Dormkut of The World Bank FOR OMCLAL USEONLY Rit No. 12523 PROJECT C0MPLETION RE 1 PORT NIGERIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 2480-UNI) NOVEMBEPR 19. 1993 MICROGRAPHICS Report No: 12523 Type: PCR Country Operations Division Western Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a "estricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wthout World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Dormkut of
The World Bank
FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY
Rit No. 12523
PROJECT C0MPLETION RE1PORT
NIGERIA
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT(LOAN 2480-UNI)
NOVEMBEPR 19. 1993
MICROGRAPHICS
Report No: 12523Type: PCR
Country Operations DivisionWestern Africa DepartmentAfrica Regional Office
This document has a "estricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wthout World Bank authorization.
A.F Accountant General of the FederationCBN Central Bank of NigeriaC&E Customs and Excise DepartnentEDI Economic Development InstituteFBIR Federal Board of Inland RevenueFMF Federal Ministry of FinanceFMFED Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic DevelopmentFMNP Federal Ministry of National PlanningFOS Federal Office of StatisticsIMF International Monetary FundNCEMA National Center for Economic Management and AdministrationNDB National Data BankNPC National Planning CommissionPC Personal ComputerPCR Project Completion ReportPRS Planning, Research and Statistics DepartnentSAP Structural Adjustment ProgramTRB Tariff Review BoardUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUSAID United States Agency for Intemational Development
Attached is the Project Compledon Repor on Nigeria - Technical Assistance Project (Lan2480UNI) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. lhe Government did nOt comment on Part I andMH of the PCR and has not prepared Part H.
'Me project was the first free-tanding tecdical assac opeion of the Bank in Nigeria. itws approved after years of discussion given the goveramens reluctne to u foreigln icalaistce to stengthen its economic management. The objecdives of the prject wer to improvethequality of stadstics, enhance planning and budgeting capability, train planners, and establish effectivemonitorig of exten debt.
The project resuted in improvement in statistics and helped to establish a nadonal trafinincer for public adminitrton; but there was little or no progress on the other componen. SomecOmponents were made Irrelevant by policy changes within six months of project approval. Despite anextended disbursement period and a shift in project emphasis toward the fAmding of computingequipment, one-third of the US$13 million loan amount was cancelled at closure. Overal the projectis ratd as unsatisfactoy, with uncertain susinabity and negligible institutional Impact.
The PCR is adequate. It identifies lack of ownership as a major factor in the usatisatoryp mance, and suggests a greater flexibility to amend project design would bave been desirablewhen progress in implementation proved inadequate.
An audit is planned.
Attachment
ndo -i w*tb ,%scotbuWm adis be .Wtn vit o u utb
FOR OFFICLL USE ONLY
PROJECT C(MNPLE`ION REPORT
NIGERIA - TECENICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
(LOAN 248MUN
CONTENTS
Page No.
PREFACE ................................................. i
T*able 1. Related Bank Loans ....... ............... ....... 10Table 2. Project Timetable ... .......................... 11Table 3. Loan Disbursements ....... .................... 11Table 4. Studies Compleod . ............................ 12Table 5. Stats of Covenants ............. ............... 12Table 6. M power Costs (StaffWeks) ....... .. ............ 12Table 7. Mission Data ................................ 13
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
NIGERIA
TECHNICAL ASSITANCE PROJECT
(LOAN 2480-UNI)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
This is te Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Technical Assistance Project in theFederal Republic of Nigeria, for which Loan No. 2480-UNI in an amount equivalent to US$13.0million was approved on December 20,1984. The Closing Date of the Loan was December 31,1992, two and a half years later than planned. Tle final disbursement was made on June 30,1993. Total disbursements amounted to $8.6 million, and the undisbursed balance of $4.4million was canceled on that date.
The PCR was prepared by the Country Operations Division (AF4CO) of the AfricaRegional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and o). On March 5, 1993, the Bai,ksent the Borrower Pars I and m with the request to prepare Part II but no comments have beenreceived.
Preparation of the PCR started during the Bank's last supervision mission in May/June1992, and is based, Inter alla, on the President's Rteport, the Loan and Guarantee Agreements,supervision repons, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, internal Bankmemoranda and files, and discussions with Government officials associated with theimplementation of the project.
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PROJECT COMPLEnON REPORT
NIGERIA - TECHNICAL ASSISIANCE PROJECT
(LOAN 2480-UNI)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
liackmnrund and Objectives
1. The Federal Government of Nigeria requested technical assistance from the Bank in 1981to help improve its policy analysis capacity. This request culminated in the Technical AssistanceProject. The objective of the project was to strengthen the basis of the Borrower's economicdecision-making by improving the quality of its statistics on the Nigerian economy, strengthe'-gthe planning and budgeting mechanisms, establishing facilities for training planners, and crasdigan effective capacity for monitoring external debt. The project was to provide consultantservices, data processing equipment and staff training to: (i) improve the efficiency of operationsin the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS); (ii) establish a system for monitoring external debt inthe Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF); (iii) help the Federal Ministry of National Planning(FMNP) monitor the execution of the national development plans; (iv) aid in the preparation ofthe Fifth National Development Plan; (v) improve the quality of training for planners; and(vi) help the Budget Department establish a mechanism in the annual budget cycle for allocatingfiscal resources in accordance with established priorities. Implementation of the project beganin May 1984, and wa.. expected to continue until the closing date in June 1990. The closing dateof the Loan was December 31, 1992, two and a half years later than planned. The finaldisbursement was made on June 30, 1993. Total disbursements amounted to $8.6 million, andthe undisbursed balance of $4.4 million was canceled on that date.
2. Tle project design approved by the Board became outdated in some components withinsix months of its approval when the Borrower abandoned Five Year Plans in favor of a systemof three-year rolling plans and budgets, supplemented with annual assessments of the economyand ultimately by a perspective plan. The project made little contribution to the Borrower'splanning and budgeting system, apart from the work done by consultants on the 1988 tariffreview as envisioned in the structural adjustment program (SAP).
3. Failure to agree on design changes in a timely manner, poor administration, and excessivedelays in implementation prevented the project from achieving the benefits anticipated at the timeit was approved. The work of the external debt-monitoring unit in FMF was not initiated untilfive years after loan approval. Even then, the unit could not get data from other divisions ofFMF and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and therefore could not produce stadstics in timefor them to be of use in debt management. The work in support of the Budget Department's(FMF) achievements were minor; some staff members were trained and consultants were engagedto assist in the tariff review of 1988, but very few of the other initiatives proposed in thecomponent were adopted.
4. When the project was first designed, computer systems were seen as an important butsubsidiary component-in part because it was difficult to anticipate the revolutionary impact ofPC-based computing. Subsequently, the computerization of various functions in FMF, FOS andthe National Center for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA) became one of the
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largest features of the project. While the Borrowwr has used some of the opportities thecomputer equipment provided, it still has opportuni-Jes afforded by to improve Its economicdatabase and the use of Its data in effective decision-making.
5. In terms of the original description of the project, the most significant achievements werein FOS. Although the project could have achieved more, FOS's data processing capability hasmade improvements, its survey teams are better equipped, and the quality of its statistics-especially in terms of extemal trade, consumer prices and national accounts-has improved. Inaddition, the project supported the creation of NCEMA, which has obtained firther support fromthe Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI).
bIrmentaflon
6. The project was plagued by delays in implementation. In addition to the invalidation ofthe original project objectives for the planning and budgeting components, administration of theproject was excessively centralized, which made decision-making cumbersome and slow; theBorrower's natural reluctance to employ funds borrowed from the Bank when more concessionalfunds became available; and inadequate preparation of the training-for-planners component.Furthermore, Bank staff perceived some reluctance in the implementing agencies when makingsensitive economic decisions, to admit outside advisers.
7. The Bank invested much more time and energy in this project than in similar projects inWestern Africa, and showed both detemination and flexibility in supportig impl(smentation.However, even after the Borrower appointed senior officials as project coordinaors theappointees were too busy to devote adequate attention to the project, and the Bank's suggesionsfor strengthening project management by putting full-time staff in charge or by creating a taskforce were not adopted. Also, the Borrower repeatedly failed to expedite the necsaypaperwork for the payment of project consultants and contractors for periods of several monts,which led to yet more delays in implementation and higher costs. Bank staff concluded that theBorrower's representatives gave the project low pliority.
Lesons Ln2ed
8. In fiure technical assistance projects, both the Bank and the Borrower need to agree andcommit themselves to:
(a) ensure ownership of the project and responsibility for implementationarrangement;
(b) agree on the philosophy of the project and be willing to make modifications andamend design specifications as warranted by changes in project objectivesresulting from administrative needs;
(c) decentralize agencies so as to expedite procurement processes, and overallinformation flow;
(d) conduct formal thematic reviews that respond to each component of the project'sparticular objectives, rather than general supervision; and
(e) ensure mechanisms whereby unused fimds can be reallocated or canceled, ifprogress in implementation proves to be inadequate.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
NIGERIA - TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
(LOAN 2480-UNI)
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM TBE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
1. roetd lfdtit
Name: Technical Assistance ProjectLoan No.: 2480-UNIRegional Unit: Africa Region - Western Africa DepartmentCountry: NigeriaSector: Public Sector
2. 8eS ouind
1. In the late seventies and early eighties acute fiscal and balance-of-payments difficultiesfollowing the global oil price decline demonstrated to the Federal Government of Nigeria that itsefforts to cope with the current economic developments were impaired by its weakness in policyanalysis. Partly, the Borrower did not have enough resources to analyze data and partly it didnot have enough data for analysis. By 1981, when it officially requested technical assistancefrom the Bank, the Borrower urgently needed to upgrade its whole statistical system-with respectto both the standard information on production, consumption, prices and trade and to indicatorsthat would permit the Borrower to monitor the implementation of its plans, budget performanceand foreign exchange requirements.
2. Despite the urgency of the problems, many members of the Government were reluctantto use project staff in making economic decisions in the fields of planning, budgeting andexpenditure control. Others expressed concern about the wisdom of borrowing Bank funds tofinance technical assistance when funding was available on grant tems from other multilateraland bilateral instdions such as the International Monetary Fund l;MM), United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP), and the United States Agency for International Development(USAID). Nevertheless, the Bank and Borrower identified problems and proposed technicalassistance to: (i) strengthen the planning system; (ii) establish a planning institute; (iii) create astronger monitoring and evaluation system for the Borrower's investment program; (iv) strengthenits debt monitoring system; (v) improve the revenue mobilization systems of the Federal Boardof Inland Revemne (FBIR), Customs and Excise Department (C&E) and other tax agencies; (vi)support the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS); and (vii) automate data systems.
3. The project eventually approved by the Bank's Board in late 1984 did not include all ofthe objectives discussed during the preparatory stages. According to the President's Report:
"The project comprises a five-year program of technical assistance to the FederalMinistry of Finance (FMF), the Federal Ministry of National Planning (FMNP)and the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS). Consultant services and dataprocessing equipment would be furnished to strengthen the managementinformation system upon which economic decision-making is based. Themonitoring of external debt and of the national plan and the budget would beimproved and programs for the training of planners would be developed.Insomuch as the ministries benefitting from the project are severely understaffed,there is a risk that insufficient counterpart support may be provided. In order to
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mindmize this risk, new administrative structures would be set up on a permanentbasis, where apropriate, to handle new functions."
The report acknowledged that the proposed measures would not meet all the Borrower's needs,but indicated that others could bt handled more appropriately by the IMF or other agencies. Inretrospect, It is noteworthy that ihe project agreement did not require the Borrower to make anycommitment to set up the 'new administrative structures."
3. Prolect Obhectives, Design and Organization
4. The objective of the project was to: (i) strengthen the basis of economic decision-makingby helping the Borrower to improve the quality of its statistics on the Nigerian economy; (ii)enhance the planning and budgeting functions; (iii) establish fcilities for training planners; and(iv) create an effective capacity for monitoring external debt. In general, the project was toidentify areas in the administration where analytic and monitoring capabilities fell short of theneeds perceived. No attempt was made to prescribe specific improvements to the structure, sinceit was thought that the technical assistance to be funished would itself encourage the prescriptionof appropriate improvements. This approach, which the Bank and the Borrower shared, wasbased on the premise that effective systems for the monitoring of external debt-or of exchangecontrol or plan implementation-could be devised and implemerAed only from within theadministrative structure co,acerned. Consequently, the Bank and the Borrower left the specificaccompisments they expected undefined.
S. FOS made efforts to build upon its ongoing twinning arrangement with the U.S. Bureauof Census. Simiy, FMF retained an in-house advisor on external debt monitoring in theExternal Finance Department, who was to be the catalyst for strengthening that function. TheFederal Ministry of National Planning (FMNP), with the support of consultants, was to establisha plan-monitoring unit and strengthen its planning capacity. A needs assessment andorganiztional review, under the leadership of someone who was to be specifically selected forthe purpose, was to provide the framework for designing ard implementing the training-for-planners component. The Budget component was to include the services of consultants inanalyzing projects, formulating capital budgets and designing means for linking the budget moreclosely with the national development plan. The project had six components:
(a) Assistance to strengthen the operations of FOS through the provision ofconsultancy services, data processing equipment and staff training.
(b) Estats hmeti of a system for monitoring external deb' in FMF through theprovision of consulting services, equipment and staff training.
(c) Assistance to FMNP for monitoring the execution of the national developmentplan, including the provision of consultancy services, equipment and stafftraining.
(d) Assistance for the preparation of the Fifth National Development Plan.
(e) Assistance to the FMNP to improve the training of planners through theprovision of consultancy services and staff training.
() Assistance to the Budget Department, through consultancy services and stafftraining, to help establish a system within the annual budget cycle for allocatingfiscal resources in accordance with established priorities.
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Furthermore, the Bank's experience Indicated that needs and the perception of needs evolveduring the implementation of projects of this kind and that it Is preferable to have a significantunallocated provision set aside for small activities. Therefore, the project Included a substantialcomponent, amounting to nearly 27% of the loan amount, for activities that were yet to beidentified. Project completion was originally expected by June 30, 1990.
6. The original design of the project, therefore, seemed flexible enough to accommodate thechanging institutional structure of the public sector in Nigeria. However, this design flexibilitycontributed to substantial delays and administrative complexities during project implementation.Later, the failure to define the sub-components of the project in specific detail created difficultiesin reaching consensus on the use oi the earmarked resources.
7. The beneficiary agencies-FMF, FMNP and FOS-were responsible for Implementing theproject. The Borrower designated a Project Coordinator In FMF to liaise with the Bank andcoordinate with the several agencies and ministries involved. Both FMNP and FOS alsodesignated project liaison officers to coordinate with the Project Coordinator at FMF.Unfortunately, coordination between the Project Coordinator and the liaison officers in the otherbeneficiary agencies was weak and led to delays in all phases of project implementation. Therewere also frequent changes in personnel in the beneficiary agencies. When design changesbecame necessary, as they soon did, it proved difficult and time-consuming to get agreement onthem. During project implementation beneficiary agencies repeatedly complained about the factthat they had to obtain approval from FMF before proceeding with sub-con.ponents. This highlycentralized structure created in itself substantial delays.
4. ect Supervison and Implemenhtion
B. Planning for the project began in 1981, but it was not approved by the Board until late1984. The Bank and the Borrower signed the agreements two months later, and the projectbecame effective in May 1985. During the long interval between the conception of the projectand its implementation, the economic situation and requirements had changed. There weresignificant variations between the planned and actual project design and objectives. The 1985supervision missions found that the Borrower was interested in expanding the external debt-monitoring component to encompass debt management and accounting. The Bank itself madenew recommendations about both the planning and budget functions on the basis of recenteconomic work by its staff. In its letters to the Borrower after the mission, the Bank indicatedthat "our review of the organization and current planning and budgeting procedures...suggesteda re-definition of the scope of the project components." In brief, it recommended that Nigeriachange from the fixed Five Year Plan system that it had used for 25 years to a more flexiblesystem of three-year rolling plans, add greater emphasis to sectoral planning and include anannual update of the macro-framework. The planning and budgeting components were soon inleft alone without any direction. Thus substantial changes were proposed for three of the sixcomponents of the project within six months after the agreements were signed.
9. At that time, PC-based computing was creating revolutionary possibilities in dataprocessing. Although computerization in the FMF, except in respect of the External Debtcomponent, was not specified as a component in Schedule 2 of the Loan Agreement, it becamea key focus of the first supervision mission. The mission concluded that FMF: (i) shouldappoint a computerization coordinator; (ii) make a qick assessment of the computing needs andcosts involved; (iii) prepare an overall plan for computerization; (iv) create a forum within FMFto discuss implementation issues and the overall plan; and (v) create a single computer centerwithin the ministry.
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10. The Bank suggested modifications to the planning and budget components, which wereimplemented without much support through the ptoject. At various times over the duration ofthe project the Bank also suggested new components for the Tariff Review Board (TRB), theImport Duty Monitoring Committee DWMC), the FBIR, the Accountant General of theFederation's Office (AMF), the C&E Department and the Women's Commission. However,delays In project implementation continued to concern the Bank. While the FOS bad engagedconsultants for the Bureau of the Census during 1984-86 and (although the FMF requiredexcessive time to request approvals) some progress bad been made on training planners, yetoverall progress had been slow and the results were disappointing. Ihe administrative proceduresfor finalizing terms of reference, short lists of consultants and contracts worked against speed andefficiency; one consulting firm was in the 22nd month of its contract before Its contrect wassigned. At the FMNP, work on the external debt component was delayed by difficulties instaffing, ill-defined reporting relationships and obstacles in the flow of Information, both withinthe FMF divisions amd between the FMF and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Five yearspassed before the FMF comissioned the necessary studies to design its computer system, andanother year before the equipment was installed and the staff trained.
11. In the letter addressed to FMF in May 1986, the Bank's Country Director commentedon the slow progress made on many components, but emphasized that the Bank's concern wasto ensure that the project assisted the Borrower as best possible in overcoming its financial andeconomic difficulties. To facilitate movement on the planning and budgeting components, theBank recommended that FMF set up a three-year rolling budget (as opposed to a fixed five-yearplan), linked to a multi-year public investmnent program. On project administration, the CountryDirector commented:
"It is unfortunate that ... the coordinator has been so tied up in recent months ....Because of this, we suggest you hire a coordinator, at least temporarily, fromoutside the Goverment .... If this project is to be successful, overall projectcoordination and the momentum of decision-making must pick up.'
The Bank suggested that the consultant project coordinator might be funded by UNDP rather thanthe Bank loan, but the Borrower did not adopt the idea. The Bank also considered the use ofconsultants to assist the Borrower with devising a plan-monitoring system and methods of trainingplanners. By the end of November 1986, Bank staff were so concerned about the project thatthey suggested that it might be better to scale the project back to a size at which it could beimplemented expeditiously.
12. The Borrower made almost no written response to correspondence from the Bank thataddressed the slow progress of the project. None of the letters written by the Bank after asupervision mission received a written response. There was, however, some correspondence withthe Bank at the working level. The Borrower's performance in project management wasgenerally unsatisfactory as indicated by its poor compliance with audits and other financialreporting.
13. The supervision mission of February 1987 managed to be more optimistic, partly becausea decision was made to fund a variety of short-term consultants who were not part of the originalproject concept. They assisted in the 1987 review of the import tariff to support theimplementation of the Borrower's structural adjustment program. Five individual consultants anda Nigerian firm contbuted to the analytical basis for the seven-year tariff introduced in Jamnary1988.
14. The May 1987 supervision mission noted that project implementation had slowed downfurther. Minor conas were taking up to four months to finalize; the decision on whether to
create a Special Account was bogged dowr; and members of the project implementation teamwere preoccupied with other matters. Despite much discussion, the FMNP had still not madeuse of the loan; and though FMF had appointed its computer adviser, the debt-monitoringconsultants were not yet selected. Thp Bank again raised the possibility of reducing the size ofthe loan, both orally and in a letter to the Permanent Secretary of FMF, and the ministryresponded that futher attempts would be made to improv- the speed of project implementation.The missioa also worried about the creation of the Nadonal Data Bank (NDB) with the supportof UNDP. Tle division of labor between FOS and NDB might, the Bank feared, divide thescarce statistical experdse available between the two institutions.
15. There were also delays in procurement. Based on experience from similar projectselsewhere, the Bank felt that time spent on specifying thoroughly the design of computerizationprograms Is always well spent, and that carefully specified systems ultimately cost less. Thus theBank was unle to accept some bidding documents or support certain procurement actions. TheBorrower thereupon complained that the Bank took excessive time to approve procurementrequests.
16. On several occasions, the Bank and Borrower made joint efforts to resolve the problems.The Borrower appointed a new Project Coordinator, although he was still encumbered with otherduties as well. Bank representatives and the new Coordinator reviewed the project in August1988. They discussed: (i) delays in payment to contractors and consultants, (ii) the fact that noconsultants had yet been hired to work on the debt-monitoring component, and (iii) an initiativetaken by the FMF's computerization consultant to design an in-house debt monitoring system.Project implementation continued to lag.
17. In the hope that Bank support to the day-to-day activities of the Borrower's variousagencies would faciIitate implementation action, the Bank decided in early 1988 to transfer theadministraiton of the project to the Resident Mission. Thereafter, an attempt was made toestablish a system of monthly meetings to review progress of the project, although other businesssoon interfered with this schedule. After the Resident Mission took charge, however, the Bank'sreview of procurement documents was considerably faster.
18. In the last three years of the project, the Borrower made a number of changes inadministration. In June 1989, the Borrower appointed a new Project Coordinator, the Directorof Finance and Supply of the Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (FMFED)thus raising the status of the project within the ministry. However, in January 1990, he wasdispatched from the ministry on a special as.ignment. In mid-1990, the Director of Planning,Research and Statistics (PRS) of FMFED was in turn appointed Project Coordinator.
19. After 1989 most of the project activity was concerned with computerization, and the FBIRand C&E were included among the original beneficiaries. In order to permit the implementatioiof the various proposals for computerization that followed, the Bank postponed closing the loanfrom June 30, 1990, to December 31, 1991. It also reallocated the proceeds of the loan.Schedule 1 of the Agreement had many disbursement categories, which proved to be a limitationwhen it came to re-allocating funds from components which were being implemented. InJanuary/February 1992, the Bank and the Borrower reached an agreement to reduce the loanamount by $5.5 million and to postpone the closing date to June 30, 1992. Although both theBorrower and the Bank had worked on the assumption that the reallocation of fimds had also beenapproved in July 1990 at the time of postponement of the closing date, the Bank did not send tothe Borrower a formal amendment until a new allocation of the proceeds was approved on March31, 1992. The closing date of the loan was extended again, from June 30, 1992, to December31, 1992, to permit the disbursement of commitments the Borrower had entered into before June30, 1992.
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20. In the end, the Bank invested more than 260 staffweeks in this project. In the first twoand a half years supervision missions visited Nigeria at Intervals of five months. By the end of1992 the Bank had devoted at least 93 staffweeks to the supervision of the project-an averageof 19 staffweeks per year of implementation (in five comparable studies conducted in otherWestern Africa countries, the average was 14.7).
S. PMlojct Result and Sustainability
21. The project had the greatest impact (compared with the original concept) in FOS, whichupgraded its hardware and software and held training for its personnel. The FOS also (i)developed a better system of compiling and disseminating exteral trade data abstracted fromcustoms information; (ii) reformed the system of consumer prices indices and (with some timelag) national account statistics; (ii) completed a census of industry and business that will providea fimework for other related investigations; C7v) redesigned agricutural sample surveys; and (v)equipped a survey team with modern tools and all-terrain vehicles.
22. The creation of the National Center for Economic Management and Administration(NCEMA) was also a modest success. Although more of its financial support came from UNDPthan from the project, the project's connection with NCEMA encouraged the Bank's EconomicDevelopment Institute (EDI) to give NCEMA further support.
23. FMF's external debt-monitoring unit faiied to achieve project objectives. Problems withthe flow of data from the other divisions of the ministry and from the CBN impeded the collationof debt statistics for effective debt management. In addition, the unit had too few members withthe accounting training necessary for its work.
24. The plan preparation and monitoring component of the project was overtaken by theBorrower's 1987 decision to change its budget method. Right at the end of the project's life, theMinistry, by then the National Planning Commission (NPC), revived an old proposal for a publicexpenditure-monitoring system, but by then it was too late.
25. FMIF officials had always opposed using borrowed funds for technIcal support services,especially when Nigeria had access to other fimding on better terms. Some of the deparmnentstaff got some training, and the consultants engaged to assist in the 1988 tariff review made asolid contribution to an important component of the structural adjustment program. Bankpersonnel suggested several other forms of support over the duration of the project, but nonewere adopted.
26. At the time the project was designed, computerization was considered an important butsubsidiary component. Nevertheless, by the end of the project's life, major computerizationprograms were under way in FMF, FBIR, AGF, FOS and C&E, where they were not funded bythe project, but were encouraged by the prospect of such funding. In addition, computers hadbeen supplied to the macro-economic department of NPC and to NCEMA. The Borrower stillhas opportunities to exploit the full capacities of computerization in support of its economicdecision making.
6. Bank and Borrower Performance
27. The Bank representatives debated the design of the project for a long time, both withBorrower officials and agencies and among themselves. Nevertheless, three of the originalcomponents were abandoned within six months of project approval by the Board. Additionally,no one assessed the needs of the planners' training compo.nent before project approval. Ihese
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events and non-events invite questions about the Bank's expectation that specific improvementswould occur during project implementation. Furthermore, while a technical assistance projectdoes tend to require staff time, the exceptionally flexible design made this one particularlydemanding.
28. One of the observations made during the project was that the standard questions andprocedures of Bank review missions, which were developed during civil works projects, may failto extract pertinent details about a technical assistance project.
29. With the exception of FOS, which had a number of quite speciftc objectives to be attainedunder the project, and which made use of the statistical expertise that Bank staff and the projectcould assemble, it would appear in retrospect that the Borrower did not assign high priority tothe project as indicated by the lack of enthusiasm to overcome the various implementationproblems encountered.
30. The Borrower's performance in project management was generally unsatisfactory asindicated by its poor compliance with audit and other financial reporting. The Borrower'stardiness in making payments to consultants and contractors placed several of them in greatdifficulty. These delays accelerated costs and reduced competition for bids. The Borrowercomplained about the time the Bank took to approve procurement requests. Borrower-Bankrelationships were not wholly satisfactory as the Borrower's failure to respond to correspondencefrom the Bank indicates. Also, frequent changes in project personnel and in the civil servicemade it d.fficult to develop lasting relationships between Bank staff and the beneficiary agencies.The project was successful in strengthening FOS and initiating computerization in the beneficiaryagencies but was incapable of providing the institutional strengthening that was needed to supportmeaningl economic reforms undertaken by the Borrower.
31. The Loan Agreement was generally adequate. Similarly, the President's Report provideda general and adequate framework of project components. Nevertheless, the flexibility inherentin the design of the project required the need for extensive and protracted consultation betweenthe Bank and the Borrower at most stages of project implementation.
32. The data needs of the project were not large. The correspondence files in the Bankprovide an adequate record of implementation. The disbursement account from Bank servicesis adequate and provides a complete picture of the pattern of project implementation. The projectaccount maintained by the Borrower, on the other hand, was incomplete because of misplaceddocumentation resulting from frequent changes in the Goverment officers concerned with theimplementation of the project.
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7. c2ONsulin Servce
33. Both individual consultants and firms (domestic and foreign) were engaged during thecourse of the project Among the individual consultants, those engaged for the tariff review madea substantive and effective contribution, as did the two national accounts specialists. Oneconsultant engaged to provide a SAP monitoring system delayed the system documentation,resulting in the unsatisfactory operation of the system. The computer adviser in FMF did somevaluable work in terms of needs assessment, but was often diverted to other activities and delayedthe implementation of the debt monitoring component by attempting to design and implement aspecialized system. In addition, the twinning arrangement by FOS and the US Bureau of thoCensus contributed to the strengthening of FOS, through their hands-on approach and throughthe professional exchange with FOS staff.
34. An issue of contention which plagued the use of local consultants was the appropriatenessof consultancy fees in the face of the rapidly changing value of the local currency. Furthermore,concern was raised about the significant differential in fees between the local consultants and theirexpatriate counterparts. These issues affected the timely hiring of local consultants, and delaysin paying them cannot have increased their efficiency.
S. Lesons leamed
35. In future technical assistance projects, both the Bank and the Borrower need to agree andcommit themselves to:
(a) ensure ownership of the project and responsibility for implementationarrangements;
(b) agree on the philosophy of the project and be willing to make modifications andamend design specifications as warranted by changes in project objectivesresulting from administrative needs;
(c) decentralize agencies so as to expedite procurement processes, and overallinformation flow;
(d) conduct formal thematic reviews that respond to each component of the project'sparticular objectives, rather than general supervision; and
(e) ensure mechanisms whereby unused funds can be reallocated or canceled, ifprogress in implementation proves to be inadequate.
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PART II
PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
The Bank has requested the Nigerian authorities to submit their own evaluationof the TAP, but this document has not been received.
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PART m
STATISTICAL INFORMATION
1. R&lated Bank Loans
LOAN TiTLE: TRADE POLICY AND EXPORTDEVELOPMENT LOAN
LOAN NUMBER: 2758-UNIYEAR OF APPROVAL: NOVEMBER 1986
Ibis quick disbursing loan had a $2 million Technical Assistance component, whosepurpose was to meet needs which it was felt could not be met under the on-goingTechnical Assistance project (Loan No. 248-UNI). The most important items fundedunder the project were (a) a sub-sector study of the Nigerian steel industry, whichprovided quantified options for the future of the state-owned steel plants; (b) needsassessment and feasibility report on the computerization of the management informationsystem of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation; and (c) staff training for theCentral Bank of Nigeria, the Nigerian Export Promotion Council and the Nigeria DepositInsurance Corporation, as well as other officials.
CREDIT NUMBER: 2431-UNIYEAR OF APPROVAL: NOVEMBER 1992
The Project is directly supportive of the Government's structural adjustment program. Itis to provide support to the key agencies involved and assist in creating an environment tofcilitate more sound management of the economy. The project aims to improve theGovernment's ability to cary out its public finance functions, including better revenuecollections and expenditure control. It also aims to provide support for the Government'sefforts at initiating reforms in the financial sector and in going ahead with privatizationand commercialization of its parastatal operations to make them more viable andfinancially sound enteprises. The Project builds and improves upon preparatory workdone under Loan 2480-UNI, particularly decentralization of participating agencies.
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2. Tctimetabh
Item Date Planned Date Revised Date Actud
Identificaton 12/15/81
Preparation
Preppraisal 05/15/82
Appraisal Mission 02/15/83
Loan Negotiations 03/20/84 04/15/84
Board Approval 11/27/84 12/20/84
Loan Signature 03/8/85
Loan Effectiveness 06/06/85 05/23/85
Loan Closing 06/30/90 12/31/91 12/31/92
Loan Completion 12/31/89 12/31/92 06/30/93
3. Loan Disbur_ments(Amounts In US $ Milions)
Bank Origina Actual Cumulative Actual % ofFY Original
FY95 - .09 .09 -
FY86 .78 .69 .78 100
FY87 4.58 1.14 1.92 35.9
FY88 4.70 .82 2.74 29.5
FY89 2.80 .71 3.45 28.6
FY90 .92 .90 4.35 33.5
FY91 - .22 4.57 35.1
FY92 - .62 5.19 39.9
FY93 - 3.41 8.60 26.2
N=: Total disbursements amounted to $8.6 million,and the undisbursed balance of $4.4 million wascanceled on June 30, 1993.
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4. Soldig Cmpk_eted
Tariff study: a maJor technical contribution to the 1987188 tariff review, addressingthe cost structure and competitiveness of Nigerian producers, and the frameworkfor protection.
Computedraon Master Plan for the Federal Ministry of Fmance.
5. Stats of Covenants
LA3.01(b) Designate a project coordinator. Complied with
LA3.01(c) Designate project liaison officers. Complied with
LA3.01(d) Establish a debt monitoring division. Complied with
LA3.01(e) Establish a plan monitoring unit in FMNP. Complied with
LA3.01(t) Designate in FMNP a training manager. Complied with
LA4.02(c) Submit audits within six months of the close Not compliedof the year. with
