Document of The World Bank FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 6938 TANZANIA FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT September 15, 1987 Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office Projects Department Transportation Division Thi dcument hm a resicted dstbdioen and may be used by relpints oly tn the perfornman of tbehi ffimid dude. Its _ontest may an oherwe be disclosed witou Wodrd Bank authorkaon. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 6938
TANZANIA
FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
September 15, 1987
Eastern and Southern Africa Regional OfficeProjects DepartmentTransportation Division
Thi dcument hm a resicted dstbdioen and may be used by relpints oly tn the perfornman oftbehi ffimid dude. Its _ontest may an oherwe be disclosed witou Wodrd Bank authorkaon.
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YOR OffMICL UE OW,THE WORLD SANK
Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.A.
opewate vAhtoin
September 15, 1987
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Tanzania Fifth Highway Project(Credit 876-TA)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report on Tanzania Fifth Highway Project (Credit 876-TA)" prepared
by the Eastern an' Southern Africa Regional Office. Further evaluation of
this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made.
.~~~~~~~~~
Attachment
L This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their offcil duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclo without Wodld lank authowluton.
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
TANZANIA
FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
Preface .......... ..... * .. e *. 1Basic Data SetiEvaiuation Summary ............... ............ ................. ... iv
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
IT. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AMD APPRAISAL..o.. 3
III. P1JBCT IMPLEMENTATION AND COS T.; 6
IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOP LOMPM....N.....T.. 14
Vo ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION. . UT. .o .. ... .... 15
VI * CONCLUSIONS.L U S I OS*.*. . *.. .. * .. ... 17.*
ANNEX Performance of the Fourth Highway (Maintenance)Project (Credit 507-TA) .............. ....... . ... .. . 20
TABLES
1. Details of Technical Assistance and Training Staff....... 212, Training at Morogoro Training Sch oool......, 223. Equipment Procurement Schedule..h...............e...... 234. Planned and Actual Accomplishments (km) - Regravelling
& Rehabilitation ...... ..... 245. Planned and Actual Project Implementatiou.. 0.04i. on6000 256. Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs.......... 267. Road Maintenance Expenditures (FY1979/80-FY1986-87)...... 278. Road Inventory Condition and Traffic Volumes -
Comparison Between 1977 and 1985....................... 28
MAP IBRD 13777
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by reipients only in the perfomanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoration.
TANZANIA
FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This Project Completion Report (PCR) has been prepared for theFifth Highway Project (Credit 876-TA) for which a Credit Agreement in theamount of US$20.5 million was signed on March 3, 1979. The Credit becameeffective on December 3, 1980 and was closed on December 31, 1985 after anextension of one year. The total amount disbursed was US$18.30 million andthe remaining US$2.20 million was cancelled. This is the sixth project inthe highway subsector, which the Bank Group has assisted in Tanzania andaddresses the country's needs in road maintenance.
The PCR was prepared by the Eastern and Southern Africa ProjectsDepartment, Transportation Division, on the basis of information containedin tne Staff Appraisal Report, a review of Bank files including supervisionand progress reports and information collected on a mission during January1987.
In accordance with the revised procedures for project performanceaudit reporting, this Project Completion Report was read by the OperationsEvaluation Department but the project was not audited by OED. The draftreport was sent to the borrower for comments; however, none were received.
Disbursed - 18.30Cancelled - 2.20Repaid to Dec. 31, 1986 - -Outstanding to Dec. 31, 1986 - 18.30Project Completion Date 06/30/84 12/85Proportion Completed by:Appraisal Completion Date (2) - 77Actual Completion Date (Z) 89
Proportion of Time Overrun (X) - 27Economic Rate of Return (2) 70 10
Cumulative Estimates and Actual Disbursements(US$ million)
FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87
i) Estimate 0.50 5.10 10.20 14.30 19.00 20.50 20.50 20.50(ii) Actual - 0.04 2.22 10.43 15.55 15.95 17.89 18.30(iii) Actual as X of (i) - - 21 72 81 77 87 89
Date of Final Disbursement: July 21, 1986.
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Item Origir.al Plan Actual
First Mention in Files or Time Table - 12/73Government's Application - 06/29/77Appraisal 10/77 04/78Negotiations - 11/30178Board Approval 07/78 01/16/79Credit Agreement Date - 03/02/79Effectiveness Date 04/30/79 12/03/80Closing Date 12/31/84 12/31/85Borrower Inited Re.-blic of TanzaniaExecuting Agency Ministry of Communications and WorksFiscal Year July 1 June 30Follow-on Project Name Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project
Credit Number 1688-TAAmount (US$ million) 50.0Credit Agreement Date June 25, 1986
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Pane 2 of 2BASIC DATA SHEET
MISSION DATA
Month/ No. of No. of Staff Date ofMission Year Weeks Persons Weeks Report
l/ Identified at the same tfime as the Fourth Highway (Maintenance) Project(Credit 507-TA).
CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES
Name of Currency Tanzania Shilling (TShs)Appraisal Year Average (1978) US$ 1 - TShs 8.00Intervening Years Average (1979-84) US$ 1 - TShs 9.50Ccmpletion Year Average (1985) US$ 1 - TShs 16.42
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
COMWORKS Ministry of Communications and WorksICB International Competitive BiddingLCB - Local Competitive BiddingPCR Project Completion ReportSAR - Staff Appraisal ReportThRM Trunk Road MaintenanceUSAID United States Agency for
International DevelopmentVOC - Vehicle Operating Cost
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TANZANIA
FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introduction
The Fifth Highway Project constituted the second of a two-phaseoffott to establish a trunk road maintenance organisation in the country. Thefirst phase was implemented under the Fourth Highway (Maintenance) Project(Credit 507-TA) which was closed on December 31, 1982. A brief account of theproject performance, which was found to be unsatisfactory, is given in theAnnex to this report.
The Fourth and Fifth Highway Projects were the outcome of the'Tanzania Highway Maintenance and Organization' study which was carried out in1972 by consultants financed by the United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment. The Association assisted the Government in reviewing the reportsat various stages of the study. The Government's formal request for financingthe Fifth Highway Project was made to the Association in June 1977. Therequest included a draft project proposal and timetable to complete projectpreparation which was accomplished with assistance of technical staff financedunder the earlier project. The Association appraisal took place in April 1978(paras. 2.05-2.08).
Obsectives
The Fifth Highway Project, along with the immediately precedingFourth Highway Project, changed the focus of Bank Group lending for highwaysin Tanza-sia from investments in highway construction to improvements in high-way maintenance and institutional building. The Fifth Highway Projectincluded the establishment of routine maintoenance capability for about 5,100km of primary roads in the nort-tern half of the country, the rehabilitationand regravelling of about 2,040 km of trunk roads, procurement of road mainte-nance and rehabilitation equipment, construction of road maintenance camps,workshops, and housing and technical assistance and tra&ning (para. 2.11).
Implementation Experience
Although the Credit Agreement was signed on March 2, 1979, it wasnot declared effective until December 3, 1980. The delay occurred as a resultof disagreement between the Association and Government over the selection ofthree key advisors to the Ministry of Communications and Works, which was acondition of Credit effectiveness. The Government attempted to recruit themon an individual basis, but the Association urged selection of a consultingfirm to provide two key advisors (paras. 3.01-3.05).
Twelve advisors, including one key advisor, were appointed on anindividual basis. Two key advisors were provided by a consulting firm. Theyall arrived separately over a period of two years. Thus, from the beginningit was difficult to adopt a coordinated approach to strengthening trunk roadmaintenance. At the advice of successive Association supervision missions,
attempts were made by the key advisor to the Senior Maintenance Engineer tocoordinate and direct the work of all technical assistance advisors, but thisadvice was not effective. The effectiveness of technical assistance was alsoundermined by the inadequate attention paid by the Government to providinghousing, office facilities, and transport (paras. 3.06-3.12).
The procurement of equipment, vehicles, and spares was affected byinitial delay due to differences of views between the Government and theAssociation over the sufficiency of notification for ICB. When it wasresolved and delivery was due, the suspension of disbursements for all proj-ects in the country by the Association in 1983 and 1984 caused further delaysand most of the items of equipment did not arrive on site until late 1984(paras. 3.20-3.22).
Results
The project fell short of completing the physical objectives andsome of the works carried out have fallen into disrepair due mainly to thepoor quality of the original works. Overall, the ERR dropped from an apprai-sal value of 70X to about lOX. However, the trunk road maintenance organiza-tion has been established in each of the 10 regions covered by the project andbudget alloca.tions for road maintenance have been stepped up to satisfactorylevels. Witha the availability of more engineers trained under the project andImprovement in training of technicians and field personnel which is beingcontinued under the ongoing Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project (Credit1688-TA), the quality of maintenance works is slowly improving (para. 5.06).
Sustainability
The project only achieved partial sustainability. Maintenance ofroads has been instituted but the quality of the work still does not keep theroads in acceptable condition (para. 3.27). Training at the highwayauthority's facilities improved but local personnel were not yet able to takeover as instructors at the end of the program (para. 3.17).
Findints and Lessons
A number of lessons have been learned from the project. First, Itwould have been preferable to reduce the scope of the project when it wasrealized late in 1984 that the Government could not maintain the entire trunkroad network. Better planning for less ambitious but critical maintenanceoperations could have produced much better results. Second, there are limita-tions to the effectiveness of technical assistance to strengthen road mainte-nance operations in the field. Many of the critical road maintenance tasksare simple technologically and the success of execution of these tasks dependsvery much on close field supervision, quality of leadership in the field, and
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a better maero economic environment; local resources provide the best means todevelop andi sustain a road maintenance capability. Third, the project illus-trated the Government's ambivalent attitude to expatriate technical assistancestaff. On the, one hand, the Government recognized the noed for technicalassistance, but on the other, it was concerned with the high costs and theburden of administering a large number of expatriates. Both Government andthe Associatior. should closely monitor performance of technical assistancestaff in order to identify as early as possible the constraints to theireffectiveness. Fourth, the project demonstrates the success of formal train-ing programs at education and training institutions as opposed to counterparttraining in the work place (paras. 6.G6-6.08).
Finally, the project points to the need to develop the local con-tracting industry to share the responsibility for maintaining the country'sroad network. The lessons learned were applied in the design of the SixthHighway (Rehabilitation) Project (para. 6.09).
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TANZANIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA)
INTRODUCTION
1.01 Tanzania is a large country (945,000 kW2) with a widely dispersedpopulation (19.8 million) and sharply contrasting terrain (0-19,340 ftabove sea level). This combination makes the transport system a complexone with transport movements over long distances an importantcharacteristic. Additional demands by its land locked neighbours fortransit through the country contribute to making the matntenance andoperation of the transport system more difficult. Overall, roads are thepredominant transport mode with the rail system catering mainly toimport/export traffic.
1.02 The Bank Group involvement in the transport sector began in 1955when a loan was made to the East African Comnunity for a railway project.Assistance in the highways subsector did not begin until 1964, two yearsafter Tanzania's independence. Bank Group assistance was initiallydirected towards investments in new roads. In the late sixties with thedeparture of expatriate engineers and later, the indigenous engineers ofAsian origin, the deterioration of the road network due to inadequate roadmaintenance became evident. Bank Group strategy then shifted towardsinstitution building, training, and assistance to strengthen the roadmaintenance organizatior.. In all, the Bank Group financed seven projectsin the highway sub-sector totalling US$156.7 million including the ongoingSixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project (Credit 1688-TA, 1986).
1.03 When the Credit Agreement for the Fifth Highway Project (Credit876-TA, US$20.5 million, 1979), the subject of this Project CompletionReport (PCR), was signed on March 2, 1979, the executing agency was theMinistry of Works. In July 1984, the Ministry of Works was merged with theMinistry of Communications and Transport to form a single Ministry ofCommunications and Works (COMWORKS). Hereafter, reference is made only toCOMWORKS.
1.04 The COMWORKS is headquartered in Dar-es-Salaam, the capital, andis primarily responsible for the administration of the trunk road system.COM11ORKS has divided the country into 20 regions for Trunk Road Maintenance(TAM). The project aimed at improving road maintenance operations byestablishing TRM organizations in each of the 10 regions located in thenorthern half of the country. The 10 regions in the southern half of thecountry were covered by a similar project, the Fourth Highway (Maintenance)Project (Credit 507-TA, US$10.2 million, 1974) which closed on December 31,1982.
1.05 The project included routine road maintenance of about 5,110 kmsand the rehabilitation and regravelling of about 2,040 kas of trunk roads;the construction and improvement of roa6 maintenance campst workshops, andoffices; the procurement of workshop equipment and equipment, spare parts,
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and materials for road maintenance; a pilot program for regional roadsmaintenance, training of engineers, and road maintenance field personnel;and technical assistance to COMWORKS. The financing of the project wasshared between the Government (201) and the Association (80X). There wereno cofinanciers.
1.06 The sources of information on which the PCR was based are listedbelows
1. Bank Project Files - Fifth Highway Project (Credit 876-TA).
2. Appraisal Report dated December 27, 1978 and CreditAgreement of March 2, 1979.
3. Consultants Study on Tanzania Highway Maintenance andOrganization - Inception Report of March 16, 1972, DraftFinal Report (Summary) of March 1972, and Final Report(Vols. I, II, ane III) of August 1, 1972.
4. Technical Assistance Consultants and COMWORKS QuarterlyProgress Reports.
5. Tanzania - Transport Sector Memorandum (Vols. I and II),May 17, 1982.
6. The World Bank Report No. 5085 on Institutional Developmentin Africat A review of World Bank Project Experience (Vols.I and II), May 17, 1984.
7. Final Report, Feasibility Study and Road MaintenanceProgram, TANZAM Highway, Consultants, May 1983 in threevolumes.
8. Final Report, Detailed Engineering Study, Rehabilitation ofthe TANZAM Highway, Consultants, May 1983 in three volumes.
9. Final Report, Three-Year Road Regravelling & RehabilitationProgram, Consultants, January 1986 in four volumes.
10. Final Report, Two-Year Training Program, Training InstituteMorogoro, Consultants, October 1986.
11. Administrative Report on the Fifth Highway Project, TrunkRoad Maintenance Section, Ministry of Communications andWorks, undated.
12. Final Financial Statement, Trunk Road Maintenance Section,Ministry of Communications and Works, undated.
II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION. PREPARATION, AND APPRAISAL
Origin
2.01 The Fifth Highway Project represents the second of a two-phaseattempt to establish a country-wide trunk road maintenance organization.The first phase, covering the trunk roads located in the southern half ofthe country was implemented under the Fourth Highway (Maintenance) Project.Both projects have their origin in the Highway Maintenance and OrganizationStudy by consultants, financed by the United States InternationalDevelopment Agency (USAID) and completed satisfactorily in early 1972.
2.07. The Highway Maintenance and Organization Study maderecommendations for (i) the improvement of road maintenance; (ii) thereorganization of COMWORKS to take over the administration of the regionaland district road networks from the regional governments in addition to thetrunk road network; and (iii) a five-year road rehabilitation andmaintenance program (1972-76). The Association assisted the Government byreviewing and commenting on study reports emphasizing particularly theinstitutional aspects. The findings of the study in respect to theinstitutional arrangements were not consistent with the Government'sdecentralization policy which called for all roads to be administered bythe regional governments. In the end, however, it was agreed with theAssociation that the administration of the trunk road network includingresponsibility for execution of trunk road meintenance would be retained byCOMWORKS (Para 2.06).
Preparation
2.03 The preparatory work essentially related to updating the earlic-work done for the Fourth Highway Project. In May 1977, the Associationpre-appraisal mission found that project preparation had not beenadequately done and recommended the need to hire consultants to assistCOMWORKS. The Association agreed with COMWORKS for the work to be carriedout by consultents already providing technical assistance to implement theongoing Fourth Highway Project. On June 29, 1977, based on discussionswith the Association's pre-appraisal mission, COMWORKS dispatched a draftproject proposal indicating in outline the project components and a time-table to complete project preparation by the end of 1977.
2.04 However, the terms of reference for the consultants to assistCOMWORKS in project preparation were not finalized until February 1978.Work commenced soon afterwards and was completed satisfactorily in May1978. The Association appraisal took place in April 1978 based on COMWORKSproject proposal of June 29, 1977 and the availability in the field of theconsultants findings.
Appraisal
2.05 The project as appraised followed substantially COMWORKS projectproposal which identified most of the deficiencies impeding COMWORKSefforts to strengthen its administration, and develop and maintain thecountry's trunk road network. However, COMWORKS proposal to include new
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construction was not accepted. But, it was agreed that a future projectwould include an element of new construction and, at the initiative of theAssociation, it was decided to establish a transport planning unit in thethen Ministry of Transport to prepare a National Transport Plan coveringall transport modes.
2.06 There were three main issues during appraisal. First, theAssociation was concerned that the existing arrangements for the regionalauthorities to carry out trunk road maintenance works were not satisfactoryand that COMNORKS should be responsible for the actual execution of roadmaintenance works in addition to its administrative responsibility.Second, there was an acute shortage of trained staff at all levels of thework force and the implementation of a formal training program was urgentlyrequired if the project results were to be sustained afterwards. Third,since in the near term, there was a need to continue to depend onexpatriate technical staff to assist COMWORKS, the Government had torestore its capability to recruit and employ such staff and to retain themuntil local counterparts were able to take over. The latter had been anissue between Government and Association under the Fourth Highway Project.
2.07 The appraisal was smooth and there was complete accord betweenGovernment and the Association. The issues raised at the decision meetingby the appraisal mission were confined to actions to be taken by Governmentto avoid the delays which had occurred in the start-up of the FourthHighway Project and enable smoother Implementation. These actions were tobe conditions of Board Presentation and comprised the following:
i) appointment of key COMWORKS staff for proper execution ofthe ongoing project (later made a condition ofeffectiveness);
(4i) implementation of proposed reorgenization of the COMWORKSand clarification of relationships with the regionalgovernments in respect of trunk road maintenance;
(iii) assignment of an appropriate role to the Trunk RoadMaintenance Organizations in the selection and recruitmentof trainees;
(iv) appointment of three key technical experts to assist incarrying out activities prior to project execution (latermade a condition of effectiveness); and
(v) presentation of a plan by Government to provide adequatehousing for technical assistance staff.
In addition, the Association requsred that some provisions be made in theproject to assist the regional governments in the maintenance of theregional and district road networks.
2.08 The project aimed at force account execution of all roadmaintenance works including periodic and rehabilitation works. Theappraisal mission did not consider the need for developing the localcontracting industry or for road maintenance operations by contract as a
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viable alternative. The overriding factor was Government's express policyof favoring the expansion of Government Involvement in all sectorsincluding the construction sector.
Targets and goals
2.09 The ultimate goal was to establish and operate an organization toplan, manage, and carry out the maintenance of the trunk road network toacceptable standards. The successive project targets were to be asfollows:
(i) to divest the regional government of responsibility forexecution of trunk road maintenance (TRM) and to passdirect responsibility to COMWORKS;
(li) to establish a TRM organization in each of the 10 regionscovered by the project headed by a Resident Engineer; and
(iii) to furnish each Resident Engineer with offices, camps,workshops, equipment and vehicles, and spare parts andmaterials to enable him to execute an agreed roadmaintenance and rehabilitation program.
2.10 The main project objectives were to prevent the deterioration ofthe trunk road network and protect capita4 investments with a view toeliminating transport as a constraint to economic growth.
Prolect Description
2.11 The project, as finally agreed between the Government andAssociation, consisted of a three-year road maintenance program andincluded:
M) the establishment of routine maintenance capability forabout 5,110 kms of trunk roads;
(ii) the rehabilitation and regravelling of about 2040 kms oftrunk roads;
(iii) the procurement of road maintenance and rehabilitationequipment including an initial stock of spare parts, tools,and materials;
(iv) the construction of road maintenance camps, workshops, andhousing for technical assistance staff;
(v) a pilot program for regional roads maintenance; and
(v) technical assistance and training.
2.12 The project was scheduled to be completed by June 30, 1984.
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III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST
Start Up
3.01 Project start-up was delayed by one and a half years. The CreditAgreement was signed on March 2, 1979 but the closing date for Crediteffectiveness was deferred five times until December 3, 1980. The delaywas caused by the non-compliance by the Government of the two conditions ofCredit effectiveness:
(i) the advisors to the Maintenance Management Engineer, theMaintenance Administrator, and the Plant and ProcurementEngineer should be in post; and
(ii) COMWORKS executive staff, having qualifications andexperience satisfactory to the Association, should be inpost for the positions of Maintenance Management Engineer,Maintenance Administrator, Plant and Procurement Engineer,Mechanical Supervisor, a Trunk Road MaintenanceSuperintendent, and a Roadworks Superintendent.
3.02 By end-July 1979, COMWORKS had submitted for the approval of theAssociation, the CVs of the three key advisors and the six local staff.COMWORKS selected candidates for the advisors' positions from amongresponses to advertisement in the local daily newspaper and requests madeto embassies and legations of foreign countries in Dar-es-Salaam as well asadvertisements by Tarnzanian embassies abroad. But, the Association wasconcerned that most applicants were from one country and recommended thatattempts be made for recruitment from a wider spectrum of countries.
3.03 Despite COMWORKS protests that it genuinely made efforts torecruit staff internationally, the Association maintained that furtherattempts should be made. Although the issue was not raised expressly, itwas clear that the Association hoped that COMWORKS would select aconsulting firm to provide the required technical assistance personnelrather than the course adopted by COMWORKS to recruit individuals.
3.04 The Association did not respond positively to COMWORKS request forapproval of the three key advisors from one country. While admitting thatthe candidates were satisfactory, the Association continued to urgeCOMWORKS to take fresh steps at recruitment. Finally, on October 23, 1979,three months after its original submissions, COMWORKS agreed to inviteconsulting firms to submit proposals for the provision of two of the threekey advisors. The individual candidate for the third advisor position(advisor to the plant and equipment engineer) was accepted by theAssociation. COMWORKS indicated in its letter to the Association that itwas adopting this course at the advice and recommendation of theAssociation.
3.05 Much valuable time was thus lost. The process of selection of aconsulting finm took nearly six months. Four firms were invited to submitproposals. It took a further six months before the two advisors took theirposts. The original nominee for the post of advisor to the RoadMaintenance Administrator was not available and about 3 months elapsed
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before another suitable candidate was found. In the meantime, the terminaldate for Credit effectiveness was deferred for the fifth time. The threekey advisors were finally appointed by the end of November 1980. Although,two of them did not take up their posts until early 1981, the Credit wasdeclared effective on December 3, 1980.
Technical Assistance
3.06 The technical assistance specialists consisted of two groups; onegroup recruited individually comprising 12 advisors including one keyadvisor and a second group of 2 key advisors provided by a consultihg firmselected after competition in accordance with Bank Group Guidelines. Inall, 18 advisory positions were to have been established under the project- 5 advisors (one each to the Maintenance Management Engineer, MaintenanceAdministrator, Plant and Procurement Engineer, dechan1.al Supervisor, andthe Bridge and Culvert Superintendent), 5 advisors to the Trunk RoadMaintenance Superintendents, 5 advisors to Equipment Service Managers, and3 advisors to the Roadworks Superintendents. Four positions of the 18advisory positions were not filled. During project implementation, theAssociation agreed to the recruitment of an advisor to the MaterialsEngineer. Details of technical staff are given in Table 1.
3.07 One advisor was in place in late 1979 and 5 others in late 1980.One key advisor (the advisor to the plant and equipment engineer), was alsoin place in late 1980 but the other two key advisors were not in placeuntil the beginning of 1981. The balance of technical assistance stafftook their positions between 1982 and 1984. Thus, from the beginning itwas difficult to adopt a coordinated approach to strengthening trunk roadmaintenance. Each one of the technical assistance staff did his work hisown way and although during the last three years of the project (1983-85),at the advice of successive Association's supervision missions, attemptswere made by the key advisor to the Senior Maintenance Engineer tocoordinate and direct the work of all the advisors, it was too little toolate. The individual advisors were employed under disparate terms andsalaries and enjoyed less benefits than the advisors supplied by theconsultants. All contracts with the individual advisors were administtiredby the Government and this meant that salaries were paid late, housing wasnot available on arrival, and much of their time was spent chasingadministrators for what was due to them. Consequently, their morale wasseriously affected and performance suffered.
3.08 A serious complaint by them was that no adjustment in theirsalaries was made for the depreciation in the value of the TanzanianShillings vis-a-vis the US dollar. Their contracts were denominated inTanzanian Shillings with provision for converting half their salaries intoforeign exchange. Their foreign exchange earnings dropped dramatically andmany felt that they had made a wrong decision in coming to Tanzania. Fiveof the individual advisors left by early 1983. Despite the Association'ssupport for maintaining a fixed exchange rate for conversion into foreigncurrency, the Government continued to reject all such claims until late1985 when the Association was planning to close the project at the end ofthe year.
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3.09 Working conditions for the individually recruited expatriate staffwere difficult because of lack of office space, insufficient transport, andpoor cooperation from local counterparts. For many months the advisorswould be doing nothing in the field as they had no transport, and equipmentand spare parts financed under the project had not arrived. When they didstart to arrive in late 1983, five of the advisors had already left. Slowstart on the housing added to the frustration of the advisors some of whomlived with families in hotel rooms for long periods of time.
3.10 The performance of the two key advisors provided by consultantswas no better. The advisor to the Senior Maintenance Engineer was foundunsuitable and had to be replaced at the end of 1982 by another who leftafter 2 months. The third nominee was on the whole satisfactory. Theimpact of the advisor to the Road Maintenance Administrator was verylimited when he left at the end of 1985 after nearly 5 years of service.Most of his attention was devoted to maintaining the project accounts,which he did satisfactorily. The performance of the individually recruitedkey advisor to the Equipment Service Manager suffered because of hisinability and unwillingness to go out to the field. He was mostly officebound and his work consisted mainly of maintaining an inventory ofequipment and vehicles.
3.11 Successive Association supervision missions in 1983 and 1984reported on the lack of effectiveness of the technical assistance staff.Most striking was the inability of technical assistance staff to adopt toan environment of shortages and poorly trained local staff and labor and toachieve some minimal success with execution of essential road maintenancetasks. For example, the most vital task in road maintenance, clearingculverts and drains - a task requiring manual tools only and unskilledlabor - was neglected.
3.12 In late 1984, things began to improve as the closing of theproject became imminent. The project closing date was extended by one yearfrom December 31, 1984 to December 31, 1985. Technical assistance stafffearing that their contracts would not be extended, stepped up theirefforts to demonstrate their effectiveness. However, it was decided that,in the next project, technical assistance would be severely limited andmuch of it would be devoted to formal training and advisory services in keyareas. Furthermore, housing and transport are essential elements inensuring satisfactory performance by technical assistance staff.
Formal Training
3.13 Formal training in the project was provided at two levels - theprofessional level and the artisans level. At the professional level, 118students were sent to Indian Universities where they graduated in Civil,Mechanical and Electrical engineering with a few in Architecture. Thisprogram was a success from the beginning. The Government was prompt inselection of suitable candidates, although some delay occurred as a resultof the Association needing time and a mission by consultants to determinethe suitability of the Indian universities.
3.14 At the artisans level, the project implemented a two-year trainingprogram at the Morogoro Training School. The project objective was todevelop courses of instruction, prepare curricula, and help COMWORKS staffto teach the courses and also administer the operation of the school.
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3.15 The Morogoro Training School was established in 1974 to train roadmaintenance field personnel - inspectors, foremen, operators, and drivers.Attempts were made under the earlier Fourth Highway Project to strengthenthe school which failed to adopt the training program latroduced by thatproject.
3.16 Concerned about the weak operation of the school and the need forre-assessment of the school's objectives and programs, consultants financedby the British Overseas Development Administration carried out a study ofthe school and the execution of the project component was based on thestudy's findings. The study recommended the establishment in the school ofa regular program of courses for road inspectors and foremen, mechanicalinspectors and foremen, and electrical inspectors and foremen and outlinedthe syllabus for each of the courses. The study also recommended measuresto strengthen the administration of the school. There was substantialdelay in implementing the project component due to the time taken byCOMWORKS to prepare a detailed training program including a schedule forits implementation. Finally, when the program was approved and consultantsselected to execute the program, it was late 1983 and actual training didnot commence until the fall of 1984.
3.17 The two-year program was completed successfully in mid-1986 withtraining provided for 66 road foremen, 30 road inspectors, 65 mechanicalforemen, 24 mechanical inspectors, and 44 electrical foremen, a total of229 trainees (Table 2). While the courses were completed successfully,there were a few drawbacks and the program fell short of its objective toenable counterparts to take over ns instructors at the end of the program.
3.18 COMWORKS found it difficult to provide suitable counterparts forthe Mechanical Instructor and the Electrical Instructor. It was alsodetermined that the two counterparts in place would need a further periodof training. Accordingly, the program is being continued by the sameconsultants for a further two-year period under the Sixth Highway(Rehabilitation) Project.
3.19 The expatriate instructors at the Morogoro Training School did notface the severe problems faced by the technical assistance staff financedseparately under the project to strengthen road maintenar.ce. The schoolhad housing available for the instructors though much work had to be doneto renovate them; transport was not difficult as the school was nearby;plus the cooperation of a keen school principal who acted as counterpart tothe team leader contributed to the relative success of the componentcompared to achievements by other technical assistance in the project.
Procurement
3.20 COMWORKS agreed with the Association to procure the bulk of theequipment, vehicles and spare parts in one exercise but suppliers wererequired to deliver the items in two lots to be separated in time by ayear. This was intended to allow time for COMWORKS to build and organizethe workshops and field offices to be ready to accept delivery and usingthem in the execution of road maintenance and rehabilitation works.
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3.21 Although the Credit Agreement was signed in early 1979, the biddocuments were not finalized until early 1981. When bids were advertisedfor ICB, there was further delay due to disagreement between theAssociation and Government ove. the sufficiency of notification for ICB.The Government adv-rtised in the local newspapers and the Governmentgazette and the Association had arranged a year earlier for publication ofa general procurement notice in the Development Business Forum Editionpublished by the UN. The Government also informed all foreign embassiesand legations in Dar-es-Salaam. As a result of the Association'sinsistence on advertising in a foreign newspaper or journal of widecirculation, a further delay occurred.
3.22 Bid response was satisfactory but when the contracts were awarded,the project was in its third year. Delays in delivery occurred as a resultof suspension of Association disbursements in 1983 and 1984 for allprojects iu Tanzania because of non-payment of arrears on past credits andloans. It was not until late 1983 that equipment and vehicles started toarrive and this continued into 1984. A list of the equipment and vehiclesprocured under the project is given in Table 3. In early 1985, it was feltthat there was need for a few additional items of equipment and anincreased stock of spare parts, particularly fast moving spares and bitumenand it was agreed with the Association for part of the unallocated creditproceeds to be allocated for this purpose. Unfortunately, procurement wasslow despite the fact that COMWORKS had accumulated considerable experiencein equipment procurement in accordance with Bank Guidelines. Much of theadditional items of equipment and spare parts and bitumen had not beencontracted for when the project was closed on December 31, 1985.
3.23 The project a'lso included provisions for construction by contractof road camps and staff houses that were to be occupied by technicalassistance staff. Instead of selecting contractors after local competitivebidding as required by the Credit Agreement, COMWORKS proceeded toconstruct the houses by force account. Progress was slow and workmanshipextremely poor. While COMWORKS had a separate building divisionresponsible for constructing government buildings, the work was carried outby the roads division which lacked the skills to construct houses. Ashortage of building materials such as cement, windows, and plumbingequipment made construction difficult and many of the houses stand today inan unfinished stage. The Association supervision missions also felt thatroad crews and maintenance funds were being diverted to carry out thebuilding works. In the event, no claims were made by the Government fordisbursements against expenditures on road camps and housing.
Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Works
3.24 The project goal was to establish an organization for themaintenance of 5110 kms of trunk roads. Many of the roads had deterioratedand the project provided for the rehabilitation of those roads in order torestore them to a maintainable condition. In all, the road maintenance andrehabilitation program called for (i) a routine maintenance capability over5110 km; (ii) regravelling of 600 kms and regravelling capability of 100 kmper year; and (iii) rehabilitation of 1440 kms.
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3.25 Eleven road camps and workshops were to be built in the 10 regionscovered by the project. In addition, 16 houses for technical assistancestaff were scheduled for construction. Six routine maintenance crews forbitumen roads and 26 similar crews for the gravel roads and 6 specializedunits for regravelling and rehabilitation were to be organized and equippedin stages to exe,.ute the whole program. The regravelling andrehabilitation crews were to be reduced to one crew in the last year of theproject.
3.26 By late 1983, about 4 years into the project, 10 camps and 5workshops out of the 11 camps and 11 workshops scheduled had beenconstructed. However, the layout of the camps was unsatisfactory in thatthe stores were small, the living quarters were too close to the yards, andstores and offices were combined with the living quarters of the foremen.The Association's supervision mission in late 1983 questioned if it wasappropriate policy to concentrate housing for labor in central locationsand urged COMWORKS to consider encouraging labor to live along the roads sothat routine maintenance could be carried out without need for vehicles totransport labor. COMWORKS has expanded its program to build in all 33road camps and this work continued after the project was closed. Only 8 ofthe 16 staff houses had been constructed by the close of the project.There were shortages in supply of building materials and fuel to constructcamps and houses, and both camps and houses were never completed.
3.27 About one-third cf the original road maintenance program wascompleted by the Government. Of the 600 kms of roads scheduled to beregravelled 258 kms (43%) were actually regravelled. Of the 1440 kms ofroads scheduled to be rehabilitated 504 kms (35%) were actuallyrehabilitated. The details of the actual and planned road regravelling andrehabilitation works under the project are shown in Table 4. Because ofdeterioration in other parts of the network, road priorities had changedand some of the resources financed under the project were employed inregravelling and rehabilitation of road sections which were not in theoriginally agreed program. Thus overall, 1620 kms (32%) of the trunk roadnetwork were improved during the project period . However, the quality ofthe works carried out was poor and the deterioration of the trunk roadnetwork has continued.
3.28 Much of the poor performance in the field was due to the lack ofproper supervision and shortage of experienced engineers; but skeletal TRMorganizations have been established in all the 10 regions covered by theproject and with the availability of more qualified engineers trained underthe project and experience gained by them, the situation is turning around.Because of the deteriorated condition of the roads, the routine maintenancecrews have been merged with the regravelling and rehabilitation crews andCOMWORKS has attempted to establish a regravelling and rehabilitationcapability in each of the 10 regions covered by the project. These crewsare presently more and more being deployed to carry out high priorityroutine maintenance tasks such as keeping the drains and culverts open andpatching, and the regravelling and rehabilitation works have beenprogrammed to be executed by contract under the Sixth Highway(Rehabilitation) Project.
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Pilot Program for Regional Road Maintenance
3.29 Little action was taken towards Implementing this projectcomponent until early 1984 when visits were made by technical assistancestaff to the two piU.ot regions, Mwanza and Zanzibar, to prepare roadmaintenance programs and determine spare parts requirements to rehabilitatethe regional equipment and vehicle fleets. Although procurement steps weretaken in the latter half of 1984, the spare parts did not arrive until late1985. Much of the failure to complete implementation of this component wasdue to the following factors. The component was introduced into theproject as an after thought and without any pretparation and both Governmentand Association gave little attention to the cteponent duringimplementation.
Cons lting Services
(a) Feasibility Studies and Detailed Engineering of TANZAM Highway
3.30 During project execution, it became evident that some key roads inthe country had deteriorated at a much faster rate than anticipated duringtheir construction and that steps had to be taken to rehabilitate andstrengthen these roads if the original investments were to be saved. Onesuch road was the heavily trafficked TANZAM Highway for which technicalassistance funds were used with Association approval to employ consultantsto carry out feasibility studies and detailed engineering to strengthen andrehabilitate certain high priority sections.
3.31 Six consulting firms were invited to submit proposals includingthe firm which provided technical assistance to COMWORKS under the project.This firm was awarded the contract for the above studies which commenced inmid-1982. The draft feasibility study report was submitted by the firmabout 2 months late. Detailed engineering commenced soon afterwards andwas completed close to contract schedule. The strengthening andrehabilitation works on the TANZAM Highway are included in the SixthHighway (Rehabilitation) Project.
(b) Preparation of a Three-Year Road Regravelling and RehabilitationProgram
3.32 An Association supervision mission in late 1984, realized thatmuch of the gravel road network was not in a maintainable condition andthat regravelling and rehabilitation of the roads being undertaken by forceaccount was not satisfactory. It, therefore, recommended a country-wideprogram for restoring the gravel roads network to maintainable standardsand recommended a study to prepare a long-term program of regravelling andrehabilitation of about 3500 kms of trunk roads to be implemented over aten-year period - a three year slice of about 800 kms is to be implementedunder the Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project.
3.33 At Government's request, the Association agreed to employing thesame consultants who carried out the feasibility study and detailedengineering for the TANZAM Highway. A contract between the Government andthe firm was signed in February 1985 and the consultants commenced economicand engineering studies in June 1985. The studies were completedsatisfactorily in December 1850 close to contract schedule.
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Implementation Schedule
3.34 A comparison between the original and actual projectimplementation is shown in Table 5. Project implementation was about twoyears behind schedule mainly due to the: (i) delay caused in crediteffectiveness; (ii) delay in the preparation of bidding documents forequipmentt and (iii) interruption of procurement due to suspension ofdisbursements in Tanzania by the Association for non-payment of arrears.
3.35 In retrospect, it is clear that the implementation schedule drawnat appraisal was realistic but unforeseen events like the Association'srefusal to accept the initial recommendations for appointment of keyadvisors and the Association's suspension of disbursements contributed todelays in the provision of project inputs and to unpredictability in theprogramming of inputs. However, once the inputs were in place significantprogress was made in implementation of the road maintenance program but thequality of the works carried out was not satisfactory.
Reportina
3.36 The consultants responsible for technical assistance and studiessubmitted their reports in accordance with their contracts. COMWORKSprepared quarterly project progress reports - the first was a brief reportfor the period ending December 1980. The quality of the reports weresatisfactory. The Government did not comply with the covenant in theCredit Agreement requiring submission of a project completion report to theAssociation.
Performance of Consultants
(a) Technical Assistance
3.37 Technical Assistance was provided by 2 key advisors from aconsulting firm and by 12 advisors, including one key advisor, recruitedindividually. Four advisor) positions were never filled. The averageperiod of service in Tanzanla of each advisor was about 3 years.
3.38 The advisors' performance was affected initially by numerousconstraints. Office facilities were inadequate, transportation was notalways available, there were delays in the assignment of counterparts whowere mostly not qualified and equipment, spare parts, and materials had notbeen procured. Above all, their work was uncoordinated. Towards the endof the project, there was a modicum of control and direction by the roadmaintenance advisor and with the arrival of equipment and spare parts theadvisors began to have an impact on road maintenance activities. Butcounterpart training continued to be unsatisfactory and it was felt towardsthe end of the project that the impact of the advisors was small and localcounterparts were tending to let the advisors do the work.
(b) Trainint at Moroftoro Trainina School
3.39 The consultants were appointed rather late but their performancewas satisfactory and they are being continued under the Sixth Highway(Rehabilitation) Project.
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Pro1ect Costs
3.40 A comparison of the actual and estimated project costs is shoL- inTable 6. The project costs which reflect only the inputs financed underthe project are close to the estimated costs. While the Goverment'scontribution to support the local costs of the project components wassatisfactory, its allocations to road maintenance budget were seriously cutfor the first two years of the project period. Expendituzes on routinemaintenance dropped from TShs 30.1 million in 1980181 to TShs 22.5 millionin 1981/82. Allocations rose slightly in 1982183 to TShs 24.7 million andthereafter, the Government continued to increase its allocations despiteserious problems in the economy. The total road maintenance expendituresrose from TShs 98.7 million in FY1979180 to 258.1 million at the date ofclosing of the project in FY1985/86 and TShs 328.7 million have beenallocated for the current financial year FY1986/87 (Table 7). FromFY1983/84, the Government became increasingly supportive of the project androad maintenance allocations have kept pace with inflation.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
4.01 At project appraisal, the Association was concerned about threeinstitutional problems. First, experience under the Fourth Highway Projecthad shown that the delegation of responsibility for the execution of trunkroad maintenance to the regional governments was not satisfactory. Second,there was little attention being devoted to the upkeep of the country'ssecondary and feeder road networks. Third, there was continued shortage ofstaff at all levels, management engineers were inexperienced, andtechnicians and field personnel were poorly trained.
4.02 With regard to the first problem, as a condition of projectnegotiations, the Government was required to reorganize the TRMorganizations in the regions by relieving the regional governments of anyresponsibility and enabling the resident engineers heading the TRMorganization in each region to report directly to COMWORKS. Unfortunately,many of the resident engineers were unqualified and consisted oftechnicians who did not have the ability to organize, manage, and superviseroad maintenance operations in the field. They also lacked powers todiscipline unsatisfactory labor. Much of the resources were wasted onsmall volumes of poor quality works.
4.03 With regard to the second problem, a belated attempt was made toinclude in the project a provision to organize maintenance of the secondaryand feeder road networks in two pilot regions (Mwanza and Zanzibar). Whenit was introduced into the project no preparatory work had been done and asa result, steps were not taken to implement the components until the lastyear of the project.
4.04 It was realized at project apprais3l that COMWORKS would havedifficulty in providing suitably qualified counterparts to technicalassistance financed under the project. Therefore, it was required as acondition of Credit effectiveness that the three local counterparts to thethree key advisors should be in positions along with the advisors.Furthermore, the Credit Agreement required that the qualifications and
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experience of local counterparts should be subject to review and appraisalby the Association. In practice, however, many of the counterparts werenot suitable and some were not appointed until later on during the project.
4.05 The shortage of experience engineers necessitated a heavy relianceon expatriate advisors. Initially, the Government accepted the advisorsreluctantly. This attitude changed during the last two years of theproject when the Government requested extensions of contract for the 2consultants' staff and 5 of the other 12 advisors.
4.06 By late 1983, although the results achieved by the project weredisappointing, there were signs that the Government was seriously committedto giving priority to road maintenance in the allocation of manpower andfunds. A TRM organization had been established in each region and effortswere made to facilitate the work of the advisors by providing them withtransport and housing in the field.
4.07 However, Government was slow in forecasting demand for spare partsand materials such as cement and bitumen and steps were not taken to usefunds available in the Credit to procure these goods. This severelylimited production in the field. An Association mission in June 1985reported that the Government had reached a plateau in strengthening thetrunk road maintenance organization and that further improvement waspossible only by developing the local contracting industry and limitingforce account works to the execution of routine maintenance tasks. Theproject was closed after extending its closing date by one year to December31, 1985.
V. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION
5.01 At appraisal, the economic return from investment in highwaymaintenance was estimated at 70%, based on reduction of vehicle operatingcosts (VOC) and increases in traffic. A sensitivity analysis had shownthat with costs increasing by 25% and benefits decreasing by 202, theeconomic return would be still acceptable with 39%. No other benefits suchas the development of the maintenance institution or benefits to travelershad been quantified.
5.02 The benefits were to be generated by a reduction in VOC due toimprovements of tie roads riding condition from poor or fair to good.However, during the eight-year life of the project, the contemplatedimprovements in the rideability of the roads did not occur as planned.According to recent surveys (Table 8), of the 5110 km to be raised to goodstandard, only 278 km or about 6X were actually raised to good standard.However, partial improvements from poor to fair standard were registeredfor about 1342 km or 26% of the roads. There was no improvement registeredon 62% of the roads and on 6% the condition worsened. These are verydisappointing results indeed. They indicate that the savings in VOC havenot materialized, except for those related to some 322 of the roads. Andeven for these roads, only a fraction of the contemplated savings wereobtained.
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5.03 The following table illustrates the failure to fulfill theobjective of che projects
Condition of the Project Roadsin 1985 Compared to 1977
Condition Condition ConditionImproved Did not Improve Worsened Total
Kilometer 16201I 31752/ 31531 51102 32 62 6 100
/I of which 52 km of bituminous roadsI/ of which 316 km of bituminous roadsDI of which 238 km of bituminous roads
5.04 The bituminous roads were the most neglected. They representabout 75% of the roads where the condition worsened end only 52 km havebeen improved to good standard. This reflects a particularly bad orderingof priorities as to where to intervene for maintenance operations since thecost of losing bituminous roads is considerable. The reason given was thatTansania was short of foreign exchange to import the necessary bitumenalthough the required equipment and labor was available.
5.05 Another element in the economic analysis is the traffic volume andits growth. Here too, the project was in difficulty because of the severeeconomic recession of the country which, in turn, is reflected in a sharpreduction in the traffic volumes. Although traffic surveys are notavailable for about 332 of the kilometrage of roads of this project, thedata presented below show that traffic decreased for over half of the roadswhere traffic was recorded and increased moderately for the balance.
Traffic on the Project Roadsin 1985 Compared to 1977
Traffic Traffic No TrafficIncreased Decreased Reported Total
Kilometer 1600 1835 1675 5110X 31 36 33 100
5.06 As a result of (i) the non-improvement of about 682 of the roads;(ii) the lower than expected level of improvement of those roads that wereimproved; and (iii) the limited proportion (31%) of the road where trafficincreased, a recalculation of the rate of return indicates a drop to about102, (compared to 702 at appraisal). The project thus is barely justifiedon the basis of VOC savings. However, the institutional build-up of themaintenance services in various provinces has been positive and should beencouraged further with proper incentives to staff and a more appropriateframe work to define the priorities where to intervene in maintenance andto give top priority to preserving the paved road assets.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Project Justification and Objectives
6.01 The project was a logical development after a decade ofinvolvement in the highway sector to upgrade the highway network. Theexodus of indigenous staff of Asian origin in 1972 brought into focus thedecline in road maintenance capability that had been going on for sometime. Both COMWORKS and the Association realized the need to stem thedeterioration of the country's highway network and began a program tostrengthen trunk road maintenance in two phases. The first phase covered10 regions in the southern half of the country and was financed under theFourth Highway Project which was not completed satisfactorily (Annex). Thesecond phase covering the remaining 10 regions in the northern half of thecountry was financed under the project which is the subject of the PCR.The project objectives were to (i) establish institutional arrangements fortrunk road maintenance; (ii) train COMWORKS staff and field personnel; and(iii) implement a road rehabilitation and maintenance program.
Project Content and Scheduling
6.02 Although the project covered only about 5100 kms, it wasambitious. The project area encompassed almost the whole of the northernhalf of the country. Distances are vast and communications especially withthe regions around Lake Victoria have always been difficult. During therainy season, road access was cut off. In retrospect, the project area wastoo large. The project should have been tried out in one or two regionssince the first phase was a failure for partly the same reason. Thedesirability of limiting the project area became obvious towards the end ofthe project but the Government had already deployed equipment and vehiclesand allocated funds and other resources to all the ten regions and wasreluctant to concentrate work on two regions.
Proiec. Implementation
6.03 The implementation capacity of CONWORKS was limited by itsreluctance to employ expatriate staff in line positions. Key vacantpositions in the ministry were filled by inexperienced and sometimesunqualified staff. Senior staff were therefore, engaged in attending today-to-day routine running of the ministry, with little time available forlong-term planning and policy making and supervision of field staff.
6.04 Technical assistance staff were employed as advisors to localcounterparts but their presence added to COMWORKS administrative burden anda few of the advisory positions were never filled. Work on building housesdid not commence until after the advisors had arrived and transport was notavailable to enable the a4visors to do field work. In a few instances, thelocal counterparts did not avail themselves of the services of theiradvisors. Thus, the effectiveness of the technical assistance staff wasnot evident until towards the end of the project period when local andtechnical assistance staff collaborated and worked harder.
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6.0S The training component was successfully implemented both inreJpect of training of engineers at Tndian universities and of road fieldpersonnel at the Morogoro Training School. With regard to the latter,there was inordinate delay in the selection of consultants mainly due tothe disappointment with a similar component in the previous project. TheGovernment agreed with the Association on the need for integration of theproposed new courses into the normal curricula of the school and admissionof trainees from all government agencies besides COMWORKS and contractors.There were also good attempts at counterpart training because of a strongcommltment by the school principal and the cooperation of localinstructors. Because of the undeveloped state of the local contracting andconsulting industry, most of the engineers and road field personnel trainedunder the project remain in the service of the Government. Training isbeing continued on the same scale under the ongoing Sixth Highway(Re!hsbilitation) Project with a view to satisfying potential needs of bothpublic and private sectors.
Lessons Learned
6.06 What proved to be most disappointing in this project is that thequality of the roads did not improve as expected although much of the fundsto do so were spent. The Government did spend a lot of domestic resourcesto train staff and pay salaries, procure material and spare parts inaddition to spending the credit's foreign exchange to acquire maintenanceequipment and hire technical assistance. What went wrong was that a fewcritical elements needed to actually perform the maintenance work weremissing. When the labor and equipment were available, the bitumen was notthere. When the labor and material were available, the equipment was notoperational for lack of spare or of fuel or of tyres, etc. In a shortagesituation. it is hance essential that an order of priority be establishedto ensur.. that the more valuable activities can be carried out first. Forexample, the lack of bitumen, which was not imported from 1984 to 1986,prevented the resealing and resurfacing works on existing paved roads inthe Moshi area. As a result, some of the roads have crumbled to the pointwhere reconstruction at a high cost is required. Hence, it would have beenpreferable to reduce the scope of the project when, in late 1984, it wasrealized the Government could not maintain that entire trunk road network.This would have enabled the project to concentrate on key activities topreserve the paved road network, and ensure that main trunk roads are keptopen during the rainy seascn. Better planning for less ambitious, butcritical maintenance operations could have produced much better results.
6.07 Another major lesson learned is that there are serious limitationsto the effectiveness of technical assistance to strengthen road maintenanceoperations in the field. Many of the critical road maintenance tasks aresimple tasks technologically and the success of execution of these tasksdepend very much on close field supervision and quality of leadership inthe field organizations; locally available resources provide the best meansto develop and sustain a road maintenance capability. It is doubtful if itis practical to achieve this by the provision of technical assistance staffon a large scale country wide. Rather, the project points to the need toimprove the macro envirom 2nt for spare parts, fuel, and materials in the
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local market and to achieve better results through ..ie provision ofappropriate incentives to management and supervisory staff at all levels.At the some time, personnel administration policies and managementpractices should be tightened and focus on staff discipline and control oflabor.
6.08 Further, the project also illustrates the Government's ambivalentattitude to expatriate technical assistance staff. On the one hand, theGovernment recognized the need for technical assistance staff but, on theother, it was concerned with the high costs and the burden of administeringto the requirements of a large number of expatriates. Both Government andAssociation should also monitor closely performance of individual technicalassistance staff in order to identify as early as possible constraints tothe effectiveness of technical assistance. The monitoring should be basedon previously agreed detailed task-oriented work programs which should beconstantly kept under review. The project also demonstrated the success offormal training programs at educational and training institutions comparedwith counterpart training in the work place.
6.09 Finally, the point is also made by the project if it is economicalto develop a full force account capability to execute road maintenanceworks. Experience shows that COMWORKS should limit its force accountoperations to routine maintenance and adopt a policy of giving out theperiodic and heavy maintenance works to be executed by contract. A starthas been made in this direction by Government in agreeing to carry out bycontract, the rehabilitation of gravel roads financed under the ongoingSixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project which includes a component todevelop the local contracting industry.
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Annex
TANZANIA
FIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Performance of the Fourth Hiahwa2 Project (Credit 507-TA)
The Fourth Highway Project constituted the first of a two-phaseeffort to establish a Trunk Road Maintenance (TRM) Organization in each ofthe 20 regions of the country. The Fifth Highway Project was the secondphase.
The Fourth Highway Project failed to achieve its physicalobjectives. Much of the road network 'covered by the project deterioratedduring the project period despite sporadic attempts to carry outrehabilitation works. There was no satisfactory planning of roadmaintenance in the project area and road maintenance operations werecarried out on an ad hoc basis dependent upon availability of resourcessuch as fuel, materials, equipment, transport, and spare parts.
The organization and management of the regional trunk roadmaintenance organizations were no.t effective and there was little controland supervision over field crews and their activities. the few scatteredroad maintenance works were of poor quality and road conditions rapidlyreverted to their original deteriorated state. Thus, the savings invehicle operating costs estimated at the time of appraisal did notmaterialize. The economic re-evaluation of the project registered anegative economic rate of return.
A recasting of the project was attempted in May 1980, about twoand a half years before the project was closed. The TRM organization wasbrought under direct control of COMWORES (earlier, the TRM organization wasreporting to the Regional Engineer, an employee of the RegionalGovernment). A road maintenance program -was established but it was notrealistic and the Government did not employ the additional technicalassistance agreed with the Association. There was little improvement inproject performance and the project was closed on December 31, 1982.
A number of lessons were learned from the project. First,successful highway maintenance depends mainly on the quality of localmanagement and availability of requisite number of trained personnel.Second, the executing agency should be fully committed to employingtechnical assistance staff. Third, technical assistance should take anadvisory role only if there are suitable local counterparts. Finally, theproject demonstrated the need to develop the local contracting industry toparticipate in road maintenance and rehabilitation works as an alternativeto force account. The ongoing Sixth Highway (Rehabilitation) Project(Credit 1688-TA, June 1986) includes technical assistance and training todevelop the local contracting industry.
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Table I
TANZANIAFIFTH HIoHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 076-TA)
PROJECT COWPLETION REPORT
Detall of Technical Assistance and Tralntng Staff
Starting Finishing Duty TotalA 0 V I S 0 R T 0 Date Date Stailon Man Months Remarks
S. Kroner 84.14*2Yen 843 5992350Olt S5,0B2D Nrone. 1 ,60,660
Tshs ot 201
TANZANIAP-WT HWMAY PR0JWT (CAIT S76-TA)
Planned A Actwal Acca.plliabasnta (P(A) - Roev.l I ing & Rmhabi Iltetien
Length PY1979/6 Fn196/8I Pt1981/6 FY1962/8 PY14f8/84 FV11004/415 P7195/8 Total as pot TetaRO0AD0 5 EC TtI N (K.) Plan Actual Planm Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Astwal Plan Actwal *Plan Actual APpralsal (t.) Ac%alm (Ka)
NeeraWel I Ing:
W..-Sebobebol(le40a 42 42 - - - - -- - 42-*t83 NiAraI4agbsti 57 a - 5 - - is 1 - go - - - so 46IS-2 eOWW-Srreel 1i6 - -- 48 - 105 as 8 25 - 34 - 15 is I"4 I2700-lmDdqiwArwata 2 - - - - 20 94 too10 80 is Ri--- ao soWL-4 lbl.tha-8lharamto us - -- - -- 25 -- 10 04 - 1 - 11 as
A-4 hati-Oedam 84 -- - - - --- 19 is9
Toftl Rmguavotllng s0 0 100 0 100 58 100 s8 100 102 100 is so is no0 268
RbhabillMotion:
ARt-7 M&uyaa-Wgmaoowr 76 70 -- 21 - -- 40 -- is -- - - - 91 55S4-21rboss-Tbora 101 90. 13 - -- 5 -- 31 -- 48 - - 108 94S0-S oadomm-Cal re 125 -- - 18 U p e a d a to S t a a n S ta a d a r d 186 125
Date of Date of Commencement Date of Completion !Contract Award of Works/Serv/D-liv of Works/Serv/Deliv Completion
---- ------- ---- - ----------- - - by Planned
PROJECT COMPONENT Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Date
1. Road Equipment and Spares Mid 1979 Early 1982 Late 1979 Mid 1883 Mid 1981 Mid 1985 0
2. Workshop Equipment Early 1980 Late 1982 Early 1980 Late 1986 Mid 1980 Mid 1986 0
3. Construction of Camps Late 1979 -- lt Late 1979 Late 1981 Late 1980 Underway 0
4. Road Maint. Materials Late 1979 Early 1982 Early 1980 Late 1982 Mid 1980 Late 1982 405. Rehab. of Reglonal Equip. -- 2t -- Late 1979 Late 1988 Mid 1980 Underway 0 tn
6. Technical Assistance A Training:(a) Tech. Asst. to COMWORKS Early 1979 Mid 1980 Early 1979 Late 1980 Mid 1982 Late 1985 40(b) Trng. at Morogoro School Late 1978 Mid 1984 Early 1979 Late 1984 Early 1981 Mid 1988 0
(c) Training Aids Late 1979 Mid 1984 Early 1980 Late 1984 Mid 1980 Late 1988 0
(d) Housing Late 1978 -- I/ Early 1979 Late 1981 Late 1979 Late 1988 0
(e) Trng. of Engineers In India Early 1979 Early 1980 Mid 1979 Late 1980 Mid 1983 Late 1984 70
1/ Works carried out by force account. No disbursements by Association.2/ Not applicable.
I n
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Table 6
TANZANIAFIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Actual A Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs
: =-== : = = 33= 33: 3 __=3 G=:2=S::55
A c t u a I C o s t Appraisal Estimate of Cost Actual_____________________ __ -_--- as E of
PROJECT COMPONENT Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Appraisal(TShs m) (USS m) (USS m) (TShs m) (USS m) (US$ m) Estimate
1/ Foreign exchange rate to convert local currency to USS IsUSS1.00 - TShs. 9.50.
2/ Foreign exchange rate to convert local currency to USS isUSS1.00 = TShs. 16.42.
3/ Appraisal estimates used In the absence of actual costs.4/ No disbursements made against these items.6/ Local expenditures on individually rocruited advisors are
not available.
TANZANIAFIFTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 876-TA)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPOr'
Road Maintenance Expenditures (FY1979/80 - FY1988/87) (TShs X 1,000)
I T E M FY1979/80 FY1980/81 FY1981/82 FY1982183 FY1983/84 FY1984/86 FYI986/86 y1I988/87 Y
1/ Budget allocations. Actual expenditures in the past have beenclose to budget allocations.
I-!a-sr-4
- 28 -
Ps je I of 2TMVAMO
FIFTH HI@Wt YOJ r (aR? 807-TA)
Road Inventory Canditioe Vd Traffic Volvo"
CoerlM Between 1077 and 18
Surface 1
inz ma iz no
Arueh a. AR-1 Arleo4mng 9 B F F F 246 172son AR-2 Aruehh-flakuyunl 75 a F F r R 402 1"son AR-9 (1) l4uywnlotI S2 8 f F H 11 74.. (I) Nakuyunil-ati 60 a P p H l18 74*eAR-4 Babat4-Oodmo Berder 42 0 P P R #i --
c. AR-8 ItiKl_enjaro Bordar-Arueo 50 B P F F/R 1683 1096
* AR-6 aB"ati-Sln,de Border 129 a p P R/H 96 -* AR-? (i) ikuyunt-rengoti Park fintoe ? 0 a p P R/H 160 278* (Ii) Hakuyuni-Serenetl fPrk aite 21 0 P P R/H 62 -
a.. (iii) Hakuyuni-seregeti Paris Oate -a a P P R/H 10 -
Sub-total "Z
Dodma a*se DO-1 (i) Dodom-Aruhea Border 11 8 F F F/R 133 84ao (ii) Oedooe-Arueh border 210 a P P F/R 48 84
aae 00-2 (i) Didom-Iringa Border 2 9 F P F/R 94 11a (I i) Dod.e-Iringa Border 140 0 P F/P F/p 94 11
sea 00-t (i) Dodiam-Oi rr 2 8 F a Fp 165 117a (i,) D_ee-Gairo #in a p a F/" 112 117
a.. D0-4 (;) Dodo.a-8ehi 6 8 F P R/H 78 88a (i;) Dodoms-Dphi a a P P RNH 73 Ss
Sub-total An
K ; uses K4-1 Iatryanl-#yantwigs 280 a p P R/H 28 18*eac K0-2 Kafeytnl-Haobwo 70 a P P ft/H a -
see K0- (i) Kiaoe-Emnyjani t 8 F F R/H s0 27asa (;;) Kisome-lNanyni -l 0 F P R/H 60 27
Sub-total m9
K;lianjaro *-- KL-1 Hisomaui 16S d F P F/R 82 2U5se. KL-2 Himo-"Deh; 2J B F F F/R 8B2 1188es* KL-3 oashI-Arushe Border aS d F F F/R 941 761use KL-4 Hlro-Kibou 60 C F F R/H 84 878o*c KL-5 His-Tavots _JZ B F Ff R/H 84 --
Sub-total 2K
Moare HA-1 undafbanza Border 21 Under Conetruction -- 218
cc HA-2 Dunda-Sireri a C P F/P R/H 72 18
Sub-total 1L
6stArdka indicate roade identified an bilb priority and ineluded under the Project for:* rehabilitation end subsiquent routla. mintance;
* regravoelling and oubseuent rowtln caintannce;
**e routine mintenance only; end
uses routine maIntenance only. am maintenance units incresae their capacity.
./ Surfeeo Type (1978): 89 Bltu.n; erav*l or Ereth
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