Inv l i I RN E S Tl R I r C T E r LULIPYi~iIri Report No. AF-60a I.1 This report was prepared for use within the Bank and its affiliated orgonizations. TThey do not accept responsibility for itg accuracy or completeness. The report may not be published nor marj it be quoted as representingr their views.' TNTPRNATTCkNL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION-AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. ASSOCIATION THE ECONOMY OF ETHIOPIA (in five volumes) Itrf"%T TT'KXL' TTT -V %J..JAULJLV.L;& ".L.L TRANSPORTATION August 31, 1967 Africa Department Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Inv l i I RN E S Tl R I r C T E r
LULIPYi~iIri Report No. AF-60a
I.1This report was prepared for use within the Bank and its affiliated orgonizations.TThey do not accept responsibility for itg accuracy or completeness. The report may
not be published nor marj it be quoted as representingr their views.'
TNTPRNATTCkNL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION-AND DEVELOPMENT
The Ethiopian calender year (EC) runs from September 11to September 10. Moreover, there is a difference of about7-3/4 years between the Gregorian and the Ethiopian era.For intance, 1959 EC runs froM. September 11, 1966 toSeptember 10, 1967. Most of the official Ethiopian statisticson national accounts, production, and foreign trade areconverted to the Gregorian calender. Throughout the reportthe Gregorian calender is used.
The Ethiopian budget year begins on July 8. For example,Ethiopian budget year 1959 runs from July 8, 1966 toJuly 7, 1967. In the report this year is referred to asbudget year 1966/67.
ECONOMY OF ETHIOPIA
VOLUME III
TRANSPOITATION
This- repointW+. i hbased orn +he findings of1 2 mTisionn in rnvemher-
December 1966 to Ethiopia composed of Messrs. David Kochav(Ghief of Missior. - T~R,RTPn) TD,fin TiJmnl (TlRPn)l .Jorgcn R Lotz
(Ilg), Willem Tiaane (IBRD), Sei-Young Park (IBRD), Stuard M.Taylor (FAO), Ann4 bal V; 1 1ela (IBRD3) , and T . El.wyng. I,i 1 am.S(FAO Consultant).
Volume III has been prepared by Mr. Sei-Young Park.
TABIE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. PROBLEMS OF TRANSPORT POLICY 2
A. Transport Investment and Economic Development 2B. Transport Coordination 3
a. Investment Coordination 3b. Regulatlon of Transport Operations 4c. Road User Charges 5
III. ROADS 7
A. Recent Developments of Road System 7B. Adninistration of Roads 8C. Road Transport Industry 10D. Review of Road Investment Plan 12
IV. RAILWAYS 17
A. Railways' Place in Ethiopian Economy 17B. Investment Requirements for Railways 18
V. PORTS 19
A. The Port Development Policy 19B. Administration of Ports 21C. Port Investment Requirements 23
VI. CIVIL AVIATION 23
A.. freneral 23B Domestic Airports 25C. Administration of Civil Aviation 26D. Operations of Ethiopian Airlines 27
ANNE
MAP
TABLESTabl e 1 - National Road Svstem. 19q7/58-1966/67Table 2 - IHA Expenditures on Roads, 1957/58-1965/66Tabhl 3 - anovenrnment Capita.nl rudget- 1903/6L,-1966/67Table 4 - Motor Fuel Consumption, 1958/59-1965166Table 5 - VMt.rn. Uehincles in Circulatinn, l962-1Q6
Table of Contents-2-
Table 6 - Average Daily Vehicle-Kilometers, 1953/5h-1965/66Table 7 - Tentative Road Investment Proeram. 1967/68-1971/72Table 8 - Revenues and Expenditures of Ports, 1960/61-1965/66Table 9 - Traffic Through Port of Assab. 1960/61-1965/66Table 10 - Traffic through Port of Massawa, l960/61-1965/66Table 11 - Pronosed Purcnhase of EqPiipment for Massawa and Assab PortsTable 12 - Ethiopian Airlines, Operating Statistics, 1956-1965Tahle 13 - AEthiopia_n a-i inn n Finbnpin1 StatiStiGS; 1956-1965Table 14 - Port of Djibouti, Traffic Statistics 1958-1965
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Ethiopia lies between 3½< and 18° N latitude and 33 and 480 E longi-tude in East Afrina. Before Eritre a wa federated in 1952; Ethionia was aninland country. The main outlet to the Red Sea was through the French Somali-
anad nort. Dbibonti The dtio br'h1. to Ethiopia the 1000 km coazt-line of Eritrea with the ports of Massawa and Assab.
2. The large size of the country -- 1,220,000 kM2 , twice the size ofFrance -- and the difficult opographical coni4tions make provisionr of adequatetransport facilities difficult and costly. Between the lowland in the easternhalf of the country which slopes toward the Red Sea .ad the So 1- Republ cand the high plateaus in the west, a high wall rises abruptly and precipitouslySep-arating the two regions. Thue road fro MUAddi Ababa to ALsm-ara ascer.ds -ad
descends the escarpment at several difficult places. At only two points alongthe wall separatin the -westerrn plateaus from tWhe eastern lowlan.ds (betweenMassawa and Asmara and between Nazreth and Addis Ababa, where there is a break'in the line of escarpm,ent) has it been possible to cor.swruct railways wtichgive access to the plateaus.
3. The backbone of the transport system of the country is roads, supple-mented by railways and air transport. Inland water transport is not impoi-tantas the rivers are for the most part unnavigable. The road system consist3 ofabout 6100 km of all-weather roads, of which 1900 Xm are asphalt paved,maintained by the Imperial Highway Authority, and over 16,000 km of unimprovedroads. A considerable part of the present road system wvas built by theItalians during their occupation from 1936 to 1941. But due to neglect untilthe early 1950's, a large part had to be rebuilt; in this operation the etnkisthree loans played an important role. The roads built during the Italianoccupation were mainly for military requirements, and the alignment andstandards are not always suitable for present economic development. Thedifficult mountain terrain, together with the special climatic problems arisingfrom the alternating extremely wet and dry seasons, present a formidablemaintenance problem.
h. There are two railways in Ethiopia. The 781 km single track meter-gauge line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti in French Somaliland, completed in 1917.is operated by the Franco-Ethiopian Railways Company. The 306 km railway fromthe Massawa port to Asmara and Agordat, in Eritrea, is operated oy the Govern-ment. The latter railway has a much steeper gradient, as it climbs 2300 min about 80 km.
5. Since the construction of the port of Assab, completed in 1961,there has been a three-way split in external trade of Ethiopia between lassawa,Assab and Djibouti. The present trend, however, is to develop the Eritrealports, particularly Assab, in preference to the French-controlled port ofDjibouti.
6. The mountainous nature of the country and the relatively under-developed overland transport facilities give special importance to internalair transport. There are about 50 airports and landing strips. EthiopianAirlines, government-owned and established in 1945, operates regular servicesto about 30 domestic airports, many of which, however, are closed during partof the rainy season.
7. During the past 10 to 15 years the Goveniment has made great effortsto expand and improve the country's transport facilities. The investmentprogram was mainly concentrated in highwav construction and in building a newdeep-water port at Assab. The length of all-weather roads has more thandoubled during the past 10 years. The road progrnm w2S mainly devoted toprimary road construction; relatively little was done with regard to mainte-nance of t-he road system and provi-sion of secondaj and feeder roads.
II. PROBLEMS OF TRANSPORT POLICY
A. Transport Investment and Economic Development
8. Ethiopia is potentially a very rich country. The fertile soil andthe livestock potentials could be the envy o maniy less favorably endowe4countries. On the other hand, the country, as discussed in the main volumeoL this report, nas many unusually difficult problems which must be overcomLeif the rich economic resources are to be exploited. Inadequate transporttherefore is but one of the problems which are holding back the progress ofthe social economy; tackling the transportation problem in isolation is notlikely to lead to a satisfactory improvement of the economic conditions ofthe country.
9. There are countries where the transport problem poses virtually theonly major constraint to development, where other econorriic needs are fli:Led bypublic investments or are met by the private sector. Examples are thenineteenth century United States, present-day Mexico and possibly Thailalnd,where provision of transport facilities may be expected to induce privateinitiative for economic improvement. Ethiopia today, unfortunately, is nlotone of these cases.
10. The task before the Government is not simply to eliminate one majorbottleneck but to attempt a simultaneous assault on the multitude of problemsthat are hindering the development of its economy. The Government, dealiUngwith many problems at once, needs well-coordinated action to distribute wiselyits human and material resources rather than concentrate all available re-sources in one sector.
11. Until recently, the policy of the Government appears to have been todevote the greater part of its available resources to the provision of trans-portation facilities, particularly in road construction. The major portionof the Gfovernment's develonment finds has been directed to road constructionwhile requirements of other sectors of the economy are rather inadequatelymet. Gonnneqiuently, the existing rapacities of the road facilities are urLder-
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utilized. With few exceptions, the daily traffic volumes on all-weather' roadswhich have been imoroved during the past decade are far below 100 vehicles withno clear indication of increase.
12. The Mission is convinced that to make investments in transportationeffective in stimulating economic developnmnt. there should be complemertaryprograms for other sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, and. thattransport investment shou%ld be closely coordinated with the investments inother sectors in order to ensure attainment of the objectives of those sectorsIt is sometimes suggested that road investments in Ethiopia have beensuccessful because they result in shorter travel time or reduce vehicleoperating ^osts. These lndicators of unit savings for travelers or truckoperators, however, cannot be taken as adequate proof of economic justificatio.if t,he traffic volum,.e is low. The test for justification is the number ofvehicles affected by the improved facilities, the volume of traffic generatedby building the road, and the value of additional crops and other productsproduced as a result of the improved transport facilities.
13. An agro-industrial survey is now being carried out with financingby USAID. The Rission believes that the survey is a timely undertakingand that it should be supplemented by a road investment survey; an invest-ment program closely coordinated with the agro-industrial developmentprogram resulting from the USAID survey should be prepared. The road invest-ment survey team should include a railway expert and an airport specialist tcconsider the possibility of alternative modes of transport. The Governmenthad requested earlier UNDP financing for a long-term highway master planstudy which would take three years to prepare. In the Mission's view, thisis both overly ambitious and costly in relation to what really is urgentlyneeded for road investment planning. The Mission suggests that the Govern-ment consult the UNDP with a view to modifying the scope of the study to aless ambitious but more useful investment survey covering the next 5 to :10years.
B. Transport Coordination
a. Investment Coordination
14. Coordination of investment activities in the transport sectorwith those of other sectors is important to ensure a balanced development.Coordination is equally important within the transport sector both ininvestment planning and in the operation of facilities.
15. The Ministry of Communications is responsible for coordinatinginvestment programming for all forms of transport, except roads. The latteris the responsibilitv of the Ministry of Public Works and the ImperialHighway Authority (IHA). There is no established procedure for coordinationof investment within the transpo-rtation sector as a whole
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16. Because of this split of investment planning, road investments arecarried out without being sufficiently related to the investment plans inother modes of transport. This is not meant to suggest that the Ministrr ofPublic works and the IHA do not know about the investments under considerationby the Ministry of Communications, or vice-versa. Investment coordination,howTever, does not merely rmean that the different agencies know the plans ofothers, but also that the size, component and timing of investments of zini-stries and agencies are adjusted in close consultation so that the totalinvestment program of the transport sector becomes an integrated whole anldthe program components represent the optimum use of investment resources..Such a coordination of investment activities -- which is essential to assurea sound development of transport -- seems to be inadequately attempted inEthiopia.
17. It is desirable that a Transport InvestmBnt Committee be organized,on which the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Public Works, the IHAand other agencies concerned should be represented. This comrittee shoul.d beput in charge of the coordination of investment programming and the elaborationof the total transport sector investment program.
b. Regulation of TransDort Coerations
18. Regulation of transport activities is primarilv the responsibilityof the Ministry of Communications. There are, however, some exceptions whichcreate confusion and render regulation less effective. The Ministry issueslicenses for shipping, airline services and other commercial transport, excentroad transnort. Administration of road transnort licensing is sharedbetween the Ministry of Communications and the M4inistry of Interior. Thelatter issiies lirenses hbasd onn tGr"hnir'.,1 Pnminntinn h-, the former. TheMinistry of Communications is responsible for regulation of tariff rates ofthe various modes of transport and for enforcemernt Or trffic lawqs Theadministration of vehicle size and weight regulation is also the responsibilityof the Ministry of Cormiminications, but this function is at present ca-rried mit.through an ad hoc arrangement, by IHA.
19. The Ministry of Communications also undertakes control of thetruiCkin- Jinrd-o.Yust 1-v h -cv. ra iorng-r- fr-eihts +to t."w-ckers.iq at mrnev+.pan.t cargo origi-
nating points, such as the port of Assab. These truckers register with theM;vnstry repre sentative _nndA + +itD, waait .Thel; _. +, load cn-- 1A -es T h r D ln, -
of such a regulation is to prevent cut-throat competition among truckers. Butthis +-pe, f a p.sppears -4-o be So., o-i-4,.eb ^I ec'n+4re rsfT
transport regulation. Competition within the framework of rational transport
the transporters' efficiency and the services offered to shippers; it would notnecessari -+ : -esul 4in-4 __ut--4oat cogeiton Prvie tsh- e G-1-ov n takes
appropriate regulatory measures, such as strict enforcement of traffic andivC%ehlic.le si ze, Lwei± and4 safety rVgULLU.LULb d.L±U anJd OZ =LUoUdLJ adqut U Lr-ad .L
charges, free competition among truckers should soon bring about an orderly
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atmosnhere in the tmrLcking industr77- The Government. therefore should re-consider this regulatory measure, so much the more because the Government canhardily afford to waste its Scarce adnmin:istrat-ve resour-es on such lessessential activities.
20. The more essential regulatory functions, such as vehicle inspectionand er' orceMent of vel-cl si a ,1 -,e-l+ "noll4 - . are + ,o,nnss+ene. lncarried out. Operation of vehicles which are unsafe to both passengers anrtraffic is acquiened , and overloading of trnucks is the rule rather thn ta.eexception.
21. Failure to enforce strictly vehicle size and weight regulationsappears to be partly due to imerfection of stauto-ry provisions topros'tviolators. Although the Vehicle Size and Weight Regulations of 1962 providedt4a- IjI± V±Lol'ator I1dL Ib ldale oal oi con-victLon to the penaltLes prescrlbedin the Penal Code of 194711, the Mission was told by agencies concerned withenforcement of these regulations that the Penal Code of 1947 does not presc-rJ.penalties for owners and drivers of overloaded trucks, and therefore the coul'tscannot convict the violators. This legal loophole should be eliminated asquickly as possible.
22. The complicated system of sharing responsibilities for coordinationand regulation of transport operations not only adversely affects theadministration of these functions but also results in no individual agen-yfeeling responsible for rectifying the situation. This problem was reviewedby the road transport expert commissioned by the UN Programme of TechnicalAssistance in 1965 to study the problem of reorganization of commercial :roadtransport in Ethiopia. He recommended that responsibilities in all matterspertaining to road transport regulation should be concentrated in the Millistryof Communications where a Directorate General of Road Transport should becreated to be immediately responsible for administering these regulation.i.Such a reorganization would help improve materially the effectiveness of roadtransport regulations. This proposal is under consideration by the Government.The M1ission recommends that the unification of responsibilities for road trans-port regulation should be given serious consideration.
c. Road User Charges
23. It was mentioned earlier that the road facilities built and im)rovedwere not adequately utilized as suggested by the generally low traffic volumeson the country's highway system. These considerations make it difficult toexpect the small number of users of the road system to pay for the full costof the road system.
24. A close investigation of the various data on road user charges,however, would reveal possibilities of increasinz the government's revenue toa level higher than it is now, if not quite to compensate its road costs.Although competition between different transport modes is of limited signifi-cance in Ethiopia, a review of road user contributions would provide the basisfor improved policv for coordination among road transport; railways and airtransport.
25. The Mission could attempt only a rough estimate of the road cost androad user contributions. This should be refined on t'e basiso mor-e -LLcULestatistics. In the Mission's estimate the road users at present are pay-ngonly a smalL portion of the Government cost.
26. Tne 6,100 Km all-weather road network in Ethiopia, which would havea replacement value of about Eth $470 million, is estimated to cost theEthiopian econormy about Eth $71 million annually, as follows:
Eth $ nillion
Depreciation of the system 27.5
Maintenance cost 17.0
Administration cost 3.0
Average economic interest on investedcapital (based on assumed rate of 10%p.a. on declining balance) 23.5
71.0
27. The level of charges collected from road vehicles in recent yearshas been some Eth $32-38 million a year. According to Government statistiLcs,the total collection of road user charges in 1965 was Eth $37.5 milion, cls
follows:
Eth $ million
Custom duty and transaction tax:
a) on vehicles and parts 13.0b) on tires and tubes 1.3
M4otor fuel tax 22.2
Motor vehicle and other carriagelicense fees 1.0
37.5
28. The tstal co1Ihrtion of road user chnrges shoTn. above represents theamount of taxes paid by users of both city streets and the inter-urban roads-st,- __ whil…e the rnoad cost AA+A.Atei earlie relate onltothe ie-
system. Based on interviews with representatives of road transport industrynnd petrnI-iim corpanies in E.thiopi, the M-oission oJimn+ .. tha -n mr%..ore +)an
one half of the total collection or less than Eth $19 million a year can beattributed to the users of the inter=urban system.,
29. If the above estimates are fairly representative, the Government isshoim to subsidize the road users to the extent of over 70 percent of thfa roadcost. In view, however, of the small vehicle fleet which uses the inter-urbanhighways (for instance, there are less than 4000 trucks and tractor-trailersin the whole country), it would be unrealistic to expect that taxes could beincreased to an adequate level to compensate the Government's road costs. Towhat extent the road user contribution should be raised, can only be decide;by further detailed studies of the problem which the Mission was not able tocarry out. This question should be studied in more detail under the proposedRoad Investment Survey.
30. There appears to be some possibilities for increased collection frornroad users. Although the motor fuel tax is not low (about 100 percent), it caibe further increased. The import tariffs on vehicles and spare parts aregenerally low, ranging from 10 percent ad valorem on trucks to 55 percent onlarge passenger cars, and could be raised. Because the inter-urban roadsystem is built and improved primarily for the benefit of heavy vehicles suchas trucks and buses, special annua' levies on heavy vehicles may be considered.The idea of charging special levies on heavv vehicles is a logical one becausemotor fuel taxes and the ad valorem custom duties do not distribute tax burdenson different tvnes of vehicle nronortinnally to the level of expenditure theyimpose on the Government.
III. R0.!nS
a Recent Develonpments of the Road System
31. Ethiopia's nrational road system at present consists of about 6100 lenof all-weather roads of which nearly 1900 km are asphalt paved, and a smallportion of earth roads. In addition, there are about 16,000 Len of proirncialdry weather roads which are under the jurisdiction of provincial governments..o.e presentl nationa' road system, represents substantia''1y r.ore than a doublJrg
of the kilometerage during the past decade. Shown here is a comparisonbetween 1957/58 and 1966/67 (Por deta;'ls see Table 1):
"'W 'A _L/ ~ ~ J'~AJL1J.Lc2.L .W ' L L~.JO L.> -6rii
Nati.Lona1l Rloadu S-ster
AsEhalted Gravelled Earth Total
1957/1958 780 1875 - 2655
1966/1967 1868 4257 657 6782
Percentage increase ini966/67 over 1957/5 1i39 127 - 155
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32. During this period, a number of trunk highways radiating from AddisAbaba were built. The 1076 km highway to Asmara became an all-weather roadafter the section between Addis Ababa and Desse was completed. The construc-tion of the Addis Ababa-Dire Dawa-Harar highway (508 km) to the east throughNazreth and Awash Station was also completed. To the south, the Addis Ababa--Shashemenne-Dilla highway (366 km) was improved to all-weather standards.Addis Ababa-Jima (335 kmm) to the southwest and Addis Ababa-Lekempti (331 km)to the west were imoroved and built, and nart of the link between Jima andLekempti via Bedelle through the coffee production center is now being com-pleted. As an alternate access to Asmara from Addis Ababa a road througlhDebre Markos, Bahar Dar and Gondar across the Blue Nile gorge was constructed,,With the opening of t-he new deep-water port at Assab on the Red Sea shore, a487 km highway from Kombolcia, south of Desse, to the port was improved toserve the foreign trade cargo traffic. In addition, a nurber of shortersections of primary roads were built or improved. The improvement in thequanlity of road system cannot be fully reesented b" +the indication ofincreases in the length of different types of road; upgrading and con-
__ 111y V wJ~A~ W. Id. AJ. ULi1± -lass1 ol- ro-£ lJuU +" - -nn-t'sideranble ir.prve..en.ts were .maCAde - d 'h n. eachl c-lasoradbuthecno
be appreciated from the above table.
33. Investment in roads during the past decade absorbed an importantpart of the countrys capital resources. Table 2 shows that DA's expen4'i-ture on construction and improvement of roads has grown from Eth$9 millionin L957/8 bo nearly Eth$22 million in 1965/66. But the above figures donot represent the total amount devoted to construction and improvement ofroads. It is known that an important, but undetermined, part of theexpenditure recorded under maintenance (see Table 2) was actually spentannually for such purposes. No consistent record for investment expenditureof the Government over the past decade was available, but in the past fewyears road construction and improvement projects on an average have accountedfor about 30 percent of the total capital investment expenditure of theGovernment (see Table 3).
B. Administration of Roads
34. Administration of the national road system is the responsibilityof the Imperial Highway Authority (IHA), an autonomous agency of the Govern-ment, established in 1951. The 16,000 km of low grade roads outside thenational road system are under the jurisdiction of local provincial govern-ments. IRA, however, provides technical services to provincial governmentsfor execution of investment projects for improving local roads.
35. The creation of IHA was at the recommendation of the Bank inconjunction with its first road loan of US$5 million in 195o. Indeed, theProclamation of 1951 creating IHA specifically mentioned the fact that it wasestablished for the purpose of improving the road system of Ethiopia incooperation with the Bank. The governing body of IRA is the Board ofCommissioners consisting of the Minister of Public Works (ex-officio chair-man). the Vice Minister of FLnance, the Vice Mnister of Commerce and Ifl istVand two other members appointed by the Emperor. The administration of D A isheaded by a fleneral Manager under whom there are five diviSiors headed b- t-Chief Auditor, the Planning and Programming Engineer, the Director of Adrnin'--stration, the Ch-ief Engineer, and the Training Engineer, respectively.
36. IHA is headquartered in Addis Aoaba, with 9 district maintenanceheadquarUters, soine 60I field *maintenaLce camps and a %dozen or r,.ore constr-& ncamps. IHA maintenance shops are not yet adequate to provide satisfactoryrLaJ rUenuarice of i'thl flaLational roadu sys'bemi. A'lLdWoUg1 rnu o-w-iis aLadrge rumber ofL Cpieces of major equipment, about 55 percent is inoperative at present duE toobsolescence and lack of repair. Inadequate maintenance of equipmrent is oneof the major factors adversely affecting the maintenance of the roads as wellas construction of new roads by departmental force.
37. The investment programming is done by the Planning and PrograrrmLingDivision. The head of tlhe division is assisted by two foreign experts IUtwould need more qualified personnel, both local and foreign, in order to im-prove its performance. However, the problem more difficult in planning thanthe shortage of expertise is the difficulty of obtaining data and information(particularly concerning plans outside the road sector) which are necessaryto ensure a proper coordination of investment progranmming. The problem of thelatter type cannot be solved by improving the organization and performance ofIHA; it requires better planning and cooperation of other Government branches.The establishment of the Nlinistry of Planning in 1966 augurs well for impirovedplanning and coordination.
38. The Planning and Programming Division is also in charge of the en-forcement of the vehicle size and weight regulations. Its operation, however,is severely handicapped because of limited funds. Only three weighingstations are in operation in the whole country. The enforcement of theregulation is ineffective and, as noted before, prosecution of violators is notensured due to the absence of a clear legal provision fcr penalties.
39. The performance of lIHA since its inception has been improving despitevarious impediments and unfavorable circumstances. IHA is at present one ofthe better organized and administered agencies of the Government and seems toprovide a model for the establishment of autonomous agencies for other mcdesof transport, such as ports and airports, which the Government is now consi-dering.
40. In order to review past performance of IHA and suggest further im-provement of its performance, a consulting firm (the Public AdministrationService of Chicago) was engaged in 1966 to study its organization and manage-ment. The consultants' services were financed bv a grant from the Bank, andthe report was submitted in November 1966. The consultants found that thepresent organization of IHA is eenerally adequate, but that there are certainproblem areas where better coordination is called for, and some internalrelationships which need improvement. The renort made detailed recommendationson reorganization of the system: increased authority for the GeneralManager vis-a-vis ITHAs Board of Commissioners, more delegation of responsibi-lity by the General Manager to his subordinates, reduction of redundant staff,provision of incentives to attrac-t trained persnormne and imnprouveme-nt, of shonpsfacilities for equipment. The Bank concurs with these recommendations, andthey were discussed with LW.A wahich also expressed its general agreement.
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C. Road Tranport Industry
41. As the road system is the backbone of the country's inland transport,system, the road transport industry carries the bulk of the traffic generatedby foreign and domestic trade. For this reason, a sound development of theroad transport industry is of utmost importance to meet economicaLly therequirements of the commodity producing sectors of the economy. There appearsto be sufficient entrepreneurship and capital both inside and outside the roadtransport industry, the latter being ready to move into the industry wheneverthere is a sufficient profit incentive.
4 2. The road transnort industry annears to provide fairly adequateservices but its growth during the past decade has been limited by inadequatedemand, The rapid inerea9e in motor fuel consin tion, which averaged over 10
percent per annum in recent years, is frequently considered the indication ofa growt.h in road transport activities (see Table 4). But it does not appearthat inter-urban motor transport has grown at the same rate; an increasingpart of the motor fuel consun vtion appears to have been accounted for by urbantraffic. This trend can be seen from the changes in the number of differenttypes of vehicles durn g the past fewv y-ears. These c1anes show grolwth
chiefly in those vehicles which use city streets, rather than izter-urbanhighways. Tabl 5 shows that between 1962 and 1965 the num'ber of passengercars almost doubled, while the number of trucks and tractor-trailers increasediJLLJ.bJ abutu L 18 ec,. 1 passenger- car f-Pleet acco,' nted fornearly 80 percent of the total number of vehicles in the country. The averagedaily veh.icle-kilometers, estimated by IHA based on its traffic cosrn4s at 38different stations on the inter-urban highway system, indicate that passenger
car traffic acco-unts for only a l'ttle over 30 percent (see Table 6). Thetotal traffic by trucks and tractor-trailer is about 35 percent larger thanthat of passenger cars although the total number of trucks and trailers i- le. sthan 4000 which is less than one sixth of the number of passenger cars in thecountry.
43. Table 6 also seems to indicate that there has been little gro-wthl ithe inter-urban road transport industry during the past decade. The tableshows that the total traffic movement on the inter-urba hghways, i terns of
vehicle-kilometers, grew by 148 percent between 1953/54 and 1965/66. Miost ofthe growth took place during the first three years and since 1956/57 theaverage annual rate of growth was only a little over 4 percent. Bus trafficincreased by about 3.5 percent annually, and there was almost no increase in
the combined total traffic of trucks and tractor-trailers during the same nineyear period. Although the relative increase of the tractor-trailer trafficcompared with that of trucks indicates that increases in the total cargovolume transported would be more than the growth of vehicle-km, all in allroad transport does not seem to have grown as might be expected on the basisof capital investment in roads by the Government during this period.
h4. Because of the limited availability of freight, competition is keenamong the truckers, who are generally owner-drivers. Few own more than twotrucks, and there is no important trucking company, aside from one cooperativeorganization. A generally similar situation prevails in the passengertransport field where operation of micro-buses predominate. Competition amongtransporters is in itself desirable because it results in, among other things,reduced charges to shippers; this means that savings due to increasingefficiency of operation and improved road conditions are being passed on tothe users of service. Such a reduction in charges took place in the past.For instance, IHA's sample checks show that the ton-lkm rate on the routebetween Addis Ababa and Assab dropped from about 10 cents (Ethiopian) in1953/54 to about 3 cents (Ethiopian) in 1965/66.
45. Competition, however, should be promoted within the framework of arational reguilatory policy in order to assure an orderly development of thetransport industry. This requires a strict enforcement of traffic and otherregulations. The Government's failure to enforce the regulations, however,has given rise to the prevalent practice of overloading, neglect of vehiclemaintenance in violation of safety regulations, etc., which increases theeconomic cost of transport while the actual charges by transportation may belowered. For instance, the overloading of trucks nearlv always increases theGovernment's road maintenance costs more than proportionally to the savingsobtained by individual truckers.
46. The need for regulation is recognized bv the Government. but it hasnot decided the types of regulation required. The Mission understood, however,that the Government's current consideration of the nuestion is mainly based ona proposal for reorganization of the road transport industry submitted by aroad transport expert of the United Nations Programmme for Technical Assistance.This report makes a number of recommendations regarding the need for moresecondary and feeder roads, conntrol of hpanu trucks deriing rnny seasonsjprovision of agricultural storage facilities to handle seasonal fluctuationsof agricultural trafficj etc . His main emphasis, however, was put on: l) tneed for Government organization of truckers and bus operations into profession-al associations for each region of the enrintrv- which shouOld, in tuilrn, horganized into a National Federation of associations; 2) a Government preparedNational Plan for Transport. determining the nation's requirements f^r roadtransport with yearly revision; and 3) the establishment of compulsory tariffs,by' thep C'ov ien.t, based or. the cos of +rarsport on different road and fordifferent types of traffic.
47. The Mission has some doubts on whether the throe measures reco:nmend-ed b' the TTN expert are appropriate.* The devrelopment of trade organiationsof the trucking industry may best be left to private initiative. Indeed,there is al-read n cooperat-i e organized in 1963 to wi4ch m.ore than co truckowners now belong. This cooperative, called iNational Transport Share Companyfrmshperxovebe rukr Ao a f virstU U- om firstUU-UV serve Ubas
from shippers to member truckers on a first-come, first-served basis.
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If no load is available through the Natraco, the member trucker is free to lookelsewhere for cargo. The operations of this cooperative appear to have beenquite successful judged by the fact that the number of member truckers in-creased fracn 177 to over 500 between 1963 and 1966. In the opinion of theMission, the Government should consider measures to encourage further develop-ment of this cooperative movement so that it can perform the functions of thesuggested obliaatorv associations.
L8. Regarding the recommendations that the Government prepare a NationalPlan for Transport and prepare and enforce compulsory tariffs, one should. notoverestimate the admi-nistrative canabilities of the Government to perform.these suggested functions. Actually, the Government's administrative resource-are not adequate even to exeeute satisfArtnrily the Tmore immediate measuresfor regulation. Moreover, the measures suggested are difficult to implement.Enforcem.ent of road transport tariffs has failed in a n,m..hp ofr other nomnntrip!swhich have substantially more developed government machinery than that ofEthiopia+.n toattmpt suh nn
*9. TIhe Mission believes that a rre realistic objective in road tr'ns-port regulation would be to achieve:
1) enforcement of the regulations for size and weight of vehiclesVicWW as G 0 4-- 4---IPbP -s - -_ s4- -- --6 4- +1,V-O O 0 V 1
practice of overloading,
2) a stricter inspection of commercial vehicles,
3) increased collection of road user charges from road users,par-icularly operators OI commercial vehicles.
D. Review of Road Investment Plan
50. Il1A:s tentative investment program for 1967/68-1971/72, which isunder review by the Government and therefore not yet approved, envisages aninvestment of about Eth$290 million, of which an approximate estimate of theforeign exchange component is about Eth$206 million. The suggested programincludes construction or improvement oI about 6500 mm oI primary, secondaryand feeder roads. As shown in the following table a great majority of in-vestment is intended for construction, improvement and paving of the prim.aryroad system, and this accounts for over Eth$251 million or 85-90 percent of thetotal expenditure; for more details, see Table 7.
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IHA Tentative Investment Progra.n1967/6WS z71/72(Nillion of Eth$)
Total Foreign1967/68 Cost1971/72 Component 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72
52. The dM.'or I I _ n h ig__ wa w ll se the _ _ _ n Lt-rl rh w. _ e_ _ erVC~~~11 *u t ] XU U-LUIUI- 1.Lr:IWV W. U -jt;.-VU UIJ Z a -. UUbLEL- - d - s SI Wt::U 1B -1
region where the unavailability of road facilities severely limits the growthOf the region1 s economy. The construction of this road is buelie-ved to br Uglarge returns on the investment. The plan is to build this road to pavedstandards. In the mission's view paving does not appear necessary as theanticipated traffic is not high and can be carried adequately with a gravelledroad.
53. The Awash-Tendaho highway has a dual justification. First, this roadwill make the initiation of the Awash Valley irrigation development schemewhich has been studied by a team of experts from the FAO, financed by the U1NDP.The study showed major developmental possibilities for this region in the formof both plantation-type development and settlement of individual farm facLJLi-ties. The Government is in principle committed to carry out the first stageof the development scheme which would be limited to an area from Awash Station
for about 100 km northward following the Awash River. Second, the const:tmctionof this road will provide an economical transport route between the Addi,Ababa area and the port of Assab, the major foreign trade port of Ethiopia.The existing route via Kombolcia has a number of sections which negotiatedifficult mountainous terrain where the cost of vehicle operation is extremelyhigh. Moreover, improvement of the existing road to adequate standards wouldbe prohibitively costly, if not impossible. The lMission believes that con-struction of the Awash-Tendaho highway -should be given serious consideration.
t4. The Mission's review of the iustification of the Waldi a-Geregerahighway did not show sufficient support for the projected investment. Onlya lower tyne of road sections at both ends of the proposed itinerary shouldbe considered, leaving the possibility of building a through connection atafuture dAnte when a cle_a~r deM=.nstratison of de-ei^pmen"'I potentlialls of +the
area can be made.
55. The Dilla-Agere Maryam road is a first leg of the Dilla-Moyale high-way which will be connected at N"oyale -wilth th hig ay system of Ke.ya. Theservice area of the road has limited agricultural potentials because of :LowrLaJinfall, but "ere ap-pears to be somue ±ores'v resources an' possibJi32LJ.LUe; forlivestock industry. The idea of providing an international connection to Kenyadoes not appear at present to have strong economic justification in view of thesmall prospects of increasing trade with Kenya in the near future. The propo-sal for the 94 km Addis Ababa -Nazreth highway is to widen this existing roadto a four-lane highway. This highway carries one of the highest daily trafficvolumes in Ethiopia, which ranges between more than 1500 vehicles near AddisAbaba and about 450 near the Nazreth end. The 20-km section between AddisAbaba and Akaki appears to require widening, but it is difficult to determinewhether widening of the whole length to Nazreth has high priority. Somedetailed traffic and economic studies should be carried out in order to assessthe priority.
56. The program to construct 2600 km of secondary and feeder roads shouldbe studied more carefully to determine priority investment projects. Al-thoughthe Mission believes that the secondary and feeder road construction shouldcommand higher priority than in the past, it does not consider all 15 secondaryand feeder roads proposed to have high priority. During the limited period ofstay in Ethiopia, the Mission visited a large number of roads proposed; itconsidered that, at least, five roads totalling about 570 km appear to havehigh priority, but this is not an exclusive list. A more detailed inves-tiga-tion may suggest some other roads to be economically justifiable projects.
57. The proposal to pave 1500 km of primary roads as a whole does notseem to have strong justification in view of the low traffic volume on most ofthese roads which ranges from 60 to 80 vehicles a dav and which does notindicate a clear upward trend. Only the Jima-Agaro road (44 km) and Nazreth-Awash road (125 km) should be seriously considered, The rest of the projectsseem to have low priority compared to other more urgent projects such assecondary and feeder road construetion.
-8. Assuming that a Road Investment Survey wllU be initiated in the nearfuture, the firming-up of the Government's investmeiin program should bedeferred until the results of the survey are known) which is expected beforethe end of 1967. It is desirable that the Government and the Bank carry out,wnen the survey is completed, a consultation on the possible road investmentprogram for the next five years.
59. The Mission believes that the Government and the consultants, inpreparing an investment program, should pay particular attention to: a) balaic-ing investments in primary, secondary and feeder roads, b) avoiding pre-mature investments, c) choosing appropriate design standards, and d) devisin,-:and adopting a more suitable method of construction in Ethiopian conditions.Below th6seitems are discussed in more detail.
60. Balance within the road sector. It appears that in the tentativeprogram, the investment in primary roads has been over-emphasized. Althoughthe basic network to connect the main population centers is an important task,it should not be done at the expense of other types of roads. Primary roadsare imiost effective only when there are other low types of roads feeding intothem and thus increasing the traffic volume. This means that the developmentof trunk roads must be accompanied by secondary and feeder roads. The lowvolume of traffic on the primary road svstem alreadv referred to atmears tobe to a large extent due to the lack of feeder roads. The Mission noted thatduring rainy seasons many trucks converge on the nort of Assab seeking import,cargo to be transported to Addis Ababa and the surrounding region, whichcreates the problem of an excess supply Of trucks nt the port. The reonfor the concentration of trucks at the port during the rainy season is under-stood to be impassable secondary roads. This means that secondary and feeAerroads improved along with the primary road projects would not only assureuninterrupted economnic activities in those areas served bly such roads, butalso a better utilization of the country's vehicle fleet.
61. Avoiding Premature Investments. The IHA appears to be planninglarge investments in primry roads which are pre-,--u-re Fo -instace, some of'the paving and widening projects for roads which were built not long ago andwith relatively low vonl_m.e of +traffic need not be done in the .e a^ futurwe.The IHA appears to believe that these investments are justified because sooneror later an adequ_ate volrme of traffic would, e-lop. It sho d,- however, ^stressed that the capital invested in a road which is not utilized efficiently,is a I v'n+hIk^nJ.U los9 to tU -UL-- prq.o or'gdecisions on what projects to execute, but also choice of right timing fortheir execuitinn . 4 eph.t t;mi4g frequenty pro4ves to be as iporta as theformer, and experience shows that more mistakes in investment planning are
made in the la++er c-+egory -h,, t
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62 rIPpr riate Desin andards. The roaos are f-equently consltbr1icueu
to standards higher than may be necessary for the anticipated traffic voLume,and it seems that this would be the case for a considerable part of the1500 km roads proposed to be paved. MIoreover, some of the gravelled roadsneed not be built to the geometric standards proposed, which appear excessive.High design standards adopted for a road unrelated to present and projectedtraffic volumes represent unproductive investment. Roads with high designfeatures do not necessarily create their own demand. It is the other wayaround. The experience in Ethiopia has been that traffic grew with roadconstruction or improvement only in those areas where there already was alatent demand for transport facilities. One of the few examples is the JTima-Agaro area where, due to growing agriculture, particularly coffee production,road construction was followed by rapid traffic growth. As already mentioned,in other areas no substantial increase in traffic followed road improvement.The traffic statistics compiled by the IHAS for the past few years from its 38count stations disprove the view that roads create traffic.
63. Method of Construction. The construction methods being applied inEthiopian road construction are generally the practice imported from USA andEuropean countries with relatively little adaptation to suit the localconditions. Examples are the extensive use of machinery in preference tolabor and the use of crushed stone for surfacing, As labor cost is low andan unemployment problem exists, the adoption of labor-intensive methods ofroad construction should be considered. The IHA appears to favor that,because modern construction equipment makes it economically feasible to adoptdesign standards not generally attempted with hand labor construction, theprimary road system should be built by modern methods, while feeder roadscould be built by more labor intensive methods. The idea of building highstandard roads using more equipment is in principle correct, but it does notnecessarily signify that all primary roads should be built to high standards,and that capital intensive methods should be used. It is not useful toregard as prim.ary roads all roads which form +.he hnqi r network of the roiintrVand propose to build them to standards which require the use of modern met'hods.This is particularly so when it is reaized that in the IHAs plan the pr-Lmarvnetwork includes practically all existing improved roads plus many km of newroads iinrider plnnning to x+.end the e+-i ting system, and an m.mber of ring-
roads, also under planning, to provide direct connection between the mainroads in the outlying areas formng concemn,tric rngs with Addis Ababa in i-.he
center.
6h. As the past construction was concentrated in high standard primaryroad~ts, h.eMe haO.s beer. lit.tvle oppo4u-.ity 4f or TUA tLo seriouslo stLu y th..e possi-
bility of adopting alternative low cost construction methods. To a certaindegee labo car. sais"corL1 susiutV->e,. hsi h rec
in airport construction in many isolated areas in Ethiopia where, due to the4i.11-jractcblt Cf bingC . ,c.144-e ln ng- 4- strips- e- 1-41 r.a.l11 J± d JCLV.._AU t.L LI.L-L.1 "J.LL MIAaL;.L_LJV.J. y, J.dLcl"1I.Lir d L,.. .LjJ.P di. L JLLjJ. U F-.' ~1- - _~'-
with hand labor. MIoreover, whatever standards are chosen for road construction,Wthe possi.blity VI 0UUZJ,.LUbUs L0.1 VIhiord IVof ce[10tLf tZAYJor LIe.vr AIuILo
be explored. For instance, regarding surfacing by crushed stone, experiencein many Africani countries with similar geographical conditions as those in.Ethiopia was that stabilizing natural soil with use of lime or cement proved
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to be very satisfactory. At present, the crushed stone which is availablefrom only a few quarries in Ethiopia has to be transported to crushing plantsand then moved again to construction sites. Due to high transport and plantcost, crushed stone costs Eth$l5-l7 per cubic meter; it is almost certain thatthe soil stabilization method of surfacing would cost less than crushed gravelsurfacing. Laboratory tests, however, would be necessary to determine howsatisfactorily the stabilized soil could substitute for crushed stone; no testhas yet been attempted.
65. It could be considered to include in the Bank's proposed fourth loanto Ethiopia, an amount for a study to exnlore possibilities of adopting cheapealternative construction methods. This type of research should continue on apermanent basis after thet completion of the studyv
IV. RJULWAYS
A. Railways' Place in Ethiopian EcEBonm
66. The importance of the two railway lines in Ethiopia has been relati-vel,, reduced ;n recer,+ years wth de-vrel op-.ts of road transpJort. Thi-is isparticularly so with the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway which is owned anda,,r.aged 1b theW Franco=Ethiopiar. DPailway C o,p,ar.y . 1P.oad construc+ion m-id ;>.-
provement between Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa is one factor affecting unfavorablythis ra-Llwayls opercat-ions, b-tA,1 4VtLL, more JU-11ort-ant rea30r, Js tshe con+tnuo-ls1
diversion of railway traffic to the recently improved Addis Ababa-Assab road..This is partly due to the Go-veirernmient policy regarding port developiment .As shwVinin Chapter V, the Ethiopian Government's policy is to encourage shippers touse thle Ethiopian port of Assab in preference to the DJibouti port in theFrench territory. Consequently, the railway traffic has been increasing ata rate much slower than the growth of Ethiopia's foreign trade In the past -few
years.
67. The 306 kon M assawa-Asmara-Agordat railway managed by the Ministry c"ommmunications maintains its operation only Decause of the de facto monopoly
of the port traffic between Asmara and the port of Massawa. Because this rai:way operates over a terrain more difficult than that of the Addis Ababa-DJib2:railway and because of the relatively short distance of the line, a prcifitabl>operation is more difficult to achieve.
68. The question which the Government must study seriously, is wletherthe continued operation of, and investment in, railways are justified ratherthan switching completely to road transport. There appears to be a presumptio2on the part of many Ethiopian transport planners that railways are an un-economic mode of transport and therefore should sooner or later cease tooperate. The Mission believes, however, that the railway question requires amore serious review on which a clear policy on the future of the railways canbe prepared. Such a review should take into consideration that when an economyreaches the point in its development where increasingly large volumes of bulkcargo must be moved over long distances, low-cost railway transport becomesnecessary. Road transport cannot provide economical services for such types
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of traffic as railways can. This means that, although the railways may findit difficult to compete with road transport now. they could do so in thefuture if the economy quickens its pace of development.
69. The M4ission did not attempt to review the various factors involvedin establishing a railwav policv. It twas obvious, however, that part of thediversion of the Djibouti traffic to Assab is due to the cheap trucking ratesbased on low road user charges. Low road user charges which divert railwaytraffic are subsidies given to road transport users. A comparison of freightrates of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway with the- road tra-nsport chargeson the Addis Ababa-Assab route indicates that in most categories of cargoes,particularly the imnort cargoes, ra-ilway rates are hiher than the quotedroad transport charge.
70. A reliable source estimates that road transport from Addis Ababa toAssab isaou m7 cheaper per +on of ^argo than rnilway transpor t or mAddis Ababa to Djibouti. The Mission's spot check of the road and railwaycb-ages al 'ears to give some credlence tIuo 'this est,.uat-e. CoW^-arLJng Mates or.coffee and hides which are exported through both Djibouti and Assab, the.issio. found that the ralwuay charge i;,0-$3Q..35 per ton of coffee andEth$40 per ton of hides while the trucking charges appear to fluctuate arolindEtAL,0 per ton of both types of cargo. These figures im,ply a difference ofless than 1 Ethiopian cent per ton/km. This small difference appears easilyaccounted for by the low road user charges.
71. To thle extent that the above analysis reflects the real situationin road and railway transport, the present difficulty in retaining freight bythe Franco-Ethiopian Railway is to a large part due to the government sub-sidies to road transport. The analysis suggests therefore that any sturly nnthe efficieney of railway transport on wnich to base the Government's raLl-ire.y policy should be accompanied by measures to implement better transport
coordination, including increased road user charges.
B. investment Requirements for Railways
72. The Government does not have an investment program for the railwaysector. Some investments are obviously necessary even to maintain the presentlevel of raiLway services. Both railways experience shortage of rolling stock,particularly wagons, which results in slow and unsatisfactory services toshippers. Both railways need better maintenance and improvement of tracks.No overall estimates of capital requirements are available. The Franco-Ethiopian Railway (Addis Ababa-Djibouti) indicated investment requirements ofEth$6 million for procurement of rolling stock, track material, and replace-ment of bridges. The iMassawa-Agordat Railways might require a similar amountof investment, but no specific indication of requirements were available atthe time of the Mission's visit.
I .) * Ji1tml- cu- 0U'' 0 _U1 LJ. UIY ~ V ~ II~ Ow .;LV1 ± U.J1 JJ
lines for both railways. For the Franco-Ethiopian Railway , the suggestionL_ 'I.. - .. Le±- -I0 .Jit rur ± .u1i to J.L±d n,uu kUI \ .LL± Ld -i i .4UL 1 dAI1 laAincludes eiftersion, of' 1.ne fromr INa-zreth to D.-i' a (300u IU,) in1 wthe south and
another line to connect the Assab port with the existing alignment somewherebetwUelle Awash Station and Dire Dawa. A Yugoslav team of experts has studcedthese extensions recently, but the Mission did not have access to their reportand conclusions. It appears, however, to the Mission that the JustificatUionfor the extensions is doubtful. The town of Dilla already has satisfactoryroad connections and there is no indication of substantial volumes of trafficsuitable for railway transport to and from the region. A similar conclusionapplies to the railway line to the Assab port. The port handles less than500,000 tons of dry and liquid cargo for transfer to and from the interior.Even if' all Djibouti tratfic were diverted to Assab, the total traffic wouldstill be far less than 1 million tons a year, composed of sundry export andilport goods and petroleum products. Although in the absence of cost estimatesit is difficult to prejudge the justification, there does not seem to beadequate justification at present for rail-line construction to the Assab port.
74. The Nassawqa-Agordat railway advocates extension of its line fromAgordat to Tessenei near the Sudan border (approximately 180 kcm). It assumesthat this would increase the freight from the present leve:L of less than200,000 tons a year to 300,000-350,000 tons. This increase in traffic isexpected to materialize from the agricultural valley which the line wouldtraverse. In the absence of cost estimates for construction and detailed dataon traffic potentials, and costs of providing alternative road transport, itis not possible to judge the desirability of the new line. The Mission uader-stood that the proposal is under review at high levels of the Government.If the proposal merits serious consideration, it would be desirable to carryout a feasibility study by quali fied experts. Whether a feasibility study isjustified, can be decided bg reviewing the details of the proposal by therailway specialist who will be a member of the proposed Road Investment Survey.
V. PORTS
A. The Port Development Policy
75. Until Eritrea was federated with the empire in 1952. Ethiopia was alandlocked country and had to rely on ports of its neighboring countries andterritories to meet its foreign trade renuirements. At the end of thenineteenth century, Ethiopia negotiated with France a special privilege to usethe Diibouti nort. in FTrenc(h Somnaliland; this led to the construction bv Franceof the railway between the seaport and Addis Ababa, which was completed in1917. The Dliihmiti nn-rt. then ber-nm.e the main Ethinnin forein trade nort.A description of the port is given in the Annex.
[U. The u lc-rpOra0tiOfn l 0E mritr-eia pPoviJ.bQ UWO adQuZL ioln 6sea-uiUUle-
to Ethiopia -- the ports of Assab and 111assawa. The Government's policy sincethen has been to build up the facilities at Assab to decrease the reliance onDjibouti. A newT deep-water port was built in Assab at an estimated cost ofEtnh26.5 million; the construction was completed in 1961. The decision tobuild up Assab wJas partly caused by the inconvenience of the sole reliance onrailway connection, which is not alwfays adequate and flexible to meet the neec.of shippers, particularly those exporters whose requirements for shippingagricultural commodities fluctuate considerably between seasons. The Dj:Lboutiport is not connected by a road from Ethiopia. The more basic reason appearsto be the desire on the part of' the Government to create adequate portfacilities within its ow^m territory to handle most of the country's fore:igntrade requirements.
77. The policy to concentrate traffic to Assab must be revieSwed care-fully taking into consideration the various possible consequences of such apolicy. Ethiopia's right of access to Djibouti involves not only the use ofthe port facilities but also the operation of the railway between Addis AIbabaand Djibouti, which would have little value for Ethiopia if the use of Dtjiboutiis to be discontinued. Niot only would the existing investments have to be for-saken, but additional investment in port facilities and overland traffic route;and vehicular equipment would be required. Ethiopia today can ill affordsuch additional capital expenditures at a time when its economic develor,imentprogram requires large investments in non-transport sectors. To be sure,the investments already made in the berth facilities in the Assab port, areadequate to handle the traffic presently moving through Djibouti if it isdiverted to Assab, but the reserve capacity may soon be used up with thegrowth of foreign trade traffic. Although berth facilities may not have tobe expanded in the near future, the diverted cargo from Djibouti would re!quireadditional cargo-handling equipment and possibly more sheds and warehousespace. The road construction and maintenance costs would go up and moregoods-carrving vehicles must be imported which would adverselY affect thecountry's balance of payments.
78. The Mission feels that although the policy to build up the Assabport as the main foreign trade port for Ethiopia is a sound long-run policy,implementation of this policy should keep pace with the development of theeconomy. The national budget should not be burdened bv the large capital.expenditure necessary merely to avoid dependence on a foreign port.
79. The emphasis given to the development of the Assab port appearsto have resulted in somewhat iinbaTnned de-velonpment between the two Eritreanports. While Assab has been built and equipped with new facilities, theN4asSawa port, whic.h handfles a somnewhat lnrger volulme of nnrgo than Assabhas received little attention and even maintenance is rather neglected.Tn view of the lnrge hinterIntid serv.ed hy the Massawa port, including Asmarthe second largest city of Ethiopia, the improvement and maintenance of thisport. shoul d not be left uznattended.
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R. Administration of Ports
80. Administration of onrt affairs is the resDonsibilitv of the MarwineDepartment of the Ministry of Communications. Until recently this depart-men+t wast n nrt+. nf +.h Theini+.rst nf Defense- Tts transfer to the Ministryof Communications nould help achieve a better coordination of investmentond -eratiornal a=r.+tie- in the por+. sector *ln-ner the- contro_ of the
Minister.
81. The IIarine Department prepares operational procedures and regulat-ions fLor ;6nd-J0VAidu",al poUS, oe+vs por^ ae,,ol9lspro-^.l s+at2.n
of ports and prepares investment programs. It is assisted by foreigntechnical advisers. Each port is operated d the 4mVmVaJ+c. respo.hbi ft
of the port manager who is appointed by the MUnister of Communications.ILiu± J.-U; 11Vt. LIU .L.L.1CLIdf,La.L d4LIUL±IUlik,y, UIUJ11 .L ULAU6-U Q -L' V.LLII UC~ 'J- .*'
Marine Department budget. As showm in Table 8, both Assab and Massawa portsseem to produce considerable operatilng surplus in reIent yec-. Te.4 nditures, however, do not include depreciation of facilities or debt services.It is therefore not possible to determine whethier the port rates are adecuaa.teto cover the Govermnent's expenditures on ports.
82. Port of Assab. The Assab port in Southern Eritrea lies at theentrance to Assab bay im a raimless region with very high temperature. Ihisport, built with financing by the Yugoslav Government, has two quays with atotal length of 1330 m, which can accommodate 6 ocean-going vessels and 5smaller craft. The depth alongside is 6 to 11 m. There are three warehouseson the quay totalling 17,000 me of covered area and a 1344 m cold storage.In addition, 174,000 m2 of open storage space is available. The port equip-ment includes 1 derrick crane, 2 mobile cranes, 10 fork-lifts, 12 tractorsand 93 trailers. The port operation requires more equipment, particularlycranes. The port is connected by a paved highway with the interior of thecountry. The traffic through the port in 1965/66 was about 330,000 tons ofexport and import general cargo and over 130,000 tons of imported petroleumproducts (see Table 9). Coastal traffic is relatively unimportant. The ex-port cargo jumped to 240,000 tons during first year of operation of the newdeep-water port from the 75,000 tons handled by the lighter port in theprevious year. Since then, the export cargo has not been increasing; in facts,there was a slight net decrease in 1965/66 compared to 1961/62. Imports onthe other hand increased almost every year. The 1965/66 import level of117,000 tons drv cargo is about double of the 1961/62 volume. The petroleumproducts piped in at special oil terminals increased from 37,100 tons in1961/62 to 133,000 tons in 1965/66. This is mainly due to the increasingswitch from Djibouti to Assab as a port of entry of petroleum products.This nAtenorv of nort traffic, however. will disanpear when the petroleumrefinery under construction in Assab is completed in 1968, The berthingcapacityv is conideredaequnni t-.o hnndle general cargo up to 700.000 tonsa year, or double the present cargo tonnage.
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8R. Port. of Massawa. The Massa.aa port in Northern Eritrea lies in theBay of Nassawra on the Red Sea, 115 km northeast of Asmara, the capital of'Eritren. Tt. stands on two connected islans,q Tanulud and Massawa, and on themainland. It has 6 berths for ocean-going vessels and 5 for small coast<l'ships wi+th t.he depth of w.ater betw+.reen 5 anrd 9 m, l^.Tn-ehniie on the oniv'
measure about 6000 m2 , but due to lack of maintenance, they are muchdeteriorated. The open storage area on the quay has lost al its asphaltsurfacing; it is dusty during dry weather and turns into mud when it rains.Petroleum-. nl oadin inst tll ations are owned by p'-riva+e oil companies, and.bunkering facilities are available. Port equipment is quite inadequate; itconsistICs onlby ofI %6 quay cranes, 21 fo_rk_-lifts arnd 01ol ",Inn. crn. I
port is connected with its hinterland by the 1iassawa-Asmara-Agordat railwayandl bvJy a paved roau to Asmara. Truckng u transpor i Is restrcted, and cn , s,
used only with permission from the Railway. Cargo increased steadily between1960o/61 arl nn4r'/L:?.1 x l 30 000 ton to 485,000 tons or _ about 7 percent.L70VV-J 'J d.iLU ±L7L)~/ UU .L.LLJIIL _)4V,VVV uJuilO UV) 4U.?,VUUV ul,VIJ.. V.I. Li,)' d.L I 'per annum (see Table 10). The construction of the Assab port did not have amarked effect on i1iassawd's traffic as this port serv-es the gdistinct area in the northern part of Eritrea from where it is not economicalto shift cargo to Assab. The City Of Asmara Tith its surrounding area 13
Ethiopia's important industrial, commercial and agricultural center. Barringa very unfavourablie development in-the economy, the port traffic in,assawawould continue to increase and the capactty of the port could be utilizedin 7 or 8 years. Tne full capacity of this port-1is. estimated by theGovernment as between 600,000 - 700,000 tons of dry carg a.yesar.-.Bettermaintenance and improvement of the existing facilities is urgently needed.In addition a plan for providing additional berths should be prepared.
84. At both ports stevedoring labor is supplied by the port office.No labor shift system is yet introduced, and stevedores are employed on acasual basis. Port working hours are from 7.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. afterwhich over-time is paid.
85. TWith a view to streamlining the administration of ports, the Govern-ment submitted a bill to Parliament for creation of an autonomous NationalPorts Authority; it will be operated by a general manager responsible to aPorts Authority Commission, which will be chaired by the Minister of Commu-nications. According to the bill, the Commission will include a representativeof port users appointed by the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce in addition torepresentatives of several government agencies concerned with maritime affairs.The Authority would be a corporate body with the right to enter into contractswith private and public persons or agencies, both domestic and foreign,and to borrow funds for the purpose of financing operations and improvementsof ports. Port expenditures will be met by port revenues, and the surpluswill be retained by the Authority. The Authority will have the power to setport rates to balance revenues and expenditures. There is no provision forautonomy of individual ports.
86. The proposed establishment of a port authority which will assumethe cperational responsibility for ports from the present Ilarine Departmentof the M1inistrv of Communications, appears to be a step toward an improvementof management of the nation's port affairs. It should, among other things,
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help improve the operational efficiency of ports and establish financial auto-nomy ir. port operations which will ensure that users will pay the cost ofservices. The operation of the Authoritv, when established" and its pre.pa-ration of a port investment plan, which does not exist at present, wouldrequire outside technical assistance.
C. Port Investment Requirements
87. For the next, few yenrs, the investments in pornts shonl1d be mainiryfor acquisition of port equipment and improvement of the Massawa facilities.HTowever; curing the Third Five-Year Plan period, 1968/69-1972/73 the problemof port capacity should be studied based on a reliable traffic forecast.The nort-. of -iassawa may have to be expanded in 7 or 8 years' time.
88. The present operating conditions of both Assab and Massawa portsare adversely affected by shortage of equipment and, in the case of Massawa,the deteriorated conditions of t4-he facilities. A lis4 of equipr.er.necessary for both ports has been prepared (see Table 11); this equipment isestimated to cost approxmately Eth$8 ml ion. It is not possible toappraise the appropriateness of the estimated requirements and the composition
of quir.e,ton the1 bkasi;s LftelsIo.S Sre visit S4o these 4ot, uit was fairly obvious that the existing equipment is not adequate to handlethe present and future port cargo, and therefore sore investment in equipmentwould be necessary. The Mission believes that a detailed review of theequipment situation should be carried out either by the Marine Departm,enL or,if necessary, by retaining a port equipment expert for a short period.Based on such a review ar equiprent procurement program can be prepared.
89. The Marine Department plans to erect 9 new warehouses in theMassawa port at an estimated cost of Eth$2.2 million. The investment inwarehouses in Massawa is a priority need and is justified. The Departmentalso plans to build 500 dwelling units in adjacent areas of both ports toprovide housing for port workers. The construction is estimated to costabout Eth$6.5 million. Although providing housing for port workers wouldimprove labor relations and increase efficiency of cargo handling, an under-taking of this nature is not in itself an essential part of port operation.Such an investment may best be left for review by the proposed National PortsAuthority, within the framework of autonomous financial management.
VI. CIVI1L AVIATION
A. General
90. The mountainous territory, the underdeveloped state of overlandtransport and the scattered distribution of population throughout the larigeterritory make domestic civil aviation an important mode of transport, atfirst, as a precursor of land transport and then as a supplement when landtransport facilities extend to areas hitherto isolated. The emphasis on
civil aviation development in the past has been laid on international aviationand the overwhelmLn- propor,ion of capital funds for air transport was spenton construction and improvement of international airports and acquisition of
r JS f _" . L .J. IJ ~ JL' ±LI.J. ~.~L~U~LLj~~.jet a-ircraft for *-nteraJ.a+or. a Fl flights- 4- the overinginent nwseu L'hiop-Ci.Airlines.
91. In 1962-1966 the Government spent over US$20.2 million in equippingand constructing airports, airnly for- iprovements of the four major air-ports at Addis Ababa, Asmara, Jima and Dire DawTa. This involved constructionof paved and lighted runways for Jet aircraft, tel-mina buildings and airportservice buildings as well as installation of air traffic control, aeronau-tical com,nranications and air na-vigation facilities at these four airj-orts.In addition, aeronautical communication facilities were installed at 17smal''er- rports, and air navigation aids were provided at 11 of thoselocations. These investments were financed by a US Development Loan FundcLreu.±v
92. Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) invested in aircraft a similar amount tothe Government's airport investment during 1962-1966. The total expenditureof Eth$50.7 million, or US$20.3 million equivalent, was distributed onpurchase of the following types of aircraft together with spare parts:
Eth$Thousand
7 DC-3's 957.23 DC-6B's 311.93 Boeing 720-Bs 49,h79.8
T o t a 1 50,708.9
93. Despite the large investments in international air service facili-ties during recent years, both the Government and EAL continue to emphasizethe international operation. As will be shown later, EAL plans to acquiremore jet aircraft and the Government has now engaged an American consultingfirm to prepare plans to imrprove runways, taxiways, aprons, navigational andlanding aids for the two international airports at Addis Ababa and Asmara.The consultants' study,begun in January 1967, will be completed in 8 months.The Government considers as its order of priority in airport investment:
1) further extension and improvement of Addis Ababa and Asmaraairports;
2) equipping the above two airports with necessary navigationaland landing instruments;
3) study of the conditions and requirements of domestic airports.
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94. It is difficult for the l4ission to prejudge that domestic aviat.Lonshould have a prior claim on the investment resources over the requirementsfor international aviation. The latter is inportant to Ethiopia because airtransport is virtually the only means of movement of people between Ethiopiaand foreign countries. As will be shown later, the international operationof EAL has been fairly efficient and, uni-Mke airlines of many other develop-ing countries, it does not rely on Government subsidies, but is a net foreignexchange earner; this seems to make investments in international aviationmerit some serious consideration.
95. From the view point of fostering economic development and socia]-integration, domestic aviation has an unusual importance, and therefore itsdevelopment should receive, at least, as much and probably more, attentionfrom the Government as international aviation. The inadequate physicalconditions of most of the domestic airports requires an urgent program forimprovement.
B. Domestic Airports
96. There are about 50 domestic airports and landing strips in additionto the four major airports for international flights. Nearly 30 of theseare served regularly by EAL, using mostly DC-3 airplanes. Most of theseairports have runways less than 5000 ft long and are located at an altitu(leof more than 4000 ft, which, combined, make aircraft operation difficult.Experts express doubt that any of these airports could be used for scheduledair transport if evaluated under internationally accepted criteria. None ofthe 50 airports and landing strips are paved or lighted, and because of thepoor soil and drainage conditions, most are closed during part of the rairnyseason.
97. Even with these inadequate facilities, domestic aviation plavsan iagortant role in maintaining communication and helping increase productionin areas without over-land transportation. The DG-3's carrv both passengersand cargo, including mail, to and from those isolated areas and the demancdfor such services is strong. In many places, passeneers sometimes must makeplane reservations a week or two ahead of time because of shortage of space.Agricultural products flown out to markets are relatively high value and/orlight weight goods, such as coffee, hides, butter, honey, poultry, etc.
98. The Government has recently requested the US Government for financialassistance for a study on domestic Girnort. investment requirements. TheM4ission recommends that this study be carried out as soon as possible, andthat based on thi a suitnble investment program for domestic airports beprepared for implementation. Pending this study, no reliable estimate ofi nves+m.?ePn+. needs~ is 25.rai abe. WrT~.^vr,Y +hthe GofLr.erm.nrt. cor.si4ders +.thn+.
Eth$40 million in the next five to ten years may be spent on domestic air-ports. It estma the foeign. exchange cwwomnet at about Lo percen.t.
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C. Administration of Civil Aviation
99. Administration and regulation of civil aviation are the responsibi-lity of the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) which is headed by a CivilAviation Administrator appointed by the Emperor. The Administration is underthe immediate supervision of the Minister of Communications and executes thepolicies established by the Civil Aviation Board, which is chaired by theIinister of Communications. CAA issues licenses for pilots; registers andinspects aircraft; regulates and controls all air routes; licenses, inspectsand regulates all airports and air navigational facilities and services;and sets tariff rates for commercial operation of aircraft and rates to becharged for the use of airport facilities.
100. Although the setup of CAA appears to indicate an autonomous agency,there is little, if any, autonomy. CAA's budget forms part of the GovernmentBudget, and revenues from airport fees and other activities are part of theGovernment's general revenue. The revenues from airport operations are onlya fraction of the expenditures. For 1966/67, the total estimated collectionof airport revenues was put at Eth$0.6 million against the total ordinarybudget for airport operations of Eth$2.7 million. The current practice isto waive landing fees and other charges from Ethiopian Airlines.
101. CPA experiences shortage of trained personnel despite the consi-derable effort to train technical operators both within the country and abroad.Because of low salaries, CAA frequentlyt looses personnel trained at itsexpense. The growfing aviation activities, both domestic and international,renuire a net addition of technical personnel. A recent review cf theaviation requirements done by American experts from the Federal AviationAgencv (FAA) suggests that, allowing for expected growth of aviation acti-vities over the next five years, the number of technicians required tonperate and maintain the Ethionian airways system must be quadrupled.
102. There is little coordination of investment and oneration of air-ports and air navigation facilities between civilian and military aviationdue pri arily to the lack of clear-cut authoritg for coordination. It isdesirable that airport facilities and services should be planned and providedw,Thinh can be u-sed jointly by militarv and civilian operators wihenever possible.
103. The FAA te2m recommended as a solution; armona other things. to theproblems of retaining technical personnel and improving coordination with-r nYni aviatione-m activritiesj to establish _ Tmperial Aviation Authority;
which would be a semi-autonomous agency similar to the Imperial HighwrayAuthority. It is doubtTflt, however, wAhether a se;miaualtonnmou-s agencv wouldbe more successful in coping with those two problems. Unless the AviationAuthority is finan.cialy autonomous and per.m_t+Aa to collect rderunte chargesfrom airlines, including EA1L, and other users of the airways facilities,4-1, A,-hori- +tv - A 'd no !t' > adequate finn.cial Vr.sorc +es to r-i nanu,re Aat ,~ .u IhJ A.a 110U I- e V A. ,U..s...
attractive pay scales to retain technical personnel. The Imperial HighwayJAUtLoriLUy, aclth±JIough, semi-autor.or,ous Jn it. s L operat±ior.s,, does r.ot h-av'e t+he
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financial autonomy and has not yet solved the problem of retaining trainedpersonnel in competition with non-Government employees. Liaison with militaryaviation can be improved by appropriate consultation between the Ministriesof Communication and of Defense. An establishment of a liaison committeecomposed of representatives of CAA and the military establishment would servethe nurnose, As militarv operations cannot be placed under the control of acivilian authority, the establishment of the Authority would not have anYi-nortagnt effects .nth regard to i -m-rn rny co.rdination of activities betweencivilian and military authorities.
D. Operations of Ethiopian Airlines
104. Ethiopian Airlines was created in 1945 to provide scheduled andnon==scheduled air services witin the contry as well as to foreign countries.Because of inexperience of Ethiopian personnel in operating an airline, acontract was negotiated wi%th Tran IWorld Ar4es to rwnage and operate tih.eairlines and to train Ethiopian personnel for management and operations.From a modest begJnning with a few surplus rmilitary C-' 4!s (equivalentDC-3's) from World War II, EAL's operations expanded very rapidly and haveUeen successful. It, now provides scheduled se-vices, as aeadyvv imen-tioned,
to nearly 30 cities and towns in Ethiopia and to 16 cities outside the countryin Africa, ZiUrope, th-e Miuddle East and India.
105. As shown in Table 12, the operational recoros vhow rapiy increasngactivities during the past decade. The number of passengers carried increasedfrom about 70,000 in 1956 to nearly 180,000 in 1965. Passenger-"nles hasmore than quadrupled from about 34 million in 1956 to 145 million in 1965.This shows an increase in long distance international flights. EHLL projectsthat passenger miles will reach nearly 270 million by 1971 which is an in-crease at about 11 percent per annum. There is little reason why thisprojection cannot be achieved.
106. The airline now employs over 1800 men which is more than doublethe number in 1959. About 350 foreign technicians are employed, but thenumber is expected to decrease as more Ethiopians acquire technical andmanagerial skills through technical classes and management traIning programs.
107. EAL's financial results show small operating surplus in most ofthe recent years. For instance, in 1965 there was an operating surplus ofEth$ 3 million which is about 3.3 percent on the total asset (see Table 1.3).This is to some extent due to the fact that EAL is waived the payment oftaxes, landing fees and other airport charges. According to EAL, thefinancial gain due to the non-payment of taxes and landing fees is more thanoffset by the expenses to operate and maintain 32 domestic airports, whichis done by EAL rather than CAA. There are no financial statistics from wlicha comparison can be made of gain and loss on the part of the EAL due to thisintertwined arrangement with CAA. It is, therefore, desirable that theadministrative and financial responsibilities between them be clearly esta-blished to avoid unaccounted subsidies one way or another.
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108. EAL owns and operates the following equipment:
- 3 Boeing 720- 3 DC-O.B- 9 DC-3- 4 Bell Helicopters- 3 Cessna 180- 3 Piper Cubs- 1 Beechcraft C18S
109. EAL plans to acquire more jet aircraft for international serviceat an estimated cost of about Eth$76 million during the period 1968-1970,,This investment wlTl be financed through foreign private banks. Someadditional investments in domestic aircraft would be made. EAL also has atentative plan to erect an office building in Addis Ababa at a cost of aboutEth$10 million. These planned investments appear economically justified andare necessary to meet the increasing volume of operation of the airline.
The Port of Djibouti
1. Djibouti is the capital of French Somaliland situated on the eastAfrican coast where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden. The French territory(22,000 square kilometers) is bounded by Ethiopia to the north, west and south,and by the Somali Republic to the southeast. The extremely arid soil andtorrid climate make this territory of no econoric significance, except for theport facilities at Djibouti which is an important bunkering center at thegateway of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The cargo movement through theport is mainly (80 percent) traffic to and from Ethiopia (export of coffee,and hides, imports of manufactured goods such as vehicles and heavy equipmentas well as timber).
2. To handle the Ethiopian import and exports, Ethiopian customsofficers are stationed in Djibouti, and the transit freight between Ethiopiaand Djibouti is moved in bonded freight cars on the Franco-Ethiopian Railways.The relations between Ethiopian and Djibouti authorities are good, and nodifficulty in transit is experienced by Ethiopian traders who ship merchandisethrough Djibouti. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia has a branch office inDjibouti which handles foreign trade transactions of Ethiopian exporters andimporters.
3. The port has 8 berths for ocean-going vessels with denth between 9and 10.8 meters. Ttwo of them are used for bunkering purposes and the rest,with a warehousing area of 12 -300 sanare meters. fnr oenernl cnrg?o vessels-There are a number of bonded and private warehouses and a meat refrigera-tionplant within the nort nrPm1ses - The r.rgo-hr n2ning equipment is adequante,and the port labor is fairly efficient.
4. The port handled about 360,000 tons of general cargo in 1965 (seeTable 1)i); as m.e.ntioned earlier, about 80 percent is cargoes to and fromrEthiopia. The port also handles about 2 million tons of petroleum productsw.Thich are m.ainly for bunkering and to a minor exten.t for the needs of FrenchSomaliland. Only a small volume of petroleum products are imported toEthinpia through Djibohti nowadaysv= Since the opening of the deep-waterAssab port in 1961, there has been only a limited growTth in general cargotrPffi an the ve-np-rt. vrol iirn hasrq not. increae d+. a l.1
5. T~~he Djbot ---- or-t Amitation has a plar vo-l vwo - diLoaberths with a total length of 400 m and 12 m depth to serve deep draft vessels.
'1fl,~~ c+~i,rn~+- - n +^ -,+,c4
TT'Z& m 1 tl, -- A-,-4 - ,4-b 1 AThe con-trction is estimted to cost U S$3, ri"A.A Vo equi 'er.t, ,ihwou:ALd%Afinanced by the French Government. The current plan is to commencec struction du* r+ing .. r1.04,7
ff r \ 0 \ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~E T H I O PI1 A,
t i R --- ' ' \ j ~TRA,NSPIORT'ATION
t % 9 - _( z s 1\,,1 5; q 6 4 a!a=oDrs ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AND IAt/DIN- 5 r-ES
\ , 4S s _ > < i 3 o~~~~~~~~~~ 50 100 1 f 200gt 2 () X5EndC ;dlqcl X 0 TT Sll_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~11O.ETERS
At / SAS f.OXGONDR/ C
y tT jJ / g { Ct kAs;ob X /A t .Z-
< '>) r j/ g g 0.I t F87,T.
a / E.h2s*g tobr <t~4YIdi e TndchQ- ccA us X,, r
\( ADonQhelo y10 ttr(p %°ABAB
rw \v ( urf / \ \~e IIuo \ ;g ~ \ RE
T.M : SEeooe
S.d De IG/-LE. \ /
14ruierDI \ ererhn s AZ
{ '^, C him T S 4 / u st;<.I" b, (;i99+9 > P~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
U0 G A N<ba Ai Ak
Table 1
National Road System, 1957/58-1966/67*(km)
Asphalt Gravelpaved Surfaced Earth -* Total
1957/58 780 1875 - 2655
1958/59 800 2250 - 3050
1959/60 870 2565 - 3435
1960/61 935 3000 - 3935
1961/62 1065 3250 - 4315
1962/63 1244 3578 - 4822
1963/64 1244 3702 - 49h6
1964/65 1S55 3869 137 5461
1965/66 1526 3778 451 5755
1966/67 1363 4257 657 6782
* Roads maintained by the Imperial Highway Authority. In 1966/67L4lu~ d.~ dUUL. 03 U1AJ lll Li. ~ULLLU.1UL U.L-y L4Ullu_1e± ±LUD d.iiU U1±"LQL Liii
which little or no investment is made by the Government. 11here some invest-An 4-V, I -,nv.n --e, ,1 1,o -n AnA V-0 nr
4nldn am ffl 9 -Ur-J Ls are maadel, vI Je are usa y prvid Ly po. c4al ±JsLVe,UV-r.ts wSt
technical assistance by the IRA.
IX* The earth roads included in this table are those dry-weatherruau~ V LUGI 'U VIA dUVVa L1 W.L_Uli -iUIIl - l±VGZaWIL re d_-LG l -lL U- 4-1- 1TA
such as providing drainage structures and surfacing with select materialsonl section1s -Wne-re dri-v-.Lig ConduitU3Loins ar-e C pd tU.LLU.LdrLy Udif.LfLiLcLU.
Source: Imperial Highway Authority.
Table 2
TI-A Fn8;t+iws on P 1957/58-1965/66
Constructiona.ndAl
Improvement 1/ Maintenance 2/ Total
1957/58 9.0 10.0 19.0
1958/59 6.6 11.5 18.1
1959/60 8.5 9.3 17.8
1960/61 17.0 10.5 27.5
1961/62 16.4 7.8 24.2
1962/63 17.4 7.8 25.2
1963/64 16.2 9.1 25.3
19(6/65 19.9 10.6 30.5
1l'65/66 21.9 12.1 34.0
1/ Including surveys and studies.
2/ An important, but undetermined, part isannually diverted to construction.
Source: Imperial Highway Authority.
uoveer-r,Le nt CaptUal DUUeL, L963Q/ U64-.L;/`JU/ U OK*
