Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00001432 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-39820) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.8 MILLION (US$20.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOR A CASAMANCE EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION SUPPORT PROJECT June 24, 2010 Fragile States, Conflict and Social Development (AFTCS) Country Department AFCF1 Africa Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Document of The World Bank
Report No: ICR00001432
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-39820)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.8 MILLION (US$20.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL
FOR A
CASAMANCE EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION SUPPORT PROJECT
June 24, 2010
Fragile States, Conflict and Social Development (AFTCS) Country Department AFCF1 Africa Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2009)
Currency Unit = CFA Franc
US$1.00 = 456 CFAF 1 SDR = US$ 1.57
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AART
ANRAC
Agence Autonome des Travaux Routiers (Autonomous Road Work Agency)
Agence Nationale de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance (National Agency for the Recovery of Social and Economic Activities in Casamance).
AGETIP Agence d’exécution des travaux d’intérêt public contre le sous emploi (Public Works Executing Agency)
CERSP Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project CP-PRAESC Comité de Pilotage du PRAESC (PRAESC‘s Steering Committee) CS-ANRAC Conseil de Surveillance de l’ANRAC (Oversight Council of ANRAC) DG-ANRAC Directeur Général de l’ANRAC (ANRAC Director General) DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DRR Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework EU European Union GIS Geographic Information System GoS Government of Senegal IRR Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MFDC Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (Rebellion Movement
in Casamance) MTR Mid-term Review PIM Project Implementation Manual PRAESC Programme de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance
(Recovery Program of Social and Economic Activities in Casamance) UNDP United Nations Development Programme
Vice President:Obiageli K. Ezekweseli
Country Director:Habib M. Fetini
Sector Manager:Ian Bannon
Project Team Leader:Demba Balde
ICR Team Leader:Moctar Thiam
ICR PrimaryAuthor : Joseph W.B. Bredie
SENEGAL CASAMANCE EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION SUPPORT PROJECT
CONTENTS
Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design...............................................12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ..............................................63. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................84. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome.........................................................145. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance .....................................................146. Lessons Learned........................................................................................................167. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners...........18Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing..........................................................................20Annex 2. Outputs by Component..................................................................................21Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis .................................................................25Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes.............26Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...........................................................................28Annex 6. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR.....................29Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents ......................................................................31MAP
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments (if any)
Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):
No Quality at Entry (QEA):
None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):
No Quality of Supervision (QSA):
None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:
Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Health 15 15
Other social services 25 5
Primary education 10 10
Roads and highways 50 70
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 33 35
Rural non-farm income generation 17 10
Rural services and infrastructure 33 50
Social safety nets 17 5 E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director: Habib M. Fetini Iradj A. Alikhani
Sector Manager: Ian Bannon C. Sanjivi Rajasingham
Project Team Leader: Demba Balde Moctar Thiam
ICR Team Leader: Moctar Thiam
ICR Primary Author: Joseph W. B. Bredie F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project's objectives are to support the Government of Senegal in: (i) facilitating a speedy restoration in Casamance of a productive economics and social environment
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similar to that existing in the rest of Senegal; (ii) laying the groundwork for sustainable long-term development in the region, while fully respecting its specificities Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The project objective is to contribute to strengthening the conditions for a lasting peace and sustainable development in Casamance through the provision of essential infrastructure and securing key investments. (a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target Values (from
approval documents)
Formally Revised Target Values
Actual Value Achieved at
Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 : 1. Increase school gross enrollment rates to the levels it was before the conflict (93%) 2. Increase in the use of health facilities by 40%
Value quantitative or Qualitative)
Date achieved Comments (incl. % achievement)
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target Values (from
approval documents)
Formally Revised
Target Values
Actual Value Achieved at
Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 : 1.1 By 2008, the negotiations rounds between the MFDC and GoS, the so-called Foundiougne rounds of negotiations have resumed.
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)
Date achieved Comments (incl. % achievement)
Indicator 2 : 2.1 Number of communities connected to the core road network (all-weather roads)
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)
Date achieved Comments (incl. %
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achievement) Indicator 3 : 2.2 Number of schools reopened and functional. Value (quantitative or Qualitative)
Date achieved Comments (incl. % achievement)
Indicator 4 : 2.3 Number of health posts reopened and functional. Value (quantitative or Qualitative)
Date achieved Comments (incl. % achievement)
Indicator 5 : 3.0 Integration of project M&E system into regular operations of local government
12 12/30/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.87 H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructuring Date(s)
Board Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at Restructuring
Amount Disbursed at
Restructuring in USD millions
Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
DO IP
02/20/2008 S S 13.96
I. Disbursement Profile
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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
1. Casamance’s isolation and its consequences. Casamance, the fertile southern region of Senegal, is geographically almost entirely separated from the rest of Senegal by The Gambia. Besides the physical isolation, people from Casamance have generally felt isolated fiscally (lack of decentralization), educationally (restricted access to universities1), and economically (disadvantaged market access). In addition, grievances over exploitation of land led to tensions among the people of Casamance. In 1982, these tensions led the Movement of Democratic Forces for Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance – MFDC) to issue a declaration of independence. For almost 30 years, the ensuing conflict between MFDC and the Senegalese army inflicted death, suffering, displacement, social disruption and destruction on the people of Casamance.
2. Background of the Conflict. Casamance comprises three administrative regions, Ziguinchor, Sedhiou, and Kolda, with a combined area of approximately 28,400 square km and a population of 1.34 million. At appraisal, the low intensity conflict fuelled by the MFDC’s estimated 1,200 to 2,000 active combatants had resulted in many thousands of lives lost, some 430 persons injured by mines, around 30,000 displaced and 13,000 refugees living in Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia. An estimated 230 villages had been deserted, 37 schools had been closed and some 4,000 displaced students housed in make-shift shelters. Many health centers had been shut down or left unattended and access to health services was further constrained by destroyed roads. One consequence of this reduction in health services was a significant increase in maternal mortality (e.g., 1,200 deaths per 100,000 births in Kolda versus the national average of 510). In agriculture, cereal production dropped by almost 20% between 1990 and 1996, and revenues from local taxes fell by more than half, which led to a significant reduction in public investment in infrastructure. Private tourism operators had closed down because of lack of security.
3. Peace Initiative. In April 2000, the newly elected third President of the Republic of Senegal committed to resolving the Casamance conflict and commenced peace negotiations. In 2001 two peace agreements were signed between representatives of MFDC and the Government of Senegal (GoS). The agreements touched on political issues such as disarmament of armed groups, liberation of prisoners, freedom of movement, mine clearing, economic and social recovery, and improved road access to reduce isolation. Despite interruptions in the peace process (para. 9) and occasional flare-ups of violence, the GoS has sustained efforts to consolidate an agreement with MFDC for cessation of hostilities and demobilization. Recently, during the April 2010 Ziguinchor festival, GoS and MFDC both declared that they are ready for peace talks. The bone of contention, however, remains the location of the peace talks. While GoS argues that they have to take place anywhere in Senegal, most MFDC factions insist they must take place outside of the country.
4. Peace Program. In 2001, in the wake of the agreements and together with donors, GoS developed the Recovery Program of Social and Economic Activities in Casamance (Programme
1 There was no university in Casamance until 2006, while high school graduation rates were consistently higher than in the rest of Senegal.
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de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance - PRAESC). PRAESC’s development was led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU) and the World Bank, and financed in part by a grant from the Japan Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) Fund. PRAESC’s objectives were to: (i) facilitate a speedy restoration of a productive economic and social environment in Casamance similar to that existing in the rest of Senegal; and (ii) lay the groundwork for sustainable long-term development in the region, while fully respecting its specificities. Specific objectives included: mine clearing; demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DRR) of ex-combatants; local development; and Supra-Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.
5. Implementation Arrangements for PRAESC. In July 2004, following the adoption of the amnesty accord, the GoS established the National Agency for the Recovery of Social and Economic Activities in Casamance (Agence Nationale de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance -ANRAC) to implement PRAESC. ANRAC was an administrative entity under the authority of the Prime Minister with the mandate to clear mines, demobilize, reinsert and reintegrate ex-combatants, rehabilitate infrastructure, and support local development. ANRAC would be guided by an Oversight Council (Conseil de Surveillance de l’ANRAC)chaired by a representative of the President and composed of representatives from ministries involved in economic and social recovery in Casamance. The Council would guide ANRAC’s activities, approve its programs, procedures and budget, and coordinate between state, local collectives, NGOs, local populations and development partners. A PRAESC Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage du PRAESC) headed by a representative of the Prime Minister would monitor implementation and an Oversight Committee of ANRAC would examine and approve annual work programs and budgets. These committees would convene at least twice yearly. The secretariat functions of the Steering Committee would be carried out by the Director General of ANRAC.
6. The World Bank’s Response. The World Bank, in the context of the preparation of the April 2003 Senegal Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), decided that it would support the PRAESC and finance part of the activities identified in the recovery program. Peace was considered inevitable. Although different MFDC factions were sending contradictory signals, violence had virtually ceased. In 2004, to respond quickly to GoS efforts to benefit from the restoration of peace the World Bank, following special procedures for emergency projects, negotiated the Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project (CERSP). CERSP was presented in the “Technical Annex to the Memorandum and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 13.8 million (US$20 million equivalent) to the Republic of Senegal for a Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project” or MOP, dated August 13, 2004. CERSP was approved by the Board on September 9, 2004 and became effective on January 1, 2005. It was to be implemented in three years.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
7. Original Project Development Objectives. The project's overall objectives2 were to support the GoS in: (i) facilitating a speedy restoration in Casamance of a productive economic and social environment similar to that existing in the rest of Senegal; and (ii) laying the groundwork for sustainable long-term development in the region, while fully respecting its
2 The project objectives are the same as for PRAESC although CERSP included only a (small) part of PRAESC and financed less than 16% of PRAESC costs.
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specificities. This would be achieved by: (1) demobilizing and reinserting 2,300 combatants and other direct victims of the conflict as well as their families; (2) ensuring the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants, their families and other persons directly affected by the conflict; (3) rebuilding or rehabilitating major social and economic public infrastructure in Casamance in three major sectors: transport, health and education; and (4) preparing a long-term development program aimed at bringing the level of development in Casamance up to the average level of other regions in Senegal, while addressing the original causes of the conflict.
8. Key Indicators. The three results indicators were: (a) 100% of identified beneficiaries engaged in legitimate economic activity; (b) 325,000 inhabitants benefitting from improved accessibility; and (c) restoration of access to basic social services to all villages affected by the conflict. The results indicators for Component 1 (DRR) were: (1.1) 100% of identified ex-combatants reintegrated; and (1.2) 100% of persons identified as directly affected by the conflict have received support for reintegration. For Component 2 (IRR) the indicators for the transport, education and health sectors were respectively: (2.1) 50 km of paved roads reinforced, 8 bridges rehabilitated or rebuilt, and 6 pontoon bridges built; (2.2) 120 classrooms rehabilitated and reopened; and (2.3) 50 health posts, 3 maternity clinics and the psychiatric clinic at Kenia rehabilitated.
1.3 Revised PDOs (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification
9. Peace Process Interrupted. For the DRR component, preparatory activities commenced in 2005, but actual implementation could start only upon formal receipt from MFDC of the list of combatants identified for demobilization. Negotiations between the MFDC and the GoS to that end continued throughout 2005 and 2006. However, in January 2007, the MFDC leader, Abbé Diamacoune Senghor, died. Negotiations fell apart and the prospect for formal demobilization greatly diminished. Senghor’s death also weakened the rebel movement. According to some observers, different factions had turned already to illegal exploitation of drugs and timber, while others were being controlled by local political interests. The evolution of MFDC from a unified separatist movement aiming to redress Casamance’s grievances to a factional movement driven more by economic and political considerations was becoming apparent and leading to a loss of support among the conflict-weary population. For the project team, the changes suggested that it was increasingly necessary to negotiate directly with local MFDC factions in project areas to ensure that project activities could be undertaken under conflict free conditions.
10. Decision to Restructure the Project. In view of the situation, the project team called for a thorough review of implementation progress, particularly of the DRR component, and undertook the Mid Term Review (MTR) in March 2007. GoS, management and the team decided that it was necessary to restructure the project to account for the new situation with regard to demobilization. The PDO and key indicators were simplified, but not fundamentally altered. The DRR component was scaled back and strategically refocused, from demobilization based on agreed amnesty conditions, to bringing peace to the people of Casamance through social mobilization, prevention of conflict and peace management. Institutional arrangements were clarified; credit proceeds were reallocated to the infrastructure component, and the credit closing date extended by one year. The reallocation and closing date extension were reflected in the April, 2008 amendment to the Development Credit Agreement. The restructuring was approved by the Board on March 19, 2008.
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11. Revised PDO. The revised project objective was to contribute to strengthening the conditions for a lasting peace and sustainable development in Casamance through the provision of essential infrastructure and securing key investments.
12. Revised Indicators. The outcome indicators of the project results framework (after restructuring) became: (a) increase school gross enrollment rates to the levels before the conflict (93%) and increase the use of health facilities by 40%; and (b) secure one significant investment in the tourism sector and two in agri-business in Casamance. The intermediate outcome indicators for Component 1 (Information; Communication; and Social Mobilization – DRR) became: (1.1) by end of 2008, the negotiation between MFDC and GoS, the so-called Foundiougne rounds, have resumed. For Component 2 (Infrastructure - Rehabilitate the Road and River network; and Support the Restoration of the Education and Health Infrastructure) the intermediate outcome indicators were: (2.1) number of communities connected to the core road network (all-weather roads); and (2.2) number of schools and health posts reopened and functional. The intermediate outcome indicator for Component 3 (Assess the Prospect for Long Term Development) was: (3.1) integration of the project Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system into regular operations of local government.
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
13. Original Beneficiaries. At appraisal the number of beneficiaries was estimated at 2,000 combatants, 16,000 family members, some 300 widows and an unknown number of irregular forces, including child soldiers. Overall, an estimated 325,000 inhabitants would benefit from improved accessibility in general, and from restored access to basic social services for all villages affected by the conflict.
14. Revised Beneficiaries. The number of beneficiaries was not changed at the MTR.
1.5 Original Components3
15. Part A: Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR). Conducting a proper physical and mental discharge of ex-combatants through: (a) the establishment of demobilization centers for the registration of ex-combatants, and carrying out of counseling activities; (b) the provision of technical advisory services for the carrying out of health and trauma clinics and related activities, including HIV/AIDS prevention and counseling activities; (c) support the relocation and reinsertion in their communities of eligible beneficiaries through: (i) the payment of relocation expenses; and (ii) the provision of grants for carrying out subprojects in capacity building for income generating purposes, including the acquisition of small equipment. Supporting the return of eligible beneficiaries to civilian life and to the social environment of their communities, including the provision of technical advisory services to the communities for facilitating the social reinsertion of ex-combatants in their midst. The provision of technical advisory services to advise eligible beneficiaries on existing professional and economic activities, including inter alia, in agriculture, small agro-processing industries, trade, tourism, livestock and fishing.
3 From “Development Credit Agreement (Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project) between Republic of Senegal and the International Development Association” November 5, 2004. In the MOP, the description of the original components is 15 pages long.
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16. Part B: Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (IRR). Carry out the reconstruction and rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure, including transport, health and education facilities, damaged by war or neglect.
17. Part C: Sustainability of Casamance Development Program. Ensuring the continued achievement of Program objectives, through the carrying out of preparation and design studies in, inter alia, hydraulics, land tenure, transport, tourism, private sector development, environment and natural resources for the long-term development of the Casamance region and the implementation of the second phase of the Borrower’s Program for the Casamance region.
1.6 Revised Components4
18. Part A: Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR). The DRR component would focus on information, communication, and social mobilization of all stakeholders (local government, civic organizations and communities) and beneficiaries (ex-combatants, their families and people affected by the conflict). The objective of the information sub-component was to reinforce the foundations for peace and the conditions for sustainable development by conducting workshops, sensitization programs and capacity building activities, and disseminating the achievements of the project to all actors. The objective of the communication sub-component was to establish a participatory mechanism to reach out to opinion leaders, political, religious and civil society leaders, artists and other influential community members and encourage them to support and own the peace process. Communication activities would be conducted through media campaigns, roundtable discussions, and socio-cultural, youth and gender related activities. The objective of the social mobilization sub-component was to reinvigorate the communal dynamics that existed, but were negatively impacted by the conflict, by reviving the traditional intra-communal mechanisms for conflict resolution and management. Social mobilization would include the annual Peace Day and the identification of a Peace Champion.
19. Part B: Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (IRR). Infrastructure, the most successful component to date would be scaled up. The component would improve key infrastructure in education, health, and transport, including the electrification of rural medical centers. The revised component would provide additional support to increase access, usage and durability: safety fences, sanitary blocks, wells, shutters, medical equipment and bedding. The education sub-component would concentrate on the construction of 31 school fences, 15 sanitary blocks with six units each, 21 wells equipped with manual pumps and the rehabilitation of 14 additional wells. The health sub-component would focus on completing the psychiatric clinic of Kenia which would be fully equipped and connected to electricity and water. Fences for 20 medical centers would be built, 21 wells equipped, 4 additional wells equipped and rehabilitated, and 25 centers would be linked to the electricity grid. The transport sub-component would focus on completing two earth roads.
20. Part C: Sustainability of Casamance Development Program. The long-term development studies had not been commissioned and would be reduced to an impact study, and a prospective study on the development of the Casamance region. The computerized M&E system, which included a geographic information system (GIS) for locating all infrastructure sites, would
4 The description of Part A and B are from “Proposal to Restructure Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project (Credit No. 3982-SE), Project Data Sheet”, February 20, 2008, pages 3 and 4. The description of Part C is a summary from Annex 1 of the Project Data Sheet.
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be made available to the local government. The website http://www.anracparc.net would be used more intensively to disseminate project activities to a wide audience. A database to identify the profiles of ex-combatants and vulnerable groups for reinsertion and reintegration would be available for demobilization.
1.7 Other Significant Changes
21. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements. The institutional arrangements were simplified and clarified. ANRAC, which had been both coordinating and implementing project activities, albeit not effectively, from its office in Dakar, would be limited to coordinating and harmonizing the reconstruction and development efforts undertaken by all partners and donor agencies in Casamance. The Oversight Committee would continue to guide implementation of the project, while the Steering Committee of the PRAESC would monitor the implementation, entrusted solely to the autonomous unit based in Ziguinchor under ANRAC.
22. Other Changes. The Results Framework was simplified to provide a practical basis for better monitoring and evaluating project activities. New outcome indicators for investment activities were proposed (Annex 2). The Project Closing Date was extended from May 31, 2008 to May 31, 2009 to accommodate the revised implementation schedule, in particular for the DRR component. A second and final extension of closing date to December 2009 was approved by management in May 2009. Project Funds were reallocated from the less performing DRR component to the infrastructure component to support the proposed changes.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
23. PRAESC was the result of the negotiations between GoS and MFDC, and the commitment of these parties and the donors to bring about peace. While the general objective of PRAESC was to restore the economic and social environment in Casamance (through mine clearing, demobilizing ex-combatants and developing businesses and infrastructure), GoS and the partners realized that these activities would not address the root causes of the conflict (MOP page 13). PRAESC thus identified critical issues that would more directly address conflict drivers by focusing on the physical and economic isolation of the region. They included: transport link between Casamance and Dakar; improved access to specific zones in the Casamance River delta; and development of tourism, water and natural resources, and land tenure issues
24. The project preparation and design team, which was led by a lead transport specialist, but included a conflict specialist, realized that in addition to demobilization, the project had to grapple with the grievances that fueled the conflict. Project design was a balance between demobilization and infrastructure, as reflected in the project activities and in the credit allocations (Annex 1). This balance was changed in favor of infrastructure activities after the MTR when the prospects for DRR were highly uncertain and the peace benefits of a broader focus on reducing isolation were apparent.
2.2 Implementation
25. Implementation arrangements before restructuring were both complex and confusing. The decision in July 2004 by the GoS to create the heavy and hierarchical ANRAC and give it the mandate to coordinate, demobilize, reintegrate, reconstruct, and program social and economic
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activities, delayed project implementation in several ways. First it took ANRAC’s Director General (DG) almost to the end of 2005 (from July 2004) to recruit staff to fill ANRAC’s four directorates, five units and one department. Few if any of the staff recruited (including the DG) had experience with economic or social development. Second, what became most difficult were the combined coordination and implementation mandates and the control over (project) funds. ANRAC’s office was in Dakar, but it used project funds to enlarge the (leased and not centrally located) project office in Ziguinchor.5 This could happen because financial management and oversight of ANRAC were weak until the MTR. Although GoS created the PRAESC Steering Committee in 2005, the Committee first met only in June 2007. ANRAC’s lack of focus and oversight until that time, in addition to the conflicting coordination and implementation mandates, caused confusion and delays. This issue was finally resolved at the MTR (para. 21).
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
26. The project implementation manual (PIM) included monitoring modalities and verifiable indictors that were used by ANRAC’s M&E unit in Ziguinchor. The unit was provided early with a GIS, which was used to identify project sites—roads, schools, and clinics—for rehabilitation, and for site selection by local communities, civil and military authorities and MFDC representatives. These stakeholders were able to see potential sites on a computer screen, which was effective in, for example, arriving at the decision by community representatives to rehabilitate inter-community earthen roads rather than the 50 km of paved highway that were to be rehabilitated under the project (para. 8). The GIS was part of the computerized information technology system which was used for field data collection and allowed nearly real-time analysis of activities. It also included a system to identify beneficiaries, including victims of mines, ex-combatants and their families, and self demobilized ex-combatants (combatants who returned on their own), and a project website which provided information to a wide audience.
27. In general, the M&E system was appropriate. The monitoring reports were timely and useful in guiding implementation. Achievement of pre- and post-MTR results indicators was monitored systematically by the unit. The unit produced semi-annual implementation progress reports. It developed among others the strategy for social mobilization and the project web site. The unit’s report on the achievements of the project at mid-term and the impact evaluation of infrastructure improvements on the restoration of peace and conflict resolution helped to formulate the new approach of social mobilization and local peace management at the MTR. After the MTR, the unit began to systematically evaluate the impact of the project on, for instance, the impact of the recovery of construction, agribusiness, transport, and tourism on the well-being of the population and their desire for an end to the conflict. The evaluation studies were the basis for the impact study and GoS’s implementation completion report produced by the unit.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
28. The February 2006 supervision mission found that ANRAC’s Environment and Social Impact unit did not understand its terms of reference and was unclear on how to implement the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF). The framework provided overall guidelines for environmental and social management; environmental assessment procedures for each of the micro-projects; environmental and social management instructions for each project
5 ANRAC had not followed procurement guidelines nor obtained IDA’s no-objection and the funds were returned by the GoS.
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component; as well as investment measures to address existing environmental problems. The lack of oversight (para. 24) and the limited expertise and experience of the environmental specialist recruited by ANRAC was a concern. Staff arranged for training of the environmental specialist and assisted the unit with implementing the ESMF.
29. At the MTR it was decided that AGETIP (Agence d’exécution des travaux d’intérêt public contre le sous emploi) which was effectively managing the infrastructure works would also manage the ESMF. The Bank’s environment staff would supervise AGETIP’s work. The 2009 project impact study by CONEXCI noted improper disposal of medical supplies at one clinic and erosion at the levy on one rehabilitated road which indicated insufficient attention to the environment and to maintenance. The Ziguinchor project unit has followed up on the environmental issue. On maintenance, GoS has an annual maintenance program that includes roads as well as public buildings such as schools and clinics. The project team has obtained assurances that the infrastructure rehabilitated under the project will be included in the annual maintenance program.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
30. The third component of the project aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the Casamance Development Program and implementation of the second phase of the Borrower’s Program for the Casamance Region. Although the project has contributed to strengthening the conditions for peace and reduced the region’s isolation through the provision of essential infrastructure, the infrastructure rehabilitated under the project is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of needs. Estimates are that some 700 km of roads require rehabilitation, including important connectors with the rest of the country (crossing The Gambia) and connecting towns and villages, some still located in areas not yet free of conflict. Projects for demining, restoring agriculture, forest resources, and social infrastructure supported by donors are in various stages of completion, relying on the procedures for working with MFDC, the army, and local governments established under CERSP.
31. What remains to fully restore Casamance’s economic and social environment and reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict, is to extend coverage of the conflict prevention and peace management activities to the entire region, and further reduce its isolation. While GoS continues peace negotiation efforts with MFDC, the World Bank, in the context of developing the upcoming Senegal CAS may discuss possible options for local and regional development that would turn Casamance into a future growth pole. To reduce isolation, the Bank and other donors are partnering with GoS in talks with The Gambia on construction of a bridge across the Gambia River at Transgambienne. This is one of the three ferry crossings between Casamance and the rest of Senegal (ferry crossings can still take up to 24 hours to get, for instance, from Ziguinchor to Dakar). These discussions are part of the new GoS Strategic Development Plan for Casamance which will be based on the on-going evaluation of PRAESC by the GoS.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
32. Restoring Casamance’s economic and social environment was the agreed objective of the peace program (PRAESC) and of the Bank project. Almost 30 years of conflict had damaged considerably the region’s once fertile and productive environment. Both the objective and the
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design were relevant in that the project made an important contribution to improving the socio-economic conditions of Casamance and thus helping to improve prospects for sustained peace.
33. Implementation by the project unit in Ziguinchor, which collaborated closely with civil and military authorities and MFDC, was also effective in that people started using rehabilitated roads to access markets, students returned to rehabilitated schools and the sick to clinics without fear of MFDC attacks. Much of this had been achieved before the MTR despite the fact that demobilization had not been possible for lack of a formal peace agreement. The restoration of the economic environment and of access to basic social services had an indirect impact on peace in that people saw that resolving conflict locally through social mobilization was possible and need not wait for formal peace and demobilization.
34. After the MTR the formal change in focus from demobilization toward social mobilization and conflict prevention was in effect a necessary response to changes in the nature of the conflict. The long conflict and the increasingly conflict-weary population had weakened the MFDC politically, financially and militarily. This post MTR approach took advantage of this situation by establishing 114 social mobilization cells throughout rural and urban areas of Casamance where communities and leaders resolve disputes and discuss ways of building peace at the local level. The local conflict resolution and peace management meant that the local MFDC faction ceased to operate or attack in project areas, and conflicts over land or other assets between returning refugees and those who stayed behind are generally resolved peacefully (see in particular Annexes 9 –10, the report “Stratégies de mobilisation sociale pour la construction d’une paix durable en Casamance” ANRAC, PARC, Juillet 2008).
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
35. Strengthening Conditions for a Lasting Peace and Sustainable Development. The revised PDO of contributing to strengthening the conditions for a lasting peace and sustainable development (through the provision of essential infrastructure and key investments) has been largely achieved in the project areas. Even before the MTR the impact of the improved mobility as a result of the extensive road rehabilitation, and the improved access to basic education and health services, had led to a reduction in conflict in the project areas. Project staff prepared the demobilization manual in anticipation of the formal demobilization of ex-combatant that would come once a consolidated peace agreement would be signed. It also identified (economic) opportunities for future ex-combatants and procedures for their reintegration into their communities. These procedures and studies were developed together with the population and local authorities and laid the groundwork for peace conditions and development.
36. After the MTR, the renewed emphasis on strengthening conditions for peace through information, communication and social mobilization has paid off. The demobilization sites, identified and prepared before the MTR, have been turned into social mobilization cells where (young) staff works on early warning, prevention of conflict, peace management and information. Staff provides advice and assistance to people returning to their places of origin on work opportunities and community reinsertion. They use the manual, the study that identified and described local opportunities, and the procedures developed as part of the integration program prepared before the MTR. People visit the cells to discuss and seek help in resolving disputes over ownership of dwellings or land between returning refugees or ex-combatants and those who stayed behind. The cells have also become a space where communities can address different development priorities, such as which road, school or clinic to rehabilitate. In addition, an
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estimated 4,000 people participated in peace meetings and benefitted from print, radio or TV media messages and discussions about peace and long-term development of the region.
37. The post MTR strategic approach to peace and social mobilization was designed to assist and create the conditions for communities to accept and reintegrate returning refugees and combatants. The advantage of the new strategy was that it created the conditions for peace and demobilization in the communities independent of progress with the high level peace talks between GoS and MFDC. The community-based conflict prevention and early warning system developed with the assistance of the staff of the social mobilization cells proved to be effective in preventing conflict. For instance, an estimated 30 conflicts within and between communities were resolved between April and December of 2009 alone according to the reports received from the cells.
38. The project contributed to sustainable development by addressing the causes of the conflict (para. 23). These include, for example, the construction of the new bridge connecting the Karones islands in the Casamance River delta with the mainland and allowing the island’s rich fish resources to get to markets, or the rehabilitated Kolda-Pata road which reopened access to markets and social services for some 40,000 inhabitants. The construction of new hotels by the private sector has contributed to the resumption and development of tourism. Implementation of the ESMF (para. 28) contributed to ensuring that investments were environmentally and socially sustainable, and the Bank in conjunction with other donors is working with GoS to create a bridge-based transport link between Casamance and Dakar. In general, the achievement of providing essential infrastructure, discussed below, contributed to both peace and sustainable development.
39. Provision of essential infrastructure. The infrastructure rehabilitation program was completed before closing. The rehabilitation of 15 inter-community roads has enabled the resumption of commerce, agriculture and tourism and restored access to basic social services in 90 towns and communities. Traffic has increased while travel costs and time have been reduced. Commercial and passenger traffic has increased, particularly on the five major transport axes.6
For example, the rehabilitated Kolda-Pata road has restored the important commercial traffic between Casamance and The Gambia, and a fivefold increase in passenger traffic has been recorded on several rehabilitated roads.
40. Education infrastructure was rehabilitated before the MTR, but improvements such as power, water, fences and educational materials were done after the MTR. The project-supported education infrastructure—35 schools connected to water and electricity and provided with equipment—has improved the capacity and the quality of teaching. For instance, the rehabilitation of classrooms in these schools resulted in an average gross enrollment rate increase of 145% between 2005 and 2009. The gross primary enrollment rate in Casamance as a whole was 104% in 2009 exceeding the project target indicator for education by 11%. Exam success rates in the 35 schools improved by a remarkable 150% in the same period.
41. One half of the health infrastructure—25 clinics—had been rehabilitated before the MTR. The other clinics and the provision of power, water and equipment to all clinics was completed after the MTR. The rehabilitation of the 50 clinics increased the number of patients receiving treatment by 42%. Between 2005 and 2009, assisted births increased by 20-95%, the availability of midwife by a factor of 1.8 and nurses by a factor of 2.4. The rehabilitation of the Kenia
6 Kolda-Pata; Oussouye-Loudia; Ouoloff-Elinkine; Boughary-Bona; and Batancountouyel-Medina Elhadj.
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psychiatric hospital in Ziguinchor was also completed, and equipment, including a brain scanner, delivered. The clinic is treating more than 2,000 patients, including victims of the conflict.
42. Key Investments. Finally, key investments in agriculture and tourism have been achieved. A new agro-business Casa Jus opened, a new hotel was built and several others reopened.
43. In deciding to fundamentally retain the overall development objectives while not proceeding with the structured DRR component, the team acted in line with established good practice in demobilization programs, which suggests not launching a program unless certain pre-conditions are met, especially a signed peace accord that provides a legal framework for a DRR program.7 Without these preconditions in place there is considerable risk of re-mobilization as well as possible perceptions that the Bank is taking sides. The team’s decision as part of project restructuring to focus on access to markets and social services, as well as community-level conflict management and social mobilization, was also in line with evolving good practice in DRR programs, only recently codified and referred to as “second generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration”8 (see Lessons Learned section for further elaboration). The time taken to make the decision to restructure the project was justified as the team explained that this was a result of Government insistence that they were getting closer to concluding a comprehensive peace agreement which would have thus required a comprehensive DRR program.
3.3 Efficiency
44. The MOP (page 47) concluded that in the absence of reliable data on the cost of the conflict it was impossible to calculate the economic rate of return for the project. In this context as a proxy, a discussion was made to base the analysis on cost-efficiency. The lack of reliable data affected implementation. The first survey in 2005 of the cost of rehabilitating the main road system in Casamance by the Autonomous Road Work Agency (Agence Autonome des Travaux Routiers - AART) suggested that the allocation (CFAF 3.143 billion for the IRR transport subcomponent) would allow the repair of some 25 community earth roads of an estimated total length of 900 km.
45. However, the Bank transport specialist and AGETIP pointed out that this estimate was over-ambitious as the roads were in worse condition than asserted by AART. In addition, fuel prices increased dramatically in 2005-7, the dollar CFAF exchange rate fell, and there was almost no price competition since few companies bid due to security concerns. The average cost for road rehabilitation was CFAF 16.2 million/km, but varied greatly by region, with CFAF 35.0 million/km in Ziguinchor region and CFAF 12.0 million/km in Kolda. The high cost in Ziguinchor can be explained largely because laterite (stone powder applied to create the road surface) had to be transported from quarries near Kolda. In the end, prices were 50-100% higher than the original estimate and the allocation, even after the increase at the MTR, financed the rehabilitation of only 15 rural roads with a total length of 241 km.
46. Overall, in terms of attribution and coverage, and with respect to activities related to social capital, social mobilization and communication, the entire Casamance land area and
7 Other preconditions include: (i) trust in the peace process; (ii) willingness of the parties to engage in DRR; and (iii) a minimum guarantee of security. 8 UNDPKO, 2010. Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations: A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities in UN Peacekeeping.Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. New York: United Nations.
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population have been covered. The 114 conflict prevention cells exist in all communes and rural councils of the region, basically in every locality where a local government institution sits. In addition, the programs conducted with the community radios, and other media have reached the entire population. The infrastructure component was based on a targeting strategy that took into account conflict but also intra-regional equity. While the project constructed schools, health posts, and rural roads in areas harboring the epicenter of the conflict (Bignona, Oussouye), it also covered areas relatively free of conflict (Kolda, Sedhiou) to avoid perceptions of bias or generating friction among regions. It is estimated that 50% of the Casamance population benefitted from infrastructure construction and rehabilitation.
47. In terms of impact, in 2004, there were a number of geographic areas in Casamance which had restricted access due to high levels of violence, including Sindian, Santhiaba Manjack, Goudomp, Camaracounda, and the Casamance Natural Reserve Park. In 2010, a large number of displaced populations have returned to their communities of origin and lead normal lives. As of today, the only area that is not accessible due to insecurity is the Casamance Natural Reserve Park. The improved security has allowed and benefited from development activities supported by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, German Cooperation, USAID, and UNDP. The conflict itself morphed and, as is often the case, with violence emerging as pockets of banditry and armed robbery.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
48. The project did improve conditions to facilitate the reintegration of the population by improving the social and economic environment of the region (part of the original PDO, see footnote 2). Economic and social conditions in and around the major urban areas of Ziguinchor and Kolda, and around 90 towns and villages, has allowed integration and return of refugees and displaced persons, the resumption of commerce and transport, and access to basic social services. Whether additional economic and social benefits could have been realized if restructuring had occurred earlier is difficult to answer since GoS insisted throughout 2006 that a comprehensive peace agreement was likely and would thus require a formal demobilization program. At the same time, plans prepared by the project unit in Ziguinchor during this time to demobilize (voluntary) ex-combatants (the self demobilized) and help victims of mines were rejected by the World Bank since the MFDC could interpret this as the Bank supporting deserters, and mine victims were being assisted by UNDP.
49. In parallel with the negotiations between GoS and MFDC, the project unit and the staff of the social mobilization cells conducted negotiations at the community level throughout Casamance, and obtained assurances from the different factions of MFDC that the infrastructure works would be safeguarded. This conflict management at the local level allowed investments to be carried out and populations to benefit from them. Although there has been no formal end to the conflict, GoS is continuing efforts to negotiate a comprehensive peace accord with MFDC.
50. The difference in ratings between the ICR (moderately satisfactory) and the last ISR (satisfactory) is based on the fact that the latter focused on the last six months of implementation and results achieved, while the ICR is based on the totality of the project, including the period before restructuring when project implementation performance was not satisfactory. It must be stressed that during the first two years of implementation and before the restructuring, the project was moderately unsatisfactory.
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3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 51. The government’s ICR does not provide direct evidence of poverty or gender impacts. However, the report by CONEXI (Annex 9 – report number 8) has estimates of the substantial income and service benefits from the employment of local companies and workers on the project’s infrastructure sub-projects. Local laborers and transport companies earned an estimated CFAF 440.0 million from the rehabilitation of roads under the project. Similar estimates are not available for other infrastructure rehabilitation nor for private investments that took place as a result of peace and improved infrastructure (hotels, taxis and other transport). Tourism is resuming and two hotels have been rehabilitated and one new constructed. Agricultural, the mainstay of Casamance’s economy has also recovered, generating employment and incomes for the rural population.
52. The extensive social mobilization activities, local meetings and media messages, have not only helped to resolve conflicts and reintegrate refugees, but have generally improved social cohesion in the towns, villages and the country side. The rehabilitation of 35 mostly primary schools has impacted positively on gender in that on average the gross enrolment rate for girls in Casamance was 101.4% in 2007. This compares well to the 88.5% for Senegal as a whole. The high enrolment rate for girls cannot be entirely attributed to the project since even before the project communities in Casamance have placed a high value on education and some areas managed to maintain high enrolment rates for girls, such as Ziguinchor with 98% in 2000.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 53. The social mobilization cells established under the project have strengthened communities by providing the space and means for them to discuss peace and address local conflict. Local government institutions such as education and health service providers have been strengthened, although ANRAC could have played a larger role if it had been located in Casamance instead of Dakar. PRAESC’s Steering Committee on the other hand worked closely with local institutions and represented the interests and concerns of the local government at the central level. The Committee’s President is on the staff of the Prime Minister and in that function actively coordinates Casamance development issues with other government ministries.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 54. The rapid recovery in school enrolments and gains in education quality is a positive sign that the people of Casamance have hope for a better and peaceful future and is one of the major achievements of the project. In addition, the social mobilization cells established throughout Casamance have been maintained after the project and broadened their scope from resolving local conflict to providing a way for communities to agree on development priorities.
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
55. There is not one encompassing beneficiary survey, but the project staff has conducted 40 community meetings, and engaged the media to produce a television and 21 radio programs estimated to have reached more than 4,000 people. The impact evaluation report has anecdotal evidence that transport costs and travel time have been lowered on the roads rehabilitated under the project. Besides the recovery in school enrollments mentioned above, the visits to clinics increased by 42% and the Kenia psychiatric clinic is treating more than 2,000 patients (including about 90 conflict victims – mines, violence, rape, etc.). The clinic, although located in Ziguinchor, provides psychiatric services across the sub-region through scheduled consultations
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in other cities and towns. Beneficiaries surveyed recognize these improvements in their environment and expressed their appreciation for the project.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial
56. The low-level conflict and the violence that has flared up occasionally during and after project implementation poses a substantial risk to development outcome. Although the Foundiougne rounds did not resume, the GoS has maintained talks with all factions of the MFDC. But, MFDC forces continue to operate often across the border with Guinea- Bissau or The Gambia and the army has limited success in containing or preventing the occasional raids and attacks. This said, in the project areas, the communities continue conflict prevention and peace management activities commenced under the project. An example of the sustained regional peace efforts was the recent call for peace by Casamance religious leaders. These peace efforts and negotiations, combined with continued efforts to improve infrastructure and lessen isolation, need to be sustained to reduce the risk to development outcome.
57. In summary, while there is no comprehensive peace accord and peace is by no means assured, the project sought to address the root causes of the conflict (sense of exclusion) and contribute to establishing the conditions for sustainable peace. At the micro level, conflict resolution mechanisms through the community cells has been an innovative approach which has helped to mediate conflict within and across communities and in border areas. The cells have been maintained after the end of the project and appear to be valued by communities. It is argued that these efforts have contributed to greater social cohesion in conflict areas. As levels of violence have abated, there is a renewed focus on development reflected in the fact that: (i) schools and health posts have re-opened; (ii) access to social services and markets has improved, and (iii) security has improved in most of Casamance. At the macro level, the project drew attention to the development needs of the region, which may be followed up in the next CAS. Options may include supporting the GoS to prepare a territorial development strategy, including the potential of regions, and a Casamance recovery and regional development action plan.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry (QEA)Rating: Satisfactory
58. The Bank worked closely with GoS and other donors to prepare PRAESC in time and in sufficient detail to allow immediate financing of activities. The MOP is very detailed and thorough in: the analysis of the conflict and its consequences; the description of the peace program; and, in particular, the careful procedures developed for demobilization (which carries high risks and pitfalls). The Bank did not address the conflicting mandate of ANRAC to both implement and coordinate the project and manage project funds which caused some initial implementation delays. However, these inconsistencies were corrected at MTR with the restructuring of the project. The team identified three implementation risks—renewed insecurity, land tenure problems, and premature deterioration of road infrastructure—but the risks associated with the peace process including a formal agreement to demobilize, which were considerable, were not addressed. Overall QEA is considered satisfactory.
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(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
59. The eight supervision missions were well spaced (5 to 13 months intervals) and staffed (procurement and financial management staff on every one, and environment and conflict staff on several missions). The Task Team Leader was stationed in Dakar (where ANRAC had its office). However, while the team worked closely with the Ministry of Economy and Finance and AGETIP, it did not have effective relations with ANRAC. Early problems with procurement, financial management and safeguards were noted and discussed, but not solved until the MTR. But the team did have effective relations with the implementation unit in Ziguinchor. It assisted the unit through regular field visits and frequent contacts. The team and management became concerned about the delay with the DRR component, but relied on the GoS to address the issues that caused the delay. The restructuring of the project at MTR was thorough and the new direction of demobilization and peace through information, social mobilization and peace management was both strategic and effective.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
60. The Bank worked effectively with the GoS and donors since 2001 to prepare the peace program for Casamance. The Project Information Document for CERSP was ready in early 2004 and CERSP was approved in November that year. The MOP was detailed and incorporated lessons from other post-conflict projects, particularly regarding demobilization of ex-combatants. At the same time, the Bank may have been overly optimistic and ambitious with regard to demobilization and did not properly identify risks related to delays or total lack of progress with this key activity. Although the Bank insisted on changes to ANRAC’s structure to satisfy fiduciary requirements (MOP page 20) it did not insist that ANRAC’s mandate to implement the project would also have to be changed before implementation could commence. This change was only made at MTR. Supervision was adequate, but the team was slow in working with ANRAC to recruit experienced staff (although this was difficult given the security situation), and urge GoS to activate the PRAESC Steering Committee to provide the much needed guidance to ANRAC. Implementation improved thanks to the well organized and thorough MTR. Overall, the Bank’s performance is considered moderately satisfactory.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
61. The new Government made the important decision in 2001 to open peace talks with the MFDC after 27 years of conflict. It showed its commitment to the peace process by allocating funds for PRAESC and CERSP, by establishing ANRAC to implement the peace plan, and by remaining engaged in the negotiations despite set-backs and delays. Although the creation of ANRAC was important, locating it in Dakar and providing little or no guidance or oversight over staff selection and its initial functioning and operations was unsatisfactory. PRAESC’s Steering Committee that was to guide ANRAC first two years after it was established. GoS has commenced an evaluation of PRAESC in order to develop a new Strategic Development Plan for the region, which should include efforts to reduce Casamance’s isolation further by among other steps agreeing with The Gambia to construct a bridge on the Gambia River (Transgambian road).
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(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory for ANRAC, Satisfactory for the Implementation Unit.
62. ANRAC’s office location in Dakar meant that staff had to travel to Casamance to manage and implement project activities. Staff did so regularly, but besides the core staff in Ziguinchor, other staff was not normally working in Casamance which limited their effectiveness. ANRAC’s staff was unfamiliar with Bank procedures and guidelines, particularly those for procurement and financial management. This led to procurement problems and weak financial management of project funds. Before the MTR, audits were qualified. ANRAC was also strictly hierarchical and initially had the mandate to not only coordinate but to implement project activities (para. 21). In practice the unit in Ziguinchor was managing and executing project activities on the ground, which led to misunderstandings with Bank staff and was only resolved at the MTR. Unfortunately ANRAC’s Oversight Council, comprising representatives of all government ministries met rarely and was not consulted by ANRAC. Similarly, PRAESC’s Steering Committee which was to guide ANRAC and approve its program and budget only began to oversee ANRAC in 2007. The Committee was important since it was involved in the peace negotiations and represented the local government in the Prime Minister’s Office. Implementation improved once the Committee began supervising ANRAC.
63. Successful implementation of the project was mostly due to the work of the Ziguinchor unit, which had key staff recruited locally, with experience in infrastructure rehabilitation, and in dealing with local authorities, communities and MFDC. Unit staff installed and operated the GIS and information technology system which greatly helped with site selection and field data collection and analysis. It also monitored project activities and produced GoS’s implementation completion report. The unit’s relations with MFDC were especially important in improving security and establishing conditions for peace.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
64. GoS took the initiative to seek peace with MFDC and kept the negotiations going despite setbacks. It contributed project counterpart funds mostly on time and successfully mobilized other donors to contribute to the reconstruction of Casamance. Transport, Education and Health Ministries worked effectively with local governments on the rehabilitation of Casamance infrastructure, making an important contribution to improved socio-economic conditions and making the sustainability of peace more likely. GoS, however, was slow in clarifying implementation arrangements with ANRAC and did not properly oversee ANRAC, which delayed the start of the project by almost a year.
6. Lessons Learned
65. Conflict resolution needs to adopt a comprehensive approach and respond flexibly. The Casamance experience confirms that while a demobilization and reintegration program is important it needs to be complemented with broader development and social mobilization efforts that can sustain peace. Building trust, rebuilding social capital, and finding areas of common ground between all stakeholders in parallel with formal negotiations are key to achieving sustainable results in fragile conditions. This is not a new lesson, but the Casamance experience is a good example of the second generation DDR approach where, in contrast to traditional DDR approaches, attention shifts from military structures toward the community as a whole. As argued by DPKO, in complex environments without a clear negotiated end to the conflict, there is a need
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to consider a set of options beyond DDR in response to local conditions and involving stake-holders. These pragmatic interventions can be developed prior to, alongside or instead of traditional DDR (DPKO, p. 31).9
66. Addressing the causes and drivers of conflict is critical to peace prospects. Project implementation shows that in post-conflict situations it is essential to first identify and then address the causes of conflict. In the first negotiations, MFDC made it clear that in addition to issues such as freedom of movement and liberation of prisoners, economic and social recovery and improved road access to reduce isolation were essential conditions for peace. The peace plan and the project therefore included both demobilization and rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure as key goals. Even before the MTR restructuring, it became clear that the peace benefits from infrastructure rehabilitation were significant despite the interruption in the negotiations and further postponement of demobilization.
67. Providing basic infrastructure is an essential condition for peace. In post-conflict situations, the impact of providing basic infrastructure that allows refugees to return, students to go back to school, access to health services, and trade and transport to resume is a prerequisite for the restoration of people’s livelihoods. It is also a prerequisite for the return to peace. It is clear from the experience of the project that peace cannot be achieved through negotiations alone, but requires a minimal functional basic socio economic infrastructure. The GoS and Bank decision to rehabilitate the basic socio-economic infrastructure of Casamance opened the way for private investors and businesses to invest in tourism, agriculture, transport and commerce. In addition, the manner in which the infrastructure for rehabilitation is selected through a process of negotiation with all stakeholders, including MFDC, was essential to ensure not only that the work could be done in peace, but that all stakeholders and users had a stake in ensuring that infrastructure would respond to the needs of communities rather than narrower interest groups. In the end, these infrastructure investments not only contribute to strengthening the conditions for peace and trust between people and communities, but also suggest that long-term development has become a common goal in Casamance.
68. Improving socio-economic conditions in conflict-affected areas can contribute substantially to peace prospects, even when political negotiations become problematic. Although conflict risks remain, there are good prospects that peace can be sustained in Casamance provided GoS maintains its commitment to further improve socio-economic conditions and reduce the region’s isolation. An important lesson from the Casamance experience and the peace program that the project supported is that when socio-economic conditions are at the root of the conflict, the Government and its development partners need not wait for the full completion of the negotiations and a comprehensively negotiated demobilization program. Provided security conditions are appropriate, actions to improve living conditions and access for the population can start early. However, it is essential that improvements in the socio-economic conditions are done in a transparent and participatory manner involving all stakeholders.
69. Mobilizing the population for conflict prevention and peace should be done in parallel with high-level negotiations. The project unit in Ziguinchor realized that it had to obtain agreements from all stakeholders, as well as from local MFDC representatives, on which infrastructure to rehabilitate. To do this it had to organize community meetings and bring community leaders together with local and central government officials and MFDC representatives. Conflicting interests within and between communities as to which road, school
9 DPKO points out that second generation DDR has evolved from practice, where practitioners have had to adapt in circumstances where the preconditions for traditional DDR are not present.
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or clinic to restore had to be resolved. These meetings mobilized the communities to discuss the implications of their decisions, as well as the need to sustain peace in order to benefit from these investments. This grassroots mobilization took place even when high-level negotiations were dead-locked or interrupted, but meant that communities, and local areas gradually became conflict-free and the population began taking responsibility for mediating and resolving local conflicts.
70. The social mobilization cells were an innovative conflict resolution system at the local level. The early warning, conflict prevention and peace management system that was put in place with the creation of the large number of social mobilization cells became an effective conflict resolution system at the local and community level. The project team understood that conflict drivers and grievances (social and economic isolation, land issues, and ethnic and religious tensions) had not gone away, but rather in some cases had intensified with the long duration of the conflict. It was highly appropriate therefore to put in place a system to address these issues after having created the conditions for people, refugees and combatants to return as a result of the rehabilitated infrastructure. The social mobilization thus became the primary vehicle for the population to address local conflicts, and the cells succeeded in creating innovative ways to communicate, influence behavior, and restore social capital at the community level. Although the project has closed, the cell structures in rural communities are now used as a basis for community-decision making about local development activities. It would be essential to document the experience, functioning and role of the cells in restoring conditions for peace and development in Casamance as a lesson for the future.
71. The field implementation unit based in Ziguinchor was crucial in achieving project results. The implementation unit in Ziguinchor was only able to attract staff from the region when it was established. Staff from other parts of Senegal was not inclined to come and or bring their families in view of the uncertain security situation prevailing at the start of the project. However, this turned out to be an important advantage in that these Casamance staff were known to the population and authorities and had been there during the time of conflict and suffering. Their acceptance by communities was a strong advantage for the project. Their local knowledge was essential and their commitment to Casamance was convincing.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies 72. ANRAC in their ICR mentions several delays attributed to World Bank procedures and staff. More generally, ANRAC’s DG and some staff expressed frustration over the continued “miscommunication” with the Bank. This issue is acknowledged by the project team, but in turn attributed to ANRAC’s heavy and complex organizational structure and lack of familiarity with Bank procedures for financial management, procurement and safeguards. This problem was resolved at the MTR when it was agreed that implementation would become the exclusive mandate of the Zinguinchor project unit.
(b) Cofinanciers N/A
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
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73. Staff of the one school and of the Kenia psychiatric center, visited by the ICR mission, expressed appreciation for what the project has achieved. The school principal and teachers were satisfied with the quality of the classrooms, the furniture and the security wall. The Kenia resident doctor was also satisfied with the infrastructure and equipment, including a brain scanner. The evaluation reports have examples of expressions of satisfaction from villages that have become connected with markets as a result of bridges and roads built under the project and many cases of expressions of hope now that communities have their schools and their children are back in school.
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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)
Actual/Latest Estimate (USD
millions)
Percentage of Appraisal
DEMOBILIZATION, REINSERTION AND REINTEGRATION OF COMBATANTS
3.15 1.43 45.4%
INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION
12.35 18.68 151.3%
SUPPORT FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PREPARATION
Borrower 1.59 0.00 .00 International Development Association (IDA)
20.00 0.00 .00
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Annex 2. Outputs by PDO and Component – Before Restructuring
PDO and Components Results indicators Outputs
1) Facilitate speedy restoration in Casamance of a favorable economic and social environment similar to that existing in the rest of Senegal, and
2) Lay the groundwork for the region’s sustainable long-term development, while respecting its specificities.
100% of identified beneficiaries engaged in legitimate economic activity.
325,000 inhabitants benefiting from improved accessibility.
Restoration of access to basic social services to all villages affected by the conflict.
At the MTR, the peace process was interrupted and the demobilization of ex-combatants and their identification as beneficiaries and engagement in legitimate economic activities was awaiting the outcome of the resumption of the Foundiougne rounds of negotiation. 16 earth roads of 251 km (10% of total road network) connecting about 90 towns and villages, 8 bridges and 6 pontoon bridges had been rehabilitated. In addition, the project staff in Ziguinchor had obtained a promise to safeguard this infrastructure. As a result, an estimated 300,0000 inhabitants benefitted from improved accessibility. In addition, 141 class rooms, 25 health posts and 26 maternity clinics had been rehabilitated. This rehabilitation restored access to basic education and health services in an estimated 42 villages affected by the conflict.
Component 1. Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR) Intermediate results, by component
Results indicators for each component
Outputs
Sub-component 1.1. Demobilization, Reinsertion and integration of ex-combatants Support the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of all identified ex-combatants of various groups (i.e., irregular forces) involved in the Casamance conflict
Sub-component 1.1 100% of identified ex-combatants reintegrated.
At the MTR, the peace process was interrupted and the demobilization of ex-combatants and their identification as beneficiaries and reintegration would have to await the outcome of the resumption of the Foundiougne rounds of negotiation.
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Sub-component 1.2. Support for reintegration of groups directly affected by the conflict Ad hoc support for reintegration of persons identified as being directly affected by the conflict.
Sub-component 1.2.
100% of persons identified as directly affected by the conflict have received support for reintegration.
The lack of a formal agreement has led to a postponement of demobilization and the subsequent identification of persons directly affected by the conflict for reintegration support. However, victims of the conflict are receiving support from the rehabilitated education and health institutions. Their numbers have been estimated at 400. In addition, GoS and other donors are assisting people wounded by mines.
Component 2. Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (IRR) Intermediate results, by component
Results indicators for each component
Outputs
Sub-component 2.1 Transport Rehabilitation of road network and river transport infrastructures in Casamance
Sub-component 2.1 50 km of paved roads reinforced. 8 bridges rehabilitated or rebuilt. 6 pontoon bridges built.
Sub-component 2.2. Education Restore functionality of existing school infrastructures rehabilitated by local collectivities, by assigning personnel to them.
Sub-component 2.2 120 class rooms rehabilitated and re-opened.
Sub-component 2.3. Health Restore functionality of existing health infrastructures rehabilitated by local collectivities, by assigning personnel to them.
Sub-component 2.3 50 health posts, 3 maternity clinics and the psychiatric clinic at Kénia rehabilitated.
At the time of the 2007 MTR, 241 km of earth roads had been rehabilitated. This is instead of the 50 km of paved roads and at the request of the communities. Eight bridges and six pontoon bridges have been rebuilt.
At the time of the 2007 MTR, 141 class rooms have been rehabilitated and reopened.
At the 2007 MTR, 24 health posts and 25 maternity clinics have been rehabilitated. The rehabilitation of the psychiatric clinic at Kenia is about 60% done.
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Annex 2. Outputs by PDO and Component –After Restructuring PDO
Outcome indicators Outcomes
Contribute to strengthening the conditions for a lasting peace and sustainable development in Casamance through the provision of essential infrastructure and securing key investments.
1. Increase school gross enrollment rates to the levels it was before the conflict (93%) and increase the use of health facilities by 40%.
2. Secure one significant investment in the tourism sector and two in agri-business in Casamance.
1. On average school gross enrollment rates have increased to 104%. The increase in the use of health facilities has reached 70%. In the psychiatric center of Kenia alone it was zero percent before the project intervention.
2. One new hotel has been built in Madina Wandifa and several other hotels have re-opened (Nema-Kadior in Ziguinchor, Le Palmier in Bignona, La Palmeraie in Sedhiou). A new agro-business Casa Jus and an enterprise for the export of banana bio have started in the region.
Component 1: DDRR 1.1. Information: create the conditions for peace and sustainable development by conducting a sensitization program
1.2. Communication: reach out to opinion leaders (political figureheads, religious and civil society leaders, artists, and other influential members of the community) for buy into the peace process and ownership of it.
1.3. Social mobilization:mobilize local communities for peace.
1. By 2008, the negotiations rounds between the MFDC and the government of Senegal, the so-called Foundiougne rounds of negotiations are resumed.
1. The sudden death of the rebel leader Abbe Diamacoune Senghor in January 2007 interrupted the peace talks between the Government and the MFDC. However, it is felt that the results of the project in terms of infrastructure will have an impact on the peace process by creating favorable conditions for peace and dialogue.
Component 2:Infrastructure 2.1. Rehabilitate the road and river infrastructure network
2.1. Number of communities connected to the core road network (all-weather roads).
2.1 214 km of rural roads have been built; 79 villages and 11 rural communities have been connected to the main road network and
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2.2. Support the restoration of the functionality of rehabilitated education infrastructure 2.3. Support the restoration of rehabilitated infrastructure
2.2. Number of schools reopened and functional.
2.3 Number of health posts reopened and functional
47 799 persons have been positively affected. 2.2 141 classrooms have been rehabilitated or re-constructed; 31 schools have been fenced-in and 35 water and 15 sanitation systems were built in 35 schools. 2.3 25 health posts, 25 maternities and one psychiatric hospital have been rebuilt and are functional with electrification, water systems and fences. 2300 patients have already visited the psychiatric hospital of Kenia.
Component 3: Assess the prospects for the long term development of the Casamance
3.0 Integration of project M&E system into regular operations of local government.
The project has conceived a performing M&E and GIS system which has been adopted by ANRAC. The impact study has been completed. The project team has decided not to undertake the long term study and has participated in the formulation of the TORs to let the Government and the German Cooperation to take the necessary steps and time to prepare such a plan.
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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis The Project Document (page 47) concluded that in the absence of reliable data on the cost of the conflict it was impossible to calculate the economic rate of return for the Project. But, not assisting with demobilization, de-mining, and rehabilitating essential community infrastructure would inhibit the development of Casamance. The lack of reliable data affected implementation. The first survey in 2005 by the “Agence Autonome des Travaux Routiers” (AART) of the cost of rehabilitating the main road system in Casamance suggested that the allocation (CFAF 3.143 billion for the IRR transport subcomponent) would allow the repair of some 25 community earth roads of an average length of 35 km (as requested by the communities instead of the 50 km of paved highway, paras. 8 and 43).
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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending Moctar Thiam Senior Transport Specialist AFTTRCo-TTL Demba Balde Social Development Specialist AFTS4 Co-TTL Ana Paula Fialho Lopes Senior Operations Officer OPCFCConflict Bourama Diaite Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPCProcurement Fily Cissokho Financial Management Specialist AFTFMFin. Management Serigne Omar Fye Safeguards Coordinator AFTENEnvironment Solange Alliali Senior Counsel LEGAFLegal Hung N. Sundstrom Program assistant AFTTRAdministration El Hadj Adama Toure Senior agricultural Economics AFTS4 CDD
Supervision/ICR Demba Balde Sr. Social Development Spec. AFTCSSocial Menchita O. Caramat Consultant AFTTRCDD /Post conflictBourama Diaite Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPCProcurement Saidou Diop Financial Management Specialist AFTFMFin. Management Ibou Diouf Sr. Transport. Spec. AFTTRTransport Ana Paula Fialho Lopes Sr. Operations Officer OPCFCConflict Serigne Omar Fye Consultant AFTSP Environment Felly Akiiki Kaboyo Operations Analyst AFTTROperations Abdoulaye Keita Procurement Specialist MNAPRProcurement Alain L. Labeau Consultant AFTTRTransport Karene Eliane Melloul Consultant OPCFCConflict Boury Ndiaye Language Team Assistant AFCF1 Administration Mademba Ndiaye Sr. Communications Officer AFREXCommunications Osval Rocha Andrade RomaoFinancial Management Specialist AFTFMFin. Management Cheikh A. T. Sagna E T Consultant AFTCSSocial safeguards Fatou Fall Samba E T Consultant AFTFMFin. Management Manievel Sene Rural Development Specialist AFTARRural development Seynabou Thiaw Seye Program Assistant AFCF1 Administration Fily Sissoko Sr. Financial Management Spec. AFTFMFin. Management Cheick Traore Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPCProcurement
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(b) Staff Time and Cost
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results There is not one encompassing beneficiary survey, but the project staff has conducted 40 community meetings, and engaged the media to produce 21radio and one television programs which are estimated to have reached more than 4,000 people. The evaluation reports have anecdotal evidence that transport cost and speed have been lowered on the roads rehabilitated under the project. Besides the return of school enrollment mentioned above (para. 39), the visits to clinics has increased by 30% and the Kenia psychiatric clinic is treating some 2,300 patients (including about 90 conflict victims—mines, violence, rape, etc.). The clinic although located in Ziguinchor provides psychiatric services throughout the region through scheduled consultations in other cities and towns.
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Annex 6. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
ANRAC Agence Nationale pour la Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance
Project d’Urgence d’Appui à la Reconstruction de la Casamance – PARC
Rapport d’Exécution du Project d’Urgence d’Appui à la Reconstruction de la Casamance
(PARC) 2005-2009
Ziguinchor, février 2010.
English summary of the Borrower’s (Executing Agency) Implementation Completion Report.
1. Introduction: A - Context and justification. The 30 year long Casamance conflict had caused displacement of thousands of people, the mining of large areas, and death and injuries, and halted all development. The third President elected in 2000 commenced peace negotiations. In 2001, the GoS prepared the peace plan – PREASC. In 2004, the armistice agreement was signed and ANRAC was created to implement PREASC. The Bank decided to contribute to the peace with CERSP. 2. B – Description of CERSP before the MTR. CERSP’ objective was to reintegrate the population into a favorable socio-economic environment. This was to be achieved through the Demobilization, Reinsertion, Reintegration (DRR) component, the Infrastructure Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation (IRR) component, and Information, Monitoring and Evaluation -; Conflict Prevention and Social Mobilization -; and, Environmental and Social Impact activities. 3. C – CERSP Reorientation. Negotiation for demobilization fell apart in 2007. A demobilization manual, integration study and information for ex-combatants and victims had been prepared under the DRR component, but the component was restructured to focus on Information, Communication, Social Mobilization and Capitalization. As part of the IRR component, amenities at schools and clinics which had been rehabilitated would be added and the last 2 of the 15 roads would be rehabilitated. 4. Results: A 25 page description of the results achieved in education, health, social mobilization and transport provides detailed data and evidence on the project’s achievements. Highlights are. Classrooms for schools in 42 towns and villages have been rehabilitated and in 34 towns the schools have been equipped with walls and drinking water. Twenty-five dispensaries and 35 maternity facilities have been built in 28 health posts throughout Casamance. As a result, in education enrollment increased from 95% in 2004 to 104% in 2008, health clinics now serve 2,600 people against 5,700 in 2005. Fifteen roads with a total length of 214 kilometers have been built/rehabilitated. Nine of these roads have opened up areas for tourism, and the improvements in the road system have enabled a resumption of export of agricultural products. 5. Extensive documentation for demobilization has been developed and community meetings on conflict prevention attended by some 2,600 people have been held throughout the region. In addition, 114 units for early warning, conflict prevention and social mobilization have been set-up and are actively working within and between communities. These units have already served some 4,100 people. Print, radio and film media have been used to inform people about peace management. Specific regulation on how to deal with conflicts over land, fishing rights, and home ownership have been prepared and made available to communities.
30
6. Project management.Management of the project activities has been guided by the work done by the M&E unit. The M&E unit has established an integrated information system (IIS) that is accessible to central and local government, to ANRAC, the World Bank and other donors and universities. The IIS comprises: details of all projects in Casamance; forms for baseline data collection for demobilization; data base for early warning and conflict prevention; a web site; and a Geographic Information System (GIS). The implementation unit in Ziguinchor has organized meetings with all regional development councils, NGO’s, and union of religious leaders to inform them about PRAESC and CERSP. It has also held regular coordination meetings with project units of: the AfDB agriculture project; the GTZ/KfW local government project; the USAID/World Education community radio project; UNICEF; the two rural development and the socio-economic development projects, and several other local projects. These meetings addressed the issues that are at the root of the conflict such as reducing Casamance isolation, natural resource development, decentralization, infrastructure maintenance, demining, electrification, and youth integration. 7. Financial Management. This section provides details on the IDA credit and the use of funds by category of expenditure, and disbursement and procurement details. It also mentions the delays with no-objections and with software acquisition, and the poor communication between ANRAC and the Bank on procurement and financial management. 8. Lessons Learned. The emphasis of CERSP was put on early warning, conflict prevention and social mobilization. This work used information and peace management staff trained and employed by the project. It turned out that information and education is crucial to advancing peace in post-conflict situations. Local information and mobilization units often found their own solutions to resolving conflict and became agents to deal with issues within and between communities. The units have acted as intermediaries between local government and rebels. The fact that the staff of these units are mostly young men rather than the traditionally elder community members has turned out to be effective since these staff can work with information and communication issues and equipment and are literate. The rehabilitation of schools has resulted in an increase in enrollment, better achievement and motivation. In health, the project has established mortality base-line information, better ambulance services and expanded coverage of health services. In transport, the project has led to better access to production sites, transport of agricultural products, increased mobility, the return of displaced persons, lowering of transport costs and reduction in transport time. The use of local enterprises has unlocked local knowledge, relations and contacts that have helped implementation. 9. In addition, the ICR concludes that the preparatory activities for demobilization – early warning, conflict prevention and social mobilization – must be sustained and expanded. This is essential for maintaining peace on the ground. Negotiation with neighboring countries to deal with arms smuggling, theft and extortion, and the conflict economy and its costs, must be intensified. Staff for peace and conflict management must be expanded and given resources, and the work of the M&E unit needs to be sustained. Finally, the need in basic health, education and transport infrastructure remains large. This need needs to be met to consolidate peace and development of Casamance. In conclusion, increasingly development partners focus on the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and the restoration of the economy as the best way to consolidate peace. Local peace management units, staff and activities are essential in this efforts towards maintaining peace.
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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 1. Development Credit Agreement (Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project) between Republic of Senegal and the International Development Association” November 5, 2004. 2. Technical Annex to the Memorandum and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 13.8 Million (US$20 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Senegal for a Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project”. 3. Proposal to Restructure Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project (Credit No. 3982-SE), Project Data Sheet, February 20, 2008. 4. Républi que du Sénégal, Décret portant création et fixant les règles d’organisation et de fonctionnement de l’Agence Nationale pour la Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance (ANRAC). 5. République du Sénégal, Arrêté portant création et organisation du comité de pilotage du Programme de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance (PREASC). 6. Procès-verbal de la session ordinaire du comité de pilotage du parc, tenue les 29 et 30 juin 2007; Procès-verbal de la deuxième session du comité de pilotage; Procès-verbal de la troisième session du comité de pilotage, Kolda, 10 octobre 2008; Projet de Procès-verbal de la quatrième session du comité de pilotage, Ziguinchor, les 29 et 30 janvier 2009. 7. Agence Nationale pour la Relance des Activités Economique et Sociales en Casamance (ANRAC), Project d’Urgence d’Appui à la Reconstruction de la Casamance (PARC), Stratégie de mobilisation sociale pour la construction d’une paix durable en Casamance. 8. Etude d’Impact du Project d’Urgence d’Appui à la Reconstruction de la Casamance (PARC), Cabinet CONEXCI, décembre 2009. 9. ANRAC, Agence Nationale pour la Relance des Activités Economique et Sociales en Casamance, Project d’urgence d’Appui à la Reconstruction de la Casamance – PARC, Rapport d’Exécution du Project d’Urgence d’Appui à la Reconstruction de la Casamance (PARC) 2005-2009, Ziguinchor, février 2010. 10. Agence National pour la Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance (ANRAC), Project d’Urgence d’Appui à la Reconstruction de la Casamance – PARC, Stratégie de mobilisation sociale pour la construction d’une paix durable en Casamance, juillet 2008. 11. Terms of Reference, Consultant for the Analysis of the Casamance potential as input to the upcoming Country Partnership Strategy, March 2010.
T A M B A C O U N DT A M B A C O U N D AA
L O U G AL O U G A
K A O L A C KK A O L A C K
K O L D AK O L D A
ZIGUINCHORZIGUINCHOR
T H I È ST H I È S
D I O U R B E LD I O U R B E L
F A T I CF A T I C KK
S A I NS A I N T -T -L O U I SL O U I S
CCaassaammaannccee
LLaa FFeerrddoo
MMaall iinnkkee
Lac deLac deGuierGuier
VV
VVaallllééee dduu FFeerrlloo VVaall
SSaalloouumm
SSaalloouu
mm
CCaassaammaannccee KKaayyaannggaa
KKoouulloouunnttoouu
SSaannddoouuggoouu
GGaammbbiiee
DDoouuee
FFaalléémméé
Darou MoustiDarou Mousti
MbakéMbaké
DaraaDaraa
KokiKoki
MpalMpal
TivaouaneTivaouane
MékhéMékhé
KayarKayar
LagbarLagbar
Haïré LaoHaïré Lao
ThilogneThilogne
MamâriMamâriVèlingaraVèlingara
SakoneSakone
KébémèrKébémèr
Nioro du RipNioro du Rip
Keur MadiabelKeur Madiabel
KarangKarang
GuinguinéoGuinguinéo
GossasGossas
NgandaNganda
KaffrineKaffrine
KoungheulKoungheul KoussanarKoussanar
MakaMaka
NiahNiahèneène
LinguèreLinguère
PayarPayar
Toubéré BafalToubéré Bafal
DialakotoDialakoto
MakoMako
DaganaDaganaNdiayèneNdiayène
Richard-TollRichard-Toll
BakelBakel
NayéNayé
KédougouKédougou
SarayaSaraya
VélingaraVélingara
MeedinaMeedinaGounasGounas
SédhiouSédhiou
BounkilingBounkiling
BignonaBignonaTanafTanaf
GoudompGoudomp
DianaDianaMalariMalari
DiouloulouDiouloulou
OussouyeOussouye
DiourbelDiourbel
FatickFatick
ThièsThiès
LougaLouga
KaolackKaolack
MatamMatam
TambacoundaTambacounda
KoldaKolda
ZiguinchorZiguinchor
M A U R I T A N I AM A U R I T A N I A
M A L IM A L I
THETHEGAMBIAGAMBIA
G U I N E A B I S S A UG U I N E A B I S S A UG U I N E AG U I N E A
To To NouakchottNouakchott
To To MboutMbout
To To BarraBarra
To To BanjulBanjul
To To KayesKayes
To To BalakeBalake
To To KoundaraKoundara
To To BafataBafata
To To FarimFarim
To To IngoreIngore
T A M B A C O U N D A
L O U G A
K A O L A C K
K O L D A
ZIGUINCHOR
CAP-VERT
T H I È S
D I O U R B E L
F A T I C K
S A I N T -L O U I S
Darou Mousti
Mbaké
Daraa
Koki
Mpal
Rufisque
Tivaouane
Mékhé
Kayar
Fâs Boye
Tioukougne Peul
LéonaNdiaye
Lagbar
Haïré Lao
Thilogne
MamâriVèlingara
Darou Khoudos
Ndangane
Sakone
Mbour
Kébémèr
Nioro du Rip
Diembéreng
Keur Madiabel
Karang
Guinguinéo
Gossas
Nganda
Kaffrine
Koungheul Koussanar
Maka
Niahène
Linguère
Payar
Toubéré Bafal
Dialakoto
Mako
RossoDagana
NdiayèneRichard-Toll
Podor
Kaedi
Bakel
Nayé
Kédougou
Saraya
Vélingara
MeedinaGounas
Sédhiou
Bounkiling
BignonaTanaf
Goudomp
DianaMalari
Diouloulou
Oussouye
Diourbel
Fatick
Thiès
Louga
Kaolack
Matam
Tambacounda
Kolda
Ziguinchor
Saint-Louis
DAKAR
M A U R I T A N I A
M A L I
THEGAMBIA
G U I N E A - B I S S A UG U I N E A
Lac deGuier
V
Vallée du Ferlo Val
Saloum
Salou
m
Casamance
Gambia
Kayanga
Koulountou
Sandougou
Gambie
Sénégal
Doue
Sénégal
Falémé
ATLANTICOCEAN
To Nouakchott
To Mbout
To Barra
To Banjul
To Kayes
To Balake
To Koundara
To Bafata
To Farim
To Ingore
Casamance
La Ferdo
Mal inke
419 m
18°W 16°W 14°W
18°W 16°W 14°W 12°W
12°N
14°N
16°N 16°N
12°N
14°N
SENEGAL
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
