A WORLD BANK COUNTRY STUDY PUB- 1678
GUATEMALAEconomic and Social Position and Prospects
AUGUST 18 t
AUGUST 1978
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GUATEMALAEconomic and Social Position and Prospects
This report is based on the findings of a mission to Guatemala in November 1976 consist-ing of:
John R. Hansen, chief of missionCaroline Doggart, industrial economist
George Faillace, public investment analystJoachim Harnack, economist for banking and public finance
Alexander Nowicki, Departmental Senior Economist, advised the mission during its stayin Guatemala and prepared the chapter on "Human Resources and the Social Scene."
The report was discussed with the Guatemalan government in September 1977 and sub-sequently updated.
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional OfficeThe World Bank
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
The World Bank issues country economic studies in two series. This report is a workingdocument and is, as such, part of an informal series based wholly on materials originallyprepared for restricted use within the Bank. The text is not meant to be definitive, but isoffered so as to make some results of internal research widely available to scholars andpractitioners throughout the world. A second, more formal series entitled World BankCountry Economic Reports is published for the Bank by The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore and London. Titles of these and all other Bank publications may befound in the Catalog of Publications, which is available free of charge from World Bank,Publications Unit, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
This report is a free publication. A small charge may be made if airmail postage isrequired.
The views and interpretations in this report are the authors' and should not be attributedto the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to any individual acting in theirbehalf.
Copyright © 1978 The International Bank for Reconstructionand Development/The World Bank
The World Bank enjoys copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Conven-tion. Nevertheless, reproduction of any part of this report is hereby granted providedthat full citation is made.
Preface
World Bank country economic reports, such as this report onGuatemala, provide the information and analysis which the Bank needs forplanning its country lending programs as well as for reviewing nationaldevelopment policies with the officials of the country concerned. Circu-lation of these reports is normally restricted to the "official community" --member Governments of the Bank and international organizations concernedwith development problems. When the World Bank and the Government con-cerned agree that a report may be of use to a wider audience, it ispublished by the Bank. This is such a case. The reader is advised, however,that this is a working document rather than a study prepared and editedwith a view to broader distribution.
Since the latter half of 1977 when the final substantive workwas done on this report, several important economic developments havetaken place. Most significant was the rapid fall in the price of coffee,a drop from about US$3.00 per pound in mid-1977 to barely over one thirdthat level today. Also, export earnings from the EXMIBAL nickel projectfell far short of anticipated levels, the result of low world marketprices for nickel which led EXMIBAL to restrict sharply its exports.Even with these adverse developments, the resulting current accountdeficit was small (barely over one percent of GDP) and growth continuedat record levels in 1977. The report's conclusion that the economy isfinancially sound and has good growth prospects for the future remainsvalid despite the current transitional problems associated with the returnto more normal coffee prices.
The events of the past few months have, however, reinforcedthe importance of the report's recommendations that tax reforms be under-taken to strengthen the Government's basic fiscal position. The coffeeprice boom produced an unprecedented revenue windfall for the Governmentthat greatly eased the problem of paying its share of the earthquakereconstruction bill. The fall in coffee prices, however, has significantlyeroded government revenues. At the same time, the Government is underintense pressure to maintain, if not expand, expenditure levels. Forexample, the outgoing administration granted a substantial increase inpublic sector salaries, and the new administration has stressed itsdesire to increase the public sector's involvement in agricultural development.Without additional revenues to finance such outlays, it is very likelythat the traditional pattern of cutbacks in public investment programs tobalance the budget will be repeated, which would prevent the new administra-tion from carrying out its programs to attack the root causes of povertyin Guatemala.
Guatemala faces a unique challenge in this area. WithinLatin America, only a few Andean countries have sharply dual economieswith a large indigenous population constituting the major portion of theimpoverished, traditional sector. And of these countries, even fewerface Guatemala's problem of a decidely heterogeneous Indian population whichspeaks not one but over a dozen distinct languages and scores of dialects.This, combined with a serious concentration of the indigenous populationon land poorly suited to subsistence cultivation, places extraordinarydemands on public sector development programs. While many years will be
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required to significantly reduce the income gap between the traditionaland modern sectors, public sector programs designed to improve the Indian'squality of life through outlays for housing, health services, water supply,and sanitation can have an important impact much more quickly. Althoughthe nation's substantial unused borrowing capacity could be furtherutilized, improved domestic resource mobilization will have to providethe majority of the financing for this increased, socially orientedexpenditure.
It is hoped that this Bank staff report will contribute toa better understanding of these issues both in Guatemala and in othercountries facing similar situations, thereby supporting the economicdevelopment efforts of the countries concerned.
Eugenio LariActing Vice-President
Latin America and CaribbeanRegional Office
GUATEMALA
CURRENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POSITION AND PROSPECTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
COUNTRY DATA
MAP
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................. i - iii
1. INVENTORY OF RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT .................. 1
A. Land Resources .. ............... .. ......................... 1B. Minerals ........ ................................... 3C. Flora and Fauna ..*......... ..*. ....................... 4D. Tourism ........................................... 4E. Infrastructure ...................... ..... ....... . 4
2. HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE SOCIAL SCENE ....... ............. 8
A. Population ......... ................................ 8B. Income Distribution . ...... . ... ..................... 11C. Social Services . .... . ...... 19D. Future Prospects ............... * . * .......... . 23
3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ............................................ 25
A. Pattern of Growth ................................. 25B. Prices ........... *.................. ........... * 33C. The External Sector ... .. ................. *..........*. 35
4. MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY ......................... .. .* 43
A. Money and Banking .............. . ........*......... 43B. Public Finance .... * ............... * ...... ......... . 48C. Public Investment ...................... * .... . 58
5. STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY ................................ 71
A. Agricultural Sector ..... ........................... 71B. Manufacturing Sector ..... .... .. .................. 80C. Mining and Petroleum ..... ....... .... *. ........... 88D. Tourism ..... . . ......... . . ....... 91
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
LIST OF TABLES IN TEXT
Page No.
1.1 Estimated Potential Use of Land ..................... 31.2 Length of Road Network .................. .. . ...... 5
1.3 Rail Freight and Passenger Traffic .................. 6
1.4 Electricity Statistics .............................. 7
2.1 Income Distribution Pattern ......... .................. 122.2 Regional Disparities - Family Income ................ 13
2.3 Employment Increases, Capital Intensity andProductivity Growth .... ..... .... . ....................... .... . 16
2.4 Profitability of Guatemalan Enterprises .............. 182.5 Illiteracy Among the Rural Population ............. 202.6 Health Indices for Guatemala and
Central American Countries ........................ 212.7 Regional Distribution of Health Services .o........... 22
3.1 Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Category ...... 27
3.2 GDP by Sector (Constant Market Prices) ............ .. 313.3 Summary Balance of Payments ....... .. -.............. 36
4.1 Financing Capacity of the Banking System ..... o- ... 444.2 Comparative Central Government Datao-o ..... 49
4.3 Consolidated Public Sector Indicators as aPercent of GDP -- .... .. .... ........ . .... 50
4.4 Autonomous Agencies - Summary of FinancialTransactions ....... ....... . .......... .......... 53
4.5 Central Government Current Expenditures ---.. 554.6 Central Government Capital Expenditures .............. 554.7 Public Sector Indicators as Share of GDP - Projected 574.8 Public Sector Fixed Investment as a Share of GDP ...o 584.9 Public Fixed Investment by Sector ...o ... o ........... 594.10 Public Investment .0.0. ........ ... ..................... . 604.11 Proposed Public Investment by Sector ..... -.......... 62
5.1 Land Tenure Pattern ............ . ..... .......... 735.2 Value Added in Manufacturing (Constant 1958 Prices).. 815.3 Basic Industrial Indicators ...... o ..... .............. 82
LIST OF FIGURES IN TEXT
3.1 Elements of Growth, 1956-1976a. National Accounts ...... o........... o..... 26b. Balance of Payments .............................. 26
3.2 Composition of Exports, 1960-1976 ............. o....... 293.3 Sectoral Growth Patterns, 1956-1976 ............ ... 31
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
STATISTICAL ANNEX
MAP ANNEX
1. Population Density2. Arable Land Availability3. Average Rural Family Income
Page 1 of 2 pages
COUNTRY DATA - GUATEMALA
AREA POPULATION DENSITYTotal 108,889 km2 6.3 million (mid-1976) 57.4 per kmAgriculture 45,503 km Rate of Growth: 3.0% (from 1960 to 1976) 137.4 per km2 of arable land
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (1973) HEALTH (1973)Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000) 43.4 Population per physician 4,570Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 13.3 Population per hospital bed 470Infant Mortali'y (per 1,000 live births) 84.1
INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1970) DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP (1970)% of national income, highest quartile 66.5 % owned by top 10% of owners 81.4
lowest quartile 6.7 7 owned by smallest 107 of owners 0.5
ACCESS TO PIPED WATER (1974) ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (1975)% of population - urban 88 % of population - total 22
- rural 15 - rural 4
NUTRITION (1975) EDUCATION (1975)Calorie intake as % of requirements 91 Adult literacy rate % 47Per capita protein intake (gr/day) 59 Primary school enrollment ah 64
1/GNP PER CAPITA in 19 7 6C: US $698
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1976 ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (7, constant prices)
US $ Xln. 7% 1965-70 1970-73 1973-76
GDP at Market Prf es 4,363.1 100o. 5.7 6.6 5.2Gross Domestic investment 869.3 19.9 4.8 4.9 14.4Gross National Saving 814. I 18.7 8.2 5.1 19.2Current Account Balance _5.5 -1.3Exports of Goods, NFS 952.0 21.8 7.4 9.3 6.0Imports of Goods, NFS 1,136.0 26.0 3.6 3.4 10.0
OUTPUT, LABOR FORCE ANDPRODUCTIVITY IN 1973
Value Added Labor Forcer V. A. Per WorkerUS$ Mln. % ,% -Us$ 7e
Agriculture and mining 719.4 28.0 883.8 57.1 814 49.0Industry 490.7 19.1 278.9 18.0 1,759 105.9Services 1,359.2 52.9 346.2 22.4 3,926 236.4Unallocated .j . 9 t si
Total/Average 2,569.3 100.0 1,547.3 100.0 1,661 100.0
GOVERNMENT FINANCECentral Government
( Q Mln.) % of GDP196- 1976 1972-75
Current Receipts 406.9 9.3 8.8Current Expenditure 336.2 T7 7.2Current Surplus 70.7 1.6 1.6Capital Expenditures 238.8 5.5 3.0External Assistance (net) 16.7 0.3 1.0
1/ The Per Capita estimate is at average 19J <mairket prices, calculated using the World Atlasmethod. All other conversions to dollars in this table are at the average exchange rateprevailing during the period covered.
2/ Total labor force; unemployed are allocated to sector of their normal occupation. "Unallocated" consistsmainly of unemployed workers seeking their flrst job.
not availablenot applicable
Page 2 of 2 pages
COUNTRY DATA - GUATEMALA
MONEY, CREDIT and PRICES 1967 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976(Banking System) (Million Q outstanding end period)
Money and Quasi Money 257.8 482.8 591.1 674.o 826.8 1,146.1Bank Credit to Public Sector 35.1 110.9 111.1 133.9 138.2 169.3Bank Credit to Private Sector 199.4 272.0 305.9 400.2 456.8 575.3
(Percentages or Index Numbers)
Money and Quasi Money as 7. of GDP 17.7 23.0 22.9 21.3 23.0 26.6General Price Index (1958 - 100) 97.6 103.5 118.4 137.0 154.1 171.7
Annual percentage changes in:General Price Index 0.3 -1.3 14.4 15.7 12.5 11.4Bank credit to Public Sector 2.6 47.3 0.2 20.5 3.2 22.5Bank credit to Private Sector 12.0 8.3 12.5 30.8 14.1 25.9
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MERCHANDISE KXPORTS (AVERAGE 1974-76)
1967 1970 197 6 US $ Mln %(Millions US $)
Coffee 201.5 30.1Exports of Goods, NFS 232.5 349.5 951.8 Sugar 86.7 13.0Imports of Goods, NFS 284.4 336.7 1,136.3 Cotton 75.6 11.3Resource GaP (deficit - -) -5T. 1 -1B4.5 Bananas 33.6 5.0
Meat 20.3 3.0Interest Payments (net) -5.1 -8.3 -9.8 All other commodities 251.4 37.6Workers' Remittances . . 8.2 Total 669.1 100;0Other Factor Payments (net) -14.3 -29.9 -16.3Net Transfers 9.3 17.5 198.6 EXTZRNAL DEBT. DECEMBER 31. 1976Balance on Current Account -_ -77 -U
US $ MlnDirect Foreign Investment 18.2 24.9 94.2Net .LT Borrowing (Public) 20.5 21.4 61.3 Public Debt, incl. guaranteed 211.7
Disbursement 33.8 36.9 71.8 Non-Guaranteed Private DebtAmortization 13.3 15.5 10.5 Total outstanding & Disbursed
Subtotal 38TT 463 155.5 I/Private Borrowing 37.4 32.9 84.7 DEBT SERVICE RATIO for i976-Other Capital (net) 10.0 -1.5 15.1 %Other items n.e.i -SI -8-L -Increase in Reserves Public Debt. incl. guaranteed 1.9
= gain) -5.5 -29.1 -221.3 Non-Guaranteed Private DebtTotal outstanding & Disbursed
Net Reserves (end year) 51.1 76.4 503.6
RATE OF EXCHANGE IBRD/IDA LENDING, (Sept. 30. 1977)(Million US $):
Through - 1971 IBRD IDAUS $ 1.00 -Q 1.00
1.00 = us $ 1.00 Outstanding & Disbursed 68.6Undisbursed 64.9
Since - 1971 Outstanding incl. Undisbursed 133.5 2/US $ 1.00= Q 1.00
1.00 5 US $ 1.00
1/ Ratio of Debt Service to Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services.2/ Excluding US$55.0 million loan for Aguacapa power project which is not yet effective.
not available
not applicable
December 8, 1977
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
US$1 = 1.00 Quetzales (Q)
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
1 Square Kilometer (km ) 100 Hectares (ha) = 247 Acres (ac)1 Manzana (mz) = 0.699 Hectares (ha) = 1.727 Acres (ac)1 Metric Ton (MT) 2,204.6 Pounds (lb) = 21.74 Quintales (qq)1 Short Ton (ST) = 2,000 Pounds (lb) = 0.907 Metric Tons (MT)1 Quintal (qq) = 46 Kilograms (kg) = 101.5 Pounds = 1.015 Hundredweight (cwt)1 Coffee Bag = 60 Kilograms (kg) = 1.3 Quintales (qq)1 Banana Box (net) = 4o Pounds (lb) = 18.2 Kilograms (kg)
ac acrebpd barrels per daycwt hundredweightha hectarekg kilogramkm kilometerlb poundMT metric tonMW megawattmz manzanaqq quintalST short ton
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANACAFE National Coffee Association(Asociacion Nacional del Cafe)
AVIATECA Guatemalan Aviation Company(Empresa Guatemalteca de Aviacion)
BANDESA National Bank for Agricultural Development(Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Agricola)
BANVI National Housing Bank(Banco Nacional de la Vivienda)
CABEI Central American Bank for Economic Integration(Banco Centroamericano de Integracion Economica)
CACM Central American Common Market(Mercado Comun Centroamericano)
CHN National Mortgage Credit Bank(Banco Credito Hipotecario Nacional)
CNPE, CONAPLAN General Secretariat of the National Council forEconomic Planning
(Secretaria General del Consejo Nacional dePlanificacion Economica)
CORFINA National Finance Company(Corporacion Financiera Nacional)
DGC Directorate General of Roads(Direccion General de Caminos)
DGE Directorate General of Statistics(Direccion General de Estadistica)
DIGESA Directorate General of Agricultural Services(Direccion General de Servicios Agricolas)
EEG Guatemalan Electricity Company(Empresa Electrica de Guatemala)
EXMIBAL Mineral Explorations and Exploitations of Izabal, Ltd.(Exploraciones y Explotaciones Mineras Izabal, S.A.)
FEGUA Guatemalan Railways(Ferrocarriles de Guatemala)
FYDEP National Enterprise for Economic Growth and Developmentof the Peten
(Empresa Nacional de Fomento y Desarrollo Economicodel Peten)
GUATEL Guatemalan Telecommunications Company(Empresa Guatemalteca de Telecomunicaciones)
GUATEXPRO National Export Promotion Center(Centro Nacional de Promocion de las Exportaciones)
IGSS Guatemalan Social Security Institute(Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social)
INDE National Electrification Institute)(Instituto Nacional de Electrificacion)
INDECA National Agricultural Marketing Institute(Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola)
INFOM Municipal Development Institute(Instituto de Fomento Municipal)
INGUAT Guatemalan Tourism Institute(Instituto Guatemalteco de Turismo)
INTA National Institute for Agrarian Transformation(Instituto Nacional de Transformacion Agraria)
SIECA Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty forCentral American Economic Integration(Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General deIntegracion Economica Centroamericana)
SPA Public Agricultural Sector(Sector Publico Agricola)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i. The growth of the Guatemalan economy has averaged 5.7 percent peryear since 1960, which was about the same as the average for Latin America as awhole. Vital to this growth, especially in the 1960s, was Guatemala's partici-pation in the Central American Common Market and the incentives offered tostimulate industrial development within this regional grouping. In 1969Honduras withdrew from the Common Market following its conflict with ElSalvador; its trade with the rest of the CACM countries continues, however,on the basis of bilateral treaties. Trade among the other countries of theregion is still governed by the Common Market rules and remains an importantstimulus to Guatemala's growth. Government deficits have been small comparedto GDP, and central bank financing has been minimal. This, combined with arelatively liberal trade policy, has kept inflation very low; from 1960until the oil crisis in 1973, increases in the GDP deflator averaged less thanone-half percent per year. Externally, Guatemala has generally kept itscurrent account deficits quite low, and in a number of years has had a surplusin its trade account. This, together with the limited public sector deficits,has helped keep external borrowing to a minimum. At present the Governmenthas virtually no debt outstanding with private external lenders, and theexternal public debt service ratio is less than two percent. Guatemala hasavoided major economic fluctuations, and the quetzal was recently chosen bythe IMF as one of the world reserve currencies, an indication of its strength.
ii. Despite the substantial economic growth in recent years, socialdevelopment has lagged. Guatemala has a heritage of two cultures--Spanish andIndian--and in large part because of the very limited role played by thepublic sector in the nation's development, the gap between these two largeethnic groups in terms of per capita income, health and education has not beenreduced to any significant extent over the past twenty years. The Indians,who constitute over 40 percent of the population, live largely in the ruralareas and are relatively isolated from the mainstream of modern national life.Socially, they are separated by their native culture and languages; physically,they are separated by the rugged terrain and lack of adequate rural roads.Because this large segment of the population does not have adequate schoolsand health facilities, adult illiteracy for Guatemala still exceeds 50 percent,and life expectancy rose above 50 years only in the past few years.
Recent Developments
iii. During the 1970's, the most notable developments in Guatemala havebeen the oil crisis which began in late 1973 and the earthquake which occurredin February 1976. The near-quadrupling of oil prices which began in 1973 ledto a sharp increase in the share of Guatemala's export earnings allocated tooil imports. However, the impact of the price increases for oil and forother imports was cushioned during this period by a resurgence of earningsfrom Central American trade, a rapid growth of tourism earnings, high coffeeprices and substantial reserves which, in 1974, allowed Guatemala to maintain
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the level of imports required to sustain economic growth. The oil crisis did,however, cause accelerated domestic inflation and, in 1975, a slowdown of therate of growth of the domestic economy. In contrast to the very low averagerates of inflation which Guatemala enjoyed in the past, prices rose by anaverage of about 14 percent per year from 1973 through 1976. Consumers, whoseaverage wages did not rise as quickly as prices, lost a significant amount ofpurchasing power. Consequently, and as a result of world recession, the realgrowth of consumption slowed down, particularly in 1975. This, along with adecline in real investment, reduced the rate of economic growth in that yearto only 1.9 percent in real terms, the slowest since the early 1950s. Exter-nally, rapid import price increases and significantly lesser increases inGuatemala's export prices led to a substantial deterioration in the terms oftrade. In 1976, however, there was an exceptional increase in coffee priceswhich reversed this deterioration. Also, economic growth, stimulated byearthquake reconstruction activity discussed below, reached 7.6 percent.
iv. The earthquake of February 1976 ripped through nine thousand squarekilometers of the Guatemalan highlands, killing some thirty thousand peopleand leaving nearly a fifth of the nation's population homeless. It was asocial tragedy of unprecedented magnitude for the Guatemalans. They respondedwith a remarkable certainty of purpose and sense of community. Within arelatively short time, basic social services were restored, albeit on atemporary basis in most cases. The Government now has underway a far-reachingprogram of reconstruction which seeks not only to replace the facilities(particularly housing) damaged by the earthquake, but to upgrade them aswell. Despite extensive reconstruction during the past year, the nation stillfaces a housing deficit substantially worse than that which existed beforethe quake. The earthquake led to a change in the Government's investmentplans for the next five years. If carried out, the revisions will increasesubstantially the degree of government participation in the nation's economicdevelopment. This would be highly desirable given its limited role in thepast and the widespread unmet social needs.
Prospects for the Future
v. Guatemala should be able to maintain rates of growth in the mediumterm somewhat above those in the past. Prospects are good for continuedgrowth in export earnings, based in large part on projected high levels forcoffee prices during the next two or three years. There should be no signifi-cant constraint on the country's capacity to import the goods required tosustain an accelerated growth and an expanded public investment program forreconstruction and development. Even if export earnings fall short of theprojected levels, the nation has a high level of reserves (seven months ofimports) and a substantial borrowing capacity which could be tapped.
vi. The tax on coffee exports should provide very adequate revenues forthe Government during the next two or three years, given its planned expendi-tures. After this period, however, it may become difficult for the Govern-ment to support desirable levels of expenditure without improvements in therevenue structure such as increased income and property taxes and pricing
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policies among autonomous agencies which would allow them to finance a substan-tially larger share of their investment programs out of current savings thanat present. The most immediate need, however, is for significantly higherexpenditures on staff, training and associated supporting capital investments(e.g., vehicles and training centers for agricultural exte-sion staff). Theseare necessary prerequisites for the expansion of economic azid social serviceswhich the Government must provide if the country is to overcome the pastconstraints on growth imposed by weak internal demand, low productivity intraditional agriculture, poor health, and limited basic education. Initialefforts have been made in some of these areas. For example, work recentlybegan on a program for upgrading the quality of public sector administrationin Guatemala.
vii. The Government, through the 1975-79 Development Plan, has placedhigh priority on improvements in these areas. With a major portion of thepopulation living outside or at the margin of the monetized economy, and withthe recent inflation eroding the purchasing power of wage earners, the inade-quate domestic demand for consumer products has been a significant constrainton expansion of domestic production. Economic growth could be acceleratedsubstantially if the effective purchasing power of the bulk of the population,particularly in the rural areas, were increased as envisaged by the NationalDevelopment Plan. A stepped-up public investment program, for which addi-tional financial resources could be mobilized relatively easily, would makea major contribution in this respect. Perhaps most important of all, thisstrategy would improve the quality of life for the majority of the Guatemalanpeople. This report contains the outline of a development program which pullstogether the various public investment projects that have been identified.
viii. Prospects for relative price stability are quite good for the mediumterm. Although the Government is unlikely to be able to bring the rate ofinflation back down to the low historical levels very quickly without causing aneconomic recession, Guatemala's capacity to import and to expand domestic pro-duction to meet increased domestic demand should allow it to bring the rate ofinflation substantially below the 1976 level. Therefore, the substantialincrease in public investment recommended in this report should be fullyconsistent with a continued reduction in the rate of inflation.
ix. The outlook for a more vigorous economic expansion would be betterassured if an agreement with the other Central American countries on a streng-thened Central American Common Market finally materializes. Although substan-tial growth in regional trade has taken place despite the difficulties facedby the Central American Common Market in recent years, the additional demandfor Guatemalan goods which would result from further progress in regionalintegration would help the country expand its industrial activity in lineswhere production is now (or would be) inefficient because of the diseconomiesresulting from a small domestic market. The prospects for continued expansionof efficient industrial production would also be enhanced by continued effortsby the Government to help manufacturers find new markets for their productsoutside the Central American area.
1. INVENTORY OF RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT
1. Although Guatemala has never been considered a country richlyendowed with natural resources, it has an abundant agricultural potentialand, in recent years, important deposits of both minerals and oil have beendiscovered which may ultimately transform the country. Guatemala's infra-structural facilities such as ports, roads, railways, power stations, and atelecommunications network help it make use of this potential, but much needsto be done to expand this infrastructure, particularly in the rural areas, iffull use is to be made of the natural resource potential of the country.
A. Land Resources
2. About one half of Guatemala's territory is mountainous. The SierraMadre forms a Highlands zone (the Altiplano) parallel to the Pacific coastthat stretches through the central part of the country from the Mexican tothe Salvadorean borders. The Western Highlands, which lie to the west ofGuatemala City, vary in elevation from 1,000 to 2,000 meters. Numerousvolcanoes are scattered throughout the chain, and some mountains reach to3,000 meters or more. The land area occupied by the Altiplano is broken andgenerally unsuitable for the intensive cultivation of corn, beans and otherbasic grains to which it is subjected. The type of terrain, the high popula-tion density and the slash and burn subsistence agriculture have resulted insevere deforestation and erosion. The rapid increase in population in thisregion, combined by highly skewed distribution of land ownership, has ledto a further breaking up of cultivable land into properties so small that themajority of them cannot support their owners without off-farm employment.
3. The portion of the plateau extending towards the Atlantic fromGuatelama City known as the Eastern Altiplano is very broken. The climateis drier than in the Western Highlands, and the production of basic grainsand tobacco which takes place there generally requires irrigation, which hasproved to be rather costly. Consequently, production in this region isgenerally restricted to tropical fruits and livestock, which do not requireirrigation.
4. The Pacific Coastal Plain is divided into two economic regions: theMountain Slopes of the Altiplano and the Pacific Plain. The Mountain Slopeshave generous rainfall and include some of the better soil resources inGuatemala. Since this region produces most of Guatemala's coffee, it is oneof the most important in the country from the economic point of view. Alongthe lower slopes, sugarcane and cotton cultivation is widespread and isencroaching on the large pastures used for the fattening of livestock. ThePacific Coastal Plain, which is 20 to 45 km wide, has abundant fertile soilsand a favorable climate that allows two crops a year in many cases. Largefarms predominate. The main products are cotton, rubber, bananas, sugar-cane, tropical fruits, and cattle.
5. The area north of the Altiplano comprises the two remaining zonesof the country--the Northern Lowlands (basically the Peten), and the Northern
Slopes, which lie between the Altiplano and the Northern Lowlands. The com-bined area of the Northern Slopes and Lowlands accounts for over 40 percent ofGuatemala's territory, but this area is inhabited by less than 1 percent ofthe population. The region has a good potential for agricultural developmentin view of the abundant rainfall and the moderately fertile soil; however,economic activity is limited because of the almost complete lack of infrastruc-ture, especially in the northern part. At present the only significant economicactivities are the foreign-owned banana plantations in the Motagua RiverValley plus some coffee growing and forestry. This is expected to change,however, with the colonization taking place under the Faja Transversal program.
6. In comparison to the other Central American countries, a largershare of the land area is capable of high or moderate yields; while Guatemala'sterritory is equivalent to about 22 percent of the combined area of CentralAmerica and Panama, it includes some 26 percent of the region's land capableof high yields for annual crops and more than 34 percent of such land capableof moderate yields (Table 1.1). However, as Guatemala has about 33 percent ofthe region's population, the productive land available per person may besomewhat lower than the Central American average. Furthermore, because ofpoor farming practices, yields tend to be substantially lower on the sametype of soil in Guatemala than in, for example, Costa Rica.
7. The widespread volcanic activity in Guatemala reveals the country'slocation in a very active seismic zone. Five major tectonic plates (Pacific,Americas, Cocos, Caribbean and Nazca) meet in the area. As a result, earth-quakes have had an important impact on the country's development. For example,the earthquakes of 1717 and 1773 led to the shift of Guatemala's capital cityfrom Antigua to its present location, and the earthquake of 1976 has had pro-found social and economic repercussions which are discussed elsewhere in thisreport. The increased understanding of the tectonic structure of the countrywhich is being gained from studies of the 1976 quake will affect the futurelocation and design of homes, factories, dams and other infrastructure.
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Table 1.1: GUATEMALA: ESTIMATED POTENTIAL USE OF LAND /a(Area in square kilometers)
Percent ofPercent Total Central
Type of Land Area of Total American Landin Category /b
Land responsive to intensive use 16,016 14.7 26For annual crops 9,604 8.8For perennial crops (or pasture) 6,412 5.9
Land capable of moderate yields 29,487 27.0 34For annual crops 3,041 2.7For perennial crops (or pasture) 26,446 24.3
Forest lands 31,853 29.3Pine 19,833 18.2Tropical hardwoods 11,518 10.6Other 501 0.5
Land capable of only low yields even undermodern practices 31,533 29.0
Total 108,889 100.0 22
Source: FAO, Potential Use of Land, Guatemala, 1971.
/a Land is classified under a category if at least 50 percent of the areacan thus be classified. The smallest area considered in the survey wasat least 3,000 hectares. The quality of the land is classified inrelation to its susceptibility to erosion; hence, land classified mainlyfor perennial crops can, with proper conservation practices, be employedfor the cultivation of annual crops or as pasture land.
/b Includes Panama.
B. Minerals
8. Guatemala's mineral resources have attracted increasing attention inrecent years. Traditionally, mining activity has been relatively unimportant,contributing less than one-half percent of both GDP and employment. The littleactivity which existed has been centered in Huehuetenango where deposits ofcopper, tin, lead, antimony and other minerals are found. However, commercialquantities of oil were proven in 1975 in the Rubelsanto area of Alta Verapaz,and by mid-1977, refined matte nickel will begin to be shipped from theEXMIBAL project, which has been developed to exploit the nickel deposit lyingnear Lake Izabal in the eastern part of the country. Both of these activities,promise to make substantial contributions to GDP and export earnings (seeChapter 5).
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C. Flora and Fauna
9. Guatemala has a wide variety of flora and fauna of commercial value.Pine and tropical hardwoods such as mahogany, oak and cedar cover much of thenational territory and could serve as the basis for a substantially largerwood products industry if, as is discussed in the agriculture section of thisreport, steps were taken to reduce the indiscriminate cutting that is result-ing in widespread deforestation and erosion. Guatemala's forests are one ofthe world's major sources of chicle for chewing gum. A wide variety of gameanimals are found in Guatmala. Decorative and song birds (e.g., parrots andparakeets) are exported, and the coastal waters provide shrimp and otherseafood.
D. Tourism
10. Guatemala's resources for tourism are outstanding. There are remainsof the pre-colonial Mayan civilization at Tikal, vestiges of the Spanishcolonial empire, and more recent remnants of the early days of Guatemalanindependence. A striking national theater, due to open soon, will offer yetanother chance for the tourist to enjoy Guatemala's rich cultural heritage.The natural scenery is unusually picturesque. In each region, the tourist canfind people wearing a colorful dress unique to the area. A highly developedhandicraft industry flourishes in Guatemala, producing particularly beautifulhand-woven textiles as well as a wide variety of other household goods and artobjects. An abundance of wild animals make hunting and photography attractive.There are beaches on both the Atlantic and Pacific, and beautiful highlandlakes surrounded by volcanic cones have good tourism potential as well. Theseresources, combined with a location only two-and-one-half hours by plane fromthe U.S., give Guatemala a unique comparative advantage in the development ofits tourism industry.
E. Infrastructure
11. The country has four major ports, of which two (Puerto Barrios andSanto Tomas de Castilla) are located on the Atlantic coast and two (San Joseand Champerico) are on the Pacific coast. The facilities at Puerto Barrioswere badly damaged by the earthquake and are now undergoing partial recon-struction. The ports on the Pacific coast are considered inadequate andconstruction of a new port is being studied.
12. Over the last 20 years, Guatemala undertook a major effort todevelop its road system, and all major production and consumption centers andthe principal ports are now connected (Table 1.2). Guatemala's basic roadsystem includes: the Inter-American Highway, which extends from the Mexicanto the Salvadorian border, passing through the Central Highlands and GuatemalaCity; the Pacific Highway, which crosses the Pacific coastal plains; and theInteroceanic Highway, which passes through Guatemala City and connects theAtlantic ports with the port of San Jose on the Pacific. Additional pavedhighways connect Guatemala with El Salvador and Honduras. In 1970 the first
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road connecting the central part of the country with the northern part of thePeten was completed. There are still large potentially rich areas of thecountry, however, which cannot be developed because of a lack of roads, andfurther expansion of the road network will be needed for continuing agricul-tural development.
Table 1.2: GUATEMALA: LENGTH OF ROAD NETWORK /1
1963 1970 1974
Paved 1,268 2,334 2,620
Unpaved 9,304 11,116 11,293
Total 10,572 13,450 13,913
Source: Directorate General of Roads.
/1 Excludes private roads with an estimated length of 3,080 km at the endof 1970.
13. Guatemala's railway network of 824 kilometers is the most exten-sive in Central America. Branch lines run from the Atlantic to the Pacificcoast and from the Mexican to the Salvadorian borders. The railway, originallyprivately owned, was nationalized in 1968. The volume of freight carried byFEGUA declined steadily between 1961 and 1965 because of the completion of theAtlantic Highway, and stagnated afterwards for a number of years leading tosubstantial operating deficits (Table 1.3). Since 1973, however, a combinationof rising freight volumes and internal reorganization gives hope that FEGUA'sfinancial future will improve (Statistical Annex Table 5.5).
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Table 1.3: GUATEMALA: RAIL FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC
(In thousands of metric tons)
1965 1970 1974
A. Freight
Tons (000) 590 607 776Ton-km (000,000) 102 104 155Average haul (km) 172 172 200
B. Passenger
Passengers (000) 1,597 1,285 1,663Pass-km (000,000) 89 92 93Average haul (km) 56 72 56
Source: FEGUA, adjusted by the Bank Transport Sector Mission.
14. Guatemala's electricity comes predominantly from thermal generation,which accounts for over 60 percent of installed capacity (Table 1.4). Thecountry, however, has a large, technically exploitable hydroelectric potential,recently calculated at 4,300 MW. 1/ Compared to present installed capacity,which, including both hydro and thermal, is less than 350 MW, Guatemala couldmeet all of its power needs for years to come without depending on petroleumif it were to develop fully its hydro potential. Even if Guatemala is able todevelop its oil deposits to the point that it could generate a substantialportion of its electricity requirements with oil-fired plants, it would stillbe more economical, given present and projected oil prices, to develop itshydro resources and export the oil. The Aguacapa and Chixoy projects whichare presently underway will markedly increase the share of Guatemala's powercoming from hydro sources.
15. At present, hardly any unused generation capacity is left. Majorinvestments, preferably based on the country's barely-tapped hydroelectricpotential, will be required to meet the demand from industry, which isalready suffering production losses due to power outages and has installedabout 100 MW of captive generating plant--equivalent to nearly one-third ofthe nation's total capacity. Additional investment will also be requiredto supply the power to rural areas needed to help raise their standards ofliving.
1/ Plan Maestro de Electrificacion Nacional, 1977-2000 - Guatemala, May 1976.
Table 1.4: GUATEMIALA: ELECTRICITY STATISTICS A1
1969 1973 1975
A. Installed Capacity (in MW)
INDE 84.3 161.6 157.7Hydroelectric 55.7 95.8 96.2Thermal 28.6 65.8 61.5
EEG 52.5 51.5 51.5Municipalities and other 12.5 12.9 17.0
Total 149.3 226.0 226.0
B. Output (in GWH)
INDE 313.1 555.1 563.6EEG 259.5 269.2 270.0Municipalities and other 31.1 33.4 33.4
Total 603.7 857.7 867.0
/1 Excluding captive generating plants, which, in 1975, accounted for another100 MW of installed capacity.
Source: Bank of Guatemala, INDE, and EEG.
16. Guatemala's telephone density (8.25 lines per 1,000 inhabitants) isthe lowest in Central America after Honduras and is only one-fourth that ofCosta Rica. A substantial increase in telecommunications infrastructure willbe required to overcome the present constraints to the country's developmentof its rural areas, tourism potential, and commercial and industrial activity.These constraints are particularly severe outside of Guatemala City and tendto aggravate the concentration of economic activity in the capital.
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2. HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE SOCIAL SCENE
A. Population
17. The crude birth rate is relatively high in Guatemala and has remainedso for an extended period of time. During most of this century, at least inthe years preceding 1960, the birth rate fluctuated between 45 and 50 perthousand population. Since 1960 a slight decline has been observed. However,the data do not point to any substantial reduction in fertility. The crudebirth rate in 1973 (43.4) was nearly the same as for the 1965-69 period(44.0). Although total fertility rate declined from 6.66 in 1949-1951 to 6.42in 1963-65 and to 5.89 in 1973, it is still high. This slight decline overtime is attributable to lower fertility among women under 30 years of age.
18. The national family planning program has had only a very minorimpact on fertility. The program, which began in 1969, functions through 120rural health centers and nine capital city clinics. Only 4.4 percent ofmarried women in the 15-44 age bracket were using family planning methods inthe mid-1970s, of which only two-thirds were using supplies and services ofthe national program. The number of new acceptors has remained at about18,000 annually since 1970. The Ministry of Health is considering expansionof family planning services through health posts throughout the countrywhich would be staffed by last-year medical students and nurses, a strongpositive step. In addition, the Ministry of Health has accelerated graduationof rural health technicians trained in family planning.
19. The crude death rate declined from 20.0 per thousand in 1955-1959,to 18.0 per thousand in 1960-1964 and to 13.3 per thousand in 1972. The 1973increase to 15.4 was clearly temporary.
20. Without adjustments for under-enumeration, the census data indicatethat the rate of population growth in Guatemala has slowed down considerably,from an average annual level of 3.1 percent (1950-64) to 2.2 percent (1964-1973). The adjusted census figures put the Guatemala population for 1973at 5.7 million, not 5.2 million as the unadjusted data indicate. If theformer figure is accepted, the rate of population growth remained stableat about three percent per year throughout the entire 1950-1973 period, whichwould be consistent with the trends noted above.
21. The age distribution of Guatemala's population has hardly changedsince 1950. In 1973, 45 percent of the population was under 15 years of ageand the dependency ratio 1/ was 0.92, only a fraction higher than the 0.83 ratiofor the whole of Latin America, but significantly higher than those for theU.S. (0.54) or Argentina (0.58). In the urban centers, where the populationis older because of lower fertility and the influx of work-seeking adults, thedependency ratio is lower, at 0.79.
1/ The ratio of the sum of population below 14 and above 65 to the popula-tion in the working age bracket of 15-64.
9 -
22. The urban population 1/ accounts for 35.3 percent of the total.Almost two thirds of it or 1.2 million are concentrated in the centralregion. At the other end of the spectrum, the Western Highlands (Altiplano)show a very high concentration of rural population--1.2 million or one thirdof total rural population, with hardly any urban agglomerations. The densityof population is unequally distributed, with one half of total populationoccupying one fifth of the total territory of the country. Regional dynamicsof population is influenced by both the cultural level and the economicpotential of regions. These factors are interrelated. The first influencesthe mortality rate, higher in more backward, less urbanized regions, where thesocial services network--health, education and housing--is largely outside thereach of most of the population. The second influences inter-regionalmigratory movements. *As a result, the population growth of regions such asthe Altiplano remained below two percent per annum, while that of the urbancenters in the central region revolved around five percent per annum.
23. Population density doubled in Guatemala during the last quarter ofthe century, from 25 to 50 inhabitants per km2. Polarization of population isconsiderable. For instance, the Peten region, with its substantial naturalresources, accounts for one third of the national territory but for only 1percent of the population and this despite an 11 percent per annum rate ofpopplation growth mainly due to migration from other regions (Figure 2.1). Atthe other extreme, the Department of Guatemala, with 2 percent of the land area,accounts for 22 percent of the population. It is therefore not necessarilynatural resource endowment which is at the roots of the location pattern ofthe population. For instance, the best land is situated along the SouthernCoast of the country, where the population density is not excessive--rangingfrom 50 to 100 inhabitants per km2, less than in some of the poorer regions ofthe Altiplano.
24. Life expectancy is 52 years, compared to the Latin American averageof 60. This may be related to the educational level, the cultural or socialhabits of the population, and to the availability of health services. In thisrespect, the indigenous population is clearly under-privileged and the lifeexpectancy differences between the population of Spanish and of indigenousorigin provide a vivid proof of it.
Life Expectancy (in years)Population Origin Men Women
Spanish 61.4 60.0Indigenous 45.0 44.0
Source: Ministry of Public Health.
1/ Cities over two thousand.
B3RD A13123-2
SEPTEMBER 1977J
G U AT E M A LAPOPULATION, 1973
............... I..............I................... I.............................................. ... ............
THOUSANDS OF PERSONS .......... I * ... I............................................................................. 5................................
251 - 500.
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t'22~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 ALTA VERAPAZe
........................................
1 5 1, - 2 5 0 . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .I .. .. .. .. ........ 1.E T L U E
251.-5 500. ............. .n.
501.0 -27500 ........ '.'-;.. .....
^ 3 |. N:§*2 2'/ .''..' ................... 2. ,,, L51ES.................. CRREPNDT
4 !81 .' S ,,,, ~~~~~.... . 4 H .QU I U L
-{'f ~~~~16 SACATAPEQUEZ|17 SAN MARCOS T18 SANTA R TOSA I19 SOLOLA 20 SUCHITEPEOUEZ|21 TOTON ICAPAN22 ZACAPA
This map hats been prepared bV rhe World Bank s staff escias, rely for the conI'e '-encoOf th. raders of the rofon to wshich t is aetaulsed The denoroinast,ons ,sod and thebeuttdarlas shevvn on inss masp 00 not imp.'y on sne partn o! roe vVorld Bans anrd <Sr Offdiatres, artyudgrnant on the legal statuS of any tenrOritr or anoy endorsement or acceptanCe of such boundertes
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25. Population projections for Guatemala 1/ assume the decline of thefertility rate from 5.89 in 1973 to 3.75 in 2000, and the increase of lifeexpectancy at birth to 64 years. Critical to these projections are the con-tinuing speed of education and population control, which should gradually helpreduce the fertility rate. In this situation, the crude birth rate shoulddecline from 41.5 to 29.6 and, although the mortality rate should drop aswell, the annual growth rate would be reduced from 2.7 to 2.2 percent.Guatemala's population would attain 11.6 million in the year 2000, with 38.1percent of the population in ages 0-14, 58.6 percent in the age bracket of15-64 and 3.3 percent would be 65 or older. This would yield a dependencyratio of 0.71, more favorable than the present one. The population of thetwenty urbanized areas, which now account for 25 percent of the total, shouldincrease to 34 percent. Urban population growth would then be around 3.8perent per annum, significantly lower than the 4.7 percent observed during thelast two decades. Guatemala City, inhabited by only 340 thousand people in1950, increased to over 1 million by 1973, and is expected to grow to 3million by the year 2000.
B. Income Distribution
26. The uneven income distribution is both a social and an economicproblem. Part of the blame for this could be placed on the still low level ofmodernization of the country, which owes its relatively high average level ofper capita income not so much to new sectors such as industry or mining, butlargely to export-oriented subsectors of agriculture which have a highlyconcentrated ownership. 2/ Also, the impact of the Government's policies hasnot been sufficient to change significantly the skewness of the distribution.Higher public expenditures directed toward generation of more rural income anda broader spread of social services are needed. Another element is the ethnicsituation; about 43 percent of the population of Guatemala is of indigenousorigin and communicate among themselves in at least a dozen languages andseveral score dialects. The weight of customs and linguistic differencesimpedes rapid social mobility and slows down the spread of education andimprovement of agricultural techniques. The indigenous population is pre-dominantly rural, residing mostly in small villages. Their integration into"modern" life, which could undoubtedly help improve their income levels, mayprove to be slow. An adequate system of incentives such as appropriate pricesfor basic grains and a better spread of technical knowledge are needed to helpthem increase their production.
1/ By the International Statistical Programs Center (ISPC) of the U.S.Bureau of the Census.
2/ According to the latest agricultural census (1964) about 10 percent oflandowners controlled 76.6 percent of all land, and 75 percent of land-owners only 11.7 percent. The land is most fragmented in the westernAltiplano, where as much as 44 percent of the country's farms arelocated on 26 percent of the country's land; 40 percent of familieswith the lowest incomes (less than 400 quetzals per annum), are locatedin this region.
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27. Incomes. Given the wide geographical and cultural disparity amongpopulation groups, a selection of a representative population sample is adifficult task. The analysis of family budgets is conducted very sporadicallyin Guatemala and has yielded not entirely reliable results. Analysis ofa sample which appears to be closest to reality yields the following picturefor 1970.
Table 2.1: GUATEMALA: INCOME DISTRIBUTION PATTERN - 1970
Average per% of Total Family Per Capita Inequality
Quartile Income Income Annual Income Coefficient /1
() ------- In Quetzals --------) (Index)
I 6.7 438 81 1.0II 10.7 700 130 1.6III 16.1 1,055 195 2.4IV 66.5 4,346 804 9.9
Total 100.0 1,635 302 3.7
/1 Ratio of per capita income in the nth quartile to same in first quartile.
Source: Ingresos y Gastos, Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas,Universidad de San Carlos, 1972.
28. This picture points to a high concentration of income at the upperend, but, at the same time, to relative equality among the three remainingpopulation quartiles. Thus, while the inequality coefficient between thehighest and the lowest quartile group is roughly 10 to 1, this coefficientcalculated for the second richest group is only 2.4 to 1. While these resultsshould be used cautiously, they tend to show that a middle class has yet toemerge, and that the standard of living of three-fourths of the population isvery low, slightly below one half of the national average ($135 compared with$302 per capita in 1970). A partial explanation lies in the productivity andincome disparity between rural and urban economic activities, and in highlyaccentuated disparities within urban areas. If the Central Region (withGuatemala City as its hub) is considered as most representative among urban-ized regions, while the western Altiplano is considered as most representativeamong rural regions, the disparities are shown to be by far more acute in theformer:
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Table 2.2: GUATEMALA: REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN FAMILY INCOME, 1969
50% Lower 30% Middle 20% UpperIncome Income Income
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
A. Average Incomes (quetzales)
I. Central Region 264 1,340 466 3,763 863 15,737Share of indigenous pop-lation - 14%Degree of Urbanization - 71%
II. Western Altiplano 218 939 365 2,327 637 8,255Share of indigenous population - 70%Degree of Urbanization - 26%
III. Total (country) 260 1,180 454 2,958 860 12,545Degree of Urbanization - 35%
B. Inequality Indices'
I. Central RegionInequality - partial /b 1.0 5.1 1.0 8.1 1.0 18.2
- overall Lc 1.0 5.1 1.8 14.2 3.3 59.6
II. Western AltiplanoInequality - partial /b 1.0 4.3 1.0 6.4 1.0 13.0
- overall jC 1.0 4.3 1.7 10.7 2.9 37.9
III. Total (country)Inequality - partial /b 1.0 4.5 1.0 6.5 1.0 14.3
- overall /c 1.0 4.5 1.7 11.4 3.4 48.2
a/ Inequality is presented in two ways. The first, partial inequity, is calculated withineach group separately (poorest, middle income, upper income), and reflects income differencesbetween rural and urban in these three large income groups. The second, overall inequality,refers to income inequalities relative to the income or the poorest rural population.
/ Within each separate income stratum (with the poorest group.1.0).£1 Throughout all income strata (with poorest rural - 1.0).
Source: Staff calculation from various sources provided by the Consejo Nacional de Planifi-cacion Economica.
29. The high productivity and related profitability of urban-basedeconomic activities (industry and construction), compared with still low-yield,backward agriculture, lies at the roots of income disparities in Guatemala.Table 2.2 suggests that even the urban poor were receiving an income almostfivefold of that of the rural poor, while the urban rich were getting anincome fourteen times as high as the rural rich. 1/ The fact that the rural richwere receiving an income only three times that of the rural poor tends to showthat either disparities in landholding or agricultural productivity arelimited, or that the owners of larger farms reside in urban agglomerations(absentee landowners) and are classified as urban rich. This latter hypo-thesis is much more plausible, considering the very uneven land distributionin Guatemala.
30. The fiscal system neither taxes the concentration of agriculturalland nor penalizes for idle land. Thus, overall tax paid on agriculturaloutput, excluding taxes on export products, amounted to roughly 1.4 millionquetzales in 1973, compared to the value of agricultural output of 616 million
1/ "Poor" is defined here as that portion of the population in the bottom50 percent of the population in terms of family income; "rich" is definedas those in the top 20 percent.
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quetzales (of which exports were 274 million quetzales). The value of agri-cultural output produced by the largest farms could be estimated at some 302million quetzales, and the 1.4 million quetzales which have been paid in taxesrepresent only 0.5 percent of the value of their gross revenue.
31. Employment: Calculation of employment and unemployment is diffi-cult in countries where underemployment is pervasive and where there are nounemployment benefits and labor exchanges which would induce the urban un-employed to register. The economically active population (EAP) of Guatemala 1/is only 29.9 percent of the entire population, one of the lowest rates inLatin America. In part, this is attributable to women's low rate of parti-cipation--only 12.1 percent of all women are considered part of the EAP (23.1percent in urban and only 5.4 percent in rural areas.) This ratherartificially low participation rate 2/ makes unemployment figures (calculatedas a difference between EAP and the employed population) lower than theyprobably are in reality.
32. The average annual growth of the economically active population was2.7 percent during 1964-73, about the same as the overall population growth.Of this group, by far the largest share (56.5 percent) were rural workers.Next were artisans and other workers, accounting for 16.5 percent of totalEAP. The share of professional personnel, technicians and the like in thetotal has grown from barely 1.6 percent in 1950 to 3.1 percent in 1973.During the same period the number of those actually, even if only partly,occupied was growing by only 1.8 percent p.a., or by about an entire percent-age point slower than the economically active population. As a result, theactually employed accounted for only 87 percent of the EAP by 1973. Partic-ularly lagging was employment in agriculture, which has been growing at only0.3 percent p.a., adding over the period of nine years only 20 thousand jobs.Growth of employment in other sectors was somewhat more impressive, rangingfrom 4 percent p.a. in the manufacturing sector to some 4.4 percent p.a. forservices. It still was unable to compensate for the weak employment increasein agriculture, the country's largest sector.
33. Comparison between the economically active population and theemployed population shows that there was roughly 13 percent open unemploymentin 1973, compared with 2.7-3.2 percent officially registered unemployment.Actual unemployment including underemployment is probably substantially higher.If persons earning less than a minimum wage--or less than required to meetbasic needs--are considered as partially unemployed to the extent to whichtheir incomes fall below the minimum wage level, the unemployment level could
1/ Those in the age bracket of 10-64, able to work.
2/ When 15 years of age, instead of 10 years, is adopted as the lowestlevel at which a person is capable of working, the participation ratedeclines to 27.8 percent.
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then be estimated at 31 percent of the economically active population. 1/When applied separately to the urban and to the rural population, the calcula-tion yields 12.2 percent unemployment in urban areas and 42 percent in ruralareas.
34. The deterioration of the unemployment situation has taken placeduring a period of substantial economic activity characterized by highgrowth rates in main sectors of the economy and by substantial capitalinvestment. At the root of this economic activity was buoyant world demandfor some agricultural crops grown in Guatemala, as well as increasing domesticdemand for some industrial goods, largely consumed by the richer strata of thepopulation. Economic activity oriented toward satisfaction of this demand didnot bring any substantial improvement in the social situation of the population,mainly because it was based on capital-intensive forms of production. Inthis respect the situation in Guatemala has been considerably different fromthat of Latin America as a whole, where, during the decade of the sixties, thegrowth of employment has been substantially higher, while the economic growthhas been even somewhat lower than in Guatemala (see Table 2.3).
35. Any substantial increases in employment and improvement in theeconomic situation of low income population during the decade 1964-73 werelimited for two reasons:
(i) While productivity in agriculture was increasing rapidly, itwas mainly because of extensive methods. A rather impressivegrowth of agriculture is due mostly to increases in productionof industrial crops, mainly sugar and cotton, on the SouthernCoast, where new arable land was expanding by 6.5 percent perannum, compared to 1.7-2.0 percent increases in new arableland used for food production. The former involved substantialmechanization, which also contributes to an unusually highmarginal capital/labor coefficient. Practically the entireinvestment in agriculture went into the Southern Coast landused for cultivation of export crops.
(ii) Industrial development was equally heavily oriented towardcapital-intensive production techniques, partly because theexisting system of investment incentives favors them morethan labor-intensive techniques, and partly because newindustrial production was predominantly destined for thedomestic market and consisted of goods--mainly processedfood, chemicals, and non-metallic minerals--which were
1/ In other words, if ten persons earn an average of half the minimum wage,the equivalent of five persons are considered unemployed. This crite-rion of "unemployment," while increasingly accepted, is obviously nota rigorous one as it puts an equality sign between employment andadequate income, which is not always the case.
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relatively capital intensive. In contrast to the highmarginal capital/labor ratio for Guatemalan industry ($10,700per new job during 1965-73), countries which based theirindustrial development largely on surplus labor and whichwere export-oriented provided more employment opportunitiesper dollar of investment in industry. For example, themarginal capital/labor ratio in Korea, a country with percapita income similar to that of Guatemala, was only $2,300per new job 1/ (1965-73, in 1973 prices). Korea's industrialinvestment during the above period was only three times that ofGuatemala, 2/ but its industry provided new employment to965,000 people, fifteen times more than did Guatemalanindustry. Critical to the success of Korea's developmentstrategy was the highly developed education system whichproduced a literate population able to acquire industrialskills quickly. Guatemala's education system needs to beupgraded markedly if the country is to reduce unemploymentthrough the development of industry. In these fieldsGuatemala's efforts are still far from adequate.
Table 2. 3
GUATgLuA: n{PLOYM?ET INCETASES, CAPITAL INlENSITY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
G u a t e m a 1 a (1964 - 73) Latin America (1960-69)
Fixed Capital Long-termFormation Incremental(Million Capital: GDP
us$ - 1973 Labor ratio growth GDP growthEmployment Growth prices 1964-73 in real Productivity Employment in real Productivity
(thou. cumulat. (us$ a/ terms growth growth terms growtbSector (% p.a.) persons) 1965-73) thou./man) (% p.a.) (% D.Ra) (S P.a. (% DO .a.)
Total 1.8 230.2 2,410 10.5 5.9 4.0 2.8 4.8 1.9
Agriculture (est.) 0.3 20.3 217 10.7 5.2 4.8 1.5 4.0 2.5
Industry (est.) 4.0 63.3 6T5 10.7 7.8 3.7 2.3 5.9 3.5
Others 4.4 146.6 1,518 10.4 5.7 1.3 4.7 5.3 O.6
f/ 1973 prices.
Source: ission's calculation from following sources: For Guatemala - 1964 and 1973 Census. (investment calcualted from F and1511D reports statistics). For Latin America - Economic Survey of Latin America, successive issues (New Yor, UN) andJoseph J. Stern, The Employment Impact of Industrial Investment, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., January 1977, p. B.
1/ This figure represents net fixed capital formation. But even grossnew fixed capital (including depreciation) per worker amounted to$3.8 thousand, still only one third of that in Guatemala.
2/ Fivefold on gross basis.
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36. Wages: Of 1,545,000 actively employed persons in 1973, as many as742,000 (48 percent) were wage-earners. Many if not most of these were paidminimum wage rates. These were raised from 84 cents in the mid-sixties, to1.33 quetzales by 1970, 1.56 quetzales by 1973 and 1.90 quetzales thereafteruntil the end of 1976. While only 52 percent of the employed benefited fromthose increases in the sixties and early seventies, this share grew to 75percent in 1973. During this period, therefore, the incidence of increases inthe minimum wage rate for all employed was only about 5 percent p.a. Thegrowth of real minimum wages amounted to 2.3 percent p.a..for those whobenefited from the increase, but if the incidence is calculated for all wageearners, the effect felt on the average member of the labor force was muchsmaller. 1/
37. The situation changed in 1976, when wage increases substantiallyexceeded price increases because of temporary labor shortages. This wasrelated to reconstruction demands and, to a lesser extent, to expansionin the agro-export sectors, especially in coffee. In the aftermath of the1976 earthquake, the wages of some skilled construction workers, such asbricklayers, more than doubled and exceeded Q 4 per day. In the agriculturalsector, wages paid to coffee workers increased from 1.50 quetzales to4 quetzales a day, while those paid to cotton workers rose from 2 quetzales to3 quetzales a day. Cane cutters also received as much as a 40 percent increasein wages. Once the extraordinary simultaneous demand for labor for recon-struction and for harvests had passed, however, wages receded to a more normallevel. For a broader group of employees, this might have implied an increaseof the minimum wage rates by 41 percent, from 56 quetzales in 1973 to 79quetzales per month in 1976. The most sought-after skills benefited evenmore. Recent wage settlements call for a 20-30 percent hike over a two-to-three year period. Unemployment has also been reduced, compared to thepre-quake level, and a low level of skills appears to be, for the time being,the only substantial obstacle to a further expansion of employment opportuni-ties.
38. Return to capital: A rather rough estimate shows that if generalemployment in the economy grew by 1.8 percent p.a. during 1964-73, and ifthe growth of real product amounted, during the same time, to 5.9 percentp.a., productivity growth amounted to 4.0 percent p.a. during the same period.As average real wages--judging by minimum wage rates--have been increasingannually by less than this amount, an increase in profit rates has probablytaken place. This hypothesis is consistent with the results of a survey of292 enterprises, whose balance sheets for 1972-74 were reviewed by the Ministryof Labor (National Wage Commission). The economic situation of these enter-prises can be presented as follows:
1/ It is not known whether entrepreneurs were also voluntarily increasingwages of those who were not apparently benefiting from increases inminimum wage rates. If they did not, average real wages might havedeclined.
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Table 2.4
GUATEMALA: PROFITABILITY OF ENTERPRISES /1
Indicator 1972 1974
(in millions of quetzales)
Total Sales 57.1 94.0Total Cost of Sales 54.0 87.0Profit 3.1 7.0Assets 79.1 94.5Liabilities 34.8 47.0Net Worth 44.3 47.5
(in percent)
Cost/Sales 94.6 92.5Profit/Sales (profit margin) 5.4 7.5Profit/Net Worth (return on own capital) 7.0 14.7
/1 Based on a review of 292 firms.
Source: National Wage Commission.
39. The return on capital doubled within a relatively brief periodof 1972 to 1974, and it appears to have increased further during 1974-76.Thus, the Association of Manufacturers reported that in 1976 the rate ofreturn on capital invested in commercial ventures amounted to 20 percent andin industrial ventures to 30 percent. These latter rates, however, werecalculated for an inflationary period, and the profit figures may be undulyinflated.
40. Nutrition and the poverty threshold: The basic diet of poorerGuatemalans is deficient in calories, proteins, minerals and vitamins.About one-third of the rural population is undernourished. About 20 percentof total rural population are still fortunate enough to be able to consumeabout 80 percent of the recommended caloric intake, about 10 percent consumeless than 70 percent of the minimum nutritional balance and the remaining 5percent consume less than 60 percent of the recommended diet. The situationis even worse for the protein balance, where the consumption of the poorerone-half of the population covers only 56 percent of protein requirements(Statistical Annex Table 1.6).
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41. Analysis of hospital entries shows that inadequate nutrition isone of the three principal direct causes of hospitalization, and isan indirect cause for many gastric and contagious diseases. 1/ The CentralAmerican Institute of Nutrition (INCAP), in Guatemala City, carried out somehighly useful inquiries into nutritional habits and requirements of thepopulation. The impact of nutrition on labor productivity in agriculture isof obvious importance. Insufficient nutrition leads to low productivity whichentails, in turn, a lower income, perpetuating a nutritional deficiency. Apartial solution could be sought in inexpensive food additives--vitamins A andC, iron, etc.--which seem to help increase agricultural productivity signi-ficantly.
42. For a family of five, the cost of purchasing all elements of afull nutritional diet would have to amount to about 3 quetzales daily in urbanareas and to about 2.6 quetzales daily in rural areas. 2/ In urban areas,estimated daily family expenditures on items other than food should amount toan additional 4.45 quetzales at a minimum (one-third of this for housing;the remainder is distributed among various other expenditures, none of whichexceed 0.8 quetzales a day per person). In rural areas, these additionaldaily expenditures should amount to 1.65 quetzales per family at a minimum.However, in 1975, with an average daily wage rate of 1.90 quetzales in urbanareas and 1.15 quetzales in rural areas, and with, at best, two workingmembers per family, family incomes remained about 50 percent below the minimumin urban areas and 46 percent below the minimum in rural areas. Urban incomesfall below the combined cost of necessary food and housing alone (StatisticalAnnex Table 1.7). A weighted (urban and rural) per capita annual income neces-sary to meet these minimum requirements is 393 quetzales in 1975 prices, aboutone-third below the GDP per capita in that year. This, when read in conjunc-tion with paragraph 28 above, may indicate that the "minimum" expendituresare outside the reach of one-half of the population. It is also true, how-ever, that this desirable "minimum" is above an absolute poverty line levelfor Guatemala.
C. Social Services
43. Provision of social services is one of the most important ways toimprove both the immediate situation and the long-term prospects for thepoorer population. "ome of these -- health services, water and sewerage --
1/ Enteritis, anemia and avitaminosis (nutritional eficiency) accountedfor 25 thousand deaths or 32 percent of all deaths from illnesses inGuatemala in 1970, compared to 23 percent in El Salvador and 18 percentin Honduras.
2/ These data are based on the conversion of components of daily recom-mended diet. into money terms using August 1975 average unit prices.See Statistical Annex Table 1.7.
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while not included in direct family income, could alleviate considerablythe lot of the poor population and make their living conditions more bearableeven within an inadequate direct income. Others, such as agricultural services(supply of inputs and spread of technical knowledge) can create a basis forincreasing their earnings in the future. Provision of these services to thepoorer population is still far from sufficient.
44. Education: Roughly one half of the Guatemalan population is illite-rate. Illiteracy is much higher in rural areas (69 percent) than in urbanareas (30 percent). The educational network is insufficient and, in somecases, incentives to enroll are too weak. The latter may be particularlytrue for the more remote, predominantly agricultural regions, where possibili-ties of employment of skilled or literate manpower are scant.
45. Furthermore, the degree of illiteracy is considerably more pronouncedamong the indigenous population. Much of this is attributable to the fact thatthis population is predominantly rural and that the penetration of the educa-tion network is much weaker there. However, even among the purely ruralpopulation, the indigenous population appears to fare the worst. This is areflection in part of the different cultural traditions of this group andof the fact that Spanish is not their mother tongue; many cannot speak iteven as a second language (see Table 2.5).
Table 2.5: GUATEMALA: ILLITERACY AMONG THE RURAL POPULATION
(Age: 7 years and above)
Origin of the Population Total Literate Illiterate /a
Spanish 100.0 37.0 63.0
Indigenous 100.0 18.0 82.0
Total 100.0 28.0 72.0
/a A sample survey of 7,000 inhabitants, conducted by the University ofSan Carlos.
46. On the national scale, 44 percent of the urban population and 76percent of the rural population of school age are not enrolled. The totalnumber of children outside the school system exceeds one million--241,000in urban centers and 797,000 in rural areas.
- 21 -
47. As far as classrooms and teachers are concerned, a certain improve-ment in their utilization--operation in two shifts, for example--should permitabsorbing the school age urban population which still remains outside thesystem. The situation in this respect is different in the rural areas, where,even if the maximum efficiency of the system is assumed, only 270,000 addi-tional places would be available, sufficient to absorb only one third of theunschooled children. Secondary schools are almost exclusively limited tolarger cities.
48. Health: The coverage of the population by the health network isanalyzed using two different approaches--country-wide average of individualhealth services, or regional availability of a "package" of health services.The former is often misleading because, as in many countries, health (andother) services are concentrated mainly in one or two regions. It may beinteresting, however, to use it for making comparison among countries. Incontrast, the latter approach provides a better insight into the penetrationof the health network into the regions.
49. In terms of comparisons with its neighbors, Guatemalan healthfacilities are at the bottom of the scale:
Table 2.6
HEALTH INDICES FOR GUATEMALA AND CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES - 1972
Per 100,000 Total forInhabitants El Costa Central(1971) Guatemala Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Rica America
No. of physicians 22.2 24.1 29.2 48.5 61.5 34.0 /aNo. of licenced nurses 14.2 31.0 11.4 21.9 60.1 23.9No. of auxiliary nurses 67.6 76.4 77.3 105.8 133.1 83.9No. of dentists 4.5 9.2 6.1 4.3 13.8 6.9No. of hospital beds 215 148 153 193 399 224
Central Govt. Spendingon Health-1973
Income per head ($) 500 350 320 540 710 461Expenditure per head ($) 4.54 5.71 4.63 4.86 4.86 4.92Expenditure/income (%) 0.9 1.6 1.4 0.9 0.7 1.1
/a 1970.
Source: SIECA, VI Compendio Estadistico Centroamericano. Health expendituresfor Costa Rica have been corrected using information of IBRD mission.Income data are from IBRD atlas.
- 22 -
50. The integrated health "package" system is based on a generallyaccepted system of standards. 1/ The situation in the Metropolitan Region isrelatively adequate compared to a much worse situation in other departments;the Western Highlands (Altiplano) are at the bottom of the scale.
Table 2.7: GUATEMALA: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH SERVICES
Regions Health network availability(compared to the "standard" system = 100)
Central
Guatemala adequateOther Departments 47
Southern Coast 43
South-West 49
Western Highlands 38
Eastern 48
51. Housing. The housing situation was deficient in Guatemala evenbefore the 1976 earthquake and became considerably more difficult after it.In the late sixties Guatemala had a deficit of 300,000 housing units--37 percent of the existing stock-which needed to be replaced, out of thetotal of 805,000 units which existed at that time in the country. Bymid-1976 the situation became much more serious. The increasing deteriora-tion of the housing stock, excluding damages from the earthquake, broughtup the deficit to 674,000 units, the urban and rural regions claiming 47percent and 53 perent respectively of the total. To this must be addedrepairs--or, often, complete reconstruction--of some 223,000 housing units,damaged by the earthquake. Finally, it is estimated that the existing housing
1/ These standards consist of the following:
One hospital per 250 thousand inhabitantsOne health center
of A type for 75-100 thousand inhabitantsof B type for 50 thousand inhabitantsof C type for 10-25 thousand inhabitants
One health post per 5 thousand inhabitants.
- 23 -
units are overcrowded, with an average of 2.7 persons per room. 1/ Merely tokeep up with demographic increases, annual additions of housing units shouldbe somewhere around 63,000 rooms or about 34 thousand new housing units. 2/The actual number of new constructions is unknown, except for the capital city,where population is growing by about 50,000 annually and where there maybe therefore a need for about 10,000 new housing units annually (at 2.7persons per room and at 1.85 rooms per unit). The average annual new con-structions in the caDital city amounted during the last decade to only one-third of the above. 3/
52. Sanitary conditions are, on the whole, inadequate. In the ruralareas, 90 percent of housing units have earthen floors, and only 31 percenthave waterproof roofing made of tile or metal sheets. Closely availablerunning water or sewerage is a rarity--15 percent of houses have the former,and the latter is almost entirely absent. In this respect, the situation inthe urban areas is somewhat better, with 61 percent of all units having brickor cement floors, 23 percent a neighboring running water installation and45 percent sewerage in the vicinity.
D. Future Prospects
53. Solutions to the problems of inequality and human poverty can besought only through a gradual adjustment of the country's economic and socialpolicies and of its budget expenditure pattern. Some ways to achieve it areoutlined in the public finance and public investment chapters of this report.
54. In searching for a solution three basic issues deserve attention.The first is the country's complex regional situation. Some of the geographicalregions such as the lWestern Altiplano are not only geographically but alsosocially isolated. If it were only for lack of appropriate transport andcommunication infrastructure, these regions could be relatively quickly andeasily integrated with the rest of the country, although at a substantialbudgetary cost. However, the isolation of these areas cannot be measured onlyby their distance from the capital city. The cultural and social differencesbetween the indigenous population and the population of Spanish extraction arealso critical. This gap can only be breached slowly for, otherwise, difficultcultural problems, social disturbances and psychological frustrations may
1/ This density applies to all rooms in these housing units. The actualdensity per bedroom is much higher, 3.8 persons/bedroom on the average.It is very unequally distributed, 2.5 persons/bedroom in urban areas and5.2 persons/bedroom in rural areas.
2/ About 48 percent of units have one room only.
3/ About 3,230 housing units annually.
- 24 -
occur. A thorough analysis of how to do this without destroying the basicfiber and cohesion of the indigenous population remains to be carried out.Such a study would also help in devising ways to improve agriculturalproductivity of the indigenous population where traditional extension tech-niques in agriculture may not prove adequate.
55. Secondly, there is a need for a policy environment which wouldinduce investors to use more labor-intensive techniques. Growth duringthe decade spanning the late 60s and early 70s was relatively highly capital-intensive. On a national scale, the cost of creation of one additional jobwas $10,000 (in 1973 prices), which is high even for industry. Creation ofnew jobs in commercial or other services should also be made possible atlower fixed cost than in the past.
56. The distribution of the fruits of long-term growth should also beconsidered. Long-term increases in overall economic productivity have beenas high as 4 percent per year, but an analysis of the evolution of realminimum wage rates indicates that this increase was distributed largely in theform of returns to capital. Furthermore, redistributive methods have notbeen used to the same extent as in other countries. The budgetary processin the past was largely a means of adjusting expenditures to the availabilityof public revenues, rather than a means of making the distribution of incomesmore equitable. It would be desirable that more attention be given in thefuture to the organic link between domestic resource mobilization, which pro-vides increased public revenue, and budgetary expenditure, which can be usedto improve the living standards of the population. The Government seems tobe increasingly aware of this important link. Thus, the budget appears to beused increasingly as an instrument for realizing Development Plan objectives,which have a clear social content.
- 25 -
3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. Pattern of Growth
Long-term Trends
57. The past 20 years of development in Guatemala have brought diversi-fication of exports, increased industrialization, and a substantially higheraverage level of per capita income. Even so, Guatemala is still primarily anagricultural economy, highly prone to the vagaries of the international coffeemarket. Furthermore, the growth of average per capita income has benefited thepopulation unevenly.
58. Economic Growth: The overall rate of economic growth in Guatemalahas accelerated significantly from the 1950s, when it averaged less than4 percent per year. Participation in the Central American Common Marketbeginning in 1960 helped raise the annual growth rate to an average of 5.5percent in that decade. Since the mid 1960s, Guatemala's growth has generallybeen above the Latin American average 1/. Guatemala has also had a fairlystable pattern of growth, only occasionally moving out of the 5 to 7 percentper .year range. The occasional departures have almost always been relatedto developments in the world coffee market. These patterns are shown clearlyin Figure 3.1, which has been based on current price data to show the impactof changes in coffee prices. 2/
59. Despite marked changes in the growth rate of Guatemalan export earningsfrom year to year, the country has been able to avoid serious balance of pay-ments problems because import growth rates have followed very closely thoseof exports. During past periods of balance of payments difficulties, the Govern-ment curtailed demand by restraining credit available through the bankingsystem. This, however, is no longer the policy of the Government. Nonethe-less, investment tends to follow movements in exports; investment propensitydrops when GDP growth is slowed by poor export performance, and as investmentin Guatemala includes an imported content of about 50 percent, this tends tolimit import demand.
60. Over the past 20 years, investment has fluctuated between 12 and15 percent of GDP, the result of sharp year-to-year changes in the growth ofinvestment (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1). During the 1960s, about one fourthof total fixed capital formation took place in manufacturing, much of it inresponse to the opportunities opened up by the creation of the Central American
1/ For the period 1965-73, for example,.the median growth in GDP in LatinAmerica was 4.7 percent compared to Guatemala's 6.1 percent.
2/ Since Figure 3.1 is based on data in current prices, it should notbe used to compare the magnitude of fluctuations over time; it isvalid only for comparing the relative magnitude of fluctuations invarious indicators at the same point in time. Real growth of GDP andbasic sectors is shown in Figure 3.3.
- 26 -
FIGURE 3.1a
GUATEMALA: ELEMENTS OF GROWTH - NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
(growth rates - current prices)
1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 197660.0 / ' _ 60.0
50.060.
Wi 40.0 INVESTMENr 40.0
cr 30.0 30.0
20.0 \ CONSUMPTION / GOP 20.0
r 10. O _: o10.0
:~.0 .0
^_o.n 10- \ -10.00
-t0.0 O v _ -20.0
-30.0 -J.I2I| -30.0
195$ 1958 1960 1962 1964 1965 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
YERRS
FIGURE 3.1b
GUATEMALA: ELEMENTS OF GROWTH - BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(growth rates - current prices)1966 1958 1960 1962 1964 1988 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
60.0 6 1\ ._ 0.
Lii40.00.UJ 40.0 40.0
CC 30.0 A IMPORTS A \COFFEE EXPORTS ,. 30.0
20.0 2.
I .0 .0c>-10.0 - \/ / \ EXPORTS - -10.0
-20.0 20.0
-30.0 I I, V I I I I -30.0
1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
YERRS
- 27 -
TABLE 3.1
GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC EXPENDITURE , 1960-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
DISTRIBUTION /A GROWTH RATES /5CONCEPt
-_____________---_------______1960 1970 1976 60-70 70-75 75-76
…______________________________________________________________________________________________
CONSUMPTION 91.6 86.5 84.3 4.7 4.8 6.6
PRIVATE 83.9 78.6 77.8 4.7 4.9 6.7GOVERNMENT 7.7 8.0 6.5 4.6 3.4 6.1
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 10.3 12.8 19.9 7.6 5.5 32.2
FIXED 9.8 12.5 20.3 7.5 5.2 40.7PRIVATE 7.2 10.2 15.0 8.5 4.3 31.1GOVERNMENT 2.5 2.4 5.3 3.9 9.2 74.0
CHANGE IN STOCKS 0.5 0.3 0.4 14.2 14.2
GROSS DOMESTIC EXP. (GDX=C+I) 101.9 99.3 104.2 5.0 4.9 9.9
EXPORTS (GOODS & NfS) 12.6 18.4 21.8 10.1 7.5 8.1TERMS OF TRADE ADJ (TADJ) 15.5 34.4 2.3
EXPORTS (IMPORT CAPACITY) 9.6 1.2 11.3IMPORTS (GOODS & NFS) 14.5 17.7 26.0 6.8 3.7 22.5
RESOURCE BALANCES 1-9 0.7 4.2EXPORTS - IMPORTS (RB) 1.5 07 22.5 - 26.7IMP CAPACITY - IMPORTS .. .. 157.0
NET FACTOR INCOME (FSY) - 1.0 - 2.0 - 1.6 14.9 2.2 - 7.3NET CURRENT TRANSFERS (NCT) - 0.9 4.6 1.2 24.3 153.6
CUR A/C BAL = EXT SAVINGS - 2.9 - 0.4 - 1.3 - 7.0 15.6-UR A/C BA --------- --------- _________
PRODUCTGROSS DOMESTIC (GDX+RB) 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.6 5.6 7.6
=S~~~~ ==== ..... ==:======…=====-=r== ==== ====
GROSS NATIONAL (GDP+FSY) 99.0 98.0 98.4 5.4 5.7 7.9
INCOMEGROSS DOMESTIC (GDP+TADJ) 5.4 4.5 8.0GROSS NATIONAL (GDY+FSY) . . . 5.3 4.5 8.4
SAVINGSGROSS DOMESTIC (GDY-C) 8.4 13.5 15.7 11.9 2.1 18.8GROSS NATIONAL (GDS+FSY+NCT) 7.4 12.4 18.7 9.9 4.8 49.3
…______________________________________________________________________________________________SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, BOLETIN ESTADISTICO
/A BASED ON CURRENT PRICES
/B BASED ON CONSTANT PRICES
- 28 -
Common Market. Manufacturing firms were set up, particularly around GuatemalaCity, mostly to produce consumer goods based on imported inputs (see Chapter5). During the same period, agricultural investment equalled only one thirdto one half that in industry. Although the share of banking credit each yeargoing to agriculture and industry was roughly the same, most of that foragriculture was used for current inputs, not capital investment (StatisticalAnnex Table 6.4). The only significant agricultural investment which tookplace during this period was that along the Pacific Coast in sugar and cottonplantations. Government lending to agriculture was very limited, and it gavelittle support to the smaller farmers in the form of technical assistance. 1/Investment in the Guatemalan economy has been financed largely from domesticsavings which, in current prices, have averaged 12 percent of GDP over thepast 10 years compared to gross domestic investment which has averagedslightly over 13 percent.
61. Consumption has tended to be much less volatile over the past20 years than investment. Lagging real incomes and persisting unemploymenthave contributed to some decline since 1960 in private consumption as apercent of GDP.
62. The demand of the Guatemalan Government for goods and serviceshas been relatively small, averaging only a tenth of that of the privatesector. Government consumption has moved more or less with GDP. Govern-ment investment has been much more volatile, growing or contracting often byas much as 20-30 percent from year to year in current prices. During the1960's, public fixed capital formation grew at roughly half the rate ofprivate investment, a reflection of the private sector orientation of theeconomy (Table 3.1). However, from 1970 to 1975, the growth of public sectorinvestment equaled or exceeded that of private investment, the result of acombination of (a) the world oil crisis and other economic problems whichdiscouraged private sector investment, and (b) the increasing role of theCentral Government as it began to implement the 1970-75 Development Plan.These trends were accentuated in 1976; following the earthquake public sectorinvestment grew by over 50 percent in real terms as the Government took thelead in the reconstruction process.
63. Export Diversification: Diversification of Guatemalan exports awayfrom coffee and into other products took place largely in the early 1960s;since 1967, there have been only modest changes in their overall composition 2/
1/ See Chapter 5 for a discussion of agricultural credit and governmentassistance to small-scale farmers.
2/ The changes in 1975 and 1976 which appear in Figure 3.2 were temporaryones due primarily to the prices of coffee and sugar, not to basicstructural changes.
- 29 -
(see Figure 3.2). The diversification of exports in the 1960's was not theresult of a decline in coffee exports, which stayed more or less stable overthe period, but rather of the substantial growth of cotton and other non-traditional products (Statistical Annex Table 3.2).
FIGURE 3.2
GURTEMRLRi COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS 1960-76(PERCENTRGES),
1960 1962 1964 1968 1968 1970 1972 1974 197670 .0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~70.0
66 0 i I I |I | I I § I I & &66.0
60.0 60.0cl) 55.0 5FEE. _ .0Lii 60.0 50.0
)450 45.01* 40.0 40.0
J 30.0 MANUFCTURES50LJ 25 .0 COTTON 25.0
2 0 -0.- f SUGARR 20.0LUJ(L 15.0 _ 15.0
i O .0 Xis , / BRNANAS 10.0s.o fr_2---4 + t r<r '-r 7- s °
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976YERRS
Source: Statistical Annex TabLe 3.2.
64. Although Guatemala has reduced its dependence on coffee exportsvery substantially, coffee clearly remains the largest single export commodity.It is a product subject to extreme price fluctuations on international markets.Changes in overall export earnings have traditionally been and continue to bevery closely linked to changes in the value of Guatemalan coffee exports.(See Figure 3.1.) Export diversification has dampened somewhat the impact ofchanges in coffee export growth on total export earnings (for example, favor-able movements in cotton and sugar prices partially counter-balanced thedecline in coffee export earnings in 1974). Coffee is still, however, thecritical determinant of export earnings.
65. The expansion of non-coffee exports which followed the removalof trade barriers within the Central American Common Market has led to anincreased openness of the economy. Between 1960 and 1976, the share of exportsin GDP nearly doubled, and similar changes took place for imports (Table 3.1).The willingness of Guatemala to expose its industrial sector to competition
- 30 -
from other Central American producers has been an important factor behind itshealthy record of economic growth and has helped improve the efficiency oflocal production.
66. Economic Diversification: During the period since 1960, industryhas, on average, grown somewhat faster than agriculture (7.1 vs. 5.1 percentper year - Figure 3.3). Although the relative shares of agriculture, industryand services in Guatemalan GDP have not changed markedly during this period(Table 3.2), the diversification and deepening within these sectors hasincreased the share of products suitable for export. 1/ This has been trueeven for the services sector, where the development of the tourism industryhas made an important contribution.
Major Developments Since 1973
67. Beginning in 1973, Guatemala departed sharply from past patterns ofdevelopment in a number of critical aspects including the rate of inflation,the rate of growth, and the balance of payments position.
68. Since 1973, rapid increases in import prices, the slowdown in worlddemand for Guatemalan exports, and the lagging internal growth of personalconsumption slowed the rate of growth substantially especially in 1975.Even so, it remained positive, a contrast to many other countries. Severalfactors were decisive in Guatemala's adjustment to the oil crisis, includingthe resurgence of Central American trade, which boosted export earningssubstantially between 1972 and 1974, the rapid growth of coffee earningsgrowth in 1973, and the substantial foreign exchange reserves which, in 1974,allowed the country to expand sharply expenditures on imports, thus avertingeconomic stagnation due to inadequate production inputs. In 1975, thecumulative effects of stagnating growth in internal demand, a reductionin exports to the Central American Common Market, shortages of basic grains,and an almost total stagnation of investment held real GDP growth to only 1.9percent, the lowest rate since the 1950s. The economy would probably havecontracted even further had it not been for the large investments taking placeduring this period in petroleum, nickel and hotels.
69. In February of 1976, the country was afflicted by a massive earth-quake which ripped across nine thousand square kilometers of the Guatemalanhighland area, killing some thirty thousand people 2/ and leaving nearly afifth of the nation's population homeless. This was a social tragedy of unpre-cedented magnitude for the Guatemalan people. They responded with a remarkable
1/ Although the growth of the agricultural sector has more or less keptpace with that of industry, this balance has not benefited the ruralpoor because a large share of the agricultural growth took placein export products generally produced on large landholdings.
2/ Official reports after the earthquake indicated 22,000-25,000, but sincethen investigation in the more remote areas have indicated a substan-tially higher figure.
- 31 -
FIGURE 3.3
GURTEMRLR: SECTORRL GROWTH PRTTERNS(RERL GROWTH RRTES)
1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 197620.0 _ I I I I I I I I I I I I I , I I I , 20.0
17 .5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~17 .517.5 - INDUSTRYLJ 15.0 -GRICULTURE 15.0
CE 12.5 GP12.5
o0f 10.0 10.0
7.5 7.5
~5.0 5.0
c0 .0 .
-2.5 -2.5
-5.0 -5.01956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
YEARS
TABLE 3.2GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR (1958 MARKET PRICES), 1960-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
DISTRIBUTION GROWTH RATESITEM ---- _________________________
1960 1975 1976 60-70 70-75 75-76
PRIMARY PRODUCTION 30.5 28.1 27.4 4.4 6.1 5.0
AGRICULTURE 30.3 28.0 27.3 4.4 6.1 4.9MINING 0.2 0.1 0.1 - 1.1 4.3 28.6
SECONDARY PRODUCTION 15.6 18.4 20.2 7.4 5.4 18.2
MANUFACTURING 12.9 15.1 15.5 7.6 4.7 10.4CONSTRUCTION 2.0 1.9 3.3 3.2 9.1 88.4PUBLIC UTILITIES 0.7 1.4 1.4 11.4 8.8 7.9
SERVICES 53.9 53.5 52.4 5.5 5.4 5.4
TRANSPORT & STORAGE 4.8 6.4 6.6 6.9 9.0 10.5COMMERCE 26.2 27.6 27.8 6.6 4.6 8.5BANKING, INSURANCE & FIN. 1.8 2.6 2.6 8.5 7.7 6.9HOUSING 9.0 5.9 4.4 2.8 2.1 - 19.2PUBLIC ADMIN. & DEFENSE 6.1 5.0 5.0 3.2 6.3 7.0PERSONAL SERVICES 6.1 6.0 5.9 4.4 7.3 7.5
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.5 5.6 7.6
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (Q MLS) 1 049.2 2 352.7 2 531.8 74.4 112.0 179.1
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA AND STATISTICAL ANNEX TABLE 3.1.
- 32 -
certainty of purpose and sense of community. Within a very few days, virtuallyall of the towns and villages affected had been contacted, and under the ableguidance of the Emergency Committee for National Reconstruction, basic socialservices including light, water, communication and health facilities werequickly restored, albeit on a temporary basis in most cases, and a massiveprogram of temporary shelter was begun so that the people would have protec-tion before the rainy season began. 1/
70. Official government estimates made shortly after the quake setthe material damage at US$750 million, excluding the major upgrading ofdamaged facilities and price escalation during the reconstruction period whichwere included in a later-US$1.2 billion replacement cost estimate. The US$750million is equal to about a fifth of the entire GDP for 1975 and to about 18months of normal fixed capital formation.
71. Although the earthquake destroyed a major share of the country'ssocial infrastructure, it left the productive economic infrastructure vir-tually unscathed and ready to support renewed economic growth. The demand forbuilding materials and replacement consumer durables, facilitated by extensivegovernment credit programs for reconstruction and record levels of earningsfrom coffee exports, were the main stimuli to economic expansion, estimated tohave reached 7.6 percent in 1976.
Future Prospects
72. The short-term prospects for Guatemalan economic growth could beconsidered outstanding. The Government's plan to carry out the reconstructioneffort without restricting normal investment activity should help maintain therapid economic expansion which followed the earthquake. The plan is veryambitious and represents a dramatic break with the past in terms of theGovernment's participation in national capital formation. 2/
1/ Although Guatemala has a subtropical climate, the highland areas riseover 11,000 feet, and temperatures dropped below freezing several timesin the period after the earthquake, causing a number of deaths fromexposure. If the emergency housing program had not been successfullycarried out before the rains began, the situation would have been muchmore grave. As it was, the majority of the population was adequatelyhoused when the rainy season arrived, and the epidemics which had beena matter of great concern were averted.
2/ Some concern has been expressed that the reconstruction investment inhousing will be nonproductive in that it will not add to the capitalstock of industry, agriculture or one of the other "productive" economicsectors. However, the housing stock of Guatemala is inadequate (seeChapter 2), and upgrading it is not only of high social priority, butcould also serve as a major stimulus to the growth of the rest of theeconomy, especially to the construction materials industry.
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73. There are few production constraints to realizing a growth of atleast six to seven percent per year in the next few years. Excess industrialcapacity and the large scope for improvement in agricultural productivitywould support substantially faster growth than in the past. 1/ There is,however, a very great need for better educational programs and facilities toupgrade the work skills of the labor force. This need will be felt mostacutely at the middle level of skills; well trained agriculture extensionworkers, teachers, and administrative personnel are badly needed. On thedemand side, attaining this rate of growth will be assisted if a concertedeffort is made to increase the productivity, incomes and purchasing power ofthe bulk of the population so that they will help provide an adequate domesticmarket for the increased production. Since the majority of the poor depend onagriculture, improving their incomes is largely a question of improving theproductivity of small-scale agriculture (see Chapter 5). Also, because of thesmall effective size of Guatemala's domestic market for industrial goods, theGovernment should intensify its search for increased trade cooperation withinthe Central America area and for markets for non-traditional export productsoutside the area.
B. Prices
Background
74. Domestic prices were remarkably stable prior to the early 1970s.The GDP deflator increased by an average of only 0.3 percent per year from1960 to 1972, among the very best performances in Latin American if not theworld. The conservative monetary policies of the Government restrictedexpansion of the money supply, and the openness of the economy allowedimports to rise with export earnings, relieving demand-pull inflationarypressures. External price developments have not been as favorable. A dete-rioration in the terms of trade in the early 1960s reduced the purchasingpower of Guatemalan exports by an amount equal on average to four percent ofGuatemala's GDP.
Developments Since 1973
75. In contrast with the extremely stable price levels earlier, domesticprices have surged by 10-15 percent each year since 1973 when the world food,oil and fertilizer crises began to push upwards prices of imported goods(Statistical Annex Table 7.1). Nineteen seventy-three was also a year ofexceptionally rapid growth in export earnings, led by coffee which surged byover 35 percent in value. These export earnings sharply increased the money
1/ Prospects for growth on a sectoral basis are discussed in detail in therelevant sectoral chapters.
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supply, an additional factor that probably contributed to the inflationarypressures created by higher import prices. The situation was exacerbatediFLCr 1973 when the OPEC oil price increases led to a tripling of Guatemala'soil import bill. 1/ Also contributing to inflationary pressures in 1974 and1975 was the shortage of basic foodgrains, which was caused by a number offactors including a shift in production from basic grains to export crops, andgovernment pricing and credit policies which did not give sufficient incentivesfor production. The rate of price increase slackened slightly in 1975 withthe general slowdown in economic activity. Also, the Government took a numberof steps to increase domestic production of foodgrains; the major increase inbasic grains production in 1975 and 1976 helped dampen inflationary pressures.At the beginning of 1976, prospects were excellent for a continuing decline inthe rate of inflation, but, by the end of the year, the exceptional demandcreated by the earthquake reconstruction combined with a massive inflow offoreign exchange from coffee and cotton exports had pushed the rate back tothe previous levels of about 11.2 percent per year (based on the GDP deflator).
76. Rapid inflation during the past few years has led to a signifi-cant loss of consumer purchasing power. 2/ This lagging growth of purchasingpower resulted in a slowdown of the growth of private consumption during thepast three years to about 4 percent per year in real terms, which allowedverv little increase in per capita terms.
77. Between 1973 and 1975, the improvement in Guatemala's terms oftrade which had taken place earlier with improved coffee prices was offsetby rapid increases in prices of petroleum and other industrial products.ln 1976, however, sharply higher coffee prices again improved the terms oftrade (Statistical Annex Table 7.2.). Although the domestic price level asmeasured by the GDP deflator increased by over 65 percent between 1972 and1976, world prices during the same period rose by over 70 percent. 3/ There-fore, despite the unprecedented levels of inflation experienced in Guatemalasince 1973, there is no evidence that there has been a deterioration in thereal value of the quetzal vis-a-vis other major currencies. In fact, therapid growth of international reserves since early 1976 may indicate someimprovement.
78. Prospects for controlling domestic inflation during the next fewyears are excellent. Although prices for exports, particularly coffee, areexpected to remain high for at least two more years, past experience indicatesthat a major share of the resulting inflow of foreign exchange will go into
1/ Although prices nearly quadrupled, there was some reduction in thevolume of oil imports.
2/ The rural poor are somewhat less affected by these movements than theurban poor because of their income in kind from agricultural production.
3/ "Index of International Inflation," Economic Analysis and ProjectionsDepartment, World Bank, 1977.
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time deposits, thus limiting the impact on the money supply. Foreign exchangeearnings, combincd with existing reserves and a very substantial untappedborrowing capacity, can be used to expand imports so that the increased demandfor goods deriving from the reconstruction process, the public investment plan,and resurgence of growth in both investment and consumption in the privatesector will not lead to scarcities which would cause inflation. Therefore,the public investment program outlined in this report (see Chapter 4 below),although larger than in the past, is still small relative to overall economicactivity and would be unlikely to have a serious inflationary impact.
C. The External Sector
Developments Since 1969
79. The 1960s were a period of export diversification and import sub-stitution based on the opportunities opened up by the Central American CommonMarket (see Chapter 2). The period since 1969 has been dominated by threemajor crises beyond the nation's control: (a) the collapse of the CentralAmerican Common Market in 1969 following the Honduras-El Salvador conflict,(b) the quadrupling of oil prices in 1974, along with major increases inprices of other manufactured imports, and (c) the earthquake of 1976.
80. Central American Common Market: The establishment of the CentralAmerican Common Market in 1960 has had a major influence on the pattern ofGuatemalan economic development. In 1969, Honduras withdrew from the groupingfollowing its armed conflict with El Salvador, but it has continued to tradewith the other CACM countries on the basis of bilateral treaties. Guatemalanexports rose significantly immediately after the conflict as Honduran tradewith El Salvador was diverted to Guatemala. However, Guatemala's exports tothe region fell sharply soon thereafter with the general decline of regionaltrade. Trade volume did not regain 1970 levels until 1973 (Statistical AnnexTable 3.5). Guatemala's trade volume with other Central American countriesdeclined again in 1975 with the economic stagnation produced by the worldrecession. However, this trade seems to have recovered substantially in1976.
81. Oil Crisis: The recovery of Central American trade in 1973 and1974 was most fortunate, for the trade surplus of about US$40.0 million whichthis generated for Guatemala each year helped counter-balance the US$59.0million increase in its petroleum import bill between 1973 and 1974. This,combined with a boom in coffee export earnings in 1973 and one in sugarearnings the following year, helped Guatemala avoid the need to contractsharply imports of other products. 1/ Guatemala was therefore able to main-tain imports of intermediate goods at a level sufficient to sustain national
1/ Guatemala's imports grew by US$273 million between 1973 and 1974, ofwhich US$59 million was the increase in the petroleum bill.
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growth at a time when many other countries, both developing and developed,were undergoing a sharp recession.
82. In 1974, Guatemala experienced its first negative resource balancesince 1971 (Table 3.3). However, because of a substantial increase in pri-vate capital flows, related in large part to imports for the EXMIBAL nickelproject and for oil exploration, it was able to finance the higher thannormal current account deficit with minimal external borrowing; net inter-national reserves were drawn down by only US$24 million, about 12 percentof reserves.
TABLE 3.3GUATEMALA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
D I 5 T R I B U T I O NITEII -- ^--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 ¶968 1969 1970 197t 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
CURRENT ACCOUNT
EXPORTS (GOODS & NFS) 232.5 268.8 302.8 349.5 338.5 391.4 529.5 701.6 792.0 951.6
MERCHANDISE (FOB) 203.9 233.5 262.5 297.1 286.9 335.8 441.5 582.2 640.1 794.3TRAVEL 5.5 6.5 9.2 12.1 I3.6 16.9 37.0 56.7 76.0 65.6OTHER NON-FACTOR SERVICES 23.1 26.8 31.1 40.3 36.0 36.7 S0.9 62.7 73.1 91.9
IMPORTS (GOODS A NFS) 284.4 296.8 299.5 336.7 371.0 3B7.3 514.3 807.6 8s8.0 1 136.3
MERCHANOISE (FOB) 226.8 237.6 240.9 266.6 289.9 294.7 391.4 631.5 672.4 904.6FREIGHT a INSURANCE 23.2 21.4 21.3 25.3 26.9 33.6 39.6 72.6 62.6 77.5OTHER NON-FACTOR SERVICES 34.7 37.8 37.3 44.8 54.2 59.0 83.3 103.5 123.0 154.2
RESOURCE BALANCE -51.9 -30.0 3.3 12.8 -32.5 4.1 15.2 -106.0 -61.0 -184.5
FACTOR SERVICE INCOME (NET) -19.4 -31.4 -35.7 -38.2 -41.8 -43.7 -45.7 -47.4 -69.0 -17.9
NET TRANSFERS 9.3 10.7 13.4 17.5 2S.2 30.1 41.6 54.0 72.6 198.6
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE -62.0 -50.7 -19.0 -7.9 -49.1 -9.S 11.1 -99.4 -62.4 -3.8......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
CAPITAL ACCOUNT__-._________--
PRIVATE SECTOR /A 37.4 32.3 38.1 37.4 54.0 60.4 50.3 85.9 157.7 178 9
PUBLIC SECTOR /B 35.4 16.5 2.6 7.7 9.1 1.9 15.8 2.6 20.4 57.3
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS -5.3 -11.6 -12.0 -8.1 -2.5 -S.9 -11.5 -12.9 -10.0 -11.1
CHANGE IN RESERVES (--GAIN) -5.5 13.5 -9.7 -29.1 -11.5 -46.9 -65.7 23.9 -105.7 -221.3......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
(NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES) 51.1 37.6 47.3 76.4 87.9 134.8 200.5 176.6 292.3 503.6
/A INCLUDES PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTIlurIONS RUT EXCLUDES LOANS WITH PUBLIC GUARANTEE/B INCLUDES LOANS TO PRIVATE SECTOR WITH GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE
83. The balance of payments situation improved somewhat in 1975.Despite a decline in coffee prices and some slackening of tourism growthbecause of the worldwide recession, record sugar earnings helped raise totalexport value substantially, resulting in a current account deficit of aboutone third less than the US$99 million deficit of 1974. This deficit wouldhave been larger had there not been a virtual stagnation of the domestic
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economy in 1975 which, combined with the excess inventory of imported goodsthat had been built up during 1974, resulted in a minimal growth of importvolume over 1974 (Statistical Annex Table 2.3).
84. Private sector capital inflows, which had nearly doubled in 1974,more than doubled again in 1975, paying for the imports which were requiredfor the accelerated investment in EXMIBAL, oil exploration and hotel construc-tion. The capital inflows for the private sector in 1975 were also boosted bya near doubling of the inflow of private financial capital compared to 1974,reflecting a decrease in world interest rates and an increase in domesticrates. Net public sector borrowings, which increased substantially in 1975,also helped the balance of payments situation. Disbursements of public debtwere not significantly higher in 1975 than they had been in previous years,but by 1975 Guatemala had paid off most of the relatively short-term externaldebt which had been obtained from private sources. As a result, amortizationpayments in 1975 were only about a fourth of what they had been the previousyear, leaving a much higher net inflow. These favorable developments allowedGuatemala to resume its pattern of reserve accumulation in 1975.
85. Aftermath of the Earthquake: The third major event to shape thedevelopment of Guatemala's balance of payments position in the past fewyears was the earthquake in February of 1976. None of the major export cropswere damaged by the earthquake. Although there was substantial destruction ofrail, highway and port facilities, these were restored quickly (or alter-natives were found), thus avoiding any major losses in export earnings frominability to ship the products. Export volume increased only minimally in1976, but the extraordinarily high world prices for coffee resulted in sharplyhigher total export earnings, despite the low prices for sugar. The growth oftourism, which had been rapid in past years, was halted by the earthquake.
86. The quake had a major iapact on the 1976 import bill, which grewby nearly US$280 million, with substantial increases in imports of construc-tion materials and consumer goods. Of the increased imports, an estimatedUS$120 million were donations in kind. 1/ Also contributing to the favorablecurrent account balance in 1976 was an inflow of US$50 million from foreigninsurance companies which had reinsured policies on property damaged by theearthquake. An additional US$55 million of other transfers and donationsbrought total transfers for the year to nearly US$200 million, compared toonly US$73 million in 1975. 2/
1/ For which a balancing entry has been made in Table 3.3 under Net Transfers.If donations in kind were subtracted from the import bill for 1976, therewould be a nominal growth of less than 10 percent, and a decline in realterms, with respect to 1975.
2/ Some of these transfers should appear on the capital account, butavailable data do not allow a separation.
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87. Despite the severity of the earthquake, Guatemala's good exportperformance, the high level of transfers, and a continued inflow of privateand public capital led to an unprecedented increase in net internationalreserves, which attained, by December 31, 1976, an equivalent to 5.3 monthsof imports of goods and non-factor services. 1/
Future Prospects
88. Short-Term Prospects: The short-term balance of payments prospectsfor Guatemala are excellent. Although coffee prices began to decline in thelatter half of 1977 they are still expected to remain at relatively highlevels for at least another two years. Moreover, efforts which are under-way now to increase the lagging productivity of the coffee sector shouldbring significant improvements in volume in 1977 and 1978, provided weatherconditions are reasonably favorable. Sugar prices are expected to risemoderately after 1977, and cotton prices are expected to remain more or lessat 1976 levels until 1978, though there may be some declines in productionbecause of the serious pesticide problem confronting the industry (see Chapter5). Nickel exports will begin making some contribution to balance of paymentsin 1977. Also, tourism shows a strong potential for resumption of its pre-vious rapid rates of growth. Exports in 1977 are likely to exceed US$1,300million. If the reconstruction process goes as expected and the nationaleconomy grows by around 6 percent, imports should attain nearly the samelevel, resulting in a small positive balance. Private capital inflows areunlikely to grow in 1977 because of the completion in early 1977 of threemajor new international hotels, and the completion by mid-1977 of the firstphase of the EXMIBAL project. They should be maintained more or less at 1976levels, however, by foreign investment in oil, particularly if the proposedpipeline to the Caribbean coast is approved (Chapter 5). Also, foreign invest-ment in manufacturing should be attracted by prospects of recovery of trade inthe Central American area. Net disbursements of public loans should exceedUS$130 million in 1977 in view of the continuing progress in preparing andimplementing projects, many of which are either wholly or at least partlydirected to the earthquake reconstruction effort. Overall, an increase ininternational reserves of some US$200 million or more may be anticipated for1977, which would bring the total to the equivalent of about seven months ofimports.
1/ This ratio was calculated on the basis of total 1976 imports includingthe US$102 million of donations in kind related to the earthquake.Excluding these extraordinary imports, the ratio is six months. ByApril 1977, receipts from sale of the 1976 coffee and cotton crops,combined with inflows of funds borrowed abroad through agencies ofoff-shore banks at interest rates below those charged by domesticbanks, had pushed net international reserves to about US$700 million,over seven months of projected 1977 imports.
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89. Medium-Term Prospects: Factors which will shape the development ofGuatemala's external position over the next five years are: (a) the possiblerestructuring of the Central American Common Market, and Guatemala's participa-tion in other economic groupings or trading arrangements; (b) the prices ofGuatemala's major agricultural exports; (c) development of self-sufficiencyin basic grains; and (d) success in oil exploitation and in nickel production.
90. The restructuring of the Central American Common Market has been inprogress since 1973 under the guidance of a High Level Committee consisting ofthe Ministers of Economy and/or Finance of the Central American countries.They have met fairly regularly to work out details of a new Central AmericanEconomic and Social Community. In May of 1975, the Secretariat for CentralAmerican Economic Integration (SIECA) issued a draft treaty which was reviewedextensively by the High Level Committee. In early 1976, a revised treaty waspresented to the Governments, who currently have it under consideration.
91. A revitalization of the Central American Common Market is importantto economic growth of the region, particularly of industry; the markets of theindividual countries are far too small to support the degree of industrial-ization envisaged by the member countries unless fragmentation of productionand sales among the countries is eliminated. Continued duplication of indus-tries operating below minimum economic scale is clearly undesirable. Becausemost Guatemalan exports of manufactured goods go to the Central American CommonMarket area, and because manufactured goods in total now constitute about athird of Guatemala's exports, success in accelerating the growth of CentralAmerican trade could have important benefits for Guatemala's exports of theseproducts.
92. Two other recent developments regarding external trading relationsmay prove important in the long term. First, Guatemala has joined the LatinAmerican Economic System (SELA), which was established in December 1974.SELA has as one of its top priorities the establishment of food processingindustries based on domestic production. If this activity is successful, itmight help Guatemala avoid a food deficit in the future. Second, Guatemalawas included in 1975 in the United States Generalized System of Preferences(GSP), which allows more than 100 Guatemalan products which previously had topay duties to enter the U.S. duty-free. Guatemala could produce and exportunder the GSP duty-free treatment many more products than it does at present.
93. The export price trends of Guatemala's current major products showvarying tendencies for the future. While price prospects are good, especiallyfor coffee, Guatemala could improve and protect its foreign trade positionsubstantially if it were to diversify further its production for export, aprocess which virtually stopped by 1970. The cultivation and export of non-traditional agricultural products such as cashew nuts, pineapples, and freshvegetables should be encouraged through technical assistance, pilot projects,and special marketing assistance. Guatemalan productivity in coffee is atpresent very low, and while it may not be advisable to expand the coffee-producing area in view of the long-term relative inelasticity of demand for
- 40 -
coffee, a continuation of present efforts to improve varieties and cultivationtechniques could improve productivity. Meat price trends look very favorableover the next few years, which would favor further efforts to expand thecountry's livestock industry.
94. The possibility of substantial increases in imports of basic grainsto meet the needs of a growing population could adversely affect Guatemala'sbalance of payments position. Guatemala has excellent resources for expandingthe production of basic grains, and these should be exploited to the fullestextent possible, not only for balance of payments reasons, but also to makeavailable basic foodstuffs at reasonable prices. (Policies which wouldencourage basic grains production are discussed in Chapter 5.)
95. The present oil exploration in Guatemala promises to yield commer-cial production by mid-1978, provided the pipeline from the Rubelsanto fieldsto the Caribbean Coast is completed as planned. It is still too early, however,to forecast the degree to which Guatemala could become self-sufficient. 1/Present proven and probable reserves would allow meeting 15-20 percent ofGuatemalan demand as of 1980 given presently estimated production levels andanticipated growth in demand (see Chapter 5). However, since the proposed oilpipeline has been designed to handle 60 to 70,000 bpd, it appears that the oilcompanies anticipate a substantial increase in production capacity over thepresent 5,000 to 8,000 barrels per day of proven and probable reserves. 2/
96. In summary, short-term balance of payments prospects are excellent,but mainly because of the extraordinarily high price of coffee. Medium-termprospects are good and can be improved if the Government takes actions neces-sary to expand the Central American Common Market, diversify exports, andattain reasonable self-sufficiency in basic grains.
1/ Because of the physical characteristics of the Guatemalan oil, it ishighly unlikely that Guatemala will ever become fully self-sufficientin oil; for the foreseeable future, it will have to export a major shareof its heavy, high sulphur crude and import lighter crude oil, eitherfor direct use or for mixing with Guatemalan crudes so that they can berefined locally.
2/ It is unlikely, however, that production will reach 60-70,000 bpdanytime in the foreseeable future; the economics of pipelines is suchthat it costs only a little more to build a significantly larger capacityline to avoid the risk of having to build a second small one later.
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External Debt - Background
97. Guatemala has traditionally maintained a conservative positionwith respect to its external debt, 1/ and its external debt service ratiois among the lowest for Latin American countries. 2/ The debt service ratiogradually climbed between 1966 and 1972, averaging 7 to 8 percent over theperiod. It peaked in 1972 at 10.5 percent because of unusually large pay-ments on the obligations contracted in the two preceding years. Since 1972,however, there has been a marked improvement in all aspects of the country'sexternal debt position, resulting in a debt service ratio for 1976 of only 1.9percent.
98. A major shift from private sources to official sources of interna-tional loans over this period (Statistical Annex Table 4.2), combined witha decline through 1974 of amounts contracted (Statistical Annex Table 4.4),have been the major factors behind this marked improvement. In 1972, nearlyhalf of the debt outstanding and disbursed was owed to private sources; byearly 1977, the Ministry of Public Finance indicated that the Government ofGuatemala had no private debt outstanding.
99. The shift from private to official sources has improved significantlythe terms of Guatemalan external debt over the past decade. For example, theaverage maturity has doubled to 24 years, the grace period has risen from 2 to7 years, and the grant element has increased from 21 to 35 percent (StatisticalAnnex Table 4.3). (This major improvement has taken place without any changein the average interest rate over the period.)
100. It is estimated that, during 1976, public external debt outstandingand disbursed repayable in foreign exchange rose by about US$46 million (to atotal of US$212 million); however, new commitments during the year came toabout US$276 million, most of it earthquake related. 3/ The distribution byexternal lender as of January 1, 1976, is shown in Statistical Annex Table4.11. The Central Government continues to hold most of the external debt;there have been relatively minor changes in the shares of other public sectorentities (Statistical Annex Table 4.5).
1/ Unless indicated otherwise, "external debt" is used here to mean externaldebt outstanding and disbursed repayable in foreign exchange contractedby the public sector or with its guarantee. All public external debtmust be approved by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank and beratified by the National Congress.
2/ In 1975, when Guatemala's external debt service ratio was 1.7 percent,the average for Latin America was 9.5 percent.
3/ This figure reflects the total amount approved by external officialsources; the amount ratified by Congress by the end of 1976 was substan-tially less.
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External Debt - Prospects
101. The external debt position of Guatemala over the next five years hasbeen forecast taking into account factors discussed elsewhere in this reportsuch as anticipated rate of economic growth, volume and value prospects formajor export items, ordinary imports given projected consumption and invest-ment trends, and level and terms of existing external debt. In addition, theprojections take into account the sharply expanded public capital expenditureprogram which is proposed in Chapter 4 to meet the country's pressing economicand social needs. It has been assumed that about 80 percent of the foreigncomponent of the proposed program will be for capital goods, the remainderrepresenting intermediate construction material imports. It has also beenassumed that 15-20 percent of the foreign exchange required, especially duringthe next two years, could be obtained from the local banking system in view ofthe high current level of foreign exchange reserves, which could easily bedrawn down significantly. Based on these assumptions, new external debtcommitments would decrease from about US$276 million in 1976 to about US$200million by 1982. The debt service ratio should peak at about 7 percent in1981 and decline thereafter.
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4. MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY
A. Money and Banking
Background
102. The most important development in the Guatemalan banking system 1/over the past 10 years has been the large increase in international reservesbecause of major improvements in the country's balance of payments position.Between 1967 and 1976, these reserves grew from $35 million to over $500million (Statistical Annex Table 6.2). Most of the foreign exchange came inas private sector time deposits, which grew by an average of 22 percent peryear over the period; at the same time, credit grew by only 14 percent peryear. By the end of 1976, excess reserves reached the equivalent of 7.7percent of deposits, compared to 1.9 percent at the end of 1975. 2/ During1977, however, excess reserves began to decline somewhat.
103. Sources of Foreign Exchange: Coffee export earnings were the mostimportant contributor to improvements in the balance of payments and thus togrowth of international reserves and banking liquidity over the past decade.(Note movements in 1970, in 1972-73 and in 1976 in Statistical Annex Tables3.2 and 6.3). The movement of private capital has been the other major sourceof changes in international reserves. Private capital moving abroad inresponse to higher foreign interest rates caused a substantial part of theUS$26 million loss of reserves in 1974. This flow was reversed in 1975by the higher domestic interest rates introduced to reduce capital outflow andto curb the mounting demand for credit. While the even more rapid growth ofreserves in 1976 was largely due to unprecedented export earnings, particularlyfrom coffee and cotton, private capital flows were still a factor. In contrastto 1975, however, the private capital inflow in 1976 was caused by an inflowof capital borrowed abroad rather than the repatriation of domestic capital.Because of domestic lending rates of up to 11 percent (about 13 percentincluding miscellaneous charges), large investors have been borrowing abroad
1/ The banking system in Guatemala consists of the central bank (Banco deGuatemala), four public or semi-public commercial banks, eight privatecommercial banks and two development banks. The remainder of the finan-cial system comprises a variety of non-bank financial intermediariesincluding two finance companies (Statistical Annex Table 6.5 providesfurther details on these institutions).
2/ These excess reserves are funds in excess of the 40 percent reserverequirement against short-term liabilities and the 15 percent reserverequirement against savings and long-term liabilities. Excess reservesmay be held either as government bonds or as cash (excess liquidity),provided that the bank has paid-in capital equal to five percent of thevalue of Government bonds held so that it can meet the legal capitalreserve requirements.
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TABLE 4.1GUATEMALA: FINANCING CAPACITY OF THE BANKING SYSTEM, 1967-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
…____________________________________________________________________________________
DISTRIBUTION GROWTH RATESITEM -------- ___________________ -----------------
1967 1975 1976 67-75 75-76…___-___________-____--_________________-________________-__________________________
ASSETS 100.0 100.0 100.0 15.4 38.2
NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 11.8 31.2 38.9 30.3 71.9
DOMESTIC ASSETS 88.2 68.8 61.1 11.9 22.9CREDIT TO PUBLIC SECTOR, NET 11.7 14.6 13.0 18.7 22.5
CENTRAL GOVT., NET 16.1 1,4.1 14.3 13.5 40.2
REST OF PUBLIC SECTOR, NET - 4.3 0.6 - 1.3CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR 66.6 48.4 44.1 10.9 25.9
SUBSCRIPTIONS TO INTL. ORGS. 3.6 1.6 1.7 4.5 48.4
OTHER ASSETS, NET 6.3 4.1 2.3 9.3 - 21.7
LIABILITIES 100.0 100.0 100.0 15.4 38.2
MONEY 48.6 37.0 38.0 11.5 42.0
QUASI-MONEY 37.5 50.7 49.9 19.9 36.2
FOREIGN LIABILITIES, MSLT 6.7 4.9 5.4 10.9 53.7
OTHER LIABILITIES 7.2 7.5 6.7 15.9 23.6
--SELECTED INDICATORS--
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (M QUETZ) 1,452.0 3,646.0 4,363.1 12.2 19.7MONEY/GDP (X) 10.0 9.6 11.3
QUASI-MONEY/GDP (X) 7.7 13.1 14.9TOTAL LIQUID ASSETS/GDP (X) 17.8 22.7 26.3
…___________________________________________________________________________________.
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA
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at lower rates through "bancos de hotel." 1/ The lack of exchange controlsand complete covertibility of the quetzal makes the exchange risk on theseloans remote.
104. Demand for Credit: The recent massive inflows of foreign exchangehave not been matched by a commensurate expansion of banking system credit.On the investment side, the very affluent, who are investing in commercialagriculture and industry, generally can finance these investments out ofprofits. This, combined with some hesitancy to undertake major investmentshas effectively limited demand for credit by this group. Those who have notbeen able to finance their investments from retained earnings or family wealthand those with very large capital requirements often borrow abroad through the"bancos de hotel" because of the relatively high interest rates charged bydomestic banks and the limit on the total lending to a single person or cor-poration. Consequently, much of the demand for domestic credit comes fromthe relatively smaller borrowers who are not able or do not need to borrowabroad. Demand for investment funds by this group has been constrained,however, by the combination of excessively high interest rates and a lack ofthe productive infrastructure such as adequate power supplies and good trans-portation facilities which is required to make relatively small investmentssufficiently profitable.
105. On the consumption side, demand for credit is limited by much thesame set of factors. The affluent do not need to borrow for consumption, thereis a very small middle class, and the poor generally cannot afford to borrowfor consumption, except in the form of credit extended by shopkeepers. Thuscredit to the private sector has increased only at moderate rates through1975.
106. The share of credit to the public sector in total banking assetsrose from 12 to about 13 percent between 1967 and 1976, though there wasa period prior to the tax reforms in 1974 when the public sector share ofbanking system assets ranged between 15 and 20 percent. In contrast to thesituation in many other parts of Latin America, growth of public sector demandfor credit has not absorbed the available funds.
1/ These are agencies of off-shore banks, often with only a small officein one of the local hotels. These banks fall outside the control ofthe central bank under current banking law because they do not acceptdeposits and deal only in foreign exchange. Because of the competitionwhich they afford to domestic banks, the latter have pushed for controlof the "bancos de hotel" under the new banking law which was approvedby Congress in 1976 but vetoed by the President. The law is now withthe Council of State (Consejo del Estado), and it seems unlikely thatany action will be taken on the law until after the 1978 elections,considering the furor which surrounded its public discussion in 1976.
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107. Supply of Credit: The banking system as a whole has been close toits maximum legal limit for the expansion of credit during the last year ortwo. Banks have more than enough reserves to cover legal reserve requirements,but face a capital/asset ratio constraint: Paid-in capital plus retainedearnings must equal ten percent of the value of ordinary loans. Although thecapital of the banking system has expanded in line with current GDP over thepast decade, the banking system would still have to increase its capital sub-stantially before it could lend enough to absorb present excess reserves. 1/Banks are generally charging most borrowers the maximum allowable interestrates on loans; at the same time, because of their excess liquidity, they havedropped the rate they are paying to only four to six percent on savingsdeposits compared to the nine percent legal maximum rate.
Major Developments in 1976
108. The most important developments in the banking system during 1976were the doubling of the previous year's record increase in internationalreserves (see Chapter 3) and an uprecedented rise in the money supply. Themoney supply in 1976 grew by about 40 percent compared to GDP growth incurrent prices of only 20 percent, which increased the money supply from 9.7at the end of 1975 to 11.5 percent of GDP at the end of 1976.
109. In contrast to its relatively slow expansion over the past tenyears, domestic credit expanded sharply in 1976, primarily because of theincreased economic activity following the earthquake (Table 4.1). The largeincrease in credit to the public sector reflects the central government'sdeficit financing through reconstruction bonds. The sharpest increase inlending to the private sector was for construction. (Statistical Annex Table6.4 shows the pattern of lending by sector.)
110. To stimulate the flow of banking system credit for financing thereconstruction effort, the Government established a trust fund program inMay of 1976, to be financed by the sale of reconstruction bonds. Under thisprogram, all state-owned banks were asked to set up special accounts toprovide credits of up to 20 years at an interest rate of not more than 4percent to individuals with monthly incomes of $600 or less for building,rebuilding, or purchasing prefabricated houses. These funds are also avail-able to small-scale enterprises which suffered earthquake damage. So far,only five banks have agreed to participate in the program: BANVI, BANDESA,CORFINA, Banco Imobiliario, and the CHN. Out of the total of $58 millionwhich the Government made available to banks participating in the trustfund program, only $38 million had been taken by the end of 1976. The same
1/ There are a few banks with a high ratio of capital to credits outstandingwhich could substantially increase their lending, but the majority ofbanks in the system are close to or at their maximum lending levelsbecause of the capital/asset requirement.
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decree also set up a $5 million housing guarantee fund to encourage commer-cial banks to use their own resources to extend credits on concessional termsfor financing housing reconstruction. This program also has had limitedsuccess--only seven commercial banks have participated, lending a totalof about $2 million. Although loans made under the trust fund and housingguarantee fund programs are not subject to the normal capital/asset require-ments, loan administration problems and the 8 percent yield (4 percent fromborrower plus 4 percent subsidy from central bank), compared to the 11 to13 percent which the banks normally charge for their funds, have discouragedbanks from participating.
Future Prospects
111. Although the excess liquidity in the banking system decreasedsignificantly during the first semester of 1977, this excess liquidity stillrepresents a substantial pool of idle capital resources which should be putto more productive uses. Despite objections that spending these funds wouldseriously accelerate inflation, this seems unlikely. First, at least one-fourth to one third of the demand for investment goods would probably be metby imports, limiting pressures on domestic supplies. Since most of the excessliquidity is held as foreign exchange, these imports would not create balanceof payments problems. 1/ Second, accelerated investment would make possibleadditional production which would help relieve domestic shortages.
112. The Government should take advantage of the scope for non-inflationaryborrowing from the domestic banking system to increase its investment programas discussed below in the Public Investment section of this chapter. Suchborrowing need not have any significant inflationary impact: the publicsector is quite small relative to the total economy; there is very substantialidle production capacity in the form of resources, machinery and peoplewhich could be put to work to meet the additional demand; and the favorablebalance-of-payments position would make it feasible to import goods to meetdemand which could not be met by domestic production. Investment in productiveinfrastructure such as power, roads, telecommunications, irrigation and grainstorage facilities would stimulate accelerated private sector investment bymaking it more profitable. The Government should also take steps to increasethe supply of and demand for credit from the domestic banking system. Thecapital asset ratio, presently 10:1, should be increased substantially with
1/ Because of the high percentage of deposits held in very large accountsand the traditional stability of these holdings, the excess liquidityper se does not pose an immediate inflationary threat. (About 90 percentof all deposits are held by only 8 percent of depositors.)
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further adjustment as circumstances require. 1/ Also, the banking systemshould be encouraged to increase its paid-in capital so that a higher levelof lending can be supported.
B. Public Finance
Background and Perspective
113. The most striking feature of the public sector in Guatemala is itssmall size compared to the national economy. 2/ The results of this have beenseen most clearly in the discussion above of human resources (Chapter 2) whereit was noted that the limited government services such as schools and healthfacilities has been a major factor responsible for Guatemala's unusually lowrates of literacy and high rates of mortality. This section considers thisand three associated issues--the inadequacies of the revenue system, thelevel of public savings, and the sectoral allocation of limited publicresources.
114.. Size of Government: While the private sector has maintained anacceptable rate of economic growth, the Government has not kept pace with thenecessary complementary social investments. It is impossible to say a prioriwhat the level of public sector participation in the economy should be, butfrom at least two perspectives it appears to have been less than required inGuatemala. First, the country falls well below most middle-income LatinAmerican countries in terms of the basic indicators of the quality of life(see Statistical Annex Table 1.5). The limited role played by the publicsector in national development over the past 20 years largely explains whyso little progress has been made in improving the access of the poor, parti-cularly those located in rural areas, to basic social services such as educa-tion and health.
115. Insights from a second perspective reinforce these conclusions: Byevery indicator of revenue or expenditure relative to GDP, the public sectorin Guatemala is clearly among the smallest in Latin America (Table 4.2).
1/ In the past, the Government has been very cautious in using monetarypolicy instruments such as changes in the capital/asset and reserverequirement ratios. More flexibility would be appropriate in light ofrapidly changing external circumstances.
2/ The public sector in Guatemala includes the central government with itsvarious administrative departments, 326 municipalities, about 20 decen-tralized agencies which depend on the central government for operatingand capital resources, and 9 state enterprises some of which are more orless self-supporting, at least for operating expenses. (Table 5.11 inthe Statistical Annex provides a list of the public sector entitiesand their functions.)
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Table 4.2: GUATEMALA: COMPARATIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DATA
(values as percent of GDP - average 1973-75)
SurplusRevenue Expenditure or Deficit
Country Total Tax Current Capital Total /a Current Overall
Guatemala (1973-75) 8.8 8.0 7.1 3.1 10.2 1.7 -1.4(1976) 9.4 8.3 7.6 3.5 11.1 1.7 -1.3
Rest of Central America 13.1 12.2 10.8 4.2 16.0 2.3 -2.9Nicaragua 12.4 11.0 9.5 4.3 17.1 2.9 -4.6El Salvador 12.5 11,6 10.3 3.2 14.3 2.1 -1.8Honduras 12.9 12.1 10.6 5.1 15.7 2.3 -2.7Costa Rica 14.5 14.1 12.6 4.2 16.8 1.9 -2.4
Other Latin America 15.4 13.4 12.4 6.2 18.6 3.4 -3.2Panama 14.6 12.2 13.6 6.0 19.6 1.0 -5.0Dominican Republic 16.4 14.7 8.5 7.9 16.4 7.6 - .1Peru 15.2 13.4 15.0 4.7 19.7 1.6 - .6
/a Current plus capital expenditure may not add to total expenditure becauseof net lending.
Source: IMF, Fiscal Data System (Guatemala data for 1976 are based onIBRD estimates.)
116. The relatively low rate of government participation in the Guatemalaneconomy is by no means a recent phenomenon (see Table 4.3). A shortage ofrevenues, combined with a fiscal policy which has maintained the overalldeficit between 1 and 2 percent of GDP on average reflects the Government'slimited role in the nation's development.
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Table 4.3: GUATEMALA: CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTORINDICATORS AS PERCENT OF GDP
(percentages)
Item 1960 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976
Current Revenues /a 10.4 11.8 10.8 11.3 12.2 13.1Central Government lb 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.9 9.0 9.3
Current Expenditures /a 8.7 10.7 9.8 8.8 10.2 10.9Central Government lb 7.2 7.8 6.9 6.9 7.4 7.6
Current Surplus 1.7 1.1 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.2Central Government 1.3 0.7 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.7
Capital Expenditures /a 2.5 2.3 4.1 3.8 3.0 4.5Central Government /b 2.1 1.5 3.4 3.3 2.6 3.5
Overall Deficit 0.8 1.1 2.1 1.2 0.2 0.7Central Government 0.8 0.7 1.9 1.4 0.4 1.3
Memo ItemGDP (million $) 1,043.6 1,904.0 2,569.3 3,161.5 3,646.0 4,363.1
/a Net of transfers./b Including transfers.
Source: Statistical Annex Tables 2.2 and 5.1.
117. Low Revenues: The low public sector revenues can be attributed totwo primary factors: First, the tax system captures only a small percent ofGDP; second, the revenues generated by state enterprises are generally in-adequate to cover their operating expenses, much less make substantial contri-butions to capital investment.
118. Central government tax revenues have generally remained between 8.5and 9.5 percent of GDP for many years. This relative stability, however,disguises the inelasticity of the system; the buoyance of the tax system hasbeen maintained by periodic revisions of tax rates and coverage. 1/
1/ The major changes which took place in 1974 are described in Memorandum onRecent Economic Developments and Prospects for Guatemala (IBRD Report No.681-GU, March 31, 1975, pages 26-27).
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119. Over the past decade, roughly three quarters of all central govern-ment revenues have come from indirect taxes, of which about two thirds aredomestic sales taxes and the remainder taxes on international trade. Amongthe taxes on domestic sales, the most important is the stamp tax, a cascadingtax levied on each transaction. Because of the widespread evasion of thestamp tax, the Government introduced a system in 1975 whereby vendors arerequired to give customers a sequentially numbered invoice for each sale, thusproviding the Government a device for auditing collection of this tax. InMarch 1977, the Government announced an intensive audit to tighten up thecollection of both stamp and income taxes.
120. The other major category of taxes on domestic sales are excise taxes,of which the most important are those on beverages and tobacco products (Statis-tical Annex Table 5.2). The majority of these are specific rather than advalorem, so their yields tend to respond to changes in volume of consumptionrather than prices. Although growing in absolute terms, excise tax collectionshave fallen from approximately 25 percent of total tax collections in 1972 to18 percent in 1976 because of their relative inelasticity.
121. Among the revenues from taxes on international trade, there has beena significant shift in relative importance from import taxes to export taxes,reflecting both the fiscal incentive agreements which have limited the growthof import tax revenues 1/ and, more importantly, recent revisions of the exporttax schedule. Export taxes have become a major element in the Guatemalan taxsystem, rising from less than 4 percent of tax revenues in 1968 to nearly 12percent in 1976; in 1977, with sharply higher coffee prices and improvedprices for other products, export taxes are expected to constitute over 35percent of current central government revenues 2/ and nearly 80 percent of theincrease in such revenues compared to 1976. A major factor behind this growthof export taxes is the tax reform package of 1974, which significantly improvedproduct coverage and replaced most of the previous specific rates with advalorem rates. Coffee and cotton exports were put on a more progressivescale, which is currently allowing the Government to reap unprecedented taxrevenues from these crops. 3/ At the same time, sugar exports lost their
1/ In 1975 import duty revenues could have been increased by one third inthe absence of $22 million of import duty exonerations.
2/ This is an exceptionally high percentage and cannot be expected tocontinue for more than two or three years. In the period 1965-1975,coffee taxes usually contributed only 2-4 percent of current revenues.The changes in the coffee export tax structure in 1974 will result inin a permanently higher average share, but in 1982, for example, whencoffee prices are expected to have dropped back to their long-termtrend values, coffee export taxes can be expected to contribute about15 percent of current revenues, assuming no changes in the tax structure.
3/ The coffee tax, for example, which is currently a very important sourceof revenues, has a marginal tax rate of 45 percent on prices over $50per cwt.
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previous tax exemption, enabling the Government to take advantage of thefavorable price developments. It does, however, leave the fiscal systemvulnerable to future declines in export prices.
122. Direct taxes have never been particularly productive in Guatemala,fluctuating between 15 and 20 percent of total current revenues over the pastdecade. Virtually all direct tax revenues are on income; taxes on propertyand inheritance have been negligible. Of the total income tax collections,payments by businesses have traditionally accounted for about three fourths.The low yield of personal income taxes reflects some income tax evasion,particularly on professional incomes, and the high level of exemptions anddeductions which leave the majority of Guatemalan citizens virtually untaxed.Personal income taxes contribute only 2-3 percent of central governmentrevenues. A series of income tax reforms in 1974 did, however, raise incometax revenues by over 70 percent, increasing the share in total tax revenuesfrom about 15 to about 20 percent in the course of a single year. Thesemeasures included addition of a surcharge of about 12 percent on incomesexceeding $10,000, the establishment of new penalties for tax evasion, and theproclamation of a tax amnesty.
123. The surge in income tax revenues was shortlived, however; while theirnominal growth in 1976 was 8.2 percent, this represented a decline in real terms.As taxes were paid on incomes earned in the second half of 1975 and the firsthalf of 1976, the real decline in income tax revenues for 1976 was attribut-able to economic stagnation in the second half of 1975 to the impact of theearthquake in the first semester of 1976, and to a liberalization of the lawconcerning the grace period for paying taxes.
124. On a sectoral basis, the largest share of income tax revenue in recentyears has come from industry, which contributes 35 to 40 percent of total incometax revenues compared to its share in GDP of only 15 to 16 percent. At the otherextreme, agriculture accounts for nearly 30 percent of GDP, but has contributedon average only 6 to 7 percent of income tax revenues. The latter figure under-states agricultural tax contribution to a certain extent, however, for theGovernment has emphasized agricultural taxation through export rather than in-come taxes, and even gives income tax credits for export taxes paid.
125. Property taxes have seldom accounted for as much as 4 percent oftotal tax revenues over the past decade, and because of their relatively slowgrowth, their share has been falling in recent years. In 1976, property taxeswere estimated at only 2.6 percent of total central government tax revenues.The low yield and relative stagnation of property tax revenues is attributablelargely to low tax rates, and a failure to keep the assessed values in linewith rapidly rising land prices. The Government is, however, taking steps tocorrect the undervaluation of property. A cadastral survey is underway; inrural areas, this will help establish values on property which has been passedfrom father to son for generations, often with no title or record of sale toestablish the property's value; in urban areas, it will help take account ofthe rapid escalation of land values.
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126. The artificially low tariffs charged by the state enterprises havealso contributed to the inadequacy of Government revenues. Although someimprovements have been made in recent years, a number of enterprises stilloperate at a current deficit, and none of them has been able to generate acurrent surplus sufficient to finance more than a nominal part of the totalinvestment which would be required to meet adequately the nation's needs(Table 4.4). For example, despite a series of tariff increases, basedprimarily on a fuel adjustment clause, INDE will still have to increase itstariffs to final consumers appreciably to finance even a nominal portion ofits planned investment program out of current savings.
Table 4.4
GUATEMALA: AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES - SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, 1970-1975
(millions of quetzales)
Item 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Current Revenues 74.0 80.0 107.4 124.5 113.2 145.2(Transf. from CG) (10.8) (12.6) (12.9) (14.1) (14.0) (27.3)
Current Expenditures 66.6 74.4 98.9 108.6 114.0 130.6(Transf. to CG) (0.1) (0.9) (4.4) (5.7) (2.9) (3.0)
Current Balance 7.4 6.4 8.5 15.9 -0.8 14.6
Capital Receipts 8.1 9.8 13.0 12.0 48.4 42.5(Transf. from CG) (5.0) (6.3) (10.4) (9.3) (37.6) (38.6)
Investment Exp. 23.3 28.7 21.0 35.3 56.1 51.8
Overall Balance -7.8 -12.5 0.5 -7.4 -8.5 5.3
FinanceExternal 2.9 11.7 -0.2 7.8 10.3 8.9Internal 4.9 0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -1.8 -14.2
Memo ItemsCurrent Balance as% of Investment 31.8 22.3 40.5 45.0 -1.4 28.2
Current Balanceexcluding net CG transfersas % of Investment -14.6 -21.6 -21.0 5.1 -26.4 -24.5
Source: Statistical Annex Table 5.4.
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127. Public Savings and Finance: As a share of GDP, public sector savingsare only one half to three fourths the level found in other Latin Americancountries (Table 4.2). Nevertheless, because of the substantially lower ratioof capital expenditures to GDP in Guatemala, the Government has been able tofinance about half of its public sector investment from current savings.
128. Because of the relatively low overall public sector deficit,a pattern which prevailed for at least the past fifteen years, the ratio ofpublic debt to GDP has also been very low; in 1975, internal debt was equalto about 8 percent of GDP, while external debt amounted to about 5 percent ofGDP. These figures rose rather significantly in 1976, however, because of theearthquake and the deficiencies of the tax system--internal debt increased bynearly one half and external by about two fifths compared to the previous year.Rather than impose special emergency taxes, the Government issued $122.0million of reconstruction bonds. Because the purchase of the bonds was madeobligatory for all people earning over $200 per month, the issue was alsointended to serve as a compulsory savings device. 1/ The Government chosethis alternative for a variety of reasons: First, it did not want to taxpeople who had already suffered because of the earthquake. Second, it fearedthat taxes on industry and commerce would discourage production at a time whenincreased output was needed. Third, it wanted to mobilize the resourcesquickly and feared that political resistance to a new tax would delay thisexcessively. By the of 1976, however, of the $122 million authorized, only $8million had been placed with the general public and $1 million with theprivate banking sector, leaving $71 million with the Bank of Guatemala and$42 million yet to be placed. Some of the bonds held by the Central Bankat the end of 1976 were turned over in March/April 1977 to purchasers buyingthe bonds on an obligatory basis under the 10-month installment plan. Atpresent, the majority of the bonds are not in the hands of the general publicbut remain instead with the commercial banks, the Central Bank, and theGovernment. Although the maturity and interest rates are the same, thereconstruction bonds are less attractive as an investment than regularGuatemalan government bonds because they do not carry a sight repurchaseguarantee. By late 1977, a secondary market for the reconstruction bondswas beginning to develop, but this market appeared to be limited basicallyto merchants who were willing to accept the bonds as payment for certainitems.
129. While the reconstruction bond issue, which was chosen in preferenceto an emergency tax measure for the reasons noted above, represented an effortby the Government to mobilize resources to finance the reconstruction, somenegative aspects must be noted. First, since the bonds were issued in lieu oftax measures, the basic weaknesses of the Guatemalan tax system were left un-changed at a time when an emergency tax program could have been implemented
1/ The Government expected that about half of the bonds would be placedthrough obligatory sales, leaving the remainder to be placed throughvoluntary purchases.
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TABLE 4.5GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURES BY SECTOR, 1968-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
…------------------------------------------------------------__--------------__------
DISTRIBUTION GROWTH RATESITEM ___________________________
1968 1973 1976 68-73 73-76…-----------------------------------------------------------_----__----------__------
ECONOMIC SERVICES 12.8 11.7 15.0 6.4 34.0
AGRICULTURE 2.3 3.8 6.6 20.3 47.5TRANSPORTATION 5.8 4.5 5.3 3.0 30.3COMMUNICATIONS 3.5 2.3 1.8 - 0.5 15.1OTHER 1.3 1.1 1.3 4.8 30.3
SOCIAL SERVICES 42.8 42.8 39.1 8.2 19.7
EDUCATION 22.4 21.4 21.7 7.3 23.9HEALTH 11.7 11.5 12.0 8.0 25.1SOCIAL WELFARE 6.9 8.1 5.3 11.8 6.8OTHER 1.9 1.8 0.1 7.1 - 54.1
GENERAL SERVICES 44.4 45.5 45.9 8.8 23.6
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION 15.5 21.5 16.4 15.6 12.6DEFENSE & POLICE 20.5 13.9 19.9 0.2 39.0JUSTICE 2.1 2.3 2.1 10.4 18.9INTEREST PAYMENTS 6.3 7.9 7.6 13.1 21.8
TOTAL CURRENT EXPENSES 100.0 100.0 100.0 8.3 23.3=====z=== ========= ========= ===SS==== ======-=-
…___________________________________________________________________________________
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE
TABLE 4.6GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURES BY SECTOR, 196B-1976
(MILLI ONS OF QUETZALES)
D I S T R I B U T I O NITEM
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-------------------------------------------
DIRECT INVESTMENT 18.2 23.3 22.0 20.2 39.5 56.0 67.4 59.2 81.1
ECONOMIC SERVICES 13.7 18.0 16.5 13.1 20.1 21.0 31.2 27.8 32.7
AGRICULTURE 1.6 4.1 2.8 2.7 3.4 3.7 9.6 10.4 5.5TRANSPORTATION 11.4 13.4 13.0 10.3 16.5 16.7 21.6 17.4 26.4COMMUNICATIONS 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.8OTHER - - 0.1 - 0.2 0.5 - _ _
SOCIAL SERVICES 4.1 4.8 3.3 2.4 13.0 26.8 18.0 11.8 31.8
EDUCATION * 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.1 5.1 11.4 6.4 4.1 7.1HEALTH 3.1 3.1 2.1 1.0 7.1 14.2 11.3 7.7 24.7OTHER - - 0.2 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.3 - -
GENERAL SERVICES 0.4 0.5 2.2 4.7 6.4 8.2 18.2 19.6 16.6-________ --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
TRANSFERS 7.4 6.7 6.6 14.0 12.7 17.9 38.7 35.8 72.3
AGRICULTURE 1.0 1.5 2.0 6.1 4.8 8.2 13.5 5.7 72.3HOUSING 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.8 1.9 0.9 - 1.5 -POWER 3.0 3.1 2.5 2.0 2.4 4.5 12.6 22.7 -OTHER 3.2 1.8 1.6 4.1 3.6 4.3 12.6 5.9
TOTAL CAPITAL EXPEND'TURE 25.6 30.0 28.6 34.2 52.2 73.9 106.1 95.0 153.4......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .........
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE.
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to be followed later by a permanent improvement in the tax structure. Second,while taxes would have yielded a net gain to the Government, the fundsgenerated by the sale of the bonds must be repayed with interest at 8 percent,a process which has already begun. 1/
130. Sectoral Priorities: The Government's limited financial resourceswere consistent with a disinclination to make major changes in its patternof current expenditures over the past decade (Table 4.5). Government currentexpenditures on economic services continue to get only about one third theamount allocated to social services. Defense and internal security receive asmuch as health and social welfare combined, and nearly as much as education.There have been, however, some significant changes in the Government's allo-cation of funds among the various economic services. Most notably, the shareof agriculture in current expenditures has more than doubled since 1971(however, as shown in Table 4.5, the share of agriculture is still so low thatthis increase has not caused any major change in overall allocations). Thischange for agriculture reflects the Government's efforts, beginning with the1970-75 Development Plan, to foster agricultural development through greaterpublic involvement, which has caused a substantial expansion of currentexpenditures on, for example, agricultural extension services and agriculturaltraining institutions. Despite the rapid growth in central government expen-ditures between 1973 and 1976 in nominal terms, the ratio of current expen-ditures to GDP only rose from 7.6 percent in 1972 to 7.8 percent in 1976.
131. Government capital expenditures have been much more volatile thancurrent expenditures, both in terms of absolute level and in terms of allocationamong different sectors (Table 4.6). In terms of sectoral priorities, therehas been a clear shift out of general government services and transportation,with a corresponding increase in housing and power. Factors back of thesechanges are analyzed in Section C below on Public Investment.
Medium-Term Issues and Prospects
132. The 1975-79 Development Plan and the Reconstruction Plan, preparedby the National Economic Planning Council (CNPE), consistently underline theneed to expand and deepen the Government's involvement in the country'sdevelopment. This is highly desirable, for it would make possible betterhousing, health, education and productive infrastructure, the shortage ofwhich constrains the nation's development. In the past, however, the Govern-ment has had only partial success in implementing the plans prepared by theCNPE, which were often well conceived, but whose practical implementationwas constrained by the Government's weak administrative capacity and itsunwillingness to mobilize the necessary financial resources. The formerremains a serious obstacle to successful implementation of current plans,and while taxes on coffee exports are at present providing extraordinarypublic revenues, within about two years the underlying weaknesses of thepresent revenue structure may again begin to limit the Government's abilityto carry out planned expenditures.
1/ Although the bonds have a nominal 15-year maturity, they are beingredeemed by the Government on a lottery basis whereby approximatelyone fifteenth of the bonds outstanding will be taken back each yearby the Government.
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133. The limited absorptive capacity of the public sector is mainly theresult of inadequate manpower and training. The degree of the problem variesfrom sector to sector. The development of roads, for example, has been givensufficiently high priority over the past decade to allow building up a com-paratively competent staff. Some of the other infrastructure sectors such aspower also have relatively good staff and absorptive capacity. On the otherhand, the social sectors (particularly health and, to a lesser extent,education) have long been neglected. Expenditures on salaries and trainingin these sectors would have to be increased substantially in the next fewyears to develop the capacity required to offer the necessary services and todevelop and implement the Development Plan's capital investment projects.
134. Such a strategy would, of course, make it essential to implementsubstantial changes in the revenue structure in the next year or two sothat, once coffee export tax revenues return to a more normal level, otherrevenues will be available to sustain the higher level of government activity.In the meantime, the Government could, if necessary, take advantage of itssubstantial unused domestic and external borrowing capacity to step up thelevel of public expenditure, so as to address some of the major unresolvedeconomic and social problems. Present plans for reconstruction and develop-ment indicate an increase in total public sector expenditure relative to GDPfrom around 16 percent at present to around 18 percent by 1982. The Govern-ment is currently considering a variety of proposals to improve tax yieldsincluding, in particular, changes in income and property tax and better taxadministration and enforcement. Improvements of this nature will be necessaryto maintain the increases in public sector savings relative to GDP which havebeen achieved during the past year. Projections indicate that, without sub-stantial improvements in the public revenue structure, public sector savingswill fall from the present 5.4 percent of GDP to about 2.5 percent by 1982(Table 4.7). Although the projected level for 1982 would still be abovehistorical levels, this clearly deteriorating trend would need to be reversedby positive fiscal reforms; furthermore, the level of public sector savingsrelative to GDP which was adequate when public investment averaged 3.5 percentof GDP will not be adequate when public investment attains a more desirablelevel of at least 6 percent of GDP. If steps are not taken to reverse thedeteriorating trend, the resulting public sector deficits could reach a point
Table 4.7: GUATEMALA: PUBLIC SECTOR INDICATORS AS SHARE OF GDP - PROJECTED
Item 1970-76/a 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Current Revenues 11.8 16.6 15.3 15.0 14.7 14.7 14.7Current Expenditures 10.1 11.3 11.4 11.6 11.8 12.0 12.2Current Savings 1.7 5.4 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.5Capital Expenditures 3.5 6.3 6.3 5.7 6.1 6.6 6.2Overall Balance(- = deficit) 1.2 -0.6 -2.1 -2.1 -3.0 -3.6 -3.4
External Financing /b 0.9 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.1 1.1Internal Financing 0.3 -1.7 0.0 0.2 1.3 2.5 2.3
/a Based on information in Table 4.3 above./b Based on net disbursements on public borrowing from balance of payments
(Statistical Annex Table 3.1).
Source: Ministry of Public Finance and mission estimates.
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at which their financing from internal sources, taking into account probablelevels of external financing, could begin to create appreciable inflationarypressures.
135. The Government has estimated that 51 percent of the US$2.7 billionpublic sector investment program over the period 1977 to 1982 will be financedfrom foreign sources (Statistical Annex Tables 5.7 and 5.8). While thisreflects to a certain extent the summation of tentative plans of individualaid agencies, the implicit total level of disbursements seems somewhat highcompared to the foreign borrowing which has been forecast in this report forbalance of payments reasons (Statistical Annex Table 3.1). These projectionsindicate that only some US$1,000 million of disbursements will be required,assuming inter alia that reserves will not fall below about five months ofimports during the period. This would represent about 37% of the investmentprogram (compared to the 51% shown as financed from foreign sources in theinvestment program itself). This difference between the level of resourcesneeded for balance of payments reasons and those needed from the point of viewof public sector resource mobilization underscores the need to improve thegovernment's fiscal performance.
C. Public Investment
Past Developments and Issues
136. Public fixed investment in the past has been inadequate to meetthe needs of the population (see Chapter 2). Compared to the other CentralAmerican countries, Guatemala has had the lowest public sector fixed invest-ment/GDP ratio for at least the past ten years (Table 4.8). The bulk ofpublic fixed investment in the late 1960s and early 1970s was for transporta-tion and power (Table 4.9). A relatively small share of public investment wasin the social sectors, although it rose substantially in the early 1970s owingto investments in water supply and sewerage. Investment in the productivesectors has always been minor. The Guatemalan Constitution provides a guaran-tee of free enterprise which has limited the development of a public sectorrole in these areas.
Table 4.8: CENTRAL AMERICA: PUBLIC SECTOR FIXED INVESTMENTAS A SHARE OF GDP, 1966-1972
(Percentages)
Annual Averages1966-1968 1970-1972 1973-1975
Guatemala 2.8 2.3 3.1Costa Rica 4.0 6.3 6.3Nicaragua 4.8 5.6 6.1 /1Honduras 3.6 5.0 6.4El Salvador 2.9 3.3 5.4
/1 1973 and 1974 only.
Source: IBRD Reports.
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Table _4.9: GUATEMALA: PUBLIC FIXED INVESTMNT BY SECTOR (1968-1976)1/
(in percentages)
Sector 1968-70Vi1971-75 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
INFRASTRUCTURE 63.7 51.0 66.3 61.9 63.2 61.3 46.6 36.7 54.2 57.5 62.4
Power 21.1 18.2 22.2 20.1 21.0 15.6 14.4 12.0 20.6 24.2 34.4Transport 37.2 26.9 40.0 39.5 32.3 45.0 31.2 21.4 22.1 26.4 16.5Communication 5.4 5.9 4.1 2.3 9.9 0.7 1.0 3.3 11.5 6.9 11.5
SOCIAL SECTORS 28.7 36.2 29.3 28.7 28.4 30.8 45.3 51.6 29.4 2T 9 30.9
Housing and Urban Development 11.5 6.2 13.4 15.2 6.o 14.0 10.3 4.9 3.8 4.0 4.2Water Supply and Sewerage 8.6 17.0 7.1 6.5 12.3 7.4 17.2 26.5 16.1 14.1 11.9Health and Welfare 4.6 3.3 4.4 2.8 6.7 6.1 5.8 3.3 2.2 2.0 11.1Education 4.0 9.7 4.4 4.2 3.4 3.3 12.0 16.9 7.3 7.8 3.0
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS 7.6 12.8 4.4 9.4 8.4 7.9 8.1 11.7 16.4 114.6 7.4
Agriculture 7.6 11.6 4.4 9.4 8.4 7.9 8.1 10.7 14.8 12.6 3.0Tourism and Other - 1.2 - - - - - 1.0 1.6 2.0 4.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
As a Percent of GDP - _ 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.6 3.3 3.5 2.6 5.6
I1 Excludes General Services (e.g., government building, defence, amortization payments, etc.) and Mining andIndustry investments.
2/ This is the period of the Economic Development Plan vhich preceeded the one currently in effect.
Source: Statistical Annex Tables 5.7.
137. The rate of growth of public fixed investment increased somewhatwith the beginning of the implementation of the 1971-1975 Economic DevelopmentPlan. Among the overall objectives of this plan were greater support for theproductive and social sectors, particularly for agriculture, education andhealth. With this plan, investment grew in almost every area. The largestincrease was in the social sector, whose share of total fixed investmentincreased from 28.7 to 36.2 percent between 1968-70 and 1971-75. Theseincreases were concentrated in education and health (including water supplyand sewerage). During this period, however, transportation continued todominate total public fixed investment.
Recent Trends and Impact of the 1976 Earthquake
138. The Government which took office in July 1974 began implementationof the 1975-1979 Development Plan, which called for an average annual increasein GNP of 7.5 percent, an annual growth of 10 percent in public investment forthe period and a total public investment during the period of Q 1,026.4 mil-lion. 1/ High priority was placed on investment in energy and agriculture
1/ Of which planned fixed investment amounted to Q 898.9 million.
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(especially construction of feeder roads and provision of agricultural credit),and special attention was given to the tourism sector. In addition, the plancalled for improvements in the Government's planning and project executingcapacity in infrastructure and social investment.
139. The massive earthquake of February 4, 1976, brought into sharpfocus the strengths and weaknesses of Guatemala's public sector and led to areevaluation of the 1975-79 Development Plan. Of the total reconstructioncost, estimated at Q 1,020 million, two-thirds was for housing and the re-mainder for infrastructure and other sectors. Most productive infrastructurewas quickly restored; only the reconstruction of Puerto Barrios and permanentrepairs to some damaged roads still remain to be completed. On the otherhand, protracted delays at the outset of the housing reconstruction programfurther highlighted the traditional deficiencies in the executing capacityof agencies in this sector. This situation is now improving, however.
140. As a result of the earthquake damages, it was found necessary tomodify both the size and, to a lesser extent, the sectoral allocation of the1975-79 Development Plan. The modifications, combined with a shift from con-stant to current prices, are reflected in Table 4.10 and resulted in a sub-stantial increase in the total amount of the public investment plan. Of thisincrease, housing and urban development accounted for 43 percent, and thepower sector accounted for 32 percent. Significant increases in the Planwere also made in the health and welfare and the transportation sectors.
Table 4.10: GUATEMALA: PUBLIC INVESTMENT-,! 1975-1979
(millions of quetzales)-J
Original CNPE Revised CNPEInvestment Plan Investment Pl'an IBRD EstimatesvtlIAnount_/ % TI3/ Amount % TI Amount % TI
INFRASTRUCTURE 483.0 47.0 898.1 46.o 7L8.5 2
Power 214.9 21.0 506.9 26.0 465.8 31.5
Transportation 176.3 17.2 241.4 12.4 213.5 14.4Communication 91.8 8.8 149.8 7.6 108.2 7.3
SOCIAL SECTORS 300.3 29.3 771.0 39.5 476.6 32.1
Housing and Urban _velopment 79.5 7.8 473.1 24.2 237.4 16.0Health and Welfaref 137.4 13.4 216.5 11.1 178.2 12.0Education 83.4 8.1 81.4 4.2 61.0 4.1
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS 230.5 22.5 252.2 12.9 186.0 12.6
Agriculture 139.1 13.6 121.7 6.2 85.5 5.8Tourism 57.2 5.6 61.7 3.2 66.3 4.5Mining and Industry 34.2 3.3 68.8 3.5 34.2 2.3
OTHERI1 12.6 1.2 31.3 1.6 31.3 2.1
TOTAL 1 100.0 1,952.6 100.0 1.481.4 100.0
1/ Includes both fixed and financial investments, based on current prices.B/ Original CNPE data are in constant 1967 prices; the other data are in current prices.
sAs percent of total investment.B Eased on actual figures for 1975 and approximate figures for 1976.
5/IBiw estimates are based on the assumptions described in paragraph 144.includes Water Supply and Sewerage.Includes General Service Investments.
Sources: Secretaria General del ConseJo Nacional de Planificacion Economica (ChPE).IBRD estimates from Appendix Table 5.8.
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141. The composition of investment was also changed by these differentialincreases; planned spending in the social sectors rose from 29.3 to 39.5 per-cent of total investment for the 1975-79 period. The Government has alsogiven high priority to investments in the power sector hoping to overcome theconstraints to both economic and social development which are presentlyimposed by power shortages. Consequently, investment in energy in the Govern-ment's revised 1975-79 investment plan has been raised by 135 percent and nowrepresents 26 percent of total public investment compared to 21 percent in theoriginal plan. The rural electrification which is part of this program shouldhelp alleviate the present imbalance in availability of electricity servicebetween the urban and the rural areas.
142. Tables 4.10 (the two right hand columns) and 4.11 reflect the out-lines of a development program which pulls together the various public invest-ment projects that have been identified and which would go a long way towardalleviating some of the main economic and social problems of the country, andwhich is consistent with domestic and external financing possibilities. Eventhough the share of planned investment in housing and urban development hasbeen reduced by one third from the Government's Plan, improvements in both theexecuting capacity of the agencies involved in the social sectors (and inparticular in the housing and urban development sector) and in the allocationof financial resources to these sectors are required if this program is to becarried out. Efforts to increase absorptive capacity should begin immediately.
143. The capital resources necessary to support an expanded investmentprogram should not be difficult to obtain. Tax yields could be improvedsubstantially, which would generate additional current savings, and theGovernment could borrow abroad from official sources more than it has in thepast. In addition to financial resources, external borrowing brings with ittechnical assistance which, in the past, has made major contributions to thepublic investment program in Guatemala. (Virtually all of the projectsproposed in the 1975-79 Development Plan are intended to involve foreignofficial financial agencies, and many of the projects were originallydeveloped by the agencies).
144. Although the current development plan only extended to 1979, theGovernment has begun to develop project-specific plans up to 1982 (StatisticalAnnex Table 5.9). Since virtually all of the identified projects are asso-ciated with potential foreign loans, the projections in this table have beendeveloped by modifying the Government's revised investment plan according torecent external lender projections regarding the timing and size of projectsthey are prepared to finance, coupled with the executing agencies' bestestimates as to the implementation time required and costs of on-going andplanned projects. The end result has been to extend the period of executioncompared to the Government's revised projections, particularly in the socialsectors where implementation capacity is weakest. In the latter part ofthe period, unidentified projects have been added to the Government projec-tions to avoid the substantial drop relative to GDP present in current projec-tions. In terms of percentage of GDP, public investment drops slightly after
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1978 (Table 4.11). This drop reflects a natural decrease in the earthquakereconstruction effort and near completion of two major hydroelectric powerprojects (Aguacapa and Chixoy).
Table 4.11: GUATEMALA: PROPOSED PUBLIC INVESTMENT BY SECTOR, /1 1977-1982(as a percent of total investment)
Estimated ProJectedSector 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Infrastructure 63 55 55 53 53 50 46
Power 34 33 32 35 33 26 19Transportation 17 14 16 11 12 13 15Communication 12 8 7 7 8 11 12
Social Sectors 30 35 33 37 35 36 36
Housing and Urban Development 4 22 20 19 19 19 15Water Supply and Sewerage 12 7 4 6 6 7 8Health and Welfare 11 2 5 6 6 5 8Education 3 4 4 5 4 5 5
Productive Sectors 7 10 12 10 12 14 18
Agriculture 3 7 7 4 4 7 11Tourism 4 3 5 6 8 7 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
As a Percent of GDP 5.6 6.5 6.5 5.9 6.2 6.6 6.2
/1 Includes fixed and financial investment.
Source: Statistical Annex Table 5.8.
Sectoral Background and Issues
145. Power: The growth of the electric energy sector has been parti-cularly unsatisfactory in recent years; inadequate planning and investmenthave left Guatemala the most poorly supplied of all Central American countriesin terms of installed capacity per capita. A substantial part of the presentinstalled capacity was built on the basis of short-term considerations to
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overcome immediate power shortages. The present Government, conscious of theinadequacy of this approach and pressed by the recent changes in fuel prices,has given high priority to the sector's development based on a long-termplan. It is aware that bottlenecks in the energy field would hold backeconomic growth and therefore the scope for social expenditure growth.
146. At present only 30 percent of the 226 MW installed capacity of theinterconnected system in Guatemala is hydroelectric, despite a relativelyabundant hydroelectric potential of which an estimated 4,300 MW is technicallyand economically exploitable. To begin a more rational development of thesector emphasizing use of hydroelectric capacity, INDE has carried out aninventory of Guatemala's hydro resources and has developed a master plan forpower generation. Means of improving coordination between INDE and EEG arebeing developed and should begin to be implemented in the near future.
147. The 90 MW Aguacapa and the 300 MW Chixoy hydroelectric projects,scheduled for completion in 1979 and 1982, respectively, are the main compo-nents of the Government's investment plan for power. Upon completion of theseprojects, the share of thermal generation in total installed capacity shouldbe down to about 30 percent--the present level of hydro capacity. This willyield savings--measured at today's oil prices--of about US$50 million a yearin imported oil.
148. The Government was actively considering development of a geothermalproject in the Moyuta volcano area, located in the southeastern part of thecountry. This area is geologically similar to the Ahuachapan geothermal fieldin neighboring El Salvador, which is now being exploited. Recent pre-feasibilitystudies indicate that some portions of the Moyuta geothermal field are noteconomically viable for geothermal power generation; nevertheless, additionalstudies are being conducted and sites suitable for geothermal power generationmay be found in the near future. In the meantime, to help meet the near-termdemand for electricity, plans are being drawn up for interconnecting theSalvadorean and Guatemalan systems. Under this plan, Guatemala will purchaseenergy from El Salvador, but after 1983, when the Chixoy project is expectedto be in operation, the reverse would take place. INDE has completed apreliminary evaluation of the national rural electrification program which,when implemented, should help to alleviate the present imbalance in avail-ability of electricity service between the urban and rural areas.
149. Roads: During the past 15 years a significant share of publicinvestment has been in the road network of Guatemala. In the 1971-75 period,for example, roads represented about 27 percent of total public investment,reflecting the high priority set by the Government on linking together thecountry with a basic transportation system.
150. The distribution of the road network varies considerably from onegeographical area to another; the highest highway density is in the PacificLowlands and the Central Highlands, where approximately 88 percent of the
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country's population is located, and the lowest highway densities are in thePeten and Atlantic areas, including the Northern Transversal Strip, whichhave 50 percent of the total area of the country but only 12 percent of thetotal population. (See Chapter 1 for further discussion of the present roadnetwork; see also Figure 5.1, which shows the distribution of populationwithin Guatemala.)
151. In the past ten years priority was given to paving existing roadsrather than developing badly needed rural roads -- average growth from1963-74 of paved roads was nearly 7 percent per year, compared to less than2 percent per year for other roads. Consequently, there is a serious short-age of all-weather farm-to-market roads, making it difficult for agriculturalcommunities to market their products. Development of feeder and penetrationroads integrated with agricultural development, particularly in the Peten andthe Northern Transversal Strip, is therefore badly needed. They would notonly improve the lot of those already in the area, but would also encourageand support the movement of people to this region from the overcrowded high-lands zone.
152. Guatemala's road network suffered an estimated US$48 million damageduring the February earthquake. Damage to the highway linking Guatemala Citywith the Atlantic Coast was the most severe; this road was closed to alltraffic for a period of about six weeks. Despite widespread and seriousdamage, most roads were reopened within a relatively few weeks. Permanentrepairs for many roads, however, will not be completed for at least another18 months.
153. Technical assistance is needed to improve preparation and super-vision of projects and to enhance the practical training of personnel of theDireccion General de Caminos (DGC). The planning unit in DGC is responsiblefor programming and planning all highway works, but its activities in thisrespect have been limited. The Consejo Nacional de Planificacion Economica(CNPE) has tried to initiate coordination between DGC and other governmentagencies involved in highway construction, but there is a need to coordinatemore effectively the overall development of the transport sector, to introduceintermodal planning and to build up an effective centralized highway trans-portation planning unit.
154. The 1977-1982 investment projections shown in Statistical AnnexTable 5.9 include several projects for development of feeder and penetra-tion roads to be carried out in connection with the country-wide rural roadprogram, the Agricultural Development Plan for the Northern Transversal Strip,and the highway program for the Peten region.
155. Railroads: The railway system began around 1870, and from 1900 to1968, was operated by International Railways of Central America (IRCA), anAmerican firm which also had control of the port operations at Barrios and SanJose. In December 1968, the Government of Guatemala terminated the IRCAconcession and created an autonomous public enterprise, Ferrocarriles de
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Guatemala (FEGUA), to take over the administration of the railroad and thePuerto Barrios port. After the take-over, FEGUA continued to operate atsubstantial losses because of obsolete equipment and excess staff. In 1974,however, FEGUA reduced its manpower drastically and replaced its fleet ofobsolete steam locomotives. At the same time, concessionary contracts forshippers were eliminated, thus increasing average tariffs. These changes havehad a major impact on the operational viability of the entity and, in 1975,FEGUA was able to generate a small operating surplus without central govern-ment transfers.
156. It is estimated that for the 1977-82 period total investment inrailroads will be minimal; the planned Q 4 million will be used mainly forrehabilitation, including repair and acquisition of rolling stock. Untilan assessment is made of the economic viability of railroad operations inGuatemala, compared to other transport modes, the small planned investmentappears appropriate.
157. Ports: Guatemala has two ports on the Pacific -- Champerico and SanJose, and two on the Atlantic -- Santo Tomas de Castilla and Puerto Barrios. 1/At present no single ministry or government agency is responsible for ports andshipping in the country; the autonomous National Port Authorities of Champericoand of Santo Tomas are responsible to the Presidency through the Ministry ofPublic Finance, while the other two ports, San Jose and Puerto Barrios, aresubject to FEGUA regulations and control. To improve coordination of portdevelopment efforts, a National Port Commission (CPN) was formed in 1972.A UNDP-financed five-year regional study of the shipping requirements andpotentials involving all the Central American Governments is being coordinatedby SIECA, and since these regional efforts may be hampered in part by the lackof policy and interport coordination at the country level, there is an urgentneed to establish a single port authority in Guatemala. The Government hasrecognized the need and has taken steps in this direction in recent months.As part of the reconstruction loan agreement with IBRD, the Guatemalan Govern-ment undertook to carry out a port organization study.
158. The ports investment program for 1977-82 includes Q 90 millionfor ports, shipping and waterways. The two major projects are the SantoTomas port expansion and a new port on the Pacific, both to be initiated in1979. The latter project has recently received high priority by the Governmentbecause there is sufficient import and export traffic on the Pacific coastplain to justify a new deep water port facility. However, the recentlycompleted Central American Transport Study (ECAT) identified the high initialcapital cost as a major problem. The same study pointed to San Jose as themost suitable location for the facility. An alternate solution reflected inTable 4.10 may be to start with a less costly port design concept capable ofbeing expanded into a more acceptable facility in the future. Close coop-eration among existing port authorities is needed to assure selection of anoptimal approach.
1/ The two ports on the Atlantic lie within 10 km of each other (see countrymap), and they tend to be complementary in their activity. Santo Tomas,which was built in 1955, is a general cargo port; Puerto Barrios, whichwas built at the turn of the century, was primarily an agriculturalcommodities export facility before the earthquake seriously damaged it.
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159. Air Transport: Aviation has been quite important in Guatemala,especially for the agricultural and tourism sectors. Even with the eventualimprovement of the road network to remote regions such as the Peten, regularair service should remain a basic necessity for transport of goods andpassengers. Scheduled and chartered transport, especially to Peten'sarchaeological sites, will continue to play a vital role for the Guatemalantourist industry.
160. The investment program for the 1977-82 period includes two impor-tant projects: (a) the construction of a new airport at Santa Elena in thePeten and (b) the first phase for upgrading Guatemala's "La Aurora" airport.A total of Q 10.0 million has been allocated by the Government for the latterof which Q 6.0 million would be provided from external sources.
161. Communications: Guatemala Telecommunications (GUATEL) is respon-sible for national and international communications, as well as the Guatemalansection of the Central American regional micro-wave network. Although thetelephone network has expanded significantly in recent years, Guatemala stillhas the next to lowest telephone density among the Central American countries(0.77 telephone units per 1,000 people). The earthquake caused substantialdamage to the central switching stations and to installations in privatehomes. GUATEL's telegraph facilities also suffered extensive damage. (Inrural areas, these facilities were commonly located in non-seismic resistantbuildings.) Emergency radio relay stations were set up throughout the countryimmediately following the earthquake, so basic communications were quicklyrestored.
162. Communication investment is expected to average about 9 percent oftotal investment in the 1977-82 period (compared to about 6 percent of thetotal during 1971-75) as Guatemala makes long overdue improvements in itstelephone system, particularly in the rural areas.
163. Housing and Urban Development: The housing sector suffered severedamage during the 1976 earthquake, which made the already critical housingshortage even worse. Prior to the earthquake, an estimated 300,000 dwellingunits out of the nation's 800,000 needed replacement or rehabilitation. Afterthe earthquake, the housing deficit was estimated to be about 674,000. Thesituation in Guatemala City was particularly grave even before the quakebecause of crowded, unsanitary conditions, and about 58,000 housing units(25 percent of the city's stock) were severely damaged. The cost of replacingand upgrading housing damaged by the earthquake is estimated to be about Q 660million or somewhat over half of the total reconstruction cost.
164. Responsibility for the development and implementation of reconstruc-tion activities in housing was divided between the National Housing Bank(BANVI) for Guatemala City and major urban centers, and the AgriculturalDevelopment Bank (BANDESA) for mostly rural areas. The housing reconstructionprogram initially suffered from delays, further highlighting deficiencies inthe executing capacity of the responsible agencies. While some progress hasbeen made recently, additional improvements are needed. Housing investment by
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the public sector (of which two thirds will be financial) is expected toaverage about 19 percent of total public investment in the 1977-82 period,a very substantial increase over the past.
165. Water Supply and Sewerage: Overall, only 37 percent of the totalpopulation of Guatemala was supplied with public water as of late 1974; inthe rural areas the proportion was 15 percent, of which only 2 percent hadhouse connections. Existing water supplies are not sufficient to meet fullythe demand even with the present limited number of connections. Consequently,rationing is widespread. Also, water sources are sometimes polluted, andlocally operated systems lack the necessary funds, personnel and implementingcapacity to maintain and improve service. Sewerage service levels are evenlower than those for water supply; in urban areas, some 26 percent are serveddirectly with public sewerage, and in rural areas sewerage is almost entirelyabsent.
166. This situation was aggravated by the earthquake, which caused anestimated Q 30 million in damage to the water and sewerage sector. Some ofthe funds, originally scheduled for expansion and new facilities are nowbeing diverted for repairs of damaged facilities. Substantial progress hasbeen made within the last year, however, in repairing and upgrading damagedfacilities. The Institute for Municipal Development (INFOM), which was createdto assist the development of municipalities outside Guatemala City, has playeda major role in the sector's reconstruction effort.
167. Following the earthquake, the Government nearly doubled the originalplanned investment for the sector for the 1975-79 period (to over Q 180 mil-lion). However, because of the sector's limited capacity to prepare and imple-ment projects, the expected difficulties in obtaining foreign financing, andthe lack of coordination between the numerous sectoral entities, this level ofinvestment will be difficult to achieve. Provided at least some steps aretaken to improve the sector's capacity to prepare and implement projects,public investments in the sector for the 1977-82 period (including reconstruc-tion) are estimated at Q 169.0 million. This level of investment assumes thatQ 100.0 million (60 percent) will be provided by external lenders. To theextent that these funds are not forthcoming, the investments actually executedwill drop from the projected level.
168. Health and Welfare: Guatemala's high mortality rates reflect thelow average level of health care. With the exception of the capital and afew other large cities, organized health care services are few or non-existent.Responsibility for health care in Guatemala lies with the Ministry of PublicHealth and the Guatemalan Social Security Institute (IGSS). In the past, IGSS'ambitious program for hospital construction has lagged far behind schedule(partly because of arrears in the Government's counterpart contributions tothe system). As a result of limited coordination between the Ministry ofPublic Health and IGSS, duplication of medical facilities has taken place insome areas, while in others no service has been provided.
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169. The National Health Plan, which is part of the 1975-79 DevelopmentPlan, envisages extending the health services and improving their quality,particularly to mothers and small children in rural areas. As a result of theserious damage inflicted by the earthquake to the health facilities, thenumber of hospital beds in Guatemala City dropped from 3.12 to 1.44 per 1,000inhabitants. However, by the first anniversary of the earthquake, consider-able progress had been made in repairing damaged hospitals and other medicalassistance facilities.
170. Family planning continues to progress as the Government has becomeincreasingly aware of the unfavorable implications of excessive populationgrowth. The national family planning program, begun in 1969, is operatedjointly by the Ministry of Health and APROFAM, a private organization. Theprogram provides family planning services as an integral part of maternityand child health care.
171. Health investment is expected to increase from 3.3 percent of totalinvestment in the 1971-75 period to approximately 6 percent for the 1977-82period. Although this would nearly double the share of the total investmentallocated to health, the health programs would still only begin to be able todeal with the country's serious health problems.
172. Education: The Ministry of Education is responsible for all edu-cation except higher education and certain specialized schools. Various typesof non-formal education and training are provided by the Ministries of Educa-tion, Health and other public institutions. Educational administration ishighly centralized and weak, staff training is inadequate, and the lack ofcoordination among educational institutions is a major problem. Recognizingthese deficiencies, the Government is proposing to reorganize the Ministryof Education to streamline management and to improve non-formal education.Several important educational programs have been instituted within the pastfew years which are oriented towards training that will (a) provide practicalvocational skills and (b) help integrate the indigenous community into nationallife.
173. The education sector suffered extensive damage during the earthquake,estimated at Q 50 million. Within one year of the earthquake, the NationalReconstruction Committee, working with the Ministry of Education and theMinistry of Public Works, had reconstructed nearly 2,000 classrooms, whichaccommodate some 25 to 30 percent of the students whose classrooms weredestroyed. Reconstruction of some 600 additional classrooms is underway,but at least three to four years more will be required to restore the class-room capacity which existed before the earthquake, much less to reduce, substan-tially the deficit of classroom space which existed prior to the earthquake.
174. The Government's support of education has been limited in the past,with education investment representing only 4 percent of total public invest-ment for the 1968-70 period (Table 4.9). However, during the 1971-75 periodeducation investment increased significantly, reaching 9.7 percent of the
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total. The share of public investment for education is projected to drop backto about 5 percent by 1982. Despite the relative decline, this represents asignificant increase in financial terms considering the size of the totalprojected public investment. This level of expenditure should prove to befeasible provided the Government continues to place higher priority on edu-cation, especially primary and non-formal.
175. Agriculture: A major reorganization of the institutions respon-sible for public policies and programs for agricultural and rural developmentoccurred during the implementation of the 1971-75 Development Plan. Theprincipal purpose of the reorganization was to transfer the responsibility forparticular programs to the specialized autonomous agencies, while seeking toconsolidate the planning and operational activities which are normally theresponsibility of the central government. The impact of this reorganizationand the major sectoral issues are discussed in Chapter 5.
176. Because of the limitations discussed in Chapter 5, it is unlikelythat public investment in agriculture for the 1977-82 period would reachsignificantly higher levels than in the past. A number of projects are shownin Statistical Annex Table 5.9 as being committed later and disbursing moreslowly than projected by the Government. The major investment projects likelyto be undertaken in the 1977-82 period include an agricultural credit projectdesigned at least in part to benefit small farmers settled under the agrarianreform program, various irrigation projects, and a resettlement program to becarried out by INTA.
177. Tourism: Tourism has played an increasingly important role in thedevelopment of the economy by increasing employment opportunities, improvingthe balance of payments and helping to diversify the country's economy.
178. The Ministry of Economy is responsible for tourism policy, which itadministers chiefly through the Guatemalan Tourist Institute (INGUAT), andthe National Finance Corporation (CORFINA), a development bank established forprivate mining, industry and tourism. INGUAT is primarily responsible forpolicy formulation, identification and planning of tourism priority zones,regulation of the hotel industry, promotional activities, sponsoring hoteltraining programs, and stimulation of handicraft production. In reality,INGUAT has limited its activities to promotion and has been unable to fulfillits physical planning and project implementation responsibilities. These haveby default gone to other agencies, which at times has resulted in overlappingactivities. (A more detailed description of the constraints facing the sectorare given in Chapter 5.) Improvements in institutional arrangements areneeded to help Guatemala realize its potential to attract more than thecurrent estimated 450,000 arrivals per year. Guatemala could, in the nearfuture, become an even more important tourist destination.
179. Aside from the large monument reconstruction project, financed inpart through a UNESCO donation, the major investment projects currentlyunderway and to be completed in the 1977-82 period are the Tikal National
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Park and the Lake Izabal projects. The Tikal project includes urban infra-structure at Flores (on Lake Peten Itza, about 60 km from Tikal), a highwayto Tikal and national park facilities at Tikal. The Lake Izabal project isdesigned to develop the tourism potential of this department, narticularlythe beaches on the Caribbean, the Rio Dulce area (which connects Lake Izabalwith the sea), and Lake Izabal itself.
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5. STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
Introduction
180. Agriculture, manufacturing and tourism are three of the most impor-tant sectors in Guatemala (though not listed separately in the nationalaccounts, tourism constitutes a substantial portion of commerce, the largestsector of the Guatemala economy.) Although mining has contributed littleto GDP in the past, and petroleum production has not yet begun on a commercialbasis, these sectors have a very substantial potential. (Major sectorscharacterized by a substantial degree of state ownership such as power, water,railways, ports and telecommunications were discussed in Chapter 4.)
A. Agricultural Sector 1/
Background
181. There has been very little change in the relative economic impor-tance of agriculture over the past decade. Despite the industrial growthstimulated by the CACM, agriculture still accounts for over one fourth ofgross domestic product, about three fifths of total employment, and over twothirds of export value. Moreover, savings from export agriculture haveprovided a substantial share of investment resources, and much of the indus-trial expansion of the past 15 years has been based on agricultural rawmaterials (e.g., sugarcane and cattle). During the same period, however, theshare of agriculture in national fixed capital formation has fallen from about15 percent to about 8 percent. Very little private investment in agricultureduring the 1960s took place in the densely populated highlands areas; most wasfor export crops in the coastal region. Public investment has concentrated onminor irrigation and grain storage facilities, together with some investmentin rural roads and water and sewer facilities. Limited investment in agricul-ture is a major cause of lagging productivity in traditional crops (basicgrains and coffee) and stagnating incomes for those involved in producingbasic grains.
182. Three main issues have dominated agricultural development overthe past decade: (a) land tenure, (b) land use, and (c) the role of theGovernment in agricultural development.
1/ The section draws heavily on a recent sector study (IDB/IBRD/AID,General Report on the Agricultural and Rural Development of Guatemala.Washington, April 30, 1976.)
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183. Land Tenure: The highly skewed distribution of land in Guatemalais a major reason behind the country's very unequal distribution of income.Nine out of every ten people in rural Guatemala live on plots too small withpresent farming techniques to provide the income needed to cover the basicneeds of one family without outside employment (Table 5.1). 1/ Within theCentral American area, only El Salvador has a higher proportion of people onsuch small plots of land, a phenomenon explained largely by the much higherpopulation density in El Salvador -- over three times that of Guatemala(Statistical Annex Table 1.3). At the other end of the scale, 80 percent ofGuatemala's agricultural land is held in units larger than 7 hectares, andthese farms are owned by only two percent of farm families. The high concen-tration of the indigenous population in the Western Highlands of Guatemalaaccounts for much of the inequality in the distribution of land; this areamakes up only 26 percent of the country, but accommodates about 60 percent ofthe population (Map Annex, Maps 1 and 2). The situation is made even moreacute by the fact that the highlands topography is very rugged and basicallyunsuited for cultivation. However, because of the population pressure, alarge proportion of this area is dedicated to agriculture, causing seriousland erosion problems and reduced productivity. In contrast, the fertileplains along the Pacific Coast are for the most part held by relativelywealthy owners in large units and are dedicated to the production of exportcrops such as sugar and cotton (Map Annex, Map 3).
184. Although an agrarian reform law was enacted in the early 1950s and aNational Agrarian Tr.nsformation Institute (INTA) has existed for nearlyas long, very little progress has been made in improving the equality of landdistribution in Guatemala. The land which INTA either currently controls orhas alloted to individuals amounts to some 400 thousand hectares, the equiva-lent of about one third of the present cultivated area, but a substantial
i/ The 90 percent of the families referred to above have farms of 7 haor less. The income which can be generated by a given plot of landdepend, of course, on the land quality, the crops grown, the prices paidfor them and the cultivation techniques used. However, on average,farms under 7 ha are less than an "agricultural family unit" as definedby the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (CIDA).CIDA defines such a unit as "an extension of land which through theincorporation of a productive process whose prevailing technology issufficient for generating adequate income to satisfy the needs ofa family living in that region, provides full employment to thefamily work force and does not require more than 25 percent additionalwork (seasonal) in relation to the total need." Farms of 4 to 7 ha,which accommodate about 7 percent of the Guatemalan agriculturalpopulation, could cover the needs of one family with moderate investmentsand improved services. Smaller holdings, which accommodate about 83percent of the farm population in Guatemala, are generally insufficientto sustain a family even with improvements.
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portion of this land is idle because of inadequate infrastructure andmanagement. 1/
Table 5.1: GUATEMALA: LAND TENURE PATTERN, 1970 (EST.)
Share ofSize of Holding /a Farms or Families Share of Area(area in hectares) (%) (cum. %) (%) (cum. %)
Small 83.3 83.3 12.3 12.3
Landless 26.5 26.5 - -Less than 0.7 14.8 41.3 1.0 1.00.7 - 4 42.0 83.3 11.3 12.3
Medium 14.1 97.4 21.4 33.7
4 - 7 6.8 90.1 6.3 18.67 - 35 7.3 97.4 15.1 33.7
Large 2.6 100.0 66.3 100.0
35 - 350 1.4 98.8 23.9 57.6Over 350 0.5 99.2 42.4 100.0Administrators 0.8 100.0 - -
/a Also includes two classes of families without land--landless workersand administrators.
Source: Statistical Annex Table 8.3.
185. Land Use: The area under cultivation in Guatemala is equal toabout 80 percent of the land known to be suitable for crop production. Thisfigure, however, disguises the fact that broad areas of good crop land withinlarge-scale land holdings in the Peten and along the Atlantic and PacificCoasts are not being utilized to full potential, while at the same time cropsare being grown in the Western Highlands on land which is unsuitable for suchuse. In 1970, about three fourths of the cultivated area in Guatemala wasused to grow basic grains (corn, beans, rice and sorghum), while the remainingarea was dedicated to export crops (primarily coffee, sugar, cotton, and
1/ Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, and Agency for InternationalDevelopment. General Report on Agricultural and Rural Development inGuatemala, 1976, p. 37.
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bananas). Since then, the share of area cultivated in basic grains hasdropped by some 15 percent, mainly because of the shift from corn to sugarcaneand cotton in the Pacific Coast area induced by high world market prices forthese products (Statistical Annex Table 8.2).
186. The marketing policies of the National Agricultural MarketingInstitute (INDECA), which is responsible for stabilizing the domestic supplyof basic grains, stimulated imports by making imported grain available atprices lower than import cost to avoid urban unrest, resulting in financiallosses. The Government took several measures in 1974 to stimulate the localproduction of basic grains: A decree of July 1, 1974, made it compulsory forfarmers with 100 manzanas (70 ha) or more to plant 10 percent of their land inbasic grains, and the availability of credit for basic grains production wasimproved substantially. During the same period, the Government announced aprohibition on the export of grains, and between 1974 and 1976, INDECA raisedthe guarantee price on basic grains by as much as 100 percent. The productionof basic grains by as much as 100 percent. The production of basic grainsincreased substantially owing to better yields rather than expanded acreage.
187. Role of Government in Agriculture: One of the major recommendationsof the 1971-75 Development Plan was establishment of a "sector publico agricola"to strengthen the role of the Government in the development of Guatemalan agri-culture. The organization of the public agricultural sector, which took placelargely between 1971 and 1973, involved the consolidation of existing agenciesand the establishment of new ones under the general authority of the Ministerof Agriculture. 1/
188. The main activities of the Government in the agricultural sector aretechnical assistance and training through the Agricultural Science and Tech-nology Institute (ICTA) and the General Directorate for Agricultural Services(DIGESA), marketing of basic grains through the National Agricultural MarketingInstitute (INTDECA), land colonization and distribution through the NationalAgricultural Transformation Institute (INTA) and agricultural credit throughthe National Agricultural Development Bank (BANDESA). The Government alsoprovides some financial support to the various producer organizations, 2/which in turn offer limited marketing and technical assistance to theirmembers. The present administration has also been exceptionally active infostering the development of producer cooperatives in the rural areas. Theseactivities are generally inadequate, although the reorganization of the"Sector Publico Agricola" mentioned above has led to important improvementsin a number of areas.
1/ Statistical Annex Table 5.11 provides an outline of the activities ofthe various agencies involved in the public agricultural sector.
2/ For example, the National Coffee Association and the National CottonCouncil.
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189. Several important problems remain, however. First, because of theautonomous nature of the various entities, coordination is inadequate. Forexample, the reorganization has not yet brought FYDEP (the Peten DevelopmentAuthority), under the overall control of the Ministry of Agriculture, althoughthe activities of FYDEP are largely agricultural. Second, despite recommenda-tions in both the 1971-75 and 1975-79 Development Plans that a Land Institutebe set up to replace the present National Institute for Agrarian Transform-ation, INTA remains a relatively weak institution outside the direct controlof the public agriculture sector. Third, the availability of agriculturalcredit is still insufficient, especially for the medium- and small-scalefarmers.
Future Prospects
190. The Government's goals for the agricultural sector include improvingagricultural production and productivity and increasing rural agriculturalincomes, especially for owners of minifundios and for landless workers.Success in attaining these goals will depend heavily on (a) improved landtenure patterns, (b) increased basic grain production, (c) improved accessto agricultural credit, and (d) prices for export crops.
191. Land Tenure: Solution of the land tenure problem requires redistri-buting existing land, and developing new agricultural lands.
192. The 1962 Law for Agrarian Transformation gave INTA the power to levytaxes on idle land. INTA can determine the appropriate use of any plot ofidle land, and for each year the owner does not follow the recommendations ofINTA, the tax which has been set by INTA can be doubled. Theoretically, thetax can become so high that the owner is induced to turn the land over to INTAas payment of the taxes. This law, however, has not been applied effectivelyin practice--little if any of the land handled by INTA has come to it inthis fashion. 1/ INTA also has the power to purchase private land, but thishas not been used.
193. A large proportion of Guatemala's total agricultural land is in verylarge holdings, where a substantial share is often left idle, and there islittle high-quality land available for colonization (that in the Peten and theFaja Transversal is only of moderate quality and lacks necessary infrastruc-ture). The land tenure problem will therefore almost certainly have to beattacked at least in part through the redistribution of existing properties.The power to levy a presumptive tax on idle land could be used more effec-tively, and the Government could establish limits on land held idle.
1/ Unfortunately, acquisition of land by INTA is no guarantee that it willbe used appropriately; much of the good, idle agricultured land is alreadyowned by INTA.
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194. Colonization of new land has been underway for a number of years.Much of the land currently held by INTA was formerly undeveloped public landwhere INTA established roads, water supplies, irrigation, etc. These activi-ties have not, however, been particularly successful. The infrastructuralinvestments were often insufficient, and there generally has been an inadequateorganization of the farmers on the so-called cooperatives, so the lands havenot been used very effectively. INTA is now involved in a very large landdevelopment program called the Faja Transversal. This area, a wide, sparselypopulated strip running from coast to coast between the highlands and the Peten,could be a valuable addition to arable land in Guatemala once the necessaryroads and other basic infrastructure investments have been made.
195. In light of the difficulties which INTA has had in the past, itwould be desirable in the Faja Transversal project to give special attentionto the following: (a) land should be made available only to organized groupswith proven viability as cooperatives, and a minimum down-payment should berequired with provision for penalties if future payments are not made,(b) development should be concentrated on a few specific areas so that suffi-cient infrastructure can be set in place to support a viable agriculturalcommunity, (c) INTA should cooperate closely with other agencies in theagricultural public sector to assure that sufficient technical assistance,credit, marketing and other services and facilities are available.
196. There is clearly a need for an organization working on land distri-bution, but to be successful, the agency should be more broadly responsiblefor integrated rural development, bringing together the various facilities andservices necessary to support agricultural activities in newly developedareas. Whether INTA is transformed and given a broader mandate, or whether itis replaced by a new agency, it would be important for the new entity to beresponsible more or less directly to the Minister of Agriculture to helpensure the coordination with other agricultural sector agencies necessary forsuccessful integrated rural development.
197. Basic Grains: The lagging production of grains has been identifiedas one of Guatemala's most serious economic problems over the next 5 to 10years 1/. Despite an adequate performance in 1976, the underlying patternsof population growth, increasing consumption and land use indicate thatbasic grain imports could result in a serious drain on the balance of paymentswithin a relatively few years. Increased production requires maintenance ofappropriate support prices, improved production techniques and increased areadedicated to basic grain cultivation.
198. The philosophy of INDECA with respect to support prices has under-gone a substantial change since the disastrous financial results of 1974.Now, instead of trying to maintain artificially high prices for producers
1/ IDB/IBRD/AID. General Report on the Agricultural and Rural Developmentof Guatemala. Washington, April 30, 1976, p. 47.
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and artificially low prices for consumers, INDECA is taking the more realisticapproach of stabilizing fluctuations in market prices. Since Guatemala hasthe basic resources required for efficient production of most basic grains,this approach should assure an adequate supply of basic grains to consumers atreasonable prices.
199. Better production techniques are needed. Present yields could beincreased substantially using already available technology. However, thesetechniques are relatively expensive, and entail higher risks. Therefore, inaddition to improving technical assistance and assuring better availability ofagricultural credit at a reasonable cost, the Government should consider acrop insurance program whereby, if the producer followed techniques specifiedby the extension agent, the Government would guarantee a fixed minimum incomefrom the crop.
200. The Government should continue its present policy of increasing thearea allocated to the production of basic grains by opening new lands (asunder the Faja Transversal program). It should also induce large landholderswith idle land to rent these lands to small farmers who could use the land toproduce basic grains. This could be done through special taxes on idle land.
201. Agricultural Credit: The lack of access to adequate credit at areasonable cost continues to be a barrier to improved output and productivity,especially for small farmers. At the same time, many farmers do not knowabout available credit or about the benefits of using it. It is unlikely thatmore than a third of the farmers in Guatemala make regular use of institutionalcredit, even though BANDESA has expanded its operations sharply since a newgeneral manager was appointed in 1974. BANDESA now serves over 80,000 farmers,many of whom are members of cooperatives receiving funds from BANDESA whichthey onlend to their members.
202. Because agricultural credit is still very underdeveloped in Guatemalaand because it can serve as an excellent vehicle for technical assistance, the-Government should continue to give high priority to the expansion of BANDESA.Private commercial banks should also be encouraged to expand their lending tomedium- and small-scale farmers. The commercial banks already have offices inmost of the departments of Guatemala and, by working through local coopera-tives, could reach farmers at the local level fairly easily. Commercial banksshould also be encouraged to work with governmert extension agents to helpassure the effective use of credit extended.
203. Export Products: The economic prospects for Guatemala dependheavily on those for coffee, sugar, cotton, bananas and beef.
204. Coffee export earnings should be.well above average for the shortto medium term. Coffee production has been at about the same level since1972, but two factors should reverse this trend: First, higher prices in 1974and in 1976 have stimulated new plantings and better fertilization, pruning,etc. Second, Guatemala signed the new International Coffee Agreement towards
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the end of 1976, and as the production quotas are based in part on exportperformance in 1976/77 and 1977/78, the National Coffee Association (ANACAFE)is making a major effort to increase Guatemala's output in these two cropyears to establish a more favorable quota position. 1/
205. For the past several years, Guatemala has been fighting the coffeeborer, which has significantly reduced the yield of export quality coffee fromgreen coffee beans. Continued government support is needed to eradicate thispest. Guatemala also faces the threat of coffee rust, which was discovered inNicaragua in November of 1976. Coffee rust is a highly contagious fungusand once it affects the tree, production is cut in half by the first year andthe tree is out of production by the end of the second. The Central Americancountries have joined together to fight this dread disease. Spraying stationshave been set up throughout Central America. An active campaign is underwayin Guatemala to make coffee growers fully aware of the problem, and procedureshave been worked out for eradicating infestations should they be detected.Success in this campaign could be critical to Guatemala's economic developmentover the next five to ten years.
206. The world market situation for coffee looks very favorable in thenext three to five years. Although coffee prices have declined substantiallyfrom the exceptionally high levels of mid-1977, they should remain above thelong term trend price in real terms for at least two more years. SinceGuatemala had sold very little of its 1976/77 crop on futures, it was inposition to take advantage of the high 1976/77 prices.
207. Cotton production in Guatemala increased very rapidly over thepast 15 years, but most of the area suitable for cotton production is nowunder cultivation, and the increasing use of pesticides has upset the bio-logical balance in the cotton growing areas, forcing a sharp increase in thenumber of applications of spray per year. The resulting contamination hascaused serious environmental damage. Consequently, the Government passed alaw in 1974 requiring a reduction by 20 percent per year in the use of DDT.The law also sets a buffer zone 100 meters wide around dwellings, roads,rivers and other crops where spraying is prohibited. Reduced pest control anda possible reduction in area due to the buffer zone requirements could lead toa gradual decline in cotton production in Guatemala over the next few years.Also, the additional cost of spraying with alternative pesticides, combinedwith crop losses due to their lower effectiveness, may drive a number ofgrowers to switch to other crops.
208. World market prospects for cotton are excellent over the next fewyears. A combination of economic recovery in industrial countries and short-falls in world production have led to dangerously low levels of stocks.Since Guatemala sells about a third of its cotton to domestic mills, demandfrom this source is also an important factor. Despite record production last
1/ Quotas are not in effect at the moment, because of high coffee prices.They would become operative should coffee prices drop below US063.23/lb.
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year, there was a shortage of raw materials for the local mills. With arecovery in Central American trade, tourism, and economic activity in indus-trialized countries, the demand for finished Guatemalan cotton textile productsshould be above that of 1976. This would indicate increased local demand forraw cotton and, thus, an added stimulus to cotton prices.
209. Exports of bananas are not expected to grow by more than about3 percent annually for the next few years. The main banana producer inGuatemala is Bandegua, a subsidiary of the Del Monte Corporation, whichpurchased the banana and other agricultural holdings of United Brands inDecember of 1972. Bandegua does not plan to expand its plantations signifi-cantly in the near future. Growing competition from other sources combinedwith increased taxation following Guatemala's membership in the Union ofBanana Exporting Countries (UBEC) have encouraged Bandegua to focus on divers-ification into other crops such as pineapples and papayas. The world priceof bananas is expected to decline somewhat through 1978, after which itshould increase more or less in line with general world prices.
210. In 1976, meat was Guatemala's fifth largest export product. Althoughincreases in livestock production over the last decade have been achievedprimarily through an expansion of the number of animals and pasture area, withlittle increase in productivity, the present emphasis which the Government isgiving the development of the sector should stimulate production and produc-tivity. Two problems should be noted, however. First, the shift of cattleproduction from the Pacific Coast to the North Slopes and the lower Peten mayhave some adverse effects on productivity because of the lower quality pasturein these areas. Second, during 1976 at least one large shipment of beef wasrejected by the United States because of excessive pesticide content, a resultof the cotton spraying mentioned above. Strict enforcement of the reductionin pesticide use which the Government has legislated would help to avoidjeopardizing Guatemala's growing beef export industry.
211. Demand prospects for Guatemala beef are mixed because, in 1976, forthe first time in 12 years, the United States implemented meat import quotas.(The U.S. absorbs most of Guatemala's meat exports.) The quota for 1977has been established at 15.6 thousand MT. 1/
212. Sugar production in Guatemala is presently at record high levels,the result of exceptionally high prices in 1975. Since prices droppedbelow cost of production in 1976, some producers may move into other crops.However, since a planting of sugar sustains three to five years of harvests,and as there may be at least a slight improvement in world sugar prices, itis likely that production in 1977 will at least equal that of 1976.
1/ This translates into a voluntary restraint level of 16.1 thousand MTfor 1977 -- quota restrictions are triggered if imports are 10 percentabove the quota, which will be adjusted annually to stay in line withgrowth in U.S. production.
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213. In summary, prospects for Guatemala's agricultural exports aregenerally very good, though efforts should be made to raise productivity,particularly in coffee. Non-export agriculture, however, suffers from frag-mented land holdings and low productivity, resulting in inadequate incomesfor farmers outside the export agriculture sector. The public sector shouldincrease its support for small farmers in the form of better technical assis-tance, land development and credit programs. These programs could raise ruralincomes and, by stimulating the production of basic grains, help Guatemalaavoid the need to import massive quantities of these grains during the nextfew years.
B. Manufacturing Sector
Background
214. Despite periods of rapid growth and some changes in structure, manu-facturing has not grown much more quickly than the rest of the economy in thepast 15 years, and the contribution made by manufacturing to GDP has thus beenrelatively stable (Table 3.2). Between 1950 and 1965 it rose from 12 to 14percent of GDP, and since 1967 it has fluctuated between 15 and 16 percent.Since 1950, substantial diversification has taken place, but productionis still heavily concentrated in consumer goods, which account for aboutthree quarters of the total value of output and value added (Table 5.2 andStatistical Annex Table 9.2).
215. The industrial labor force in 1975 was estimated at 219,000, about14 percent of the economically active population (Statistical Annex Table 1.2).Two thirds of industrial workers are involved in cottage industries 1/ wherevalue added per worker is only one fifth of what it is in larger industries.Productivity in industry as a whole increased on average by 2.9 percent peryear between 1964 and 1975, though there was some decline after 1973 (Table5.3). There has been a chronic shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers,and although there is abundant unskilled labor, widespread illiteracy makes itdifficult to find workers with the basic literacy required even for unskilledjobs. Though the National Technical Training Institute (INTECAP) has made amajor effort to expand its vocational training program, government participa-tion in industrial training programs has been minimal.
216. Gross new investment in manufacturing in constant 1973 prices grewfrom $21.0 million in 1964 to $44 million in 1975, an average increase of 6.7percent per year (Table 5.3). 2/ Three industrial sectors--food processing,
1/ Up to 4 employees per unit.
2/ These data were developed originally by CORFINA and do not necessarilyagree with national accounts data; furthermore, the latter, which areonly roughly divided by sector, are for industry as a whole, not justfor manufacturing.
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chemicals and non-metallic minerals--absorbed 60 percent of total new invest-ment from 1971 to 1975. Despite the accelerated investment in intermediateand capital goods industries during the past few years, relatively littleintegration has taken place within the manufacturing sector between rawmaterial processors, capital goods producers and manufacturers of finishedgoods.
TABLE 5.2GUATEMALA: VALUE ADDED IN MANUFACTURING (CONSTANT 1958 PRICES)
1960-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
DISTRIBUTION GROWTH RATESSECTOR ------------------------------ ------------------------------
1960 1970 1976 60-70 70-75 75-76-- _-_-------------_______---------------_-------_________-__----___---_------__---_-_---------_
CONSUMER GOODS 85.8 75.2 77.0 6.2 5.1 11.1
FOOD PROCESSING 30.4 27.0 27.6 6.4 5.7 7.3BEVERAGES 18.2 10.8 12.3 2.2 5.5 21.6TOBACCO $.3 6.2 5.9 4.6 2.1 18.5TEXTILES 9.1 11.9 9.4 10.6 - 0.5 12.1CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 13.9 11.5 10.3 5.6 3.7 3.6FURNITURE & FIXTURES 3.5 2.3 2.1 3.2 3.1 5.2PRINTING 1.8 1.7 1.6 7.4 4.5 -MISCELLANEOUS 0.6 3.5 7.9 28.7 21.3 18.6
INTERMEDIATE GOODS 11.6 13.4 12.9 9.2 4.2 9.7
WOOD AND CORK 1.8 1.9 1.9 8.2 4.3 10.3PAPER 0.4 1.7 2.1 23.4 9.7 5.1LEATHER 1.2 1.1 0.8 6.5 1.3 3.1RUBBER 0.8 1.4 1.4 13.5 3.4 19.6-CHEMICALS 3.4 3.6 2.7 8.4 - 0.4 5.0NON-METALLIC MINERALS 3.9 3.6 4.0 6.8 6.4 13.7
CAPITAL GOODS 2.7 11.5 10.1 24.6 2.7 6.5
METAL PRODUCTS 1.1 7.8 6.5 30.8 1.5 7.2MACHINERY (NON-ELECTRIC) 0.1 1.3 1.0 33.5 1.6 5.1ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 0.2 1.4 1.4 29.2 5.9 3.8TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 1.2 1.1 1.2 6.5 8.0 6.8
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 7.6 4.7 10.4SUC===s=B ==N=====S s==sG=== ===S ==== ========= =s======Z
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA
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Table 5.3: GUATEMALA - BASIC INDUSTRIAL INDICATORS
(Millions of 1973 dollars and thousands of persons)
Average Growth1964 1971 1975 /a 1964-75
Value Added /b 168.3 274.0 365.3 7.3
Larger Industry 108.5 188.1 258.4 8.2Smaller Industry 59.8 85.9 106.9 5.4
Fixed Capital Formation 21.3 33.1 43.5 6.7
Larger Industry 20.1 31.7 42.1 7.0Smaller Industry 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4
Exports 41.7 150.4 283.4 19.0
Imports 31.4 327.9 610.5 31.0
Trade Balance 10.3 -177.5 -327.1
Employment 138.7 176.0 219.5 4.3
Larger Industry 35.1 51.5 69.4 6.4
Smaller Industry 103.6 124.5 150.1 3.4
Productivity Index 100.0 128.3 137.2 2.9
Source: CNPE
/a Estimated./b Larger industries are those employing five or more persons.
217. Almost all manufacturing industry in Guatemala, both small- andlarge-scale, is privately owned. Most larger firms (a number of which haveforeign participation) belong to a relatively small group of individuals, manyof whom are also involved in cash-crop agriculture, cattle-raising, commerceand financial services. After the Common External Tariff came into force in1960, the inflow of foreign capital accelerated as firms which had previouslyexported to Central America began to set up processing or assembly plantsinside the CACM tariff wall.
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218. Retained profits and private contributions have provided the bulkof industrial finance for domestic industries. Partly or wholly foreign-ownedfirms have relied on direct loans and equity capital from abroad, as well asretained profits. Domestic financial intermediaries have only played a minorpart in providing capital for industry. The finance that was available wentmainly to medium- and large-scale enterprises. Domestic bank lending toindustry has traditionally been primarily on a short-term basis (97 percentof industrial loans granted in 1975 were for one year or less). Also, loancollateral regulations are exacting. The Central American Bank for EconomicIntegration (CABEI) has provided capital for large-scale industries, whileCORFINA, the government-owned development finance company, has providedlimited funds for cottage and small-scale industries.
219. The manufacturing sector's imports rose faster than exports between1964 and 1975, turning a small sectoral trade surplus into a large deficitwithin the period. The import dependence of Guatemalan industry as a whole isstill comparatively modest; in 1975, imported inputs accounted for only12 percent of the gross manufacturing output. The consumer goods industries,which depend heavily on local agricultural products, generally had low levelsof imports, unlike the intermediate and capital goods sectors which dependheavily on imported steel and other intermediate and capital goods.
220. About a quarter of gross output is exported, of which half goes tothe CACM. In fact, without access to the CACM, which provides a market of 17million people compared to the local market of only six million, Guatemalanindustry would not have been able to reach its present state of development.The Government has set up an export promotion center, GUATEXPRO, which isperforming a useful role within its limited resources and is trying to expandmanufactured exports to countries outside the CACM area.
221. The role played by the Government in Guatemala's industrial sectorhas been, and still is, minimal. It has encouraged industrialization throughfiscal incentives, and the tariff structure has provided varying degress ofprotection. Fiscal incentives--mainly attractive import duty and income taxexemptions--have boosted investment in larger industries. But they haveserious disadvantges. Import duty exemptions have tended to encourage capital-intensive import substitution industries, few of which have contributed to thedevelopment of Guatemala's natural resources. A number of them, notablypharmaceuticals, are also heavily import dependent.
222. More recently, the introduction of minimum wage legislation andprice controls, the establishment of CORFINA (a state-owned developmentfinance company), and the introduction of GUATEXPRO have shown the Governmentto be moving slowly into some of the peripheral areas traditionally reservedto the private sector for control as well as encouragement purposes. But thisdoes not appear to be part of a concerted policy for closer involvement inindustry.
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Recent Development in the Manufacturing Sector
223. In 1975 of real manufacturing value added dropped by one and one-halfpercent (Statistical Annex Table 2.1). Several factors were responsible forthis extraordinary decline. First, there was the substantial decline inreal terms in Central American trade in 1975 (Statistical Annex Table 3.5).This market over the past 15 years had been one of the most important sourcesof growth for the Guatemalan manufacturing industry (about half of Guatemalanmanufactured exports go to other Central American countries). Articles suchas textiles, footwear, and apparel were the primary items affected by the 1975contraction of real demand. Most severe was the 25 percent decline in exportvolume to Nicaragua, a country where the textile, apparel and footwear indus-tries, already hard hit by the contraction of internal demand, felt partic-ularly threatened by the lower-cost Guatemalan imports, leading the Governmentof Nicaragua to declare these items "sensitive" and subject to special traderestrictions. A second factor was the drop in private consumption growthrates which had begun in 1973-74 with the onslaught of world inflation andrecession. This led to higher domestic prices, and, with lagging salaries, aloss of purchasing power. Although the Government expanded its consumptionexpenditures during 1975 by over 11 percent in real terms (22 percent incurrent prices), this came in the second half of the year and had relativelylittle effect because of the comparatively small share of government consump-tion on total GDP (Statistical Annex Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
224. A third factor in the slowdown of industrial growth in 1975 was thesharp decline in gross domestic investment in real terms. This resultedlargely from the sharp decline in inventory accumulation during 1975, thenatural consequence of the high level of inventories accumulated during1973-74 in anticipation of further price increases. Although many of theseinventories were of imported goods, there were also stocks of domestic goodswhich, as they were used up, depressed demand for additional domestic produc-tion.
225. In 1976 there was a marked recovery in industrial production.Real growth is estimated to have been at least 10 percent, the highest levelsince the late 1960s. Of the factors contributing to this marked change from1975, the reconstruction activity is probably the most important. Directly,there was a sharp increase in demand for a wide variety of industrial products,both construction materials and consumer goods destroyed by the earthquake.Indirectly, the general recovery of economic activity in 1976, the higher realwages brought about by the scarcity of labor, 1/ the recovery of purchasingpower, good agricultural production, and expanded credit as part of the
1/ Despite a historical pattern of underemployment, there were labor short-ages in 1976 in certain areas. Most significant were the shortages ofskilled construction workers (especially masons) and the shortages ofmigrant workers for harvesting export crops, the result of reconstruc-tion activity in the highland areas.
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reconstruction program increased the demand for all types of industrialproducts. Externally, the 1974 decline in real terms in exports to theCentral American Common Market area was reversed in 1976; country-specificdetails are not yet available on these exports, which are primarily of manu-factured goods, but in 1976 exports to the region as a whole grew by over 18percent in value and 6.2 percent in volume. Preliminary data indicate thatthe value of exports of nontraditional manufactured products 1/ to the rest ofthe world grew by about 10 percent.
Industry - Future Prospects
226. Given the relatively high rates of growth which industry has enjoyedover the past fifteen years, there is no reason to believe that industry couldnot attain at least a 7-8 percent growth rate throughout the remainder of thisdecade. In fact, with the recovery of Central American trade which seems tobe under way and the general increase in world demand for manufactured goods,coupled with the possible further increases in demand for building materialsas reconstruction continues, there is a good chance that industry may growby 8-9 percent per year during the next year or two. Thereafter a growth ofsix to seven percent may be expected.
227. The Government could take a number of steps to help assure that thesegrowth rates are attained and that, at the same time, the pattern of industrialdevelopment becomes more attuned to attaining the social objectives expressedin the 1975-79 Development Plan. As noted earlier, a major cause of declinesin industrial growth in the past (e.g., 1969-70 and 1974-75) was weakenedexternal and internal demand. By taking steps to raise the disposable incomesof the bulk of the population and to orient industrial production towardsmeeting the needs of this segment of the population, the Government couldbring about a major growth in the internal market, thereby not only stimulat-ing growth of local industry, but also reducing its vulnerability to fluctua-tions in external markets.
228. The 1975-79 Development Plan formulates an industrial productionstrategy basically consistent with the Government's social objectives. Thefollowing are key elements in the strategy:
229. Links between Primary and Secondary Production: A major obstacleto the development of Guatemalan industry is the lack of regular supply ofprimary inputs of adequate quality. Also, as noted in the agricultural dis-cussion above, there is a very important potential for expanding the domesticprocessing of agricultural products such as cotton and wood. The productionof textiles and apparel, already an important industry in Guatemala, couldsubstantially increase and, at the same time, provide employment for relativelyunskilled workers. (Here again, of course, expansion of the effective demandwithin the Guatemalan market for these products could be critical since there
1/ Manufactured goods excluding processed agricultural products such assugar and meat.
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are serious limitations on the expansion of textiles and apparel exports.)Provided a major government effort is made to reverse the presentdeforestation trends, the wood products industry holds great promise asan holds great promise as an area for integrating primary and secondaryprocessing. This tends to be a highly labor-intensive industry, and there isa good internal market for these products, especially with the reconstructionactivity which has created a demand not only for rough-sawn dimension timber,but also for finished mill work such as windows and doors. The non-metallicminerals sub-sector is another likely candidate for expansion, for it is basedon relatively abundant domestic materials, and the reconstruction activity(which is likely to continue for some years) has sharply increased demand, notonly for sand and gravel, which is in short supply in Guatemala City, but forfinished non-metallic mineral products such as cement pipe and asbestos-cementroofing materials.
230. Decentralization: In 1973, the Department of Guatemala, where 26percent of the nation's population lives, accounted for 73 percent of employ-ment in larger industries and 40 percent of total manufacturing employment.Because of the increased congestion around Guatemala City and the desire tocreate new employment opportunities in the highland areas most affected by therecent earthquake, the Government is actively considering policies which wouldfoster the decentralization of industry. At least two factors should beconsidered: First, despite the share of manufacturing activities in GuatemalaCity, industrial employment density in terms of industrial workers per thousandurban population is still below the national average and well below that ofQuezaltenango and other western departments. Second, industry tends toconverge on Guatemala City because it has better infrastructure facilities andancillary services, access to the largest market within the country and theattraction to many of life in the capital city.
231. Rather than directly restricting the industrialization of themetropolis, the need is for more encouragement to industries in the outlyingregions. The Government is working on a dual program of fiscal incentives andfinancial support to promote decentralization. So far, the program onlyapplies to small-scale construction materials industries in earthquake affectedareas outside the capital. In due course the program's scope is proposed tobe much wider.
232. Even if effective, fiscal incentives can become quite expensive interms of lost public revenues. On the other hand, if adequate infrastructureis not present, fiscal incentives may be almost totally ineffective. Sinceprovision of the necessary infrastructure to all urban centers in Guatemalaneeding development would be prohibitively expensive, the Government couldidentify one or two regional poles of development and undertake a concentratedprogram of public investment in infrastructure in those areas. This wouldgive the Government an effective means of controlling the pattern of indus-trial decentralization, and, if these development poles are successful, thelong-term cost would probably be lower than that of fiscal incentives,especially if the costs of economic distortion induced by fiscal incentives
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are considered. The choice of development poles is crucial. Although depart-ments hit by the earthquake should be given short-term priority in theGovernment's capital spending programs, long-term development should probablyconcentrate on areas outside Guatemala City where there is already significantindustrial activity. Among these areas, Quezaltenango and Escuintla have theedge over other departments in also being outside the seismic danger area, asdemarcated in February 1976. The industrial estate operations near the portat Santo Tomas de Castilla on the Caribbean coast could form a furthergeographic growth center for export-oriented industries.
233. Other Issues of Industrial Policy: The Development Plan indicatesincreased Government support for industry. Most in need of special supportare agroindustries (particularly dairies and vegetable oil manufacturing),forest product industries, small-scale labor-intensive construction materialsand consumer goods industries, and export industries. Since agroindustrialdevelopment has been curtailed in part by the inadequate supply of qualityinputs such as cotton seed, milk, and fruits and vegetables for canning, stepsshould be taken to improve the production and organization of the agriculturalsector in this respect, for example, along lines suggested ealier in thisreport. For basic consumer goods industries such as dairy products, whereprices have been controlled in an attempt to aid the lower income classes, arelaxation of these price controls would probably be the most effective formof government support to the industry. 1/
234. Credit support from the Government for priority sectors wouldprobably be channeled most efficiently through CORFINA, which requires a newinjection of capital to meet the demand for industrial finance, as its absorp-tive capacity improves. CORFINA also needs more technical staff to deal withthe project development and industrial programming that will be required ofit.
235. Fiscal incentives, which are administered throughout Central Americaunder the provision of REIFALDI (Regulation for Implementation of the FiscalIncentives Scheme for Industrial Development), are likely to continue to playan important role in government policy towards industry despite the loss ofpublic revenues, the relatively high effective protection which they give tosome industries, and the bias they foster towards relatively capital-intensiveinvestments. But there are at least two ways in which they should be appliedmore stringently. First, a more rigid application of time limits for importduty exemptions should be introduced. The incentives should support onlyinfant industries and those that need longer-term subsidizing for overridingsocial or economic reasons. (In the latter case, strict a priori criteriashould be developed which could then be used to judge individual cases.)Second, the Government's industrial planning capacity should be strengthened
1/ This already appears to be underway in the milk industry where, in early1977, the situation had deteriorated to the point that milk producerswere threatening to cease deliveries of milk and to leave the industry.
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to provide the information necessary for a judicious administration of incen-tive policies. The granting of fiscal incentives should not be routine, butrather be based on a critical appraisal by the Government of each particularproject and its potential benefit to the country.
236. A final and probably longer-term approach which the Government couldtake in orienting future industrial development to meet its goals of improvedincome distribution would be to seek agreement with other countries in theregion on restructuring the Central American fiscal incentives system toreduce its present bias towards capital-intensive investments.
C. Mining and Petroleum
Mining Sector
237. Structure and Legal Background: Mining has contributed very littleto Guatemala's economy; between 1960 and 1975 its share of GDP fell from 0.2to 0.1 percent while its labor force remained constant at around 0.2 percentof the total. Export earnings have remained below 2 percent of overallexports during this period. Mineral production for export includes lead,copper, antimony and tungsten. Quarry output--including clay, limestone,marble, and feldspar--is mostly for domestic consumption.
238. Mining operations in Guatemala may be either privately owned oroperated as a concession from the state. 1/ Most mines today are small onesproducing lead, antimony and tungsten and are concentrated in Huehuetenango.Four exploitation concessions have been granted under the provisions of the1965 law, the biggest being the Niquegua nickel mine developed by EXMIBAL(Exploraciones y Explotaciones Mineras de Izabal). The Oxec copper mine inAlta Verapaz, which exports some 12,000 tons of copper concentrates a year, isthe second most important concession.
Recent Develogments
239. The EXMIBAL Nickel Venture: This project is being developed toexploit the proven reserves of some 60 million tons of lateritic nickel orethat lies to the north of Lake Izabal in the eascern part of Guatemala. The
1/ Mining operations are regulated by three laws: the Mining Code ofJune 30, 1908, Legislative Decree No. 2000 of May 14, 1934, and thecurrent Mining Code, Decree Law 342 of May 4, 1965 and its implementingregulation of March 3, 1967. Decree Law 342 enables the Government togrant exploitation licenses for 40 years and total exemption from dutieson all imported mining inputs. Hydrocarbons exploration and exploitationare subject to a special law, the Petroleum Code, Decree No. 345, whilequarrying activities are regulated by the Quarrying Law, Decree No. 47-69.
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project, which has been under consideration for about 13 years, is beginningoperations after having suffered considerable physical and administrativedelays and a serious escalation in costs. EXMIBAL is owned 80 percent by theInternational Nickel Company of Canada Ltd. (INCO), 20 percent by Hanna MiningCompany, and has received financial assistance from the IFC. The investmentwas originally estimated at $120 million in 1973; by May 1976 it had reached$224 million. The original project, which was based on output of 50 millionlbs of nickel matte a year, has been scaled down to 28 million lbs. Nickelproduction at the smelter started in mid-1977, and exports, scheduled to beginsoon, are expected to reach $18 million this year and to rise to $58 millionby 1978. Initially nickel shipments will go to the INCO refinery in Wales.Between 1978 and 1985 the percentage of the company's gross export incomewhich will remain in the country as domestic expenditures is expected to risefrom 17.6 to 27.5 percent. The company has obtained import duty exemptionsand partial income tax exemptions for ten years. These will give EXMIBAL a 42percent income tax exemption in the first five years, falling to 21 percent inthe second five-year period.
240. The project has already had a strong stimulating effect on develop-ment of what is one of Guatemala's poorer regions. In the medium term, theproject's net foreign exchange earnings might be increased significantly ifthe import of oil for power generation could be eliminated by making hydro-electric power available or by using the high sulphur domestic oil presentlybeing developed in the Rubelsanto area (see below).
Petroleum
241. Consumption of petroleum products in Guatemala amounts to about23,000 bpd, and will increase substantially later during 1977 when the EXMIBALproject becomes operational. Oil supplies are imported, mainly from Venezuela,in the form of products or product blends, and are separated at the 14,000 bpdTexaco refinery in Escuintla. A second refinery, with a capacity of 12,000bpd, owned by Chevron and Shell, was mothballed in 1975. Retail prices of oilproducts are controlled by the Government, and sales of diesel oil to agricul-tural and transport enterprises are subsidized.
242. After the introduction of the 1955 Petroleum Code, a certain amountof oil exploration took place, mainly in the province of El Peten. However,the test wells were abandoned, partly because tuke companies were discouragedby the escalating tax structure imposed by the Petroleum Code, which, afterfour years of studies and consultations, was replaced in 1974. Under the newlaw, oil companies can negotiate an initial three-year exploration period,which can be extended for up to five more years. If commercial production isestablished, the Government has a right to at least 50 percent of gross crudeoil output. Oil companies are still somewhat dissatisfied with legislation,largely because it does not spell out the taxes and royalties which are to bepaid (a regulation is expected to be enacted in the near future which wouldclarify this point).
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243. Despite the problems with the existing Petroleum Code, ShenandoahInc. has already explored successfully in Guatemala, finding oil in commercialquantities in the Rubelsanto area of Alta Verapaz. Basic Resources Interna-tional, part of the Senandoah consortium, started exploring in the late 1960sin the area around the Tortugas salt dome where it discovered oil in 1972. In1973, Basic Resources was joined by Shenandoah and Saga Petroleum in develop-ing its concession area. In September 1976, Shenandoh formally notified theGovernment that the Rubelsanto oil field was commercial, with proven andprobable production capacity now estimated at 5,000-8,000 bpd. Exploratorywork is currently under way in several other similar geologic structures inthe same area, which is not far from the Reforma group of oil fields inMexico.
244. Shenandoah estimates the Rubelsanto reserves at 30 million barrels.The oil has a high sulphur content which, combined with the high parafin con-tent and the lack of "light end" fractions for producing gasoline, kerosene,etc., make it unsuitable by itself for the domestic market, and it cannot beprocessed economically by itself with existing domestic refinery capacity.Basic Resources is currently negotiating for a 100-mile 12-inch pipeline tothe coast with related facilities. The pipeline would have a capacity of60-75,000 bpd, far in excess of what Rubelsanto could produce now, but leavingroom for future increases in production levels as new reserves are proven.The pipeline project would cost between $25 and $30 million. Rubelsanto oilwould be piped to a Caribbean terminal at Livingston, then be shipped torefineries in the Caribbean or United States. Guatemala would go on importingthe particular products that it needs. The second possibility is to mixdomestic crude with lighter imported crudes for local refining, possibly atthe mothballed Chevron/Shell refinery. Finally, both EXMIBAL and the cementplant (and possibly others) may use some of the local crude directly. Thepipeline, without which oil commercialization cannot begin, will be completedal. the earliest in the second quarter of 1978. Until now there has been nopublic investment in petroleum and future petroleum investment is assumed tobe privately financed in the projections of this report.
245. In sum, the mining sector has contributed little to the economy sofar. Investment in nickel and petroleum exploration and exploitation duringthe last few years, however, are beginning to have an impact, and the balanceof trade should begin to benefit by 1978 or 1979. Meanwhile, investment inboth the nickel and petroleum projects has had some multiplier effects onemployment and income in priority development regions. Activity in thepetroleum sector could rise sharply in the next few years. This would requirestrengthening the Government's mining administration structure--especiallyintensifying survey activities and building up the technical expertiserequired from the public sector for dealing with oil companies. Financialsupport and technical aid for small-scale mining, such as exists now inHuehuetenango, would help to develop a sector that is labor-intensive, export-oriented and not as dependent on foreign capital and technology as the largerprojects are. A development finance corporation like CORFINA could play animportant role.
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D. Tourism
Background
246. Guatemala's tourist industry has been booming until 1973 (StatisticalAnnex Table 3.9). This is not surprising, for Guatemala has a myriad ofattractions for tourists, as was discussed in Chapter 1. Over the period1967-1975, the number of tourists grew by an average of 13 percent peryear. Most of this growth, however, has come more recently; between 1970 and1975 tourism grew by an average of 21 percent per year. During the sameperiod, tourism earnings grew from $12 million to nearly $80 million peryear.
Prospects
247. Prospects for future development of the tourism industry are excel-lent, especially in view of the industry's remarkable performance followinglast year's earthquake, when the widely forecast decline in tourism earningsfor 1976 did not occur.
248. The main constraints facing the industry are the lack of adequatefirst class hotel capacity, inadequate facilities at Tikal, a shortage oftrained personnel, and the poor telecommunications network within the country.Also significant was the short average stay of tourists.
249. Because of the rapid growth of the tourism industry in Guatemala,it has been difficult in recent years to obtain accommodations at the first-class hotels. Occupancy rates rose on a year-round basis, including slackseasons, from 65 percent in 1972 to 85 percent in 1975 for first-class hotels.However, large-scale investment has taken place in hotels during the pastthree years, and three first-class hotels are opening this year. In addition,the two major existing first-class hotels have upgraded their facilitiessubstantially. When these facilities are in operation, the number of first-class rooms will have increased from 1,000 to 2,000.
250. The Government has been working actively on a major improvement ofthe facilities at Tikal. A US$22 million project (of which CABEI is expectedto finance US$12.0 million) will improve the airport at nearby Flores, upgradethe road from there to Tikal, and restore the archaeological monuments in theNational Park of Tikal. When these infrastructure improvements are ready, theGovernment expects the private sector to follow with investment in hotelfacilities, which at present are practically non-existent. Because of theshortage of water in this area, the Government should undertake studies toidentify adequate sources of water to support the proposed development atTikal and Flores. The Government would also be well advised to arrange withAVIATECA, the national airline, an upgrading of its service to Flores/Tikal;at present the service is irregular and is subject to unexpected cancellations-and interruptions which can discourage tourism. In addition to the Tikal
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project, the Government has under active consideration a master plan for thedevelopment of tourism in the Department of Izabal, which would include LakeIzabal, the Castillo de San Felipe, and the beach at the Bay of Amatique onthe Caribbean.
251. To increase the supply of trained hotel personnel, it would beadvisable to expand vocational training programs. The poor internal telecom-munications system in Guatemala was identified by a recent study I/ as animportant constraint to tourism development. At present, it is quite difficultto contact hotels outside the capital city by telephone to make arrangementsand reservations. Even within hotels in Guatemala City, the telephone systemsare often woefully inadequate. GUATEL is working to improve this situation.
252. At present the average stay of a tourist in Guatemala is only 4.5days. Although this is an improvement over several years ago, it is stillfar lower than in Mexico, for example, where the average stay is 11.4 days.Tourism earnings could be increased substantially by upgrading and diversi-fying tourism attractions in Guatemala to encourage longer stays.
253. In sum, Guatemala has an excellent resource base for tourism develop-ment and is actively moving in the right direction to take advantage of theseresources. Priority on tourism development can help the balance of paymentssituation, and, as it is a labor-intensive industry which generates employ-ment at a relatively low cost, it can also improve income distribution.
1/ Stanford Research Institute, Plan de Accion de Mercadeo para el DesarrolloTuristico de Centraoamerica y Panama. This study was financed by AID andexecuted in cooperation with the Secretariat for Central American Tourism.
STATISTICAL ANNEX
Table Number
I. SOCIAL INDICATORS
1.1 Guatemala: Population by Region and Department (Total/Urban/Rural),1950-1985
1.2 Guatemala: Labor Force by Sector, 1950-19731.3 Central America: Population, Income and Area, 1965-19751.4 Guatemala: Age Structure of Population by Sex, 1950-19851.5 Social Indicators, 19741.6 Nutritional Balance of the Population1.7 Nutritional Requirements and the Recommended Minimum Family Budget,
1975
II. NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
2.1 Gross Domestic Product by Sector (Constant 1975 Prices), 1967-19762.2 Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Category, 1967-1976 and 1976-19852.3 Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure (Constant 1975 Prices),
1967-1976 and 1976-19852.4 Gross Fixed Capital Formation by Sector and Type, 1969-19762.5 Initial Cost Estimates of Earthquake Damage, 1976
III. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND EXTERNAL TRADE
3.1 Balance of Payments, 1967-1976 and 1976-19853.2 Summary of Exports, 1960-1976 and 1976-19853.3 Imports by End Use, 1967-1976 and 1976-19853.4 Trade with Other Central American Countries, 1967-19763.5 Central American Trade (Constant 1958 Prices), 1967-19763.6 Central American Trade by Product, 1968-19733.7 Export Value by Country, 1967-19763.8 Import Value by Country, 1967-19763.9 Tourist Arrivals by Origin; Tourism Earnings, 1967-1976
IV. EXTERNAL DEBT
4.1 External Debt Flows by Source, 1966-19764.2 External Public Debt Outstanding by Source, 1972-19774.3 Average Terms on External Public Debt Outstanding (Disbursed Only),
1967-19764.4 Average Terms on New Public Debt Commitment, 1966-19764.5 Distribution of External Indebtedness Among Borrowers, 1972-19764.6 External Public Debt Outstanding Repayable in Foreign Currency, 19764.7 External Public Debt Outstanding Repayable in Local Currency, 19764.8 Service Payments on Outstanding Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency,
1968-19964.9 Service Payments on Outstanding Debt Repayable in Local Currency,
1968-19964.10 Projections of Service Payments on External Public Debt, 1968-1985
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STATISTICAL ANNEX Page 2
Table Number
V. PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCES
5.1 Summary of Central Government Operations, 1967-1976 and 1976-19825.2 Central Government Current Revenues, 1967-1976 and 1976-19825.3 Central Government Current Expenditures by Sector, 1967-1976 and 1976-19825.4 Central Government Capital Expenditures by Sector, 1968-1976 and 1976-19825.5 Summary Transactions of the Autonomous Agencies, 1968-19755.6 Consolidated Public Sector Operations, 1968-1976 and 1976-19825.7 Summary of Fixed Public Investment, 1968-1976 and 1976-19825.8 Summary of Fixed and Financial Investment, Estimated, 1976, 1977-19825.9 Proposed Fixed and Financial Public Investment Plan by Project, 1977-19825.10 Public Debt, 1966-19755.11 Structure of the Public Sector
VI. MONEY AND CREDIT
6.1 Summary Accounts of the Financial System, 1972-19766.2 Financing Capacity of the Banking System, 1967-19766.3 Consolidated Banking System - Selected Indicators, 1967-19766.4 Gross New Lending by Sector to Private Sector, 1967-19756.5 Structure of the Financial System
VII. PRICES
7.1 Price Indices, 1972-19767.2 Terms of Trade, and Terms of Trade Effect, 1970-1976
VIII. AGRICULTURE
8-1 Value of Agricultural Production, 1966-19758.2 Cultivated Area, Production and Yield of Principal Crops, 1967-19768.3 Land Tenure Patterns, 1970
IX. INDUSTRY
9.1 Value Added in Manufacturing (Constant 1958 Prices), 1966-1975and 1950-1975
9.2 Manufacturing Value of Output (Constant 1958 Prices), 1966-1975
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8/30J78TASLE 1.1
GUATEMALA: POPULATION BY REGION AND DEPARTMENT (TOTAL/URBAN/RURAL), 1950-1985(THOUSANDS OF PERSONS)
(PERCENTAGES)
______--___--____ __--____________ _____----____--- _--_--_____-____ ----- -_--- _______________ ____- ______- ___- __- _____- ____- _- __- _-___-___
D I S T R I B U T I O N G R O w T H R A T E SDEPARTMENT ------- ____________________________-…
1950 1964 1973 1977 1985 50-64 64-73 73-77 77-85_______----___________ _______________--_--- _--_____--__________-- -_---_-- _____________ ____-- _________-- _-- _ __- - _____-- _____-___-
* URBAN & RURAL **
HIGHLANDS (ALTIPLANO) 1,481.9 2,192.1 2,863.5 3,297.7 4,241.3 2.8 3.0 3.6 3.2
CHIMALTENANGO 132.2 168.6 213.6 231.6 271.0 1.8 2.7 2.0 2.0GUATEMALA 477.6 843.1 1,130.5 1,396.0 1,958.2 4.1 3.3 5.4 4.3HUEHUETENANGO 217.7 299.0 390.3 444.0 557.2 2.3 3.0 3.3 2.9QUETZALTENANGO 200.4 280.1 351.8 383.3 457.3 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.2QUICHE 190.3 259.5 334.8 366.8 440.6 2.2 2.9 2.3 2.3SACATEPEQUEZ 65.4 83.1 105.5 117.7 141.7 1.7 2.7 2.8 2.3SOLOLA 90.2 111.5 144.3 152.3 173.7 1.5 2.9 1.4 1.7TOTONICAPAN 108.1 147.2 192.7 206.0 241.6 2.2 3.0 1.7 2.0
SOUTH (SUR) 866.7 1,309.8 1,610.4 1,799.2 2,218.6 3.0 2.3 2.8 2.7ESCUINTLA 134.7 280.0 322.8 392.6 540.1 5.4 1.6 5.0 4.1JUTIAPA 151.2 202.0 267.2 284.7 332.0 2.1 3.2 1.6 1.9RETALHULEU 72.8 121.8 146.2 169.5 218.6 3.7 2.0 3.8 3.2SAN MARCOS 253.1 350.0 433.4 474.5 562.9 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2SANTA ROSA 119.5 162.8 205.6 217.8 251.1 2.2 2.6 1.5 1.8SUCHITEPEQUEZ 135.4 193.2 235.2 260.1 313.9 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.4
EAST (ORIENTE) 392.3 546.7 726.8 783.1 939.2 2.4 3.2 1.9 2.3~~~~S W U ~ SZ St f - .. S*.. WRSflSZS U==. StUn == bUSSE === U.. ..... ==...... ,., =
CHIQUIMULA 122.8 155.3 193.8 194.8 210.1 1.7 2.5 0.1 0.9IZABAL 59.9 120.8 188.4 225.0 315.2 5.1 5.1 4.5 4.3JALAPA 81.8 102.7 133.8 142.4 164.1 1.6 3.0 1.6 1.8PROGRESO 52.1 67.9 84.2 89.0 101.3 1.9 2.4 1.4 1.6ZAGAPA 75.7 100.0 126.6 131.9 148.5 2.0 2.7 1.0 1.5
NORTH (NORTE) 278.7 370.7 464.4 477.7 530.2 2.1 2.5 0.7 1.3
ALTA VERAPAZ 206.5 270.6 339.5 344.9 376.8 1.9 2.6 0.4 1.1BAJA VERAPAZ 72.2 100.1 124.9 132.8 153.4 2.4 2.5 1.5 1.8
PETEN 17.3 27.4 65.0 78.2 112.8 3.3 10.1 4.7 4.7
TOTAL 3,036.9 4,446.7 5,730.1 6,435.9 8,042.1 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8. ....... ........ ......... ................. . ......... ......... ......... .........
TOTAL URBAN a RURAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0......... ............... ... ......... .........
TOTAL URBAN 24.9 33.4 35.7 37.8 41.4 4.9 3.6 4.4 4.0..... ........ .... ... ...... .-......... .............. ......... .............. ......... .............. ......... .............. .........
TOTAL RURAL 75.1 66.6 64.3 62.2 58.6 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.1* .... ........ ................ - -........ .. ......... ............. ......... ............. ......... .............. .........
SOURCE: NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING COUNCIL. CUADROS ESTADISTICOS DE LA POBLACION, JANUARY 1978.
Note: These data have been updated since the text was prepared to accord with the final revised population
figuires for Guatemala. Thus there may be small differences between the numbers here and those in the text.
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TABLE 1.2
GUATEMALA: LABOR FORCE BY SECTOR, 1950-1973
------ _ --------------------------- --- - - - - - - -- - - - - --------_ _ _ - - _ _ _-- ____---___________________________________
(THOUSANDS OF PERSONS) (PERCENTAGES) GROWTH RATESSECTOR ------------------------------ __
1950 1964 1973 1950 1964 1973 50-64 64-73…_______________ - - -- - ------- ___- _ __- ____---__-_-__-_-_-___-_-___-__-__________-______-______- ______- __-_- ___
AGRICULTURE 702.2 838.3 1 017.0 68.2 60.4 58.1 1.3 2.2MINING 1.5 1.8 2.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.3 2.3INDUSTRY 118.3 180.6 236.7 11.5 13.0 13.5 3.1 3.1
CONSTRUCTION 28.4 55.7 71.7 2.8 4.0 4.1 4.9 2.8PUBLIC UTILITIES 1.3 3.6 4.7 0.1 0.3 0.3 7.5 3.0COMMERCE & FINANCE 55.9 94.9 127.0 5.4 6.8 7.3 3.9 3.3
TRANSPORT 16.5 33.6 44.4 1.6 2.4 2.5 5.2 3.1SERVICES 101.0 152.1 209.7 9.8 11.0 12.0 3.0 3.6OTHER (INCL. NOT SPECIFIED) 4.3 26.8 35.7 0.4 1.9 2.0 14.0 3.2
TOTAL 1 029.4 1 387.4 1 749.1 100.t 100.0 100.0 2.2 2.6...... ......... ...... .-..---. .-..-----. .---.-..-... .-..-.. .........
SOURCE: NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING COUNCIL. 'CUADROS ESTAOISTICOS OE LA POSLACION-, 1978.
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Table 1.3: CENTRAL AMERICA: POPULATION, INCOME AND AREA, 1965-1975
- Plpulalo2/ _ Area Income Per Capita4Country 2 Population Growth p.a.
Thousands Percent Growth p.a. Ka ths) Percent Per Km (us$) 1965-751975 1975 1965-72 ]/ 1975 . l79 L (Percent)
Central America 17,149 100.0 2.73/ 14114 100.0 39.6 4602i/ 2.03-/
Guatemala 6,270 36.6 2.9 108.9 26.5 57.6 550 2.4
El Salvador 4,006 23.4 3.3 21.1 5.1 189.9 350 1.2
Honduras 2,832 16.5 2.2 312.1 27.2 25.3 320 1.7
Nicaragua 2,071 12.1 2.5 U8.4 28.8 17.5 540 1.5
Costa Rica 1,970 11.5 2.9 50.9 12.4 38.7 710 4.1
I/ 1974 World Bank Atlas and Economic Analysis and Projections Dept.
v/ IBRD. Economic_A ysis and Projections Dept. and mission estimates.31 Weighted average.
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813017STABLE 1.4
GUATEMALA: AGE STRUCTURE OF POPULATION BY SEX. 1950-1985
(PERCENTAGES)-
D I S T R I B U T I O N G R O W T H R A T E SCATEGORY --------------------------- _--_---_-- ---__________ ------------------------------
1950 1964 1973 1977 1985 50-64 64-73 73-77 77-85______________________.________________________________________________________________________________________--_________
AGE 0-14 YEARS 43.0 45.6 44.6 43.3 42.0 3.2 2.6 2.1 2.4
MALE 21.9 23.2 22.7 22.0 21.4 3.2 2.6 2.2 2.4FEMALE 21.2 22.4 21.9 21.2 20.6 3.2 2.6 2.1 2.4
AGE 15-64 YEARS 54.0 51.6 52.6 53.6 54.7 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.1
MALE 27.4 26.2 26.8 27.1 27.7 2.4 3.1 3.3 3.1FEMALE 26.6 25.4 25.8 26.5 27.1 2.4 3.0 3.6 3.1
AGE 65 AND OVER 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.4 2.7 5.9 3.5
MALE 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.4 2.4 7.0 3.4FEMALE 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.4 3.0 4.9 3.5
TOTAL POPULATION 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8*-...... ... .............. . ........ .. ...... ..... . ... ......... ......... .........
MALE 50.7 50.7 50.8 50.7 50.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8FEMALE 49.3 49.3 49.2 49.3 49.3 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.8
DEPENDENCY RATIO /A 85.2 93.7 90.1 86.6 82.8 0.6 . -0.4 -0.9 -0.5
SOURCE- NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING COUNCIL. 'CUADROS ESTADISTICOS DE LA POLACION ... 1978.
/A RATIO OF POPULATION OUTSIDE 15-64 AGE BRACKET TO THOSE WITHIN.
-98-
Table 1.5: GUATEMALA: COMPARATIVE SOCIAL INDICATOfiS (LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES)-,! 1974
Indicator Guatemala L*tin Aaerica World Guatemala GuatemalaLatin Am. World
GNP per capita 580 465 338 124 172
P@L nde 2/ 53 67 59 79 89
birth Rate (per 1,000) 43 38 30 113 143
Death Rate (per 1,000) 15 10 11 150 136
Life Expectancy (years) 53 60 61 88 87
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 live birth) 79 79 70 100 113
Adult Literacy (%) 47 64 3L 73 138
Education Expenditure ($ per capita) 11 14 10 79 110
Population Growth Rate (%) 2.8 2.8 1.9 100 147
1/ Defined as countries with a 1974 per capita GNP of $3004699.
2/ The PQLI or Physical Quality of Life Index is an unweighted composite index reflecting life expectancy,infant mortality and literacy. Countries around the vorld were ranked on a 1 to 100 scale by each ofthese indexes, with the worst perfornir being assigned a value of 1 and the best a value of 100. ThePQLI is the sum of these three indices for each eountry divided by three.
Source: Developed from Sewell, John W., et. al. The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977(Washington, D.C.: Overseas Dewlopownt Council, 1977, pp. 160-171.)
-99-
Table 1.6: GUATEMALA: NUTRITIONAL BALANCE OF THE POPULATION
(in grams per day)
Available Recommended Index of Nutrition,.1i--lto Consumption 100 = Recommendcc. T
Item Urban Consumed by Income Strata Real (weightedand intake by age mr.Rural Poorest Middle Higher Highest (Rural structure of Available to intj.-Areas 50% 30% 15% 5% Areas) the population Recom. diet Recom.
Milk 137 40 82 192 865 125 268 51 47
Eggs 15 5 13 26 76 19 27 56 70
Meat 40 18 39 69 178 62 70 57 b9
Beans 28 20 33 43 57 50 61 46 82
Vegetables 67 43 82 111 155 86 170 39 51
Fruits 52 31 66 93 118 29 80 65 36
Bananas 57 44 63 77 99 38 124 46 31
Potatoes 7 5 8 11 14 17 68 10 25
Rice 6 3 7 11 25 16 43 14 37
Bread 41 21 41 69 153 4o 70 59 57
Tortillas 535 222 390 399 329 496 312 171 41
Sugar 71 50 80 103 138 53 65 109 82
Fats 14 6 12 21 54 8 13 108 62
Coffee 9 6 11 14 20 9 4 225 225
Source: Calculated by the Mission from various sources including University of San Carlos, INCAP, andNational Planning Council.
Table 1.7: GUATEMALA: NUTRITIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE RECOMMENDED MINIMUM FAMILY BUDGET - 1975
Food requirements (recommended) and their value(per family) Recommended Minimum Family Budget (in Quetzales)
Unit RecommendedPrice Daily Urban Family Rural Familyin Expenditure Daily Daily
Food Quantity Quetzales Quetzales Items Exp. % Exp. %
Milk 0.5 litre 0.28 0.14 Food 3.06 40 2.59 61.0
Fgg's 4 0.04 0.16 Housing 1.41 19 0.12 2.8
Meat (inc. 1.7 lbs. 0.5 0.85 /a Clothing 0.82 11 0.42 10.0bones) Fuel, electr.,
Beans 0.5 lbs. 0.19 0.09 water 0.37 5 0.37 8.8
Vegetables 10 ounces 0.03 0.27 Transport 0.37 5
Fruits 21 ounces o.oo6 0.12 Appliances, furniture 0.30 4
Potatoes 13 ounces 0.003 0.04 Personal care 0.22 3 0.35 8.2
Cereals 12 ounces 0.017 0.20 Education 0.22 3
Sugar 9.5 ounces o.oo6 0.05 Health 0.15 2
Fats 2.0 otnces o.046 0.09 Miscellaneous 0.15 2 0.39 9.2
Tortillas 33 pieces 0.01 0.33 Others o.44 6
Bread 24 pieces 0.025 0.60
Salt 4 ounces 0.003 0.12
Total 3.06 Total 7.1 4.24
Actual minimum daily wage rate(per one worker) 1.90 1.15
a/ While this item is recommended in a theoretical diet, it appears highly improbable as a daily requirementeven at a better-than-minimum level of income.
Source: Calculated from data provided by the Comision Nacional de Salarios (Ministry of Labor), INCAP (NutritionInstitute) and the Institute for Economic and Social Research (San Carlos University). -101-
12/09/77
TAB3E 2.t
GUATEr;ALA: GROSS DCONEST-C PR_D CT (CONSTANT 1975 PRICES), 1967-1976tIILLIC.S GOF CETZALES)
D I s T R I B U T I O NSECTOR ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1939 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
PRIMARY PROCUCTION 627.6 698.1 719.2 757.2 810.2 594.3 940.5 991.3 1 026.1 1 076.2
AGR!cLU T_R- 624.8 695.9 717.0 754.6 807.6 891.9 938.1 998.2 1 022.8 1 072.1
-. I:NING 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.3 4.2
.E.CGGAT UGR.DUCTION 420.3 462.8 498.6 513.0 545.8 589.3 643.1 660.2 671.2 792.5
,!AU'N ACTLR:NG 349.8 332.1 423.3 436.1 466.9 496.3 536.0 555.1 552.3 609.5_Q'.S- Q _CTr!JN 44.9 42.5 44.1 43.9 43.9 53.1 63.2 58.5 68.0 126.1
UTIITIES 25.6 28.2 31.1 33.1 35.0 39.9 43.9 46.7 50.6 54.8
. 6 ,.:CES1 231.2 1 331.1 1 409.1 1 492.5 1 559.1 1 669.5 1 778.9 1 891.0 1 949.4 2 053.0
rTANa%sRT S STORAGE 119.6 131.3 142.5 151.3 162.5 183.6 202.3 226.4 233.7 258.2
'.':'','EFCE 639.3 710.2 744.4 798.2 834.8 884.0 944.1 1 006.2 1 005.5 1 090.799.411.3, INSURANCE & FINUNCE 53.6 55.7 59.2 65.2 67.1 72.5 92.6 88.6 95.o 101.5HCJSIN8 175.9 182.1 168.7 192.3 196.2 201.6 205.2 206.9 215.0 173.6PULBLI ATV'N. & DEFENSE 1:0 5 2.8 127.9 133.9 135.7 151.3 154.7 163.5 183.2 195.9PERSCNAL S_RVICES 132.3 139.0 146.4 151.5 162.8 176.5 190.0 199.4 217.0 233.1
,RQCSS DOMESTIC PROOJCT 2 279.0 2 491.9 2 626.9 2 762.7 2 915.1 3 193.0 3 362.6 3 542.5 3 646.7 3 921.6
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA
-102-
PAGE 1 OF 212/08/77
TABLE 2.2 (1)GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY EXPENDITURE CATEGORY (CURRENT PRICES), 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF OUETZALES)
D I S T R I B U T I O NITEM ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
CONSUMPTION 1,289.8 1,363. 1i,492.7 1,647.0 1,730.8 1,842.7 2,202.5 2,679.5 3,125.2 3,678.3
PRIVATE 1,177.2 1,248.5 1,356.7 1,495.6 1,591.5 1,686.0 2,035.9 2,472.9 2,874.9 3,394.3GOVERNMENT 112.6 115.3 136,0 151.4 139.3 156.7 166.6 206.6 250.3 284.0
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 188.1 243.9 210.0 244.2 285.5 254.8 351.6 588.0 586.8 869.3
FIXED 191.7 220.9 231.0 238.6 263.6 272.5 356.6 467.9 570.8 885.4PRIVATE 147.9 176.9 176.o 193.4 206.2 205.4 269.2 374.7 462.5 654.2GOVERNMENT 43.8 44.0 s5.o 45.2 57.4 67,1 87.4 93.2 118.3 231.2
CHANGE IN STOCKS -3.6 23.0 -21.0 5.6 21.9 -17.7 -5.0 120.1 16.0 -16.1
GROSS DOMESTIC EXP. (GDX=C+I) 1,477.9 1,607.7 1,702.7 1,891.2 2,016.3 2,097.5 2,554.1 3,267.5 3,712.0 4,547.6_-- ____ - _------- --------- _--- -- - ------_-- -_ - ------- _------- - ------ -- _- _--- ----- _--------
EXPORTS (GOODS a N-S) 232,5 266.8 302.8 349.5 338.5 391.4 529.5 701.6 792.0 951.8IMPORTS (GOOOS S NFS) 284.4 296.8 299.5 336.7 371.0 387.3 514.3 807.6 858.0 1,136.3
RESOURCE BALANCE (X-M) -51.9 -30.0 3.3 12.8 -32.5 4.1 15.2 -106.0 -66.0 -184.5
NET FACTOR SERV. INC. (FSY) -19.4 -31.4 -35.7 -38.2 -41.8 -43.9 -45.7 -47.4 -69.o -17.9NET CURRENT TRANSFERS (NCT) 9.3 10.7 134.0 17.5 25.2 30.1 41.6 54.0 72.6 198.6
CUR A/C SAL - EXT SAV -62.0 -50.7 101.6 -7.9 -49.1 -9.7 11.1 -99.4 -62,4 -3.8. _---- -- ----- -------- -- -------- _- -- -_-_-- -- _ -- ------ _- _---- _----- -- --- _ _____------- _---- --
PRODUCTGROSS DOMESTIC (GDX+R8) 1,426.0 1.577.7 1,706.o 1,904.0 1,983.8 2,101.6 2,569.3 3,101.5 3,646.0 4,363.1
=-s *.s=7=z= .==== -===== .a= = == T77===.7 .=== = sw.; .= . ==.. GROSS NATIONAL (GDP+FSY) 1,406.6 1,546.3 1,670.3 1,865.8 1,942.0 2,057.7 2,523.6 3,114.1 3,577.0 4345.1
SAVINGSGROSS DOMESTIC (GDP-C) 136.2 213.9 213.3 257.0 253.0 258.9 366.8 482.0 520.8 684.8GROSS NATIONAL (GOS+FSY+NCT) 126.1 193.2 311.6 236.3 236.4 245.1 362.7 488.6 524.4 855.5
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, ESTUDIO ECONOMICO Y MEMORIA DE LABORES
NOTE: THE OAIANCE OF PAYMENTS TOTAL FOR 1976 DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH THAT IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TAsLE BECAUSETRANSFER PAYMENTS ON NATIONALLY OWNED INSURANCE POLICIES HELD ABROAD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.
-103-
PAGE 2 Of 21 2/08/77
TAaLE 2.2 (2)GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY EXPENDITURE CATEGORY (CURRENT PRICES), 1976-1985
(MILLINS OF QUETZALES)
D I S T R I 8 u T I O NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198F 1982 1983 F9P4 1985
CONSUMPTION 3,678.3 3,985.6 4,720.6 5,507.3 6.313.6 7,190.7 8,169.9 9,283.5 10,544.4 11,971 d
PRIVATE 3,394.3 3,410.1 4,051.7 4,734.8 5,423.1 6,164.2 6,986.6 7,940.0 9,019.0 10.2,.91,GOVERNMENT 284.0 575.5 668.9 772.5 890.5 1,026.5 1,183.3 1,343.4 F,525.3 1,7;2.0
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 869.3 1,094.6 1,182.5 1,212.4 1,376.1 1,562.1. 1,773.3 2,013.3 2,265.9 2,595 6
FIXED 885.4 1,073.9 1,169.5 1,197.6 1,359.4 1,543.1 1,751.7 1,988.8 2,28.1 2,'64.1PRIVATE 654.2 820.9 858.4 864.5 971.0 1,070.6 1,233.9 1,400.9 1, "0.6 1,8,>.;GOVERNMENT 231.2 253.0 311.1 333.1 388.4 472.5 517.8 587.9 667.5 757 9
CHANGE IN STOCKS -16.1 20.7 13.0 14.8 16.7 19.0 21.6 24.5 27.8 31.6
GROSS DOMESTIC EXP. (GDX.C+I) 4,547.6 5,080.2 5,903.1 6,719.7 7,689.7 8,752.8 9,943.2 11,296.7 12,830.3 14,567.4
EXPORTS (GOODS A N,S) 951.8 1,312.0 1.366.0 1,507.0 1,654.0 1,864.7 2,106.8 2,385.5 2,706.6 3,076.7IMPORTS (GOODOS & NFS) 1,136.3 1,278.5 1,421.6 1,573.2 1,791.7 2,044.9 2,318.2 2,633.4 2,991.8 3,399.3
RESOURCE BALANCE (X-M) -184.5 33.5 -55.6 -66,2 -137.7 -180.2 -211.3 -247.9 -285.3 -322.6
NET FACTOR SERV. INC. (FSY) -17.9 -63.0 -70.2 -71.1 -72.3 -76.2 -81.4 -87.7 -95.9 -106.2NET CURRENT TRANSFERS (NCT) 196.6 70.0 77.0 84.7 93.2 102.5 112.7 124.0 136.4 150.1
CUR A/C SAL . EXT SAV -3.8 40.4 -48.9 -52.7 -116.8 -153.9 -180.0 -211.6 -244.8 -278.8
PRODUCTGROSS DOMESTIC (GDX+R8) 4,363.1 5,113.6 5,847.5 6,653.5 7,552.0 8,572.6 9,731.9 11,048.8 12,545.0 14,244.9
GROSS NATIONAL (GDP+FSY) 4345.1 5050.6 5,777.2 6,582.4 7,479.8 8,496.4 9,650.5 10,961.2 12,449.1 14,138.6
SAVINGSGROSS DOMESTIC (GDP-C) 684.8 1,128.0 1,126.8 1,146.2 1,238.4 1,381.9 1,562.0 1,765.4 2,000.6 2,273.1GROSS NATIONAL (GDS+FSY+NCT) 865.5 1'35.0 1,133.6 1,159.7 1,259.3 1,408.1 1,593.3 1,801.7 2,041.1 2,316.9
------------------------------------------------------------- __--------------__-----------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, ESTUOIO ECONOMICO Y MEMORIA DE LABORES AND IBRD PROJECTIONS.
NOTE: THE BA,.ANCE OF PAYMENTS TOTAL FOR 1976 DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH THAT IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TABLE BECAUSETRANSFER PAYMENTS ON NATIONALLY OWNED INSURANCE POLICIES HELD ABROAD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.
-104-
PAGE 1 OF 312/08/77
TABLE 2.3 (IA)GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC EXPENDITURE (CONSTANT 1975 PRICES), 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF OUETZALES) /A
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I B U T I O N
CO NCE PT - ----- ------ ----- -- ---------- ------ --- -- - ------ ------------------ - ----------- ----- ------- ------- ----1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
…------------------------------------------------------------------__--------__-----------------------------------------------------
CONSUMPTION 2,102.5 2,190.7 2,329.7 2,474.6 2,599.1 2,766.1 2,910.0 3,020.0 3,125.1 3,331.9
PERSONAL 1,939.8 2,026.9 2,139.8 2.263.0 2,393.2 2,549.4 2,693.1 2,792.9 2,874.9 3,066.3GOVERNMENT 162.8 163.8 189.9 211.6 196.0 216.7 216.9 227.1 250.2 265.6
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 383.1 478.7 396.0 451.9 512.6 449.3 523.3 658.0 586.9 784.7
FIXED 388.7 442.8 450.2 443.7 480.1 475.8 529.7 522.0 570.9 799.3PRIVATE 308.8 362.4 372.1 367.3 385.0 364.6 401.6 416.8 452.6 593.5GOVERNMENT 79.9 80.4 78.1 76.3 95.2 111.0 128.1 103.2 118.3 205.8
CHANGE IN STOCKS -5.6 35.9 -54.2 8.2 32.5 -26.6 -6.4 136.0 16.0 -14.6
GROSS DOMESTIC EXP. (C+I) 2,4B5.6 2,669.4 2,725.6 2,926.6 3,101.7 3,215.3 3,433.3 3,678.0 3,712.0 4,116.6
EXPORTS (GOODS & NFS) 443.B 499.4 563.4 550.6 573.8 656.i 718.9 766.7 792.0 856.5TERMS OF TRADE ADJ 105.9 126.7 124.3 206.2 147.2 90.8 111.6 39.6 - 24.7
EXPORTS (IMPORT CAPACITY) 549.7 626.1 667.7 757.0 720.9 746.9 830.8 806.3 792.0 681.2IMPORTS (GJODS S NFS) 650.9 676.8 662.4 714.8 760.6 718.2 790.1 903.4 858.1 1,051.3
RESOURCE BALANCESEXPORTS - IMPORTS (RB) -207.1 -177.3 -99.0 -163.9 -186.8 -62.1 -71.1 -136.7 -66.o -194.8IMP CAPACITY - IMPORTS -101.2 -50.7 25.4 42.2 -39.7 28.7 40.7 -97.1 -66.0 -170.1
NET FACTOR INCOME -49.7 -58.4 -66.5 -62.9 -70.6 -75.9 -64.0 -57.6 -70.0 -16.GNET CURRENT TRANSFERS 14.1 16.5 19.7 24.5 35.6 43.2 52.1 58.5 72.6 184.0CUR A/C BAL s EXT SAVINGS -136.8 -92.6 -21.4 3.8 -74.6 -3.9 28.8 -96.3 -63.5 -2.7
PRODUCTGROSS DOMESTIC (GDX+RB) 2,278.5 2,492.1 2,626.7 2,762.6 2,914.9 3,153.2 3,362.2 3,541.4 3.645.9 3.921.8
GROSS NATIONAL (GDP+FSY) 2,226.9 2,433.7 2,560.2 2,699.7 2,644.3 3,077.3 3,298.2 3,463.7 3,575.9 3305.2
INCOMEGROSS DOMESTIC (GDP+TADJ) 2,384.4 2.618.7 2.751.0 2,968.8 3,062.1 3.244.0 3,474.0 3,580.9 3,645.9 '-.S.SGROSS NATIONAL (GDY+FSY) 2,334.7 2,560.3 2,684.5 2,905.9 2,991.5 3,168.2 3,410.0 3,523.3 3,575.9 3929.9
SAVINGSGROSS DOMESTIC (GDY-C) 281.9 428.0 421.3 494.1 473.0 478.0 564.0 560.9 520.8 614.6GROSS NATIONAL (GDS+FSY+NCT) 246.3 386.1 374.5 455.7 438.0 445.3 552.1 561.7 523.4 782.0
…------------------------------- _-_- __----- _-_------------- ___- _ ___ _------ _----------- _ ____ ___ ___ ___-_-_ _______-____---- ----…-…
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, BOLETIN ESTADISTICOA/ THIS DATA HAS BEEN CONVERTED FROM 1958 PRICES AND, BECAUSE OF ROUNDING MAY NOT BE EXACTLY EQUAL TO CURRENT PRICE SERIES FOR 1975.
-105
PAGE 2 OF 312/08/77TABLE 2.3(1B)
GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC EXPENDITURE (CONSTANT 1975 PRICES), 1971-1976
(PERCENTAGES)-----------------------------------------------------
__----------------------__--__-_--____-_____---__-----_-----__---__-----_---_-_
D I S T R I B U T I O N G R O W T H R A T E SCONCEPT -------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 75-76
CONSUMPTION 67.7 86.6 85.3 85.7 85.0 6.8 5.2 3.8 3.5 6.6
PERSONAL 80.9 80.1 78.9 78.9 78.2 6.5 5.6 3.7 2.9 6.7GOVERNMENT 6.9 6.5 6.4 6.9 6.8 10.6 0.1 4.7 10.2 6.1
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 14.2 ' 15.6 18.8 16.1 20.0 - 12.4 16.5 25.7 - 10.8 33.7
FIXED 15.1 15.8 14.7 15.7 20.4 - 0.9 11.3 - 1.5 9.4 40.0PRIVATE 11.6 11.9 11.8 12.4 ¶5.1 - 5.3 ¶0.1 4.3 8.1 31.1GOVERNMENT 3.5 3SB 2.9 3.2 5.2 16.7 15.4 - 19.4 14.6 74.0CHANGE IN STOCKS - 0.8 - 0.2 3.8 0.4 - 0.4 .. -76.0 .. -88.2
GROSS OOMESTIC EXP. (C+l) 102.0 102.1 103.9 101.8 105.0 3.7 6.8 7.1 0.9 10.9
EXPORTS (GOODS & NiS) 20.8 21.4 21.7 21.7 21.8 14.3 9.6 6.6 3.3 8.1TERMS OF TRADE ADJ 2.9 3.3 1.1 - 0.6 - 38.3 23.1 - 64.6EXPORTS (IMPORT CAPACITY) 23.7 24.7 22.8 21.7 22.5 3.6 11.2 - 2.9 - 1.8 11.3IMPORTS (GOODS & NFS) 22.8 23.5 25.5 23.5 26.8 - 5.6 10.0 14.3 - 5.0 22.5
RESOURCE BALANCESEXPORTS - IMPORTS (RB) - 2.0 - 2.1 - 3.9 - 1.6 - 5.0 - 66.8 14.5 92.2 - 51.7 195.0IMP CAPACITY - IMPORTS 0.9 1.2 - 2.7 - 1.6 - 4.3 . 41.6 .. - 32.0 124.6
NET FACTOR INCOME - 2.4 - 1-9 - 1.6 - 1.9 - 0.4 7.5 - 15.7 - 9.9 2t.4 -76.3NET CURRENT TRANSFERS 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0 4.7 21.2 20.6 12.3 24.1 153.6CUR A/C SAL EXT SAVINGS - 0.1 0.9 - 2.7 - 1.7 - 0.1 - 94.7 .. .. - 34.1 -95.7
PRODUCTGROSS DOMESTIC (GDX+RS) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 8.2 6.6 5.3 3.o 7.6.... =... .....- ===S ==e = .... === .... == .*- ...-....... = ......................... U S st.lt .S .S.S .GROSS NATIONAL (GDP+FSY) 97.6 98.1 98.4 98.1 09.6 8.2 7.2 5.6 2.6 9.2
INCOMEGROSS DOMESTIC (GOP+TADJ) 102.9 103.3 101.1 100.0 100.6 5.9 7.1 3.1 1.8 8.2GROSS NATIONAL (GDY+FSY) 100.5 101.4 99.5 98.1 100.2 5.9 7.6 3.3 1.5 9.9
SAVINGSGROSS DOMESTIC (GOY-C) 15.2 16.8 15.8 14.3 15.7 1.1 18.0 - 0.6 - 7.1 18.0GROSS NATIONAL (GDS+FSY+NCT) 14.1 16.4 15.9 14.4 19.9 1.7 24.0 1.7 - 6.8 49.4- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE! BANK OF GUATEMALA, BOLETIN ESTADISTICO
-i06-
PAGE 3 OF 312/08/77
TABLE 2.3 (2)GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC EXPENDITURE (CONSTANT 1975 PRICES), 1976-1985
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I 3 U T I O NCONCEPT ------------------------------ _________________________________-___-__-_
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
CONSUMPIION 3,331.9 3,552.8 3,719.6 3,993.0 4,234.0 4,492.0 4,755.2 5,036.5 5.334.0 5,648.6
PERSONAL 3,066.3 3,080.2 3,211.0 3,446.6 3.645.3 3,857.8 4,071.9 4.311.5 4,564,7 4,832.2GOVERNMENT 265.6 472.6 508.6 546.4 588.7 634.2 683.2 724.9 769.3 816.4
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 784.7 898.9 899.1 857.6 909.7 965.1 1,023.9 1,086.4 1,152.8 1,223.4
FIXED 799.3 881.9 889.3 847.1 898.6 953.3 1,011.5 1,073.2 1,138.8 1,208.5PRIVATE 593.5 674.1 652.7 611.5 641.9 661.4 712.5 756.0 802.2 851.3GOvERNMENr 205.8 207.8 236.6 235.6 256.8 291.9 299.0 317.2 336.6 357.2
CHAN53E IN STOCKS -14.6 17.0 9.9 10.5 11.1 11.7 12.5 13.2 14.0 14.9
GROSS DOMESTIC EXP. (C+I) 4,116.6 4,451.6 4,618.7 4,850.6 5,143.7 5,457.1 5,779.1 6,122.9 6,486.8 6,872.0
EXPORTS (GOODS & N,S) 856.5 930.6 1,044.6 1,109.0 1,182.9 1,262.4 1,348.0 1,440.3 1,539.9 1,647.3TERMS OF TRADE ADJ 24.7 283.2 124.8 91.5 48.8 35.4 22.4 10.0 -2.0 -13.3
EXPORTS (IMPORT CAPACITY) 881.2 1,213.8 1,169.3 1,200.6 1,231.6 1,297.8 1,370.4 1,450.3 1,537.9 1,634.0IMPORTS (GOODS & NFS) 1,051.3 1,182.8 1,217.0 1,253.3 1,334.2 1,423.2 1,507.9 1,601.0 1,700.0 1,805.3
RESOURCE BALANCESEXPORTS - IMPORTS (RB) -170.1 -252.2 -172.4 -144.3 -151.3 -160.8 -159.9 -160.7 -160.1 -158.0IMP CAPACITY - IMPORTS -152.6 31.0 -47.6 -52.8 -102.5 -125.4 -137.5 -150.7 -162.1 -171.3
NET FACTOR INCOME -16.6 -58.4 -59.6 -56.2 -53.3 -52.6 -52.5 -52.8 -54.0 -55.9NET CURRENT TRANSFERS 184.0 64.2 65.3 66.9 68.7 70.7 72.6 74.7 76.8 78.9
CUR A/C BAL . EXT SAVINGS -2.7 36.7 -41.9 -42.1 -87.1 -107.3 -117.3 -128.8 -139.3 -148.3
PRODUCTGROSS DOMESTIC (GDX+RB) 3,921.8 4.199.4 4,446.3 4,706.3 4,992.4 5,296.3 5,619.2 5,962.2 6,326.7 6,714.0
GROSS NATIONAL (GDP+FSY) 3905.2 4,141.0 4,386.8 4,650.1 4,939.1 5,243.7 5,566.7 5,909.4 6,272.7 6,658.1
INGOMEGROSS DOMESTIC (GDP+TADJ) 3,964.0 4,482.6 4,571.1 4,797.8 5,041.2 5,331.7 5,641.6 5,972.2 6,324.7 6,700.7GROSS NATIONAL (GOY+FSY) 3929.9 4,424.2 4,511.5 4,741.7 4,987.8 5,279.1 5,589.1 5,919.4 6,270.7 6,644.8
SAVINGSGROSS DOMESTIC (GDY-C) 614.6 929.8 851.5 804.8 807.2 839.7 886.5 935.7 990.7 1,052.1GROSS NATIONAL (GDS+FSY+NCT) 782.0 935.6 857.3 815.5 822.6 857.8 906.6 957.6 1,013.5 1,075.1
------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________--______________________
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, 8OLETIN ESTADISTICO S IBRD PROJECTIONS _
-101-
11/10/77TABLE 2.4
GUATEMALA: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION BY SECTOR AND TYPE, 1969-1976
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)7 ------- --------------------------------------------------- ____----___--___________-
D I S T R I S U T I O NITEM
1969 1970 1971 197! 1973 1974 1975 1976
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 231 239 264 273 357 468 571 885
AGRICULTURE /1 19 20 22 26 31 45 54 67MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 9 9 11 13 16 25 32 42IMPROVEMENTS 10 11 11 13 15 20 22 25
INDUSTRY /1 63 71 70 74 96 137 164 205TRANSPORT & COMMUN.CATIONS 22 28 41 29 41 56 86 109PUBLIC WORKS 41 43 44 55 77 82 97 140OTHER PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION 27 28 27 23 32 50 56 120OTHER INVESTMENT /2 59 49 60 66 80 98 114 244
BY TYPE 231 239 264 273 357 468 571 885
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 153 157 182 182 233 316 394 611AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENTS 10 11 11 13 15 20 22 34ROADS AND CONSTRUCTION 68 71 71 78 109 132 155 240
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__---------------------------------
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA AND WORLD BANK ESTIMATES/1 INCLUDES CAPITAL INVESTMENTS BY THE PUBLIC SECTOR/2 INCLUDES ONLY LOCALLY PRODUCED CAPITAL GOODS
-1C8-
Table 2.5: GUATEMALA: INITIAL COST ESTIMATES OFEARTHQUAKE DAMAGE, 1976
In millions of US dollars
Total Estimated Foreign Foreign DomesticItem Cost Exchange Content Exchange Currency
(percent) Cost Cost
I. Housing 491 22.0 109 382
Metropolitan Area 236 25.0 60 176Larger Towns 74 15.0 11 63Smaller Towns 104 10.0 10 94Miscellaneous 1/ 77 35.0 28 49
II. Infrastructure 72 62.0 45 27
Transport 66 62.0 41 25Power and Telecommunic. 4 78.0 3 1Other 2 32.0 1 1
III. Social Overhead 148 32.0 47 101
Social Service Facilities 98 34.0 33 65Urban Services 14 41.0 6 8Government Builidings,etc. 36 22.0 8 28
IV. Productive Sector 39 30.0 12 27
Agriculture 8 15.0 1 7Industry 11 60.0 7 4Commerce and Services 20 19.0 4 16
Total 750 28.0 213 537
1/ Household goods replacement, rubble removal, etc.
Note: This table covers only basic replacement costs; it does not include the substantialupgrading expenses included in the later government estimate of $1,200 million.
-109-Source: Government estimates.
PAGE I OF 412/o8/77
TABLE 3.1 (1)GUATEMALA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
D I S T R I S U T I O NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 i973 1974 1975 1976
CURRENT ACCOUNT
EXPORTS (GOODS S NFS) 232.5 266.8 302.8 349.5 338.5 391.4 529.5 7oi.6 792.0 951.8
MF'vCHANDISE (FOB) 203.9 233.5 262.5 297.1 296.9 335.8 441.6 p82.2 640.9 794.3TRAVEL 5.5 6.5 9.2 12.1 13.6 16.9 37.0 56.7 78.0 65.6OTIER NON-FACTOR SERVICES 23. 1 26.8 31.1 40.3 38.0 38.7 50.9 62.7 73.t 91.9
IMPORTS (GOOS & NFS) 284.4 296.8 299.5 336.7 371.0 387.3 514.3 807.6 858.0 1 136.3
MERCHANDISE (CIF) 249.7 259.0 262.2 291.9 316.8 328.3 431.0 704.1 735.0 982.1MERCHANDISE (FOB) 226.5 237.6 240.9 266.6 289.9 294.7 391.4 631.5 672.4 904.6FREIGHT AND INSURANCE 23.2 21.4 21.3 25.3 26.9 33.6 39.6 72.6 62.6 77.5
OTHER NON-FACTOR SERVICES 34.7 37.8 37.3 44.8 54.2 59.0 83.3 103.5 123.0 154.2
RESOURCE BALANCE -51.9 -30.0 3.3 12.8 -32.5 4.1 15.2 -106.0 -66.0 -184.5
FACTOR SERVICE INCOME (NET) -19.4 -31.4 -35.7 -38.2 -41.8 -43.7 -45.7 -47.4 -69.0 -17.9
PROFITS -14.3 -23.9 -28.4 -29.9 -29.5 -33.9 -38.5 -49.2 -59.4 -59.0INTEREST -5.1 -7.5 -7.3 -8.3 -12.3 -13.6 -9.4 -1.2 -9.3 -9.8
(ON PUBLIC DEBT) - -4.6 -5.0 -6.2 -7.5 -6.7 -6.9 -5.9 -6.4 -12.7OTHER INVESTMENT INCOME - - - - - - - - -4.4 42.7WORKERS REMITTANCES - - - - - 3.8 2.2 3.0 4.1 8.2
NET TRANSFERS 9.3 10.7 13.4 17.5 25.2 30.1 41.6 54.0 72.6 198.6
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE -62.0 -50.7 -19.0 -7.9 -49.1 -9.5 11.1 -99.4 -62.4 -3.8
CAPITAL ACCOUNT
PRIVATE SECTOR /A 37.4 33.9 39.0 37.4 54.6 60.3 53.1 89.1 127.3 194.1
DIRECT INVESTMENT 18.2 22.8 25.5 24.9 27.6 15.1 35.2 45.7 83.1 94.2LONG TERM LOANS, ETC. 14.3 10.5 4.Q 13.6 9.9 16.4 18.6 18.0 36.4 35.9SHORT TERM LOANS 4.9 -4.5 -17.2 -15.8 10.7 20.7 -3.1 20.8 11.4 66.9NET RORROWING BY PRIVATE
FINANCIAL INSTS. - 5.1 16.7 14.7 6.2 8.1 2.4 4.6 -3.6 -2.9
-110-
PAGE 2 OF 412/08/77
TABLE 3.1 (1)GUATEMALA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
D I S T R I 3 U T I O NITEM
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
PUBLIC SECTOR /C 35.3 14.9 1.7 7.7 B.S 2.0 13.0 -0.7 50.9 42.1
LONG TERM 30.4 12.2 - 15.4 3.6 1.4 9.8 -o.7 50.8 44.1
*.. BY SOURCE *.* 20.4 14.1 0.5 16.9 2.7 -2.4 7.B 2.4 51.2 46.1------ __ _ _---- --- --- ------ --------- --- ----_ _ --- ----- _-------- _--- --- -_ --- _----- ----- -----
DISBURSEMENTS 33.B 29.8 19.0 36.9 22.3 32.0 20.0 23.4 59.1 51.7AMORTIZATION 13.4 15.7 18.5 20.0 19.6 34.4 12.2 21.0 6.9 5.6
INTERNATIONAL ORGS. 3.0 4.4 7.1 6.4 7.2 6.5 9.0 12.1 9.0 16.4DISBURSEMENTS 5.4 6.9 9.9 9.1 8.5 6.5 11.0 14.2 11.4 19.2AMORTIZATION 2.4 2.5 2.9 2.7 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.8
GOvERNMENTS 3.4 4.3 0.9 0.6 0.3 5.4 5.3 7.1 44.6 30.0DISBURSEMENTS 4.9 5.7 2.7 2.4 2.1 7.2 9.0 9.2 46.7 31.1AMORTIZATION 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.7 2.1 2.1 1.1
OTHER SOURCES 14.0 5.4 -7.5 9.9 -4.8 -14.3 -6.5 -16.9 -2.4 -0.3DISBLIRSEMENTS 23.5 17.2 5.4 25.4 11.7 16.3 - - - 1.4AMOR1.ZATION 9.5 11.8 13.9 15.5 16.5 30.6 6.5 16.8 2.4 1.7
*.. OTHER PUBLIC.LT *** 10.0 -1.9 -0.5 -1.5 0.9 3.8 2.0 -3.1 -0.4 -2.0
TRANSACTIONS WITH INTERNA-TIONAL FINANCIAL ORGS. 10.0 -1.9 -1.4 -1.0 0.9 0.6 -2.6 -3.1 -0.3 -2.0IMF CREDITS 10.0 -1.9 -2.3 -11.1 - - - - - -SDR ALLOCATIONS - - - 4.2 3.9 3.8 - - _ -
OTHER - 0.9 5.9 -3.0 -3.2 -2.6 -3.1 -0.3 -2.0OTHER (NON-BORROWING) - - 0.9 -0.5 - 3.2 4.6 - -0.1 -
SHORT-TERM(PUBLIC + FIN.) 4.9 2.7 1.7 -7.7 4.9 0.6 3.2 - - -2.0
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS -5.3 -11.6 -12.0 -6.1 -2.5 -5.9 -11.5 -12.9 -10.0 -11.1
CHANGE IN RESERVES (--GAIN) -5.5 13.5 -9.7 -29.1 -11.5 -46.9 -65.7 23.9 -105.7 -221.3......... ... ==S=5==== ... ====. .. ,,.=. . . .... c==-
tNET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES) 51.1 37.6 47.3 76.4 67.9 134.8 200.5 176.6 282.3 503.6_-- ---------------------------------- _- ---- _ ---_ -----_---_----_ ---_------__-----_-__ ----_----_ ---- -- ___-_ ----- ---_ ---- _-----_ --- _----
/A INCLUDES PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BUT EXCLUDES LOANS WITH PUBLIC GUARANTEE/B THIS LINE DOES NOT INCLUDE NET BORROWING BY PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSIC INCLUDES LOANS TO PRIVATE SECTOR WITH GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE -3.12-TOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA
PAGE 3 OF 4DATE: 12/08/77
TABLE 3.1 (2)GUATEMALA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1976-1985
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
D I S T R I 6 U 7 IO NITEM
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
CURRENT ACCOJNT
EXPORTS (OODS 0 NFS) 651.6 1 312.0 1 366.0 1 507.0 1 654.0 1 964.7 2 106.8 2 395.5 2 706.6 3 076.7
MERCHANDISE (FOB) 794.3 1 148.0 1 178.2 1 291.0 1 404.5 1 576.3 1 773.6 2 000.4 2 261.5 2 562.4NON-FACTOR SERYICES 157.5 164.0 167.8 216.0 249.6 288.4 333.3 385.1 445.1 514.3
IMPORTS (GOOD5 4 NFS) 1 136.3 1 278.5 1 421.6 1 573.2 1 791.7 2 044.9 2 318.2 2 633.4 2 991.8 3 399.3
MERCHANDISE (CIF) 962.1 1 028.0 1 135.1 1 247.2 1 421.8 1 624.9 1 841.4 2 092.1 2 377.3 2 701.5
OIHER NON-FACTOR SERVICES 154.2 250.5 286.5 326.0 370.0 420.0 476.8 541.3 614.6 697.9
RESCOJRCE BALANCE -184.5 33.5 -55.6 -66.2 -137.7 -180.2 -211.3 -247.9 -285.3 -322.6
FACTOR SERVICE INCOME (NET) -17.9 -63.0 -71.0 -72.3 -73.4 -77.2 -82.2 -88.2 -96.2 -106.5
PROFITS 59.0 -70.0 6S5.0 -89.3 -93.7 -98.4 -103.3 -108.5 -113.9 -119.6INTEREST -9.6 -7.0 -1.0 1.0 3.2 2.9 1.5 -0.6 -4.7 -10.9(ON PUBLIC DEST) -12.7 -20.4 -26.1 -32.0 -38.1 -44.1 -48.0 -52.2 -57.5 -63.6
OTHER INVESTMENT INCOME 42.7 6.0 6.4 6.9 7.4 7.9 8.4 9.0 9.6 10.3WORKERS REMITTANCES 8.2 8.0 8.6 9.2 9.8 10.5 11.2 12.0 12.8 13.7
NET TRANSFERS 196.6 70.0 77.0 84.7 93.2 102.5 112.7 124.0 136.4 150.1
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE -3.8 40.4 -49.6 -53.8 -117.9 -154.9 -180.8 -212.1 -245.0 -279.0......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .... s
CAPITAL ACCOUNT
PRIVATE SECTOR /A 194.1 133.6 76.6 76.2 82.8 92.5 103.1 114.8 141.7 155.9
-112-
PAGE 4 OF 4DATE: 12/08/77
TABLE 3.1 (2)GUATEMALA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1976-1985
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
D I S T R I 6 U T I O NITEM
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
PUBLIC SECTOR /C 42.1 122.0 125.4 126.0 122.5 88.1 90.8 98.3 101.5 106.0
LONG TERM 44.1 122.0 125.4 126.0 122.5 88.1 90.8 98.3 101.5 106.0
*** BY SOURCE ** 46.1 122.0 125.4 126.0 122.5 68.1 90.8 98.3 101.5 106.0
DISBURSEMENTS 51.7 133.2 150.3 156.6 160.7 166.6 172.4 167.6 168.9 177.1AMORTIZATION 5.6 11.2 24.9 30.6 38.1 78.5 81.6 69.2 67.4 71.1
INTERNATIONAL ORGS. 16.4 59.4 82.2 85.0 90.4 94.0 97.0 91.7 89.9 92.0DISBURSEMENTS 19.2 65.0 88.7 92.7 98.4 103.9 109.3 106.9 107.2 112.2AMORTIZATION 2.8 5.6 6.5 7.7 8.0 9.9 12.3 15.2 17.3 20.2
GOVERNMENTS 30.0 31.7 32.8 31.7 25.0 -10.9 -10.0 5.0 3.8 3.4DISBURSEMENTS 31.1 32.6 37.0 38.6 36.8 35.5 33.7 29.0 27.4 27.9AMORTIZATION 1.1 0.9 4.2 6.9 11.8 46.4 43.7 24.0 23.6 24.5
OTHER SOURCES -0.3 30.9 10.4 9.3 7.1 5.0 3.8 1.6 7.7 10.6DISBURSEMENTS 1.4 35.6 24.6 25.3 25.5 27.2 29.4 31.7 34.3 37.0AMORTIZATION 1.7 4.7 14.2 16.0 18.4 22.2 25.6 30.1 26.6 26.4
*** OTHER PUBLIC LT *** -2.0 - - - - - - - - -
SHORT-TERM(PUBLIC + FIN.) -2.0 - - - - - - - - -
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS -11.1 - - - - - - - - -
CHANGE IN RESERVES (-=GAIN) -221.3 -295.6 -154.3 -150.4 -87.4 -25.7 -13.2 -1.0 1.9 17.1-== = = ==== =====s== ===== ====-Ss s= -=- --- -- .. .... ==.. ...... ...1 m ..... Z==
(NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES) 503.6 799.2 953.5 1 103.9 1 191.4 1 217.1 I 230.3 1 231.3 1 229.4 1 212.4
/A INCLUDES PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS BUT EXCLUDES LOANS WITHPUBLIC GUARANTEE/8 THIS LINE ODES NOT INCLUOE NET BORROWING BY PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSJC INCLUDES LOANS TO PRIVATE SECTOR WITH GOVERNMENT GUARANTEESOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA AND IBRD PROJECTIONS
-113-
PA"E I OF UP4C 1 0 r 3
TABLE 3.2 (1)GUATEMALA: EXPORTS BY PRODUCT, 1910-t976
(MLS OF DOLLARS, TNS METRIC TONS. CENTS PER KG)
D I S T R I 8 U T I O NPRODUCT -------------- ____________________________--______----
1960 1965 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 , 1975 1976
AGRICULTURAL PROD. - VALWE 105.0 142.4 150.3 163.5 154.5 190.2 241.6 309.7 294.7 309.2
COFFEEVALUE 74.6 91.7 91.4 100.6 96.3 105.3 145.6 172.9 164.2 242.5VOLUME 79.9 95.3 99.6 95.1 100.0 113.7 114.0 121.1 133.8 117.8
PRICE 93.0 96.0 81.7 105.7 96.2 92.6 126.8 142.6 122.7 205.9COTTON
VALUE 5.8 34.4 40.3 27.2 26.0 40.9 47.9 71.0 74.0 83.7VOLUME 12.1 70.6 84.1 57.7 55.6 85.1 98.2 126.2 96.4 93.1
PRICE 48.0 49.0 48.0 47.1 46.8 48.1 48.7 56.3 76.7 89.9BANANAS
VALUE 17.3 4.9 11.8 13.6 14.5 25.6 24.7 31.5 34.5 41.3VOLUME * 189.0 34.1 144.6 200.4 235.8 270.8 263.2 298.9 236.6 265.9
PRICE 9.0 13.0 8.1 6.8 6.1 9.5 9.4 10.5 14.6 15.5OTHER AGRICULTURAL PROD.
VALUE 7.3 11.4 16.8 22.1 17.7 18.4 23.4 34.3 22.0 21.7
MINERAL PRODUCTS - VALUE 1.5 0.4 4.4 4.4 3.4 3.8 6.6 8.4 8.2 6.2
INDUSTRIAL GOODS - VALUE 9.4 49.3 107.8 129.2 129.0 141.8 193.4 264.1 338.0 336.9
PROCESSED AG. PROD. - VALUE 0.3 8.8 18.7 21.9 27.3 34.1 47.0 71.1 132.5 131.8SUGARVALUE 0.1 4.2 6.7 9.2 9.9 16.1 21.9 49.6 115.6 111.0VOLUME 0.7 31.6 46.0 57.3 66.7 91.2 126.2 134.2 200.7 302.7
UNIT VALUE 10.0 13.0 14.5 16.0 14.8 17.4 17.4 36.9 57.6 36.7BEEFVALUE 0.2 4.6 12.0 12.7 17.4 18.0 25.1 21.5 16.9 20.8VALUE 0.5 5.8 12.3 12.1 16.2 15.4 17.3 13.7 12.2 14.5
UNIT VALUE 38.0 79.0 97.7 104.9 107.0 117.5 145.6 157.1 130.5 143.4
MANUFACTURED GOODS /AVALUE 9.1 40.5 89.1 107.3 101.7 107.7 146.4 193.0 205.5 265.1
TOTAL VALUE 115.9 192.1 262.5 297.1 286.9 335.8 441.6 582.2 640.9 794.3
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA/A INCLUDES MISCELLANEOUS PROCESSED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
-114-
PAGE 2 OF 2DATE: 12/15/77
TABLE 3.2(2tGUATEMALA: EXPORTS BY PRODUCT, 1976-1985
(MLS OF DOLLARS, THS METRIC TONS, CENTS PER KG)
----------------------- - ---------------------- ___----------------------------------------- - ---------------------------------- - --_____
D I S T R I B U T I O NPRODUCT -___--___________ _--
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1991 1982 1983 1984 1985
AGRICULTURAL PROD. - VALUE 389.2 701.1 590.1 597.5 585.3 023.8 665.6 711.2 760.9 815.1
COFFEEVALUE 242.5 542.8 431.3 419.4 390.8 406.4 422.7 439.6 457.2 475.5VOLUME 117.8 124.1 129.1 134.2 139.6 145.2 151.0 157.0 163.3 169.8
PRICE 205.8 437.7 334.4 312.6 280.1 260.1 280.1 280.1 280.1 280.1CDTTON
VALUE 83.7 93.8 89.5 99.6 106.3 117.2 129.1 142.3 156.8. 172.9VOLUME 93.1 69.9 92.6 95.4 98.2 101.2 104.2 107.3 110.5 113.9
PRICE 89.9 104.4 96.8 104.4 108.3 115.9 124.0 132.7 141.9 151.9BANANAS
VALUE 41.3 40.6 42.2 47.9 53.6 61.1 69.7 79.5 90.7 103.4VOLUME 265.9 282.7 296.8 311.7 327.2 343.6 360.8 376.8 397.8 417.6
PRICE 15.5 14.4 14.3 15.4 16.4 17.8 19.4 21.0 22.8 24.8OTHER AGRICULTURAL PROD.
VALUE 21.7 23.8 27.0 30.6 34.6 39.1 44.1 49.8 56.2 63.4
MINERAL PRODUCTS - VALUE 8.2 12.6 80.5 86.5 96.3 107.2 119.2 132.7 147.7 164.3
INDUSTRIAL GOODS - VALUE 326.9 434.3 507.6 606.9 722.8 845.3 988.7 1.156.5 1,353.0 1.583,0
PROCESSED AG. PROD. - VALUE 131.6 126.0 144.5 177.6 217.5 250.5 288.6 332.5 383.1 441.5SUGAR
VALUE 111.0 100.7 113.1 138.5 169.4 196.2 227.2 263.1 304.7 352.9VOLUME 302.7 322.4 338.5 355.4 373.2 391.8 411.4 432.0 453.6 476.3
UNIT VALUE 36.7 31.2 33.4 39.0 45.4 50.1 55.2 80.9 67.2 74.1BEEF
VALUE 20.8 25.3 31.5 39.1 48.1 54.4 61.4 69.4 76.4 66.8VALUE 14.5 15.2 16.0 16.8 17.6 18.5 19.4 20.4 21.4 22.5
UNIT VALUE 143.4 166.7 197.2 233.4 273.6 294.4 316.8 340.9 386.8 394.7
MANUFACTURED GOODS /AVALUE 265.1 308.2 363.1 429.3 505.3 594.8 700.1 624.0 969.6 1.141.5
…________ - -- -_ -- _ - ___ _____ --------- --------
TOTAL VALUE 794.3 1,148.0 1,176.2 1.291.0 1.404.5 1.576.3 1,773.6 2.000.4 2,261.5 2,502.4*8-0-0......... ........... ws....... ....--- - -- .......... ...... a ... .........
SOURCE: WORLD BANK ESTIMATES (RMSM)/A INCLUDES MISCELLANEOUS PROCESSED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
-115-
PAGE I OP if11/07/77
TABLE 3.3 (1)GUATEMALA: IMPORTS BY END USE. 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
---------------- ___---_-----------_-------_____-----------------___-___------__-_-_-----------------------__------_--___--------____
D I S T R 1 8 U T I O NCATEGORY ------------------ __________________________________________--____--
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
CONSUMER GOODS 74.0 77.9 78.7 87.7 89.4 91.1 116.8 162.6 164.9 196.7
NON-DURABLES 51.1 52.5 54.2 60.2 60.3 61.6 79.5 106.5 111.1 121.3(FOOD) - - - 24.7 22.9 23.3 24.0 35.0 .. 43.2
DURABLES 22.9 25.4 24.5 27.5 29.1 29.5 37.3 56.1 53.8 75.4
INTERMEDIATE GOODS 126.1 123.2 126.2 146.1 153.1 166.5 221.4 408.9 398.7 529.5
GENERAL MATERIALS 93.6 96.7 93.9 108.3 113.8 121.9 162.9 269.0 253.4 267.5METAL 15.6 14.6 16.9 12.4 11.5 13.0 16.5 29.7 22.5 29.2NON-METAL 78.0 82.1 77.0 95.9 102.3 108.9 146.4 239.3 230.9 238.3
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 12.2 15.8 17.8 18.5 16.2 15.6 24.9 46.3 37.5 68.8PETROLEUM & LUBRICAKTS 14.2 8.3 11.9 14.9 18.1 25.2 33.0 92.0 103.3 110.0
(CRUDE OIL) .. .. .. 10.9 13.2 20.7 27.2 64.4 73.1 66.7OTHER /A 6.1 2.4 2.6 4.4 5.0 3.8 0.6 1.6 4.5 83.2
CAPITAL GOODS 49.6 57.9 57.3 61.4 74.3 70.7 92.8 132.6 171.7 255.9
AGRICULTURE 5.5 6.8 5.S 5.7 6.6 7.4 9.7 15.2 19.4 23.3INDUSTRY & MINING 32.5 37.2 38.3 42.9 42.8 48.2 58.2 83.5 99.8 167.8TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 11.6 13.9 13.5 12.8 24.9 15.1 24.9 33.9 52 5 64.8
TOTAL 249.7 259.0 262.2 295.2 316.8 328.3 431.0 704.1 735.3 982.1
MEMO ITEMS:CONSUMER GOODS EXC.. FoOD 74.0 77.9 78.7 63.0 66.5 67.8 92. 127.6 .. 1535INT. GOODS EXCL. PETROLEUM 111.9 114.9 114.3 131.2 135.0 141.3 188.4 316.9 295.4 344.0
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------__-----------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, ESTUDIO ECONOMICO Y MEMORIA DE LABORES AND WORLD BANK ESTIMATES/A INCLUDES UNCLASSIFIED GOODS AND B/P ADJUSTMENT
-110-
PAGE 2 OF 212/08/77
TABLE 3.3(2)GUATEMALA: IMPORTS BY END USE, 1976-1985
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
D I S T R I B U T I O NCATEGORY ----- _-----------___-_____-__________________________________________________-_____-___
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
CONSUMER GOODS 19S.7 230.5 250.8 273.7 309.7 350.8 396.1 448.8 508.4 575.9
INTERMEDIATE GOODS 454.0 536.5 603.4 667.6 759.2 863.6 982.6 1,118.0 1,272,4 1,448.3
PETROLEUM & LUBRICANTS 1.10.0 137,7 143.S 141.4 156.8 173.9 192.9 214.0 237.4 263.3OTHER 344.0 39B.8 459.6 525.2 602.4 659.7 789.6 904.0 1,035.0 1,185.0
CAPITAL GOODS 256.0 261.0 280.9 305.9 352.8 410.5 462.7 525.3 596.4 677.3
PUBLIC INVESTMENT 58.9 63.5 85.7 98.7 110.5 129.0 132.1 140.1 148.7 157.8OTHER 197.1 197.5 195.2 207.2 242.3 281.5 330.6 385.2 447.7 519.4
TOTAL IMPORTS OF GOODS (CIF) 906.6 1,028.0 1,135.1 1,247.2 1,421.8 1,624.9 1,841.4 2,092.1 2,377.3 2,701.5-- . ...... ~ssss=z== .... ==== z-zs==== ... ===== ...... =.== .. *=,==-= . _.. - .-= . ........ ...=== -=s=...
SOURCE: WORLD BANK ESTIMATES
-117-
DATE: 7/18/77TABLE 3.4
GUATEMALA: TRADE WITH OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COJNTRIES1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
D I S T R I B U T I O NI TEMt ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
EXPORTS (FOB) TO 57.8 70.8 83.6 102.3 92.1 98.9 130.u 163.2 169.1 189.1
EL SALVADOR 28.7 32.5 35.5 38.8 40.8 45.3 55.6 65.2 74.9 84.4HONDURAS 9.4 12.7 17.7 28.9 6.9 9.4 16.7 21.3 22.7 25.2NICARAGUA 10.6 11.3 12.7 14.5 16.7 17.6 26.8 40.1 33.9 37.9
COSTA RICA 9.0 14.3 17.9 20.1 25.7 26.7 30.6 36.6 37.5 41.6
IMPORTS (CIF) FROMt 42.2 43.1 51.4 65.0 66.4 68.8 89.6 122.1 103.1 106.4
EL SALVADOR 29.3 27.9 33.2 39.5 42.5 45.8 57.1 72.6 59.8 58.7HONDURAS 5.4 5.7 6.0 7.1 1.8 1.3 3.2 7.6 12.5 14.5NICARAGUA 2.1 2.8 4.6 7.2 B.6 8.7 12.4 19.5 14.4 14.8COSTA RICA 5.3 6.8 7.5 11.2 13.6 13.1 16.9 22.4 16.5 18.4
TRADE BALANCES'- OVERALL 15.7 27.6 32.4 37.4 25.7 30.1 40.4 41.2 65.9 82.7
EL SALVADOR -0.6 4.5 2.2 -0.7 -1.7 -0.5 -1.2 -7.4 15.2 25.7HONDURAS 4.0 7.1 11.7 21.8 7.1 8.1 13.5 13.7 10.2 10.7NICARAGUA 8.5 8.5 8.1 7.3 6.2 9.0 14.4 20.6 19.5 23.1COSTA RICA 3-. 7.6 10.3 8.9 12.2 13.6 13.7 14.3 21.0 23.2
TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 197.9 227.3 255.4 290.2 283.2 327.5 436.2 572.1 623.5 794.3
CACM 57.8 70.8 83.8 102.3 92.1 98.9 130.0 163.2 169.1 189.1REST OF WORLD 140.1 156.5 171.7 187.8 191.1 228.6 306.1 408.9 454.4 605.2
IMPORTS 247.3 249.4 250.2 284.3 303.3 324.0 431.0 700.5 732.7 982.1
CACM 42.2 43.1 51.4 65.0 66.4 68.8 89.6 122.1 103.1 106.4REST OF WORLD 205.1 206.3 198.8 219.3 236.8 255.2 341.4 578.4 629.5 875.7
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA
-jiB-
DATE: 7/1S/77TABLE 3.5
GUATEMALA: CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE (CONSTANT 1958 PRICES), 1967-1976(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
D 1 S T R I B U T I O NITEM ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
EXPORTS (FOB) TO: 59.3 73,3 83.3 96.4 87.8 95.6 109.8 119.1 109.7 116.5
EL SALVADOR 29.4 33.6 35.3 36.6 38.9 43.7 47.2 47.6 48.6 -HONDURAS 9.7 13.2 17.6 27.2 8.5 9.1 14.1 15.5 14.7 -NICARAGUA 10.9 11.7 12.6 13.7 16.0 17.0 22.6 29.3 22.0 -COSTA RICA 9.3 14.9 17.8 19.0 24.5 25.8 25.9 26.7 24.3 -
IMPORTS (CIF) FROM: 43.2 44.7 51.1 61.2 63.3 66.5 75.7 89.1 66.9 81.5
EL SALVADOR .30.1 28.9 33.0 37.2 40.5 44.2 48.2 53.0 38.8 -HONDURAS 5.5 5.9 6.0 6.6 1.7 1.2 2.7 5.5 8.1 _NICARAGUA 2.2 2.9 4.6 6.8 8.2 8.4 10.5 14.3 9.4 -COSTA RICA 5.4 7.0 7.5 10.6 12.9 12.6 14.3 16.3 10.7 -
SOURCE: DERIVED FROM DATA IN TABLE 3.4 USING GLOBAL GDP DEFLATOR FROM TABLE 7.1. (THIS RATHER THAN THE IMPORT AND EXPORT PRICEINDICES WAS USED BECAUSE THE LATTER WERE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY OIL PRICES ON THE IMPORT SIDE AND BY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS SUCH ASCOFFEE AND SUGAR ON THE EXPORT SIDE, GOODS WHICH ARE UNIMPORTANT IN CENTRAL AMERICAN INTERNAL TRADE.)
-119-
11/04/77TABLE 3.6,
GUATEMALA: CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE BY PRODUCT, 1968-1976(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
D I S T R I B U T I O NITEM _________--
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-------------------------------------------
FOOD PRODUCTSEXPORTS 15.0 18.3 21.5 17.7 17.2 19.5 23.4 24.8 30.0IMPORTS 8.0 7.9 9.2 8.8 7.7 7.7 11.2 13.8 12.3
TOBACCO AND BEVERAGESEXPORTS 1.7 2.1 3.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.8IMPORTS 0.1 0.1 0.2 - - 0:1 0.4 0.7 0.8
NON-FOOD RAW MATERIALSEXDORTS 2.7 2.8 2.1 1.4 2.0 5.6 4.1 4.4 3.9IMPORTS 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.9 O.B 1.5 2.0 2.2
LUBRICANTS AND FUELSEXPORTS - - - 0.1 - - 0.1 0.2 0.3IMPORTS 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.2 - - - -
FATS AND OILSEXPORTS 1.7 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.1 - -IMPORTS 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.2
CHEMICAL PRODUCTSEXPORTS 9.8 11.5 15.3 18.0 20.2 26.6 34.0 39.0 46.2IMPORTS 10.6 13.4 15.7 15.4 16.8 21.4 26.5 24.6 24.5
PROCESSED RAW MATERIALSEXPORTS 26.3 31.4 38.6 34.4 37.7 52.9 64.7 65.9 73.3IMPORTS 17.1 19.9 22.6 23.3 24.7 31.7 39.9 31.7 34.3
MACHINERY AND TRANSPORT EQUIP.EXPORTS 2.8 3.9 5.0 5.1 6.0 6.8 8.6 11.1 11.2IMPORTS 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.4 2.8 3.9 4.7 4.4 5.3
OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODSEXPORTS 10.9 13.0 16.3 13.2 13.7 17.8 23.7 22.4 24.1IMPORTS 8.7 9.5 11.6 13.0 13.8 17.4 21.2 21.4 24.2
OTHEREXPORTS - - - - - 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3IMPORTS - - - - - - - -
TOTALEXPORTS 70.9 83.8 102.3 92.1 98.9 132.5 161.1 170.2 192.1
IMPORTS 49 .4 55.8 65.0 66.4 68.8 84.1 106.1 98.9 103.8
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALANOTE: IMPORTS ARE CIF; EXPORTS ARE FOB.
-119-a
DATE: 11/04/77TABLE 3.7
GUATEMALA: EXPORT VALUE BY COUNTRY, 1967-1976(PERCENTAGES)
----------------------------------------------------- __----------------------__----------------------------------------------_______
O I S T R I 6 U T I O NCOUNTRY
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
NORTH AMERICA 30.3 27.5 28.5 28.3 31.0 29.1 33.9 33.5 25.1 36.3
UNITED STATES 30.0 27.0 27.4 27.5 30.2 28.3 33.0 32.2 22.2 35.1CANADA 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.4 0.7MEXICO 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6
CENTRAL AMERICA 28.4 30.3 31.9 34.4 32.1 29.5 29.4 28.0 26.4 24.9
EL SALVADOR 14.1 13.9 13.S 13.1 14.2 13.5 12.6 11.2 11.7 11.1HONDURAS 4.6 5.4 6.7 9.7 3.1 2.8 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.3NICARAGUA 5.2 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.8 5.2 8.1 6.9 5.3 5.0COSTA RICA 4.4 6.1 6.8 6.8 9.0 7.9 6.9 6.3 5.9 5.5
SOUTH AMERICA 6 CARIBBEAN 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.1
EUROPE 26.5 22.7 24.0 24.9 25.8 26.1 24.1 25.6 35.3 23.7
GERMANY 11.6 9.3 9.8 11.1 10.6 10.1 9.2 10.9 9.7 10.7GREAT BRITAN 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 2.0 1.5 7.9 0.4FRANCE 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.6HOLLAND 2.7 2.5 2.4 3.5 3.4 4.1 2.9 3.4 3.3 3.4OTHER 11.0 9.7 10.2 9.3 10.4 10.2 8.7 9.2 13.6 8.6
AFRICA 0.8 2.2 1.5 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.5
ASIA 9.7 13.3 10.0 7.7 7.4 9.2 7.6 7.0 5.9 10.2
OTHER /A 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.3 i.3 2.6 1.3 1.9 2.9 0.3
TOTAL iCOD° 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0=,.====== -==== =..=,==== ====.-=== . ===='== ==°==='= ... .......
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, BOLETIN ESTADISTICO/A INCLUDES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT
-120-
11/04(77TABLE 3.8
GUATEMALA: IMPORT VALUE BY COUNTRY, 1967-1976(PERCENTAGES)
------------------------------------------------------------- ____-_________--___________________--_-------_-----_____-__------------
D I S T R I B U T I O NCOUNTRY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
NORTH AMERICA 44.4 42.9 37.4 38.4 34.5 37.1 36.4 36.0 38.4 41.4
UNITED STATES 40.1 39.2 32.6 34.2 30.7 31.6 31.1 31.5 34.0 36.2CANADA 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.9MEXICO 2.7 2.5 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.3 3.3
CENTRAL AMERICA 16.9 16.7 19.6 22.3 21.0 21.0 20.8 17.3 14.0 12.7
EL SALVADOR 11.7 10.8 12.7 13.5 13.4 13.9 13.2 10.3 8.1 7.0HONDURAS 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.7 1.7NICARAGUA 0.9 1.1 1.8 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.0 1.8COSTA RICA 2.1 2.6 2.9 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.2 2.2 2.2
SOUTH AMERICA & CARIBBEAN 3.5 2.2 2.4 2.2 5.1 6.9 9.0 14.7 17.2 13.4
VENEZUELA 2.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 3.0 4.9 6.2 11.7 10.5 7.7OTHER 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.1 6.7 5.7
EUROPE 24.2 25.0 25.5 23.7 24.3 24.5 23.1 21.7 20.3 20.0
GERMANY 10.0 . 10.0 9.9 9.3 9.9 9.1 9.5 8.1 7.5 7.0GREAT BRITAN 3.8 4.6 3.8 3.6 4.4 4.1 3.5 2.7 3.2 3.1FRANCE 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.3HOLLAND 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.0OTHER 7.6 7.5 9.1 7.6 6.9 8.1 7.3 7.6 6.5 7.5
AFRICA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0.1 -
ASIA 9.9 9.6 10.4 10.8 10.8 9.2 10.6 9.7 9.6 12.5
OTHER /A 1.0 3.7 4.6 2.6 4.3 1.3 - 0.5 0.4 -
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0ss=s ..... 2... ..... ==,=.... =.= ........ .. ===ss ... = -.. =.=== ..... z.. - ..... =.=====,=........
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, BOLETIN ESTADISTICO/A INCLUDES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT
-121-
1 1 / 09 /77TABLE 3.9
GUATEMALA: TOURIST ARRIVALS BY ORIGIN; TOURISM EARNINS3, 1967-1976(THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE AND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
D I S T R I S U T I O NCOUNTRY
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
NUMBER OF TOURISTS(THOUSANDS)
NORTH AMERICA 60.8 64.0 67.6 63.8 90.5 103.1 130.9 144.2 157.5 129.3
CANADA 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.5 3.4 3.8 5.0 6.2 7.9 7.1UNITED STATES 47.8 48.7 50.6 48.0 66.6 77.1 99.9 113.6 119.8 97.9MEXICO 11.3 13.1 14.6 13.3 20.5 22.2 26.0 24.4 29.8 23.3
CENTRAL AMERICA 88.4 84.2 81.0 81.3 104.4 193.9 214.2 208.0 222.1 211.6
SOUTH AMERICA 6.2 7.0 8.4 8.4 11.4 13.5 15.7 16.0 23.3 17.3
CARIBBEAN 0.8 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.4 2.4 1.9
EUROPE 13.2 15.5 16.9 16.6 27.1 31.9 35.0 37.1 42.7 37.9
GERMANY 3.4 4.0 4.4 3.8 6.3 8.0 8.6 9.0 10.2 9.2SPAIN 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 4.8 4.4 4.9 4.5 5.0 4.3FRANCE 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.6 4.3 5.6 6.3 6.6 8.6 7.3ITALY 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.7 2.4 3.0 3.2 3.8 3.8 3.6SWITZERLAND 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.9 3.2 2.5OTHER 3.5 4.5 4.6 4.9 7.7 8.5 9.6 10.3 11.9 11.0
ASIA 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.7 3.1 3.0 4.2 4.5 4.9 4.6
OTHER 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.0 0.8 1.1 1.9 0.9 1.5 1.3
TOTAL 171.6 174.6 178.2 173.7 238.8 348.1 403.6 412.1 454.4 402.9
TOURISM EARNINGS - NET -4.4 -3.4 0.3 -2.6 -7.9 -7.4 -1.4 4.9 23.2 -16.1
CREDIT (S MLS) 5.5 6.5 9.2 12.1 13.6 16.9 37.0 56.7 78.0 65.6DEBIT (S MLS) 9.9 9.9 8.9 14.7 21.5 24.3 38.4 51.8 54.8 81.7
------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF MIGRATION AND GUATEMALAN TOURISM INSTITUTE (INGUAT)
-122-
Table 4.1: GUATEMAIA: ETrMNAL IEBT FLDWS BY SOURCE (IEBT REPORTING), 1966-1976
(in millions of US dollars)
Private Sources 1966 1267 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Suppliers CreditsDisbursements -- 3.1 0.3 -- -- 8.3 -- -- -- -- --Amortization 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 o.6 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1Interest 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 o.6 0.5 o.5 o.4
Private BanksDisbursements 3.6 1.9 9.9 6.4 25.4 3.4 16.3 -- -- -- 1.4Amortizaticn 4.8 3.6 3.4 4.4 6.1 9.5 22.7 5.4 15.7 1.3 o.6Interest o.6 0.5 0.7 1.4 2.2 2.9 2.4 2.1 o.6 0.2 0.2
Private BodsDisbursements 6.2 18.5 7.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --Amortization 2.1 4-7 7.1 8.4 8.4 6.4 6.8 _ __Interest 0.9 1.3 2.0 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.3 -- _
Other Private Source DebtDisbursements _- -- -- -- -- -- -Amortization o.4 o.4 o.4 - _ -_ - - -- --Interest -- -- -- __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
TOTAL - Private SourcesDisbursements 9.8 23.5 17.2 6.4 25.4 11.7 16.3 -- - --. 4Amortization 7.8 9.5 11.8 13.9 15.5 16.5 30.6 6.5 16.8 2.4 1.7Interest 1.7 2.0 3.0 3.5 3.7 4.o 3.4 2.7 1.1 0.7 o.6
Official Sources
International OrganizationsDisbursementa 2.3 5.4 6.9 9.9 9.1 8.5 8.5 11.0 14.2 l1.4 19.2Amortization 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.7 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.8Interest, 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.7 2.5 2.5 3.5 4.o 4.6 5.4
GoverrnentsDisbursements 1.5 4.9 5.7 2.7 2.4 2.1 7.2 9.0 9.2 46.7 31.1Aiortization 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.7 2.1 2.1 1.1Interest o.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.2 6.6
TOTAL - Official SourcesDisbursements 3.8 10.3 12.6 12.6 11.5 10.6 15.7 19.9 23.4 58.1 50.3Amortization 3.4 3.9 3.9 4.6 4.5 3.1 3.8 5.7 4.2 4.5 3.9Interest 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.5 2.6 3.5 3.3 4.2 4.8 5.8 12.0
TOTALDisbursaments 13.6 33.9 29.9 19.0 37.0 22.4 32.0 19.9 23.5 58.1 51.8Amortization 11.3 13.4 15.7 18.5 20.1 19.7 34.4 12.2 21.0 7.0 5.7Interest 3.0 3.h 4.6 5.0 6.2 7.5 6.7 6.9 5.9 6.4 12.7
Memo Items
Debt Service 14.3 16.8 20.3 23.5 26.3 27.2 41.0 19.1 27.0 13.4 18.4Net Disbursements 2.3 20.5 14.2 0.5 16.9 2.7 -2.4 7.7 2.5 51.1 46.1Net Transfers -0.7 17.1 9.6 -4.5 10.7 -4.8 -9.1 0.8 -3.4 44.7 33.4Bebt Service as % of Exports 5.4 7.2 7.6 7.8 7.5 8.0 10.5 3.6 3.8 1.7 1.9Net Transfers as % of Imports -o.3 6.o 3.2 1.5 3.2 -1.3 -2.3 0.2 -o.4 5.2 2.9
Source: IBRD Debt Reporting System 11/23/77 11/29/77
-123-
Table 4.2: OUATEMAL.: ErTIENAL PUBLIC EEBT OUTSTANDING BY SOIECE, 1972-1977
(Repayable in Foreign Currency - As of Beginning of Period)
Millions of Dollars Percent of Total1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Private Sources
Suppliers CreditsTotal 10.3 9.2 8.1 7.0 5.8 4.7 5.5 5.0 4.1 3.5 2.1 0.9Disbursed only 10.3 9.2 8.1 7.0 5.8 4.7 9.4 8.6 7.2 6.1 3.5 2.2
Private BanksTotal 38.0 28.7 24.5 9.1 8.3 22.7 20.4 15.7 12.5 4.6 3.0 4.1Disbursed only 29.6 23.2 17.9 2.2 0.9 1.7 27.1 21.8 16.0 1.9 0.5 0.8
Private BondsTotal 7.4 0.7 O.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 4.0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1Disbursed only 7.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 6.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2
All Private SoorcesTotal 55.7 38.6 33.2 16.6 14.5 27.8 30.0 21.1 17.0 8.4 5.2 5.0Disbursed only L7.3 33.1 26.6 9.7 7.1 6.8 L3.4 31.1 23.7 23.2 4.3 3.2
Official Sources
International OrganizationsTotal 61.1 76.9 96.3 113.3 162.3 334.4 32.9 42.1 49.2 57.1 57.8 60.7Disbursed only 40.1 46.6 53.4 65.6 74.5 90.8 36.8 43.7 47.6 57.2 45.0 42.9
GoverncentsTotal 69.1 67.2 66.2 68.6 103.9 188.9 37.2 36.8 33.8 34.6 37.0 34.3Disbursed only 21.6 26.9 32.2 39.4 84.0 114.1 19.8 63.0 28.7 34.4 50.7 53.9
All OfficialTotal 130.2 144.1 162.5 181.9 266.2 523.3 70.0 14.7 83.1 91.6 94.9 95.0Disburaed only 61.7 73.5 85.6 105.0 158.5 204.9 56.6 68.9 76.3 91.6 95.7 96.8
All Sour cesTotal 185.9 182.7 195.6 198.5 280.6 551.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Disbursed only 109.0 106.6 112.2 114.6 165.6 211.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Memo Items: TotalDebt (including undisbursed) as % of GDP 8.8 7.1 6.2 5.4 6.4 10.5
Source: IHED Debt Reporting System, 11/23/77 11/30/77
<'I,.
Table 4.3: GUATEMALA: AVERAGE TERMS ON EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT WTSTANDING (DISBURSED ONLY)-! 1967-1976
(Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency as of End of Year)
Source 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Suppliers CreditsAmount (million US$) 5.3 4.6 3.5 2.6 10.3 9.2 8.1 7.0 5.9 4.7Average Interest Rate (%) 5.1 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2Average Maturity Period (years) 6.7 8.9 9.3 9.8 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6Average Grace Period (years) 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0Grant Element (%) 10.9 11.3 10.9 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.3 lo.4 10.4 10.5
Private Bank CreditsAmount (million US$) 7.8 14.4 16.4 35.7 29.6 23.2 17.9 2.2 0.9 1.7Average Interest Rate (%) 5.9 6.6 6.7 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.8 6.1 6.1 6.2Average Maturity Period (years) 13.3 11.2 11.9 9.0 9.7 12.1 11.4 17.9 18.2 20.0Average Grace Period (years) 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.8Grant Element (%) 17.6 13.9 14.3 8.4 8.9 10.3 8.8 20.6 20.7 21.6
Privately Placed BondsAmount (million US$) 30.7 30.6 22.3 13.8 7.4 o.6 o.6 0.5 0.4 0.4Average Interest Rate (%) 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5Average Maturity Period (years) 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.1 14.0 14 .0 14.3 14.3 14.3Average Grace Period (years) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 4.4 4.4 4.8 4.9 4.9Grant Element (%) 9.9 9.5 9.7 10.0 10.9 31.0 31.0 31.8 32.0 32.0
Multilateral LoansAmount (Idillion US$) 15.0 19.4 26.5 32.9 40.1 46.6 53.4 65.5 74.5 90.8Average Interest Rate (%) 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.oAverage Maturity Period (years) 19.7 23.2 24.4 25.1 24.9 25.0 24.4 23.4 22.7 22.8Average Grace Period (years) 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.9 5.o 5.3Grant Element (%) 29.7 31.3 31.0 30.7 30.2 29.9 28.3 26.4 25.9 27.6
Bilateral LoansAmount (million US$) 15.5 19.8 20.7 21.3 21.6 26.9 32.2 39.4 814. 114.1Average Interest Rate (%) 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 4.7 5.3Average Maturity Period (years) 20.2 22.0 23.5 25.3 27.3 31.4 3$.6 37.8 27.5 24.0Average Grace Period (years) 4.0 4.6 5.1 5.8 6.5 8.0 9.4 10.2 8.9 8.4Grant Element (%) 32.6 35.o 37.7 41.2 44.8 51.4 57.9 61.2 42.6 36.9
Total (as of end of year) 2/Amount (million US$) 74.8- 88.9 89.4 106.3 109.0 106.6 112.2 114.6 165.6 211.7Average Interest Rate (%) 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.5 5.o 5.5 5.6Average Maturity Period (years) 12.5 14.1 16.6 16.8 18.6 22.5 24.5 27.4 24.7 23.2Average Grace Period (years) 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.o 3.4 4.3 5.3 6.4 6.8 6.9Grant Element (%) 19.5 20.8 23.4 22.1 24.1 29.4 32.4 37.3 33.8 32.2
1/ Includes private debt with government guarantee. Debt with an original or extended maturity of over one year unadjusted for currencyrealignments reported as of end of period.
2/ Includes US$0.4 million of debt from other private sources.
Source: IBRD - External Debt Reporting System (as of 11/23/77). 11/30/77
Table 4.4: GUATEMAIA: AVERAGE TERMS ON NEW EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT COMMITMENTS/, 1967-1976
(Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency)
Source 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Suppliers CreditsAmount (million UiS$) 2.8 -- -- 3.2 5.2 -- -- -- -- --Average Interest Rate (%) 7.5 -- -- 7.5 7.0 -- -- -- -- --Average Maturity Period (years) 10.3 -- -- 11.0 10.5 -- -_ __ __ __Average Grace Period (years) 0.8 __ __ 2.0 0.5 -- -- -- -- --Grant Element (%) 9.0 -- -- 10.3 10.8 -- -- -- -- --
Private BanksAmount (million US$) 1.9 12.1 13.2 19.7 4.7 18.3 2.8 0.3 0.5 15.0Average Interest Rate (%) 5.9 7.0 7.4 8.4 6.0 8.0 5.9 5.5 6.o 6.8Average Maturity Period (years) 15.2 7.9 7.8 9.3 14.6 10.8 16.6 15.5 19.1 8.5Average Grace Period (years) 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.6 2.0Grant Element (%) 18.9 10.3 8.9 6.8 18.3 7.8 20.2 21.4 21.8 11.6
Privately Placed BondsAmount (million US$) 18.5 7.0 -- .02 -- -- -- -- -- --Average Interest Rate (,) 6.7 6.7 -- 4.5 -- -- -- -- --Average Maturity Period (years) 5.0 5.0 -- .3 -- -- -- -- -- --Average Grace Period (years) 1.0 1.0 __ 1.3 -- -- __ __ __ __Grant Element (%) 8.1 8.0 -- 26.9 -- -- -- -- -- --
International OrganizationsAmount (million US) 20.9 17.9 3.2 1.8 8.8 18.3 23.6 19.1 51.9 175.2Average Interest Rate (%) 5.8 6.1 7.0 5.3 6.5 7.0 4.o 4.8 6.8 5.6Average Maturity Period (years) 24.6 24.6 12.7 25.0 19.7 19.9 29.2 22.1 21.9 28.2Average Grace Period (years) 4.4 6.2 3.4 4.5 4.4 4.9 7.2 6.6 5.8 7.7Grant Element (%) 28.6 27.4 14.4 32.9 22.0 18.7 47.6 36.6 22.9 34.8
GovermentsAmount (million US$) 6.4 8.6 0.6 25.1 11.5 -- 4.6 4.5 37.4 86.0Average Interest Rate (4) 4.6 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.6 -- 2.6 2.6 2.3 6.5Average Maturity Period (years) 21.0 42.7 40.8 40.5 41.3 -- 40.9 40.0 12.9 23.3Average Grace Period (years) 5.8 12.7 10.8 11.0 11.2 -- 10.9 10.0 6.7 7.2Grant Element (%) 36.0 68.8 68.o 64.6 65.3 __ 65.o 64.4 16.8 25.5
TotalAmount (million US$) 50.5 45.7 17.0 49.8 30.3 36.6 31.0 23.9 89.7 276.2Average Interest Rate (,) 6.1 5.6 7.1 5.3 5.0 7.5 4.o 4.4 7.0 6.1Average Maturity Period (years) 15.8 21.8 10.0 25.7 25.5 15.4 29.8 25.6 18.2 24.6Average Grace Period (years) 3.0 5.6 1.7 6.3 5.8 3.0 7.2 7.2 6.1 7.1Grant Element (%) 20.6 29.3 12.1 37.1 35.9 13.2 47.7 41.6 20.3 29.0
1/ Includes private debt with government guarantee. Debt with an original or extended maturity of over one year unadjusted for currencyrealignments reported as of end of period.
Source: IBRD - Debt Reporting System (as of 11/23/77). 11/30/77
Table 4.5: GUATEMALA: DISTRIBUTION OF EXTERNALINDEBTEDNESS AMONG BORROWERS, 1972-1976
Borrower 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976e
Central Government 59.8 65.9 65.o 57.4 48.9
Rest of Central Government 0.5 1.1 3.5 3.2 3.9
State Enterprises 23.2 21.8 22.0 20.4 .23.7Aviateca 3.2 2.5 2.1 1.4 0.9Fegua 1.8 1.4 1.2 o.8 o.5Guatel 1.4 3.1 4.9 6.3 8.7Inde 14.2 12.6 12.0 9.2 10.1Ports 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.0 0.7Other 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.9 2.9
Public Financial Intermediaries 16.5 11.2 9.5 18.9 23.5Bank of Guatemala 10.7 15.9 .6 1 20.1BANVI 5.8 5.3 4.9 3.5 3.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Bank of Guatemala, IBRD Debt Reporting System and IMF StaffEstimate.
4/25/77
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11/23/77
TABLE 4.6: GUATEMALA:
EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1976
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1, 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
D E B T O U T S T A N D I N G : I N A R R E A R STYPE OF CREDITOR ------------------------- -- -
CREDITOR COUNTRY DISBURSED :UNDISBURSED: TOTAL PRINCIPAL INTEREST
SUPPLIERS CREDITSSPAIN 1,495 - 1,495 - _UNITED KINGDOM 2,786 - 2,786 - _UNITED STATES 380 - 380 - -
TOTAL SUPPLIERS CREDITS 4,661 - 4,661 - -
PRIVATE BANK CREDITSUNITED STATES 1,719 5,960 7,679 _MULTIPLE LENDERS - 15,000 15,000 - -
TOTAL PRIVATE BANK CREDITS 1,719 20,960 22,679 - -
PRIVATELY PLACED BONDSCANADA 21 - 21 -
UNITED STATES 375 - 375 -TOTAL PRIVATELY PLACED BONDS 396 - 396 - _
MULTILATERAL LOANSBCIE 37,680 33,170 70,850 - _IBRD 42,379 69,026 111,405 - -
IDB 10.770 161,33B 152,108 - -TOTAL MULTILATERAL LOANS 90,829 243,534 334,363 - -
BILATERAL LOANSCANADA 495 3,468 3,963 - -GERMANY, FED.REP. OF - 2,540 2,540 - _UNITED STATES 59,666 33,7B6 93,452 - _VENEZUELA 53,901 35,000 88,901 - _
TOTAL BILATERAL LOANS 114,062 74.794 188,856 - -
TOTAL EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 211,667 339,288 550,955 - -
NOTES: (1) ONLY DEBTS WITH AN ORIGINAL OR EXTENDED MATURITY OF OVER ONE YEAR ARE INCLUDED IN THIS TABLE.(2, DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDES PRINCIPAL IN ARREARS BUT EXCLUDES INTEREST IN ARREARS.
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11/23/77
TABLE 4.7: GUATEMALA:
EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1976
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1, 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN LOCAL CURRENCY
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
D E B T O U T S T A N D I N G : I N A R R E A R S
CREDITOR COUNTRY DISBURSED :UNDISBURSED: TOTAL : PRINCIPAL: INTEREST
BCIE 16,020 9,131 25,151 -IDS 65,296 36,843 102,139 -UNITED STATES 270 - 270 _
TOTAL EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 81,586 45,974 127,560 -
NOTES: (1) ONLY DEBTS WITH AN ORIGINAL OR EXTENDED MATURITY OF OVER ONE YEAR ARE INCLUDED IN THIS TABLE.(2) DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDES PRINCIPAL IN ARREARS BUT EXCLUDES INTEREST IN ARREARS.
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11/23/77TABL. 4.8: GUATEMALA:
PAGE 1SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROUECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1976
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1, 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN FCREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS
TOTALYEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I D D : OTHER CHANGES
BEGINNING OF PERIOD…________-…___-…_ _ ____ -_ _ _- __________________________________________ -----------------------
DISBURSED : INCLUDING : COMMIT- : DISBURSE- : S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- : ADJUST-ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS : MENTS ----------- ----------- :-----------: LATIONS MENT .
PRINCIPAL : INTEREST : TOTAL: (1) : ~(2) : (3) : (4) : (5) : (6) : (7) : (a) (9)
1966 5,266 5,640 - 306 949 326 1,275 1 -1969 4,622 4,690 - 43 1,125 270 1,395 25 -1970 3,540 3,540 3,156 - 936 214 1,150 -1971 2,605 5,761 5,184 8,340 644 311 955 - -1972 10,301 10,301 - - 1,094 748 1,842 - -1973 - 9,207 9,207 - - 1,141 576 1,717 - -1974 8,066 8,066 - - 1,078 522 1,600 - _1975 6,988 6,988 - - 1,134 451 1,585 - -1976 5,854 5,854 - - 1,193 408 1,601 -
1977 4,661 4,661
. * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * *
1977 4,661 4,661 - - 1,188 315 1.503 - -1978 3,473 3,473 - - 844 234 1,078 - _1979 2,629 2,629 - - 883 173 1.056 - -
1980 1.746 1,746 - - 924 109 1,033 - -1981 822 822 - - 822 42 864 - -
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE
YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
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11/23/77TABLE 4.8: GUATEMALA:
PAGE 2
SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1976
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1, 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR PRIVATE BANK CREDITS
TOTALYEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT : T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGES
I BEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUDING : COMMIT- : DISBURSE- : S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S : CANCEL- : ADJUST-I ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS : MENTS …: ----- ----------- ----------- LATIONS I MENT *
: PRINCIPAL : INTEREST : TOTAL: (1) : ~(2) : (3) : (4) : (5) : (6) : (7) : (8 (9)
196P 7,845 15,896 12,135 9,938 3,375 724 4,099 225 -11969 14,403 24,430 13,190 6,359 4,397 1,413 5,810 4,000 -1970 16,365 29,223 19,662 25,437 6,144 2,156 8,300 -1971 35,658 42,741 4,746 3,426 9,496 2,868 12,364 -1972 29,589 37,991 18,284 16,300 22,664 2,388 25,052 4,923 -1973 23,224 28,688 2,802 - 5,353 2,074 7,427 1,646 -11974 17,870 24,490 282 - 15,689 558 16,247 -1975 2.181 9.083 457 - 1.278 150 1,428 -1976 903 8,262 15,000 1,450 634 175 809 - 511977 1,719 22,679
* * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * 4 * * * *
1977 1,719 22,679 - 20,960 3,500 672 4,172 - -1791976 19,000 19,000 - - 4,977 1,171 6,14B - 11979 14,024 14,024 - - 3,310 894 4,204 - -1980 10,714 10,714 - - 2,143 693 2,8361981 8,571 8,571 - - 2,143 547 2,690 -1
1982 6,429 6,429 - - 2,143 401 2,544 -1983 4,286 4,286 - - 2,143 255 2,398 -1984' 2,143 2,143 - _ 2,143 109 2,252 -
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
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TABLE 4.8: GUATEMALA: 11/23/77
PAGE 3SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1976
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1. 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS
TOTALYEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D : OTHER CHANGES
BEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUDING : COMMIT- : DISBURSE- : S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S : CANCEL- : ADJUST-: ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS : MENTS ----------- ----------- :-----------: LATIONS : MENT .: : : : : PRINCIPAL : INTEREST : TOTAL: (1) : (2) : (3) : (4) : (5) : (6) : (7) : (8) : (9)
1968 15,025 39,920 17,949 6,864 2,460 737 3,197 346 21969 19,427 55,065 3,150 9,915 2,609 601 3.410 573 11970 26,533 54,834 1,640 9,115 2,733 1,695 4,428 450 11971 32,916 53,492 6,850 8,486 1,270 2,541 3.811 - 11972 40,133 61,073 16,350 8,515 2,024 2,501 4,525 479 -11973 46,623 76,919 23,558 10,960 1,990 3,483 5,473 3 -2,1971974 53,395 96,287 19,117 14,242 2,083 3,981 6,064 - 31975 65,554 113,324 51,922 11,428 2.417 4,593 7,010 419 -1551976 74,457 162,255 175,172 19,200 2,834 5,446 8,280 236 61977 90,829 334.363
* . . . * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * .* *
1977 90,829 334,363 - 52,555 5,672 7,233 12,905 - -1978 137,712 328,691 - 44,815 6,533 9,441 15,974 - -31979 175,991 322,155 - 34,693 7,694 11,178 16,872 - -21980 202,989 314,459 - 24.182 7,981 12.047 20,028 - -21981 219,186 306,476 - 20,128 9,867 12,130 21,997 - 11982 229,450 296,610 - 18,536 10,370 11,984 22,354 - -61983 237,610 286.234 - 14,054 10,664 11,647 22,311 - -41964 240,996 275,566 - 14,054 11,169 11,319 22,468 - -41985 243,878 264,393 - 13,475 11,611 10,906 22,517 - -41986 245,737 252,778 - 7,041 13,531 10,400 23,931 - -11987 239,246 239,246 - - 15,670 9,851 25,521 - -41988 223,572 223,572 - - 15,851 8,950 24,801 - -81989 207,713 207,713 - - 15,752 8,052 23,804 - -11990 191,960 191,960 - - 15,634 7,161 22,795 - -51991 176,321 176,321 - - 15,170 6,289 21,459 - -11992 161,150 161,150 - - 11,746 5,506 17,252 - -31993 149,401 149,401 - - 11,016 4,928 15,944 - -21994 138,383 138,383 - - 10,931 4,372 15,303 - -11995 127,451 127,451 - - 9,133 3,813 12,946 - -31996 118.315 118,315 - - 7,769 3,456 11,225 - -1
*.THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
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11/23/77
TABLE 4.8: GUATEMALA: PAGE 4PAGE 4
SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1976
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1, 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR BILATERAL LOANS
TOTALYEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT : T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I 0 D : OTHER CHANGES
BEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUDING : COMMIT-: DISBURSE-: S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- : ADJUST-I ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS : MENTS :---------------------- ---------- : LATIONS : MENT .
PRINCIPAL INTEREST: TOTAL: (1) : (2) : (3) : (4) : (S) : (6) : (7) : (8) : (9)
196S 15,506 35,016 8,600 5.747 1 427 853 2,280 - -21969 19,778 42,187 630 2,659 1,765 942 2,707 4,200 -1970 20,672 36,852 25,100 2,409 1,811 916 2,727 203 -1971 21,270 59,938 11,500 2,14B 1,848 1,008 2,856 510 -1972 21,570 69,080 - 7,201 1,839 750 2,589 - 11973 26,933 67,242 4,650 8,984 3,667 694 4,361 2,000 -21974 32,250 66,223 4,500 9,212 2,081 846 2,927 - -1975 39.380 68,642 37,350 46,694 2,087 1,200 3,287 33 -1976 83.987 103,872 85,992 31,137 1,051 6,615 7,666 19 621977 114,062 188,856
* * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED ' * * * * '
1977 114,062 188,856 - 21,468 917 5,972 6,889 - _197B 134,613 187,939 - 16,208 838 6,798 7,636 - -21979 149,980 187,099 - 14,211 1,010 7,603 8,613 - _1980 163,180 186,089 - 11,031 1,046 8,395 9,441 - -21981 173,163 185,041 - 8,697 31.956 9,064 41,020 - _1982 149,903 153.085 - 3,182 26,783 6.960 33,743 - -31983 126,299 126,299 - - 4,268 5,062 9,330 - 21984 122,033 122,033 - - 4,239 4,849 9,088 - -11985 117,793 117,793 - - 4,239 4,654 8,893 - 11986 113,555 113,555 - - 4,386 4,471 8,857 - 11987 109,170 109.170 - - 5,211 4,469 9.680 - -11989 103,958 103,958 - - 5,041 4,204 9,245 - -31989 98,914 98,914 - _ 4,673 3,963 8,836 - -1990 94,041 94,041 - 4 878 3 729 8 607 - 11991 89,162 89,162 - 4,882 3,497 8,379 -1992 84,279 84,279 - - 4,887 3,260 8,147 - -21993 79,390 79,390 - - 4,893 3,027 7.920 - -11994 74,496 74,496 - - 4,898 2.792 7.690 - -11995 69,597 69.597 - - 4,903 2,558 7,461 - 11996 64,695 64,695 - - 4,909 2,324 7,233 - -2
' THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNOISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
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TABLE 4.8: GUATEMALA: 11/23/77
PAGE 5SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1976
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1, 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TOTAL
YEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT : T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGEsBEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUOING : COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- : ADJUST-ONLY :UNDISBURSEO: MENTS MENTS :----------- …----------------------: LATIONS MENT
PRINCIPAL : INTEREST TOTAL: (1) : (21 : (3) : (4) : (5) : (6) : (7) : (8) : (9)
1968 74,768 127,598 45,684 29,855 15,685 4,619 20,304 584 -11969 88,B70 157,012 16,970 18,976 16,471 5,007 23,478 8,798 11970 89,375 146,714 49,774 36,977 20,056 6,232 26,288 653 21971 106,298 175,781 30,280 22,400 19,692 7,479 27,171 510 21972 109,009 185,861 36,634 32,016 34.375 6,691 41,066 5,402 -1973 106,649 182,718 31,010 19,944 12,231 6,854 19,085 3,649 -2,2001974 112,163 195,648 23,899 23,454 21.012 5,931 26,943 31 31975 114.573 198,507 89,729 5B,122 8,990 6.415 13,405 452 -1551976 165,597 280,639 276,164 51,787 5,712 12,663 18,375 255 1191977 211,667 550,955
* * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * ' * *
1977 211,667 550,955 - 94,983 11,673 14,200 25,873 - -1791978 294,798 539.103 - 61,023 13,192 17,644 30,836 - -41979 342,624 525,907 - 46,904 12,897 19,848 32,745 - -21980 378,629 513,008 - 35,213 12.094 21,244 33,338 - -41981 401,742 500,910 - 28,825 44,788 21,783 66,571 - 21962 385,782 456,124 - 21,718 39,296 19,345 58,641 - -91983 368.195 416,819 - 14,0S4 17,075 16,964 34,039 - -21984 365.172 399.742 - 14,054 17,551 16,277 33,628 - -51985 361,671 382,186 - 13,475 15,850 15,560 31,4-10 - -31986 359,292 366,333 - 7,041 17,917 14,871 32,788 - -1987 348,416 348.416 - - 20,881 14,320 35,201 - -51988 327,530 327.530 - - 20,892 13.154 34,046 - -111989 306,627 306.627 - - 20,625 12,015 32.640 -- 11990 286,001 286,001 - - 20,512 10,890 31,402 - -61991 265.483 265,483 - - 20,052 9,786 29,838 - -21992 245.429 245,429 - - 16,633 8,766 25,399 - -51993 228,791 228,791 - - 15,909 7,955 23,864 - -31994 212,679 212,879 - - 15 829 7 164 22.993 - -21995 197,048 197,048 - - 14,036 6,371 20,407 - -21996 183,010 183,010 - 12,678 5,780 18,458 - -3
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
-134-
11/23/77TABLE 4.9: GUATEMALA:
SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1976
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED JAN. 1, 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN LOCAL CURRENCY
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TOTAL
YEAR : DEBT OUTSTANDING AT : T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I 0 0 : OTHER CHANGESBEGINNING OF PERIOD
: DISBURSED : INCLUDING : COMMIT- : DISBURSE- : S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- : ADJUST-ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS MENTS :…- ----- : LATIONS : MENT .
PRINCIPAL : INTEREST : TOTAL: (1) : (2) : ~~(3) : (4) : () : (6) : (7) ()(9)
1968 15,174 35,561 7,118 5,261 893 623 1,516 -1969 19,542 41,787 19,000 6,270 978 725 1,703 - -1197L 24,833 59,808 15,960 10,233 1,443 917 2,360 7 31971 33,626 74,321 7,440 8,792 1,511 1,378 2,869 9,500 -21972 40,906 70,748 5,858 9,408 2,099 1,619 3,718 722 11973 48,216 73,766 21,964 12,935 2,536 1,982 4,518 360 2,1981974 60,452 95,072 2,002 9,577 2,581 2,32B 4,909 275 11975 67,245 94,219 10,717 8,663 3,019 2,416 5,437 272 1591976 72,997 101,804 29,148 11,935 3,346 2,772 6,118 46 -1977 81,586 127,560
* * * . * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * *
1977 81,566 127,560 - 14,055 4,423 2,908 7,331 - _1978 91,218 123,137 - 5894 4,690 3,109 7.799 - 11979 92,423 118,448 - 4,960 4,774 2,988 7,762 - I1980 92,611 113,675 - 4,358 4,829 2,638 7,667 - 41981 92.143 108,850 - 3,983 5,010 2,670 7,680 - -21982 91,114 103,838 - 2.973 4,997 2,478 7,475 - 21983 89,095 98.843 - 2,973 4,853 2,286 7,139 - -11984. 87,214 93,989 - 2,973 5,306 2,264 7,570 - -11985 84,680 88,682 - 2,643 5.010 2,121 7,131 - 21986 82,515 83,674 - 1,159 5,446 1,976 7,424 - -21987 78,224 78.224 - - 5,835 1 786 7,621 - 41966 72.393 72.393 - - 5,656 1 595 7,451 - _1989 66,537 66,537 - - 5,501 1,403 6,904 - -11990 61,035 61,035 - - 5,368 1,225 6,593 - 31991 55,670 55,670 - - 5.219 1,049 6,268 - 21992 50,453 50,453 - - 4,577 868 5,465 - 21993 45,678 45,878 - - 3,963 761 4,724 - 11994 41,916 41,916 - - 3.629 652 4,281 - -11995 38,286 38,286 - - 3,210 554 3,764 - 11996 35,077 35,077 - - 2,582 481 3,063 - -1
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
-135-
11/23/77TABLE 4.10: GUATEMALA:
SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
ACTUAL 1968-1976 AND PROJECTED 1977-1985
INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMbITTED JAN. 1, 1900 - DEC. 31, 1976DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TOTAL
YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I 0 N S 0 U R I N G P E R I 0 D OTHER CHANGESBEGINNING OF PERIOD
…________ _______________________- ____________________________________________…______________- _______________________
OISBURSED : INCLUDING COM,tIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- : ADJUST-ONLY IUNDISBURSED: MENTS MENTS …------ LATIONS : MENT .
PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL(1) 1 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (B) (9)
1968 74,768 127,598 45,684 29,855 15,685 4,619 20,304 584 -11969 88,870 157,012 16,970 18,976 18,471 5,007 23,478 8,798 11970 89,375 146,714 49,774 36,977 20,056 6,232 26,288 653 21971 106,298 175.781 30,280 22,400 19,692 7,479 27,171 510 21972 109,009 185,661 36,634 32,016 34.375 6,691 41,066 5,402 -1973 106,649 182,7i8 31,010 19,944 12,231 6,B54 19,085 3,649 -2,2001974 112,163 195,648 23,899 23,454 '21.012 5,931 26,943 31 3'975 114,573 198,507 89,729 58,122 6,990 6,415 13,405 452 -1551976 165,597 280,639 276,164 51,787 5,712 12,663 18,375 255 119
. . . . . . THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * *
1977 211,500 550,700 185,300 133,195 11,600 14,300 26,400 - -1976 333,095 724,400 172,S00 15G,285 16,483 20,729 37,212 - -
1979 4o6,b97 880,717 128,578 156,616 22,150 27,547 49,697 - -
1960 601,362 937,145 155,018 160,670 29,685 34,647 64,332 - -1961 732,343 1,112,473 171,707 166,550 70,010 41,541 111,551 - -1902 o25,868 1,214,174 159,099 172,373 73,109 46,380 119,489 - -1963 928,153 1,500,164 167,029 167,561 60,786 51,488 112,274 - -19o4 1,034,927 1,406,407 179,039 16S,852 67,394 57,465 124,859 - -t985 1,136,385 1,518,052 191,914 177,100 71,055 63,566 134,621 - -
THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSEW FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM CNE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
-136-
PAGE 1 OF 211/10/77
TABLE 5.1 (')GUATEMALA: SUMMARY OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I B U T I O NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
REVENUE 124.0 135.6 149.0 163.1 171.3 185.1 214.7 260.8 351.4 428.1
CURRENT 122.8 133.6 146.9 162.3 170.5 163.6 212.7 278.6 329.8 406.9CAPITAL 1.2 2.2 2.1 0.8 0.8 1.5 2.0 2.2 21.6 21.2
EXPENOITURE 147.2 144.4 159.3 176.4 182.1 211.0 250.7 325.1 365.8 484.5
CURRENT 117.4 118,8 129.3 147.8 147.9 158.8 176.6 219.0 270.6 331.1CAPITAL 29.8 25.6 30.0 28.6 34.2 52.2 73.9 106.1 95.0 153.4
BALANCE - OVERALL -23.2 -8.6 -10.3 -13.3 -10.8 -25.9 -36.0 -44.3 -14.4 -56.4
CURRENT - 5.4 14.8 17.6 14.5 22.6 24.8 35.9 59.6 59.0 75.6CAPITAL -26.6 -23.4 -27.9. -27.8 -33.4 -50.7 -71.9 -103.9 -73.4 -132.2
FINANCING 23.2 8.6 10.3 13.3 10.8 25.9 36.0 44.3 14.4 56.4,===-==== = .... ===== == -=====2= = ... ====== ==-=-== ... ^====== ..... ===== .sSs= ....... ......
EXTERNAL (NET) 1B.6 11.1 -1.7 23.3 0.8 9.2 17.2 7.4 13.0 16.7
DISBURSEMENT 28.4 23.2 12.3 38.7 14.4 35.9 23.4 24.5 18.7 22.2AMORTIZATION 9.8 12.1 14.0 15.4 13.6 26.7 6.2 17.1 5.7 5.5
BONGS (NET) 10.9 1.0 -7.4 -7.4 -5.4 -5.8 6PLACEMENT 15.0 7.0 - - - - -AMORTIZATION 4.1 6.0 7.4 7.4 5.4 5.6 , .
INTERNATIONAL ORMS. (NET) 3.4 4.0 7.7 12.1 11.6 11.7 12.5DISBURSEMENT 5.3 6.0 9.8 14.3 12.1 12.9 14.4 .AMORTIZATION 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 0.5 1.2 1.9 .
GOVERNMENTS (NET) 3.3 4.1 0.4 0.2 - 4.7 6.7DISBURSEMENT 5.0 5.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 7.0 9.0 .AMORTIZATION 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 .
PRIVATE SOURCES (NET) 1.0 2.0 -2.4 18.4 -S.4 -1.4 -2.0 .DISBURSEMENT 3.1 4.3 - 22.0 - 16.0 -AMORTIZATION 2.1 2.3 2.4 3.6 5.4 17.4 2.0 .
INTERNAL (NET) 4.6 -2.5 12.0 -10.0 10.0 16.7 18.8 36.9 1.4 39.7
BANK OF GUATEMALA 1.7 -3.0 5.9 -7.1 9.4 -9.7 -17.7 47.3 -37.5COMMERCIAL BANKS -3.0 1.2 -1.9 1.2 10.9 23.6 23.6 -29.7 40.0DEVELOPMENT FIN. INST. - - 1.0 -0.1 1.1 0.5 3.0 0.3 -3.6OTHER 5.9 -0.7 7.0 -4.0 -11.4 2.3 9.9 1.8.0 2.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__-----------------------------------------------_-____
SOURCE: STATISTICAL ANNEX TABLES 5.2, 5.3 AND 5.4.
-137-
Page 2 of 2
Table 5.1 (2): GUATEMALA: SUMMARY OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 1976-1982
(millions of quetzales)
DistributionItem 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Revenue 428.1 659.9 674.6 742.1 815.3 922.3 1.043.5
Current 406.9 653.3 667.9 734.8 807.2 913.1 1,033.1Capital 21.2 6.5 6.7 7.3 8.1 9.1 10.3
Expenditure 484.5 561.1 686.1 770.9 898.6 1,o42.6 1,202.4
Current 331.1 401.8 467.6 540.7 624.1 720.3 831.4Capital 153.4 159.3 218.5 230.2 274.5 322.3 371.0
Balance - Overall -56.4 98.8 -11.5 -28.8 -83.3 -120.4 -159.0
Current 75.8 251.5 200.4 194.0 183.1 192.8 201.7Capital -132.2 -306.1 -350.0 -361.0 -441.7 -539.2 -575.6
Financing 56.4 -98.8 11.5 28.8 83.3 120.4 159.0
External (net) 16.7 58.7 73.5 73.2 72.2 50.7 65.3Internal (net) 39.7 -157.5 -62.0 -44.4 11.2 69.6 93.7
Source: Ministry of Public Finance and mission projections. 12/6/77
-138-
PAGE 1 OP 21t/07/77
TAeLE 5.2 (1)GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVEP!.1ENT CURRENT REVENUES, 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF CUE TZALES)
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__--------------------------.,--------------------------
D I S T R I B U T 1 O NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 t975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------____________---,----_________---__________
TAX REVENUES 109.7 122.6 135.0 148.7 155.2 164.4 131.9 255.4 300.8 370.4
DIRECT TAXES 18.8 22.1 22.1 24.7 26.3 29.9 33.0 40.4 62.8 67.5
INCOME TAXES 14.0 16.0 16.6 18.7 20.5 22.4 25.3 32.0 54.9 59.2PERSONAL 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.3 5.0 5.5 6.1 7.3 12.7 13.9CORPORATE 10.2 12.3 12.6 14.4 15.5 16.9 19.2 24.7 42.2 45.3
PROPERTY TAXES 4.8 6.1 S.5 6.0 5.8 7.4 7.7 8.4 7.9 8.3REAL ESTATE TAXES 4.1 5.2 4.7 5.1 4.9 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.6 8.0OTHER 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.5 0.3 0.3
INDIRECT TAXES 90.9 100.5 112.9 124.0 128.9 134.6 158.9 215.0 238.0 302.9
DOMESTIC SALES 55.6 66.1 72.7 77.6 81.2 87.2 101.4 134.4 146.5 183.8EXCISE TAXES - 32.3 35.1 38.0 38.3 40.3 44.2 51.8 57.1 66.6
O/W PETROLEUM - 9.8 10.9 11.5 12.0 13.2 14.5 16.5 18.1 19.3ALCOHOL - 14.6 15.2 15.9 17.2 17.8 19.8 23.8 25.6 31.1OTHER - 7.9 9.0 8.6 9.1 9.3 9.9 11.5 13.4 16.2
STAMP TAXES - 30.6 32.8 35.6 36.9 40.6 49.6 74.1 78.5 104.7MOTOR VEHICLE TAXES - 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.6 3.9 - -OTHER 55.6 1.0 2.2 3.1 3.0 3.2 4.0 4.6 10.9 12.5
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 35.3 34.4 40.2 46.4 47.7 47.4 57.5 80.6 91.5 119.1IMPORT TAXES 29.8 29.6 33.9 37.7 39.7 38.8 43.6 59.4 60.2 69.9DUTIES - 28.2 26.2 28.2 28.7 28.1 31.9 44.3 45.2 53.2SURCHARGE (SAN UOSE) - 0.6 6.3 7.8 9.4 9.0 9.2 13.8 14.2 l5.0OTHER 29.8 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.5 1.3 0.8 1.7
EXPORT TAXES 5.5 4.8 6.3 8.7 8.0 8.6 13.9 21.2 31.3 49.2COFFEE - 4.4 5.9 8.2 7.5 7.9 13.7 20.1 7.6 36.8OTHER 5.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 1.1 23.5 10.4
NON-TAX REVENUES 14.3 13.2 14.0 14.4 16.1 20.7 22.8 25.4 50.6 57.7
ORDINARY BUDGET 8.5 8.6 9.9 10.9 11.3 13.3 12.9 18.3 18.4 29.2
PROPERTY INCOME 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.2 2.8 3.7 7.2PUBLIC SERVICES 4.0 4.3 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.6 7.4 7.9SALES OF GOODS 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6SURPLUS OF CG ENTERPRISES - - - - - 1.3 1.3 2.2 3.0 2.8OTHER 3.7 3.7 6.9 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.4 9.3 3.9 10.7
EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET 14.0 13.0 15.1 15.3 18.1 17.8 19.3 19.5 61.9 42.7
EARMARKED REVENUES 11.5 10.8 12.9 14.5 15.8 16.4 17.8 16.9 5.8 8.1GRANTS FROM ABROAD 2.2 1.9 1.9 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.4 5.3OTHER 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.7 0.6 0.6 1.8 55.7 29.3
LESS: EXTRA-OROINARV TAXES 8.2 8.4 11.0 11.8 13.3 10.4 9.4 12.4 29.7 14.2
TOTAL REVENUES 124.0 135.8 149.0 163.1 171.3 185.1 214.7 280.8 351.4 428.1
LESS: CAPITAL RECEIPTS 1.2 2.2 2.i 0.9 0.8 1.5 2.0 2.2 21.6 21.2
CURRENT REVENUES 122.8 133.6 146.9 162.3 170.5 183.6 212.7 278.6 329.8 406.9
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE
-139-
Page 2 of 2
Table 5.2 (2): GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT REVENUES, 1976-1982
(millions of quetzales)
Item Distribution1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Tax Revenues 370.4 586.4 592.4 649.9 712.0 806.o 913.3
Direct Taxes 67.5 80.8 93.7 108.0 124.3 143.0 164.5
Income Taxes 59.2 70.7 81.9 94.3 108.3 124.4 142.9Property Taxes 8.3 10.1 11.8 13.7 16.0 18.6 21.6
Indirect Taxes 302.9 505.7 498.7 541.9 587.7 663.3 748.8
Domestic Sales 183.8 219.6 254.3 292.7 336.3 386.3 443.8International Trade 119.1 286.1 244.4 249.2 251.4 277.0 305.0
Import Taxes 69.9 80.4 90.4 101.0 116.4 134.4 154.3Export Taxes 49.2 205.6 154.0 148.2 135.1 142.6 150.8
Non-Tax Revenues 57.7 66.9 75.5 84.9 95.2 106.8 119.8
Total Revenues 428.1 659.9 674.6 742.1 815.3 922.3 1,043.5
Capital Receipts 21.2 6.5 6.7 7.3 8.1 9.1 10.3
Current Revenues 406.9 653.3 667.9 734.8 807.2 913.1 1.033.1
Source: Ministry of Finance and World Bank estimates. 12/6/77
-140-
PAGE 1 OF 211/07/77
TABLE 5.3 (1)GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURES BY SECTOR. 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I B U T I 0 NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 196B 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
ECONOMIC SERVICES 16.7 15.2 17.2 18.0 19.7 22.4 20.7 26.2 36.3 49.8
AGRICULTURE 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.7 4.1 7.3 6.8 9.0 14.1 21.8TRANSPORTATION 7.8 6.9 8.0 7.3 8.2 8.0 8.0 10.8 15.2 17.7COMMUNICATIONS 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.7 0.1OTHER 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.3 3.3 1.9 2.1 2.3 4.2
SOCIAL SERVICES 50.4 50.9 57.5 61.1 69.8 70.5 75.6 94.5 105.3 129.5
EDUCATION 26.4 26.6 29.3 30.4 35.5 35.0 37.8 51.7 54.4 71.9HEALTH 13.4 13.9 17.4 19.7 17.2 20.0 20.4 25.9 32.6 39.9SOCIAL WELFARE 7.5 8.2 7.0 8.3 13.4 12.2 14.3 16.7 18.1 17.4OTHER . 3.1 2.2 3.8 2.7 3.7 3.3 3.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
GENERAL SERVICES 50.3 52.7 54.6 68.7 58.4 65.9 80.5 98.3 129.2 152.1
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION 17.5 18.4 19.2 20.1 22.3 30.0 38.0 38.5 50.7 54.3DEFENSE & POLICE 23.6 24.3 24.4 37.3 23.1 22.0 24.5 38.0 53.5 65.8JUSTICE 2.6 2.5 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.4 4.1 4.8 5.4 6.9INTEREST PAYMENTS 6.6 7.5 7.7 8.0 9.4 10.5 13.9 17.0 19.6 25,1
TOTAL CURRENT EXPENSES 117.4 118.8 129.3 147.8 147.9 158.8 176.8 219.0 270.8 331,1.... a.. ..... .....ss s==.== -a=xs .......... ==.- ..... w= == - ..= ...... ......... .rsss s= ......
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE
1'41-
Page 2 of 2
Table 5.3 (2): GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURES BY SECTOR, 1976-1982
(millions of quetzales)
DistributionItem 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Economic Services 49.8 60.4 69.9 80.5 92.5 106.2 122.0
Social Services 129.5 157.0 184.1 214.4 249.2 289.7 336.7
General Services 152.1 184.4 213.6 245.8 282.4 324.4 372.7
Total Current Expenses 331.4 401.8 467.6 540.7 624.1 720.3 831.4
Source: Ministry of Finance and mission estimates. 12/6/77
-142-
PAGE 1 OF 21I/07/77
TABLE 5.4 (1)GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURES BY SECTOR, 1968-1976
(MILLInN' OF OUETZALES)
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I 3 U T I O NITEM
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
DIRECT INVESTMENT 18.2 23.3 22.0 20.2 39.5 56.0 67.4 59.2 81.t
ECONOMIC SERVICES 13.7 18.0 16.5 13.1 20.i 21.0 31.2 27.8 32.7
AGRICULTURE 1.6 4.1 2.8 2.7 3.4 3.7 9.6 10.4 5.5TRANSPORTATION 11.4 13.4 13.0 10.3 16.5 16.7 21.6 17.4 26.4COMMUNICATIONS 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.1 - 0.1 - - 0.8OTHER - - 0.1 - 0.2 0.5 _- -
SOCIAL SERVICES 4.1 4.8 3.3 2.4 13.0 26.8 16.0 11.8 31.8
EDUCATION 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.1 5.1 11.4 6.4 4.1 7.1HEALTH 3.1 3.1 2.1 1.0 7.1 14.2 11.3 7.7 24.7OTHER - - 0.2 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.3 - -
GENERAL SERVICES 0.4 0.5 2.2 4.7 6.4 8.2 18.2 19.6 16.6
TRANSFERS 7.4 6.7 6.6 14.0 12.7 17.9 38.7 35.8 72.3
AGRICULTURE 1.0 1.5 2.0 6.1 4.8 8.2 13.5 5.7 -
HOUSING 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.B 1.9 0.9 - 1.5 -
POWER 3.0 3.1 2.5 2.0 2.4 4.5 12.6 22.7OTHER 3.2 1.8 1.6 4.1 3.6 4.3 12.6 5.9 -
TOTAL CAPITAL EXPENDTTURE 25.6 30.0 28.6 34.2 52.2 73.9 106.1 95.0 153.4RS===s. - ...... ... =....= ..... == m ==== == =-£=s= ... ... =m==. --- s= *r===----
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE.
-14 3-
PAGE 2 OF 211/07/77
TABLE 5.4 (2)GUATEMALA: SUMMARY OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURES BY SECTOR, 1976-1982
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------
D I S T R I B U T I 0 NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__---------------_-------
DIRECT INVESTMENT 81.1 94.0 129.1 139.6 184.3 229.6 272.2
ECONOMIC SERVICES 32.7 40.9 56.5 56.4 77.5 97.1 116.7
SOCIAL SERVICES 31.8 35.1 53.1 62.3 70.8 91.3 106.3
GENERAL SERVICES 16.6 18.0 19.5 20.9 36.0 41.2 49.2
TRANSFERS 72.3 65.3 89.4 90.6 90.2 92.7 98.8
AGRICULTURE .. 15.0 13.5 12.0 14.0 20.0 25.0HOUSING 25.0 40.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 30.0POWER 8.5 18.9 17.2 11.3 13.4 10.0OTHER *. 16.8 17.0 21.4 29.9 29.3 33.8
TOTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 153.4 159.3 218.5 230.2 274.5 322.3 371.0....... a. . ...... S*SSUbas. a...W.. .. a ns .... ..... am .*.......
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND WORLD BANK ESTIMATES
-144-
1 .- ol2 <n 41 _ C o '2 2 . 4<oou
v ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 <' OOgt I I 7 Ic-.'40 4
i c a ~p .f ool |'2 V .'< « '2 2 ,,
~~~~~- S | °N no c |c 1 D
X~~~~ i) Xt S -2|2
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PAGE 1 OF 411/ 10/77
TABLE 5.6 (1GUATEMALA: CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATIONS, 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I B U T I O NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 19b8 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976_______________._____________________________________________________________________________________________--______________________
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
CURRENT REVENUE 122.8 133.6 146.9 162.3 170.5 183.6 212.7 278.6 329.8 406.9(TRANSFERS FROM RPS) 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.9 4.4 5.7 2.9 3.0 4.3
CURRENT EXPENDITURE 117.4 118.8 129.3 147.8 147.9 158.8 176.8 219.0 270.8 331.1(TRANSFERS TO RPS) 5.4 6.6 11.3 10.8 12.6 12.9 14.1 14.0 27.1 5.0
CURRENT SAVINGS 5.4 14.8 17.6 14.5 22.6 24.8 35.9 59.6 59.0 75.8
CAPITAL RECEIPTS 1.2 2.2 2.1 0.8 0.8 1.5 2.0 2.2 21.6 21.2
INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE 29.8 25.6 30.0 28.6 34.2 52.2 73.9 106.1 95.0 153.4(TRANSFERS TO RPS) 4.4 4.7 4.8 5.0 6.3 10.4 9.3 37.6 35.8 43.4
OVERALL BALANCE -23.2 -8.6 -10.3 -13.3 -10.8 -25.9 -36.0 -44.3 -14.4 -56.4
EXTERNAL FINANCING, NET 18.6 11.1 -1,7 23.3 0.8 9.2 17.2 7.4 13.0 92.9
DISBURSEMENT 28.4 23.2 12.3 38.7 14.4 35.9 23.4 24.5 18.7 21.7AMORTIZATION 9.8 12.1 14.0 15.4 13.6 26.7 6.2 17.1 5.7 5.0
DOMESTIC FINANCING, NET 4.6 -2.5 12.0 -10.0 10.0 16.7 18.8 36.9 1.4 -36.5
BANK OF GUATEMALA 1.7 -3.0 5.9 -7.1 9.4 -9.7 -17.7 47.3 -37.5 -COMMERCIAL BANKS -3.0 1.2 -1.9 1.2 10.9 23.6 23.6 -29.7 40.0DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS - - 1.0 -0.1 1.1 0.5 3.0 0.3 -3.6 -OTHER 5.9 -0.7 7.0 -4.0 -11.4 2.3 9.9 19.0 2.5 _
-149-
PAGE 2 OF 411/10/77
TABLE 5.6 (1GUATEMALA: CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATIONS, 1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
D I S T R I 3 U T I O NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
REST OF PUBLIC SECTOR
CURRENT REVENUE 45.0 54.1 67.2 74.0 80.8 107.4 124.5 113.2 145.2 173.8(TRANSFERS FROM CG) 5.4 6.6 11.3 10.8 12.6 12.9 14.1 14,0 27.1 5.0
CURRENT EXPENDITURE 37.0 49.4 58.9 66.6 74.4 98.9 108.6 114.0 130.6 154.7(TRANSFERS TO CG) 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.9 4.4 5.7 2.9 3.0 4.3
CURRENT SAVINGS 8.0 4.7 8.3 7.4 6.4 8.5 15.9 -0.8 14.6 19.1
CAPITAL RECEIPTS 5.5 10.2 6.0 8.1 9.8 13.0 12.0 48.4 42.5 96.0(TRANSFERS FROM CG) 4.4 4.7 4.8 5.0 6.3 10.4 9.3 37.6 35.8 43.4
DIRECT INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE 15.6 19.1 20.5 23.3 28.7 21.0 35.3 56.1 51.B 131.1
OVERALL BALANCE -1.8 -4.2 -6.2 -7.8 -12.5 0.5 -7.4 -8.5 5.3 -16.0
EXTERNAL FINANCING, NET 5.7 3.5 6.4 2.9 11.7 -0.2 7.8 10.3 8.9 53.1
DISBURSEMENTS 6.1 4.8 7.8 4.5 13.8 4.8 9.9 - - 55.2AMORTIZATION 0.4 i.3 1.4 1.6 2.1 5.0 2.1 -10.3 -8.9 2.1
DOMESTIC FINANCING -3.9 0,7 -0.2 4.9 0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -1.8 -14.2 -37.1
PUBLIC SECTOR
CURRENT REVENUE 162.1 180.6 202.1 225.4 237.8 273.7 317.4 374.9 444.9 592.6CURRENT EXPENDITURE 148.7 161.1 176.2 203.5 208.8 240.4 265.6 316.1 371.3 476.8
CURRENT SAVINGS 13.4 19.5 25.9 21.9 29.0 33.3 51.8 58.8 73.6 115.8
CAPITAL RECEIPTS 2.6 7.7 3.3 3.9 4.3 4.1 4.7 13.0 28.3 57.8INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE 41.0 40.0 45.7 46.9 56.6 62.8 99.9 124.6 t11.0 241.1
OVERALL BALANCE -25.0 -12.8 -16.5 -21.1 -23.3 -25.4 -43.4 -52.8 -9.1 -67.5
EXTERNAL FINANCING, NET 24.3 14.6 4.7 26.2 12.5 9.0 25.0 17.7 21.9 146.0
DISBURSEMENTS 34.5 28.0 20.1 43.2 28.2 40.7 33.3 24.5 18.7 151.8AMORTIZATION 10.2 13.4 15.4 17.0 15.7 31.7 8.3 6.8 -3.2 5.8
DOMESTIC FINANCING, NET 0.7 -1.8 11.8 -5.1 10.8 16.4 18.4 35.1 -12.B -78.5
TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 4.6 -2.5 12.0 -10.0 10.0 16.7 18.8 36.9 1.4 -8ANK OF GUATEMALA 1.7 -3.0 5.9 -7.1 9.4 -9.7 -17.7 47.3 -37.5 -CObIMERC:AL BANKS -3.0 1.2 -1.9 1.2 10.9 23.6 23.6 -29.7 40.0 -DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS - - 1.0 -0.1 1.1 0.S 3.0 0.3 -3.6 -OTHER 5.9 -0.7 7.0 -4.0 -11.4 2.3 9.9 19.0 2.5 -
TO REST OF PUBLIC SECTOR -3.9 0.7 -0.2 4.9 0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -1.8 -14.2 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__-----------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND IBRD ESTIMATES-150-
Page 3 of 412/8/77
Table 5.6 (2)GUATEMALA: CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATIONS, 1976-1982
(millions of quetzales)
DistributionItem 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Central Government
Current Revenue 406.9 653.3 667.9 734.8 807.2 913.1 1,033.1(Transfers from RPS) 4.3 5.2 6.o 6.9 7.9 9.1 10.5
Current Expenditure 331.1 401.8 467.6 540.7 624.1 720.3 831.4(Transfers to RPS) 5.0 5.9 6.7 7.7 8.7 9.9 11.2
Current Savings 75.8 251.5 200.4 194.0 183.1 192.8 201.7
Capital Receipts 21.2 6.5 6.7 7.3 8.1 9.1 10.3
Investment Expenditure 153.4 159.3 218.5 230.2 274.5 322.3 371.0(Transfers to RPS) 43.4 65.3 89.4 90.6 90.2 92.7 98.8
Overall Balance -56.4 98.8 -11.5 -28.8 -83.3 -120.4 -159.0
External Financing, Net 92.9 60.1 79.0 81.1 77.6 55.4 61.3
Disbursement 96.6 65.8 88.7 94.4 95.2 95.5 106.5Amortization 3.7 5.7 9.7 13.3 17.6 40.1 45.1
Domestic Financing, Net -36.5 -158.9 -67.5 -52.3 5.7 65.0 97.6
-151-
Page 4 of 412/8/77
Table 5.6 (2)GUATEMALA: CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATIONS, 1976-1982
(millions of quetzales)
DistributionItem 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Rest of Public Sector
Current Revenue 173.8 207.6 240.5 276.8 318.0 365.3 419.7(Transfers from CG) 5.0 5.9 6.7 7.7 8.7 9.9 11.2
Current Expenditure 154.7 184.8 214.0 246.4 283.0 325.2 373.5(Transfers to CG) 4.3 5.2 6.o 6.9 7.9 9.1 10.5
Current Savings 19.1 22.8 26.4 30.4 34.9 40.1 46.1
Capital Receipts 96.0 49.0 67.1 68.o 67.7 69.5 74.1(Transfers from CG) 43.4 39.2 53.6 54.4 54.1 55.6 59.3
Investment Expenditure 131.1 202.3 205.3 206.1 242.9 295.5 289.1
Overall Balance -16.0 -130.5 -111.8 -107.7 -140.3 -185. -168.9
External Financing, Net 53.1 61.5 54.8 53.4 53.4 41.2 38.o
Disbursements 55.2 67.4 61.6 62.2 65.5 71.1 65.9Amortization 2.1 5.9 6.8 8.8 12.1 29.9 28.0
Domestic Financing -37.1 69.0 57.0 54.3 86.9 144.6 130.9
Public Sector
Current Revenue 592.6 849.9 895.6 997.0 1,108.5 1,259.4 1,431.1Current Expenditure 476.8 575.5 668.9 772.5 890.5 1,026.5 1,183.3
Current Savings 115.8 274.4 226.8 224.5 218.0 233.0 247.8
Capital Receipts 57.8 16.3 20.1 20.9 21.6 23.0 25.2Investment Expenditure 241.1 322.4 370.1 381.9 463.3 562.2 600.8
Overall Balance -67.5 -31.7 -123.2 -136.5 -223.7 -306.2 -327.8
External Financing, Net 146.0 121.6 133.8 134.5 131.0 96.6 99.3
Disbursements 151.8 133.2 150.3 156.6 160.7 166.6 172.4Amortization 5.8 11.6 16.5 22.1 29.7 70.0 73.1
Domestic Financing, Net -78.5 8 -10.6 2.0 92.7 209.6 228.5
Source: Ministry of Finance and IBRD projections.
-152-
PAGE 1 OF 211/07/77
TABLE 5.7 (1)GUATEMALA: SUMMARY OF FIXED PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 1968-1976
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
-__-----------------------------------------------------__-------_______________---___-______-__-___--_____________________-
D I S T R I B U T I O NSECTOR -_-_____-___________________________________________-_-_
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976---------------------------------------------------- _-_---__-------__-__--_--__-------------------------------------------
INFRASTRUCTURE 24.4 26.8 26.2 27.0 25.0 30.7 60.3 54.3 150.6
POWER 8.2 8.7 8.7 6.9 7.7 10.0 22.9 22.9 83.0TRANSPORTATION 14.7 17.1 13.4 19.9 16.7 17.9 24.6 24.9 39.8COMMUNICATGION 1.5 1.0 4.1 0.2 0.6 2.8 12.8 6.5 27.8
SOCIAL SECTOR 10.7 12.4 11.8 13.7 24.2 43.2 32.6 26.4 72.5
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMEN 4.9 6.6 2.5 6.2 5.5 4.1 4.2 3.8 10.1WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE 2.6 2.8 5.1 3.3 9.2 22.2 17.9 13.3 28.6HEALTH AND WELFARE 1.6 1.2 2.8 2.7 3.1 2.8 2.4 1.9 26.7EDUCATION 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.5 6.4 14.1 8.1 7.4 7.1
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS 1.6 4.1 3.5 3.5 4.3 9.8 18.3 13.8 18.0
AGRICULTURE 1.6 4.1 3.5 3.5 4.3 9.0 16.4 11.8 7.3TOURISM AND OTHER - - - - - 0.8 1.9 2.0 10.7
TOTAL FIXED PUBLIC INVESTMENT 36.7 43.3 41.5 44.2 53.5 83.7 111.2 94.5 241.1
SOURCE: STATISTICAL ANNEX TABLES 5.4 AND 5.5.
-153-
Page 2 of 2
TIkbis 5.7 (2): GUATEMJ.IJ: SIUO4AY OF FIXED PUBLIC INVEsTMEN, YESTIMATED, 1976, AND PiANUiD, 1977-82
(io miiion- of q-et-ie,)
~r enti nn E stiaote 197roetos90
TNFIRASTRUCOIOE 1,3856
6150.3 43 177.3 ~19 70 074.2 52 55 201.1 56 4) 246.1 55 63 278.9 57 55 278.0 59 54.
'I-e 777.4 34 83.0 34 r06.8 52 42 120.7 55 39 132.4 56 410 152.o 52 39 148.3 55 25 1lo.6 319 2jT- nortati-n 364.8 16 39.9 17 46.0 41) 19 59.3 45 19 43.5 54 13 56.2 60 14 71.4 Si. 16 88.2 o3 17C-oeoinntion 243.4 11 27.8 12 21.5 10 10) 24.2 SL P. 25.2 57 ' 37.5 58 1o 59.0 53 11. 73.0 011 11
SOCIAL SET0OkS 614.5 27 72.5 30 67.6 15 2' 81.7 48 26 92.3 54 28 10. 55 26 124.1 54 29 148.3 32 29
loosig .nd Orb- On-Ilp-.ot 173.4 8 10.1 4 27.6 38 11 30.9 31 10 29.1 32 9 26.6 32 7 31.6 29 7 27.6 34 5.4.t0er 3opply and 3e--r-g 168.6 7 28.6 12 21.2 64 8 15.7 70 5 21.5 65 7 25.5 71 6 39.5 57 9 45.2 47 QAqeaIth and Welfare 155.8 7 26.5 11 6.0 33 3 19.1 60 6 21.2 74 7 30.0 73 8 29.0 74 7 47.5 02 9Ed-ct... 116.7 5 7.1 3 13.0 35 5 15.0 44 5 1'.5 49 5 18.2 31 5 21.0 56 5 28.0 59 6
PRIODUCTIVE SECTORS 275.8 12 18.0 7 7.9 20 3_ 25.2 49 8 39.7 55 12 42.0 57 11 69.5 56 16 91.5 51 17
Ag,i-nlt... 135.7 6 7.3 3 3.3 6 1 10.2 10 3 16.2 51 5 18. 56 5 37.0 63 9 51.3 58 1Dtoooi,, 140.1 6 10.7 4 1.6 30 2 15.0 55 5 21.5 58 7 24.0 57 5 32.5 48 7 4o.5 19 3
TOTAL P-ROnOOtD FIXED 18E010 225.9 100 2411.1 100 253.0 47 130 311.1 51 10 3. 5 1o 384 5 0 7. 6 10 517.8 56 1
Fore ign Fi nancing Requiredf-r Balance of Payments 4/43 *53 48 47 42 35 33
1/Exclo.de general nerejoe, ining and inonotrye.YI Indicates percen.t of tt.1t i-ontnnt.
Indicatenoron finn foreign o a- esttiatd on aproject basis; derived free G-nveernts plans.Mission estimate of grass disbursementa of public axctwm~l borroeing a a- pu'cent of planhud investoent required to finance current account deficit - shoen inStatistical Annewx Table 3.1, given the level of ether capital infloes indicated the".
Snurce Appendix Table 5.9. 12/8/77
Table 5.8, GUATEMALA: SUIMMAR OF FIXED AND FnACLIAL PUBLIC INVESTEENT, ESTIIATED, 1976, AND PLANNED, 1977-82
(in millionm of quet-ales)
Prect5ion3 Estimate 'roJections1977-19B2o 7s 19761977 197- 1979 19B0 19dl 19B2
T To-taS TI Tta IFS'TITotaSF3iT l SS I t TI ToSa F T o STI FS ST
INFRASTRUCTURS 1.385.6 S1 150.6 63 177.3 49 55 204.2 52 55 - 56 53 266.1 55 53 278.9 57 SO 278.0 59 46
Power 777.b 29 83.0 34 iO6.8 52 33 120.7 55 32 132.4 56 35 152.4 52 33 148.3 55 26 116.8 59 19Transportation 364.8 14 39.8 17 66.0 bO 14 59.3 45 16 43.5 54 11 56.2 60 12 71.6 64 13 88.2 63 15Communication 243.4 9 27.8 12 26.5 5O 8 24.2 54 7 25.2 57 7 37.5 58 8 59.0 53 11 73.0 56 12
SOCIAL SECTORS 951.1 35 72.5 30 113.7 b3 35 122 0 42 33 141.1 47 37 160.2 46 35 200.8 44 36 213.3 46 36
Housing and Urb.n Development 510.0 19 10.1 4 73.5 39 22 72.2 31 20 77.9 32 20 86.5 32 19 108.3 29 19 92.6 34 15Water Supply nd Sewerage 168.6 6 28.6 12 21.2 64 7 15.7 70 4 21.5 66 6 25.5 71 6 39.5 57 7 45.2 47 8Health and Welfare 155.8 6 26.7 11 6.0 33 2 19.1 60 5 26.2 74 6 30.0 73 6 29.0 76 5 67.5 62 8Ed-oation 116.7 4 7.1 3 13.0 35 4 16.0 44 4 17.5 49 5 18.2 34 4 24.0 56 5 28.0 59 5
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS 364 0 14 18.0 7 31.6 58 10 63.9 51 12 39.7 56 10 57.0 49 12 82.5 55 14 109.5 47 18
Agriculture 193.4 7 7.3 3 22.8 64 7 27.4 51 7 16.2 51 4 20.0 5o 6 63.0 60 7 64.0 45 11Tourism 170.6 7 10.7 4 8.6 41 3 16.5 50 5 23.5 58 6 37.0 48 8 39.5 49 7 45.5 50 7
TOTAL PROPOSED FIXED JINDFINANCIAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT 2,700.7 100 261.1 100 322.6 68 100 370.1 69 100 381.9 53 100 463.3 51 loo 562.2 52 100 600.8 52 100
Foreign Financing Requiredfor Balance of Pa2 ents 4/ 37 43. 41 41 35 30 29
I/ Eclodes general services, mining and industry inve-t-ents.2/ Indicates percent of total investment.1 Indicates percent from foreign source as estimated on project basisi dained frm Govrnrment's plans.W Mission ostiate of gross diaboratents of public external borrowing as a pereent of planned investment required to finance current account deficit as ahows
in Statistical Annex Table 3.1, given the level of other capital inflows indicated there.12A /77
Sourore Appendix Table 5.9.
Page 1 of 3Table 5.9: GUATEHIALA PROPOSED FIXED &501 978A.NcbAL PuBLiC iN9Bs31nP PLAN BY PROJECT, 1977-, 98222
PrincipalExterna Total Projec.r.____________ P R 0 JEZT I 8N
Sector Finenoteg 55930~~/. Foreign Local ~ B 157 ~ ~ t5-~ ______Tt.2 F._ig. L -
1.O0 750 9.033. 106 56j ) 50 ' 120.7 56. 55.7 132.5 73.5 55. 152. 78.7 73.5 1oO.3 81.3 57.7 lii.8 05.7 a.
Coornol In ",Iet",o 512.7 3;715 241.2 10 .06~o~3.85_4s.. _9.9 106.6 57.41 .24 127.0 55.3 51.7 05.3 51.3 oS.0 44.8 23.7 21.1I.sganp (lt t .eE20I/:300/Ios) 1177 S WU 777 . 77 "S 73 . 71 trr 77 3 I777 7 T
5. loioop ABEI,00i5/IIB 450.0 216. 155. 50.61 22.3 18.3 57.8 37.3 30. 7B. 8 543.3 35.5 130.0 50.0 50.0 91.1 5.8.0 53.1 a. 8 273 7 21.13. Frooie n-oi-o 0DB/23BEI 33. 127 21.1 15.7 65.9 7.8 5.5 1.1 7.8 6.1 1.1 50. 5.n 3.6 .5 .0 .3 .7 I 0 .2
300cr - ~~~~~~~~~15.9 5.8 12.1 11.9 3.2 8.7 3.L 1.5 1.9 1.6 .1 1.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .I .0 . .0 :
Inc 1 ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~2.5! .35 ,0 13.9 9.1 1.5 85.8 15.5 .4 25.5 13.5 12.0 52.0 30.0 22.3 72.0 45.0 27.2
2. Iroonoteojon -'ABI 47- .- .i __ _L 6 _ _F 77 =6_S_3- 0 - S0 -16 3 I,.fJ 3.3 .5 .5 .0 1.3 3.2 1.1 10. 8. 8 .0 1. . 2 . 03 _. ri IDBtlfoatoI18/1 55.3 25.0 29.0 2.0 .0 2.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 10.0 5.0 5.0O 10.3' 5.3 5. 120 5.0o 7.0o 12.0, 5.0 7.
4.Ohr -6.0 3.0 3.0 .0 .3 .2 1.0 .5 .5 3.0 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.73 1.3 .0 .3 .3 .3 .0 .7S. 707.kotiftcd (le.th,roal) - 15.3 53.0 60.0 .0 .0 .8 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 13.0 5.3 5.0 57.3 25.3 15.7 50.3 40.3 27.3
rKA!;5?JF.:ATIO4 181.3 ~~~____ 1____ 27.7 59. 25.732__ ____7 55.2 3.5 3. 715 58 2.7 82 5.3 19
1:. sSonrolos505-t22.0 81.1450 1.3 32. #3 ,3f 98 .0 _____
orrentl in Ion,otlo 65.311055.0 5.59.0 1'.5 210 2.3 9.0, 95 .0 8. 5.0 . 4.3 30 .0 3.0 .3 .3 .71. Ocads ___ ___ 15. r r . -r -r -zr ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ 7 ~ -r _a. -oen loose and Otoer I19/CA80I 38.0 110 20 17 710 T 30 . o.o0 7 ~3~* ~r T S 3
b. Road -or El peten" Area -4.5 .0 .5 1.0 .0 1.0 3.0 .0 00 .8 0 . 3 . 3 .7 . 0 . 0 .c1.y.G .. Sad.-Ota Maria Ton -11. .0 11.0 2.0 .30 2.012.0 .0 0 2.3O .0 2. 2.0o1: 2.0 .5o 0.3o 1.0 .0c 1.7D .3~ .3
2. 31c rosot1.5 .7 10.5 3.5 .3 LO .0 43o540 5 .0 4.0 5 .0 .0 . .0 .0 .0 .0 . 3 .a. o.i_ote : 7- T 77T1 -77 -7 -4 77 Th " T7 -7 TI -3 -t7 =T h Th3 -Th -l. Ailr-do - .5 . 3j.5 1.5 .3 1.5 1.0 .0 1.3 1.0 .0 1.0 .0 .0 . .0 .0 .0 . 3 .0 .0
Ono Prenote 71~~~~~~~30.3 213.0 127.3 19.5 9.3 10.2 38.3 2.74 4 050.7 765. 52.2 33.5 18.7 68.6 458.9 227 8.2 5.3 18n~~ r rs -~~~~ -r -n -n -r~~r r r~ r56.3r31~9
TIralee-noo bloc - Th~~~~~- r ThI ThIu TI -TIT -175 Th37 -ETt7 ThI75.Oaio.Esqoltla 7- 7 0 '2 .5 .0 .3 .7 2.0 1.9 .1 2.8 2.3 .2 2.2 2.1 .1 1.7 .9 .0 .3 .0 .0
c. luteoaa-Olloouoa . ~ 0 50 .9 .3 . .0 0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 2.0 1.5 . 2.5 2.3 .2 2.7 1.9 L53.01 Ancor-Oao0elooo - 5~~.5 Z5 37 .0 .7 .I 15 1. .1 2.0 1.9 1 a2. 1.9 .7 1.0 .5 .4 .3 .0 .3
c.301:c~ccto 0
o cc 5.5 5.0 D3 ..0 .0 .0 ..0 .0 .0 .0 . .0 1.5 1. .1 2.5 0.2 .3G.uor--e Isobar - 5. . . 7 . 3 0 .0 .0 3.3 . 2.7 25~ 3 2. 3 2.2 .1 7 .0 .
g. Oocuaoola-'co. Sto Jose -6.2 5.5 .7 .70 .0, .1 3.0 .9 .2 2.0 0.9 .2 2.0 0:8 .2~ 1.3 .9 . .0 .0 .o.leoolntla-Taateoo . ~~9.8 5.5 1.2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .9.2 2.3 2.0 .3 0.0 2.5 .5 3." 3.2 .2
701cr - 5~~~~~~~~3.5 71.8 28.7 15.5 7.8 5.7 30.7 20.0 10.0 10.5 7.7 3.5 8.5 .7 8.5 .09 .0O .3 .0 .0 .0
a. Aircorte -~~~~~~1L -9 -5 7.115 3.7 5j 3 2 12.3 5.8 5.2 23.5 15.5 7.0 20.5 15.-5 5.0 .7.0 25.0 15.3
-. ..a Aurora' - ~~~~170 5.3s 5. 0 .0 . 0 0 . 3.8 2.5 5 3.0 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.011 tb-r . 52 .3 5.'2 1.5' .0 1. 5 2.7 .0o 2.7 .0 .0 .: 2 . 7 .0.57 0 .
5.Porte D .0S7rfcPort IBRD 97.0 55.7 35.0 . .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 3.3 2,8 .2i10.7 o.' .0 1.0 10.3 53 3. 00 1.
oaEloc.- I91RD 27.3 15.3 c73.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 50 .0 .5 0.3 10.5 9.0 1.5 3 .5 37.5 .D 3.5 3.7 .0
ccotru -o 038.D 3.0 2.21.0 2.0 15 1.0 .5 .5 . 3 ., ..0 .0 .0 .3 ' .7. .0 cc. itoer - 1.5 ~~~~~1.5 .5I 15 . 1.'5 .0 .0 .7 .0 .3 .0! .0 .7 .2 .7 .D ~ 0 3 .
indotiflId go90.3 530 05. .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 I , . .0 5.0 3.7 2.2 ' 50 2. 50~O" 50 50
!I:. 2;UNCO3 TIOA0NS 266.9 116.5. 18.3 245.5 123 1. 04. 171 0. 25.2 15.5 - - -__ 1. 590 3. 2. 3.0 55.0 32.1
Ž-soooooliotoecŽstioo- 185.5 1536 3 245.5 12.3 12.2 17. 9%j 7.51ID.5 5.0 4.5.1la j0 , 0 7 .0 a3 3 31. ES5,Slof5tSca.ao 'Io- 7
dlonot toehoefclitine IB8D 29.0 15.3 13. 4.5 2.3 2.2 l .3 .5 .5 .0 . .7 .3 .0 .3 .0 .0 .0 .3 .3 .3
otoo cd rura ur. La. IBRD 55.3 26. 020. 15.0 9.0 5.0 12.5 7.8 5.0 9.5 5.5 4.0 17.3 5.0 5.0 .0 .0 7 .7 .3 .th_ Aolr 230 10.5 5.3 6.5 6.0 0.0 5.5 3.5 1.5 2.0 1.5 .5 .5 D. .3 . .3) .1 .7 .7 .3 .0
An. 18.1 1008 . .0 . . . 3.5 7.6 IL.7 5.5 5.3 27.5 16.8 10.7 59.0 31.1 027.59 73 cO8 3.
ojoolictiln, rual arac- 3.0 20.0 15.3 .3 .0 .3 3 . 3 .7..30 : I 3 1 4O 9 322. inal raio oaee.oo cycoon . 35.0 50.0 25.0 .0 .. 0 0 .55 . .0 3.0 2.0 ?SO 3 2 0 10.0 7.0 3 7 15.7 7,.0 5.3
Qohoc - 51.5 22.5 15.5 .~40 . .0 52 0.5 3. 5.0: 3.0 3.6 . :5 15 57 5. L . .c. jcizcooofind - 8~~~~~5.3 50.3 55.3 .7 .7 .7 .3 .0 .0 3 .3 .0 1.350 5.13175.70 15.7 20. 53.3 37.93 23.7
T.bl. S P OGUAIISHIAl PROPOSED FIXED AND FINYANCIAL PUBLIC TIVESTHll7l PLAN BY PROJECT, 1977-1982-/P
(in million, of qetnelee)
PriNeipOlEeenl Tota1 Proleot or P PO0J E C T I080
S_ ctor Fim neg Pros1 T neBto 19 77 197U 1979 19bO l9YL 1932Pro eot (or ProorA) _ Soorc.e _E. _____ ____Tot_l ________ ,,Nt Forela e 1 Total Foreian lo-aL Total Fornign Locol _ Foreign Loc 1
1V. OUSIN0 A:0I URBALN DEVELMN;T 9 10.9 165.6 345.3 73.5 28.5 45.0 -.2 22.0 49.2 77.9 25.1 52.8 86.5 27.4 59.1 108.3 30.9 7. 4 92.6 31.7 60.9
L ?t7I (hous ngJ - OP.0 0.1. .b S15.U 2.0 I.E 3.2 .1.2 .0 .08.0 1.0 .0 . .4; -44 -44 44 -144 44 -44 -14 =o -. .
2. Lrb., Dee., MiOn. ?roJect. AMD.CABEI 18.0 2.7 15.3 5.9 2.2 3.7 5.4 .5 4.9 3.0 .0 3 0 2.5 .0 2.5 1.2 .0 1.2 .0 .0 .03. Other - 28.9 7.2 21.7 12.4 3.0 9.4 9.0 2.5 6.5 7.5 1.7 5.8 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
rBALe2Aou ID1.?.0 11.'° 3 39.. 15.3 01.153.6 18.6 39.0 67.1. 23.4 44.1. 01.0 27..4 56.6 1.00.1 3 0.9 76.2 92.6 31.7 60.9~~8A80E00 (hoo,60ng) 028 t~~~~~~~~~~ET 3 7 394 1.3 24 d. 35.0 a4.0 27. 570 1091 30. ff 6.2T .
2. HAVI (hoqsing) 245.0 53.0 192.0 19.0 2.0 13.0 26.0 4.0 22.0 34.0 8.0 26.0 50.0 11.0 39.0 68.0 18.0 90.0 52.0 10.0 42.0a. Banio Noellioge
(13,000 onit.) I8ED 43.0 23.0 20.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 8.0 4.0 4.0 14.0 8.0 6.0 12.0 6.0 6.0 S.0 3.0 2.0 .0 .0 .0b. bilsc Daelliogs
(13,M00 unit-) .43.0 .0 43.0 6.0 .0 6.o 6.0 .0 6.0 8.O .0 6.0 8.0 .0 8.0 8.0 .0 8.0 7.0 .0 7.00. 061iD Ine,. D"llings
(13,000 unit.) - 73.0 .0 73.0 9.0 .0 9.o e.o .0 8.0 10.0 .0 10.0 19.0 .0 15.O 20.0 .0 20.0 15.0 .0 19.Od. 2di6 1.lnow Dlelinge V-eOel.n
(1,000 neit.) GoDnne.eot 6.0 .0 6.0 .0 .0 .0 4.0 .0 4.0 2.0 .0 2.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0e. Fat.oe HMo ing ProJect - 80.0 30.0 90.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 15.0 9.0 10.0 35.0 15.0 20.0 30.0 10.0 20.0
3. Wholen-le Karknt ?r,.J.0 - 16.0 11.0 5.0 .0 .0 .0 3.1 3.1 .0 8.0 4.8 3.2 4.0 3.1 .9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .01.. Other 6. 3.8 3.1 2.8 .3 2.5 3.7 3.2 .5 .4. .3 .1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 05. U.ide.tifid 5 9.0 00.0 35.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .7 .0 .0 10.0 5.0 5.0 20.0 5.0 19.0 25.0 1380 1590
V. WATE? SU-PLY 01 0 EIDIA S OE 2313 130.7 100.6 212 13.6 7.6 15.7 11.0 4.7 21.5 14.2 7.3 25 18.0 73. 39.5 22.5 17.0 45.2 21 21.0
1. Ou t09931.fi9SoC,ey92.1. 99.2 37.2 19.7 12.7 7.0 12.2 8.5 3.7 73 4.0 3.3 4.0 3.0 1.0 2.5 1.5 O 0 .0 .0
E.p.e-ifo IDB 24.5 18.0 6.5 4.0 3.0 1.0 7.0 S.0 2.0 9.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 .0 .0 .0 .02. EtPAOUA CABEI 1.0 1.0 .0 .9 .9 .0 .1 .1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 0 .S .0 .S .0 .0 .03. I0080 ID 7.2 3.9 3.3 S.S 3.6 1.9 1.0 .3 .7 7 .0 .7 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0L. otinstry or Poblic
(1029:Pa80) IDB 9.2 6.9 2.4 3.6 2.8 .8 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.6 1.0 .6 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .05. Doya-?io"' y. Aqoedoc 0 900.5 25.9 09.0 5.7 2.4 3.3 .1 .1 .0 0 0 . .0 0 .0 .0 0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
en 138 9 75.S 63.4 1.9 .9 6 3.5 2.5 1.0 11.2 10.2 4 0 21.5 15.2 6.3 37.0 21.0 16.0 45.2 21.2 24.01. Onoerge SycE. p 9ifie
Wt .r.hed - 36.4 25.5 10.9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 6.7 4.6 2.1 12.5 0.7 3.8 10.0 7.0 3.0 7.2 5.2 2.02. Colleotion and freat,t
Plant - North Wlter.h.d - 26.0 18.0 8.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 2.0 1.5 .5 4.0 2.5 1.9 8.0 6.0 2.0 8.0 6.0 2.03. Solid Wont. Dioposal - 8.5 6.5 2.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 3.5 3.0 .S 4.0 3.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 .0 .0 .04. I!IFO _ 3.0 2.0 1.0 .S .4 .1 1.9 1.0 .S 1.0 .6 .4 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .05. Mi.iotrY DI Publi .s1ath
(U3EPAR) (Re-tonoorotionof 'o.I Aiqoedot.) 'IDA 5.0 3.5 1.0 1.0 .S .* 2.0 1.5 .5 1.0 .S .S 1.0 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
6. Yi Water SUpPly S3l.o (Pb... I) - 60.0 20.0 10.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 15.0 S.0 10.0 30.0 10.0 20.0
VI. 011AT0 AND WEFA00 10A.8 112.0 52.8 6.0 2.0 4.0 19.1 11.5 7.6 24.2 18.0 6.2 30.0 22.0 8.0 29.0 21.9 7.5 47.5 29.5 18.0
p9 0 tta0';ei 0 oL'oe10.8 1.9 9 9.0 1.9 3.6 .0 .t6 2.2 .0 2.2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0a. .~~O±n~~y Oo ,Ooano ~~ea10h ADD '-7. -r.7 _i:t '_77 T -77 0 0 4. 4 0 5
2. Other _ 8.2 .0 8.2 2.5 .0 2.5 3.5 .0 3.5 2.2 .0 2.2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1 e 101.0 UO1. 43.5 1.0 . . 19.5 11.5 4.0 22 0 18.0 4.0 30.0 22.0 8.0 29.0 21.5 7.5 47.5 29.5 18 01. Min orf PublLc -Ith _
a. DorolOH6i 31.erv1o66 - 31.0 28.0 .6 .0 .0 .0 9.0 3.0 2.0 6.o 9.O 1.0 8.0 7.0 1.0 8.0 7.0 1.0 7.0 6.0 1.0b. Oth-r - 2.5 2.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 1.9 1.9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
2. ioi,1tr. or ?oblic Mork.a. 0ooO0alt.nngo 8.90pit. - 4.5 3.5 1.0 .0 .0 .o 2.5 2.0 .S 2.0 1.0 .5 .O .0 .0 .0 .0 .o .0 .0 .0b. S. J300 de Dios 0.pit.11 18.0 09.0 3.0 .0 .0 .0 2.0 1.9 .S 3.5 2.5 1.0 6.0 9.0 1.0 6.0 5.5 .5 .5 .5 .00. Other - 8.0 6.5 1.6 1.0 .5 .5 4.0 3.5 .S 3.0 2.5 .S .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
3. I000* 7)Tospitol 7,1 12.0 10.0 2.0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .8 .S 6.0 9.0 1.0 .50 4.5 .5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0b. Hospit.l1 Net II - 09.0 20.0 5.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .S .S 9.0 4.0 1.0 10.0 8.0 2.0
L. Uotid.tifiLd - 90.0 25.0 25.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 9.0 30.0 19.0 15.0
T.bl. 5.9 3UATEMAIA7 �..DPOSED FIXED AND FINAWIAL PMLTC INVES7KENT PLAN BY ?RCJEC7, 1977-11,922
21.. Fl �-i�g Ildl
_-ce,� T-tll F"in L-1 1=1 L-m, L-- -�UTM =-1- N F-i" -- a!
'111. UU"ATIM 126 7 61 2 65 5 11 5 8 5 1� 9 1 -Lti 1.2 -IL�2 24 1 13 5 11 5 28 1 16 5 11
44.2 114.2 30.1 9.5 1.5 6.) 10.) 9.2 '.5 9.' 1.1 8.) 5.0 2.) L.31. W., I?
IBRD 5 7 4 2 2 5 1 0 2 5 1 5 I., 1 5 1 1.7 1.2 .1b. V-1- AID 7:0 I:, 6:0 1:5 I:D :5 .5 1:3 2.0 .) 2.,) 1.5 1.511111�:ty If Ll�,, 11TICAP IDB 10.0 7 .5 2.5 2.5 2.0 5 2 3 1 0 1:�O 2:, 2.1 .5 1.0 .5 .5 2.) �.D i.,U.i "i ty f j.. C-I.. 10 5 10 5 2.3 .0 2:0 2:1 :) 2 2:1 1.,1 :1 I.j 1.� j i.�
0 .9 D I -1I:D :0 1:0 .0 5 5 :1
.5 47.0 35.5 3.5 8.5 5.) '.5 8.5 4.82 l.D 2.5 5.0 �.5 2.5 L.0 18.0 11.5 6.5 28.0 lo.5 1-5
1. MLai�t�y If Ed-ti- AlD -T-� -71 -'" -TT -772. Mi.i�tly If Fbli� A-k,C_ -t i_ I,
.3-.d.'y S,,h..I.� IERD 22.0 14.5 7.q D .0 .0 3.0 2.0 1.0 5-1 3.0 2.) 5.9 3.3 2.0 6.) 5.) 1.) ;.j 1.5C_ '- 'i- If ?ENE-.
AID 5.5 4.D 1.5 .1 .0 .0 .5 l.; 1.0 1.5 1.0 .5 2.0 1.5 .5 i1.5 .3 1.5 1.0 .0 1.0 .5 D .5 .3 .0 .0 .0 D j D
3. .5 10 5 54. U.id-tift.d 45.0 25.0 20:0 :1 .0 .1 a :0 :I .0 .0 10.0 5.0 5-0 25.( '5-5 13:,3
VIII. AGRICULTT.FE - 1- 5 93 4 22 8 - 8 1 27 4 - - 41 0 21 1 17 0 64 0 11 5 1, 5
stel i� E- ti. 12.0 -1�5 IL2 I). 2 L.0 7.1 1.6 L.2 .2 L.9 j D .0 .0 .0k1D/ID3 44 -1" = -= = = = = = = -- N -- 7 = -- 7 -- 7
2. V-i-, AID/IW.D/IDB 9.q .5 9.0 2.2 .2 2 .0 3.1 .1 1.0 4. 2 .2 4.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .) .0
11- 8a.5 -�4 8.6 �.5 4.1 20.? _14 7.8 12.3 7.0 5.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 43.0 26.0 IT.0 64.0 28.5 35.5I-BLUDESA IDB 4.4 =. , -77 -77 -- r� = . -T7 = .3 = .5 -7.7 -7-o -5 -3 D -775 -52, Aui-It-1 �,.dit IBRD 30.0 15.0 15.,) .9 .0 .0 2.0 1.0 1.0 3.3 1.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 L. I 11.0 7.0 �.l S.j3. I-i EX.. (V-i- ) 32.0 23.0 12.0 .1 .0 I b.0 3.0 1.0 6.o 4.D 2.� 6.0 L.0 2.0 9.0 5.0 31.3 8.0 4.j -3
L ix- AID 21 �' 13 � 5 0 2 1) 1 5 1 5 2 D I 0 1.0 3 0 2.0 1 0 6 0 4 0 2.0 6:1 1-1 2:1 2.1 :5 1:15: Ot 2:2 :0 2:2 1:1 :0 :I 1:1 :0 1 1 :0 0 :0 :0 :0 .0 0 .0 0 s6. Zi-'.tifi.d 55.0 30.0 25.0 .3 0 .0 0 .0 :0 0 :0 .0 0 .0 .0 15.0 10.0 5.0 40.0 20.0 20.3
IX. TOGRiv 176 1 " 88 3 5 6 5 5 1 16 5 5 2 8 3 23 5 13 6--LZ 37 0 17 7 19 3 -29 5 19 4 20 1 45 5 22 I 23 0
C 34.5 11.0 1.3 .4 .9 3.7 1.3 2.4 7.5 3.2 L. ) 8.5 .72 5.3 5-1 1.0 4.0 3.0 _LL�,�Mlli IDB -7 D2. kzt ... UNFSCO
mi . r Ed...) (d .. ti-) 30 3 9 0 21 5 4 3:0 1:1 2:1 5 4.D ".0 2.5,:I 2:1 3:1) 3:D 5:0 5.0 I.c
3. Oth.� 2:5 1:2 1:03 :3 :11 :2 2 1 1 0 1 3 1 0 0 .3 D D .3 .0 .0
lh�76 76.8 3.1 L.2 12.8 5.9 5.9 13.4 5.6 28.5 M.5 Ih.0 34.5 16.� 16.1 42,5 22.J 23.5-77 _44 -0 -0 -- - -o -o -3IDB
D .. 1.p-.-. If -Tik.1 11- CABBI 21.7 12.0 9.7 2.0 1.0 l.Cj 7.0 4.0 3.0 7.7 4.0 3.7 5.0 3.0 2.0 .0 .0 .0 D .0b: D-lm-t f 12.0 10.0 2.0 .0 .0 .5 .4 .1 3.0 2.5 .5 3.0 2.6 L 3.0 2.5 .5 2.5 2.0 .5_ oth- 10.3 7.7 2.6 .3 .1 2.0 I .'s .4 1,.o 3.0 1.0 4.0 3.D 1.0 .0 D .0 .0M t- lit.. ?.1k "L. A-.,." 5.6 3.5 2.0 " D 1.3 .9 .4 1.3 .9 .4 i.5 .9 .6 1.5 .6 .0 :j :nD't.r 1.5 .0 1.5 1.0 .0 1.11) .5 .3 .1 .0 .0 .11 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
5. UIid..tifi�d 85.0 40.0 45.0 .0 .3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 15.0 5.0 10.0 30.0 15.0 15.0 40.0 20:'o 20.'D
iJg .. d 1.d-t1y,I-.t-.t..db._ I. g-i.. i- i. by, p..ifi� p-j-t, tt.1 i-.t-.t i. h-, Ith.Wh th. di.b-- .t P-id f th- P-J..t -y t W-1 .. ti-ly ithi. th. 1977-1982 P.�Ud. dh- th.
i, by .9..Y P-U-, t.t.1 i-,t-.t t. i. tho 1977-1982 p-id.
S._- , JERD 12/8/77
11/03/77TABLE 5.10(1A)
GUATEMALA: PUBLIC DEBT, 1967-1976(MILLIONS OF OUETZALES)
_______________________..____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
D I S T R I B U T I O NITEM
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
INTERNAL 101.1 106.9 101.9 109.8 117.9 165.4 201.4 259.5 2B6.3 458.1
FLOATING 14.4 17.9 9.8 20.4 8.4 15.3 23.7 18.5 21.1 71.4BANK LOANS 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 - - - - - -BNDS 82.1 85.7 90.8 88.4 101.6 145.7 170.7 234.5 259.2 380.8OTHER 4.3 3.1 1.0 0.8 8.0 7.5 6.9 6.4 5.9 5.9
EXTERNAL 61.3 75.7 86.1 108.7 114.0 129.3 146.0 150.3 170.3 195.1
LONG TERM 60.6 75.0 85.4 108.0 113.4 128.6 145.3 149.6 169.4 193.1OTHER 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 2.0
TOTAL 162.4 182.6 188.1 218.6 232.0 297.7 347.3 409.7 456.6 653.2
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, BOLETIN ESTADISTICO.
NB: THESE DATA ARE FROM THE DIRECCION DE CONTABILIDAD DEL ESTADO AND EXTERNAL DEBT FIGURES MAY NOT CORRESPOND TO THOSE OF THE IBRDDEBT REPORTING SYSTEM.
11/03/77TABLE 5.10 (19)
GUATEMALA: PUBLIC DEBT. 1967-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
------------------------------------------------------------- __--------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I B U T I O N G R O W T H R A T E SITEM
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 75-76----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------__-----------______---___----_-_---__---___----____-___
INTERNAL 56.6 58.0 63.3 62.7 70.1 42.8 19.5 28.9 10.3 60.0
FLOATING 5.1 6.8 4.5 4.6 10.9 82.1 55.3 - 21.9 14.1 237.7BANK LOANS - - - - -BONDS 49.9 49.1 57.2 56.8 58.3 43.5 17.1 37.4 10.5 46.9OTHER 2.5 2.0 1.6 1.3 0.9 - 7.0 - 6.8 - 7.7 - 7.4 - 0.5
EXTERNAL 43.4 42.0 36.7 37.3 29.9 13.4 12.9 2.9 13.3 14.5
LONG TERM 43.2 41.8 36.5 37.1 29.6 13.4 13.0 3.0 13.2 14.0OTHER 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 11.3 - 0.2 - 6.9 43.5 110.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 28.4 16.7 18.0 11.4 43.1
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, BOLETIN ESTADISTICO.
NB: THESE DATA ARE FROM THE DIRECCION DE CONTABILIDAD DEL ESTADO AND EXTERNAL DEBT FIGURES MAY NOT CORRESPOND TO THOSE OF THE IBRDDEBT REPORTING SYSTEM.
-159-
Page 1 of 2
Table 5.11: allATEMllAi STRUCTUFTE OF THl PUBLIC SECTOR
Yas of Entity Functions Fcaciai ieeourcas
0. Central Governowt The central gsr,n-ent is coposad of the foilonirg broochesl 3alee (etap), in-one, propert enort, Impor, excise1. Legislative Breech and other tanes; also use charges, fee,, and other con-
P.Jodiil Branchremu.3. oecutice Braooh
b Ministries (Foreign Relations, Iterior, Fince and PublicCredit, Defe ee, Ed-cation, Health and Poblie Welfare, laborEconomy, Agriooltcrs, Coaeonhoathen nd Public Works).
. Court of Accountsd. Ilsntxral Counile. Attorney General
II. loca goceronent FPr adninlsnrati-e pe-poes, Gitaala i. divided into 22 depart- The depWtoecete are -its of the central -cerpmeetneots nd 324 aficpaiities, of raryicg esie nd iLprctnce. d hars no indepeode -t ecens. The -ucuiciplities receive
the oruceed, of certei sior tones, eec-ife ctarges, feesand cesuercial and idndtr-al lice-e-e So additloc, pro-eedafron certain taes oilec-d by the control gcoira- t aetaefesrfred e the INFOM for relndiog to the nocicPalltils.The e-cered rveasinclude tones ci beer, gan.lin, andliquor. The nuolcipalitien are c1sc empocered to lsuebonds oe stilacr temse and conditions to th-ie placed by theTfreasury.
III. Autxsacouea*ndeeomi-actnoa5oucentit iee
i1 ilntoersioy of San Carlos National ulniversity Spe:eting euboidy fc' central gverlnrent, equal to aboutprcent of the ordinary fiscal revacuc
2. 3ocil -ecutirity Ccetitute (51SS) The Inetitut. cas established In 1946 acd began -elratione in the Cntrbt- to the eccial security eciene cueber aboot h70,1OGDe-artoent of Guot-talc in 1948; gradually it h.s ectecded its r-one-third of the labor foroe. Sxciu1 eecrity cconribution
-or-ices tc -oet of ths 22 derrtnt ts of ohs cot utry. -re equaralest to 13.5 perceot of tho ineured pereo 1s salary,The Inetitut p-rcides (a) medical care and ac.h bei-fite ffr of uhieh 3 parnent is pyable by the employ.e, 7 peroent byeMpicyme-t connected ac-idante, nd (b) medical c-rs for the enlloyer aed 3.5 percent by the Stte. I. the ea ef
- matereity cas.e in the Depar-etet of GuatoIa, Slime November pobic e-ployees,e e Stte -ntribtee 3.5 Percent as eployer-1968, the loetitote hoe else VrotIded cedical are fcr erdicacy The lorerneant lee not contribated regularly its shtres os Stainille..s in the Departrt of uatonial. and .e etpley. r cZtribotioD for f oternity case comeraga are
6 p-rcect of the olaryof i the ndured pen, of ahe ic 2 p-ercet is paid by the e-I.o. antid per ccct by cthe -epIoyr.-
3 National icosng Bank (BANVI) Co.s.cctice of ice--oet ho-itg. (Succeeded INI in July 1973.) I-neste..ct copenditure a-re fin nced b e a lcrer-neflttracefere.s
4. Inetitte of Agraian Transfrnatton (INTA) Land redietribtion and settlement aetiotie. Mainly central gcverns3ct tr-aufer.
5. a-tieal Forestry Institute (INAFOR) Forest age.nt, inciudig contr-l of 1-eb-riag operstioca fainly control got- r1oset tr-f-ers.sed refores-atio- progrs th-ougheut Glutomala .ocept Peten
6. Li-estok De-elp-ent Frogr-a (FRODEGA) Cre-ted as the executing agency for af IBRD-financed li-eetuck Obtine resouro.s -r,on the Kitietry of Agrirclti-e andproJect, PRODEOA pov-ids credit and teohn.ial assstance to capital f-on the IMiD lcan.li-estoek preducers.
7. Nationl Agicultural Die-lop-ent Bahk (BANDESA) Ma.tetins tee eiodous, one for traditionl agrioultural production entr-l goveronect tranefere, interest on loaoe madeoredits ce mars or tees c-nnercisi tense, and one for trust fuede redi-counting fadiliten cith Bank of -uate-sia, and erternalfor s-elS-scale frmers aH hoeseig. Ica,.
3. National Agricaltur-l Mur-ektig 1ntitete (INDECA) Buys and se11s basic grati (corn, cheat, rice and eorghbe) ti Central g-verirtnt trans-frs nd ertarnal credit.stabilile d-tesoic prices. Operaste ohit of silos throegheutcountry.
9. e-titoue f AgaICTt)ur Oca- ad Operates agrccuturaf enper.net statione nd done onteesin i a --y ceotral goercnent tran.fere.fehnielegy (ICTJL) service -rk.
Page 2 of 2
Table 5.11: GUATEK{ALA: STRUCThtiR OF THE PUBLIC SECTCR
Nns of Entity Fovctions Financial Renorcee
III Antnnomous and semi-autonmo-s entities (-nt'd.)
10. Cooperatives Intitote Fosters development of agrin,ltoral cooper.tive. Central goverPonm,t transfers
11. Peten Development Ag.noy (FPDEP) Development of egrinsltural, forestry, and tearist resnorose of Mainly .entral government transfers. Legally attaonenthe Petse, a large nd sparsely settled departzest in the to the Ministry of National Defense.merth of the country.
12. National Plannig Counoil (CNPE) Preparation of development plans. Central govercemnt trensfers.
13. Gt lannalse Toorie Institote (INGUAT) Promotion of touris. T-os on lodging nd travel.
11. National Sports Federation (CDAG) Progmtion of physical education and ceordination of sport Central governoent tranfer.activity in the -o=stry.
15. Workers Recreation Institute (IRTRA) Establishing social ad reoreatinal senters for vorier. Ts on recreational ectivities.
16. NationalI n-eitute of Adcinietration (INAG) Technicel traieiog for goosroment nkaere in administrative Ceotrel government tr-nfre. and -ontribation freeUSID.
17. Technicl Institote far Training nd Training and tschnicel aseisteone Central goesrusent tranfers.Prodactivity (INTEOP)
1h. Permanent GCunittee of Eoponitions (CIPEREX) Promotion, exhibitine and salos of indostrial produts. Central goverancot tr-nsfers.
19. Soperintenden.y of Backs Sfpervision o finan-ial inetitutions. Quotes on the individual finencinl institutions.
20. Military Penions Institote (IPM) ProeSoisirsof peo nino and otter pajsetnt in military seo, Conrtlb.tions of participant., nd central gcvrnrmttheir fenilies or suvvr,transfers.
21. G-oatelan Eport Progotioc Institote (GUATEXPRO) Promotion of non-traditioal enports. Central goorersnt treofera.
IV. Pblio Enterprises
1. Nitional Electricity Inatitote (INDE) INDE is the most importt of the poblin coterprises It Receipts fron colon of sinotriity, loan from IBSDdistributes directly ess then 10 permnst of its output; th and transfers from contral gcrernment.restin.edr is distributed throogh EEGSA nd municipal osVpanies.
2. Gatemalan Electricity Enterprise (EEG) Forerly foreige, sitne 1972 gover"vent-omed. Largest Re.eipto from saeIs of eotrmnitydistributor of elsotrimity in GPuteal. some 70 percent ofit. total sales of electricity is bo-ght from INTE.
3. GCutn ai Telnoesv- ni-ntions Administration Opomation of 11 national and internati-nnl tel somonoications Chnrgss for ri(GUATEL) vith e..eptino of dome-tic tolegreph eroics.
4. Sante T-as do C-still. Part Authority Me-ng-enst of thi est i portat seaport on thi Atlntic, Chg r evihandling over 25 peroen. of the oontry's trade.
5. Cha.psrico National Port Authority Manages..t of thi Pacific seaport. Charges for servioss
S. Guctonlan Airlioms (AVIATECA) Rational and international airline servie ftor passengers Charges for services and nentral government trnsfers.and cago.
7. Goatonalan Rilnays (FEGUA) Opre.tion of railnay netark ionn oting G.atenala City nd Charges for services and central goernent trafrs.Chanperioc on the Poifric, and tie main line vith othte citiesoor Salvadoras horders. Until mid-1962 this mnatork coo operatedhy the Ieterrational Railsay of Central America (IRCA).
8. Mono.ipal D-eolopsmnt ID-titote (INFoM) T.shoical end finnoial a tsiemonos in nucicipalities Charges fr loans, loans from innernatinal agencies,and transfers from nontral goernsent.
9. Milk Products Processing Plant (PROLAC) Nope and sell milk and dairy products, operates prones.nig and Fin aially espprtidehydrating plants, and provides linited te-hoical -seistaneoto dairy far.er.
Notn, 1. Se Statistical Appendin Table 6.5 for public nn-n.ial enitftei ot ter th de-lopsent banis.2. EInlodod froc tie pr-scnt list are aboot sin de.entralic.d notities of lesIer .. o rtane.
S-r-es Ministry of Fin-co mnd IH. 7/7/77
-161-
stlOe 0.1 7IATIMALA: IIOOAFY ACCCUNTS .; T:1 FI9AN1CiL 1 YSF!, .172-r
:io nillion- of quet-sles)
Prel. F> 1972 1973 1974 II'5 19Th 1t2 V9 .9Th 1995 17a
C. Bank of Guate-.ma II. Co--eno- ol and ' ,rlopd r.t lanks
lnteonatoo-al reserves, net 137.6 213.6 188.4 298.6 515.1 International reserves, set -2.9 -al -2.1 -3,- _.Assets 1402 220.5 23F 309.7 519.0 Assets 5. 3 7 l1 3.2
or enlot.: Holdings o'f SD3s 8.3 13.9 13.8 13.5 13.6 LiabIlities, short-tern -3.1 -11.7 -i.5 -1.0 -. ":Liabilities, short-tern -2.6 -6.7 -13.4 -11.1 -3.9
Domestic .ssets 105.6 62.8 125.6 96.5 b.69 Cash in vaults 9.3 12.1 0 17_ I;Credit to Centrsl Gooven3ent, net 45.7 27.5 74T. 37.3 86.0 eserve deposits 91.1 103.5 .0 27-4.
Credit 70.0 55.5 125.3 102.7 200.3 Other 9., 0.1 o. 1 0.1Depos-it -24.3 -28.0 -50.5 -65.4 -114.3
Credit to reat of publie neotor, set 3.4 -3.1 5.7 10.1 -11.0 Doewstic assets - 353.6 419 48o 0 59641 72.0Credit 10.2 7.4 17.8 27.5 15.8 Credit to Cestral. Goer-nent, set 7 88.1 T 9'._ 99.9Deponits -6.8 -10.5 -12.1 -17.4 -27.5 Credit to rest of piblic seotor, net 7.2 -15 .1.5 -7 -L.9
lffio-sl onpital and reserves -10.3 -10.3 -19.4 -ii.6 -32.0 Credit 11.9 2.3 9 L 1.J 1.9Crealt to financial -ntermediaries 37.7 29.7 i8.8 50.6 14.1 Deposi
ts- -3.7 -3.8 -2.9 -6 -: 5
To -os -eroial bhaka 28.4 24.6 28.6 25.4 4.1 Offitial capital and reserves -16.7 -23-5 -9rJ I -4D -4-To deoeloprent i-ntitotions 9.3 5.1 10.1 25.1 8.5 Credit to private sector 272.0 305 . 400.2 -54 '7;.To nonbank inter-ediaries (C0RFIPA) -- -- 0.1 0.1 1.5 Unolassified assets, net 36.5 50.3 5c.6 89.7 95,
Suhscriptions to isterational Assets 57.' 79.6 86.4 135._' 35 2agencies, net 9.8 9.5 13.6 15.3 22.7 Liabilities -21.2 -29.3 -29.8 -15.5 -36.6
Jnolassified assets, net 19.3 9.5 3.1 -5.2 7.8Assets 21.2 23.0 29.1 26.1 -3 0. Forein liabilities (medium- sndLimo.iioties -1.9 -13.5 -06.3 -91.3 -8.0 log-es) l gb* 9.1 9.1 19.12
Allocation of SDRS 12.9 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 Liabilities to Bank of Goatemala 29.2 21.0 31.4 45.e 13.
Foreign liabilities (medium- and Liabilities to nosbhnk istermediaries 3.9 6.8 5.3 53 13.2long-tern) .16.5 10.2 8.3 36.8 60.2 lir5 7
5iabiliiStn9np. e175 193023.7 .9 1790.7 291.9Liabilities tn banking i-stitutions 100.2 115.4 134.1 69.4 2S d 61 Cash in v&at.o 9.3 12.1 131 187 18.6 Time and savings deposits 271.1 33.40. 78.. 651.1Resery? deposits 90.6 103.2 118.2 152.6 272.4 Secorities 0.8 0.7 c.6 0.6 o.6Other- 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 c.6 Capital and reserves 41.4 44.7 51.9 55.9 72.6
Less: Deposits of n..nbankLiabilities to nacnbek intermedoanies -- . 0.2 0.5 0.6 inses't ediaries -3.9 -6.8 -5.3 -3.3 -15.-
Csc'resoy in circulation 113.6 136.6 157.2 174.2 15 4 22
-162.
Page 2 of 2
Table 6.1: GUATEYVAIA: SUMMAhY ACCOUNTS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTE:M, 1972-1976
(in millioas of quetzalea)
Prel. Prel.1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1972 1973 1971 1975 1976
III. Consolidated Banking Systes V. Cossol idated Financial System
Ieternational reserves, net 134.8 209.4 183.4 294.8 506.7 Net internatiosal reasr- es of theAssets i45.5 227.8 213.2 318.5 534.7 banking system 134.8 209.4 193.b 291.8 506.7Liabilities, short-tern -10.7 -18.4 -29.8 -23.7 -28.0
Domestic asseta 4-73.7 503.8 631.6 724.4 877.6Do-estic assets 430.7 461.4 575.1 648.6 797.3 Credit to Central Goversaent, set IS 6.6 124.9 145.5 81T77 05.6Credit to Central Government, net 100.3 115.7 133.T 132.6 195.9 Credit to rest of public sector, net 11.0 -4.2 0.9 6.2 -15.8Credit to rest of public sector, net lo.6 -4.6 00.3 5.6 -16.6 Official capltal and reserves -45.7 -56.6 -71.3 -96.0 -130.2Official capital sad resqyves -27.0 -33.8 -40.5 -52.5 -76.4 Credit to private sector 320.9 356.6 474.9 551.1 691.0Credit to private ssotor- 272.0 305.9 400.2 456.8 575.3 Sbscriptions to internation.alSub-cription to international agencies, net 9.8 9.5 13.6 15.3 22.7
agencies, set 9.8 9.5 13.6 15.3 22.7 Unclassified assets, net 62.1 64.6 62.9 95.1 1O3.1U-clasified a.ssets, net 56.0 59.7 59.8 84.6 106.2 Interbank float 9.0 9.0 8.1 6.2 0.2Interbank float 9.0 9.0 8.1 6.2 0.2
Foreign liabilities 45.1 40.9 41.6 69., 4TAllocation of SDPs 12.9 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 Allocations of SDBs 12.9 11.3 I 4.3 14.3 14.3
Foreign linlilifies of nonbaskForeign liabilities (sedins snd interaediariest' 4.6 6.6 9.6 9.8 10.0
long-term) 27.6 20.0 17.7 45.8 70.4 Median and long-term foreign liab. 27.6 20.0 17.7 45.8 70.4
Liabilities to nosbank intermediaries 3.9 6.9 5.5 8.8 13.8 Liabilities to private asetor CM3) 563.4 672.2 776.3 949.3 1.289.6Mosey M1 ,) 211.4 20.3 299.3 348.6 95.1
Liabilities to peivate sector 521.1 629.5 720.9 874.4 1,205.5 Time and other depositnU 274.2 333.8 379.0 483.5 657.0Currency in cijyolation il3.6 136.6 157.2 174.2 235.2 Less: Deposits of nonbanh istermed. -3.9 -6.9 -5.5 -8.8 -13.8Sight deposits- 97.8 123.7 142.1 174.4 259.9 Securities 7/ 1.8 0.7 0.6 o.6 o.6Time and savings deposits 271.4 330.7 374.6 478.1 651.0 Capital and reserves- 80.9 84.3 102.9 125.4 150.7Sec,rities 9.8 0.7 o.6 o.6 o.6Capital and reserves 41.4 44.7 51.9 55.9 72.6Less: Cash in vaults sad deposits of ,/ Sinking fand and foreign exchasge deposits.
nonbank intermediaries -3.9 -6.9 -5.5 -8.8 -13.8 j Includes mortgage bonds.i Includes foreign esehange deposits.
IV. Nosbank Financial Intermediaries 4/ Includes credit to CORFINA (nonbank financial intermediary); see Bank ofG.atemala.
Foreign liabilitie_5/ -4.6 -6.6 -9.6 -9.8 -10.0 5/ Ns term available.
__rr-ysod do.iti _9 6. _____ __13 8 Tf 1-clodes "other liabilities' of ..cnbak intermediaries.Currenoy sad deposits 3.9...% 6.9 5.5 8.8 13.8 1/ Inolodes technical and anthematical reserves.BSnk of G-stemala -- 0.1 0.2 0.5 O.Corc=ercial banks 3.9 6.8 5.3 8.3 13.2 Source: Bank of Goatemala and IMN.
Domestic assets 43.0 42.4 59.5 75.8 8o.3Credit to Central Govern3ent, net 6.3 9.2 11.9 13.6 19.7Credit ts rest of public -ector, net 0.4 0.4 o.6 o.6 o.8Official capital sod reserves -18.7 -22.8 -30.8 -43.5 -53.8Credit to private sector 48.9 50.7 74.7 94.3 117.2Unclassified assets, net 6.1 4.9 3.1 10.8 -3.6
Liabilities to private sector 42.3 42.7 55.4 74.9 84.1Savings deposits 0.2 0T, 0.5 0W6 0.3Capital and reserves 21.7 19.5 26.o 32.5 36.9Technical and mathematical reserves 17.8 20.1 25.0 37.0 41.2Other 2.6 2.7 3.9 4.8 5.7
11/07/77TABLE 6.2
GUATEMALA: FINANCING CAPACITY OF THE BANKING SYSTEM, 1967-1976(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
D I S T R I B U T I O NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
ASSETS 299.5 332.9 370.1 410.0 463.5 565.5 670.8 758.5 943.4 1.304.0
NET INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 35.4 37.6 47.3 76.4 87.9 134.8 209.4 183.4 294.8 506.7
DOMESTIC ASSETS 264.1 295.3 322.8 333.6 375.6 430.7 461.4 575.1 648.6 797.3CREDIT TO PUBLIC SECTOR 35.1 38.3 42.7 40.2 75.3 110.9 111.1 133.9 138.2 169.3
CENTRAL GOVT. 48.1 46.8 50.7 44.8 65.7 100.3 115.7 133.6 132.6 185.9REST OF PUBLIC SECTOR . -13.0 -6.5 -6.0 -4.6 9.6 10.6 -4.6 0.3 5.6 -16.6
CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR 199.4 219.2 234.9 241.8 251.1 272.0 305.9 400.2 456.8 575.3SUBSCRIPTIONS TO INTL. ORG 10.8 6.1 9.5 10.5 10.5 9.8 9.5 13.6 15.3 22.7OTHER ASSETS, NET 18.6 29.7 35.7 41.1 36.7 38.0 34.9 27.4 38.3 30.0
LIABILITIES 299.5 332.9 370.1 410.0 463.5 565.5 670.8 758.5 943.4 1,304.0
MONEY 145.6 150.9 161.3 173.2 178.4 211.4 260.4 299.4 348.7 495.1QUASI-MONEY 112.2 129.7 153.6 176.9 210.6 271.4 330.7 374.6 478.1 651.0FOREIGN LIABILITIES, MWLT 20.0 24.1 24.6 24.2 31.3 27.6 20.0 17.7 45.6 70.4OTHER LIABILITIES 21.7 28.2 30.2 35.7 43.2 55.1 59.7 66.8 70.6 67.5
--SELECTEO INDICATORS--
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1,452.0 1,562.0 1,706.0 1,904.0 1,983.8 2,101.6 2,569.3 3,161.5 3,646.0 4,363.1MONEY/GDP (%) 10.0 9.7 9.5 9.1 9.0 10.1 10.1 9.5 9.6 11.3QUASI-MONEY/GOP (X) 7.7 8.3 9.0 9.3 10.6 12.9 12.9 11.8 13.1 14.9TOTAL LIQUID ASSETS/GDP (X) 17.8 18.0 16.5 18.4 19.6 23.0 23.0 21.3 22.7 26.3SOURCE------------------------------------BAN----------------------_OF------- __-----GUATEMALA-------------------------------------
SOURCE! BANK OF GUATEMALA
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PAGE 1 OF 211/07/77
TABLE 6.3GUATEMALA: CONSOLIDATED BANKING SYSTEM - SELECTED INDICATORS, 1967-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
D I S t R I B U T IO NITE----
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
ASSETS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES,NET 11.8 11.3 12.8 18.6 19.0 23.8 31.2 24.2 31.2 36.9DOMESTIC 88.2 88.7 67.2 81.4 81.0 76.2 68.8 75.8 68.8 61.1
CREDIT TO PUBLIC SECTOR 11.7 11.5 11.5 9.B 16.2 19.6 16.6 17.7 14.6 13.0CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR 66.6 65.8 63.5 59.0 54.2 48.1 45.6 52.B 48.4 44.1OTHER 9.9 11.4 12.2 12.6 10.6 8.5 6.6 5.4 5.7 4.0
LIABILITIES 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10o.0
MONEY (MI) 48.6 45.3 43.6 42.2 38.5 37.4 38.6 39.5 37.0 38.0CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION 27.5 25.1 24.6 23.5 21.3 20.1 20.4 20.7 18.5 18.0SIGHT DEPOSITS 21.1 20.3 19.0 18.8 17.2 17.3 18.4 18.7 18.5 19.9
MONEY 6 QUASI-MONEY 86.1 64.3 85.1 85.4 83.9 85.4 86.1 88.9 87.6 87.9OF WHICH QUASI-MONEY 37.5 39.0 41.6 43.1 45.4 48.0 49.3 49.4 50.7 49.9
OTHER 13.9 15.7 14.9 14.6 16.1 14.6 11.9 11.1 12.4 12.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------- __-----__-----------------------------_---_-__---------------
G R O W T H R A T E SITEM ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
66-67 67-68 68-69 69-70 70-71 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 75-76______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________--____
ASSETS 6.6 11.2 11.2 10.8 13.0 22.0 18.6 13.1 24.4 38.2-- - -------- -- - - -- ---- --- -- - - - -- __- -- __ --------- --- ___ _____ ----- __ ----- __ ______ ___- _____
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES,NET - 13.4 6.2 25.8 61.5 15.1 53.4 55.3 - 12.4 60.7 71.9DOMESTIC 10.3 11.8 9.3 3.3 12.6 14.7 7.1 24.6 12.B 22.9
CREDIT TO PUBLIC SECTOR 2.6 9.1 11,5 - 5.9 B7.3 47.3 0.2 20.5 3.2 22.5CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR 12.0 9.9 7.2 2.9 3.8 8.3 12.5 30.8 14.1 25.9OTHER 6.4 27.7 19.6 14.2 - 4.7 - 2.6 - 7.1 - 7.7 30.7 - 1.7
LIABILITIES 6.8 11.2 11.2 10.8 13.0 22.0 18.6 13.1 24.4 38.2
MONEY (Ml) 3.5 3.6 6.9 7.4 3.0 18.5 23.2 15.0 16.5 42.0CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION 1.7 1.1 9.0 5.9 2.3 15.3 20.3 15.1 10.8 34.9SIGHT DEPOSITS 5.9 7.0 4.3 9.2 3.9 22.4 26.5 14.9 22.7 49.0
MONEY 6 QUASI-MONEY 7.7 8.8 12.3 11.1 11.1 24.1 22.4 14.0 22.7 38.63F WHICH QUASI-MON2Y 13.8 15.6 18.6 15.0 19.1 28.9 21.8 13.3 27.6 36.2
OTHER 1.5 25.4 5.2 8.9 24.4 11.0 - 3.6 6.0 38.0 35.4
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PAGE 2 OF 211/07/77
TABLE 6.3GUATEMALA: CONSOLIDATED BANKING SYSTEM - SELECTED INDICATORS. 1967-1976
(PERCENTAGES)
----------------------------------------------------- __----------------------__----------------------------------------------------_
G R O W T H S H A R E SITEM ------------------------------------ ___ -7_____________________________________________________
66-67 67-68 68-69 69-70 70-71 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 75-76______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________--____
ASSETS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 000.0 100.0 100.0
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES.NET - 28.8 6.6 28.1 72.9 21.5 46.0 70.8 - 29.6 60.2 58.8
DOMESTIC 128.8 93.4 73.9 27.1 78.5 54.0 29.2 129.6 39.8 41.2
CREDIT TO PUBLIC SECTOR 4.7 9.6 11.B - 6.3 65.6 34.9 0.2 26.0 2.3 8.6
CREDIT TO PRIVAtE SECTOR 112.0 59.3 42.2 17.3 17.4 20.5 32.2 107.5 30.6 32.9
OTHER 12.0 24.6 19.9 16.0 - 4.5 - 1.4 - 3.2 - 3.9 6.8 - 0.2
LIABILITIES 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 °00.0 100.0 ¶00.0…________ --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- -- - -----
MONEY (MI) 25.7 15.9 28.0 29.8 9.7 32.4 46.5 44.5 26.7 40.6
CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION 7.3 2.7 20.2 13.5 4.1 14.8 21.9 23.5 9.2 16.9
SIGHT OEPOSITS 18.3 13.2 7.8 16.3 5.6 17.5 24.6 21.0 17.5 23.7
MONEY & QUASI-MONEY 96.9 68.3 92.7 87.7 72.7 92.0 102.8 %4.5 62.6 88.5
OF WHICH QUASI-MONEY 71.2 52.4 64.8 57.9 63.0 59.6 56.3 50.1 56.0 47.9
OTHER 3.1 31.7 7.3 12.3 27.3 8.0 - 2.8 5.5 f7.4 11.5
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________--____
G R 0 W T H (MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
ITEM66-67 67-68 68-69 69-70 70-71 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 75-76
ASSETS 19.1 33.4 37.2 39.9 53.5 102.0 105.3 87.7 184.9 360.6
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES,NET 5.5 2.2 9.7 29.1 11.5 46.9 74.6 -26.0 111.4 211.9
DOMESTIC 24.6 31.2 27.5 10.8 42.0 55.1 30.7 113.7 73.5 148.7
CREDIT TO PUBLIC SECTOR 0.9 3.2 4.4 -2.5 35.1 35.6 0.2 22.9 4.3 31.1
CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR 21.4 19.8 15.7 6.9 9.3 20.9 33.9 94.3 56.6 118.5
OTHER 2.3 8.2 7.4 6.4 -2.4 -1.4 -3.4 -3.4 12.6 -0.9
LIABILITIES 19.1 33.4 37.2 39.9 53.5 102.0 105.3 87.7 184.9 360.6
MONEY (MI), 4.9 5.3 10.4 11.9 5.2 33.0 49.0 39.0 49.3 146.4
CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION 1.4 0.9 1.5 5.4 2.2 15.1 23.1 20.6 17.0 60.9
SIGHT DEPOSITS 3.5 4.4 2.9 6.5 3.0 17.9 25.9 18.4 32.3 85.5
MONEY & QUASI-MONEY 18.5 22.8 34.5 35.0 38.9 93.8 108.3 82.9 152.8 319.3
OF WHICH QUASI-MONEY 13.6 17.5 24.1 23.1 33.7 60.8 59.3 43.9 103.5 172.9
OTHER 0.6 10.6 2.7 4.9 14.6 8.2 -3.0 4.8 32.1 41.3
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA ANO TABLE 602-A
-166-
11/10/77TABLE 6.4
GUATEMALA: GROSS NEW LENDING OF BANKING SYSTEM BY PURPOSE TO PRIVATE SECTOR(MILLIONS OF OUETZALES)
-------------------------------------------------------------_--__---_-----_-__----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I B U T I O NSECTOR ----------------- _ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
AGRICULTURE 47.9 52.1 56.1 55.3 48.4 56.3 66.5 106.9 105.5 104.4COFFEE 14.6 13.5 17.1 17.6 14.7 15.3 15.2 20.6 19.9COTTON 15.6 16.4 17.9 18.0 14.1 15.3 21.1 40.8 23.6SUGARCANE 4.1 4.1 2.7 3.2 3.1 4.9 4.8 6.4 10.7 -CORN 0.5 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.5 2.4 12.1 20.3 -BEANS 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.9 -RICE 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.9 3.3 -LIVESTOCK 10.3 12.4 12.4 11.7 12.8 15.2 17.5 18.0 17.7OTHER 2.5 4.6 4.4 3.8 2.7 3.6 4.7 7.3 8.1 _
MANUFACTURING 28.2 32.0 44.6 44.6 52.3 52.1 64.1 122.6 122.9 129.3
CONSTRUCTION 8.2 10.6 14.4 16.3 17.7 17.8 19.6 27.3 14.4 62.9
COMMERCE 18.9 24.5 26.8 30.1 37.8 37.2 40.0 58.1 58.2 60.2
OTHER 6.8 7.2 10.0 10.5 13.6 15.1 11.8 11.6 41.4 36.1
TOTAL 110.0 126.4 151.9 156.8 169.8 178.5 202.0 326.5 342.4 392.9.-.. ......... =-. .sa-- . -. .... -- ws ssss ......... ........ ........... .... =.... ......... ......... ......... ....................----
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA, BOLETIN ESTADISTICO.
-167-
Pag. 1 of 3
Tebis 6.5, ouATw.AfA BThIItm Or TI mAciLL sami
uses Of 3atiby O p0rm Breach Functions d Strnctureof ooetsals of total Offloe
Total Fpinacial Systm 2.126.6 100.0
BhOd.. Snt_ 1913 4 SsOO
1. Bank of Ooatlsel 801.6 37.7 31 The Bank ha. al tho norl fooctioo od posero of a cootrol bank uith reg-rd to the issof currency, relation Idth the rest of the b.oking syt, and control of its internationalreseue. Tb. Boak - established in 1945, but it. cherter hbo boo. r-eised -sor.l tic...The last of th. aodifil.tions be, off-ti-e cn Ootob.r 1, 1967.
Th. 8mk ts adeini.t-rd bya Mlonetary Beard, ooooi.tig of a prosident, . i-o-p-otdont,aod nko other dirioto-r. Th.. iooldo the oinisters of Fono, E-oaony od Agrilutoe,oho sre ex-oTfi.o; and roprentotiveo of the Univ-roity of S.. Carlos, the atet btnka, thepri-te book., od thb r.oogoisd ro-ial, iodotrial, ood .gri .torl .ooiatinoa Thepresident, vioe-Preident, acd the rproesentative of th. Uniersity of So, Carlos oreappoittd by the OoG-r,ent, nd their tr,eo of ffice lat fofo years. The othbr oppointeddirsetor. 51 cho0en by their rsapeptivo Oo tor. 0d they r fo co year.
2. Co rcial Book. 984.7 46.3
Public
a. BLnco Credito Hipotecerio koiojol 101.4 4.8 15 The Nationel Mortgage Bonk started opooationa In 1940. It is tateto-end nd operate.priearily ase o crci-l od agriul trt l bok.
S_i -P.blic
b. Uno de loo Trobejadoreo 13.1 0.6 2 The Workers' Book is a si-offici.l book bhioh c established to-crd tha end of 1965 forthe prpo.- of protiag .11 -. i0g. cod pro-idiog crodit for -orhere' organiz tions endiodividoolo. Ome fouorth of ito copit.1 is proided by th. Gover,ot od the r-in.der bypayroll dd tine O frn 12 itployees of the pblic cd prit se *ct,.S enrning sore thaQ 60 a -ota.
c. Bnco Indutrial 159.0 7.5 3 The Indoutrial Boak is capitelized oodeo legal dispooitions vhibh -cqn1re thot ail fi.be-fittintg fro. aeptio.s of isport dotIs onder the Industrial Iooenti,os L.. -ro todeposit the qivPl-lnt of 10 p.rc-ot of th.e .coted dbtios for tha Indotril Book or
5paroeot for C00Frl inot a special 00000t 00th the Book of OoOtale. Theco dopootto 0r0
p-riodioafly torned o-r to the IUdestriel Bank, bhich in turn iosa. nooredseable oh r.to the depositors. The Boak is opovered to uodertake tha seol operetiono of a oroiclboak, as . il 00 lmog-teo. indostrial ortgo lpoos, hot to date it. op.r-tioso ha.cono.totd chiefly of tho--y... 10.- to indoatrial fi- h.hoio prodoe iepoot-oob.titotieggoode, d octribtot to regional trade or exports to the reot of th vorld.
d. Banco del LsJrcito 54.0 2.5 4 Th. Bnco d.l Ieroito is copitalioed onder proosiotc of Decre. No. 4o of May i9n, vhichroquir. the Military Pension Food to contribute 51 perocet of th. paid in capital. Th.Ary p ffitor - cti d,ty o rn qi,J d to oootribot a .. osh of their salary for tbhcapit.lisatio. of this book, cod tae nomilitary private aaeotr say eloo cotribots.
-iii.
Tabl 6.5 G0AT1ULA. STRUCTOUtE OF r2E FINANCIAL SY1STEM Page 2 of 3
- ~~~~~~~~~~~Total As5st: One. 31. 1987SBane of Entity In millions As percent Brnch Fanotion- and str-ctornof qoetoalfs of total Offices
Pr-tlat
e. Bano del Agro 79.4 3.7 12 A priv-te, toataaaln.mOed bonk.
f. 3-no Agricola M-rcottil 123.2 5.8 8 A private, G-tnaloned bank.
g. Bnco do Ocidents 81.1 3.8 8 A private, G,steman1aoend bank.
h. Banco de Granci Y To-o.n 112.6 5.3 16 A private, G-tsanalao-ooned bapk.
i. B-co I- 1obiliario 79.6 3.7 13 A privat., 3vatoelan-ed bonk.
J. B0nk of Londo. and Iontreal 87.8 14.1 6 A branoh of a foreign-oed bank b.e.d in tie Baa.
k. S nk of boori-o 68.1 3.2 2 A brmnoh of fareigo-oned bank boeed in the United States.
1. 8... Internccional 25.1 1.2 ... k private bank establisbed in JrlY 1976, oith 25S particip.tion of 8.000 do Iberia, Op.a.3. Develop,et baoks 127.1 6.
a. B-no Naclo-al do Dnoarrollo Agricola 66.3 3.1 35 The Agriculitrl DLopont Book o established In Decenber 1970 nd started operatioos(SANDESA) in A'ril i9n, vhen it took over the agricoltural credit operations of the 1n-titute for tneDsvPloTosnnt of Prodootion (IWP) nd of the National Agrarian Baok (BHA). The pricestabiliti.otic. program provi-nsly andinister-d by tbb INFOP bays boon transfrfred to tinUational Instiute for the Cosr.iroialioation of Agricoltora1 Pro-bhe (fNlhEA) -d th.e tat-ocod plantationa operted by the BRA6 kne b.no tranoferrd to the Raticnal I..tltote forAgrarian 1rr-fontion (INTA).
The Ohiof *oron- of fonds of BAINEA ore ceontral bank rodiscoants, ,adic-ten foreign loans.h.-nled thrHagh tbe Bak of Gnatmoala, .. pit.1 ... ntribatbims fr the Goreroet (8601286'satbhoried Capital is Q 12 nillion) nd doesitta -rvred free the-riae f thp en-t-tor,
b. B co l-acooi-I do 1. Vivianda (BANVI) 60.8 2.9 2 The Nation-l Ho-eing Bank ao -stabliekhd in Fsbroary 1973 and startnd operoti.ns in July1973. BANVI took over nl. the operations preobionly perfo.-ed by Ii0. The =nin scores offonds of BANVI are mdi.ao-ters foreign loans channeled through the Bonk of Gat-la andcapital cootribotion, fr-c the Goveron,nt. BANVI is engaged ie the pr-otion of .edi-- nndlow-incre bowhing coo5truotion
lc9-
Page 3 of 3
Toble 6.5: GUIATfEIAIk sTRm=E OF THE FINANCIL STSTEM
Total Assets: Dec. 31. 1976Nkm of Entity n million. A. percnt Brnch Functions nd 3tructor
of quetals of total OMlions
Nonbank Finaneial Intermediaries 213.2 10.0
1. Finance Canpenlen 37.7 1.8
a. Private 26.2 1.2 Since 1964, private finance coapanies have boeen alloed to operate in the provision of(FIASA-FIOGA) long-term developnt loans to industry nd agriculture, pr-nided that they ae idpmodnt
of the in_rnial banks. There re presntly too private finanoe uspenies: the FinancieraIndustrial Goteaultsea (FIGSA) nd the Finnoier Industrial Agropeuaria (FlASA). Moatof their resources deriv frm capita1 uhbcriptions, but thm FIASA, since it. establiehwntin 1969, ha. also oe d foreign lines of cerdit.
b. Public 11.5 0.5 The National Fina Corporation (COR3NA) wee created to proote induetrial development,(CORFIYA) mining, md tourin. COR71A'. authorined capital is Q 10 million of vhich Q 6 million vill
be provided by the Overanent, over a period of four years, and 0 4 millin fro the privateeector. Thie private enctor oontributioe will be raiaed under legal dispositions chichrquin thatre tatl firmsp befiting from ex1ptions of import dutisa under the IsttrialIncati..s Le ar to deposit the equivalent of 5 percent of the excpted duti.a for 1cORPkAor the equivalent of 10 percent for the Induetril Bank into a special aceonut with the BMakof Oateale. luORFT1N tank ovmr the induotriel portfolio of INFOP.
2. Trust Fundo 70.4 3.3 BANIESA is in charge of a11 these trust funds, vhich channel credit minly to th agrioulturel(SaCICS - Grasen aco Artieashe - ectar. Their reonurces derive frn central g-vranet cotribution en loans fra AIE andDesASrollo RMurl - Fondo Di.raifioein IDB. Is May 1976 a special honeing trust fund cs added, finaced thrh the sae of recI -Cafe) str.ctino bonds.
3. S-ingo nd Loan Cooperatives 21.2 1.0 The.e cooperative aim m11 savings and icon aesocintione eagged in the provisimo of cerditin vrions lonal _oanditise through the country.
4. Wahoroe Credit Companeie 11.5 o.5 Thes companie, the first of ohich wa stablished in 1969, iss.a warehouse certificates(bonoe de preudi) ehih maybe u ed as collateral for bank lasu
5. Inqurasce Compnies 72.4 3.4 There are 22 inenronee noapaise (of ohich 10 sre ftoreign- d) operatiog under th Juria-diction of the Ssprimtendny of Bae. The foreign-owd cpanipes required ti hold aportion of their t.ehnical reserv in Ouet_elas securitiea--prinipally anrtgage bonds;aor er, thy not underteh i-stOnte outside the Central Arica -ar. Sinme 1966it bhe ben required that the mjority owrehip nd the mag_.t of local ineurmouscoMaise be controlled by OGuat_lan national.
Source, DIF.
r141?o
Table 7.1: GUATEMALA: PRICE INDICES, 1972-1976
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1975 1976
A. Wholesale Prices (1950 - 100) C. Consumer Prices (1975 = 100)
Average during period 119.6 136.6 167.7 188.4 208.2 Average during period 100.0 110.7Domestic products 116.9 13 163.7 5.0 204.4 Foodstuffs 100.0 109.6
Food and beverages 122.3 145.1 171.3 191.2 199.9 Housing, fuels, and services 100.0 109.7Textiles 90.8 104.4 138.8 151.4 153.1 Clothing and footwear 100.0 124.7Construction materials 113.3 119.7 156.5 188.8 243.5 Household goods 100.0 111.8Fuels 133.6 139.2 162.5 172.2 219.3 Transport 100.0 103.5Other 91.5 114.3 162.4 187.2 217.6 Other 100.0 106.7
Imported products 142.9 151.4 192.3 219.3 240.8Food and beverages 179.9 193.4 210.8 242.2 275.9 End of period 100.5 118.9Fuels 93.6 95.5 179.4 189.1 194.0 Foodstfs 102.2 116.9
Housing, fuels and services 100.7 122.8End of period 123.5 154.2 187.6 199.7 221.3 Clothing and footwear 102.4 137.1Domstic Ipro ucts 121. 15T7 170.7 190. 21.8 Household goods 101.8 124.6
Food and beverages 129.3 164.4 18h.2 200.1 203.0 Transport 100.2 104.2Textiles 93.6 122.6 157.2 157.1 159.9 Other 101.2 112.2Construction materials 113.2 134.4 169.7 198.9 275.4Fuels 138.7 143.8 157.9 179.9 271.1Other 84.2 173.9 167.6 235.3 231.8
Imported products 141.9 153.6 211.4 231.2 268.3Food and beverages 177.7 198.4 291.9 257.1 311.5Fuels 94.3 93.9 184.6 196.6 210.8
B. Consumer Prices (1946 10XO)Y D. Rural Foodstuff Prices (1975 - 100)
A ge.during period 147.0 168.2 195.0 220.6 Average during period 100.0 l04.7Foodstuffs 159.4 190.2 7 5Fuels 117.4 130.1 200.1 205.9 Ene of period 97.5 111.2Housing 110.8 110.8 110.8 110.8Clothing 138.3 160.3 178,3 222.2Other 156.2 162.6 190.5 214.4
End of period 148.2 174.o 221.8 223.6-oodstuTfs 990297 7 2.1 Z;77
Fuels 117.1 130.9 208.5 227.1Housing 110.8 110.8 110.8 110.8Clothing 143.2 161.9 214.2 257.2Other 160.9 167.5 201.9 226.3
/ Refers only to price movements within Guatemala City.Refers to price movements in five cities.
Source: Bank of Guatemala. (Elaborated by IMF.)
-170-
Table 7.2: GUATEMALA: TERMS OF TRADE, AND TERMS OF TRADE EFFECT, 1970-1976
(Values in millions of quetzales)
IndexCurrent Unit Value at CumulativeValue Value Volume Value 1970 Volume Price Effect/
Exports1970 297 100.0 100.0 100.0 2971971 287 96.6 99.4 97.2 289 -81972 336 113.1 110.6 102.3 304 +71973 442 148.8 120.2 123.8 368 711974 582 197.0 130.6 150.9 446 1491975 (prelim.) 650 218.9 133.4 161.7 480 1831976 (estimate) 784 264.0 135.0 195.5 566 269
Imports1970 292 100.0 100.0 100.0 2921971 317 108.5 103.8 104.5 305 131972 328 112.5 i04.0 108.2 315 231973 431 147.6 125.5 117.6 343 511974 705 241.6 155.7 155.2 453 1611975 (prelim.) 735 251.9 146.2 172.3 503 2111976 (estimate) 875/b 300.0 165.2 181.6 530 238
Prelim. Estimate1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 17
(1970 100)
Terms of Trade 93.0 94.5 105.3 97.2 93.8 107.7
(Cumulative over 1970)
Terms of Trade Effect -21 -16 20 -12 -28 31
Export Price Effect -8 7 71 149 183 269Import Price Effect 13 23 51 161 211 238
Sources: Bank of Guatemala and IMF estimates.
a/ Change in value with respect to value at 1970 volume.b/ This figure does not include Q 102 million which corresponds to donations
in kind after the February 1976 earthquake. 5 10/77 -171-
11 /04/77TABLE 8.1
GUATEMALA: AGRICULTURAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION. 1967-1976(MILLIONS OF 1958 QUETZALESI
--------------------------------------------- _-_--_-_-----_-_____-----_----____-__------_-----------------__----------_-----__------
D I S T R I 3 U T I O NITEM ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
CROPS 287.3 305.9 310.5 320.3 333.5 380.2 407.1 445.3 452.B 473.7
EXPORT CROPS 142.1 158.8 160.0 152.9 16B.5 199.5 216.8 247.9 233.5 234.6
COFFEE 87.8 96.4 98.4 108.5 110.1 122.3 127.3 139.4 140.8 134.1COTTON FIBER 36.9 41.4 37.1 29.6 33.6 45.0 52.9 63.5 54.5 56.9BANANAS 8.3 12.9 16.2 16.8 17.8 23.4 25.2 32.0 27.0 29.2COTTON SEED 4.0 4.6 4.2 3.3 3.7 4.9 5.9 6.8 5.2 6.3CARDAMAN 1.8 2.1 2.0 3.3 2.4 2.2 4.0 5.0 5.3 6.7OTHER 3.4 1.4 2.2 1.4 0.9 1.7 - 1.5 1.0 0.7 1.4
CROPS FOR LOCAL CONS. 112.3 114.3 116.9 121.2 122.7 128.2 133.5 138.1 149.3 147.0
BASIC 60.0 59.9 61.0 63.6 63.1 65.i 68.1 69.0 78.3 73.5CORN 32.8 32.4 33.1 36.3 35.5 35.5 38.2 37.5 43.8 39.4BEANS 25.7 26.3 26.6 25.8 26.0 27.5 27.6 27.8 29.1 28.3POTATOS 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.3 3.7 5.4 5.8
OTHERS 52.4 54.5 55.9 57.6 59.6 63.2 65.4 69.1 70.9 73.5FRUITS 19.5 20.1 20.8 21.4 22.1 22.8 23.5 24.2 24.9 25.7VEGETABLES 18.0 18.5 19.1 19.7 20.3 20.9 21.6 22.2 22.9 23.7LIMA BEANS 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4PEANUTS 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1LENTILS - - - - - - - - - -OTHER 13.7 14.6 14.8 15.3 15.9 18.1 19.0 21.2 21.6 22.6
INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS 32.9 32.8 33.5 36.1 42.4 52.4 56.8 59.3 70.1 92.1
SUGAR CANE (NATURAL) - 11.1 12.4 13.2 13.9 18.2 21.8 24.1 28.6 41.9SUGAR CANE (PURE SYRUP) 20.7 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.9 4.7 5.2 6.2 9.0SUGAR CANE (BROWN SUGAR) - 5.5 6.2 6.6 6.9 9.1 10.9 12.0 14.3 20.9WHEAT (UNMILLED) 3.1 4.5 3.1 4.1 4.6 5.9 5.0 5.3 6.7 6.2RICE . 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.5 6.4 6.6 4.6 2.3 5.0 2.6TOBACCO 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.5 4.0 4.1 4.0RUBBER 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 . 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.5 3.7TE DE LIMON 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.2KENAF FIBER 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9CITRONELA 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2SESAME SEED 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.6 1.9 1.5 0.5 2.1COCOA 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.4BARLEY - - - - - - - - - -
LIVESTOCK SECTOR 119.0 126.5 155.0 172.6 196.4 203.3 207.3 209.5 210.4 228.8
NON-MEAT PRODUCTS - 66.4 81.4 92.9 101.1 109.8 114.2 111.2 111.8 125.9MEAT PRODUCTS - 43.7 53.6 62.4 74.5 72.9 72.0 71.8 69.7 73.2
BEEF - 18.1 22.1 30.7 38.8 40.1 38.7 38.4 36.5 41.9PORK - 24.9 30.6 31.0 34.9 32.1 32.5 32.6 32.3 30.5SHEEP - 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.a 0.7GOATS - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
FOWL - 16.4 20.1 17.3 20.8 20.7 21.1 26.6 29.0 29.7
FORESTRY 38.2 38.0 39.5 41.1 42.1 44.1 46.4 48.3 48,3 53.5
HUNTING AND FISHING 5.1 4.5 4.8 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2
INPUTS TO AGRIC. SECTOR 41.-i 43.7 46.9 49.6 53.1 58.2 61.3 65.2 66.0 70.1
VALUE AGOED BY SECTOR 408.2 431.2 462.9 489.7 524.3 E74-7 605.1 643.8 651.5 692.1
GROSS VALUE OF PRODUCTION 449.5 474.9 509.8 539.3 577.: '_ 2. 9 666.4 709.0 717.6 762.2SR:A======NC ====-= ==D===== G==-=AT= ...LA E====...EC.N.MC..Y MEMRA 0 LAB=RES. -2 =
SOURCE: BANCO DE GUATEMALA, ESTUDIO ECONOMICO Y MEMORIA DE LABORES -172-
PAGE I OF 2DATE: 7/C 1/71
TABLE 8.2GUATEMALA: CULTIVATED AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELD OF PRINCIPAL CROPS, 1967-1976
(THS. HECTARES, THS. METRIC TONS, AND KILOGRAMS PER HECTARE, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED)
D I S T R I 8 U T I O NPRODUCT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1966 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__----------------------------------------------------
BASIC GRAINS
CORNCULTIVATED AREA 712.3 661.7 690.2 711.9 661.9 563.3 496.7 561.8 582.0 559.0PRODUCTION 633.3 625.5 679.3 703.7 785.8 774.6 820.2 646.2 756.7 800.0YIELD 889.1 945.3 984.2 988.5 1190.0 1392.7 1671.9 1164.7 1299.6 1449.0
BEANSCULTIVATED AREA 125.6 144.1 150.4 184.9 150.6 176.9 215.5 84.9 97.9 110.0PRODUCTION 43.5 45.0 45.4 62.5 64.8 65.3 83.1 57.3 62.4 73.0YIELD 346.5 312.4 301.7 340.0 430.0 370.0 360.0 683.1 645.4 672.0
RICECULTIVATED ARCA 6.1 11.7 13.6 9.3 11.2 19.8 11.0 12.4 12.2 18.7PRODUCTION 14.5 20.4 25.1 14.5 22.7 58.7 29.4 24.2 19.0 32.2YIELD 2356.4 1749.4 1800.0 1500.0 2000.0 3000.0 2704.1 1978.2 1575.0 1743.2
WHEATCULTIVATED AREA 39.1 39.1 39.1 30.0 31.0 32.0 37.4 39.0 45.9 46.6PRODUCTION 29.2 36.9 38.8 31.0 33.0 35.0 41.2 43.1 56.0 55.9YIELD 747.0 942.4 992.4 1030.0 1060.0 1090.0 1100.0 1100.0 1200.0 1200.0
SORGHUMCULTIVATED AREA 44.0 47.0 49.0 51.0 43.0 50.1 39.5 33.1 74.0 56.6PRODUCTION 32.0 42.0 54.0 46.0 47.0 36.6 37.6 43.9 59.6 91.7YIELD 700.0 900.0 1100.0 900.0 900.0 739.1 964.8 1341.7 815.6 1640.9
EXPORT'PRODUCTS
COFFEE .CULTIVATED AREA 202.0 202.4 202.8 203.6 204.5 254.6 245.2 243.5 247.6 247.8PRODUCTION 97.1 97.7 116.6 112.0 118.0 138.3 131.6 130.5 138.0 138.0YIELD 461.0 482.0 575.0 550.0 577.0 532.1 555.3 554.9 575.5 576.0
COTTONCULTIVATED AREA 84.3 89.8 84.9 84.5 74.4 77.3 89.2 103.7 110.9 80.3PRODUCTION 63.5 80.0 46.0 56.8 61.3 71.0 96.2 112.5 102.9 88.9YIELD 753.1 890.9 542.8 670.0 823.0 919.0 I079.0 1084.0 939.6 1185.1
SUGAR CANECULTIVATED AREA 31.5 25.3 28.7 31.4 30.6 35.8 43.9 54.8 64.2 88.2PRODUCTION (MLS MT) 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.4 4.2 5.7YIELD (THS MT/HA) 62.8 69.6 63.4 64.4 70.8 76.9 66.0 61.9 65.0 65.0
-17 3-
PAGE 2 OF 2DATE: 7/01/77
TABLE 6.2GUATEMALA: CULTIVATED AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELD DF PRINCIPAL CROPS, 1967-1976
(THS. HECTARES, THS. METRIC TONS, AND KILOGRAMS PER HECTARE. UNLESS OTHERWISE INOICATED)
-------------------------------------------------------- __-------------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I B U T I O NPRODUCT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
BANANASCULTIVATED AREA 3.2 3.2 4.1 4.4 4.5 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0PRODUCTION 96.3 130.0 193.5 195.0 250.0 304.0 290.0 340.0 213.0 267.1YIELD 30100.0 40600.0 47200.0 44500.0 54300.0 60800.0 66900.0 68100.0 42700.0 53400.0
RUBBERCULTIVATED AREA 1.7 2.5 3.4 3.5 4.1 - - - - -PRODUCTION 1.1 1.7 2.3 2.9 4.3 - _ _ _ _YIELD 646.0 694.0 676.0 916.6 1051.0 - - - - -
SUGARSUGAR CANE (MLS MT) 2.0 t.8 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.4 4.2 5.7REFINED SUGAR (THS MT) 180.8 156.4 175.8 184.6 197.1 250.9 266.6 311.9 384.0 544.5YIELD (KG/MT) 91.4 88.9 96.6 91.2 90.8 91.2 92.1 92.0 95.0 92.0
TOTAL AREA CULTIVATEO 1249.9 1226.8 1266.2 1314.6 1215.9 1214.7 1183.5 1138.2 1239.9 1212.2BASIC GRAINS 927.2 903.6 942.3 987.1 897.7 842.1 900.1 731.2 812.0 790.9EXPORT CROPS 322.7 323.2 323.9 327.5 318.2 372.6 383.4 407.0 427.9 421.3
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------__----------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: WORLD BANK ESTIMATES. NOTE: AS THESE ESTIMATES WERE BASED ON INFORMATION FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES OTHER THAN THE BANK OFGUATEMALA, THE DATA ARE NOT ENT:3ELY CONSISTENT WITH THOSE IN TABLE 9.1.
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Table 8.3: CENTRAL ANICA: LAND TENUE PATTERNS, 1970
Total Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nic ra Costa Rica7 Gee * '. .t S ._T * n Ginn. %
Number of Farms or Families
Landless Workers 27.7 27.7 26.5 26.5 26.o 26.0 31.2 31.2 32.6 32.6 25.7 25.7Microfincas under 0.7 ha 167S MT 17! 141.3 2E3 50.3 1. 4I1 Tfl 314.0 310. 7.2Small Sub-Family 0.7 - 4 ha 32.2 76.5 42.o 83.3 36.o 86.3 23.9 65.3 23.4 57.4 12.8 70.0Medium Sub-Family 4 - 7 ha 7.4 83.9 6.8 90.1 6.1 92.4 11.7 77.0 7.7 65.1 4.7 74.7Family 7 - 35 ha 10.5 94.4 7.3 97.4 4.9 97.3 17.9 94.9 17.6 82.7 14.3 89.0Medium Multi-Family 35 - 350 ha 4.o 98.4 1.4 98.8 2.0 99.3 3.9 98.8 13.0 95.7 8.1 97.1Large Multi-Family over 350 ha 0.4 98.8 0.4 99.2 0.2 99.5 0.3 99.1 0.9 96.6 0.7 97.8Adninistrators 1.2 100.0 0.8 100.0 0.5 100.0 0.9 100.0 3.4 100.0 2.2 100.0
Area
Under 0.7 ha o.6 o.6 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.30.7 - 4 ha 6.o 6.6 11.3 12.3 12.3 13.6 5.5 6.3 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.84 - 7 ha 4.0 10.6 6.3 18.6 5.2 18.8 6.1 12.4 1.8 3.4 1.5 3.37 - 35 ha 16.2 26.8 15.1 33.7 16.7 35.5 27.4 39.8 11.3 14.7 14.3 17.335 - 350 ha 35.2 62.0 23.9 57.6 33.6 69.1 32.7 72.5 44.1 58.8 41.1 58.7Over 350 ha 38.0 100.0 42.4 100.0 30.9 100.0 27.5 100.0 41.2 100.0 41.3 100.0
Source: SIECA, VI Corpendio Estadistico Centroamericano, p. 93. Based on estimatea for 1970.
11/03/77TABLE 9.1
GUATEMALA: VALUE ADDED IN MANUFACTURING (CONSTANT 1958 PRICES)1967-1976
(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------__-----------------------------------------------------
D I S T R I 8 U T I O N
SECTOR ------------- ______________________________________--___--1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
CONSUMER GOODS 173.3 189.9 202.0 212.6 232.2 244.2 261.9 276.0 272.7 303.0
FOOD PROCESSING 58.3 69.5 73.6 76.5 85.9 89.8 93.4 96.4 101.1 108.5BEVERAGES 26.6 27.1 28.9 30.6 33.1 34.8 40.0 42.6 39.9 48.5TOBACCO 16.5 15.2 15.8 17.6 18.0 18.5 19.3 19.7 19.5 23.1TEXTILES 29.4 30.3 31.7 33.8 36.1 36.6 38.1 39.0 33.0 37.0CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 27.8 31.5 33.3 32.6 34.4 35.6 36.7 37.8 39.1 40.5FURNITURE & FIXTURES 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.4 7.5 7.7 8.1PRINTING 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.0 5.4 5.9 6.5 6.1 6.1MISCELLANEOUS 4.7 6.1 7.8 10.0 12.9 16.5 21.1 26.5 26.3 31.2
INTERMEDIATE GOODS 31.3 34.0 36.9 37.8 36.9 38.7 44.4 47.1 46.4 50.9
WOOD AND CORK 4.1 3.9 5.0 5.5 5.2 5.6 6.6 7.0 6.8 7.5PAPER 3;0 3.6 4.0 4.9 4.7 5.8 8.1 9.3 7.8 8.2LEATHER 2.1 3.7 3.7 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.3RUBBER 3.6 4.5 4.1 3.9 3.9 4.5 4.6 5.0 4.6 5.5CHEMICALS 8.5 9.3 9.5 10.3 9.8 9.9 10.5 10.9 10.1 iO.6NON-METALLIC MINERALS 10.0 9.0 10.6 10.2 9.9 9.4 11.2 11.8 13.9 15.8
CAPITAL GOODS 23.8 30.9 34.4 32.5 34.1 36.9 39.5 38.5 37.2 39.6
METAL PRODUCTS 16.1 21.1 23.6 22.0 23.1 25.0 26.7 25.0 23.7 25.4MACHINERY (NON-ELECTRIC) 2.6 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.1ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 2.8 3.7 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.3 5.2 5.4TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.7
TOTAL 228.4 254.8 273.3 282.9 303.2 319.8 345.8 361.6 356.3 393.5
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA
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11/03/77TABLE 9.2
GUATEMALA! MANUFACTURING VALUE OF OUTPUT (CONSTANT i958 PRICES), 1967-1976(MILLIONS OF QUETZALES)
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__---------------------------------------------_-______
D I S T R I S U T I O NSUB-SECTOR ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------__-----------------------------------------------------
CONSUMER GOODS 421.4 473.3 504.0 532.3 589.2 616.3 654.8 68B.0 680.8 747.0
FOOD PROCESSING 195.5 234.4 247.6 261.2 296.2 305.8 316.7 326.8 345.1 370.6
BEVERAGES 33.9 35.3 38.9 41.1 44.6 47.5 54.5 58.0 51.2 62.3TOBACCO 21.3 19.7 20.4 22.8 23.4 24.0 25.0 25.6 25.1 29.6TEXTILES 68.1 70.4 73.7 78.5 83.9 85.0 88.5 90.3 71.8 80.4CLOTHING & FOOTWEAR 73.6 80.9 85.3 84.2 89.0 92.0 94.9 97.8 100.8 104.6FURNITURE & FIXTURES 10.9 11.2 11.6 12.0 12.3 12.7 13.4 13.7 14.1 14.8PRINTING 6.3 6.2 7.0 7.6 7.8 8.3 9.3 10.2 8.1 8.2MISC 11.8 15.2 19.5 24.9 32.0 41.0 52.5 65.6 64.6 76.5
INTERMEDIATE GOODS 74.7 81.0 87.3 89.4 87.4 92.1 104.9 111.6 109.0 119.4
PAPER PROOUCTS 6.7 8.0 9.0 11.0 10.5 12.9 18.0 20.7 16.3 16.9WOOD & CORK MFG. 9.7 9.4 11.9 13.3 12.4 13.5 15.7 16.8 16.2 18.0LEATHER & PROD. (EX. SHOES) 4.2 7.4 7.4 6.1 6.8 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.4 6.7RUBBER PRODUCTS 8.4 10.5 9.7 9.2 9.0 10.5 10.8 11.7 10.8 12.8CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 24.9 27.1 27.4 28.6 28.1 28.7 30.3 31.6 29.5 31.1NON-METALLIC MINERALS 20.8 18.6 21.9 21.2 20.6 19.5 23.2 24.1 29.8 33.9
CAPITAL GOODS 56.9 74.2 82.7 77.8 81.5 88.5 94.5 91.3 87.9 93.5
METAL PRODUCTS 42.8 56.2 62.8 58.6 61.3 66.6 71.1 66.6 63.2 67.7MACHINERY (NON-ELECTRICAL) 5.3 7.0 7.8 7.3 7.7 8.3 8.9 8.3 8.0 8.3ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 5.3 7.0 7.8 7.3 7.6 8.3 8.8 10.1 9.6 10.0TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 3.5 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.3 5.7 6.3 7.1 7.5
TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION 553.0 628.5 674.0 699.5 758.1 796.9 854.2 890.9 677.7 959.9.... ....... ......... ......... .........a .as=t "=sssr ....... s ..... ss a...ss* s BM:
SOURCE: BANK OF GUATEMALA
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MAP ANNEX
1. Population Density (IBRD A13123-3)
2. Arable Land Availability (IBRD A13123-4)
3. Average Rural Family Income (IBRD A13123-1)
-lT8-
BRD A1312-3SEPTEMBER 1977
G U AT E M A LAPOPULATION DENSITY, 1973
.................. I..........I............... .:-.- .-.-..-..-..............
PERSONS IER HECTARE . .. ......
Liii 0. - 250.
.......251. - 500. ....... 12.
m ~~~~~~...........4501. - 750.
tt 751~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.-10. \........ ... ..........' 751. -1000..
1001. -2000.s 1001 2000 ',',','' ,' ,..................
_ 1'~~~~~.'.'.'.:.'.:.'.'.'.'.........'.' :.' -* 2001 - 6000. ........................
............ I............
.. . . . . .. '......'........ .......
......... .. ef, .. f.8 HU UE NA G
I.@ ... ,,.......... @. ............... . . . .¢* . 2.e . . *. . . ._ . . w
'it et 91 I 16 SACAtAPEQUE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .> . . ., . . . . ,, ,, ,, 2,,@, ..-.. .............. .. I......v.............I. ,.,.,.,.,......................... _
/ ;/~~~~~~~~~~~~.I..... .. *96I.9..... Iv.0..a . .' t . .'...,'9tm ... . . . . . ./
i,*, Z**2-eX e. @ ,Yr2s*@**@ e.. ..... .... .......... . ... ................. w ' ' "-o : ~~~~~...... ..... . ,,,,,,, . ..................,,....,
ax----r --2-2.......... .. ... 0......e. @. t , ...........: u ~~~~.,*-.:. *..:. ' *.... ........ ..,
| l >i | '~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*w ' e 'S'¢et::t S . , .A0\-.g2/
s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . .1 . . '' . . . .¢' N;''''2'' UMBERS CORtRESPOND TOv~~~~~~~~~~~...... ... . NAMES OF DEPARTMENSn
1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~17 SAN MARCOS18 SANTA ROSA
1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~19 SOLOLA20 SUCHITEPEOUEZ
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~21 TOTON ICAPAN22 ZACAPA
|This map hat been prepared by the World B3ank s staff asciusively for the convenienceof the readers of the report is which it is attr,shed The denominations used and thebsundaries shown on this map dt not imply, on the part of the World Bank and itsaffilhates, any judgment on the legal statuso of any territory sr any endorsemenl or
iacoepteoce of such boundaries
-179-
IBRD A13123-4SEPTEMBER 1977
G U A T E M A L AARABLE LAND AVAILABILITY,1973
..... ... ..............................
......................................
..............................................................................HECTARES ER CAPITA.....................................
HECTARES PER CAPITA ............................................................................
6. - 55. ~.....................................,, t: a . .. ~....................................
.. ,ee 3. 4- 6. ....................... ..............~~~~~~~~~... ..............._ ....... ~~~....................................~~~~~~~~..... U.-. -. ---.-................
c ,, ,\ ...... ~~~~..............."I.................
> >#*.99022 ~~~~............. w.§*........ 00w.e
_ \~~~~~~~~~~~.ee... . . .e.e.... I *.. ..
NUMBERS CORRESPOND TONAMES OF DEPARTMENTS
3 CIIALTA ERAPAZ3 OCEZALTENANAGO
16 SCATAPEMUEA
17 SUANEMARLA18 SANHUTANROSA19 SOLOAA
21 TOTANLAPAN22 ZJUTAPA
_hte map ha, -ean prepared by the Wortd Banks staff eocfusiv for the eni2PETEothedofterepttowhch t tacheThenmntUETZALdEadN
nasshononthismapdonot . on,the.pnfte dBakenICt rjudgmenton the ,.,legastatsantertororany
acceptance.of.soih..oun.TAEe1
M . 1~~~~~~~-io|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2 TOTONCARREPAN DT
_ | l - 1 _~~~~~~~~~2 ZAMECOADPARTET
_la,w. *. . 1 t.- o--l, ol th ALTA oftERAPAZ8k dd_-_ i*g- - th lg. 2tw ofJ Vh E,,o R - ,ArPAZn
&CcopfohC Of *c bo*un3dHALE,,ANAG
_ 111 l l i 4 CHIQUIMULA~~~~-1 8 o
IBRO A13123-1SEPTEMBER 1977
G U A T E A L AAVERAGE RURAL FAMIL1Y INCOME, 1970
1969 QUETZALES
Dii 0. - 400.401, 401. - 450.
451. - 500.
, .......... ...... .. @... ..... . . . ... ...
. .. .. .. .. . . .. ... . .. I.. . .. o. . 4. . ... ,.............
/§wi*s*j-§tt,.. ....... . ......... ....... .... ..... .....t_, .yt , fl..C. .. ,...... .. ,_
s-~~. -..* ........ .*--W1> ->o-BA*@e******s***-*-.o ......... ......... ....... .........,_
17 ... .. ......... . ........ NUMBERS CORRESPOND TO
NAMES OF DEPARTMENTS
... 1., . ..... I
V.~~~~ . ...... 1 ALTA VERAPAZ.19... eee*-~e.en...,. - . SS*..eI...e... ,2 BAJA VERAPAZ
M - , , i~~~~ .7 ..... , , . , "
V,---.-7 .. .<t..... ..... 3 CHIMALTENANAGO,1,......... ........... 4 C IUIMULA
.. '''''\''''''^''''\...---"" ... ...... 1.7 ............ 'NMSODEATNS
5 EL PROGRESO
': :,' ',:','. ,e r6 ESCUINTLA7 GUATEMALA8 HUEHUETENANGO9 IZABAL
10 JALAPA1 1JUTIAPA12 PETEN13 QUETZALTENANGO14 EL QUICHE15 RETALHULEU16 SACATAPEOUEZ17 SAN MARCOS18 SANTA ROSA19 SOLOLA20 SUCHITEPEQUEZ21 TOTONICAPAN22 ZACAPA
rhis map has been preptred by the WoHd aank8 s sotff ooclIs-oly fo,r tho tnstcof the edern of the npoet to wh,ch it s attached. rhe deno-natnonc usred -ssa thoboe,ndworn shown on this m,o do nor o-pfy on tho part of the Wansd Bank d-, fsaffihates. any ,dgm eat on the bogel
tortus of any teotory or sov osndorsenrtrns rs
acceptnce of such boundari es
iSi-
The World Bank
Headquarters European Office Tokyo Office U1818 H Street, N.W. 66, avenue d'Iena Kokusai BuildingWashington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. 75116 Paris, France 1-1 Marunouchi 3-chomeTelephone (202) 477-1234 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, JapanCable Address INTBAFRAD
WASHINGTONDC
