Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 11283 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ZAIRE EDUCATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROJECT (CREDIT 1519-ZR) OCTOBER 16, 1992 Population and Human Resources Division South Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 11283
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ZAIRE
EDUCATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROJECT(CREDIT 1519-ZR)
OCTOBER 16, 1992
Population and Human Resources DivisionSouth Central and Indian Ocean DepartmentAfrica Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit Zaire (Z)US$ 1.00 = Z 5.86 (December 1982)US$ 1.00 = Z 55.79 (December 1985)US$ 1.00 = Z 450.073 (November 1989)Z 10(.00 = US$ 0.222 (November 1989)SDR 1.00 = US$ 1.321 (January 1990)
MEASURES
Metric System
FISCAL YEAR
January 1st - December 31st
ACADEMIC YEAR
Scptcmber - June
ABBREVIATIONS
BPE Bureau des Projets Education (Project Implementation Unit)L)EPS Departement de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire (Ministry of
Primarv and Sccondary Education) also referred to as the DepartmentP'RAIGEUI Projet d'Appui aux Institutions de Gestion Economique et Financi6re
(Assistancc to Economic Management)SDR Special Drawing RightsSECOPE Service de Contr6lc et de la Paie des Enseignants (Teachcr Pay Service)
FOR oMCIUL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK
Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.A.
Office of Director-GenwralOperauons Evolustion
October 16, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Zaire Education TechnicalAssistance and Training Proiect (Credit 1519-ZR)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report on Zaire Education Technical Assistance and Training Project(Credit 1519-ZR)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office with Part II of thereport contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made bythe Operations Evaluation Department at this time.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
FOR omcLAL USE ONLY
PRJECr COMPLEnION REORT
ZAIRE
EDUCAIION TCICAL ASSSTANCE AND 1RAININ PROJECr(CREDrr 1519-ZR)
TBEOF ON1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1PRE FA CEnO SU M R ........................................................... ii
EV L A IN_IM R ............................................. iii
L PROJECr IDENIT`Y .............................................. 1
IL BACKGROUND .................................................. 1
IL PROJECT OBJECUIVES AND DECR ON. ......................... 2Project objectives ............................................... 2Project components .............................................. 2
TV. IPROJBCr DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION ........................... 3
V. PROJECTE MWPLE3MENTATION ........... .......................... 4Duration of the Project . .......................................... 4Major changes that arose during implementation ....................... 5Project risks ................................................... 6
VL PRO EBCr CSTS M AND FINANCING ................................ 6Project cost ................................................... 6Cedit allocation . .............................................. 6Digbumements ................................................. 6
VEL PROJECr RESULTS ... . ................................... 7Results relating to data collection and processing ....................... 7Results relating to school mapping .......... ........................ 7Results relating to the functional reorganization of the DEPS ..... ........ 7Results relating to technical education ............................... 8Results relating to training .............. .......................... 8Results relating to the school textbook polcy .......................... 8Results relating to technical asistance ............................... 9Impact and sustainability of project achievements ....................... 9
VIBL PARTICIPANT PERFORMANCE .................................. 9IDA Performance ............................................... 9Borrower Performance ........................................... 10Project Relationships . .......................................... 10Technical asistance . ........................................... 11Documentation and data rmlating to the project ....................... 11
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their o(ficial duts. Its contents may not otherwise be disclo o without World Bank authorization.
Dt CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS ................................... 11Lessons to be drawn ........................................... 12
PART II: A REV[EW OF THE PROJECr FROM THE BORROWER'SPERSPECTIVE .............................................. 13
L INrRODUCnON ................................................ 13
IL PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION ........................ 13Project Components ............................................ 14
Im PROJECT DESIGN AND EXECUTION ............................. 15Project Design ................................................ 15Relevance of project components .......... ........................ 15Scope of operations ............................................ 15Project implementation . ......................................... 15Preparation ................................................ 15Performance of the Government .................................. 16Performance of IDA ........................................... 16Recommendations for future projects ............................... 17
BORROWER'S OBSERVATIONS ON PART I OF THE PCR .... ............ 18BORROWER'S OBSERVATIONS ON PART m OF THE PCR .... .......... 19
PART m: STATISTICAL IN'FORMATION
Table 1 IDA Credits Relevant to the ProjectTable 2 : Planned and Actual Dates of Project TimetableTable 3 : Cumulative Estimated and Actual DisbursementsFigure 1 Estimated Disbursements at Appraisal, Revised and Actual (by Fiscal Year)Table 4 Planned and Actual Completion Dates of ComponentsTable 5 Project Costs (by component)Table 5(a): Project Costs (by disbursement category)Table 6 Project FinancingTable 7 : Planned, Revised and Actual Allocation of Credit ProceedsFigure 2 Planned and Actual Credit AllocationsTable 8 : Training provided by the ProjectTable 9 : Infrastructure, Goods and EquipmentTable 10 StudiesTable 11 : Compliance with Credit CovenantsTable 12 Staff Inputs by Stage of Project Cycle in Staff WeeksTable 13 : IDA Mission Data by Stages of ProjectTable 14: Annual and Cumulative Disbursements (in SDRs)Table 15 : Exchange Rate Fluctuations
PROJECr COMPLETION REPORT
ZAIRE
EDUCATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROJECr(CREDIT 1519 - ZR)
PREFACE
1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Education Technical Assistanceand Training Project in Zaire, for which Credit 1519-ZR in the sum of US$9 millionequivalent (SDR8.6 million) was approved by the Executive Directors on April 9, 1985. TheCredit Closing Date, originally March 31, 1988, was postponed three times to March 31, 1991at the Government's request. The Credit Account was kept open a few more months tohonor withdrawal applications arising from commitments made before the final revisedClosing Date. The last disbursement was made on August 19, 1991 and an undisbursedbalance of SDR812,454.68 was canceled.
2. This PCR was prepared jointly by the Population and Human Resources Division ofthe South-Central and Indian Ocean Department, Africa Regional Office (Preface,Evaluation Summary and Parts I and III) and the Borrower (Part II).
3. Preparation of this report was based, inter alia on the following sources: thePresident's Report, the Credit Agreement, supervision reports, audit reports, correspondencebetween the Association and the Borrower, the Project Implementation Monitoring System(PMIS), and discussions with representatives of the Borrower in the field. Comments werealso obtained from the IDA task managers/project staff who identified, prepared, appraisedand supervised the project.
I
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PROJECT COMPLEPILON REPORT
ZAIRE
EDUCATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROJECr(CREDIT 1519-ZR)
EVALUATION STNMMARY
ProJect Background and Objectives
1. Among the major problems confronting the education sector in Zaire during the earlyeighties, those relating to management (adininistrative, financial and pedagogicalmanagement) figured prominently. Ineffective organizational structures, underdevelopedmanagerial and planning capacities and poor information systems all tended to undermine theeffectiveness of the education system. The capacity to monitor both the efficiency andeffectiveness of the different educational programs and address identified issues was weak.Meanwhile, the existing information system in the Department of Primary and SecondaryEducation (DEPS) was inadequate because information flows were often haphazard,inaccurate and disorganized. Data were collected which were not directly related to decision-making and achievement of educational objectives. Non-utilization and inadequatedissemination, and inability to analyze and interpret data led to bottlenecks in the design ofpolicy and planning. Furthermore, development of the productive sectors of the economy wasconstrained by the poor quality of technicians produced by the technical education andvocational training system. In general, many of the technical education and vocationaltraining institutions were inefficient and ran inadequate programs. Quality of training was lowas a result of an under-qualified teaching corps, insufficient and outdated equipment andscarcity of teaching materials. It was against this background that the Zaire EducationTechnical Assistance and Training Project was developed to assist the DEPS in improving itscapabilities in planning, administration and management of the system and, thereby, its abilityto provide more efficient and higher quality education. To that end, the project's specificobjectives were to:
(a) strengthen educational planning by introducing a procedure for the systematiccollection of data and developing a school-mapping methodology;
(b) strengthen educational administration and management by analyzing theadministrative structure of DEPS, formulating a plan for its reorganization,training staff and providing means of transportation and communication;
(c) improve the efficiency and quality of education through a survey of technicalschools, preparing programs to upgrade their teachers and testing newmethods of production, distribution and cost recovery for school textbooks.
2. The project consisted of seven basic components: (i) organization, testing andevaluation of data collection and processing; acquisition of equipment and supplies, andtraining of personnel involved in those activities; (ii) pilot operations to establish a school
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map in two areas; evaluation of the operations with a view to the formulation of a generalmethodology; (iii) production and distribution of 200,000 textbooks; training of necessarypersonnel; evaluation of the operation; (iv) survey of technical and vocational schools witha view to formulating and implementing refresher training programs for teachers andimproving training programs; (v) analysis of the DEPS's administrative and financialprocedures in order to propose and implement reforms to the Department's structures andprocedures; training of personnel and provision of means of transportation and radiocommunication; (vi) training of 2,800 school principals and inspectors; (vii) establishment ofa Data Processing Unit, installation of equipment and development of appropriate software.
Implementation Experience
3. Implementation took three years longer than the three-year period envisaged duringappraisal. This significant delay was due primarily to: (a) a shortage of governmentcounterpart funds in relation to estimated needs and their tardy disbursements; (b) delays inrecruiting consultants and numerous turnovers in long-term expertise; (c) poor quality of thework produced by certain experts and/or their Zairian counterparts; (d) lack of knowledgeand experience on the part of DEPS officials to monitor such an operation and lack ofinformation and documentation about various aspects of the project; more specifically, theCoordinating Committee created to supervise the project locally did not function adequately;(e) absenteeism and a lack of professionalism of staff involved in implementation; (f) gaps inproject management by the BPE, in particular as regards procurement and accounting.Disbursements were thus slower than estimated at appraisal, but nevertheless they wereregular owing to the large share (60%) represented by technical assistance costs. The creditwas closed on March 31, 1991 and the last disbursement made on August 19, 1991. Anundisbursed balance of about 10% of the Credit was canceled.
Project Results
4. In general, project results were fairly disappointing given the fact that some aspectsof the main objectives of the project were not achieved. First, the DEPS could not bereorganized owing in part to delays and the poor quality of the study of its structures andprocedures and in part to a lack of commitment on the part of the authorities to makechanges. Secondly, none of the activities regarding technical education was carried out owingto a lack of counterpart funds, as well as the mediocrity of expertise in charge of thatcomponent.
5. The Project did however achieve the following results: (a) acquisition and satisfactorydistribution of nearly 190,000 textbooks involving the participation of the various conventionalchurch-affiliated networks involved in the management of the education system; the successof this operation pointed to the fact that further success was possible in any future operationaimed at distributing teaching materials to schools (virtually nonexistent at present)notwithstanding the country's size and poor communication network; (b) extensive datacollection on the system and preparation of a statistical yearbook; this was the first nearlyexhaustive database to be produced since about a decade (the previous publication of dataon the system was produced about 11 years before that); (c) the short-lived school-mappingpilot operations; (d) the establishment of a Data Processing Unit capable of computerizedmanagement of the education system; however, the unit's survival after the project nowdepends on staff stability and the availability of resources for supplies, maintenance andoperation; (e) the survival of SECOPE following the withdrawal of assistance by the initial
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donor; the project's support to SECOPE made it possible to maintain the improvement inteacher payroll procedures and the control of the opening and closing of schools; (f) thetraining abroad of 28 higher-level staff of the DEPS; however, the fact that 90% of in-countrytraining was not carried out is regrettable and attributable to a shortage of counterpart fundsand the mediocrity of technical expertise in this area; (g) the preparation of a subsequenteducation project focusing mainly on the distribution of textbooks and teacher training.
Sustainability of Project Accomplishments
6. There is doubt as to whether or not project accomplishments are sustainable. Forexample, the probability that the Data Processing Unit created under the project wouldsurvive for long is low because of the likelihood of turnover of project-trained personnel andthe fact that funds for operation and maintenance may not be readily available after theproject. However, the support provided to SECOPE under the project ensured theoperational survival of that unit. SECOPE's activities and high level of efficiency may be asource of hope for the future especially in controlling the opening and closing of schools aswell as in ensuring that teachers get paid. Meanwhile, the relative success of the distributionof textbooks is another promising sign brought out by the project since it indicated that futureoperations aimed at distributing teaching materials (in short supply at present) could besuccessful notwithstanding the country's size and poor communication network. Furthermore,the training received abroad by DEPS staff now occupying various positions of responsibilitywould certainly have sustainable effects.
Conclusions and Lessons
7. The main reasons for the abandonment or partial completion of key projectcomponents and hence poor results of the project were the inadequacy and repeated delaysin the payment of counterpart funds, poor project management on the part of Zairianofficials, a lack of commitment on the part of the senior officials of the DEPS to changestructures and procedures that they themselves found inadequate, and the poor quality of asignificant proportion of the technical assistance provided for project implementation.
8. Lessons to be drawn. The main lessons to be drawn from this technical assistanceproject can be summarized as follows:
(a) ensure that the role, responsibilities and results expected of each partyinvolved in the project are clearly defined and delineated (especially those ofthe Project Office and technical assistance specialists responsible for projectimplementation);
(b) prevent certain project components from being dependent on others whendifferent people are involved or, if unavoidable, schedule start-up activities forthe latter only after sufficient progress has been made in the implementationof the former;
(c) limit the scope of the project to changing only those structures or proceduresdirectly related to the project if it is not certain that political commitment isabsolute or if such structural changes are associated with major socialdifficulties;
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(d) make sure that the other donors or experts to be involved in projectimplementation are closely associated with project preparation; similarly, asearly on as during project preparation, involve those local entities that willhave overall responsibility for the project (e.g. the Coordinating Committeein this case), making their establishment and operation a condition of creditnegotiation;
(e) determine, as early as possible during project preparation, the key activitiesof the project for which intensive joint supervisions and evaluation during thecourse of implementation will be necessary and undertake such evaluationsduring implementation as planned, including a joint mid-term review ofprogress achieved in carrying out the project;
(f) to the extent possible, implementation of key elements of the project shouldnot be made too dependent on the availability of counterpart funds and,because of that, allocate counterpart funds to project activities that are notstrictly vital to the rapid and efficient achievement of key activities financedby the credit;
(g) the opinion and non-objection of IDA should not be limited to the initialtechnical assistance contract, but mechanisms should be envisaged throughwhich IDA's opinion and non-objection would still be sought duringimplementation of the contract (through provisions in the technical assistancecontract, joint exaluations etc);
(h) the project design should be as simple as possible; a simple project that isclosely supervised greatly improves the chances of successful implementationand achievement of immediate project objectives which, in turn, may influencethe attainment of long-term development objectives; and
(i) supervision missions should be fielded at appropriate and flexible intervals toaddress emerging problems; they should also ensure reasonable continuity instaff and comprise the necessary specialists competent in the fields covered bythe project.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ZAIRE
EDUCATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRANNG PROJECT(CREDIT 1519-ZR)
PART I: REVIEW OF THE PROJECT FROM IDA'S PERSPECIIVE
L PROJECT IDENTITY
Project Name Education Terlnical Assistance and Training ProjectCredit No. : 1519-ZRRegional Vice Presidency Africa Region, Country Department IIICountry : ZaireSector : Education
,. BACKGROUND
1.1 At the time of project preparation, Zaire's economy was experiencing severe tradebalance difficulties, galloping inflation and a considerable budget deficit. However, beginningin 1983, the Government, with assistance from the International Monetary Fund, World Bankand Paris Club, sought to resolve these problems and took various measures to improve themanagement of the economy and the performance of institutions. Thus, in 1983 Zaireseemed ready to embark on the path towards progress and determined to take appropriatemeasures.
1.2 In the primary and secondary education sub-sector, 98% of the budget was allocatedto wages and salaries, leaving only slightly more than US$5 per year per student for operating,maintenance, supplies and investment expenditure. The Primary and Secondary EducationDepartment (Dipartement de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire -- DEPS) was no longerreceiving any significant external financing; the donors gradually had withdrawn their aid,except as regards technical assistants. This partially accounts for the poor performance of theDEPS in managing the sector and projects.
1.3 Administration of the primary and secondary education system was very centralized.Some 4.5 million students in primary schools and 1.4 million in secondary schools were, forthe most part, enrolled in the regions, far from the government concentrated in the capitalcity. Eighty percent of primary schools and 65% of secondary schools, however, were church-affiliated and the Government had signed agreements (conventions) with these churchesassigning them only the daily management of the schools. DEPS decided on the opening ofnew schools, paid the teachers and recruited them in accordance with regulations that wereoften skirted, resulting in a teacher/student ratios (1/23 in primary schools and 1/18 insecondary schools) that were lower than in many industrial countries. The centralized
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management of meager operating budgets as well as school fees resulted in a virtual totalabsence of teaching aids (books, supplies) in the schools. The under-qualification of manyteachers and the lack of pedagogical support given the fact that most inspectorates werebereft of means, also contributed to the deterioration in the quality of education.
1.4 Meanwhile, development of the productive sectors of the economy was constrainedby the poor quality of technicians produced by the technical education and vocational trainingsystem. In general, many of the technical education and vocational training institutions wereinefficient and ran inadequate programs. Quality of training was low as a result of an under-qualified teaching corps, insufficient and outdated equipment and scarcity of teachingmaterials.
1.5 World Bank involvement in the education sector began in 1971 with the FirstEducation Project (Credit 272-ZR) in the amount of USS6.5 million. Its objectives were tohelp reduce the number of under-qualified teachers and other staff in primary education, andimprove the curricula and teaching conditions in selected technical schools. Because ofsignificant delays during implementation and an increase in costs due to inflation, thoseobjectives were not fully achieved. A Second Education Project (Credit 624-ZR) for US$21million was approved in 1976 to increase the system's capability for training rural primaryschool teachers and agricultural technicians. The project ran into serious implementationdifficulties and was closed in September 1982 with an undisbursed balance of US$18.8 million(about 90% of the total credit).
IH. PROJECr OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIMON
1.6 Project objectives. It was against this background that a third education training andtechnical assistance project was identified in April 1983. The project was prepared by theGovernment, assisted by a consulting firm under a Project Preparation Advance (P262-ZR).The World Bank appraised the project in February 1984. The main objective of the project(PR. No. P-3766-ZR of August 15, 1984) was to increase capabilities in planning,management and administration of the Primary and Secondary Education Department and,thereby, its ability to provide higher quality and more efficient education.
1.7 To that end, the more specific objectives of the project were to help the Government:(a) strengthen its education planning by introducing a procedure for systematic data collectionand developing a school-mapping methodology; (b) improve the efficiency and quality ofeducation through a survey of technical schools, preparing programs to upgrade teachers oftechnical subjects, and testing new methods for the production, distribution and cost recoveryof textbooks; (c) strengthening education management and administration by analyzing theadministrative structure of DEPS, formulating a plan for its reorganization, training higher-level staff, and providing means of transportation and communication.
1.8 Project components. The project included the following components:
(a) Planning and statistics: Carrying out a program of data collection and analysis,including the production of statistical forms; training outside of Zaire for
trainers in planning and training in Zaire for regional staff of the DEPS andschool staff; acquisition of equipment and materials for use in the foregoing;
(b) School mapping: Carrying out pilot school-mapping exercises in the Kengearea of the Bandundu Region and in the Madimba area of the Bas-ZaireRegion and the development of a school-mapping strategy based on theresults thereof; training outside and inside Zaire in school mapping;
(c) Production of textbooks: Production and distribution of about 200,000 schooltextbooks on mathematics and French language for the first two years ofsecondary school in Bas-Zaire and Equateur; training outside of Zaire in suchpublishing, production and distribution; evaluation of the textbook program;
(d) Technical education: Conducting a survey of technical and vocational schoolsand the preparation of programs to upgrade their teachers in eight specialties;training outside and in Zaire in specific fields of technical education;development and testing of improved technical education programs(curricula);
(e) Strengthening of the DEPS: Conducting an analysis of the functional,administrative and financial structures of the DEPS; modifying its structuresand procedures in conformity with a plan based on the foregoing; trainingoutside and in Zaire of DEPS staff in budgeting, accounting and educationmanagement; installation of radio communication equipment in Kinshasa andin the regions, and training of staff in its use and maintenance;
(f) Training of school principals and inspectors: Formulating and carrying out aprogram to train about 2,400 primary and secondary school principals, otherschool administrators and inspectors in administration, management, budgetingand accounting; in addition, providing means of transportation andcommunication for inspectors (bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles etc.);
(g) Data processing: Improving the data-processing capabilities of the DEPSthrough the installation of new equipment and the acquisition of new softwareprograms and materials; training outside and in Zaire in informationmanagement; and the organization of the data-processing services as aseparate administrative unit directly under the responsibility of the SecretaryGeneral of the DEPS.
IV. PROJECI DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION
1.9 The project was designed to respond to two major concerns: the first -- resulting fromthe experience of the two previous projects -- was that any investment in education in Zairecould have an impact only if management of the system by the DEPS were radicallyimproved; the second -- relating to the findings of a study done by UNESCO in 1981 -- wasthe overriding need for technical education to produce skilled technicians suited to the needsof the productive sector of the economy. In this regard, project objectives seem appropriate.
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However, in the initial three-year period envisaged, the project seems to have been overlyambitious for certain components, given the scope of the studies that were to precede theoperations (in particular, on strengthening management and technical education) and giventhe fact that the institutional and functional restructuring of the DEPS should have takenplace prior to some of the training in order for that training to have been meaningful.
1.10 The project preparation documents set forth clearly defined objectives, but only briefly-- if at all -- do they cover the issue of the national human resources to be mobilized toachieve those objectives. They also seem to systematically underestimate the necessary timefor carrying out the type of large-scale reforms that were envisaged under the project. Infact, the inefficiency within the government offices that were going to be responsible forimplementing the project and the need to improve the situation had been one of the project'sjustifications. Preparation therefore appears to have lacked pragmatism.
1.11 Owing to the many institutional aspects covered by the project and hence theinvolvement of other sectors than education, the establishment of a Coordinating Committeeto monitor the project and resolve implementation difficulties as they arose seemedapparently useful. It was also a fairly innovative idea. Although established in 1984, it onlybegan to operate in 1986. Meanwhile, although it was supposed to meet four times a yearduring project implementation, there were years when the Coordinating Committee only metonce. These factors may explain why the committee, although well designed, was notsufficiently involved in project implementation and, consequently, did not have the expectedimpact.
1.12 Lastly, the respective role and responsibilities of the Education Project Office (Bureaudu Projet Education -- BPE), other entities (Directions) and the technical assistance agencyresponsible for project implementation were not sufficiently delineated. Independent of othershortcomings of both the BPE and the consulting firm (see para. 1.14), this undoubtedlylargely accounts for certain delays in fulfilling contractual obligations (reports, annual workplans, etc.), as well as the leniency on the part of the BPE and the Government vis-a-vis theexperts involved in the project. This certainly contributed to some of the poor results of theproject.
1.13 A posteriori, the more rapid involvement of senior officials through the CoordinatingCommittee and a clearer delineation of the responsibilities of each party involved would havecertainly enhanced the possibility of the project succeeding notwithstanding the point madeearlier (para. 1.10) that project preparation lacked pragmatism.
V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
1.14 Duration of the Project. The Project was to be implemented over three years and theoriginally planned Closing Date was March 31, 1988. As it was a technical assistance project,recruitment of the technical assistance firm was a condition of effectiveness and the contractwas signed on November 12, 1984. Delays in signing the Credit Agreement and initialdeposits in the project account held up effectiveness for some six months, until April 1985.Delays in implementation led to a first extension of the closing date to March 1989 and thesignature of an addendum to the contract with the technical assistance firm for the duration
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of that extension. The project was extended two other consecutive times in order to allowfor finishing various aspects of the project nearing completion (in particular as regards dataprocessing) and to prepare the next education project. The project was closed on March 31,1991. Six main reasons can be given for the delays in implementation: (a) primarily, aconstant shortage of government counterpart funds in relation to estimated needs and tardydisbursements; (b) delays in recruiting consultants and numerous turnovers in expertise; (c)poor quality of the work produced by certain experts and/or their Zairian counterparts, whichmeant that some of the work had to be re-done and the outputs delayed (for example, thestudy of the DEPS) or even abandonment of aspects of the project (training of principals andinspectors as well as many technical education activities); (d) lack of interest on the part ofDEPS officials to project monitoring, which undermined the work of the CoordinatingCommittee; this led to slow processing of documentation within the Ministry (study on thereorganization of the DEPS) and/or in other government offices (request for funds andcompetitive bidding process, in particular); (e) absenteeism and a lack of professionalismamong Government officials; (f) weaknesses in project management by the BPE, in particularas regards procurement and accounting.
1.15 Major changes that arose during implementation. The major changes made mid-stream to the project in relation to the initial components described in para. 1.8 were asfollows:
(a) Support to SECOPE (Service de la Paie des Enseignants -- Teacher PayrollOffice) in the last two years, through the provision of additional equipmentand technical assistance. The inclusion of that Office in the last phase of theproject was due primarily to its efficiency in pursuing certain major objectivesset initially for the Project (control of the opening of new schools,management of recruitment, career monitoring and teacher payroll,establishment of a radio communications network with the regions, collectionof data on the education system). A second justification was the overridingneed to maintain the key gains by the Office when the assistance of the initialdonor was withdrawn following political difficulties between Zaire and thatcountry. Before giving its non-objection to involvement in this activity, IDAgot assurances that the initial donor also had no objection to suchinvolvement.
(b) Inclusion of a third pilot region for school mapping to replace the satellitecoverage initially planned;
(c) Scaling down of the study on technical education owing to a shortage ofcounterpart funds and the considerable delays in the project;
(d) Elimination of the analysis of budgeting procedures within the DEPS becausesimilar studies were being carried out for the government by the PRAIGEFIproject;
(e) Elimination of computerization of teacher payroll following the establishmentwithin the DEPS of an office responsible for that operation (SECOPE,established with the support of another donor).
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1.16 Project risks. Two major risks had been identified in the President's Report, namelythe ability of DEPS to carry out the project given weaknesses in its management capacity andthe political commitment of the Government to change the way in which the DEPS operated.These two risks did in fact become reality and were in fact underestimated since they causedfurther substantial delays in implementing the project. A third risk had also been identified,concerning the reliability of available data, but that risk proved to be minor, since thereliability of the data collected by the statistical surveys proved to be fairly good, as shown bycross-checking with data collected independently by SECOPE. It is astonishing that theshortage of counterpart funds was not viewed as a major risk during appraisal, because it wasone of the lessons drawn from the first project and one of the factors in the suspension ofthe second. Meanwhile, in order to minimize project risks, a joint annual review ofimplementation was called for in the President's Report. As shown by Bank mission reports(Table 13 of Part III), this did take place only once in 1986 when an intensive supervisionmission was fielded. Held annually, such missions would have made it possible to efficientlyrevitalize the project by encouraging firmness on the part of Zairian officials vis-a-vis boththe experts whose performance was substandard and the officials of the offices involved inthe project.
VL PROJECT COSIh AND FINANCING
1.17 Project cost. Total project cost, including contingencies and taxes, was estimated atsome US$10.7 million, of which US$1.7 million in local costs and US$9 million in foreignexchange. The World Bank Credit was for SDR 8.6 million (US$9 million). Of that amount,a total of SDR 7.8 million was actually disbursed during project implementation. Most of theundisbursed share of the Credit (SDR 0.8 million) represents either local training not carriedout (Part F of the project, see para. 1.18), the acquisition of equipment associated with thattraining or the publication of the two statistical yearbooks that were not issued.
1.18 Credit allocation. The credit allocations estimated at appraisal and those fromsubsequent revisions (1988 and 1990) are shown in Table 7 of Part III. They can becompared with the actual breakdown of the Credit given in the same table. The table showsthat the categories where actual amounts spent significantly exceeded projections arerehabilitation works, vehicles for inspectors and consultant services. In the first case, althoughcertain premises were not rehabilitated, the overrun was due to an increase in constructioncosts in Zaire, owing to a higher than projected inflation during implementation of theproject. In the second case (vehicles for inspectors), the higher cost was due to errors inprocurement which led to the cancellation of a first bidding process and the recruitment ofinternational expertise to help elaborate new bidding documents. In the third case, theoverrun occurred as a result of successive addenda to the contract with the technicalassistance firm so that actual duration exceeded the initially planned duration of technicalassistance; meanwhile, additional expertise was required to complete certain elements of theproject (data processing) and to assist the Government in the preparation of a subsequenteducation project. The categories for which disbursements were significantly belowprojections correspond to those parts of the project that were not carried out (see para. 1.15).
1.19 Disbursements. Estimated and actual (cumulative) disbursements under the Creditare shown on Table 3 of Part III. In general, it can be seen that from the outset of the
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project and throughout its duration, disbursements were less rapid than planned, but veryregular throughout the first four years. This was due to the large share (60%) representedby the cost of technical assistance.
VIL PROJECT RESULTS
(See Table 4 of Part III for the data relating to the results)
1.20 Results relating to data collection and processing. The results relating to thiscomponent are very mixed. One of the first results is the satisfactory rehabilitation(infrastructure, furnishings, air conditioning and electrification) of the premises in which thedata processing unit is housed. As regards statistics and data processing, the feasibility ofrelatively reliable surveys has been proven. Data processing software were developed and arenow in operation. A statistical yearbook was published in 1989 (i.e. 11 years after the lastone available). However, this success was quite limited since two other planned publicationsof the statistical yearbook were never undertaken. Furthermore, the data collection anddissemination networks established by the project proved to be cumbersome and costly, andsubsequent activities (in 1991) used the network established by SECOPE, which is moreefficient and easier to manage. Data processing was developed, under contract with atechnical assistance firm, after the departure of the firm initially recruited for that purpose.However, the computer hardware within the office, which has been made a Direction owingto the project, is cumbersome (super minicomputer HP 3000). It requires highly skilledpersonnel whose stability is not ensured given the low pay and limited career incentives in thecivil service. Furthermore, it requires imported materials for operation (which are difficultto acquire) and a special environment (air conditioning, security, maintenance). All of theseimply large operating expenditures. Although the initial choice of hardware was judicious atthe time of project appraisal, the foreseeable delays in the rehabilitation works of thepremises would have undoubtedly justified postponing the ordering of the equipment (whichremained in storage for nearly two and a half years). This would certainly have meant theselection of a different and probably more appropriate type of computer, given the rapidevolution in computer technology.
1.21 As regards school mapping, a pilot operation was carried out and a methodologymanual prepared. However, these documents have been filed away and did not have anyimpact on the management of the education system in the region in question. A posteriori,it appears that the methods were too cumbersome and sophisticated for the circumstancesexisting in the country for which simple and pragmatic approaches are more appropriate.Such was the approach adopted by SECOPE, which justifies the support provided belatedlyby the project to that office.
1.22 Results relating to the functional reorganization of the DEPS. A study withrecommendations for the administrative and financial reorganization of DEPS was carried outand submitted to the Government in June 1987. As regards administrative reorganization.the report was put on the back burner and has now been dropped once and for all becauseof the political implications of its recommendations, in particular those regarding thedeployment of personnel and decentralization. For the record, that part of the project raninto considerable delays because the first version of the study and recommendations weredeemed by the World Bank to be of substandard professional quality. With regard to
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financial reorganization, work on the budgeting study ceased because it was felt to bepremature owing to the development of similar and broader exercises under the PRAIGEFIproject.
1.23 As regards expenditure procedures, the teacher payroll was the most important aspectbecause of the considerable percentage that this heading represents of the DEPS's budgetand because of the large number of fictitious teachers suggested by the data available duringappraisal (para. 1.3). Because of delays in the installation of the computer hardware, theproject was not able to develop the computerization of that procedure as scheduled.However, as of 1990 the Credit started providing support to activities developed by SECOPEwithin the DEPS (see para. 1.15). Thus, following the withdrawal of the initial donor, theCredit helped maintain the operations of SECOPE, one of whose main activities dealt withthe rational management of expenditure.
1.24 Results relating to technical education. Despite the importance of this aspect of theproject (see para. 1.4 and 1.8), the completion status of this component is particularlydisappointing. Primarily owing to a shortage of counterpart funds, the preliminary survey oftechnical and vocational schools was repeatedly postponed and ultimately no survey wascarried out. Although a report on technical training and the methodology for formulating andtesting training programs was prepared, no training was carried out. This component was thusa total failure.
1.25 Results relating to training. Table 8 of Part III summarizes the results of the trainingprograms. Training outside of Zaire envisaged under the various components was carried out(28 people trained, as against 27 projected). The training was considered satisfactory by thebeneficiaries, although at times it was felt to be overly theoretical and not tailored to thesituation in Zaire. The completion rate for training in Zaire is much more disappointing. In-service training, seminars and workshops were undertaken prior to the school mappingexercise, the statistical survey and data processing activities. As regards computer training,the lack of hardware throughout the stay of the experts from the technical assistance firmmeant that only theoretical training could be given. However, there was some training foroffice staff following the delayed installation of the computer through a supplementarycontract with a computer software firm, together with an on-site introduction in its use duringthe first statistical data processing runs. A brief seminar was also held for regional officials.Overall, the objectives for local training were not achieved, as less than 10% of those targetedby the project received training. The most remarkable failures were in the training ofprincipals, inspectors and technical teachers. The reasons for these failures lie both in ashortage of counterpart funds as well as the incompetence of the experts in charge of thetraining component.
1.26 Results relating to the school textbook policy. Despite a significant delay (due tounavailable counterpart funds), which meant prolonged storage of the textbooks, bookdistribution in the two regions (Bas-Zaire and Equateur) was ultimately satisfactory, involvingthe church-affiliated education networks. The evaluation of this operation in 1989 showedthat the rate at which textbooks were actually arriving at the targeted schools, even the mostremote and with greatest difficulty of access, was over 90%. As part of the preparation ofthe next education project, a supplementary study was carried out under the Credit toevaluate the conditions for expanding the operation, since a school textbook component wasenvisaged by the Government. In both cases, it is unfortunate that only preliminary reportswere produced and that the technical assistance specialists never provided any complete and
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final reports. As regards the cost recovery policy, the directives that were issued anddisseminated never had any impact. This is not surprising -- or alarming for that matter --because the data available at that time indicated that school operating expenses for studentswere already being met in large part by family contributions. In fact in some areas, someparents had already made advance payments for the purchase of the textbooks.
1.27 Results relating to technical assistance. The project included a substantial technicalassistance program involving the use of 24.5 man-years of long-term experts and 6.5 man-yearsof short-term consultants (i.e. an average technical assistance of some 10 full-time people forthe three years planned for the project). The recruitment of expertise ran into slight delays,as the long-term experts came on board only in July 1985. The delay was caused primarilyby the slow approval of the experts by the DEPS. Initial working conditions were notsatisfactory and the coordinator lost a great deal of time in solving logistical problems, to thedetriment of team coordination and real output. The recruitment of short-term consultantsoften experienced delays, which nay part;all' account for the slow pace of proJ,-ctimplementation.
1.28 Impact and sustainabilitv of project achievements. Although it is too early to judgethe impact of the project, there is understandably some uncertainty given its incompleteimplementation. One positive aspect must be stressed: the feasibility of the distribution oftextbooks in a vast country with communication problems shows that one of the greatestconstraints on the quality of education can be resolved if the means are made available. Forthe rest, apart from the individual training provided, the constraints that the project soughtto eliminate remain in full force. Meanwhile, it is very unlikely that the Data Processing Unitcreated under the project would survive for long because of likely problems relating topersonnel stability and the availability of means of operation and maintenance. However,since the closing of the project the unit has continued to make some further achievements(like the evaluation work it has recently undertaken in the Kinshasa school district).
yin. PARTICIPANT PERFORMANCE
1.29 IDA Performance: The pre-appraisal phases of the project were handled swiftly andprofessionally by World Bank staff. After sound identification, the project was preparedrapidly. The document drafted by the appraisal mission brought the difficult areas of theproject into sharp focus and proposed appropriate solutions (including the establishment ofa project fund account requiring the signature of the project director and the head oftechnical assistance for the project; anticipation of some implementation difficulties andmaking provision for their resolution; the use of more intensive supervision missions than thenormal supervision mission). These suggestions were also included in the President's Report.However, preparation of this project lacked some degree of pragmatism especially in termsof the amount of time allocated to carry out certain activities. It is not surprising that theClosing Date of the Project was postponed three times notwithstanding the fact that certainactivities were never carried out.
1.30 Proiect supervision, as summarized in Tables 12 and 13, consists of three distinctperiods: (a) project start-up, when missions consisted of several people whose expertisereflected the main areas of the project (education planner and training specialist) after which
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an intensive supervision was organized as planned (supervision mission V) (i.e. a total of 18.6man-weeks in 20 months); (b) a period of some two and one half years during whichsupervision was provided by a single person, whose area of expertise evidently did notencompass all project areas; the supervision missions went out, on average, about twice everyyear and each mission lasted about 10 days (i.e. a total of about 7.8 man-weeks in 29 months);(c) a period of about one year during which supervision was provided by the preparationmissions for the following project. The most critical difficulties (cumulative delays in theproject overall, poor quality of study reports, major difficulties in the components not carriedout, difficulties in procurement, etc.) evidently appeared during the second period. It wouldappear that during the second phase the World Bank did not devote as much attention tosupervision as a project in difficult straits would require. First, an annual intensive mission,in accordance with projections, might have helped to mobilize the senior officials of theDEPS and other departments involved and would have demonstrated greater firmness vis-a-visthe Borrower. Second, the supervision missions during that period, while identifying projectbottlenecks, did not, according to supervision reports, seem to have sought solutions toproblems other than the systematic and repeated postponement of deadlines. The last periodwas characterized by a great effort on the part of the World Bank in trying to ensuresuccessful completion of those parts of the project for which there was some hope. Ingeneral, the Bank staff should have demonstrated more imagination or firmness during themost critical moments of project implementation.
1.31 Borrower Performance: The contractual obligations under the Credit were onlypartially complied to by the Government. The major problem is that relating to theinsufficiency of counterpart funds and delays in making payments, and in providing workplans, timetables and annual reports. There were also problems and delays relating to thetransmission of annual audit reports and the initial audit on the Special Account and theProject Fund Account. Themselves the cause of problems that marred projectimplementation, these factors also reflected a casual attitude on the part of the Borrower inproject implementation and monitoring. Poor performance is attributable to actors at variouslevels in the DEPS and BPE. Firstly, the senior officials in DEPS were responsible for(a) the interrupted activities of the Project Coordinating Committee, which was establishedto periodically analyze implementation, achievements and difficulties, and propose solutions;(b) a lack of reaction to important documents such as that on reorganization of the Ministry.Even a rejection of the conclusions and proposals would have made it possible to discussmeasures acceptable in the political context and in some measures could have been limited(probably leading to a reallocation of the funds); (c) failure to demand adequate performancefrom contracted technical experts, officials and staff of the offices involved; and(d) interference in procurement operations (bottlenecks with bidding documents). Second,as regards the BPE, despite the difficulty of its work (see para. 1.12), it demonstrated certainfailings, in particular (a) in project account management, despite the comments made by theannual audits and the training received by the BPE head accountant, and (b) in theprocedures for competitive bidding and procurement, which ran into significant delays. Third,the various offices involved in implementation and whose directors did not take suitablemeasures to mobilize the necessary human resources or reduce the absenteeism that paralyzedproject progress, carry part of the blame.
1.32 Project Relationships: Relationships with senior DEPS officials, the director of theProject Office and the officials of the other departments involved (Planning, Finance, PublicAdministration) were at all times considered excellent by the various Bank missions,
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notwithstanding the fact that these excellent relationships did not lead to excellent projectresults.
1.33 Technical assistance: Technical assistance was evidently a key factor in the difficultiesregarding project implementation. The services of the firm contracted for project preparationand implementation were not entirely satisfactory. The problems were of several types: (a)the technical assistance contract was the first involvement of the firm in Zaire and morespecifically in education. The particularly difficult working environment presented difficultiesfor a good number of specialists who in addition had no work experience in developingcountries; (b) although certain specialists had specific expertise that resulted in quality work,others clearly lacked expertise or professionalism that resulted in outputs whose quality wasdeemed insufficient by the Association, or by a lack of any results at the end of their work;(c) as a group, the specialists on board did not work together as a team, which resulted ininternal conflicts as well as poor integration within the DEPS, and even conflicts with otherspecialists in the DEPS (this was in particular responsible for difficulties in the trainingcomponent and a lack of interaction with SECOPE); (d) high staff turnover (none of thelong-term experts remained in the same assignment throughout the life of the project; 50%of specialists had already moved one year after the start of the project); and (e) grievouserrors of judgment on the part of several specialists who were declared persona non gratafollowing indiscretions. However, the technical assistance services used in the last part of theproject to complete certain aspects of the project and for preparation of the following projectwere considered excellent.
1.34 Documentation and data relating to the project: The project produced a largequantity of information and data contained in the background papers, Credit Agreement,President's Report, audit reports, supervision reports, bidding documents and bid evaluationreports. The information used in the preparation of this PCR was taken from documents andfiles of the World Bank, DEPS and the BPE regarding the project. Project supervisionreports are clear and complete and contain a large number of annexes and technicaldocuments. Supervision, especially during the final phases of the project, led to some fruitfuldialogue with Zairian authorities. Although it did not always result in the immediate solutionto specific problems, that dialogue made it possible to identify problems and discuss them, andvastly contributed to the development of a subsequent operation (the education sectorrehabilitation project - PRESED).
IX CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
1.35 Despite disbursement of about 90% of the Credit, the attainment of objectives of theEducation Technical Assistance and Training Project is disappointing. The insufficiency andrepeated delays in payments of counterpart funds, poor project management on the part ofZairian officials, insufficient commitment on the part of senior DEPS officials to changestructures and procedures they nevertheless considered inadequate, and the mediocrity of thetechnical assistance provided to assist in project implementation were the main reasons forthe abandonment or partial implementation of key project components.
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1.36 Lessons to be drawn. The main lessons to be drawn from this technical assistanceproject are summarized as follows:
(a) ensure that the role, responsibilities and results expected of each partyinvolved in the project are clearly defined and delineated (in particular in thecase of the Project Office and project technical assistance);
(b) prevent certain project components from being dependent on others whendifferent entities are involved or, if unavoidable, schedule start-up andrecruitment contracts for the latter only after sufficient progress has beenmade in implementation of the former;
(c) limit the scope of the project to changing only those structures or proceduresdirectly implicated in the project if it is not certain that political commitmentis absolute or if such structural changes are associated with major socialdifficulties. When meticulously thought out and successfully implemented,partial reorganization of management has greater chances of having a positivesubsequent impact on more comprehensive reforms;
(d) make sure that the other donors or experts to be involved in projectimplementation are closely associated with project preparation; similarly, asearly on as during project preparation, involve those local entities that willhave overall responsibility for the project (e.g. the Coordinating Committeein this case), making their establishment and operation a condition of creditnegotiation;
(e) determine, as early as during project preparation, the key activities of theproject for which intensive joint supervisions and evaluation during thecourse of implementation will be necessary and undertake such evaluationsduring implementation as planned including a joint mid-term review ofprogress achieved in carrying out the project;
(f) to the extent possible, implementation of key elements of the project shouldnot be made too dependent on the availability of counterpart funds and,because of that, allocate counterpart funds to project activities that are notstrictly vital to the rapid and efficient achievement of other key activitiesfinanced by the credit;
(g) the opinion and non-objection of IDA should not be limited to the initialtechnical assistance contract, but mechanisms should be envisaged throughwhich IDA's opinion and non-objection would still be sought duringimplementation of the contract (through provisions in the technical assistancecontract, joint evaluations etc);
(h) the project design should be as simple as possible; a simple project that isclosely supervised greatly improves the chances of successful implementationand achievement of immediate project objectives which, in turn, may influencethe attainment of long-term development objectives; and
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(i) supervision missions should be fielded at appropriate and flexible intervals toaddress emerging problems; they should also ensure reasonable continuity instaff and comprise the necessary specialists competent in the fields covered bythe project.
PART II: A REVIEW OF THE PROJECT FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPEC`IIVE
(Translation)
I. INTRODUCI1ON
2.1. Following an agreement between IDA and the Republic of Zaire, a third educationproject was identified, prepared and implemented between 1983 and 1991. During the pre-identification and preparation stages, the IDA staff members responsible for the project wereMessrs. Jonathan Brown (formerly Deputy Chief, Education Division) and Albert Aime(Education Adviser in the same Division). By the time project negotiations were taking placein Washington, Mr. Brown was no longer the officer in charge but had been replaced byMr. Aime, and by the time the Credit became effective, Mr. Aime in his turn had beenreplaced by Mr. J. McCabe, Education Planner. Because of the turnover among IDA projectofficers, the Zairian authorities became anxious that the objectives of this project might nolonger be properly understood, and it has been their view that the changes in IDA'sEducation Division had certain ill effects in this regard.
2.2. According to the President's Report (Document No. P-3766-ZR), the technicalassistance component of the project was a guarantee that the Government would be able toincrease its management capability and limit the risks associated with the project. However,when potential consultants were being canvassed, those the IDA-Zaire joint selection missionregarded as top-rank (roughly 90%) all declined the offers made to them, obliging theGovernment to make do with second- or third-rank candidates. This compromise was to havevery regrettable consequences as far as project consulting and technical assistancearrangements were concerned.
2.3. It should also be noted that inflation in Zaire was high between the project pre-identification stage (US$1 = Z 5.86 in December 1982) and the date the Credit becameeffective (US$1 = Z 55.79 in December 1985). It was against this background that thisCredit became effective in August 1985.
IL PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION
2.4. The main objective of the project was to increase the planning, management andadministrative capabilities of the Department of Primary and Secondary Education (DEPS),and thereby its ability to provide higher-quality and more efficient education.
2.5. The more specific objectives were to enable the Government:
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(a) to strengthen its education planning by introducing a program for thesystematic collection and processing of data and by carrying out a pilot projectin school mapping;
(b) to strengthen education management and administration through (i) analysisof the administrative structure of DEPS, (ii) formulation of a plan for itsreorganization, (iii) training of its personnel, and (iv) provision of means oftransportation and communication;
(c) to improve the relevance and quality of education through (i) a survey oftechnical schools, (ii) preparing programs to improve the skills of teachers oftechnical subjects, and (iii) testing new methods for producing, distributingand recovering the cost of textbooks.
2.6. Project Components: The project was subdivided into the following components:
(a) Planning and statistics: Implementation of a program of data collection andanalysis, including production of statistical forms; training outside Zaire fortrainers in planning, and training inside Zaire for regional DEPS and schoolstaff; acquisition of equipment and materials for use in the foregoing.
(b) School mapping: Carrying out pilot school-mapping exercises in the Kengearea of the Bandundu Region and in the Madimba area of the Bas-ZaireRegion, and development of a school-mapping strategy based on the resultsthereof; training outside and inside Zaire in school mapping.
(c) Production of textbooks: Production and distribution of about 200,000 schooltextbooks on mathematics and French language for the first two years ofsecondary school in Bas-Zaire and Equateur; training outside Zaire in suchpublishing, production and distribution; evaluation of this program.
(d) Technical education: Conducting a survey of technical and vocational schools;preparation of programs to retrain their teachers in the eight specialtieschosen; training outside and inside Zaire in the planning and provision oftechnical education; preparation and testing of improved technical teacherpackages.
(e) Strengthening of DEPS: Conducting an analysis of the functional,administrative and financial structures of DEPS; modification of itsorganization and procedures as per a plan based on the results of thatanalysis; training outside and inside Zaire for DEPS staff in budgeting,accounting, and education administration and management; installation ofradio communication equipment in Kinshasa and the regions, and training ofstaff in its use and maintenance.
(f) Training of school principals and i'nspectors: Formulating and carrying out aprogram to train about 2,400 primary and secondary school principals, otherschool administrators and school inspectors in administration, management,budgeting and accounting; in addition, providing means of transportation forinspectors (bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles etc.
_- - - - -
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(g) Data processing: Improving the data-processing capabilities of DEPS throughthe installation of new equipment and acquisition of new programs andmaterials; training outside and inside Zaire in information management; andorganization of data-processing services as a separate administrative unitunder the direct responsibility of the Secretary General of DEPS.
M. PROJECT DESIGN AND EXECUTION
2.7. Project Design: Two aspects of project design call for comment:
- the relevance of project components;- the scope of project operations.
2.8. Relevance of project components: The choice of project components was based onsound judgement; some of them were responses to criticisms of DEPS from Zairian circlesregarding the need to resolve the problems relating to the quality of education (deteriorationin the quality of education, gap between user needs and training given, etc.). However, someother components were not integrated into the overall structural organization of themachinery of government. This was the case of Component E (Strengthening of DEPS)whose objective was to bring about a reorganization of the DEPS. However, suchorganizational changes in the Departments of the Executive Council (now Ministries of theGovernment) were not a matter for DEPS alone, but also -- and, in fact, chiefly -- for theMinistry of the Civil Service. Any discussion or study of the internal organization of DEPSshould have involve this Ministry, whereas the approach advocated did not involve it directly.This omission explains the reserved attitudes of both DEPS and the Ministry of the CivilService, as well as the almost complete lack of interest evinced by all parties concerned.
2.9. Scope of operations: The scattering of project activities throughout DEPS wasdeplorable; practically every Division behaved as if it were responsible for some projectcomponent or other, although in fact the Project Office had designated a special staff groupin only one Division. Staff not directly involved were often critical of activities in progress,on occasion causing some loss of motivation among those involved in a particular task. Whileit is true that there were problems to be attended to throughout the sector, we believe itwould have been better to adopt the approach of proceeding by stages (i.e. grouping two orthree components of the project together) rather than that of allowing operations to be sodispersed.
2.10. Project implementation: During the course of project implementation, numerousproblems arose, ascribable to the lack of adequate preparation and to the poor performanceof the parties participating.
2.11. Preparation: Preparation of technical materials had been entrusted to a firm ofconsultants recruited under IDA guidelines. During project negotiations, it became clear thatthese materials were wanting on the analytical side, so much so that certain matters were tobe reviewed and re-thought before the Credit became effective.
2.12. During execution, other difficulties developed with the team of consultants: (i)approximately 98% had not been involved in the preparatory process, which meant they were
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unfamiliar with relevant materials; (ii) a lack of cohesion within the team; (iii) difficulties inadapting to an unfamiliar environment.
2.13. This technical assistance, mediocre in quality as it was, nevertheless accounted forroughly 60% of the total cost of the project, an excessive figure. In future, similar designerrors should be avoided if such a project is to be spared attacks both from within and outsideDEPS. The results anticipated from this assistance (improvement in the execution capabilitiesof DEPS) did not materialize fully.
2.14. Performance of the Government
(a) Education Project Office (BPE): Although BPE's responsibilities wereoutlined in Credit Agreement 1519-0-ZR and its Side Letter No. 1, DEPSoften prevented it from exercising its prerogatives. For instance, DEPSrecruited the project accountant and procurement specialist (required underthe terms of the Credit Agreement, Side Letter No. 1) using criteria otherthan their professional qualifications and failing to follow the guidelinesagreed on mutually with the IDA project start-up mission. This situation ledto undeniable shortcomings in the areas of accounting and procurement.
(b) Coordinating Committee: This Committee, required under the terms ofSection 3.10 of the Credit Agreement, functioned more or less normally,although its support in monitoring project execution left something to bedesired.
(c) Ministry of Planning: Disbursement of project funds by this Ministry withinthe framework of the capital budget was very poor, notwithstanding the factthat this Ministry was represented on the Coordinating Committee. Choicesand decisions were made according to criteria that did not fit in with anyprogramming of project operations. The ensuing chronic lack of counterpartfunds appears to be one of the chief reasons for the project's poor results.
(d) Ministry of Finance: The Contract Awards Committee, supervised by thisMinistry, was largely to blame for many of the delays that affected projectcontracts. Its laxity where its own functioning was concerned (meetingsconvened but then canceled for lack of a quorum, inadequate secretarialservices, etc.) seriously obstructed operations planning.
2.15. Performance of IDA: As noted in our introductory remarks, the original IDA projectofficers were reassigned immediately after the Credit became effective. While this did notaffect the general supervision of the project, there were some instances of disagreement overwhat approaches should be followed to achieve desired results. However, the other stagesof the project (pre-identification, identification, preparation and supervision) went ahead ina manner the Government considered satisfactory. The various documents put out by IDA,by making not only essential but also pertinent information available, contributed to soundunderstanding of the project and improved its implementation.
2.16. During the implementation period, approximately nine supervision missions wereorganized: one in 1985, three in 1986, two in 1988, and one in 1989. Although what theproject did achieve was due to them in large part, and although they strengthened the
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IDA/Government communications that were so essential throughout this period, we believethat the question of mission frequency under future projects could be reviewed in theinterests of greater efficiency of monitoring arrangements, particularly in the difficult kind ofsocioeconomic circumstances which Zaire has had to face in recent years. A frequencypattern of one mission per quarter would be more suitable.
2.17. Recommendations for future projects
(a) Ensure that IDA and Government officers involved in the initial phases of theproject (pre-identification and preparation) are still part of it at the time it isactually launched so that risks of differences in interpretation and approachcan be kept to a minimum.
(b) Ensure that any participating entities and individuals are fully informedregarding the project and their own responsibilities in it.
(c) Devise ways of protecting BPE from the kind of situation where curtailmentof its autonomy may prevent it from carrying out its functions.
(d) Shorten present contract award procedures as far as possible.
(e) Ensure that technical assistance is selective and restricted to areas in whichZaire has no capabilities of its own.
(f) Introduce provisions that will oblige the Government to make the necessarycounterpart contributions to the project within reasonable time limits,essential if scheduling and execution of project components are to be wellsynchronized.
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BORROWER'S OBSERVATIONS ON PART I OF THE PCR
2.18. Taken as a whole, the analysis of the project given in Part I is a reasonably objectiveaccount of the facts surrounding implementation of the various components of the project.We also find the lessons referred to or recommendations made to be pertinent and possiblyapplicable to the planning of future operations.
2.19. In our view, the format of the Project Completion Report, slightly different from thatof the Completion Report on the Second Education Project (Credit 624-ZR), providesworthwhile pointers for personnel who may be responsible for coordinating activities underfuture projects.
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BORROWER'S OBSERVATIONS ON PART mI OF THE PCR
Table 4: Projected and Actual Dates for Completion of Project Components
Component 6: Means of transportation for inspectors
These activities were completed in March 1990.
The first bidder did not withdraw because of poor and slow procurementprocedures, but because of IDA's refusal to consent to mark-up of unit costsfollowing a change in the yen/US$ exchange rate; since the bid wasdenominated in dollars, the bidder needed to increase the amount to be ableto supply the entire package of goods and services required. The Bankrecommended that a second bidding competition be organized with theassistance of specialized international agency. The equipment had alreadyarrived by the closing date of the Credit period.
Component 10: Technical Assistance
- Numerous consultants assigned to the project made no contribution to it atall, although this component accounted for over 60% of total project cost.
- The Government, which had expected to benefit from their special services,instead devoted considerable time to resolving problems peculiar to consultingand technical assistance personnel as a group.
- The comparative advantage seems disproportionate.
Table 5: Project Costs (by Component)
- Actual costs: Figures forwarded in BPE letters Nos. 324/91 of December 18,1991 and 054/92 of March 20, 1992.
- Additional copies are attached for your convenience.
Table 11: Compliance with Credit Agreement Obligations
- Section 3.08, Degree of Compliance: Carried out and vehicles distributedsince May 1991 by regional DEPS offices.
- Section 3.10, Degree of Compliance: In fact, 14 meetings were held - five in1985, three in 1986, one in 1987, four in 1988 and one in 1989 (V.accompanying certification).
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TABLE 1 PROVIDED BY THE BORROWER
MINISTRY OF PRIMARY, SECONDARY. AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATIONEducation Projects Office
CREDIT 1519-0 ZRMeetings of Coordination Committee
Year Number of Meetings
1985 51986 31987 11988 41989 1
Given in Kinshasa, April 7, 1992
Director of Projects
/s/ Ihando A. Kambembo
SEAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL EDUCATION,REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE
TABLE 2 PROVIDED BY THE BORROWER
A. TOTAL ANNUAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TRANSFERS TO PROJECT ACCOUNT(in zaires)
IAmount of_ms of Credit Objectives Tear of Status Ccmenta
Credit US f Apiracmlllion
The project's objective was to help There were considerable delays in projectfinance the construction, implementation, and a shortfall in therehabilitation and equipment of attainment of project objectives because ofsecondary teacher training schools, cost increases caused by the high inflation
First teacher trainer training and Closing rate, devaluation of the zaire. delay inEducation 6.5 primary and technical education 1971 date counterpart funds, which were insufficientProject inspector training, curricula Dec. 31, in any case, and the rwo wars that broke
(Credit 272- development and improvement at 1981 out in the country. ImplementationZR) selected technical schools, and a difficulties were also caused by
study on improving the Department's imperfections in the architectural plans, amanagement of the system. lack of communication between the firm of
architects and the consultants responsible Wfor equipment, and mediocre projectmanagement by the PMU, which had receivedinadequate support from DEN.
The main objective was to provide There were considerable delays at allsupport for the Government's rural stages of project implementation. Thesedevelopment policy by constructing delays and galloping inflation prompted theand equipping five rural teacher revision of the project in 1981. The
Second training schools, rehabilitating Closing Government was unable to meet theEducation 21 and re-equipping six agricultural 1976 date conditions required to carry out theProject technician training schools and one Sept. 30, revised project; the Credit was canceled
(Credit 624- higher institute of agriculture, 1982 with an undisbursed balance of US$18.8ZR) and providing technical assistance million. The reasons for the
and scholarships for those implementation delays were the sam asestablishments. The project also those mentioned in the case of the Firstfinanced studies with a view to a Project.future project and resources toimprove the administration,management and financing ofeducation.
B Proiect Calendar
Table 2: PLANNED AND ACTUAL DATES OF PROJECT TIMETABLE
Item Planned Dates Actual Dates
Pre-Appraisal April 1983 April 1983
Preparation DEPS assisted by a consultancy firm - 1983 1983
Appraisal Mission February 1984 February 15-29, 1984
Credit Negotiation May-June 1984 May 31-June 1, 1984
Approval June 1984 September 11, 1984
Signature of Credit December 19, 1984
Credit Effectiveness October 1984 April 9, 1985
Closing Date March 31, 1988 March 31, 1991
Final Disbursement September 30, 1988 August 19, 1991
C Credit Dibursments
Table 3: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
B. Appraisal Disbursement:Adjustment according to 1875 5400 8800 9950 (10150) (10200) (10350) (10350)exchange rate SDR/US$
C. Actual Disbursement 1323 2830 4450 6300 7900 8600 9360 9375
D. Actual Disbursement(in % of total adjusted 15,7 32,0 47,2 63,4 77,8 84,2 90,4 90,6credit)
E. Actual Disbursement(in % of adjusted 70,5 52,4 50,6 63,4 77,8 84,2 90,4 90,6appraisal estimate)
Date of last disbusement: August 19, 1991.
All amounts are equivalent in dollars at the date of appraisal (ISDR = 1.0465 US dollars)The amounts are adjusted by taking into account the exchange rate between the US$ and the SDR% calculated according to the total credit expressed in US$ by converting 8.6 million SDR at the median exchangerate US$/SDR of that particular year.
/ / E ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Revision (February 87)40.00 ' R o ( /-- Revision (April 90)
3000/ Actual Disbursement
2000
1000
1985 1980 1987 1988 1989 *990 1991 1992
D. Project ImplementatioL
Table 4: PLANNED AND ACTUAL COMPLETRON DATES OF COMPONENTS
Project COmponent f Planned Completion | Actual Competio - months of Delay _a Cna--D
1 Planning and statistics* - Consultation caittee March 86 Not carried out- Organization of structure June 86 Not carried out
- Rehabilitation of office space June 86 Suspeaded - The rehabilitation of office apace was postponed to alater project so that it could be thought out within thefrmework of a general redistribution of infrastructure-ong the offices of the DEPS.
- equipmet June 86 May 07- (11 months)
- publication of statisticalyearbook: June 86 January 89
first yearbook -(36 months) t The delay was due to late installation andputting into service of the central data processingequipnt. Cooputerized data processing and theproduction of the yearbook have been carried out vith new
June 87 Not carried out software expertise contracted following the departure of _*scond yearbook June 88 Not carried out the fir originally hired for the Projet.third yearbook
2. School mpping- Phba I s adiba region December 86 IJUn 1988 -(18 month.) The amal for this study vas prepared but
never published.
- Pbas 2 t Kenge region September 87 Not carried out - The lack of counterpart funds wae given as the minreaon for non-implamentation. Th witch in consultantsmld-Project also delayed Implementation.
- Pbahe 3 s Tehela region December 88 not carried out - This third phas vw introduced to replace ths ue ofstelLte coverage originally planned (decision datedOctober 1985). The reaons for non-implentation arethe sm as for Phase 2.
- Final reports School mapping September 88 Not carried out Imthodology
0'01-'O m,
3. Production of textbooks- Purchase of 200.000 manuals March 86 January 86 (2 months) 184.000 student textbooks and 4,600 teachers'- Distribution of manuals handbooks
Das-Zaire Region September 86 April 88Equator September 86 October 88 (19 months) - Distribution vas delayed for lack of
counterpart funds. vhich held up payment of both storagecharges and distribution costs. Distribution vas carriedout by utilizing conventional contribution channels forthe individual schools (Catholic. Protestant andKimbangulit). An evaluation of this distribution (over
- Cost recovery procedures March 86 July 86 952 of the textbooks reached their destination) wasconducted in March 1989.
(4 mois)
4. Technical education A validated questionnasire was produced in April 1987.- Survey December 85 Not carried out The survey vas never conducted because of lack of- Teacher upgrading (40 people x 3 July 86 Not carried out counterpart funds but also because of the witch inmonths) consultants. The consultant responeible for revising the- Revision of curricula August 87 Not carried out programs never produced his report.- Final report September 87 Not carried out
S. Strengthening of the Depar nt- Study of Department'sadministration June 86 June 87 - (12 montba): The delay vas attributable to the poor N
central administration quality of the preliminary study produced by the cotechnical consultants. The final propoaals submitted tothe Goverent were never followed up by any comments.
March 88 Not carried outregional administration December 86 August 87 -(8 months): The conclusions from these studies were
- Study of the Department's never put into practice because of the inability tobudgetary and accounting management computerize these management systems (delay in conmonent
7) and developments resulting from the reforms to theState Budget by the PRAIGEFI Project.
August 88 Not carried out- Implementation of studyconclusions December 86 Not completed
(procedure manuals) - 12 transmitter-receivers vere purchased. Three were- Radio commnic ations system installed (used in conjunction with equipment from the
SECOP8 unit). The delays were due to poor procurementprocedures, failure of Departnt to decide on sites, andthe lack of counterpart funds to pay for theirinstallation.
6. Training of Principals andInspectors March 86 March 1990 - (48 months). The first bidder withdrew because of poor- means of transportation for and slow procurement procedures and also because of IDA'sinspectors refusal to consent to a mark up of unit costs following a
change in the Yen/US$ exchange rate; since the bid wasdetermined in dollars. the bidder needed to increase theamount to be able to supply the entire package of goodsand services required.
March 86 December 1989(partially) - (45 months) 200 copies of a guide for administrators
- Training programs were produced but were not distributed because it wasconsidered too theoretical and untested.
July 86September 88 )December 1989 - Carried out only very partially: 140 people trained.
- Training for trainers ) September 88 )Not completed Delays attributable to lack of counterpart funds and.- Training for principals ) 2,400 above all. to the weakness of the technical expertise.- Training for inspectors ) persons
7. Data processing- Rehabilitation of office space March 86 July 88 -(28 months). Rehabilitation satisfactory. Delays
attributable to slow procurement procedures and poor- Computer hardware June 86 July 89 selection cf bidders.
- (36 months). Delays attributable to slow procurementprocedures and to the technical requirements for the site(air-conditioning, grounding) that vere not met. Thiscomponent was finally launched witb new software expertscontracted following the departure of the firm originally- Computerization of personnel September 88 Not carried out hired for the Project.
ImanagementThe computerization of personnel management was developedin the course of the Project by another unit of theDepartmenc (SECOPE). This duplication of services wasattributable to the lack of any clear policy on the part
septembre 88 Not carried out of the Department and to the technical expert's inability- Computerization of financial septembre 88 Not carried out to fit into the Department. As soon as the Project'smn8agement technical expert left, the Credit becam involved in the- Computerization of exAmination operation of this unit (supplementary equipment andcorrection technical expertise).
(8) Local Training- PL- malg *nd statistic. (66 popl d6cambre 87S 3)- School mappng Juillet 86 Not carried out- Technlcal edouation (40 people s 3 acOt 88 Not carried out 'Umonths) septebre 88 Partially carried 140 people attended a seminar.- Iducatie management (144 people) out- Principals and Inspectors (2400 |people) a( above) ___.__._._._._,_,_ ,_I
(9) Training outside Zaire- 27 people for 168 m/h December 87 December 89 28 people trained. While the training was satisfactory,
it was, in certain cases, considered too theoretical andunrelated to Zaire's problems.
(10) Technical Assistance- 9 long-term experts 294 months December 88 December 89 Numerous consultants assigned to the project made no
contribution to it at all, although this component- 18 short-term experts 78 mois Throughout project accounted for over 602 of total project cost. TheGovernment, which had expected to benefit from theirspecial services, instead devoted considerable time toresolving problems peculiar to consulting and technicalassistance personnel as a group.
h.3. Since this was a technical assistance project, the dates initially projected in the project implementation timetable were extended toallow for the actual arrival in Zaire of the technical assistance firm.
4- o0 ~
m mo i-D(0t
- 31 -
E. Pro1ect Expenditures and Financina
Table 5: PROJECT COSTS (BY COMPONENT)
COUPOKT COST BSTIMM% AT APP86lBSAL;
l ___________________________________ Loc eost lor. oxebac a Tot l ccat1. Planning and statistics 109.3 692.8 802.12. School mapping 145.6 863.3 1,008.93. Production of textbooks 91.5 506.5 598.04. Technical education 212.0 796.3 1,008.35. Strengthening of the Department 551.1 1,769.9 2,321.06. Training of principals and inspectors 218.4 1,238.9 1,457.37. Data processing 187.5 2,060.9 2,248.48. Project administration 149.6 598.4 748.09. Project Preparation Facility --- 473.0 473.0
TOTAL 1,665.0 9,000.0 10,665.0
Data provided by the Government on actual cost by component (Table B ofPart II) are incomplete (for 1985 to 1988 only) and unreliable since thefigures are incompatible vith Bank disbursement data (Tables 5 (a) andTable 14]. For this reason, it vas not possible to compute actual costs bycomponent.
Local cost For. exchange Total cost Local coat For. exchange Total cost
1. Rehabilitation of office space 40.0 60.0 100.0 34.5 126.9 161.42. Equipment, supplies and materials 79.0 1,330.0 1,409.0 49.2 919.7 968.93. Distribution and printing of textbooks 228.0 150.0 378.0 47.2 250.1 297.34. (a) Vehicles (bicycles, motorcycles and 5.0 128.0 133.0 239.5 239.5
outboard motors) 262.0 262.0 131.5 131.5(b) All other vehicles 392.0 4,338.0 4,730.0 0.5 4,950.5 4,951.0
5. Consultant and expert services and surveys 481.0 340.0 821.0 28.7 10.3 39.06. (a) Training in Zaire 672.0 672.0 3.8 747.6 751.4
(b) Training outside Zaire 40.0 40.0 3.1 37.8 40.97. Audits 104.0 90.0 194.0 8.5 3.4 11.98. Materials and printing for statistical
forms 60.0 60.0 3.5 59.0 62.59. Fuel, lubricants and spare parts for 473.0 473.0 438.8 438.8
vehicles under Category (4b) above 336.0** 1,057.0 1,393.0 ***51.8 51.810. PPF 4.1 4.111. Unallocated (exchange rate losses) w
TOTAL 1,665.0 9,000.0 10,665.0 179 7,971.0 8,150.0
* The figures shown here are those given in the Project cost tablea. They aho minor differences compared to the figuresincluded in the Credit Agreement.
** With reapect to the Govermnt's sha re, this amount refers to physical and price contingencies.
*5* Punda credited to the special account (broken down by unallocated categories)
- 33 -
Table 6: PROJECT FINANCING(million USS)
Funding Sources - Progammed I :I eviscd - -al_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~~~ (N e ota ti o ) - : -: -
IDA 9 & 815
Government Counterpart 1.67 -- 0.97
TOTAL COST 10.67 -- 9.12
Table 7: PLANNED, REVISED AND ACTUAL ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS('000 US$)
CATEGORIES Nogotistione X.viseod- RwS*.4 Ctuii lI Estimate Estimate Estimate Ditbuie.ment
1. Rehabilitation 7. Auditing2. Equipmnt, supplies and 8. Equipsent and
materials statistical forms3. Distribution and 9. Fuel, lubricant andimpression of manuals spare parts for4.a. Vahiclea (Bicycles, vehicles (cat. 4.b)motorcycles, and 10. Initial deposit inoutboard motor boat) the Special Account4.b. All other vehicles II. PPF (pro-investmentS. Consultants and experts study)6.a. Training in Zaire 12. Unallocated/6.b. Training overseas unclassified by
cateqories
- 35 -
F. Prolect Results
Table 8: TRAINING PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT(FORECAST AND ACCOMPLISHED)
____-________|________t: * Tt | *| -
A. OVERSEAS
1) Planning 3 2 6 3 3 61,5
2) School map 2 6 12 2 6 12
3) Administra- 10 9 90 13 2 x 0.3 90.6tion/Management 2 x 3
______ ____ _ ______ _____ _____ 1 x 12
4) Computer 2 9 18 3 3 9science
5 )Technical 6 3 18 3 3 9study 18_3
6) School manuals 3 1 x 9 21 3 1 x 9 212 x 6 2 x 6
7) Project 1 3 3 1 3 3management _
L TOTAL 1 271 - 168 J 28 -- 150.6
B. LOCAL _ _ _ _
1) Planning/ 198 _ _ 10 85 _ _ --Statistics
2) School map 20 0.5 120 25 __ -_
3) Technical 40 3 -- 0 __ -_
study
4) Educational 144 _ _ - 0 __ -_
Management
5) Directors/ 2400 __ __ 140 _Inspectors I I
TOTAL 280 2[ [ 250 -
Length and total in months.
- 36 -
Table 9: IInIASTIUCTOUZ. GOODS UD 1Q01r
1WRATI~UE.GoODS 'Am mIZN! I I. Rbhabilitation 600 if 600 at
2. Data processing centers I Iacility, electric poer. air-conditioning
A 'super-mini computerTwo mini computersSoftware development
3. School textbooks 200.000 textbooks 188 600 textbooks
*. Radio co=micatioa system by S0 centers 12 tranumitter-receivers procuredtrancoitt r/reeoi:r S installed
5. Transportation for tho inspectors 90 motorcycles Procured. not delivered*0 bicycles9 outto mdotors
6. Other vebicls and equipmnt 9 vehiclesI conputer Procured and deliveredSO pi ce of . ic _ .q i m _ ... ,..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Table LOt STUDIES
= ~ ~ ~ ~~ T : = : = .m 1 -- ' -0! 00-|ZCS~IHrlslg'3000!0 0STWI~ ~ ~~. , , s a i, , X asxcr uomxyv OURI ago X1W lw n-w i- yL
1. Scbool sapping Develop a School mapping methodology Carried out in one No impactmethodology ftolloing a pilot project. suitable for region. Methodology not
us in other regions of the country yet prepared.l ~~~~~~~~(-R48?-
2. Study of The study of technical and vocational Not carried out no impacttehnical chools Il to help determine whicbeducation achoolare to be selected for
*dditional quipment developmnt ofcurricula and training for tebor
.. _________________________ _ train er i g for t_ c
3. School textbooks Toot and evaluate nw metbods of Carried out in two The satisfactory results in termsproduction, distribution and coat regions of distribution prompted plans forrecovery for textbooks (PR.50). a more extensive operation in a
*. Hanagemnt o. the To conduct an in-depth Study of the Partially carried out Since the Goveruent never issuedDepartment Departsents administrative and its co_mnte on the Study's
financial structures at the national, conclusions. its impact can beregional and local level. Conclusions rbSrdod * negligiblto fore the basis of the policy for tr sphysical and administrativereorlaniuation of the Department(Pa 2).
5. Project To prepare a pro;*ct to follow the Carried out It is too soon to assese itsPreparation Third education Project. impat in light of tbh recent
changes in Zaire.
G. Status of Credit Covenants
Table II: COMPLIANCE WITH CREDIT COVENANTS
SECllON [ OBUGATIONS TO BE MET By BORROWER TIME FRAME | DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE
3.01 (a) To furnish funds, facilities and resources needed for Throughout project Only partially camed out.Project implementation.
3.01 (c) To open a "Project Funds" account and to deposit in By the deadlines Only Z 5.0 million of the Z 10.0 budgeted was paid into the account in 1985,it an initial amount equivalent to US$20,000 prior to set Z 9.5 million of the Z 18.5 million budgeted in 1986; Z 10 million of theproject effectiveness and additional amounts Z 35 million budgeted in 1987; Z 17 million of the Z 20 million budgeted inequivalent to US$50,000 by April 1, 1985 and 1988 (Z 40 million requested). Government funds have, in general, fallenUS$30,000 by July 1, 1985. To make payments at the short of proven needs and have been paid after considerable delays. Thesebeginning of each quarter corresponding to the points are two of the major reasons for the delays and time lags in Projectexpenditures estimated for the quarter. implementation.
3.02 To provide the services As soon as possible in the The 8 long-term experts from the technical assistanoe firm started work in- of long-term experts case of the experts and as July 1985. Half of the experts had already been replaced by the end of the- of short-term consultants needed in the case of the first year. The hiring of consultants was usually done as the need arose but
consultants with major delays and, in many cases, when the equipment needed for thework was not yet available. The competence of certain experts was wquestionable, as was the quality of the work done by the team, which lackeda united approach.
3.03(a) To supply - or arrange for the supply of -- the As needed Carried out.imported items, financed out of the proceeds of theCreditL
3.03(b) To ensure that the items and services financed out of Throughout the Project Carried out, in general, although the 1969 audit noted that various pieces ofthe proceeds of the Credit are assigned exdusively to equipment purchased under the Project had disappeared and, despite anthe Projet enquiry, had not been traced.
3.04(a) To provide IDA with plans, specifications, reports, As needed Carried out but often delayed.wai schedules and procumrement documents.
3.04(b) To keep the accounts and adopt whatever procedures Throughout the The accounting documents and inventories were often poorly kept despiteare needed to ensure the smooth progres of te Project the training gien to the accountant at the strt of the Project. ProcurementProjectL procedures were often poorly carried out.
uo3.05(a) To provide asance that school fees (Minerval) arc September 1985 Not carried ouL 0
kept by tbr chooLs. -£0 1,
o X-! ,9 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~11
3.05(b) To establish a plan for the use of the revenue from September 1985 The Decree and the Depanrtmental Circular were published in July 1986.textbook rental.
3.06 To submit to IDA, for its approval, the list of schools As soon as possible Ust submitted in July 1984 and deemed satisfactory.where the textbooks financed out of the proceods ofthe Credit are to be distributed.
3.07 To submit tentative plans to IDA for changing the 18 months after The document containing proposals for the Department's reorganization wasDepariment's structure and procedures. Project effectiveness submitted in August 1986. IDA felt that it needed to be reworked and
rewritten. The final version was submitted in June 1981.
3.08 To submit to IDA, for its agreement, the procedures At the appropriate time Carried out but vehides only distributed as from May 1991.for the organization and management of a fund forvehicles for regional education officials.
3.09 The Project Office was to prepare and submit to IDA By the dates set There were considerable delays in submitting both the work programs andfor approval: the progress reports. The reports were, on several occasions, considered(a) A work program for the year to come by inadequate and had to be rewritten.November I of each year(b) A progress report and evaluation of the previousyear's activities by March 31 of each year(c) A list of candidates for training outside Zaire; theprograms and institutions involved in trainingseminars in Zairem
3.10 The Government was to set up an inter-Departmental As soon as possible The Committee was estabfished by Decree in July 1984 and met five times inCoordinating Committee which was to meet quarerly 1985. Three meetings also took place in 1986. It met once in 1987, fourto examine the work programs, the budgets and the times in 1988 and once in 1989. Because of the infrequency during someProjwect progress repots. years of its meeting, the Committee was therefore unable to adequately
perform its role of monitoring the Project or helping to solve any problemsencountered.
4.01 Project audits. Each year Obligation met, although there were major delays in submitting the reports.
4.02 Audit of the Project Funds account and of the Special Within 6 months of the The audit scheduled for December 1985 eventually took place in May 1986Account by the Departmcnt of Finance, Budgeting accounts being opened and the reportw as submitted to IDA in August 1986.and the Portfolio.
0~JQm -3
0 XI-
Iv ~
- 39 -
IL Use of Bank's Human Resources
Table 12: STAFF INPUTS BY STAGE OF PROJECT CYCLE IN STAFF WEEKS
