Documentof The WorldBank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Reprt No. 8686 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT MAURITIUS URBAN REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1926-MAS) MAY 23, 1990 Infrastructure Operations Division Eastern Africa Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosedwithout World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Reprt No. 8686
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
MAURITIUS
URBAN REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(LOAN 1926-MAS)
MAY 23, 1990
Infrastructure Operations DivisionEastern Africa Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
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FOR OFFICIAL US ONLYTHv WORLD SANKtWashngton. DC. 20433
US A.
0K ad Ou.tw-GwuIOpm IWiu;i"^
May 23, 1990
MEMORAN"DUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Mauritius -Urban Rehabilitation and Development Project(Loan 1926-MAS)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report on Mauritius - Urban Rehabilitation and DevelopmentProject (Loan 1926-MAS)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No auditof this prcject has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department atthis time.
Attachment <
This document ha a rstictd distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfomuanceof theit offcia dutie& lu contents may not otherwise be disclosed witbot World Ban authorization.
F70 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MAURITIUS
URBAN REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LO"N 1926-MAS)
This document has a estricted distdbution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their oflicial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoritio.
Table of Contents (Cont'd)
Page No.
ANNEXES
1. Contract Data ......... ........... ............. 272. Total Project Costs: Estimated and Actual ...................... 283. IBRD Loan Disbursements by Category: Estimated and Actual ...... 294. MHC: Key Performance Indicators . . ....... 305. Compliance with Key Covenants .................................. 316. Affordability of La Tour Keonig Housing: Estimated and Actual.. 327. Project Cost Recovery: Estimated and Actual ... 338. Physical Planning, Environment and Housing Expenditure (1988-90) 349. Housing Investment 1984 - 1990 . .................. .. 3510. Economic Rate of Return Calculations . ... . 36
CHARTS
1. Appraisal and Actual Implementation Schedule . .. 382. Loan Disbursement Profile: Estimated and Actuaa. . 39
ATTACHMENT: Comments from the Borrower ... 40
J,
MAtRITIUS
URBAN REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1926-MAS)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for an urban developmentproject for which Loan 1926-MAS was approved on December 8, 1980 in the amountof $15.0 million. Final disbursement was made on August 26, 1987 at whichtime $2,591,108.95 was cancelled.
The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Division of the EasternAfrica Department on the basis of documents contained in the regional files,information provided by staff members of the Bank involved with the projectduring its execution, and a visit to Mauritius in April 1989. The PCR wascommented on by the Borrower whose views have been incorporated. The valuableassistance provided by the Government of Mauritius and the staff of theexecuting Ministries, departments and agencies is gratefully acknowledged.
This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower for comments and they are attached tothe Report as an Attachment.
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MAURITIUJS
URAN REHABILITATCIC AND DEMELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1926-MAS)
Total Project Cost (US$ millions) 24.4 18.1Underrun I Overrun (1) -25.8
Loan/Credit Amount (US$ millions) 15.0Disbursed 12.4Cancelled 2.6Repaid to 06130189 4.2Outstanding to 06/30/89 8.2
Date Physical Components Completed 07183 04/85Proportion Completed by Above Date 100 60Proportion Time Underrun I Overrun 62Economic Rate of Return (2) 17 11.7
Cumulative Estimated & Actual Disbursements(US$ millions)
First Mention 12/77Govt Application - 06/78Negotiations 10/80 10180Board Approval 12/80 12/80Loan Agreement Date 01/81 01/81Effectiveness Date 05/81 05/81Closing Date 06/84 12/85 12/86Borrower Government of MauritiusExec Agency Min of Econ Plan & DevelFiscal Year (Borrower) 1 July -30 JuneFollow-on Project None---------------------------------------------------------------- __----
URBAN REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPNENT PROJECT (LOAN 1926-HAS)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
EVALUATION SUMMARY
1. This was the first Bank-supported project in the urban sector inMauritius. The project was successful in completing all physical works and inimproving existing urban infrastructure. A total of over 6,200 new andimproved dwellings were added to Mauritius, housing stock at costs affordableto low and moderate income households. The project successfully laid thegroundwork for future action to be taken in the area of national physicaldevelop'-ent pl.nning necessary to make the best use of the country's limitedland resources in a manner consistent with sound environmental management.
2. The project was designed to assist the Government of Mauritius tostrengthen institutions for planning, development and maintenance in the urbansector. The project sought to establish and implement sound and replicablepractices for the provision of utilities, urbanized land and housing inexisting as well as new urban areas, reducing where possible centralgovernment budgetary support for these purposes. In addition it attempted toprovide relief to cyclone victims, rehabilitate services to low-income housingareas damaged by recent cyclones and improve the efficiency and service ofpublic transport throughout the island. 'he major institutional objective ofthe project was to provide the basis for the implementation of a nationalphysical development plan.
3. The project consisted of (a) 573 serviced residential plots withcore houses and selected comnunity facilities for mainly low-incomebeneficiaries at La Tour Koenig, Port Louis; (b) an island-wide program of6280 loans for home improvement and new house construction loans; (c)upgrading of water and sewer services at five housing estates owned andoperated by the Central Housing Authority (CHA); (d) improvement of trafficmanagement in the Port Louis - Curepipe corridor; (e) improvement of themanagement of solid waste in Port Louis; and (f) technical assistance todesign and implement a framework for national physical development planning,study the island-wide transportation system, and investigate revenue-generating potential within the non-urban district councils.
4. The physical components were efficiently implemented and no majorproblems were encountered. There were no major modifications to the projectapart from the redesign of the plot layout and house plans for the new housingcomponent at La Tour Koenig. The changes to this component producedmarginally fewer plots and marginally larger houses, with the result that thepoorest of the beneficiaries selected for the scheme required higher incomesthan anticipated at appraisal. The periodic revision of income limits during
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the project inplementation period was carried out in consultation with andprior approval from the Bank. The delay between the time of the cyclones in1979 and the availability of housing credit and new serviced residential plotsprecluded meeting the immediate shelter needs of cyclone victims.
5. The goal of providing housing finance to 3700 eligible househvtdsowning plots exceeded the initial target by 70 percent. The Mauritius HousingCorporation (MHC) successfully implemented the program and continues tomaintain an exceptionally low record of repayment arrears, consistently below1? of net mortgage value. The savings achieved in other components financedby the IBRD loan were used to top up the flow of funds to MHC. In the finalanalysis, 92X of loan funds actually disbursed by the Bank were directed toMHC for on-lending to eligible beneficiaries. Devaluation of the Rupee withrespect to the dollar also contributed to the expension of the componentwhich, measured in local curreny, doubled in size. The project period wascorrespondingly extended from three to five and one half years.
6. The project was co-financed by the Saudi Fund for Development(SFD) in the form of a soft loan used to improve infrastructure at severalpublicly-managed housing estates in Port Louis and to improve trafficmanagement in the Port Louis - Curepipe corridor. Both initiatives weresuccessful although their implementation was the most protracted owing to thelengthy start in establishing the credit.
7. The technical assistance component was designed to facilitate: (a)implementation of the National Physical Development Plan; (b) examination ofisland-wide transportation issues; (c) valuation of all non-urban property;and (d) training of MHC extensita workers.
8. A combination of factors worked together to frustrate theimplementation of the National Physical Development Planning (NPDP) exercise.These factors included i) GOM reluctance to use loan funds to financetechnical assistance; ii) a lack of clarity about the precise nature of theinstitutions being proposed; iii) the difficulty in reconciling oftencontradictory recommendations made by the different studies; iv) fundamentaldisagreement between Ministries as to who should be responsible for theexercise; and (v) a lack of political will to enforce the introduction of landuse control measures which might inhibit economic growth at a time whenunemployment was a major national issue. As a result, the NPDP was neverformalized as a Government policy during the project period. However muchground work was prepared and an awareness of the vital importance of economicdevelopment with proper environmental management has been created at alllevels of Government and amongst the public at large. The Borrower intendsto pursue the establishment of the NPDP as part of a multi-donor program foreconomic development with environmental management assisted by the Bank.
MAURITIUS
URBAN REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1926-MAS)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
1.01 Mauritius is a small island of 2,000 square kilometers locatedabout 2,400 km from the African mainland in the Indian Ocean. In 1980almost two-thirds of all land was under sugar cultivation, the dominantsector of the economy in terms of output, exports, employment and as asource of public revenue and private investment. Mauritius lies in themidst of a cyclonic area and is subject to periodic devastation by tropicalstorms.
1.02 In 1980, the population of the country was about 1,000,000 andgrowing at an annual rate of approximately 2 percent. Sixty-five percentof the country's residents lived in urban settlements, creating averagepopulation densities of 50 people per hectare measured over net useableareas excluding land devoted to sugar. The labor force was expected togrow by 3.3Z per year, adding 120,000 new entrants to the market between1970 and 1980.
1.03 The need to create additional industrial jobs was expected toput increased pressure on urban land and services. GOM's response to thecompetition for scarce land was to develop a physical development strategyfor the island (1972 - 2032). The strategy was adopted in principle byGovernment in 1979 in the form of a National Physical Development Plan.The plan provided long-term locational guidance, a set of sound land usecriteria and a preferred terminal land use configuration but lacked animplementation framework.
1.04 During the 1970's Mauritius invested 1 avily in housing (about12 percent of GNP). The bulk of the stock was financed out of privatesavings or commercial bank loans inaccessible to the poor. Apart from MHCwhich on average approved some 400 housing loans per year, no other formalcredit was available for home improvement or extension. A policy of rentcontrol distorted the housing market by pushing all new investment towardshigh income housing to the detriment of the poor. This was accompanied bydeterioration in the condition of the existing StoCk owing to lack ofadequate incentives for maintenance.
1.05 The vast miajority of Mauritius' population has access to pipedpotable water, either through privata connections or from public standpipes. Towards the end of the 1970's, cost recovery for this service wasput on an economic footing with the raising of tariffs. Less than onequarter of the population was served by highly subsidized public seweragesystems, the remainder making use of individual facilities, including pitlatrines. Collection ard disposal of solid waste is the responsibility ofunderfinanced local authorities and is most problematic in Port Louis whereless than half of all refuse was dealt with.
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1.06 Mauritius is served by a well-developed network of roads withthe heaviest concentrations of traffic in the Port Louis - Curepipecorridor. Public transport is provided by privately owned bus companies.The major problems with the system include poor regulation, lack ofcoordination, lack of policies for fare and tariff structures, long queuesduring peak periods, overcrowded terminal facilities and poorly maintainedequipment.
1.07 Urban and local government is administered through the fivemunicipaA and three district councils. These bodies are financially weak,receiving up to 80Z of their budgetary requirements from centralGovernment.
1.08 The project, the first IBRD-financed operation in the urbansector, attempted to strengthen institutions for planning, development andmaintenance. It sought to establish and implement sound and replicablepractices for the provision of utilities, urbanized land and housing inexisting as well as new urban areas, reducing where possible centralgovernment budgetary support for thesa purposes. In addition, it attemptedto provide relief to cyclone victims, rehabilitate services to low-incomehousing areas damaged by recent cyclones and improve the efficiency andservice of public transport throughout the island.
1.09 The major components of the project included creation of newlow-income community development, the improvement to existing public sectorhousing. the provision of housing finance on a national scale, improvementto management of vehicular traffic and solid waste, the strengthening oflocal government finances and the establishment of a national physicaldevelopment planning mechanism. The total cost of the project was $24.5million of which $5.0 million was to be financed by the Saudi Fund forDevelopment (SFD).
1.10 Sources of information on which this report was based includethe following:
a) World Bank records;b) Financial and other records prepared by the various
implementing agencies in Mauritius;c) Interviews with World Bank and Mauritian officials
associated with the project;d) Site inspection of the physical works after completion.
II. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
A. Urban Sector Rre:ew and Proiect Identification
2.01 In the mid 1970's GOM, with Bank assistance, developed a seriesof industrial estates as part of a strategy for employment generation andeconomic growth (IDA Credit 411-MAS). As an extension of this program, itwas proposed that the La Tour area on the southern boundary of Port Louisbe conridered as a suitable site for a new town development, incorporating
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commercial, industrial and r6sidential development. In July 1977, at therequest of GOM, the Bank visited Mauritius with a view to assessing thepotential for the La Tour area and advising the Government on a suitablecourse of action. The Bank recommended that the scheme be co-.sidered inthe overall context not only of the development of Port Louib but alsowithin the context of urban development in Mauritius as a whole.
2.02 Subsequently, a Bank mission was mounted in February 1979 withthe objective of identifying a possible integrated urban project. Themission focussed on reviewing the national-level urban planning work thenbeing carried out by consultants, reviewing studies on traffic managementand transportation and seeking Government views on the desirability ofdeveloping a strategy for managing the urbanization process in Mauritius.The mission determined that the possible components of a project cuuldinclude a part of the La Tour development, upgrading of existing urbanareas, employment generation, urban transport, and development of anoverall urban sector strategy. It was agreed that a Bank mission beundertaken to gain a more thorough understanding of the state of Mauritius'urban sector. In August 1979, the Bank carried out an analysis of thesector and largely confirmed the identity of possible areas of assistance.Shortly thereafter consultants funded by the Australian Governmentundertook a feasibility study for the proposed La Tour urban developmentscheme.
2.03 In December 1979, while these studies were underway, the islandwas struck by Cyclone Hyacinthe, causing extensive damage to services andshelter in low-income residential areas of the Port Louis - Curepipecorridor. In response to a GOZ request for emergency assistance to providerelief to victims of the cyclones, the Bank agreed to accelerate theprocessing of the project and to include a component for upgrading urbanservices in existing low-income areas.
B. Proiect Preparation
2.04 In the span of four months beginning in February 1980, theproject was taken through the phases of preparation and pre-appraisal. InMarch 1980 GOM requested and the Bank approved a Project PreparationFacility (PPF) of $143,000. The funds were used to expedite thepreparation of a sewerage upgrading component, the La Tour scheme siteinvestigation and a detailed engineering and a traffic management study.GOM, with some consultant engineering assistance, prepared detailed plansfor the development of the first phase of La Tour Koenig, a residentialscheme designed to accommodate several hundred homeless victims of thecyclones. A program of housing finance to be managed by the MauritiusHousing Corporation was broadened from its initial base of lending for theLa Tour Koenig project to include other mainly low-income householdsrequiring finance to rebuild their dwellings damaged by the cyclones. Fourhousing estates, also affected by the hurricanes and operated by theparastatal Central Housing Authority, were identified for selectiveupgrading of their infrastructure. The urban sector review indicatedsevere traffic management problems in Port Louis and, therefore, acomponent was prepared which dealt with improving the flow of trafficthrough the city. A proposal to construct a major transportation center in
Port Louis was dropped because of uncertainty surrounding the location of aproposed through road which would link the major north and south boundroads passing through the city center. MOH prepared a proposal for thestrengthening of the solid waste management system in Port Louis, the soleremaining component in an earlier proposal for comprehensive areaupgrading.
2.05 The inclusion of cyclone-related works caused the project tobecome larger than originally conceived and, therefore, the need forsources of cofinancing was identified. The Saudi Fund for Developmentagreed to fill the funding gap.
C. Project Appraisal
2.06 As appraised in May 1980, the project consisted of the followingcomponents:
(a) 740 serviced residential plots with core houses and selectedcommunity facilities for mainly low-income beneficiaries at LaTour Koenig, Port Louis;
(b) an island-wide program of financial credit for home improvementand new house construction loans;
(c) upgrading of water and sewer services at selected housingestates owned and operated by the Central Housing Authority(CHA);
(d) improvement of traffic management in the Port Louis - Curepipecorridor;
(e) improvement of the management of solid waste in Port Louis; and
(f) technical assistance for:
(i) implementation of the National Physical Development Plan;(ii) examination of island-wide transportation issues;(iii) valuation of all non-urban property; and(iv) training of Mauritius Housing Corporation (MHC) extension
workers.
2.07 Approximately 25 acres of land at La Tour Koenig, just south ofPort Louis and adjacent to thL industrial estates of Cormandel andPlaine Lauzun, were to be serviced for integrated housing development.Approximately 740 plots were to be provided, at least 60 percent of whichwere to be for sale to households earning up to MRs 1200 per month. Allplots were to be provided with piped water supply, waterborne sanitation,roads, paths and storm water drains, electricity, street lighting and anoptional core house. Agreement was reached during negotiations that LaTour Koenig would be brought under the jurisdiction of an appropriatemunicipal authority for purposes of cost recovery and maintenance.Community facilities were to include a primary school, a kindergarten, acreche and a small commercial center.
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2.08 Under the project a line of credit was to be made available toMHC to allow extension of its low-income lending operations. The programwas to make available formalized credit for home repair and reconstructionfor cyclone victims as well as extensions and construction of new housing,including that required in La Tour. The credit was to provide 3,700 loansover four years with 60 percent of the loans going to households earningless than Rs 1200 per month.
2.09 Under the upgrading component, damaged and substandard seweragelines and water mains in four public housing estates (La Cure, Roche Bois,Vallijee, and Borstal) were to be rehabilitated and improved storm waterdrains were to be installed.
2.10 The public transport improvement and traffic managementcomponent was designed to improve the efficiency of island-wide transportservices and reduce unnecessary congestion, especially in Port Louis.Vehicular parking was also to be treated under this component, includingpossible changes to relevant legislation.
2.11 A solid waste management program was designed to supply themunicipality of Port Louis with a modest number of simple vehicles,equipment, and maintenance facilities. Acquisition of additional land forrefuse tipping was to be _ condition of disbursement for this component.The component was designed taking into account longer-term studies to becarried out under other donor arrangements.
2.12 A range of technical assistance was to be supplied to facilitatesome of the institutional reform sought under the project. Four keyelements of this program included the implementation of the NPDP, anisland-wide transportation study referred to above, island-wide propertyvaluation, and training for MHC extension workers.
2.13 The coordination of the overall project was to be undertaken bythe Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. The Ministry of Housingwas to implement the La Tour Koenig component with MHC administering thehousing finance program. The Ministry of Works was to implement thetraffic management and public transport component and the rehabilitation ofthe CHA estates. CEB was to provide the necessary electrical supply. ThePort Louis municipality was to implement the solid waste managementcomponent.
2.14 The total project cost was estimated to be MRs 185.1 million(US$24.5 million) at October 1980 prices. Physical contingencies werecalculated at 1OX on all infrastructure and building works. Pricecontingencies were estimated at 152 p.a. for 1981/82 and 10 p.a.thereafter. The estimated foreign exchange requirement was 63 percent.External finance accounted for 80 percent of the total cost, with 19percent of the total to be provided by the Saudi Fund for Development.
2.15 Negotiations were carried out in Washington in October 1980 andthe project was approved by the Board on December 8, 1980. The loan
agreement was signed on January 8, 1981. Implementation was expected totake four years and a completion date of June 30, 1984 was set.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Start-Up
3.01 To enable loan effectiveness the Bank asked the Government toprovide written assurance that the legal requirement to table the loanagreement in the Legislative Assembly was only procedural and did noteffect the powers of the Minister of Finance who had authorized theMauritian Ambassador in Washington to sign the agreement. The loan wasdeclared effective on May 5, 1981.
3.02 By June 1981, all loan conditions except one relevant to thestart-up of the project were complied with. Subsidiary loan agreementswith the four parastatal executing agencies had been finalized and aproject coordinator was in post. The exception concerned the housingcredit program for which the Government was required to have entered intoan effective loan agreement with the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) as acondition of disbursement for the component. In the final analysis the SFDdeclined to co-finance housing credit, preferring instead to fund theirprovement of the CHA housing estates and the transport components. Inorder to effect disbursement against the housing credit component,Government and the Bank agreed to a partial waiver of the conditionunderwhich IBRD funds, up to $3.5 million of the total of $5.9 millionwould be disbursed against the housing credit until such time as the SFDloan became effective. This would leave a balance of $2.4 million of IBRDmoney required to finance house construction at La Tour Koenig and hencepermit the main components of the loan to be financed under the unlikelycircumstances that the SFD loan never materialized.
B. Physical Progress
3.03 Review of implementation progress of the project suggests thatall the physical works financed by IBRD were carried out in a relativelytimely and orderly manner by competent local organizations. The physicalcomponents co-financed by the Saudi Fund for Development endured lengthydelays caused by the establishment of the credit long after the IBRD loanbecame effective and the requirement to seek donor approval throughoutprocurement procedures. The major institutional component of the project,the establishment of a functioning National Physical Development PlanningUnit was never really achieved. Technical assistance required for theinstitutional components of the project was almost exclusively providedthrough grant-funded assistance. The schedule comparing actual andappraisal estimates of project implementation by component is shown inChart 1.
Land Development at La Tour Koenig
3.04 Site Planning and Design. The design of the site layout,undertaken as part of the project preparation phase, was prepared by the
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MHLE Implementation Unit and based in part on design concepts contained ina pre-feasibility study carried out by consultants funded by the AustralianGovernment in late 1979. The principle organizing concept of the plan wasthe use of terraced housing located in mid-plot, each unit spanning thefull width of the plot and attaching to its neighbor at a party wall. Plotfrontages averaged 4.7 meters. The principle benefit attributed to theplan was its economy in land, infrastructure and construction costs. Areview of the site plan by legal experts in May 1981 revealed the potentialdifficulties of resolving legal disputes between neighbors over issues ofcommon roofs and party walls which might arise during the process ofexpanding the core units into complete dwellings. Moreover, a marketingstudy carried out in December 1980 had suggested consumer resistance toplots averaging only 90 m2 in area. The market survey also identifiedpeoples concern about the practical difficulties associated with expandinga core unit attached to its neighbor on each side, i.e., movement ofbuilding materials through the unit to get to the backyard. The opinionwas also expressed that a core housing unit was not necessary in everycase, some plot allottees preferring to build their houses from scratch.As a consequence, a major re-design exercise was done which resolved allthe above problems, including amending all house plans from row housedesigns to semi-detached plans. The exercise also resulted in the numberof plots being reduced from 740 to 573 and the average plot size beingincreased from 90 m2 to 130 m2 The exercise was completed in early 1982at which point contracts for the installation of infrastructure were let.These events delayed the program by about six months.
3.05 House Design. Six prototype core houses were built in October1980 after which a market survey was carried out as mentioned above. Thepublic reaction to the demonstration units resulted in the dropping of thethree smallest of the house types. The remaining three core house plans,all larger than the largest house design reviewed during project appraisal,contained a separate kitchen, one or two other rooms, and a bathroom withshower and toilet. The largest unit, 36m2 in area, also incorporated aporch. Construction materials included concrete block walls, cast in-situconcrete roofs, steel door and window frames and stainless steel kitchensinks. All units were designed to be expanded horizontally at the back ofthe plot. One construction feature which was added to the plans duringdetailed design stage was the introduction of reinforced concrete columnswhich allowed for the upward extension of the unit, i.e., two storeys. Acontract was let for the construction of 336 units beginning in July 1982.The last units were handed over in August 1983, only one month behind theoriginal implementation schedule.
3.06 Site Servicing. The design of site services was done by theMHLE Implementation Unit which included the services of a qualifiedengineer and quantity surveyor. Contracts were let to private contractorsfor (i) site clearance; (ii) installation of all on-site roads, stormdrains, water supply linv-, sewerage mains and telephone conduit; and iii)bulk supply of water to the site. Installation of electrical reticulationwas carried out by CEB and street lights were installed by MLG. Details ofthe contracts awarded are given in Annex 1. With the exception of thecontract for the bulk supply of water which was delayed because of a changein the decision by CWA on the source of water supply for the scheme, all
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contracts were completed without undue difficulty. This fact may beattributed to the high quality of contract administration provided by theUnit. More than 120 weekly site meetings were held with contractors betweenSeptember 1981 and December 1984.
3.07 Plot Allocations Applications for plots were invited jointly byMHC and MHLE from eligible households in April 1981. More than 3,000households came forward from which 1,680 appeared to be qualified accordingto criteria agreed with the Bank. It was intended that 60 percent of theplots should be allocated to households earning not more than MRs 1.200 permonth and preference was to be given to victims of cyclones. Eligibilitycriteria also included not already owning a house or plot of land in thecountry. Selection of beneficiairies was accomplished by public ballottingin the presence of the Minister of Housing in June 1981. More than 80percent of all allottees lived and/or worked in the vicinity of the La Tourproject site. Actual plot allocations began in November 1983 and finishedin October 1984. Plot allocations were delayed a few months after thecompletion of core units owing to the 1983 drought which delayed the supplyof water to the scheme.
3.08 Community Facilities A primary school, designed by MHLE, wascompleted in October 1983 and began operation in 1984. The operation ofthe kindergarten began in 1985. The creche, under construction in March1983, did not become operational until January 1987, owing to theuncertainty as to which local government authority was responsible for thescheme as a whole. No large scale recreational facilities have beenimplemented but the Ministry of Youth and Sports has created volleyball andbasketball pitches. A health center has been constructed with the help ofprivate funds. Community initiative has led to the creation of a small daycare center. To date there are no major commercial facilities within theproject site as the need for such services is met by facilities in theimmediate area. However, the inhabitants of the scheme have formed anassociation which is sponsoring Cooperative Society's stores. MHC iscurrently considering their application to use two of the prototype housesfor a start of their business and is also completing the working designs ofa commercial block to which the Cooperative Society's stores will move andover which MHC will provide 12 apartments.
Home Improvement and Construction Loans
3.09 Loan Targets. MHC exceeded the overall target of 3,700 loansfor the home improvement and construction lending program established atthe time of project appraisal. By June of 1984, the original target datefor completion, 3,659 loans had been approved. Approximately 6,280 loanswere financed between July 1, 1980 and June 30, 1987. the closing date ofthe loan accounts. This total includes 556 loans made for new units at LaTour Koenig housing estate.
3.10 House Consolidation. MHC increased its number of buildinginspectors from 4 to 12 to meet the demand created by the program. Theadditional inspectors hired were all experienced and needed only a modicumof in-service training to undertake their duties. Most borrowers performedthe function of a general contractor, hiring labor and buying materials
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according to their own schedule of implementation. MHC made loandisbursements to the householder on the basis of staged inspections of thework. There were very few reported cases of plot holders turning over thewhole process of construction to a contractor.
Table
Allocation of IEHC Loans b. Incose Groue(1980 - 1987)
Other incomebeneliciaries 2,83? 4S.2% 164,828 61.03% 68,099
Total 6,280 100.0% 270,07& 100.00%
Rehabilitation of Services to CRA Estates
3.11 Service Design. This component was financed by SFD and absorbednearly 50 percent of the co-financing loan. Consultants appointed by theMinistry of Works prepared detailed engineering designs and tenderdocuments for the improvement to water supply and sewage disposal £or thefour estates: Borstal, Vallijee, Roche Bois, and La Cure. Tenders, invitedunder ICB, were opened in July 1982. Disagreement arose over theconsultants evaluation of the bids and recommendation for award of thecontract. The consultants favored a private sector firm with the secondlowest bid whereas the Ministry preferred the employment of DevelopmentWorks Corporaton. a parastatal body, with the lowest bid. Following adelay of eight months the contract was finally awarded to DWC andsupervision was undertaken by a special unit within MOW without theservices of the consultant.
3.12 Implementation. The scope of the works finally undertaken inrespect of the four CHA estates included 14km of surface water drainage,5.5km of sewerage main, 168 manholes, 16.5km water supply mains, 1046 houseconnections to water supply and reinstatement of 16.5 km of road. Theworks were completed in various stages between January and November 1985,some 12 months behind schedule. Delays on the part of the contractorresulted in claims for liquidated damages by MOW. The major causes ofdelays were inclement weather and lack of building materials. Uponcompletion of the works, the Municipality of Port Louis was invited to takeover the maintenance of the storm drains but declined to do so, claimingthat the design standards were too low. The water mains were handed over toCWA and MOW took over the sewer systems.
3.13 Role of CWA. In addition to the goal of improving the standardsof water supply to the CHA estates, one of the objectives of the componentof the project was to introduce an element of cost recovery for the
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services provided. To this end it was proposed that CWA install watermeters for every house as and when the contractor had upgraded the watersupply lines to each dwelling. This was achieved at all four estates byMay 1986 and billing 4s in effect.
3.14 Additional Works. Owing to the devaluation of the MauritianRupee with respect to the Saudi Riyal, the SFD loan was adequate to coverthe additional cost of remedial works to sewers at CHA's Vallee des Pretresestate. Upgrading of water supply to outlying villages valued at MRs 20million was also added to the program and undertaken in 1988.
Public Transport Improvement and Traffic Management
3.15 Traffic Management. This component, also funeed by SFD,included a total of seven contracts valued at MRs 10 million awarded forthe installation of traffic signals, execution of civil works required toinstall the signals and other improvements to the urban road network. Inall 33 traffic lights were installed including 6 pedestrain signals.Implementation delays were caused by the time required to receive approvalsfrom SFD and the long delivery time required for shipping of trafficsignals from overseas. Implementation carried on into 1987. Small itemsof equipment, a traffic sign manual and a tow truck were also procured.
3.16 Parking. A locally funded study of on-street parking measuresrelated to the direction of traffic flow was undertaken. The resultingpackage of street markings and signposts was inadvertently omitted from thethe civil works contracts let for the traffic signals and was neverimplemented. Measures to introduce off-street parking in Port Louis werenot implemented under the project because of uncertainty surrounding theimplementation of a proposed through road. The through road wassubsequently constructed and became operational in 1988. It was financedat a cost of MRs 75 million including the cost of a major bus terminus incenter town, by the AfDB. Concern amongst shop owners about thepossibility of removing parking from their immediate business environs mayhave also put a damper on the execution of this component of the project.No legislative changes were made, nor were parking wardens hired or tariffsintroduced.
3.17 GRNW Bridge. A feasibility study to replace GRNW bridge wascarried out with finance provided by UNDP. The recommendation wasfavorable and a new bridge financed by the African Development Bank wasconstructed. It was commissioned in September 1985 at a cost of MRs 29million.
3.18 Transport Study. An island-wide Transport Study was carried outby a team at the Transport Management Unit of MOW under the supervision ofan advisor financed by CFTC. The study, completed in December 1984, madeproposals for bus route rationalizations, the reorganization of private buscompanies into a cooperative and for infrastructure improvements. A numberof small bus depots have been constructed as a result of the study.
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Solid Waste Management
3.19 Solid Waste Study. Under the loan agreement, Government was toundertake a study of the long-term needs for solid waste management in thecountry. In September 1982 a report prepared by a French consulting firmwas submitted to Government for review. The major recommendation was theacquisition of a new site for sanitary landfill between Port Louis andCurepipe and the conversion of the existing site at Roche Bois to atransfer point.
3.20 Refuse Tips. Following the review of the French study, land atLes Salines, near the port area, was earmarked for a new tip, thus meetingthe condition of disbursement for this component of the loan. It wasoperated as such for a few months but discontinued after complaints fromthe public caused operations to cease. The site at Roche Bois hascontinued to be used, not only by Port Louis but also by PamplemousseDistrict. It is not functioning as a sanitary landfill operation.
3.21 Collection. After drawing up a shortlist of simple equipmentand vehicles for immediate needs, Port Louis decided that the cost of IBRDmoney was too high. As an alternative, they procured the necessarycommodities from an existing line of credit from the Indian Government.The savings of $400,000 in the loan was allocated to the MHC Housing Creditcomponent. Little of the equipment received is still in use, some of itbeing defective from the start and other idle as a result of a lack ofspare parts and local servicing capability.
3.22 Workshops. The municipality of Port Louis undertook to renovateand expand the existing workshop facilities, including the installation ofnew equipment and construction of a new workshop in Roche Bois, using IBRDfunds at a total cost of MR 1.0 million. A number of training courseswere also carried, improving the knowledge and skills of mechanics,welders, electricians and management staff, although the cost of this didnot appear to be charged to the project.
Technical Assistance
3.23 Funds for technical assistance in the amount of $1.1 millionwere provided under the project to assist GON with (i) implementation ofthe National Physical Development Plan (NPDP); (ii) carrying out of island-wide transportation and land valuation studies; and (iii) training of MHCextension workers. Actual accomplishments were mixed. Various sub-studiesrelated to the NPDP were undertaken with the assistance of expatriateconsultants, three of which were financed from the loan at a total cost of$24,000. The island-wide transport study, funded by the SFD, was undertakenby the NTA as discussed above. Training of MHC extension workers and theisland-wide land valuation study were never undertaken. In the case of MHCthe need did not arise in view of its own training program through itsbuilding inspectors. Less than six percent of the MR 8.1 million allocatedunder the project for these purposes was spent, GOM preferring to use grantsources of funding for technical assistance.
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C. Proiect Costs
3.24 A detailed breakdown of actual project costs compared withappraisal estimates is provided in Annex 2. In local terms, finalexpenditure amounted to MRs 231 million compared with the appraisalestimate of MRs 185 million, an overexpenditure of 24 percent. However,measured in terms of US dollar, there was an underrun of 25 percent. Themajor factor which accounts for this is the significant devaluation of theRupee against the US Dollar and the Saudi Riyal during the projectimplementation period. The real savings in actual costs, especially inrespect of technical assistance, engineering supervision and solid wastemanagement, amounting to MRs 15 million, were used to increase the size ofMHC's housing finance program. Overall contingency provisions in theproject were more than adequate since at no time were transfers made fromCategory 11, 'Unallocated', to other categories except for a final transferof the whole amount to Category 3a to boost allocations for housing creditsto MHC.
D. Financing Plan
3.25 A summary comparison of actual and estimated project financingis given in the table below. The IBRD loan of US$15.0 (MRs 113.6 million)was expected to finance 61 percent of total project costs. The proceeds ofthe loan which were disbursed, amounting to US$12.4 million (MRs 157.6million), financed approximately the intended share of project costs.
3.26 The loan from the Saudi Fund for Development, amounting toSR16.8 million (MRs 69 million) was signed on March 22, 1982. It wasrepayable at 22 interest over 20 years. One hundred percent of all costsare being financed under the loan, i.e., no requirement for governmentcontribution. No increase in the scope of works has been planned beyondthose mentioned in para 3.14 to permit the application of the additionalproceeds of the loan created by the devaluation of the Rupee against theRiyal. It is, therefore, projected that US$2.6 out of the maximum US$5million will be used in the project. This accounts for the reduction inthe actual share of total project costs covered by the SFD loan. The SFDloan was still active in 1989 and so final disbursement figures were notavailable.
3.27 Disbursements from the various categories of the loan are shownin Annex 3 and accumulated disbursements from the loan by year comparedwith appraisal estimates are given in Chart 2. Disbursements began asscheduled but took place at a slower rate than originallv projected,requiring six years compared to the appraisal ertimate of the three-and-a-half years. The rate of disbursement of the IBRD loan was tied closely tothe rate of disbursements of MHC to project beneficiaries, since credit forhousing made up 95 percent of the loan amount. Once the housing creditprogram came on line, actual disbursements were uniform as can be seen bythe straight line in Chart 1. The average annual total disbursement by MHCduring the six-and-a-half year period was MRs 28.2 million, with a high ofMRs 35 million and a low of MRs 25 million. The lag in the disbursementprofile can be attributed to the doubling in the size of the MHC loanprogram from 3,700 to 6,300 borrowers without an increase in the rate ofprocessing loans. Under such circumstances, an increae of 70 percent inthe size of the program required a commensurate extension of time.
3.28 No disbursement of IBRD funds were made against the componentsfor upgrading CHA estates and public transport as these were financed bythe Saudi Fund for Development. There was no disbursement against Category8 as the cost of providing electricity to La Tour was charged to Categoryla.
3.29 By December 30, 1986, the second and final extension of theclosing date of the loan, some US$2.5 million or 17 percent remainedundisbursed. On August 26, 1987 IBRD closed the loan account at which timeUS$2,591,108 was cancelled.
F. Procurement
3.30 According to the Loan Agreement, procurement of all goods andcivil works was to be by ICB except for:
a) civil works for the solid waste and traffic management componentswhich could be carried out by force account; and
b) goods for the solid waste component as well as any contract forcivil works estimated to cost less than the equivalent of (250,000and miscellaneous equipment except traffic signalling equipmentwhich, after grouping, estimated to cost less than $100,000equivalent, could be procured using local bidding procedures.
3.31 The installation of infrastructure and the construction of corehousing at La Tour were the subject of ICB, both contracts having beenestimated to be in the region of US$1 million. No international firmsshowed interest in being prequalified for the works, presumably because ofthe relatively small scale of the operations involved. All bids wereopened by the Government Tender Board. Bid evaluation was undertaken bythe MHLE Implementation Unit whose recommendation was referred back to the
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GTB for approval. A schedule of the major contracts awarded is given inAnnex 1.
G. Reporting
3.32 Over the life of the project, GO4 submitted less than half ofthe required quarterly reports, preferring instead to await the arrival ofWorld Bank supervision missions to report on progress. Financial reportsfrom MHC were submitted on a regular basis.
H. Role of the Bank
3.33 GOM officials considered the implementation of the La TourKoenig component as a major milestone in the development of appropriatestrategies for low- to middle-income housing. They were appreciative ofthe role played by IBRD in guiding the preparation of the scheme. The MHLEimplementation team developed an esprit de corps which was fostered byhighly co-operative interaction with the first project officer assigned tothe project. Members of the team look back upon the experience, now nearlyten years later, with undisguised feelings of accomplishment. Their onlyregret is that the knowledge and skills acquired by the team were not usedto replicate the project.
3.34 All components of the project were supervised by the formerWater Supply and Urban Development Division of the East African ProjectsDepartment. During implementation, a total of 12 supervision missionsvisited Mauritius. By project completion, a total of 53 staff weeks or anaverage of nine staffweeks per year were spent in the supervision effort.The first six missions totalling 19 staffweeks were carried out within thefirst two years of project implementation. The last mission was undertakenin November 1987.
3.35 The quality of working relations between IBRD and the Governmentof Mauritius remained highly productive throughout the project's executionnotwithstanding an element of frustration experienced by Bank staff overthe issue of implementing the NPDP in the later years of the project.
IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE
A. Overall Performance
4.01 La Tour Koenig. To-date all core units and serviced plots havebeen sold. All but about 20 plots (which MHC is presently trying torepossessa and re-allocate) have been developed. Over 300 plot holdershave extended their core houses, in many cases by adding a second storey tothe original one storey dwelling. NHC calculates its total investment atla Tour to be MRs 31.7 million. Many of the houses constructed appear toexceed the quality one would expect in an estate dedicated in part tofamilies of low-income. This can be attributed to two factors. Firstly,
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care was taken to avoid branding the scheme as a *low-income" project inthe minds of the public. This was achieved by a moderate increase in thestandards of design of both the plot layout and house plans after projectappraisal. Allocation criteria ensured that 40 percent of the plots wouldbe allocated to households above the Olow-income' level of MRs 2,000 permonth. Secondly, average incomes of allottees in the project haveincreased substantially since the scheme began through a series ofmandatory wage and salary increases and the general growth of the nationaleconomy over the last eight years. The average anuual increase in earningsof monthly paid central government workers, likely to have formed asubstantial proportion of the population of allottees, increased by 3.5percent annually in real terms between September 1980 and September 1987.The allocation agreement prohibits transfers for 10 years without MHCauthority. There is little evidence that any of the original allotteeshave sold their rights to the plots. The incidence of sublettingdwellings, also prohibited without MHC permission, is more difficult todetect. MHC has authorized subletting in cases where the owner has beentransferred to another location for purposes of work.
4.02 All in-ground infrastructure services are operating according toacceptable standards. The maintenance of roads and stormdrains leavessomething to be desired as does refuse collection. These shortcomings havebeen caused by the continued lack of resolution of the iseue of localauthority jurisdiction (refer to para 4.07 (a) below). This issue is alsoresponsible for the fact that there are as yet no major recreational orcommercial facilities in the project and that lengthy delays in getting thecreche to operate were experienced. A temporary solution to refusecollection has been worked out with the assistance of the LivingEnvironment Unit of MLG.
4.03 MHC Housing Credit Program. MHC continues to run an efficienthousing development operation for all income groups. Annex 4 illustratesthe key performance indicators for the corporation. MHC continues to devote40 percent of its resources to the low-income group whose cut-off ceilingis now MRs 3,000 per month. Arrears on their total loan portfoliocontinues to be less than 1 percent of net mortgage assets. At the end ofFY 1986, arrears stood at 0.42 percent, amounting to approximately MRs 2million outstanding from borowers. At the end of FY1987 MEC recorded adebt/equity ratio of 3.49 and an interest spread of 3.01 percent, bothindicators well within the targets called for under the project. AGovernment of Mauritius equity contribution amounting to MRs 21.6 millionallowed the dWe ratio to come down to a more conservative limit.
4.04 CHA Estates Rehabilitation. Services upgraded under thiscomponent of the project were handed over to their respectiva authoritiesfor maintenance. Spot checks undertaken to assess the degree to which theremedial works may have improved the management of storm water flowsindicated definite capacity to avoid the worst of damage but narrow roadwidths prohibit the sizes of drains which would be required for heavyrains. There were few signs of water rollecting on the roadsides. Allwater and sewer systems appeared to perform adequately, with water bornese\vage pumped to two pumping stations, one of which was constructed underthe project, for onward transmission to the two main sewage treatment works
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in Port Louis. CHA reported that no major complaints have been received inrespect of services; however, there have been a few isolated cases ofsewerage problems in the Roche Bois and La Cure estates. To-date tnerehas been little maintenance of the roads and drains. Cost recovery isbeing made with respect to water consumption through CWA. KW reported thatthere were widespread arrears with respect to sewer charges. It has beenproposed that by July 1990 CWA and MW would implement a process of commonbilling whereby water and sewer charges would be collected at the same timewith the latter charges being a function of the volume of water consumedand no longer on the assessed value of the property. Government hasembarked upon a phased program for upgrading of an additional 46 CHAestates at an estimated cost of MRs 56 million, based upon the experiencegained under the project.
4.05 Public transport. MW reported that while the introduction oftraffic signals has succeeded in regulating traffic flow, they sometimescreate extra delay to motorists because the signals are not vehicleactuated and cannot cope with the erratic nature of traffic. During themission it was observed that at peak hours in the city center, trafficpolicemen turn off the signals, preferring to regulate the traffic by handsignals to reduce congestion. The congestion observed was also caused byexcavation works in progress throughout the city center. Traffic flow hasincreased at a rate of 5 percent per year since 1980. This is as a resultof more vehicles on the road and a drop in the real price of petrol, i..e,MRs 32 per gallon in 1982 to MRs 35 in 1989.
4.06 Solid waste management. Port Louis is still experiencingdifficulties with managing solid waste. In July 1988, Port Louis engagedthe services of a private contractor to collect refuse in a small area ofthe city center. This is apparently operating successfully and it isproposed to continue the approach in 1989. It was reported that thismethod would also be used in the CHA estates in the future. In 1988 ODAfinanced a study of solid waste management for the whole country. Thestudy identified deficiencies of the existing solid waste management toinclude: (a) lack of basic operational data and financial information; (b)inadequate provision of waste storage receptacles (although a reasonablestandard of refuse collection); (c) irregular collection frequencies andlow productivity of labor; and (d) a very low standard of waste disposalwith possible health hazards. The study, currrently under review by GOM,recommends, inter alia, maintaining waste collection as a municipalfunction but advocates putting waste disposal under MLG.
B. Covenants
4.07 GOM's record in meeting the requirements of key covenants in theloan agreement is summarized in Annex 5. All covenants were met with thefollowing exceptions.
a) S. 3.06: The land of La Tour Koenig ... shall be brought underthe jurisdiction of an appropriate authority for purposes ofmaintenance and taxation.
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The Municipality of Port Louis agreed to take over the area inquestion in July 1984 subject to conditions concerning the financialliability they would incur in doing so. More specifically, theMunicipality required, inter alia, that they be not held responsiblefor repaying any part of the IBRD loan for the project and thatestimates of expenditure for running the estate be covered byadditonal central government grants. GOM and the local authoritynever reached agreement on this issue.
b) S. 4.05t GOM to ensure that direct beneficiaries and occupiersof all estates under CHA pay water and sewerage charges according toexisting tariffs.
At the present time responsibility for water and sewerage tariffs aresplit between CWA and MW respectively. As has been recounted above,CWA has installed water meters on those properties whose owners haverequested a water connection within the four CHA estates included inthe Project.
c) S. 4.03: GOM to provide incentives for the proper improvementand maintenance of rental housing.
A committee of central government officials '-t up to review theLandlord and Tenants Act (1960) made its recommendations toGovernment; however, no decision has been made on the matter.
4.08 In June 1986 all three matters were brought to the attention ofthe Cabinet by the relevant Minister but no action h&5 been forthcoming.
C. Reaching the Target Group
4.09 Of the 573 plots serviced at La Tour Koenig, 400 were allocatedto households in the low-income group. This exceeded the target of 60percent established at project appraisal by 9 percent.
4.10 During the course of the housing and construction credit programmounted by MHC, two of the important parameters governing itsadministration were revised after consultation and agreement with the Bank.The revisions were designed to boost lagging performance in reaching thetargeted low-income households with housing finance.
4.11 Firstly, the maximum income limit defining the low-income groupwas increased on three occasions from its initial level of MRs 1,200 permonth. After a first increase to MRs 1,600 per month agree' in April 1982and a second increase to MRs 1725 in November 1982, MRs 2,000 was agreed inApril 1983 on condition that this level be maintained until at least June1984. These increases sought to maintain the pool of income-eligiblehouseholds to those earning below the median household income underconditions of rising salaries and wages. The second parameter to beadjusted was the proportion of the number of loans to be allocated to thelow-income group. This was reduced from the originally increasing scale(50Z in FY81, 55Z in FY82 and 602 in *FY83) to a flat 40 percent for eachyear of the program. The relaxation of this constraint was justified on
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the grounds that the effective demand as measured by the number ofqualified applicants for housing finance from the low-income group was lessthan the supply offered by the MHC program. The net effect of thesechanges allowed MHC to easily reach and indeed exceed the revised targets.
4.12 Over the period July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1987, 55 percent of allhousing and construction loans were allocated to households in the low-income group compared to the revised target of 40 percent agreed in April1982. Low-income lending absorbed MRs 105 million or 39 percent of thefunds. The extent to which victirs of the recent cyclones were assistedunder the program was impossible to judge because loan applicants were notasked whether they had suffered losses because of the cyclones. There Issome evidence that a small percentage of low-income borrowers werepermitted to borrow in excess of the maximum loan where they could producea member of the extended family who would serve as a guarantor and agree toremit a portion of the monthly payment directly to MHC.
V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
A. MHC Finances
5.01 MHC now manages in excess of 10,000 mortgage loans. There issome indication that the administrative capacity to handle this volume ofwork is being stretched, mainly because staff turnover during recent yearshas been quite high. The corporation is carrying out a recruitmentexercise to fill 24 vacancies including the post of Accountant and twoAssistant Accountants. Further, the corporation is increasing its use ofcomputers to process accounting and statistical information. The lastannual report published was for FY84, but the year-end accounts for FY85and FY86 have been completed and duly audited. The year-end accounts fQrFY87 are being completed, leaving those for FY88 to be drawn. The delayscan largely be attributed to the introduction of the computer and toturnover of qualified staff.
5.02 MHC counted 225 outstanding applications for loans yet itcontinues to process and approve on the average more than 70 applicationsper month.
5.03 It is noteworthy that since the implementation of the project,which considerably increased its lending capacity, MHC's self-financingrevolving fund has increased from about MRs 10 million to MRs 20 millionand its reserves (retained profits) from MRs 28 million to over MRs 70million, as illustrated in Annex 4.
5.04 In ancicipation of reduced flows of public funds into thecorporation, MHC is attemptirq to mobilize private resources for investmentin housing through a number ot savings instruments. In November 1988, aform of home-ownership savings plan was introduced to encourage regularmonthly saving by individual depositors. By February 1989 nearly 3,000accounts had been opened within four months.
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B. Affordability
5.05 At appraisal it was determined that the least expensive solutionat La Tour Koenig, consisting of a serviced plot and a one-room core, wouldbe affordable to households earning MRs 870 per month (732 of thepopulation) assuming 25 percent of income devoted to housing. As a resultof the redesign of the site in 1J82 which created larger plots, the priceof the basic plot measuring 7m by 17.5m doubled from the estimated cost ofMRs 4,000 to MRs 9,358 (1980 prices). The cost of the minimum contractorbuilt core house increased from MRs 16,800 to MRs 18,972. Consequently theminimum shelter solution was affordable by a head of household earning MRs1,200 per month, assuming he could afford to devote 33 percent of hisincome to payment of housing. It appears therefore that the least costsolution was only affordable by those households at the masimum incomeceiling in 1980. By the time allocations occured in November 1983, themaximm income ceiling had been raised to Rs2,000 per month. The 1983price of the minimal core house solution was affordable by a household withan income of Rsl,500. Annex 6 illustrates the estimated and actualaffordability of two of the contractor built housing solutions on basicplots at La Tour Koenig.
5.06 The actual price of the maximum core house on a basic plot wasaffordable only to those households in the top 25 percent of the incomedistribution in 1980, i.e., those earning MRs 1,600 or more. Because ofthe increase in the income ceiling by 1983, the price of the maximum housewas affordable by households earning MRs 2,000 per month.
C. Cost Recovery
5.07 It was anticipated at appraisal that about 73 percent of allcosts would be recoverable directly from beneficiaries through loanrepayments and service charges to relevant authorities. The remaining 27percent was to be recovered through central government revenue. In fact,owing to the shift of expenditure away from items such as non-recoverabletechnical assistance and items with weak cost recovery mechanisms such asrefuse and traffic management, the pruportion recoverable by GOM fell toonly 17 percent. This left the bulk of cost recovery, Rsl9O million, toborrowers from MHC. Annex 7 gives a breakdown of the proportion ofrecoverable costs in comparison to those anticipated at appraisal.Municipal rates in Port Louis have not been increased since 1980. It isthe responsibility of central government to update the valuation roll uponwhich the municipality can then levy a rate.
D. Terms of Loans
5.08 The actual terms of housing loans correponed closely to thoseanticipated at appraisal. Low-income borrowers are repaying MHC at therate of 12 percent per year over 15 to 20 years. Other borrowers arerepaying at 14 percent over the same period.
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VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Institutional Arrangements
6.01 The institutional arrangements adopted for project coordinationand implementation corresponded to those outlined at appraisal. TheMinistry of Economic Planning and Development was the lead Ministry withinwhich was placed the project unit which consisted of the ProjectCoordinator. The Coordinator was also the head of the National PhysicalDevelopment Unit until its transfer to MHLE in 1987.
6.02 A separate unit was established within the MHLE to coordinatethe implementation of the La Tour Koenig housing scheme. It was headed bythe Chief Town and Country Planning Officer who was designated projectmanager assisted by a second Town Planner who was designated the projectco-ordinator. The rest of the team included 3 architects, 3 engineers. 2part time quantity surveyors, a finance officer and a sociologist.Virtually the whole of MHC's staff was involved in the housing creditcomponent of the project.
B. Overall Achievements
6.03 A major goal of the project was to strengthen institutions forurban planning, development, and maintenance. The project sought toestablish and implement sound and replicable practices for provision ofutilities, urbanized land, and housing in existing as well as new urbanareas, and in so doing also reduce central government budgetary support forthese purposes.
6.04 Housing institutions. MHLE and MHC gained an enormous amount ofpractical experience in planning, designing and managing low-income shelterprograms in urban areas. Unfortunately the experience gained has not beenput to use in replicating the successful aspects of the project. In wasnot until 1989 that MHC began a project at Le Hochet, just north of PortLouis, which is based on the concept of minimal but improvable servicedplots and one- and two-storey core housing. The team assembled in MHLE forLa Tour was disbanded in 1984 and has not executed a similar project since.
6.05 National Physical Development Planning. The objectivesassociated with the NPDP, although ambitious, were considered by the Bankto be central to the success of the project as a whole in that they soughtthe establishment of institutional capacity to control land devlopmentthroughout the country. Although the Unit received periodic assistancefrom seconded officers of government and consultants, it was never staffedon a permanent basis. During project implementation, attention focussedbriefly around three studies:
(i) Spatial Investment Strategies..The consultant study analyzedfour possible spatial development scenarios for Mauritius andrecommended that the continvled growth of the Port Louis - PlaineWilhelms' urban complex be advocated.
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(ii) Administrative and Financial Study. The main recommendationswere the introductions of elections at District levels,endorsement of the idea for island-wide valuation of non-urbanland leading to revenue generation from rural areas and anemphasis on government decentralization.
(iii) Development Authority Study. The consultant report recommendedthe establishment of a parastatal development authorityresponsible for integrated industrial investment planning andland management. This idea supported the creatior. of the highlysuccessful Mauritius Export Development and Investment Agency(MEDIA) which was established by legislation to coordinate thedevelopment of several industrial estates throughtout thecountry.
The recommendations of these three studies were reviewed by MEPD and aconsolidated set of proposals was submitted to Cabinet for approval. InSeptember 1986, after reviewing the submission, Cabinet established aMinisterial Committee to once again study the issue of land resourcemanagement.
6.06 Despite numerous studies, the all-important National PhysicalDevelopment Planning Unit was not permanently established and littleactivity occurred after 1985. A proliferation of Government Commissions,committees, task forces and individual experts, both Bank- and non Bank-financed, became involved in a process which became more and moreconvoluted over time. A combination of factors worked together tofrustrate the continuation of the NPDP exercise. These factors included(i) GOM reluctance to use loan funds to finance technical assistance; (ii)a general confusion about the precise nature of the institutions beingproposed and often contradictory recommendations made by the differentstudies; (iii) fundamental disagreement between MPED and MHLE as to whoshould be responsible for the exercise; and (iv) the establishment of aCommission on Local Government to review the whole situation. As a result,the NPDP was never formalized as a policy of Government.
6.07 In 1986 GOM requested French technical assistance to review thewhole matter, fully 10 years after the original French-assisted MATIM studylaunched the concept. In March 1987 they presented their conclusions whichrecommended a further package of technical assistance to redo the processwith a view to including measures for implementation and control. Sincethat time, with the transfer of the initiative from MEPD to MHLE after theelection in 1987, further efforts to remount the exercise have come under aproposed project for the promotion of development with greaterconsideration to issues of environmental management.
6.08 Urban Policy. In addition to the central objective ofestablishing a national physical development planning capacity, the projectattempted to achieve important policy goals in several other urbansubsectors.
6.09 GOM did redirect housing investment by increasing the amount andavailability of credit accessible to the poor. Moreover, this was achieved
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without significantly increasing the total amount of housing investment inMauritius. Annex 9, taken from the National Development Plan 1988 - 1990,shows how in real terms investment in all housing increased from MRs 788million in 1984 to MRe 817 million in 1987, a rise of 3.6 percent. Thesame table also shows that housing investment decreased significantly whenexpressed as a p.,rcentage of GDP and of GDFCF. That is, it decreased from6.12 to 3.5t and 28.51 to 12.62 respectively. The lower profile accordedto housing investment as a fraction of GDP is the result of the overallincrease in GDP and not as a result ot polloies enacted to put a brake onhousing investment itself.
6.10 GOM did reduce direct government involvement in housingconstruction but has not reduced the CHA housing construction program.Annex 8, also taken from the NDP 1988 - 1990, shows the continued declinein public sector funding for MHC. The corporation is seeking privatesector resources and may in the future be able to issue debentures if theneed is felt and as soon as its present financial situation can beclarified in the eyes of potential investors. Funding levels for CHA arestill significant and are earmarked for further upgrading of existingestates and construction by force account of new housing for low-incomehome ownership on privately owned plots. In addition GOM has noteliminated over time central government subsidies to housing. Both MHC andCHA have housing programs with elements of grant funding and lending belowmarket interest rates to low-income borrowers.
6.11 It cannot be said that GOM provided immediate relief, throughhousing construction and repair loans, to cyclone victims. Nor can it besaid that it has established procedures for future cyclone relief programs.GOM has, with SFD assistance, updated and rehabilitated some existing urbanservices especially those damaged by cyclones and has plans to continue todo so. The 3-year delay between appraisal of the project and theallocation of plots at La Tour precluded any significant effect on thehousing situation of victims of the 1979 cyclone.
6.12 While GOM did improve efficiency of traffic flow in the urbanareas for a while, it did not appear to improve service standards of publictransport throughout the island nor did it strengthen transport managementplanning and implementation capacity of the NTA and TMU in the MW.
6.13 The objective of valuing non-urban land in the country was todetermine if significant revenue for local authorities could be generatedthrough property tax in the three district council areas. The idea wasunpopular from the start. Government claimed there was a lack of skilledmanpower to undertake the valuation task since most of the qualifiedvaluers were occupied with processing protests lodged by urban councilresidents following the revaluation of their lands. Several months elapsedbefore the necessary legislation could be amended to bring the valuation ofdistrict lands under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. In thefinal analysis the exercise was never carried out.
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VIZ. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION
A. Appraisal Analysis
7.01 In calculating the economic rates of return (ERR) at appraisalfor the La Tour Keonig and MHC Housing Credit components it was anticipatedthat direct benefits would be derived from: (a) the provision of least costservices to a population of 3,700 people by 1983 in the La Tour Keonigdevelopment; (b) provision of basic shelter on a self-help basis to apopulation of 19,500 people throughout the country; (c) and employmentstimulated by the construction of 3,700 houses and the servicing of 740plots. In addition, it was anticipated that 15,850 people living inselected CHA estates would benefit from improved access to water supply andsanitation.
7.02 The following costs were included in the calculation of the ERRat appraisal:
(a) site development costs, including land, design andsupervision, on-site infrastructure, allocable primary infrastructure andphysical contingencies; and
(b) value of house construction loans.
The valuation of benefits was based upon estimates of rental values ofnewly created properties made under the project. Based on the above costand benefits, the ERR for the La Tour Koening and MHC housing creditprogram, comprising 70 percent of total base costs, was estimated at 12percent at appraisal.
7.03 The major non-quantifiable benefits that were to accrue to theeconomy of Mauritius included the following: (a) improvement in trafficflow through the Port Louis - Curepipe urban corridor; (b) higher standardsof refuse collection and disposal; (c) better public transport throughoutthe country; and (d) improved land use management.
B. Ex-Post Reevaluation
7.04 In calculating the ex-post ERRs essentially the same methodologyemployed at appraisal was used. The actual costs were brought to 1982 baseprices. Benefits for the La Tour Keonig and MHC components were based onimputed values of rents for plots and dwellings respectively. The imputedrental values of the project housing components were based upon informationprovided by MBC. The benefits came on stream in 1984 when the first plotsat La Tour were allocated. On the basis of these assumptions, the ex-postweighted average economic rate of return of the final La Tour and MHCcomponents, representing about 83 percent of total project costs, has beencalculated at 11.7 percent compared to appraisal estimates of 12 percent.
7.05 The La Tour Koenig project component, despite serving 22 percentfewer households than planned at appraisal, had one important demonstrationeffect regarding policies; it introduced full cost recovery. The estimatedERR of the actual scheme has been calculated at 11.1 percent.
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7.06 The housing credit program implemented by MHC was successful inthat it demonstrated the ability of a small efficiently run body to puthousing credit in the hands of over 6,000 households over a period of sevenyears. The ERR of this component was calculated at 12.0 percent.
7.07 Other benefits of the Project, more difficult to quantify.included improved solid waste collection, if not disposal, and betterregulated motor traffic, if not less congestion. CHA estates have beenimproved in their ability to meet the requirements of water and sanitationneeds of their inhabitants. Cost recovery for water supply in CHA estateshas I proved. Legislation governing the development of residential plotswas amended to facilitate the self-help extension of dwellings based onattached core housing of the type first proposed in 1979.
7.08 Additional longer-term benefits are expected to accrue to theeconomy of MHiritius through the groundwork laid for the establishment ofan institutional basis for long-term rational land management.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
A. Conclusions
8.01 The Urban Rehabilitation and Development Project was the firstIBRD-assisted project in the urban sector in Mauritius. It has clearlydemonstrated the viability of an appreach to delivering urban serviceswhich are affordable to the majority, though not the poorest, of urbanresidents with a minimum of public subsidy. The scheme at La Tour Koenighelped ease the housing shortage in Port Louis and, in fact, revealed alarge pent-up demand for serviced plots of the type offered under thescheme. It represented the country's first attempt to implement the core-housing principle and is the first housing development to provide communityfacilities as an intlegral part of the project. The housing credit programprovided the first window of opportunity for low-income borrowers todevelop residential plots and to rebuild and extend their existingdwellings.
8.02 The project was less successful in its institution-buildingobjectives largely because of the concern by the government of the day tolimit public expenditure under conditions of structural adjustment.
B. Lessons Learned
8.03 Public Participation. The successful development of shelter atthe La Tour Koenig scheme can be attributed in part to the fact that theneeds of the beneficiary population were defined in some detail through aprocess of consultation involving the evaluation of the public's reactionsto demonstration houses built by the project implementation unit. Resultsfrom the survey were fed back into the design process, giving rise tomodified plans for plot layouts and core house units. At the same time,care must be taken to ensure that information from the market is not used
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to skew the project away from achieving some of the social goals whichGovernment may have established at the outset. There is some evidence tosupport the contention that, as a result of the survey, the projectstandards were raised beyond those affordable by the original target groupearning Rs870 per month in 1980.
8.04 Administrative Arrangements. Implementation of some aspects ofthe project was frustrated by a lack of agreement on issues ofgeographical, technical and administrative jurisdiction. The fact that LaTour Keonig has not been annexed by Port Louis has been the principal causeof poor maintenance of infrastructure services. It also caused the delayeddevelopment of community and commercial facilities in the complex. Thedisagreement about the proper ministerial locus for the NPDP contributed tothe non-implementation of this component of the project. The often fuzzyboundaries between the subjects of separate consultant studies concerningthe NPDP created a level of disorientation which contributed to thedifficulties in reaching resolution on important policy issues. Theselessons point to the necessity of either resolving key "turf" issues beforethey contribute to delays or devising a process that should lead to such asolution.
8.05 Timing of Co-financing. The project benefitted from two sourcesof external finance: IBRD and SFD. The judicious selection of distinctcomponents assigned to each source of co-financing minimized the delaysuffered by the whole project created by delays in establishing the SFDcredit. Parallel financing of distinct components within a single projectis the preferred strategy, especially if additional sources of finance areidentified after the primary source becomes effective.
8.06 Housing Credit. The principles for allocating housing credit toproject beneficiaries were not clearly defined in one important respect:whereas IBRD meant to stipulate a maximum total loan amount for eachborrower as a function of affordability irrespective of the source of thehousing credit, there is evidence that MHC may have allocated loans largerthan this maximum total but only claimed reimbursement from IBRD in theamount of the "maximum" loan. The result was that some borrowers weregiven access to loans larger than they would have received (or possiblyafforded) had IBRD been the only source of funds being invested in theprogram. Future projects should ensure that criteria for allocation ofhousing loans are clearly documented and understood by the relevantimplementing agencies.
8.07 Technical Assistance. As under other projects in Mauritius,the Borrower was reluctant to use relatively expensive IBRD loan funds tofinance expatriate technical assistance. Of the total of $1.1 millionprovided in the loan only $24,000 was actually spent. GOM pursued grantsources of assistance to meet the needs for expatriate expertise with ahigh degree of success. This suggests that when preparing future projects,IBED should anticipate the aversion to committing loan funds for thiscategory of expenditure and encourage and assist the Borrower to identifyalternative, less costly sources of technical assistance.
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8.08 Least Cost Solutions. The borrower decided not to use IB3L loanfuwas to fMnance the procurement of vehicles and equipment for themuielpality of Port Louis owing to the availability of a less expensivelb of credit tied to procurement in the country offering the line ofcredit. The goods actually received performed less satisfactorily thanplanned because of defects in their manufacture, a lack of spare parts andinadequate local servicing capability. Had the borrower used marginallymore expensive financing that allowed a free choice of source of supply,the perfoimance of the goods procured could well have given better valuefor mney than that offered by the least cost solution.
8.09 merpency Proiect Lending. The preparation of the project wasaccelerated in an attempt to bring speedy assistance to households whichlost their houses to the cyclone which struck the island in 1979.Assistance was to have been in the form of new serviced residential plotsand housing loans. The design of the La Tour Koenig scheme which emergedfrom the shortened preparation period proved to have problems whichrequired a major redesign after project appraisal. In the final analysis,plots at La Tour Koenig were not allocated until late 1983, nearly fouryears after the storm, and far too late to be of assistance to the victims.Applicatioc forms used by MHC to solicit requests for housing finance didnot Include questions on whether the applicants were cyclone victims. Infuture, decisions to expedite project preparation on the grounds of annational disaster should include a realistic assessment of whether thebenefits achieved by quicker processing will really accrue to thoseIntended to be assisted.
hID= 2MAURITIUS
URBAN REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTPROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Contract Data
Contract description Contractor Bid Value Appraisal Final Start End Procureestimate Amount Date Date Method
Site clearance Omnicom 394.500 392,500 Oct 81 Apr 82 LCDOff-site water Bhunjun & Sons 923,111 923.111 Sep 81 Sep 84 LCDOn-site infrastructure Bhunjun & Sons 4,261,127 5,165.445 Mar 82 Sep 84 ICBCore house construction (336 units) Allied Builders 7,939,157 8,467,389 Jun 82 Dec 84 ICBPrimary school DWC 1,207.855 1,317,777 Jun 82 Oct 83 LCBCreche DUC 1,527,535 1,234,904 Mar 83 Dec 83 LCB s
CHA Housing Estates (by SFD)
Upgrading of services (M168) DWC 23,200,000 14,818,000 21,979,757 Jul 83 Jan 86 ICB
Civil works for signals (M3/Lot A) Prime Construct 1,820,845 2,106,491 Sep 84 Apr 86 LCBCivil works for signals (M3/Lot B) Bhunjun & Sons 575,483 562.152 Oct 85 May 86 LCBOther civil works (M4) Bhunjun & Sons 1.026,469 787.992 Nov 86 Feb 87 LCBAdditional traffic signals Silec FF975,261 FF975,261 Jul 86 May 87 Reg
Ireland Blyth 80,500 80,500Civils for additional signals (M3A) Bhunjun & Sons 1,653,795 1,413,554 Nov 86 Jan 87 LCDWeighbridgelmark4ng equip MECOM 531,171 501,171 Oct 84 Apr 85 LCBTraffic conesabollards Blanche Birger 38,983 38,983 Oct 84 May 85 LCBTowing unit Ireland Blyth URL39,667 UKL39,667 Aug 85 May 86 LCD
URBA REHMUTATION A DEVEUPENTPRJCruJEt COUPLxTIUx RIURT
Casl lnce With KeY tovenant
Section Covenant w Actual Rmarko
S 3.01 amN to maintain project In coepilon(b) Coordinator in EP
3 3.01 GeVtoentrInto iay 01 AlI Ires_ment(c) subsidlary loan agrew- *i b Vy 1ase witth UKed, CEa, CyAand PL
s 8.02 CO1 to use qualified In copi tanceconsultanat. or tfeas- eXCep for landbility studies, trans- valuation whichport studies, deign was not carriedof rehabilit tion outworks lad voluOtion,training
S 8.08 Brlng LaTour land under Not achloved buoproper jurisdiction being incoporoted
in future assess-tion xercise
S 8.07 Carry out on long-torm Dec.84 Done with Frenchmanagement of solid technicalwast assistance
88 .08 G0" to require UN to In coewplano;estblislo LaTour unit disbanded InImplementation unit In 1964 at the en
Of project co_go-not
S 4.08 COV to provide Not achiovedincentive for tsprove-m at/maintenane ofrental houing
S 4.04 CON to carry out study Study dons byof urban traffic and NTA but noparking logislation and legislativeIntroduce necessary changesamendenta
S 4.06 Wu0 to ensure occupants In complianceof CHA estates pay with water butaccording to existing not with s_erewater andsrtariffs
S 4.06 GOV to do study on Oct. 82 Done but noswerge system costs actlon takesand exchaonge vie onPropose tariff changs
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ANNEX 6MAURITIUS
URBAN REHABILITATION & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTPROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Affordability of La Tour Keonig Contractor Built Core Housing;Estimate and Actual (1980 prices in Rupees)
Core + 1 room Core + 2 rooms(Type 3) (Type 6)
-----------------------------------
Estimate Actual3/ Estimate Actual3/
Price of "BASIC' plot 4,000 9,565 4,000 9,565Price of core house 16,800 18,972 24,800 30,830
-------------------------------------
Total plot and construction 20,800 28,538 28,800 40,395
Less 102 deposit 1/ 2,080 1,000 2,880 1,000Balance to Loan 18,720 27,538 25,920 39,395
1/ MHC reduced deposit to flat Rs1,00O per borrower owing to lack ofavailable savings among low-income members.
2/ Appraisal estimates at 12 percent over 25 years, actual over 15 years.3/ Price of land and core deflated by 26.5 percent to 1980 prices.4/ Appraisal estimates based on 25Z income to housing exependiture,
actual on 332.Si 1980 income data.6/ Based on 3? pa of value of land and buildings.
ANNEX 7MAURITIUS
URBAN REHABILITATION & DEVELOPMENT PROJECTPROJECT COMPLETION REPORTCost recovery (Rs 000)
Project ComponentActual Actual costs recovered byAbsorbed by ----------------------
Apprsl Actual Central Plot Loan Rates &Cost 1/ Cost Government Charges Payments tariffs
and MHC to MHC to MHC to PLM/CW
A. LaTour Koenig1. Land 2,450 2,140 500 1,6402. On-site infrastructure 8,386 5,165 1,093 3,039 1,0333. Off-site infrastructure 3,929 923 923 04. Community facilities 4,205 2,651 2,651
B. Housing credit 111,975 182,299 182,299
C. Upgrading CHA Estates1. Stormwater drainage 6,0412. Water & sewerage 14,096 21,979 19,781 2,198
D. Transport & Traffic 12,918 11,379 11,379
E. Solid waste 5,672 1,143 1,143
F. Engineering & Supervision 5,467 2,876 2,588 288
G. Technical Assistance 9,975 499 499
TOTAL 185,114 231,054 40,558 4,967 182,299 3,231
Actual distribution of burden 17.55Z 2.15Z 78.902 1.402
Appraisal distribution of burden 27.462 0.482 60.48Z 0.072
Notes on Assumptions Used to Calculate Rate of Return
1. La Tour Koenig Land Servicing
The analysis includes the full cost of the land purchased by MHC from DBM.
Infrastructure costs included the costs for the removal of bolders on thesite, installation of water supply and sewer systems, roads and stormdrains, telephone conduits, electrical reticulation and street lighting,and engineering and legal fees.
Overhead costs were assumed to be equal to R91,305,OOO as reported by MHLE,spread equally over 4 years.
Maintenance costs were assumed to be 2 percent of total infrastructurecosts.
The benefits stream has been determined on the basis of: 573 plots with anaverage imputed rental value of Rs300 per month. The plots came on streamat the following rate: 1983 - 345; 1984 - 228.
All costs and benefits are expressed in 1982 prices.
2. MHC Housing Credit Program
Costs were based on the value ofloans appoved each year increased byRsl,OOO per borrower to include beneficiaries deposits. The assumption wasmade that all loans were fullly disbursed within the calendar year duringwhich they were approved.
MHC overheads were assumed to be 1 percent of the value of loans approved.
Average rental values were assumed to be Rs550 per month in 1982 prices.
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iII
- 40 - ATTACHMENT
COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER
ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE ADDRESSED TO THIE DIRECTOR
Ctntrat A)ouoing AutboritpM A U R I T I U S
VII.. No. nose-" 4I.m s 464-56336
YM. ADORS6S - MOUSING
Cuft nar. CHAL 124 Vol.2YOU4R ASP. I44ILL
26th April, 1990
Mr. Alexander Nowicki,Division Chief,Operations Evaluation Department,International Bank for Reconstructionand Development,Iternational Development Association,1818 H Street, N.W.,Washington, D.C. 20433,U.S.A.
Dear Mr. Norwicki,
Ae: MAURITIMU - Urban Rehabilitation and Develop_ent Project
(Loan 1926-MAS)
PlroJect CouDpletion Report
Thank you for your letter of the 16th March on the abovesubject.
I have the honour to submit the following coments:-
(a) The execution of works in the four concerned CRA HousingEstates (vis. La Cure, Roche Bois, Vallijee and Borstal)and subsequently improvement of sewerage works to Valldedes Pretres CHL Housing Estate was done under contractby the Development Works Corporation under the supervisionof Ministry of Works, and CRA was not directly involvedtherein.
(b) Following the implementation of the upgrading of infra-structure in the above Housing Estates, no major complaintshave been received in respect of services on those HousingBstates. However, a few isolated cases of sewerageproblems have been reported in respect of Roche Bois andLa Cure Housing Rstates.
In case you need any further information, please do nothesitate to contact me.
