Document of
The World Bank
Report No: NCO00004670
NOTE ON CANCELLED OPERATION REPORT
(IDA-53630)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 52.2 MILLION
(US$80 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
FOR A
SOUTH SUDAN – EASTERN AFRICA REGIONAL TRANSPORT, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT FACILITATION PROJECT
FIRST PHASE OF PROGRAM
April 9, 2019
Transport Global Practice
Africa Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective September 30, 2018)
Currency Unit = South Sudan Pound (SSP)
SSP149.32 = US$1
SDR1 = US$1.39525000
FISCAL YEAR
July 1 - June 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AfDB African Development Bank
ASA Advisory Services & Analytics
CPMS Corridor Performance Monitoring System
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC Eastern Africa Community
EATTFP East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project
EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction
ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
FSI Fragile States Index
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GRSS Government of the Republic of South Sudan
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IDA International Development Association
IEG Independent Evaluation Group
IPF Investment Project Financing
JIMC Joint Inter-Ministerial Committee
KeNHA Kenya National Highway Authority
KICTA Kenya Information and Communications Technology Agency
KRA Kenya Revenue Authority
MoFCEP Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Planning
MoTI Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Kenya
MoTPS Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services
MTRB Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges, South Sudan
OPRC Output and Performance-Based Road Contract
OSBP One Stop Border Post
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PMT Project Management Team
SETIDP Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project
SOP Series of Projects
SSCS South Sudan Customs Services
SSNBS South Sudan National Bureau of Standards
SSRA South Sudan Roads Authority
TA Technical Assistance
UN United Nations
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem
Country Director: Carolyn Turk
Practice Manager: Maria Marcela Silva
Project Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed
NCO Team Leader: Emmanuel Taban
NCO Primary Author: Alan G. Carroll
The World Bank (P131426)
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Africa
South Sudan- Eastern Africa Regional Transport , Trade and Development Facilitation Program (Phase
One)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
D A T A S H E E T ............................................................................................................................................. 2
A. BASIC INFORMATION ................................................................................................................................ 2
B. KEY DATES .................................................................................................................................................... 2
C. RATINGS SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 2
D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES .................................................................................................................. 2
E. BANK STAFF .................................................................................................................................................. 3
F. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs ............................................................................... 4
1. CONTEXT, PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN ............................................. 5
2. POST-APPROVAL EXPERIENCE AND REASONS FOR CANCELLATION .................................... 12
3. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................... 15
4. LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................................................................................... 18
ANNEX 1: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES . 20
ANNEX 2: LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................... 23
M A P .................................................................................................................................................................. 24
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D A T A S H E E T
A. BASIC INFORMATION
Country: Africa Project Name:
South Sudan- Eastern
Africa Regional
Transport, Trade and
Development Facilitation
Program (Phase One)
Project ID: P131426 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-53630
NCO Date: 01/07/2019
Financing Instrument: IPF Borrower: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
SUDAN
Original Total
Commitment: USD 80.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 1.84M
Revised Amount: USD 9.57M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies:
Ministry of Roads and Bridges
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B. KEY DATES
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 01/17/2013 Effectiveness: 12/31/2014 12/22/2014
Appraisal: 11/25/2013 Closing: 12/30/2019 09/14/2018
Approval: 05/20/2014
C. RATINGS SUMMARY
Performance Rating by NCO
Outcomes: Not Applicable
Risk to Development Outcome: Not Applicable
Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
D. SECTOR AND THEME CODES
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Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Information and Communications Technologies
ICT Infrastructure 19 19
Transportation
Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 59 59
Public Administration - Transportation 15 15
Industry, Trade and Services
Public Administration - Industry, Trade and
Services 7 7
Original Actual
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Economic Policy 63 63
Trade 63 63
Trade Facilitation 63 63
Private Sector Development 22 22
Jobs 12 12
Job Creation 12 12
Public Private Partnerships 10 10
Urban and Rural Development 24 24
Rural Development 12 12
Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 12 12
Urban Development 12 12
Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 12 12
E. BANK STAFF
Positions At NCO At Approval
Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Makhtar Diop
Country Director: Carolyn Turk Bella Bird
Practice Manager: Maria Marcela Silva Supee Teravaninthorn
Project Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Tesfamichael Nahusenay
Mitiku
NCO Team Leader: Emmanuel Taban
The World Bank (P131426)
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NCO Primary Author: Alan G. Carroll
F. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 08/26/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory
0.00
2 04/09/2015 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
0.60
3 12/01/2015 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
2.33
4 06/28/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately
Satisfactory
2.80
5 03/23/2017 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
1.70
6 03/06/2018 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 1.81
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1. CONTEXT, PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND DESIGN
Country Context
1. The South Sudan - Eastern Africa Regional Transport, Trade and Development Facilitation Project
(SS-EARTTDFP) was conceived as a key element of a multi-country program (see the next section). By
2013, when this project was identified and prepared, the Bank had been supporting regional integration
through multi-country programs for a number of years. This approach was first formalized in 2008, with
the publication of the Bank’s Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. 1 A
subsequent Bank strategy document, Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It,2 issued in 2011,
reinforced the importance of the regional development approach, which was seen as especially relevant
from the infrastructure and trade perspectives, to overcome the physical disadvantages of land-locked
countries such as South Sudan. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) of the SS-EARTTDFP laid out
the regional development rationale and expected benefits in detail.3
2. The economy of South Sudan, which became an independent country in 2011, has been dominated
by oil exports. The country is dependent on its principal southern neighbors, Uganda and Kenya, for its
flows of formal trade with the outside world. These links are restricted due to limited transport access and
logistical/institutional bottlenecks. South Sudan remains extremely fragile, lacking many of the basic
conditions to support development. At the time of appraisal of the SS-EARTTDFP, South Sudan was
estimated to have a population of about 12.3 million and a GDP of US$9.3 billion (2012). With a land area
of about 648,000 sq. km, South Sudan is endowed with abundant natural resources, including a large
amount of good quality rain-fed agricultural land, potentially irrigable land, aquatic and forest resources,
and significant oil reserves. Yet, in 2016, more than 82 percent of South Sudanese were living under the
international poverty line (poverty headcount), placing South Sudan amongst the poorest countries in the
world. Currently, South Sudan ranks 181 out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index, including
an average life expectancy of only 56 years.4 The continuing internal conflict has impeded the application
of effective macroeconomic policies and aggravated South Sudan’s economic collapse, as reflected in
significant monetization of the fiscal deficit, high inflation, a wide spread between the official and the
parallel market exchange rates, and disrupted trade flows.5
3. The World Bank had been a partner since 2005 in the establishment of the Sudan Multi-Donor
Trust Fund-National (MDTF-N) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS). These
MDTFs were intended to follow up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan signed in
January 2005.6
1 The World Bank, Report No. 43022-AFR, March 18, 2008. 2 The World Bank, February 2011. See various parts of the document; see especially “Box 9: Regional approaches as game changers”. 3 Project Appraisal Document, South Sudan – Eastern Africa Regional Transport, Trade and Development Facilitation Project, First
Phase of Program, Report No. PAD646, April 15, 2014, pp. 1-6. 4 South Sudan Economic Update, July 2018, World Bank. 5 Op. cit. 6 The 2005 CPA was an accord signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The
CPA was meant to end the second Sudanese civil war, develop democratic governance, and share oil revenues. It also set a timetable
for a Southern Sudan independence referendum.
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4. The history of the SS-EARTTDFP, from its inception, has been intertwined with prolonged armed
conflict. The end of the second Sudanese civil war in 2005 ushered in a period of relative calm leading to
the foundation of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. Immediately thereafter in 2012, the country started
to experience scattered inter-ethnic warfare, and South Sudanese forces carried out a short-lived seizure of
the Heglig oil fields in lands claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. In December 2013, fighting broke
out between forces loyal to the President his former deputy, igniting the South Sudanese civil war. Ugandan
troops were deployed alongside South Sudanese government forces against the rebels. The United Nations
sent peacekeepers to the country as part of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This
phase of the conflict focused mainly on the Upper Nile and Jonglei regions in the north of the country.
Numerous ceasefires were mediated and subsequently broken. A peace agreement was signed in Ethiopia
in August 2015 under threat of United Nations sanctions for both sides. The conflict erupted again in July
2016, this time extending south to the Equatoria regions where the SS-EARTTDFP-financed regional road
was located. Violent military operations caused massive population displacement and the destruction of
livelihoods, which in turn fueled the creation of multiple localized armed groups. In September 2018, a
“Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan” was signed between the
government and the opposition in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, armed conflict and violence against
civilians have continued.
5. Throughout these years of warfare, thousands of civilians have been killed, widespread human
rights abuses have been documented, essential civilian infrastructure such as clinics, hospitals, and schools,
have been looted, destroyed, and abandoned, and more than four million people have been forced to flee
their homes, about 200,000 of whom are sheltering in United Nations compounds and hundreds of
thousands as refugees in neighboring countries.7 Through the end of 2018, about 400,000 people were
estimated to have been killed in the war. As of the writing of this NCO, the food security situation has
continued to deteriorate, with nearly seven million people, or two-thirds of the country, facing extreme
hunger, according to leading international aid agencies.
Sectoral Context
6. As of 2012, South Sudan’s road network totaled 12,642 km, of which around 4,000 km were all-
weather gravel roads and the rest were tracks and trails. Maintenance was weak, so that most roads were
in poor to very poor condition, especially in rural areas that are largely inaccessible during the six-month
rainy season (April to October). These conditions made transportation in South Sudan slower and more
expensive than almost anywhere else in Africa. This, in turn, hindered farmers’ access to key inputs and
their ability to move their products to local and regional markets.8 Shortly before the SS-EARTTDFP was
prepared, the World Bank had assessed the country’s transport sector management institutions as being “at
a formative stage”, with the capacity of the Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MRB), which had the overall
responsibility for the road infrastructure, as weak.9 More recently, the Bank has observed that, since the
conflict re-started in 2016, no road works of any kind have been carried out, and sector institutions have
become dysfunctional.
7 Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/africa/south-sudan# 8 Implementation Completion and Results Report, South Sudan Rural Roads Project, Report No: ICR00004114, World Bank, June 12,
2017. 9 Op. cit.
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7. Soon after South Sudan was founded, when there was considerable goodwill in the international
community toward the country, the World Bank and other development partners sought opportunities to
support activities that would produce substantial development impacts while being relatively simple and
straightforward, in view of the country’s very limited capacity. As a result of a 2013 donors consultative
meeting focused on South Sudan and Kenya, the improvement of the key Juba-Nadapal road section within
South Sudan of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor (extending into Kenya) provided a good prospect for
an intervention that met the aforementioned criteria. The engineering design studies for this road segment
had been carried out under a project financed by the MDTF-SS.
8. The PAD for the SS-EARTTDFP observed that, geographically, the southeastern states of South
Sudan are the closest to the sea ports and agricultural markets in the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and
Kenya. The development potential along the Juba-Nadapal road includes agriculture production (forestry,
fishery, tea, coffee, cereals, live-animal and animal products); cement and lime industries; and mining of
gold and semi-precious stones. The improved road also would facilitate the delivery of social and
administrative services and promote commercial services, including storage facilities and road-side
businesses.
9. From the regional standpoint, intra- and inter-regional trade and development were being hampered
by the relatively poor transport links between the countries of Eastern Africa, the unsatisfactory
performance of the ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam, the high cost of internet access in South Sudan,
and an array of technical, political and policy-related factors.10 The Juba - Nadapal - Eldoret road was
envisioned as an extension of one of the East African Community (EAC) road corridors linking South
Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, and further connecting to the Dar-es-Salaam – Dodoma – Isaka
corridor, which joins the Trans East African Highway at Dodoma. The Juba - Nadapal - Eldoret road also
was seen as a complement to the Kampala-Juba-Addis Ababa corridor development, facilitated by the
African Development Bank (AfDB), which shares the Juba – Kapoeta section (240 km) and links South
Sudan to Djibouti port.
Rationale for Bank involvement
10. By the time that South Sudan gained independence, the World Bank had become invested as a
leading development partner for the country, to some extent because of its role as the manager of the
MDTF-SS. Over the period from late 2012 through the end of 2013, when the EARTTDFP was prepared
and appraised, South Sudan, despite suffering from some low-level, localized conflicts, was judged by the
Bank and other development agencies to offer good prospects for socio-economic progress, provided that
international support would be forthcoming.
11. The South Sudan project was packaged as part of a regional program (see below). At that time, the
World Bank considered that it had developed a valuable body of experience and expertise with regional
(multi-country) operations, making it well placed to take the lead in the proposed EARTTDFP.
12. Another significant element of the Bank’s involvement was that, at the time that the project was
prepared, the Bank had declared itself ready to increase assistance to fragile and conflict-affected countries
10 High logistics costs, cumbersome customs regulations, informal cartels, and limited competition in the trucking industry. Supply
chains to South Sudan are long and rely on a sequence of discrete operations involving many procedures, agencies and services, all of
which are prone to rent-seeking and over-regulation.
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(FCCs).11 The Bank was in the process of establishing a fragile states hub in Nairobi, and had, in the
“Africa’s Future” report of 2011, expressed its willingness to take risks in supporting fragile and conflict
affected countries, as reflected in the document’s statement, “As an operating principle, we should view
the Bank’s primary reputational risk in fragile and conflict situations as the risk of operational inefficacy,
that is, of not achieving results in peace consolidation and early development.”12
Project Development Objective
13. The project development objective was to enhance regional connectivity and integration of the
Recipient with its Eastern Africa neighboring countries, and its access to sea ports.
Program and Project Components
14. Multi-Country Program. The EARTTDFP program was to be implemented as a three-phase
Series of Projects (SOP) using Investment Project Financing (IPF). The program met the guidelines for
IDA Regional Program Funding. The provisional scale of the overall program was estimated at about
US$1.3 billion. The first project, which is the subject of this NCO, had a total cost of US$255 m., of which
US$80 m. were to be from an IDA credit, US$150 m. were to be provided by the China Export Import
Bank as a loan (parallel financing), and US$25 m. were to be counterpart funds from the Government of
the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS).
15. The second phase of the regional program (P148853), covering Kenya, was approved by the World
Bank’s Board on June 11, 2015, with a closing date of December 31, 2021. It has a total cost of US$676
m., comprising an IDA credit of US$500 m. to the Government of Kenya and US$176 m. in government
counterpart funding. Component 1 covers upgrading the Lokichar-Nadapal/Nakodok road in Kenya up to
the limits with South Sudan. Component 2 includes support for the implementation of trade facilitation
measures, including designing a One Stop Border Post on the border of South Sudan and Kenya, a social
infrastructure needs assessment, design and implementation of pastoralist roadside markets, and
implementation of trade and development facilitation measures, including designing export processing
zones, provision of site and services, and certification of products.
16. The third project in the program, as yet not prepared, was intended to enhance support to trade
facilitation measures along the priority corridors linking South Sudan to Mombasa and Djibouti seaports
and finance the rehabilitation of the remaining sections of the Nadapal - Eldoret road in Kenya not financed
under the first and second projects. This project was estimated to cost about US$175 million.
17. The South Sudan project covered the following:
a) Component 1: Support to the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges (MTRB) (US$222
million of which IDA financing was US$47 million). The sub-components were: (a): Upgrading
of approximately 125 km of the Juba-Torit road section of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor. This
was to be financed mainly by a loan from the China EXIM Bank (as parallel co-financing to the
project). (b): (i) Construction and rehabilitation, within the Recipient’s territory, of bridges between
11 Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It, op. cit., p. 34, para. 99. 12 Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s Support to It, op. cit., p. 37, para. 113.
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Kapoeta and Nadapal and upgrading of approximately 40 km of the Kapoeta- Narus road section
of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor and (ii) related supervision costs. (c): Road repairs of
approximately 190 km of road sections, within the Recipient’s territory, between Torit and Kapoeta,
and Narus and Nadapal.
b) Component 2: Facilitation of Regional Transport, Trade and Development (US$12 million of
IDA financing). This component aimed to support promotion of sound transport, trade and
development facilitation measures, increasing the efficiency of the corridors. This included: (a):
Support to the Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Planning (MOFCEP) and the South
Sudan Customs Service (SSCS) in the facilitation of regional trade and transport through the
establishment of an institutional base and legal framework, including: (i) the harmonization of
customs procedures and the legal establishment of a One Stop Border Post (OSBP) in Nadapal; (ii)
the provision of advisory services for the modernization of the Recipient’s custom services; (iii)
the implementation of an integrated border management system; and (iv) the provision of advisory
services and equipment for the establishment of a trade information platform within the MOFCEP.
(b): Support to MTRB in the facilitation of regional trade, transport and development, including:
(i) the carrying-out of a trade and development facilitation study and transport review on key
national corridors; (ii) the preparation of a transit transport agreement protocol and related support
to the Recipient’s national corridor management committee; (iii) the preparation of legal
agreements and regulations for the establishment of a vehicle overloading control system; (iv) the
development of a legal framework on traffic and safety, and the carrying out of a road safety audit
along part of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor within the Recipient’s territory; (v) the
implementation of a Corridor Performance Monitoring System (CPMS); and (vi) the carrying-out
of studies and ESIAs for the simplification of export-import processes, the certification of products
and the provision of services at rest stops.
c) Component 3: Institutional Development and Program Management (US$6 million of IDA
financing), including: (a): Strengthening of MTRB’s institutional capacity through the provision
of advisory services and training, and the preparation of a sectoral governance and anti-corruption
strategy. (b): Provision of advisory services to MTRB to strengthen its safeguards management
capacity. (c): Provision of advisory services, training and logistical support, including office
equipment, materials and supplies, and operating costs as required to sustain the management and
coordination of project implementation activities, including audits, and the monitoring and
evaluation of progress achieved in the execution of the project.
d) Component 4: Connecting Juba with Fiber Optics (US$15 million of IDA financing).
Construction of a fiber optic cable, alongside the part of the road located in the Recipient’s territory,
from Juba to Lokichoggio in the Republic of Kenya at the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret Corridor.
Project costs and funding
18. Table 1 summarizes the cost and funding of the SS-EARTTDFP.
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Table 1: Project Cost and Funding (US$ million)
Components IDA GRSS China EXIM
bank
Total
Support to MTRB 47 25 150 222
Transport, trade and development facilitation 12 12
Institutional development and program management
support
6 6
Connecting Juba with fiber optics 15 15
Totals 80 25 150 255
Implementation Arrangements
19. The project implementation agencies were MTRB and SSCS, with the former as the lead agency.
SSCS was responsible for implementing the trade facilitation component. MTRB established a Program
Management Team (PMT), and SSCS established a Project Implementation Unit (PIU). MTRB was
responsible for the financial management and procurement of the Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) component on behalf of the Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services
(MoTPS). The Bank’s policy on “Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints”, which
permits some alternative implementation and preparation provisions, was not triggered in the Bank’s
appraisal of the project.13
Risk Analysis
20. The overall risk of the EARTTDFP was rated “high” at appraisal, as part of the program was to be
implemented by a country affected by conflict, and implementation required the engagement of two
countries and multiple agencies. The program also required that significant financial resources be
contributed by multiple development partners. The Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF)
presented in the PAD for the South Sudan project was comprehensive, and it rightly highlighted the highest
risks and main mitigation measures as being in the areas of implementation capacity, governance,
construction costs, insecurity, and armed conflict. The ORAF did not explicitly address the risk that the
country (including the project area) might be engulfed by more widespread warfare with resultant adverse
impacts on local populations. Technical and management capacity risks and gaps in financial management,
procurement, and safeguards capacity were to be mitigated by the engagement of consultants. Governance
risks were to be addressed by a Governance and Anti-corruption (GAC) Action Plan, but the PAD did not
specify how this would be carried out. The risk ratings are listed in Table 2.
13 Under the Bank’s policy for Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints in force at the (then under OP 10.00,
paragraph 12), the following exceptional arrangements could be applied in a project: (i) defer environmental and social requirements
to the project implementation stage; (ii) use exceptional alternative legal and operational implementation arrangements; or (iii)
consolidate the normally sequential stages of identification, preparation and appraisal into a single review.
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Table 2: Risk Ratings at Appraisal
Risk Rating: H (High Risk); S (Substantial); M (Moderate Risk); L (Low Risk)
Rating
ggggg
gggg Project Stakeholder Risks S
Implementing Agency Risk
- Capacity H
- Governance H
Project Risks
- Design H
- Social and Environmental S
- Program and Donor S
- Delivery Monitoring and
Sustainability
H
- Other (Optional) H
Overall Implementation Risk H
Quality at Entry
21. The program design had taken into consideration the recommendations of an evaluation by the
World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of regional (multi-country) programs.14 These focused
on country commitment, matching the scope to national capacities, delineation of roles at the regional and
national levels, and accountable governance arrangements. Also, the program had been intended to reflect
the early lessons gained from the East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP)
(implemented between 2006 and 2015) regarding the need be realistic in terms of scope, timeline and
outcomes.
22. In the event, although the project design contained relatively simple and straightforward roadworks
under Component 1, it also included challenging institutional modernization, reform, and capacity-building
elements under Components 2 and 3 which, in retrospect, were overly ambitious given the country and
institutional contexts.
23. The decision to use parallel co-financing for the project’s major civil works component greatly
increased demands and risks in project coordination and implementation. The SS-EARTTDFP was
designed as one of the first initiatives of a joint partnership between the World Bank and China EXIM
Bank to enhance growth and poverty reduction in Africa. An agreement had been signed in September
2013 between the President of the World Bank and the Chairman of the China EXIM Bank spelling out
the core principles to guide projects to be co-financed between the two entities.
24. Despite the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, the Bank’s senior management agreed, in
April 2014, to send the project to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors for approval, acknowledging
that the project was high risk and that armed conflict could disrupt or even halt the project, citing the
14 The Development Potential of Regional Programs - An Evaluation of World Bank Support of Multi-country Operations, World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group, 2007.
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country’s “instability and insecurity” and noting that “The anticipated benefits of this project have to
overcome the challenges of implementing the project in a conflict-affected country with limited capacity,
spot insecurity and land mines, and raising the finance required to meet the huge investment.” The Board
approved the project on May 20, 2014. The World Bank Financing Agreement (FA) was signed on June
12, 2014, and the credit became effective on December 22, 2014.
2. POST-APPROVAL EXPERIENCE AND REASONS FOR CANCELLATION
This section provides a summary of the key factors that affected the project’s implementation and led to
its cancellation. Readers are referred to the supporting documents listed in Annex 2 for details on all
aspects of project implementation.
25. Activities carried out. Up to mid-2016—when the World Bank put project implementation on
“hold” (also referred to as a “pause” in some documents) due to a renewal of widespread armed conflict—
various preparatory activities were carried out, including repackaging of the road upgrading contracts,
recruiting technical assistance consultants, preparing Terms of Reference for priority studies and
assignments, formation of PIUs in SCSS and MoTPS, and preparation of bidding documents for the ICT
components. A consultancy services contract was signed in March 2014 for preparation of the Output and
Performance Based Road Contracting (OPRC) bid documents and the design review for reconstruction of
bridges, culverts and the gravel sub-base between Kapoeta and Nadapal. The consultant encountered
difficulties in fielding experts to South Sudan due to the perceived insecurity in the country and had to
deploy a locally-based firm to carry out the reconnaissance survey and comparison of the original design
with the situation on the ground. In October 2014, the consultant submitted its interim report, a draft of
the OPRC bidding document, and the updated feasibility report and conceptual design report with
confidential engineering cost estimates. These cost estimates came out to be about 80 percent higher than
the original 2011 estimates, mainly due to the addition of significant margins to cover the new insecurity
related risks, price increases over the intervening three years, and the inclusion of asphalt overlay works
at the end of the OPRC period, which were considered essential for establishing all weather connectivity
on the corridor. These cost escalations were addressed on the Bank-financed side by reducing the length
of the gravel sub-base works and on the China EXIM side by increasing the loan from US$ 116 million to
US$ 169 million.
26. The GRSS signed a commercial contract on November 30, 2015 with a consortium of Chinese
contractors to undertake the upgrading works from Juba to Torit (including the Torit by-pass), funded by
the co-financing loan from the China EXIM Bank. The contractors had mobilized their equipment in Juba
and had started site inspection before the mid-2016 resumption of armed conflict.
27. By the time of the project’s closure in September 2018, disbursement of the IDA credit remained
very low, at US$1.84 m. (2.3 percent of the original committed amount as of January 2018).
28. Armed conflict. By far the leading factor that affected the project’s implementation was armed
conflict (see the brief chronology under Country Context, above). The Bank’s Implementation Status and
Results Report (ISR) No. 2 of April 2015 noted substantially decreased performance of the Government’s
main Project Management Team (PMT) due to the worsening security situation. The procurement
processes for the civil works, monitoring, and institutional development consultancies had been planned
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to commence in the third quarter of 2016, but the Bank decided to halt all project activities in July 2016
due to the uncertain security and fiscal environments, the resultant continuing decline of capacity of the
implementing agency, and the inaccessibility of the road works area. As of March 2017, nearly three years
after the project’s approval and nearly two and a half years after the credit’s effectiveness, very few
substantive outputs had been produced.
29. Limited government implementation and financial capacity. The Bank’s Aide Memoire of
September 2015 noted that “The combined effects of the conflict and complexity of the project are causing
delays and cost overruns, which over time may lead to failure to achieve the objective of the project and
may [require] looking into alternative project management arrangements, including engaging a project
management firm like United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) that could operate in the
current working environment in South Sudan.” The numbers and scope of the contracts to be managed
were evidently overtaxing the capacity of the implementing agencies, apart from the effects of the conflict.
The capacity of the PMT was further weakened following the exit of key staff, including the project
coordinator, after the outbreak of the wider conflict in July 2016. The Government appointed another
project coordinator whom the Bank felt was not adequately qualified. Overall, in the last two years of the
project, the GRSS was unable to maintain effective implementation capacity. On the financial side, in
March 2015 the GRSS informed the Bank that it would not be able to meet its commitment to provide the
counterpart financing (US$ 25 m.) due to the financial crisis associated with the conflict and the declining
international price of oil. Up to the date of cancellation of the credit, no government counterpart funds had
been disbursed to the project.
30. Delay in Co-Financing with China EXIM Bank. The China EXIM co-financing was to fund the
major civil works under the project and was essential to fulfilling the project development objective. The
expectations of the GRSS and the World Bank of materializing this co-financing contributed to prolonging
the project until mid-2018. Even so, the World Bank’s Financing Agreement did not prescribe any “cross
conditionality” with China’s loan. A covenant in the Bank’s Agreement merely gave a deadline of 12
months from the effectiveness date of the Bank’s credit for the effectiveness of the Chinese Co-financing
Agreement. On the other hand, China EXIM’s “Facility Agreement” with GRSS included a “Condition
Precedent of Initial Utilization” [of China EXIM’s loan facility] that GRSS must produce documentation
from the World Bank confirming that “the procurement process for the works, monitoring, and several
consultancy services as described in the letter delivered by the World Bank . . . dated July 20, 2017, has
successfully completed and that the World Bank is ready to disburse under the IDA Financing
Agreement”.
31. As early as mid-2015, the Bank started to consider whether the South Sudan project may have to
be restructured to achieve the connectivity objective, in case the planned parallel financing from the China
EXIM Bank for the upgrading of the Juba-Torit road did not come through. Alternatives considered
included limiting the project to reconstructing bridges and rehabilitating the existing gravel road.
Nevertheless, the Bank’s emphasis remained on trying to consummate the Chinese financing. The China
EXIM Bank approved a loan of US$169 million on December 27, 2015. Subsequently, China EXIM
notified the World Bank that the loan signing could not occur as planned in July 2016, due to the renewed
conflict in South Sudan.15 The Bank’s management provided two extensions for the deadline of the credit
15 According to project documentation, apart from the direct effects of the security situation on the feasibility of carrying out road
works, the China EXIM Bank was concerned about the effects of the drop in international oil prices and the consequent risk of economic
collapse of South Sudan, given that their loan agreement with South Sudan was based on a barter arrangement for South Sudan’s oil.
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covenant regarding the signing of the Co-Financing Agreement, with the last one expiring on August 31,
2016. Finally, on September 7, 2017, the GRSS and China EXIM signed the loan agreement in China.16
Up to the time that the World Bank credit was cancelled in August 2018, work under this contract was
limited to surveys and design work.
32. Based on information obtained from representatives of China EXIM for this NCO, China EXIM’s
loan agreement has lapsed and is now invalid because the GRSS did not meet its conditions for
effectiveness and disbursement (including the condition about World Bank readiness to disburse as
mentioned above).
33. Relation to Kenya SOP2 project. Another consideration in prolonging the project was the wish
of the stakeholders to try to preserve the integrity of the regional SOP program, with its expected synergies
of development benefits for South Sudan, Kenya and other neighboring countries. As noted above, the
second phase project of the regional SOP had been signed with Kenya in mid-2015. In the end, when
overriding considerations caused the Bank to cancel the South Sudan project (see Assessment of
Operational Risks, below), it was determined that the Kenya project would still be economically and
socially viable on its own. An analysis performed in 2018 showed that estimated traffic demand on the
Lokichar-Nadapal/Nakodok road in Kenya would be reduced by about 20 percent; the net present value,
considering an already expected 20 percent increase in costs, would decrease by US$176.2 million (from
US$504.5 million to US$328.3 million); and the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) would be reduced
from 24.5 percent to 19.2 percent, remaining well above the threshold of 12 percent. Apart from this, the
upgrading of the Kenya road will facilitate provision of humanitarian aid to South Sudan.
34. Assessment of Operational Risks. In late 2017, the World Bank carried out an assessment of the
operational risks to and the feasibility of the project going forward. This was originally conceived as a
joint assessment with China EXIM, but in practice it was carried out by the Bank between December 2017
and May 2018. The main findings of this assessment were as follows:
• At the time, the armed conflict had spread across much of the country, and the conclusion of the
assessment was that the situation was unlikely to change for the better soon.
• The fragmented political process showed few signs of improving or bringing peace, the security
situation in the country was on the downside, and the raging civil war posed an extraordinary risk
to the implementation of the project.
• Lack of access to project sites and severely weakened institutional capacity created insurmountable
challenges in supervising works and safeguards compliance, verifying outputs achieved, and
conducting audits of activities executed in project sites outside Juba
• Furthermore, due to the passage of time and the changes since the project’s approval, the
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) no
longer provided coverage of all project impacts. The environmental and social risk profiles of the
project had increased significantly. Based on the assessment, the World Bank considered that it
16 The agreement called for the Juba-Torit road to be constructed by a consortium of Chinese contractors using the “Engineering,
Procurement, and Construction” (EPC) contracting model which was a pre-requisite for China EXIM loan approval.
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was improbable that the Government would be able to meet its safeguards obligations in view of
its eroded capacity to plan and implement.
35. Suspension and cancellation. As a result of the findings of the risk assessment, the Bank’s
management decided to cancel the project. Bank management met with officials of the China EXIM Bank
to inform them of the Bank’s position and obtain their views. In accordance with normal procedures under
Section 6.02 of the applicable General Conditions, the Bank first notified the GRSS on June 29, 2018 of
the suspension of the credit, citing the existence of “an extraordinary situation . . . which makes it
improbable that the Project can be carried out or that the Recipient or the Project Implementing Entity will
be able to perform its obligations under the Legal Agreement to which it is a party” and that “make it
improbable that the Program, or a significant part of it, will be carried out.”
36. The World Bank officially notified the GRSS of the cancellation of the project in a letter to the
Minister of Finance dated August 15, 2018, and the cancellation officially took effect on September 14,
2018.
3. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
During project preparation
37. The documentation for the South Sudan project indicates that the project was prepared with due
attention to the Bank’s technical, fiduciary, and safeguards standards, and that the project was thoroughly
reviewed at the concept, quality enhancement, and appraisal stages. Nonetheless, the Bank failed to take
into account that the project’s design—involving not only road works but also advanced customs and
trade reforms, institutional development, and fiber-optics development—was too complex relative to the
very weak institutional capacity and skills of a newly-established and extremely poor country. Appraisal
of the ability of the institutions involved in the project—MTRB, SCSS, MoTPS, and MoFCEP—to absorb
capacity and system strengthening interventions was inadequate.
38. The Bank had been pro-active in facilitating the financing of feasibility studies and detailed
designs for the road under a previous Bank-financed project, Sudan Emergency Transport and
Infrastructure Development Project (SETIDP, P095081). The Bank worked actively with the GRSS
during project preparation to obtain the services of a consultancy firm to prepare the OPRC documents
before commencement of the procurement of the civil works contracts. In the event, this process was
delayed as a result of the crisis that erupted in December 2013, and the consultancy services started after
project approval.
39. The Bank’s decision to approve the project in May 2014 could be questioned, in light of the
outbreak of armed conflict in the country in December 2013. But, at that time, the scope of the conflict
seemed limited, and it was impossible to foresee how the civil war would expand in geographic coverage
and severity over the next several years. The momentum behind the project was enormous, fueled by
intensive technical preparation, a high-visibility financing partnership with China, and the fact that the
project was part of a regional integration program with Kenya and potentially other countries. In this
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context, it is worth quoting at length from the final Board-approved PAD, which reflects a somber
assessment of the project’s risks:
“The project is located in areas so far not affected by the violence which broke out in December
2013. It remains a top priority for the Government given the country’s landlocked status and the
need to develop an efficient regional development corridor through Kenya to the sea port of
Mombasa. The corridor is an alternative safe and efficient route for humanitarian aid operations
transiting through Kenya. If the conflict is not resolved quickly, it may pose some risks, including:
(i) diverting the attention of the Government from development projects implementation; (ii) the
ability of the government to ensure law and order in the project area could be weaker and safety
of contractors working on the project would be at risk, and may lead to abandonment of the works;
(iii) the risk level of the country will be high and responses to invitation to bid may not only be
limited but costs of construction could go beyond the expected limit; (iv) the ability of the
government to implement the project may be compromised and an independent project
management firm or a UN Agency like United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) may
have to be engaged to be manager of the civil works contracts and deliver the monitoring and
supervision services of the road improvement and fiber installation, as well as the technical
assistance to the modernization of the SSCS; and (v) the government contribution to the project
may not flow as expected.”17
40. Although the Board approved the project, it is relevant to note that three members of the World
Bank’s Board abstained from voting to approve it. Their governments reportedly shared the view that
South Sudan was not ready for such a long-term development investment and should continue to receive
only humanitarian assistance.
During implementation.
41. The Bank’s project team carried out five missions to South Sudan after Board approval,
supplemented by two reverse supervision missions in Kenya after mid-2016, when the security situation
forced the halting of missions to the country. During the first two years of implementation, before the
project was paused, the Bank was pro-active in various ways. It supported a project launch workshop in
September 2014 that engaged key stakeholders, including MTRB, MoTPS, Customs, Commerce, Ministry
of Finance, Ministry of Physical Infrastructure Eastern Equatoria State, private transport operators,
Members of Parliament, civil society, and Bureau of Standards, among others. The Bank followed up on
the Project Preparation Advance, including reviewing the design of the Juba - Nadapal road, preparation
of the bidding document for the OPRC contract, preparation of environmental and social safeguard
instruments, recruiting technical and fiduciary specialists, and conducting training. The Bank also worked
to facilitate the activation of the China EXIM loan by guiding the GRSS though the many required steps.
The Bank’s detailed supervision missions and Aide Memoires, which included comprehensive lists of
follow-up actions, helped the GRSS to keep the project on track.
42. As noted above, the Bank paused the implementation of the SS-EARTTDFP as of July 2016 due
to the renewed outbreak of civil war and the inaccessibility of the project road area. The World Bank
17 This text, under the heading “Impacts of the Conflict in South Sudan on the Project” (paragraphs 15-17), was added to the final,
Board approval version of the PAD.
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office in Juba was relocated to Nairobi as a security precaution. As part of the response to the restarted
conflict, the Bank put in place a set of enhanced operational measures for assuring fiduciary oversight and
compliance for the Bank’s portfolio. For the SS-EARTTDFP, a considerable flow of contacts continued
over the next 18 months between the Bank, GRSS, and other stakeholders at the Bank’s senior
management and technical levels. Between November 27 and December 1, 2017, the Bank and a
delegation from the GRSS conducted a reverse mission in Addis Ababa to review the project’s status as
the first step for carrying out the Assessment of Operational Risks. During the life of the project, the Bank
team produced six Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) and six detailed Aide Memoires.
43. As of March 2017, according to the ISR of that date, the Bank team was still viewing the “pause”
of project implementation as temporary and was seeking ways to continue the project, including extending
the legal covenant for signing of the China EXIM Bank loan, relocating the staff of the Government’s
Project Management Team to Nairobi to sustain capacity during the pause period, and considering a
formal project restructuring. At the same time, there was consensus among all the key players---the Bank,
China Exim Bank as well as the Chinese Ministry of Finance, that if the security situation continued to
deteriorate and no signs of improvement were evident by the end of the year, the Bank would take steps
to cancel this project.
44. By November of 2017, after the World Bank Annual Meetings, the Bank’s management had
reached agreement that the project needed to be cancelled, in view of the continued deterioration of the
country environment and the implausibility of achieving the project’s objectives. The challenge was to
manage the cancellation process carefully in order to ensure support for the decision from key
stakeholders, primarily the China EXIM Bank. The Bank proposed preparation of an Operational Risk
Assessment as the key vehicle for this process (see above). The Assessment was carried out by Bank staff,
vetted by Bank management, and shared with China EXIM. A senior Bank manager travelled to Beijing
in March 2018 to present the findings and consult on the Bank’s decision to cancel the project, to which
China EXIM agreed after some discussion.
45. It might be argued that the Bank should have cancelled the project much sooner, perhaps as early
as mid-2017. At that point, one year had passed since the civil war had resumed and the project’s
implementation had been put on hold. It did take the Bank a long time to sort out its views about the
project, taking into account the pending Chinese co-financing and the need to ensure that the Kenya
project of the IDA-financed regional program would remain politically and economically viable on its
own.
46. Conclusion. The Bank’s performance can be assessed in two stages: (i) between entry and up to
the implementation pause in 2016 and (ii) from the implementation pause onwards until cancellation.
While there were some shortcomings in the project’s quality at entry, those might have been remedied by
project restructuring if the project had not been derailed by the country conditions. The Bank’s original
risk assessment was reasonable. Although the Bank knowingly took a high risk in deciding to approve the
project in early 2014, this cannot be characterized as a reckless decision under the circumstances. During
implementation up to the pause, the Bank took the necessary steps to support implementation and
continuously monitored the situation, maintaining timely engagement with GRSS. On the other hand,
during the last two years after the project was paused, the Bank’s performance had some important
shortcomings related to: (i) managing the uncertainty of the project’s situation, leading to differences of
opinion between the Bank’s Global Practice, the Regional VPU, and the Country Management Unit on
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whether, when and on what basis to cancel the project, and (ii) processing the actual cancelation after the
decision was made. Coordination of internal actions during the final months of the project could have
been better. In retrospect, more decisive intervention at different levels could have led to an earlier
cancellation of the project, avoiding extra administrative costs and risk exposure.
47. Taking into consideration the above, the Bank’s performance overall is rated Moderately
Satisfactory.
4. LESSONS LEARNED
48. Simple project design. In this project, the World Bank failed to apply the well-established lesson,
reinforced by numerous IEG reviews, that project designs should be kept simple in situations of weak
client capacity. This example of the Bank’s support for an unduly complex project in a weak environment
indicates a lack of rigor in appraising clients’ institutional absorptive capacity. It also reflects internal
incentives to commit IDA resources18 and apply leading-edge concepts to projects (in this case, regional
trade and transport facilitation) regardless of their appropriateness in a specific context. It is hoped that the
experience of this project may contribute to an acceptance by the Bank that sometimes, very simple,
unsophisticated project designs are for the best.
49. Co-Financing Risks. The decision to use the South Sudan EARTTDFP as one of the first vehicles
for the World Bank-China EXIM partnership was made without considering whether such an arrangement
was appropriate, given both the fragile country context and the fact that the two financing partners had
very different motivations and perspectives. Moreover, the project depended on the Chinese co-financing
for its primary justification, because China EXIM’s loan covered the upgrading of the main trunk road. In
the event, these factors combined to produce a very long delay in approving the Chinese co-financing and
a prolongation of decision-making on the project’s cancellation. In this regard, it is worth noting that the
covenant in the Bank’s FA giving a deadline for the signing of the China EXIM agreement proved
meaningless, as it and its repeated extensions were not met and the Bank did not enforce it. The experience
of this project suggests various lessons:
• Conflict-affected, fragile countries, especially where there are high risks to civilians, may not be
the most appropriate settings for untested co-financing partnerships between entities that have very
different outlooks and interests.
• If co-financing in such situations is deemed necessary, the World Bank should ensure that it has
very clear understandings and coordination arrangements with financing partners on how to deal
with armed conflict outbreaks and their associated social and environmental consequences,
including “worst case” scenarios.
• As a general practice in co-financing, but especially in high risk, conflict-affected situations, the
World Bank should ensure that projects are designed in such a way that preservation of a co-
financing arrangement does not become the overriding consideration when severe problems arise.
For example, the project could be designed to be economically viable without the co-financing and
able to be quickly restructured should it become necessary.
18 The SS EARTTDFP was approved in May 2014, just before the end of IDA 16 in June 2014.
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50. Cancellation as a positive response. The experience of this project shows that the operating
environment in a fragile and conflict-affected country can change quickly and unexpectedly, and that there
are limits to what the Word Bank can do when armed conflict engulfs a project area or an entire country
program. If measures such as changing the project’s geographical focus or using alternative
implementation arrangements (e.g., a U.N. agency) are insufficient, cancellation may be the only option.
In such circumstances, the Bank should not view cancellation as a failure, but rather as a necessary and
appropriate response as part of its policy of making carefully considered investments in high-risk
situations.
51. Bank management intervention to address critical conditions. In future similar situations,
where country conditions become so severe that a project’s implementation has to be paused and Bank
missions suspended for extended periods, decision-making on the project should be promptly and
effectively escalated to higher management levels in the Bank. This is especially necessary where differing
perspectives between internal Bank units may need to be harmonized and/or where there is potential for
serious reputational risks for the Bank. In this regard, the Bank may benefit from drawing on its recent
experience in establishing new practices and protocols related to the management of social safeguards
risks in projects.
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ANNEX 1: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending (from Task Team in PAD Data Sheet)
Tesfamichael Nahusenay
Mitiku Sr Transport. Engr. AFTTR Team Leader
Josphat O. Sasia Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR Co-Task Team Leader
Wolfgang M. T. Chadab Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Senior Finance Officer
Hassine Hedda Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Finance Officer
Gibwa A. Kajubi Senior Social Development
Specialist AFTCS Senior Social Development Specialist
Yasmin Tayyab Senior Social
Development Specialist AFTCS
Senior Social
Development Specialist
Alexandra C. Bezeredi Regional Environmental
and Safeguards Advisor AFTSG
Regional Environmental
and Safeguards Advisor
Ntombie Z. Siwale Senior Program
Assistant AFTTR
Senior Program
Assistant
Benqing Jennifer Gui Information Officer TWICT Information Officer
Adenike Sherifat
Oyeyiola
Sr Financial
Management Specialist AFTME
Sr Financial
Management Specialist
Teguest Demissie E T Temporary AFTTR Contractor Telesec Temporary
Services
Svetlana Khvostova Operations Officer AFTSG Operations Analyst
Maiada Mahmoud Abdel
Fattah Kassem Finance Officer CTRLA Finance Officer
Tadatsugu Matsudaira Senior Trade Facilitation
Specialist AFTTR
Senior Trade Facilitation
Specialist
Juliana C. Victor-
Ahuchogu
Senior Monitoring &
Evaluation Specialist AFTDE
Senior Monitoring &
Evaluation Specialist
Daniela Anna B. D.
Junqueira Senior Counsel LEGAM Senior Counsel
Muhammad Zulfiqar
Ahmed Sr Transport. Engr. AFTTR Sr Transport. Engr.
Joel Buku Munyori Senior Procurement
Specialist AFTPE
Senior Procurement
Specialist
Timothy John Charles
Kelly
Lead ICT Policy
Specialist TWICT
Lead ICT Policy
Specialist
Lucy Anyango Musira Program Assistant AFCE2 Program Assistant
Suzan Poni Piwang Team Assistant AFMJB Team Assistant
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Josphine Kabura Kamau Financial Management
Specialist AFTME
Financial Management
Specialist
Anjani Kumar Senior Procurement
Specialist AFTPE
Senior Procurement
Specialist
Emmanuel Taban Highway Engineer AFTTR Highway Engineer
Bedilu Amare Reta Consultant AFTHE Environmental Specialist
Supervision/NCO (from Task Team Members in all archived ISRs, if available)
Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku Task Team Leader GTI01 Sr Transport. Engr.
Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Task Team Leader (ADM) GTI01 Sr. Transport Engineer
Emmanuel Taban Highway engineer GTI01 Highway engineer
Jennifer Gui ICT Policy Specialist TWICT ICT Policy Specialist
Wenxin Qiao Transport Specialist GTR07 Transport specialist
Tim Kelly Lead ICT Policy Specialist GTI11 Lead ICT Policy Specialist
Joseph Nyabicha FM Specialist/consultant GGODR FM Specialist
Christine Kandaru Operations Analyst Operations Analyst
Anton Baare Sr. Development Specialist GSU07 Sr. Development Specialist
Dorothy Morrow Akikoli Program Assistant AFMJB Program Assistant
Kenneth Ocheng Kaunda Consultant GGODR Procurement Specialist
Jean Lubega Kyazz Operation officer Trade and competitiveness
Stephen Amayo Sr. Financial Management
Specialist GGO25 Sr. Financial Management Specialist
Teguest Demissie Team Assistant GTIDR Team Assistant
Grace Tabu Program Assistant AFMJB Program Assistant
Ankur Huria Sr. Private Sector Specialist GTCTC Sr. Private Sector Specialist
John Bryant Sr. Environmental Specialist GEN01 Sr. Environmental Specialist
Syed Sada Team Assistant GTI01 Team Assistant
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(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Actual Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Staff Weeks and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands (including travel and
consultant costs)
Lending
Total: 92.46 / 361,248.83 602,799.06
Supervision/NCO
Total: 126.63 / 510,273.1 679,181.3
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ANNEX 2: LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. Project Appraisal Document April 2014
2. Implementation Status and Results Reports
• #1 August 2014
• #2 April 2015
• #3 December 2015
• #4 June 2016
• #5 March 2017
• #6 March 2018
3. Mission Aide Memoires
• October 2014
• February-March 2015
• September 2015
• March-April-May 2016
• October-December 2016
4. Management letter, October 2015
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M A P