's pedagogical division.

There were problems of inconsistency between schedules of accommodation(revised by ICCE) and curricula designed by the MOE reflecting poorcoordination between the MOE and ICCE. For example, in the construction ofthe first group of eight Common Facilities Centers, ICCE included workingareas for carpentry, while the HOE was excluding carpentry from thecurriculum. However, it was possible to resolve this and similar problemsbecause the design of buildings was flexible enough to allow for the economicconversion of facilities for current curriculum requirements.

Supervision (Civil Works)

3.14 ICCE's supervision of construction works operates at five levels,two staff positions in the field (a field engineer/architect and a regionalmanager) and three in Bogota headquarters (a division chief, an assistantdirector for construction and the director general). Although stafffunctions and responsiblities at each level are clearly defined, mostdivisions of the field staff are actually designated at higher levels,undermining authority of field staff who tend to approach issues with extremecaution. This weakness appears at all levels, so the owner/contractorrelationship is not effective enough to maintain performance of contractorswithin good quality standards. In sum, supervision of civil works was lessthan effective and resulted in the development of various problems (para.3.17).

Civil Works

3.15 As specified in the Loan Agreement, the Borrower initially calledfor International Competitive Bidding (ICB) to award construction contracts,but there was only a minimal response from Colombian firms of any consequenceand none from foreign firms. To remedy this, ICCE decided to use a revisedversion of the official local bidding procedures for the project instead ofsetting up a separate bidding method based exclusively on Bank guidelines.The main aspects of the revised bidding procedures were:

(a) pre-qualification requirements on the basis of financial, legal andgross volume of productivity standards which generally yielded agroup of 80 firms out of about 300 contractors; and

(b) bid evaluation included the comparison of each bid with an officialestimate (as required in local bidding). Generally, about 5OZ ofbids were rejected because they failed to satisfy all conditions.

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Contrisetors

3.16 Although ICCE was unable to provide timely financing of itsconstruction program, constructors were generally cooperative in continuingto carry out the terms of their contracts. However, construction workmanshipwas generally mediocre, due in part to the weakness of ICCE's supervisionprogram and/or inadequate specifications. In the Common Facilities Centers,the mission observed the construction problems that follow:

(a) rainwater seepage in 50% of the walls that have a northernexposure, because joints in the brickwork are not water-tight;

(b) in Ibague, roof gutters receiving rainwater from two cotr,;rg5nglevels leak due to faulty workmanship;

(c) in Cali, tile roofing is defective and rainwater leaks into 30% ofthe rooms;

(d) in Medellin, one of the structural columns is out of line; and

(e) in Sabanalarga, the lowered windows of the auditorium are bendingand falling out.

ICCE is attempting to have the contractors repair all known cases ofdefective workmanship before the liability periods expire, but its cumbersomeprocedures for dealing with such matters are time-consuming and oftenineffective.

Furniture and Equipment

3.17 The procurement of furniture encountered only minor problems, andthe quality of that furniture is generally good. However, the procurement ofequipment bad major problems that developed at an early stage of projectimplementation. These problems were mainly due to the poor coordinationbetween the MOE and ICCE, the decision to purchase over half of the equipmentwhen school construction had barely begun, and underestimating the complexityof storing so much equipment.

3.18 Taking into account the ill-timed and deficient supply of equipmentfor the INEMs under two previous projects, at the time of project appraisalthe Borrower and the Bank recognized the need to strengthen the procurementunit in ICCE. Therefore, steps were taken to upgrade the position of theprocurement officer to the level of an assistant director and to provideadditional staff. This move did little to improve procurement for theproject, however, because the procurement unit handled the nationalprocurement program for ICCE and the project was only a part of that program.

3.19 The first package of equipment to be procured was for theimplementation of the Teacher Training Program. Actions regarding thismatter were closely monitored by the Bank, which on several occasions urgedICCE to accelerate procurement of that equipment. ICCE responded bypreparing architectural designs and equipment lists for all 24 CommonFacilities Centers and proposed the procurement of about 60% of the equipment

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for both programs and Rural.Secondary Schools. ICCE also proposed plans forstarting the Common Facilities Centers construction program, and the Bankaccepted both proposal.

3.20 In late 1974 when the Borrower began to consider revising theproject, counterpart funds were sharply reduced and implementation sloweddown. This coincided with the adoption of Government regulations which endedICCE's privilege of import tax exemptions. Also, by 1975 educational reformmeasures were being taken that would alter the organization of the CommonFacilities Centers and Rural Centers. These unforeseen developments had thefollowing adverse effects on the first phase of equipment procurement:

(a) most of the equipment arrived at the port of Barranquilla in 1976,where it remained for almost a year because ICCE did not have thefunds to pay the required taxes and customs fees;

(b) while in customs, the equipment suffered from corrosion andpilferage and ICCE reported that the loss was estimated at 2U,however, the loss is suspected of having been higher (about 5%). Amore accurate review of the losses was hindered by incompleteinventory records; and

xc) about 10% of the equipment procured was no longer needed in theCommon Facilities Centers by 1976 because of the curricular andschool organizational changes that had been effected by theGovernment's reform measures. Eventually, that equipment wasdistributed to the satellite schools of the Common FacilitiesCenters where it is being well used. Altogether, it is estimatedthat about 10% of the funds spent on the first equipmentprocurement may be considered as wasted.

3.21 In 1981, ICCE determined the balance of equipment and consumablematerials required for the 20 Secondary Centers and 13 Rural Primary Centersas well as the equipment surplus available for distribution to schoolsassociated with the Common Facilities Centers. Procurement of this secondphase, amounting to US$3.2 million, was carried out within the last fourmonths of project implementation and most of the equipment had arrived byJuly 1982. Delivery to the schools was expected to be completed by September1982.

Maintenance

3.22 The Colombian educational system has very limited resources for themaintenance of physical plant and equipment. Most preventive and routinemaintenance is under the responsibility of each institution, which isallocated a relatively small amount of funds for maintenance in its annualbudget. In 1982 the 11 Common Facilities Centers that are in operationreceived a total allocation of US$78,600 for maintenance, which represents15% of the total annual budget per school. Furniture and equipment ofproject institutions has not required major maintenance because most of ithas only had two or three years of use. Service to equipment carried outunder contract has proved to be successful (as in the case of Medelln whereclassroom typewriters, that on the average have a weekly use of 50 hours, areserviced regularly by contractors and remain in good condition). Buildings

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of project institutions are new and do not require maintenance now. However,in a few years the need for maintenance is expected to increase substantiallybecause inflation has resulted in the selection of more economicalspecifications, which reduced the initial cost but will acceleratemaintenance expenditures. For example, wall paint in the last group ofCommon Facilities Centers to be built is not of the washable type and willrequire replacement about 50Z sooner (5-6 years) than it would take forbetter quality wall paint. Expeditious maintenance during the liabilityperiod is an unresolved problem. The MOE should undertake a study in orderto determine the real cost of maintenance of physical facilities and takeaction for implementing it. It is well to point out that on the average mostequipment installed in project schools should be replaced in less than tenyears. The Borrower has no provisions for making such replacements possiblebecause the necessary financial resources are simply not available.

Technical Assistance

3.23 Technical assistance for project implementation consisted of twoparts:

(a) assistance provided by the UNDP for strengthening educationaladministration and planning, staff training; and

(b) assistance provided by ACPO to organize and supervise extensionservice for the rural schools and train its personnel.

The UNDP in Colombia agreed to absorb a portion of the technical assistancerequirements of the project in its Country Program for the period 1972-76.The total UNDP allocation to the education sector was about US$6.0 millionfor the four year period, of which about US$1.5 million was designated tocover the cost of 40 staff-years of technical assistance and relatedequipment for the project. UNESCO served as the executing agency for theprogram for the entire sector which initially consisted of 11 subprograms in1973, but was reduced to 8 subprograms in 1975 due to financial constraints.However, only about half of those subprograms offered technical assistancerelated to the project. A summary of the project related subprograms asrevised in 1975 and implemented by 1976 follows.

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UNESCO-UNDP Technical Assistance Project Related Program (1975/76)

(USS '000)

Project Subprogram Revised (1975) ImplementedObjective Title Cost S-Months Cost S-Months

Strengthen Admin. Administration 455.5 99.3 141.4 25.3and Planning and Planning of

Education

Develop syllabi Education Research 250.0 42.0 207.0 42.0for industrial/agriculturesubjects

Develop programs "Concentraciones 675.0 95.4 704.8 189.7for rural second- de desarrolloary schools rural'

Organize vocation- Human Resources 1,590.0 391.0 1,185.9 267.0al educ. super- Developmentvisory serviceand developcurricula fortechnical teachertraining

TOTAL 4 subprograms 2,970.5 627.7 2,239.1 482.0(40.1Staff-

Yrs.)

3.24 The technical assistance program outlined above also benefitednon-project schools, i.e., INEM schools of the first and second educationprojects, other rural development centers (about 26), secondary agriculturalinstitutes, other technical schools, polythechnic institutes and the MOE.Due to the lack of data, It is not possible to quantify the specific amountof that technical assistance that went directly to the various elements ofthe project.

3.25 Although the implementation of this technical assistance programwas generally successful, little evidence remalns to indleate that It had anysignificant effect on the project ltself. This was due to the fact that itsimplementation coincided with the period when project implementation waseither progressing slowly (1974) or was suspended by the Covernment(197511976). Thus the project, which actually did not start making headvayuntil 1978/1979, could not garner the desired benefits fro, that portion ofthe technical assistance program.

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3.26 The same fate befell the second part of the technical assistanceprogram which involved ACPO, a non-governmental agency of Colombia,contracted by the MOE in October 1973 to render specific services to theRural Development Centers. Between 1973 and 1976, ACPO fulfilled itscontract by:

(a) providing 149 courses for 'campesinos" on health, agriculture andrural community development;

(b) giving rural community leadership training to 448 -campesinos- atACPO's headquarters in Sutatenza;

(c) acquiring and equipping three mobile units (ACPO-mobiles) thatvisited about 383 rural communities touching about 75,000 personswith instructional programs covering health, sanitation, communitydevelopment, farming and domestic science; and

Cd) providing 15,000 hours of radio instruction for rural dwellersthrough Radio Sutatenza, AC20's powerful radio network.

3.27 Had project implementation progressed according to the appraisedschedule, ACPO's technical assistance program would have greatly benefitedthe Rural Development Centers. However, in 1976 when ACPO completed itscontract none of the project schools had been completed; thus the effects ofthe program simply vanished. ACPO tried to extend its contract when itbecame clear in 1976 that the construction of the rural comprehensive schoolswas seriously behind schedule, but the MOE refused the extension because bythat time the Government's policy toward non-governmental agencies involvedin Government projects had changed.

Special Covenants

3.28 The Loan Agreement covenants that received less than fullcompliance are listed below. A detailed listing of compliance with covenantsis shown in Annex 4.

(a) Section 3.01(b)(i)-Design, construct, furnish and equip 20 CommonFacilities Centers. Almost all of the Centers were completed, butone was only balf done by the Closing Date. The reason for thiswas the unusually long time required to acquire a site for theCenter in Cartagena.

(b) Section 3.01(b)(iv)-Conduct a Technical Teacher Training Programfor about 2,000 technical teachers. The Technical Teacher TrainingProgram was not implemented as originally planned. It was carriedout before the schools were constructed and staff was appointed,thus its value to the schools is questionable. A more modestprogram was subsequently carried out for teachers as the schoolsopened.

Cc) Section 3.05(a)-The Borrower shall appoint qualified directors forthe Common Facilities Centers and the Rural Development Centers atleast six months before the Centers open. Although qualifiedpersons are being appointed to the project schools in al-I cases,

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their appointment is usually not made six months prior to theopening of the given center. The main reason for this is that theMOE usually lacks the necessary funds to make the appointments withmuch lead-time.

(d) Section 4.03(b)-The Borrower shall maintain adequate insurance onbuildings and facilities of the project. Insurance policiescovering the buildings and facilities have not been acquired.Financial constraints and the lack of regulations related toinsurance for school premises are the reasons for non-compliance.

(e) Section 4.05-Close relationship shall be established between RuralDevelopment Centers and INCORA, ICA, SENA, and other developmentagencies. Close relationships were never established between eachRural Development Center and INCORA, ICA, SENA, ACPO and otheragencies of the Borrower. Those relationships have been weak andsporadic at best.

(f) Section 4.07-Establish and maintain a Vocational EducationSupervisory Service. The vocational education extension servicewas established as a function of the supervisory section of theHOE, but with the reorganization of the MOE in 1976 the servicelost its identity and its functions were sub-divided into the twosupervisory sections that manage the programs for the INEM schoolsand the Common Facilities Centers.

3.29 The Bank should remind the Borrower about the need to comply withthose covenants for which compliance is still possible, i.e., completion ofthe Cartagena Center, finding a way to provide basic insurance coverage onbuildings, and strengthening vocational supervision for the Common FacilitiesCenters.

Bank Performance

3.30 The Bank was prompt in developing the project from identificationto Board approval (18) months. During its implementation the project wasvisited by a total of 20 supervision missions representing 33.2 staff-weeksof effort. Almost alU of the missions (19) were staffed by either educators,architects or both and their frequency was at least two missions per yearexcept in 1975 and 1981. 6/ There was good continuity of staff involvement,

6/ In 1975 only one supervision mission was carried out because the Borrowerwas not prepared to receive other missions that were proposed by theBank. This was during the period when the Government had suspendedimplementation. In 1981 there was only one supervision mission inSeptember; but that was considered sufficient since the project wasnearing its closing date.

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as the same architect served the project from 1974 to its completion, oneeducator from 1975 to 1979 and a second educator from 1979 to completion.

3.31 The Bank was consistently flexible in dealing with practically allproblem areas associated with the implementation of the project. Itsflexibility was most evident on two occasions (1977 and 1981) when theGovernment proposed modifications to the project which the Bank generallyaccepted. The Bank should have insisted in the early years of implementation(1974/75) that the technical assistance program involving ACPO and the UNDPbe phased so that it would be in harmony with the opening of the firstschools. As it was, those agencies provided their assistance When none ofthe schools were ready for operation. In retrospect, the Bank might havelooked more critically at the Government's 1977 proposal for modifying theproject with a reappraisal that would have assessed the country's financialcapacity to finance its share of project costs.

IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCES

Project Costs

4.01 The final cost of the project was US$29.3 million, which is 12%below the appraisal estimate of US$33.5 million. A comparison betweenestimated and actual costs by category including Bank/Borrower participationis given in the table that follows.

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Estimated and Actual Costs in USS

Borrower'sCategory of Appraisal Bank's Contri- Actual Dif-Expenditure Estimate Contribution bution Cost ference X

I. Furniture 13,630,000 10,314,665 609,348 10,924,013 +2,705,987 +20andEquipment

II. Project 17,691,000 5,975,636 11,184,603 17,160,238 - 530,762 -03Adminis-tration,Profes-sionalServices

III. Civil 597,000 309,292 107,279 416,571 - 180,429 -30Works forRural Devel-opment Ser-vices Center

IV. Technical 1,631,000 631,999 157,999 789,999 - 841,001 -51Assistance

V. Preparation 30,000 27,421 0 27,421 - 2,579 -08of PCR(added12/81)

TOTAL 33,579,000 17,259,013 12,059,229 29,318,242 -4,230,758 -12

58.9% 41.1%

4.02 The factors that contributed to the -12% difference between totalestimated costs are:

(a) the reduction in the number of Common Facilities Centers from24 to 20;

(b) the reduction of the size of the 13 Rural Development Centers;

(c) the elimination of the 96 new primary schools and 462 extensionunits which constituted the satellite network for the RuralDevelopment Centers; and

(d) the use of only half (49%) of the estimated amount for technicalassistance with the deletion of the sector survey and sectorstudies, which accounted for almost US$0.5 million of unused fundswhile another US$0.2 million was left unused in the technicalassistance plan for the Rural Development Centers.

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4.03 Had all of these elements been implemented, as originally planned,there would have been high cost overruns as shown by the table that follows:

Estimated Costs if Project had beenImplemented as Originally Designed

(in US$'000)

Cost per Differ-Appraisal Original ence

Category Assumptions Estimate Plan X

I. Furniture 15% increase to cover 13,630 15,674 + 15and Equipment inflationary increase

II. Project Admin. Tocal common facilities 17,691 36,185 + 104.5Civil Works center construction

would have been 163,020 m2

at US$163/m2 and totalrural centers' construc-tion would have been53,539 m2 at US$170/m2

III. Civil Works Rough estimate on cost 597 1,194 + 100for Rural increase for 3 satelliteDevel. Serv- centersices Center

IV. Technical As- No change 1,631 1,631 0sistance

V. PCR Prepara- No change 30 27 - 08ration

TOTALS 33,579 54,711 + 163

4.04 The costs for furniture and equipment exceeded the appraisalestimate by 202 and civil works (Category II) was only 3X under the appraisalestimate despite the significant reduction of the construction component. Inthese two cases the cost increases were due to the inflationary pattern thatstarted climbing sharply in 1973 (the project was appraised shortly beforethe 1973 oil crises). The severity of cost escalation in Colombianconstruction can be seen between December 1972 and May 1982 when the cost persquare meter of construction increased 800%.

4.05 In the other two major categories (III-IV) costs fell considerablybelow the appraisal estimates because of the reductions in project scopebrought about by the project revisions in 1977 and 1981.

Use of Loan Proceeds

4.06 Annex 2 shows the appraised and actual disbursement schedule forthe proceeds of the Loan. It can be seen that by the Bank's FY77 when theproject should have been completed according to appraisal estimates, only 36%

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of the Loan had been disbursed. There was only one change in the percentageof disbursement during the life of the project. That change was agreed uponwhen the project was revised in 1977, and the rate of disbursement forCategory II (civil works) was increased from 30 to 35%.

4.07 The end result was that US$2.1 million of the US$21.2 million Loanwas unused by the Borrower and cancelled by the Bank.

V. OPERATION OF PROJECT INSTITUTIONS

Overview

5.01 Policy changes and educational reform measures that took placewithin the first two years of project implementation resulted in significantchanges to the project schools in 1977. The structure of the CommonFacilities Centers was changed by reducing the number of grade levels fromsix to two and some of the subject areas were eliminated. The RuralDevelopment Centers were affected more drastically as they were convertedfrom secondary rural schools to primary schools that were supposed to have anextensive network of satellite schools. This change also caused thereduction of the size of these schools. There was a further complication forthe Rural Development Centers by the uncoordinated manner in which ACPOimplemented its training and rural organization program (para. 3.27). In asubsequent reduction of the scope of the project in 1981, three of the 23Common Facilities Centers were eliminated and the Rural Development Centerswere converted once again to rural lower cycle secondary schools, and theirsatellite network was eliminated. The Las Gaviotas component was carried outexcept for the three satellite centers that were eliminated in 1981. Onlyfour of the Common Facilities Centers have been in operation for more than ayear while seven others are in their first year of operation. Eight recentlycompleted Common Facilities Centers will open before the end of 1982 and onewas still under construction when the project closed and will now becompleted, at the Borrower's expense, by December 1982.

Attainment of Educational Objectives

5.02 The project's broad educational objective of extending diversifiedsecondary education to medium-sized cities and rural areas is in the processof being met by the Common Facilities Centers. AtLa±naent of this objectiveis currently limited by the fact that only 7 of the 20 Common FacilitiesCenters are fully operational. In addition, although 12 of the 13 RuralDevelopment Centers are operational, they are in a transitional phase intheir development from primary schools to first cycle secondary schools.Enrollment and graduation comparisons for the seven operational CommonFacilities Centers are given next.

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Common Facilities Centers Enrollment and Graduation Comparisons andRural Development Centers Enrollment Comparisons

1982 Appraisal 1982Appraisal Actual Estimate of No. ofEstimate Enrollment Graduates Graduates

7 Fully Operational 11,900 8,906 (752) 3,500 3,000 at (86%)Common FacilitiesCenters

13 Rural Devel- 7,000 b/ 1,500 (222) N/A N/Aopment Centers

a/ This figure is the 1982 enrollment for the 11th grade which is expectedto graduate by the end of the year.

b/ This figure was reduced to 2,600 in 1977 when the project was reduced.

5.03 The actual enrollment for the Common Facilities Centers is 762 ofthe appraisal estimate because two sites were changed after appraisal and theBorrower overestimated the potential student population. Also, in threesites at the time of appraisal it was expected that the Borrower wouldprovide transportation to extend the sphere of influence of the CommonFacilities Centers, but that has not taken place because the HOE has not hadthe funds to acquire buses. As adjustments are made and the other centersbecome operational, it is expected that the estimated enrollment target wlllbe realized and perhaps surpassed. It is also well to point out thedifficulty of comparing estimated and actual enrollments for the CommonFacilities Centers due to the change in the number of grades that theseschools now have. At appraisal the schools were to have six grade levels butas of 1977 the grades have been reduced to two (10 and 11).

5.04 With regards to enrollment comparisons of the Rural DevelopmentCenters it is misleading to base the comparison on the appraised estimatebecause of the changes that were made in this program in 1977. It is moreappropriate to compare the actual enrollment with the modified figure of 1977which placed the target at 2,600 students. In that case the actualenrollment is still 59% of the expected target. This can be explained by theBorrower's decision in 1980 to start converting the 13 primary school centersto secondary centers serving grades 6-9. In short, the centers are now in atransition period which is expected to enable them to reach their enrollmenttarget of 2,600 by ,1985.

5.05 The educational objective of training 2,000 technical educationteachers was not achieved as planned. The training program that was plannedand implemented under the UND? technical assistance program took place abouttwo years before the first schools were completed, therefore, project schoolstaff could not have been involved. The training program was actuallydesigned to serve technical education in general and the project schools were

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only a part of a much larger whole (para. 3.24). However, the Borrower didimplement a less ambitious training program between 1979 and 1981 thattouched a total of 3,061 staff members directly and indirectly associatedwith the Common Facilities Centers program. The short courses offeredtotaled 7,275 hours and they concentrated on various aspects of operations inthe Common Facilities Centers.

5.06 The extension service was implemented by ACPO between 1975 and 1976when none of the rural centers were in operation and thus most of its effectsdissipated by the time the first Rural Development Centers started tofunction in 1979 (para. 3.27). Under current operations the Rural Centersare conducting extension services of a limited nature for their respectiverural communities but these efforts are generally ineffective for lack ofresources, organization, and trained personnel.

5.07 The educational and developmental objectives for the Las GaviotasRural Development Services Center were attained in general terms, althoughthose objectives were vague since the time of appraisal. The three satellitecenters that Las Gaviotas was supposed to serve (para. 2.13) were deletedfrom the project at the request of the Borrower in 1981. At Las Gaviotas,however, the facilities were greatly improved and the center is definitely ina better position now than before to carry out its mission to assist in thedevelopment of the surrounding rural area (the "llanos") as well as assistingin rural development beyond its sphere of influence. The primary school atLas Gaviotas is effectively serving about 200 students (grades 1-5) from thesurrounding area, providing agricultural and community development servicesto the adult population, and making large strides in becoming an outstandingcenter for the development of appropriate technology for rural development.

5.08 The educational sector survey and the sector studies originallyplanned in the project were not realized in the early stages ofimplementation because of financial constraints and a change of priorities onthe part of a new government (para. 2.19). These were eliminated from theproject in 1977 with Bank concurrance when the project was modified. TheBank apparently conceded that the Borrower did not want the studies.

The Common Facilities Centers Program

5.09 Of the 24 Common Facilities Centers envisaged at the time ofappraisal, 20 were retained when the project content underwent its lastmodification in 1981. At the time of completion the breakdown for the 20Common Facilities Centers was:

7 - Fully operational4 - Operating with the first of the two-year program and ready

for full operation in 19838 - Construction completed (6) or virtually completed (2)1 - Construction about 50% completed (Cartagena), will be

completed by the Borrower.

The Government stated its commitment to use its own resources to build thethree Common Facilities Centers that were deleted in 1981.

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The Purpose of the Common Facilities Centers

5.10 When appraised the Common Facilities Centers were to be part of theINEK system by providing a more economical alternative to the INENs forextending diversified secondary education. The Government concluded thatreplicating the INEM model throughout the country was too costly. The mainobjective of diversification was to train students so that they would findeasier access to the labor market, although the training provided was notmeant to produce skilled manpower. But since appraisal, Colombia hasre-interpreted diversification to mean a curriculum that prepares a studentfor the world of work by providing general vocational orientation 7/ in aselected numbers of areas through practical work in workshops andlaboratories. This interpretation led to the establishment in 1976 of thenine-year basic education structure, which is followed by two years of"concentrated diversification" that are currently offered in the CommonFacilities Centers program. By virtue of the reforms enacted in 1975/76 theCommon Facilities Centers have three other missions in addition to providinga vocational orientation for the students of their satellite secondaryschools, those are:

(a) provide special courses to 9th grade students and adults of thesurrounding area as part of a community service program;

(b) provide technical assistance to the secondary schools of theirrespective Departments that want to improve their diversifiedprograms; and

(c) provide in-service teacher training on diversified secondaryeducation to teachers in their respective Departments.

One can deduce from the foregoing that the Common Facilities Centers areexpected to act as educational development centers for their respectiveDepartments. The eleven centers that are in operation are, in fact,performing these functions, although some are more successful than others intheir efforts. The center of Medellin, for example, is having excellentsuccess in providing all of the services mentioned.

Administration of the Common Facilities Centers

5.11 National atministration of the Common Facilities Centers is handledcentrally by the MOE through a special pedagogical unit that plans theopening of each new center, trains personnel, develops operational budgets,recommends the appointment of staff, supervises operations, and coordinateswith ICCE on matters pertaining to physical plant, furniture and equipment.

7/ A general vocational orientation means an initial phase of vocationaltraining that introduces the student to a given vocational area, providestne student with basic skills for that area, and generally prepares thestudent to enter an intermediate level of additional training.

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At the local level each Facilities Center is headed by a director and,although the educational functions of the centers are more diverse thanforeseen at the time of appraisal, the administrative system developed atappraisal has proved adequate. The scheduling system is relatively simpleand effective. The students from the satellite schools are scheduled for twofull days a week as planned during appraisal. In fact, no other system couldwork as well, given the distances between the Common Facilities Center andthe satellite schools. In this manner commuting problems for the studentsare minimized, two shifts are able to operate daily and the facilitiesachieve a high utilization rate between 80-90%. By scheduling students on atwo day a week pattern the Common Facilities Centers have a fifth day of theweek when they do not receive regular students. That fifth day each week isused to offer courses for the community, rendering technical assistance toother schools, or conducting in-service teacher training.

5.12 Common Facilities Centers' satellite school relationships aregenerally satisfactory. Coordination is mainly through a steering committeecomposed of the principals of the satellite schools and the Common Facilitiesdirector. The eleven centers that are already in full or partial operationhave a total of 112 satellite schools of which 96 are public and 16 areprivate. The number of satellite schools per Common Facilities Center rangesfrom 3 to 21. Although enrollment data were unavailable, the directors ofthe centers and the MOE pedagogical group confirmed that enrollments at thesatellite schools had increased significantly as a result of theirassociation with the program.

Curriculum of the Common Facilities Centers

5.13 The diversified curriculum for secondary education is divided intotwo parts covering 35 weekly periods: a general academic core having 21weekly periods which must be taken by all students, and a vocational corehaving 14 weekly periods offering various options. The academic core isoffered in the satellite schools with the exception of laboratory work inphysics and chemistry which is given in the Common Facilities Centers. Thevocational core is given in the Facilities Centers and includes the fiveareas listed below. Since all of the centers do not offer all of the areas,the numbers in parenthesis indicates how many Common Facilities Centers offereach area.

(20) Natural Sciences (Earth science, biology, chemistry, physics)(8) Industry (drafting, metals, electricity, electronics)(18) Commerce (Business education)(20) Health and Nutrition (aimed at community service)(8) Applied Arts (music, art, designing, drafting, ceramics)

5.14 The quality of the application of this curriculum in the 11 CommonFacilities Centers that are in full or partial operation varies. However, itis generally good considering that they have been working under certainconstraints, such as having incomplete equipment, having too few consumableteaching materials, teaching students who are generally poorly prepared forthe Common Facilities Centers program, working with a new system that has noprecedence and having the program taught by teachers who have been exposed toa limited and improvised program. This situation will improve before the endof 1982 when all of the equipment, teaching materials and library books will

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have been installed in each center. Also, there are efforts to reduce thestudent preparation gap through closer working relationships between theCommon Facilities Centers and the satellite schools. In this regard thecenter at Medellin has developed a program that could serve as a model forothers. The program exposes 9th grade students to part of the CommonFacilities Centers' program a year before they enter it and assists theteachers of the satellite schools to strengthen the articulation of theirprogram with that of the center.

5.15 The two-year vocational orientation curriculum is not meant toproduce skilled workers, and for that reason some of the more successfulcenters, like the one in Medellin, are thinking about adding a two-yearpost-secondary program in the future. That program would produce a -tecnicoprofesional" (a technician). In fact, Medellin, has already submitted such aproposal to the MOE. Although it might be premature at this time for anyCommon Facilities Center to undertake such an expansion of its program, itwill almost be necessary for some of the centers to do so within a few yearsin order to open new training opportunities for their graduates.

The Common Facilities Centers' Students

5.16 By design the centers are located in areas populated by low incomefamilies. A sample of 117 students from 10 Centers indicates that 69% of thefathers of those students earn between US$95-240 per month and 8% have noincome at all. The educational level of the parents was also reported lowwith 72% of the fathers and 652 of the mothers having less than eight yearsof schooling. Student data collected and analyzed by the DiversifiedSecondary Education Study (DiSCuS) involving 697 students from four centersthat are fully operational also point to the low socio-economic status of theCommon Facilities Centers students when compared to a central group ofnon-project school students (Annex 5). That comparison also shows thatproject school students tend to perform less well on the relevant achievementtests than the non-project school students. These data outline theeducational challenge faced by the Common Facilities Centers, and alsosupport the decision to create such institutions as a means of not onlyextending diversified education, but of reaching economically deprivedstudents. Unlike the graduates of the INEM schools, whose socio-economiclevel is higher and who have a tendency to enter higher education, themajority (about 95%) of the project school graduates have to enter the labormarket or a higher level of vocational training since they are economicallyand academically ill-prepared for university entrance.

The Teachers of the Common Facilities Centers

5.17 The 11 operational centers currently have a total of 326 teachers,all of whom are qualified according to the standards of the MOE. It has notbeen as difficult to recruit qualified teachers as was anticipated at thetime of appraisal. About 40 of the teachers carry the title of instructorbecause they are expert in the subject area that they teach but lack formalpedagogical training except for what they have acquired through the project'steacher training program offered by the MOE. The major difficultyencountered in staffing the centers when they are ready to become operationalis the inability of the MOE to make staff appointments promptly because offinancial limitations.

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The Program of the Rural Development Centers

5.18 The program of the Rural Development Centers is beset by problemsthat eminate from the changes of direction that it has received duringimplementation. A program that originally started as a rural secondaryeducation effort changed in 1977 to a rural primary education program, andreturned in 1981 to its original secondary level but on a significantlyreduced scale. All but two of the 13 rural centers are in operation. Of thetwo inoperative centers, one (Unguia) will start to function in 1983 and theother (Sibundoy) is being converted to a rural adult training center at theinsistence of the local community. The other 11 rural centers are operatingmostly with the first two secondary grades (6-7) and will have the fourgrades (6-9) of that program by 1984. Their current enrollment of 1,551students is therefore only 22% of the appraisal estimate of 7,000. In fact,it will be impossible for them to reach the appraisal enrollment estimatebecause their construction design was reduced as a result of the 1977modification of the project. However, they will probably reach the revisedenrollment target of 2,600 students within the next 3-4 years. The changesin the scope of this project component occurred because a new governmentassumed power shortly after the project started (1974) and adopted adrastically different position than the previous government had in regard tothe Rural Development Centers. At appraisal the Bank did not anticipate howthe new government would support the project in general or this component inparticular.

The Purpose of the Rural Development Centers

5.19 The current role of the Rural Development Centers is divided intothree parts:

(a) provide the lower cycle (grades 6-9) of diversified secondaryeducation to the students of their respective rural areas (onlyabout 50% of that task is currently being done);

(b) provide educational extension services for rural communitiesconsistiag of adult literacy programs, improvement health andhousing conditions, promotion and organization of rural communitydevelopment (only about 30 of this currently being done); and

(c) provide instructional services and supervision for the primaryschools of the surrounding rural area (about 25% of this currentlybeing done).

5.20 Its current role is similar to the one established at appraisal,except that the Rural Development Centers were supposed to be larger. Inaddition to being subjected to changes that have delayed their development,the Rural Development Centers are also hindered in carrying out their tasksby:

(a) limited operational budgets;

(b) lack of adequate student transportation in rural areas where thedistances are significant; and

(c) lack of properly trained staff for rural development.

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5.21 The irony of this situation is that one of those problem areas (babove) was supposed to have been resolved at the time of appraisal when theoriginal construction plans called for student dormitories and some bustransportation. Another problem (c above) was handled when ACPO implementeda training program for rural development staff. In both cases, however, theplans failed as dormitories and buses were eliminated in the 1977 revision ofthe project when the size of the centers was reduced (para. 2.18), and ACPOconducted its training program when the rural centers did not exist (para.3.27).

5.22 This component of the project is deficient but it can be salvagedprcvided the MOE mounts an efficient and energetic effort within a year toaddress those weaknesses cited previously (para. 5.20).

Operating Costs

5.23 The table that follows shows actual and appraisal estimates of theoperational costs per student in the Common Facilities Centers and the RuralDevelopment Centers and includes a rough comparison with actual per studentcost in the INEN's and non-project rural centers.

Operational Costs per Student (US$)(In 1982 Prices)

Appraisal ActualEstimate US$ Cost

11 Common Facilties 343 326 (-5Z)CentersINEM - 436

11 Rural Development 210 540 (+157Z)CentersNon-Project Rural - 700Centers

5.24 The fact that only 11 of the 20 Common Facilities Centers are intheir initial phase of operation and that their enrollments have not yetreached their expected levels distorts the comparison given in the table.Nonetheless, the actual cost is 5% below the appraisal estimate measured in1982 prices. A breakdown of total operational costs shows that 88Z of thattotal is consumed by personnel salaries and 12% for general operationalexpenses. Of the 88% of costs that represent personnel salaries, 48% goesfor salaries of administrative personnel. This is high currently becausemost of the administrative staff is appointed when the Common FacilitiesCenters start to operate, while the teaching staff is appointed as theenrollment develops. In other words, during their initial operational phasethe centers are top-heavy with Administrative personnel. In a well-established center like the one in Nedellfn, the per student cost is US$267or 18% below the average cost for the 11 Common Facilities Centers. Althougha direct comparison between Common Facilities Centers and INEM's is notpossible because of the differences between the structure of the two types ofschools, the INEM per student cost is given in the table to draw a roughcomparison.

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5.25 The table also shows that in the Rural Development Centers theactual per student costs are 157Z above appraisal estimates. In this casepersonnel salaries constitute 96Z of the total operational costs; that leavesonly 4% for general operational expenditures. Administrative personnelabsorb 70X of the total expenditures for personnel, but at least 20% of thatadministrative staff is composed of technical personnel that works in thecommunities and not In the schools. As in the case of the Comon FacilitiesCenters, the full complement of admnlistrative staff is appointed to eachrural center as soon as the school opens regardless of the size of thestudent enrollment. This creates a distortion of ratios of administrator-teacher and adminlstrator-student and increases the cost of administration.As the rural centers increase their student enrollments this distortion willbalance out, as can be seen in four of the well-established rural centers(Cienega, Los Palmitos, Santander and Turbo) where the per student costs arelower than the average ranging from US$315 to 395.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Project Generation

6.01 During the project generation period (appraisal) the Bank failed toforesee how differently a new government would look upon the project. When anew government assumed power in 1974 eight months after the date ofeffectiveners, project implementation slowed down and was eventuallysuspended in 1975 as the Government began to consider posslble changes. By1976 the Covernment proposed drastic changes which the Bank accepted and theproject was amended In 1977. At appraisal the Bank should have detected thepossibility of changes in attitude on the part of a new Government. Thedesign of the project should have been made more flexible in order to m*kefuture changes, if necessary, without drastic modiflcations (paras. 3.02 and3.03).

6.02 The original deslgn of the project was clearly focused on urban andrural secondary education, and all of the components, save two, were directlyconnected to that level of education. The sector survey and sector studieswere only indirectly linked to secondary education but the justlflcatlo fortheir inclusion in the project was sound. However, the inclusion of the LasGaviotas component appears to have been made without any linkageconsiderations, and the rationale for its inclusion In the project is vaguein the SAR, v-rking papers, and the documents In the project file. In thedocumentation there are only vague hints that by strengthening Las Gaviotasas a rural development center the stage could have been set for a follow-upBank project in rural development. This component should have been moreclearly defined and justified at appraisal. Because of this omission, Banksupe